Weber's Sociology and the Exact Sciences:
The Common Characteristics of
Both Epistemologies*
Katsumi YASUMURA Rikkyo University
I
Whenever every science is forced to change its own paradigm due to empirical facts, the science seems to be confronted with philosophical problems. At such a time, as Einstein stressed, such problems should be tackled by scientists of the individual sciences themselves. As noted by Einstein:
At a time like the present, when experience forces us to seek a newer and
more solid foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to the philoso
pher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; for, he himself knows best, and feels more surely where the shoe pinches (Einstein,
1970; 59).
This circumstance in science is arguably the same in sociology as well, as Weber indicated when he accepted that:
Only by laying bare and solving substantive problems can sciences be
established and their methods developed. On the other hand, purely
epistemological and methodological reflections have never played the
crucial role in such developments. Such discussions can become important
for the enterprise of science only when, as a result of considerable shifts of
the 'viewpoint' from which a datum becomes the object of analysis, the idea
emerges that the new 'viewpoint' also requires a revision of the logical
forms in which the 'enterprise' has heretofore operated, and when, accord
ingly, uncertainly about the 'nature' of one's own work arises (Weber, 1949:
116).
The advice here for sociologists is that they too should confront the philosophical considerations within their own 'science'. "•kMethodological•l discussions rooted within their own subject matter", Weber argued, "may be more useful for the
*I wish to express my gratitude for the advise and. assistance offered me by Profs. Naoharu Shimoda, Scott T. Davis, and the late Prof. Hiroshi Ushikubo.
Annals of the Japan Associationfor Philosophyof Science,March 1988
-131- 22 Katsumi YASUMURA Vol. 7 self-clarification of special disciplines in spite of, and in a sense even because of, their methodologically imperfect formulation" (Weber, 1949: 114).
In this paper an investigation of the philosophical problems of theory construc tion in contemporary sociology will be attempted by emulating the perspectives of
Einstein and Weber respectively. Recently, such schools of antipositivism as phenomenology, ethnomethodology and critical theory, have prevailed in theoretical sociology. The outcome has not only been the decline of research based on the principles of positivism, but a deadlock in the production of sociological theory. With this condition as a background the philosophical problem with which sociolo gists should deal at present could thereby be considered to be the task of inquiring into the logical foundation of scientific recognition in sociology.
The primary object of this paper lies in a critical examination of Weber's sociological epistemology, and in a comparison of it with the original epistemology of the exact natural sciences. It has previously been contended that Weber's sociological epistemology is different to that of the natural sciences.1. This prevail ing interpretation of Weber's sociological epistemology shall be questioned here.
To this ends the argument will be carried forward in three steps. Firstly, while examining Weber's understanding of the methodology of the natural sciences and presenting its essential characteristics, a comparison of the methodologies of Weber and the natural sciences will be undertaken. While examining this, we shall contend that the foundation of scientific recognition is common to both sociology and the natural sciences and, moreover, that this point brings into relief the philosophical problems to which sociologists must give consideration when develop ing theory in contemporary sociology. When considering the epistemology of the natural sciences, Cassirer's interpretation, because of its insight in relating the thought on physics from Galilei through to Newton and Einstein, shall be the one drawn upon here.2
For an analysis of Weber's thought on sociological epistemology the following seven are, of all his works, perhaps the most important3.: 1. Roscher and Knies:
The Logical Problems of Historical Economics (Weber, 1975 •k1903, 1904, 1906•l); 2. "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" (Weber , 1949 •k1904•l); 3. "Criti cal Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" (Weber, 1949 •k1906•l); 4. Critique of Stammler (Weber, 1977 •k1907•l); 5. "Some Categories of Interpretative Sociol ogy" (Weber, 1981 •k1913•l); 6. "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics" (Weber, 1949 •k1913•l); 7. "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociol ogy" (Weber, 1947 •k1922•l).
Of these writings, numbers 5, on "Interpretative Sociology" and 7, on "Funda mental Concepts" can, although in some parts deal with epistemological and methodological subjects, be considered not so much epistemological as theoretical works, the purposes of which are to define concepts for theory construction.
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However number 2, the paper on "Objectivity" is perhaps the most important of his epistemological works, for it is here that his consideration of sociological recognition is shown most clearly. According to the ruthless criticism of Tenbruck to the effect that: "a series of methodological works after the paper on 'Objectivity' are charac teristics of tendencies such as deteriorating quality, reducing interests, and constrict ing in essence" (Tenbruck 1959: 579), this work on "Objectivity" shall be examined here because of the value of its formulations on 'ideal types'. It is not the intention here to develop a close theoretical exposition of Weber's epistemology, although such a task is of course an important one, instead Weber's ideas shall be examined with the view to employing them as a tool for the further formulation of sociological theory. Weber's epistemology here is not an 'object' of study as much as a 'means' to research the foundation of a scientific sociology. Such an attitude is nothing other than the same as that underlying Weber's own epis temological study.
II Weber constructed his sociological epistemology in conformity with the assump tion that the human faculty of recognition has a variety of limitations to the infinite of a given real world.4. This assumption is explicitly presented in Weber's state ment that: All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is 'impor tant' in the sense of being 'worthy of being known' (Weber, 1949: 72). Here Weber suggested that human 'thought' conclusively intervenes in scientific recognition. "What sciences alone can provide are concepts and judgements which are neither empirical reality nor production of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering by thought in a valid manner." (Weber, 1949: 111)5. It is as a matter of course that in every kind of recognition the concepts are constructed by means of taking thought as the 'frame of reference' of recognition. From this premise Weber provided the question of 'what' as the frame of scientific recognition and 'how' it should be established. As for the frame of scientific recognition, Weber made a rigid distinction between social and natural sciences according to their logical form, indicated the limitation of the application of the natural scientific recognition to sociology, and attempt to go on to create the proper epistemology. Weber himself did not directly discuss the epistemology of exact natural science in detail. He only indirectly provided it for the purposes of making a comparison with the epistemology of sociology. However, it seems profitable to investigate Weber's argument on the -133- 24 Katsumi YASUMURA Vol. 7 epistemology of the exact sciences as he deals with its limitations when begining to expound his consideration of sociological recognition.6.
The frame of exact scientific recognition is, according to Weber, the 'law'
(Gesetz). He regarded the lawfulness as the 'regularity' (RegelmaƒÀigkeit) which is abstracted from repeatedly observed facts. Moreover, he considered the ultimate purporse of the study of natural science as the unification of the law formation. It was thus that he called this science the 'nomothetic discipline' (nomotetische
Wissenschaft) after the argument of W. Windelband and H. Rickert. The logical operation of such a discipline in the process of recognition was explained by Weber as follows:
•c (The) logic of (natural scientific) investigation requires the progressive elimination of individual entities and the deduction of establised 'law'-
which only become special cases - from other laws still more general. In
consequence, the general concepts become increasingly empty of content
and increasingly alienated from empirically intelligible reality. The logi
cal ideal of such a science would be a system of formulate of absolutely
general validity (Weber, 1975: 64). Here, as a consequence of Weber's idea on the recognitional form of exact natural science, the characteristics of constructive concepts forming the frame which he refered to will be also brought into relief. Weber's logical theory of the concept on exact sciences is considered to be identical with the traditional logic of Aristotele's.
Weber reckoned the concept employed in exact sciences as a 'generic concept'
(Gattungsbegriff), i.e., the 'concept of substance' (Substantzbegriff), the formation of which was explained on the ground of Aristotelian logic. The fundamental feature of this concept formation is that such concepts are constituted by means of some common properties selected from a given reality.
Owing to such a feature of the formation of 'concept of substance', a logical problem arises in a process of recognition. "The definitive logical instrument of
(exact natural sciences) is the use of concepts of an increasingly universal extension. For just this reason, these concepts become increasingly empty in content" (Weber,
1975: 56). Thus, in proportion to the extent to which such a concept enlarges (that is, in accordance to the ascension of the concept from the particular to the general), the quantity of intension decreases, although at the same time the number of objects which the concept represents increases. "The more comprehensive the validity, - or scope-of •ka generic concept (Gattungsbegriff)•l, the more it leads us away from the richness of reality since in order to include the common elements of the largest possible number of phenomena, it must necessarily be as abstract as possible and hence devoid of content" (Weber, 1949: 80). If the laws and theories of exact natural sciences are to be constructed by means of such concepts: "•ktheir•l domain is that set of problems in which the essential features of phenomena-the properties
-134- No. 3 Weber's Sociology and the Exact Sciences: 25
of phenomena which are worth knowing-are identical with their generic features."
(Weber, 1975: 57) "A problem, therefore, lies within this domain only if our theoretical interest in the empirically given individual case is satisfied as soon as this
case can be classified as falling under •ka generic concept (Gattungsbegriff)•l" (Weber,
1975: 57). Thus, because of the points mentioned above, Weber, who intended to
grapple with the objective recognition of the 'individual events', indicated the limitation on the application of the epistemology of exact sciences to sociological
recognition.
E. Cassirer also criticized the traditional epistemology of exact natural sciences
on the problems caused by the formation of 'concept of substance' in the same
manner as Weber. Cassirer said, "What we demand and expect of a scientific
concept, first of all, is this: that, in the place of original indefiniteness and ambigu
ity of ideas, it shall institute a sharp and unambiguous determination; while in
•k traditional epistemology•l, on the contrary, the sharp lines of distinction seem the
more effaced, the further we pursue the logical process." (Cassirer, 1953: 6) If one
is to look back along the theoretical history of physics, the fact that as the typical
exact science it has never had such a problem concerning the formation of 'concept
of substance' becomes obvious. The concept formation of exact natural sciences
cannot be explained on the basis of Aristotelian logic. The theoretical development
of exact natural sciences cannot be understood without the mode of thought of the
concept formation founded by a new epistemology.
This question was elucidated thoroughly by Cassirer in his Substantzbegriff und
Funktionsbegriff in 1910. Cassirer's criticism against the traditional epistemology is
for the most part identical with Weber's argument, especially where he indicated the
limitation of exact scientific recognition and avoided it in his creation of a proper
sociological recognition.
III
Cassirer indicated that the original construction of exact sciences had been
converted from the 'concept of substance' to 'that of function' since Galilei's
dynamics. 'The concept of function' (Funktionsbegriff) brings about the mode of
relational concepts of mathematics in natural sciences, and consequently affords
them 'scientific' recognition. As for mathematical concepts as the typical 'concept
of function' and empirical concepts as 'that of substance', Cassirer showed the nature
of both concepts and the mode of thought in their formation as follows:
Mathematical concepts, which arise through genetic definition, through the
intellectual establishment of a constructive connection, are different from
empirical concepts, which aim merely to be copies of certain factual
characteristics of the given reality of things. While in the latter case, the
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multiplicity of things is given in and for itself and is only drawn together for the sake of an abbreviated verbal or intellectual expression, in the former case we first have to create the multiplicity which is the object of consideration, by producing from a simple act of construction (Swung), by progressive synthesis, a systematic connection of thought constructions (Denkenbilden). There appears here in opposition to bare 'abstraction', an act of thought itself, a free production of certain relational systems (Cassir er. 1953: 121. Conceptual elements in the 'concept of substance' are extracted from the content of sensuous perception, and consequently, in this concept the conceptual elements are necessarily linked with the sensory elements. Thus, the 'concept of substance' is never far away from an empirical reality, nor separable from a certain feature of reality. However, there is no rule for the extraction of sensory elements. The working of thought behind the formation of 'concept of substance' is given at will; therefore the sensory elements extracted in the 'formation process' cannot always be certified. Contrary to the 'concept of substance', the formation of 'concept of function' is characteristic of the 'genetic definition' (genetische Definition) by the positive working of thought. Such formation is first of all that conceptual elements of a premise, such as the axiom of mathematics is posited beforehand and then, that on the basis of these elements, a relation is produced through the logically systematic linkage of elements. Because of the characteristic of such formation, it is evident that the 'concept of function' is never directly linked with experience in the formation process. Even if the initial step of the premise is involved in the psychological moment to empirical fact, the premise itself is dissolved in the necessary form constructed by unambiguous thought. It occurs to us that if the formation of 'concept of function' is grounded on the ' necessary thought' (notwendiges Denken), then the mathematical concept is the most typical instance. However, Cassirer also considered that the 'concept of function' is applied in empirical and the exact natural sciences, and that moreover their scientific recognition is impossible until this concept is introduced into them. If "the exact scientific concepts only continue an intellectual process already effective in pure mathematical knowledge" (Cassirer, 1953: 223), a philosophical problem of 'existence' seems to arise. This problem is the conflict between the ' necessity' of mathematics and the 'contingency' of experience and has been a grave philosophical difficulty since Plato's time. However, this philosophical difficulty, according to Cassirer's argument, had been overcome by Galilei's creation of dynamics (Cf. Cassirer, 1942). In Galilei's dynamics, the focus of the recognition on nature lies not in that the structure and shape of a given reality is, as it is, described empirically, but that dynamism of the reality is explained on its principle with mathematical form in the respect of the concept 'motion'. On the theoretical -136- No.3 Weber'sSociology and the ExactSciences: 27
development of physics from Galileo's dynamics to modern physics, Cassirer ex plained, physical theories have been inseparably related to mathematics: The theories of physics gain their definiteness from the mathematical form in which they are expressed. The function of numbering and measuring is indispensable even in order to produce the raw material of 'facts', that are to be reproduced and unified in theory. To abstract from this function means to destroy the certainty and clarity of the facts themselves... It has become increasingly clear that all content belonging to the mathemati cal concept rests on a pure construction. The given of intuition forms merely the psychological starting-point; it is first known mathematically when it is subjected to a transformation, by which it is changed into another type of manifold, which we can produce and master according to rational laws (Cassirer, 1953: 115-116). The transition of the focus in the recognition of nature by Galilei implied the great conversion of thought behind recognition. Instead of 'comparison' and ' differentiation' of the fundamental operation in thought, Galilei's dynamics was created on the basis of 'free invention' (Einstein, 1970: 96). For example, the concept 'motion', which Galilei constructed by his free invention, "is a predicate that is never immediately applicable to the things of the surrounding sense-world, but holds solely of that other class of objects, which the mathematician substitutes for them in his free construction" (Cassirer, 1953: 121). "Motion is not a fact of sensation, but of thought; not of perception but of conception" (Cassirer, 1953: 121). As understood from his 'law of falling bodies', Galilei bestowed his law with ' universal validity' by mathematical representation and, moreover, with 'objective validity' by the physical experiments which compose the mathematical constructs in a real world. Cassirer demonstrated in his Zur Einsteins'chen Relativitatstheorie 1921 that the epistemological foundation which is shown in Galilei's dynamics has been invariable from Galilei's to Newton's mechanics and on through Einstein's theory of relativity. Thus, the logical characteristics of the 'concept of function' as argued by Cassirer will make clear the meaning and feature of the 'law' and 'theory' in exact sciences. The laws of exact sciences play the role of the 'frame of reference' of recognition. In ordinary recognition concept formation is done almost implicitly in language, while in scientific recognition it is done manifestly in laws or theories. "What is unconsciously done in language is consciously intended and methodically performed in the scientific process." (Cassirer, 1944: 210) As mentioned in part II, Weber similarly emphasized this point. He contended that: "in (the procedure spoken in language of life itself) the attainment of a level of explicit awareness of the viewpoint from which the events in question get their significance remains highly accidental" (Weber, 1949: 107). "The great attempts at theory-construction
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in our •kcultural•l science were always useful for revealing the limits of the
significance of those points of view which provided their foundation" (Weber, 1949:
105-106).
Truly Weber emphasized that it is indispensable to manifest one's viewpoint in
scientific recognition. But what he regarded in the law of natural sciences as
' regularity' is a misapprehension caused by considering constructs of law as the
' concept of substance'. Proper law on the ground of the formation of 'concept of
function' is the principle of dynamism by scientists' intuition to a real world. This
principle is formulated as the frame of reference of recognition, and then by the frame, the causality of events can be recognized. Laws of exact natural sciences are
neither 'empirical generalization' nor 'empirical regularity' extracted from a sen
suously given manifold, although Weber regarded them as so. It is at this point in
contemporary sociology, where, particularly in the case of sociologists employing
statistical methods, there frequently seems to have occurred some misunderstanding
about the conception of law and theory.' The hypotheses which they provide as
laws or theories are not, in many cases, considered as a dynamism of phenomena, but
rather as simple empirical generalizations or empirical regularities.
Laws are not directly related to phenomenon themselves, this is another point
which is also frequently misunderstood. The laws of exact natural sciences cannot
indicate anything to us about nature itself. As a result, it is sure that scientific laws
are, as Weber and Rickert indicated, 'abstraction' isolated from the real world. The
sense of 'abstraction' on the proper law, however, is the form grasped in dynamism
of the reality. The three laws of Newton's mechanics, although none of them
correspond to phenomenon, but if they are applied as the frame of reference in
recognition, individual phenomenon, for example, the falling of bodies, the revolu
tion of planets, the trajectory of objects in flight and so on, can be recognized and
predicted scientifically. The sense of the abstraction on the law of exact sciences are completely different from that of simple regulality constituted by the concept of
substance; therefore the abstraction of proper law is beyond that which Weber and
Rickert showed as the limitation of the exact sciences.
Laws or theories of exact natural sciences provide us with the foundation of
causal recognition of natural phenomena. They are created by scientists' 'free
invention' on the principles of the dynamism of nature. Such principles are re
presented through the form of mathematics. At this point, the laws of the exact sciences are isolated from any immediate sensuous perception of nature. Scientists
thereby create something that cannot be directly observed from nature. "Percep
tion indeed provides us the result, but it prevents us from reaching the principle by
itself. The principle must be settled through the pure appendage of thought"
(Cassirer, 1969: 34). "A theory can be tested by experience, but there is no way from experience to the setting up of a theory" (Einstein, 1949: 89). In theory
-138- No. 3 Weber's Sociology and the Exact Sciences: 29
construction in the exact natural sciences the creative thought of a scientist confront
ed with the object comes to intervene conclusively. Cassirer designated such
thought as 'object-thought' (gegenstandliches Denken) after Goethe (Cf. Cassirer,
1969: 46). Galilei was the first man to embody 'object-thought' in the exact
sciences. Moreover, he verified such thought empirically with his own experiments.
Thus, it seems obvious that Weber's epistemology of the exact natural sciences
was smilar to the traditional theory of knowledge prevailing in his time. At that
time the exact sciences in question, however, had made a rapid progress independent
ly, one far removed from the traditional (and Weber's) epistemology. Such exact
natural sciences, as shown above, seem to have been founded by Cassirer's philoso
phy of science beyond Kant's. On the other hand, Weber produced his own sociology by overcoming the limitations of the traditional epistemology of the exact
natural sciences. In part IV, Weber's sociology and Cassirer's philosophy of science
will be compared and investigated.
IV
Weber indicated that there was an intervention of thought in the recognition
process of sociology as well as of the exact sciences. Thereupon, he posited the ' value idea' (Wertidee) as the frame of reference of sociological recognition. "With
out the investigator's •kvalue ideas•l," Weber argued, "there would be no principle of
selection of subject-matter and no meaningful knowledge of the concrete reality"
(Weber, 1949: 82). Moreover, he also emphasized that this value idea should be designed systematically by an investigator as well as by the law of exact sciences,
as:
The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon
the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjec
tive in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presuppotions of
our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those
truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us (Weber, 1949:
110).
With the intention of converting such a value idea into a concrete construct,
Weber presented the 'ideal type' (Idealtypus). The ideal type was defined by
Weber as follows8.:
•k The ideal type•l is a conceptual construct (Gedankenbild) which is neither
historical reality nor even the 'true' reality. It is even less fitted to serve
as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one
instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with
which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explica
tion of certain of its significant components (Weber, 1949: 93)
-139- 30 Katsumi YASUMURA Vol. 7
Judging from this definition, the ideal type is considered to have the characteristic
of the 'object-thought' as well as the law of exact sciences, although Weber overloo
ked to mention the fact that natural laws do so too. Weber rather presented the
ideal type as the proper concept-device in sociological recognition, because he
mistook the law of exact sciences for the 'empirical regularity' pursued on a more
universal level.
Moreover, the 'genetic concept' (genetischer Begriff), Weber emphasized, should
be employed as the constructive concept of ideal types. "Precise genetic concepts
are necessarily ideal types" (Weber, 1949: 106). "Such concepts of •kideal types•l",
Weber said, "are constructs in terms of which we formulate relationships by the
application of the category of objective possibility" (Weber, 1949: 93). In Weber's
sociological epistemology, however, he did not refer precisely to which rule it is by
which we can give such a formation of ideal types such a logical necessity. As far
as this point was concerned, Weber was dependent upon 'imaginative powers' or
'judgements' of 'disciplined investigators' or 'educated men of culture' (Cf. Weber, 1949: 81). He did not find that the 'genetic concept' had been established as the
' mathematical concept' in the very form that he idealized.
Weber conceptualized the result of sociological investigation as follows: "a
systematically correct scientific proof in the social sciences, if it is to achieve its
purpose, must be acknowledged as correct even by Chinese..." (Weber, 1949: 58). Is it possible, however, to attain such a result if the value idea, which itself is a
sociocultural product, is posited as the basis of recognition? In Weber's methodol
ogy, it remains obscure as to how value ideas, even if manifested, can be constituted
concretely as ideal types. In the case of exact natural sciences the basis of recogni
tion is represented mathematically as law or theory, and consequently, in such
recognition the universal validity can be guaranteed. As a matter of course Weber
abandoned the universal validity of sociological recognition from the first (Cf.
Weber, 1949: 72). The reason for such abandonment, according to Weber, was that
analyses of social phenomena always rest on 'special and one-sided viewpoints'
(spezielle and einseitige Gesichtspunkte). It is considered, however, that the recog nition of natural phenomena as well as of social ones are necessarily dependant on
special and one-sided viewpoints, if Weber's premise of his epistemology, i.e., that
the limitation that men cannot recognize the whole reality, is taken into account.
Even if we consider that Weber combined value ideas with the 'historical individ
uals' from the beginning, it seems more appropriate to regard value ideas as adhered
to the language as the 'frame of reference' of recognition in ordinary life. Besides,
Weber regarded the proper characteristic of sociological recognition as the value
laden, but this characteristic ought to be the same in natural scientific recognition.
It appears sure that the recognition of nature in history before natural sciences was
influenced by the value ideas within each culture range respectively. 'Scientific'
-140- No.3 Weber'sSociology and the ExactSciences: 31
recognition of natural phenomena has become possible at length since the modern exact natural science appeared, and accordingly, the basis of recognition instead of the value idea, was established. ' Scientific' recognition in sociology, Weber considered, is made possible in terms of the unambiguously causal explanation of social phenomena. Then, "(where) the individuality of a phenomenon is considered," Weber argued that: the question of causality is not a question of laws but of concrete causal relationships; it is not a question of the subsumption of the event under some general rubic as a representative case but of its imputation as a consequence of some constellation. (The question of causality) is in brief a question of imputation" (Weber, 1949: 78-79). However, such a causal relation of individual events cannot be settled in points of the logical frame and the meaning of its relationship, until the frame of reference of recognition is set up. Namely, we provide the frame, thereby recognizing 'why' or 'how' a cause leads to an effect. Moreover, in 'scientfic' recognition such a frame should have the characteristics of universal (necessary) and objective (empirical) validity. The frame of reference in exact sciences, as repeatedly mentioned above, lie in laws or theories. It is possible to, by means of a law, to 'recognize', 'explain', or ' predict' a variety of individual events which are percieved differently through sensuous perception. The function of such a law in causal explanation is character ized by the point that dynamism of a phenomenon is formulated, and then such a dynamism clarifies how the causal relationship is established. Weber certainly posited the ideal type as the frame of reference of explanation or recognition, and on that occasion also remarked upon the requirement of a 'law'. He said: "if the causal knowledge of the historians consists of the imputation of concrete effects to concrete causes, a valid imputation of any individual effect without the application of 'nomological knowledge'-i.e., the knowledge of recurrent causal sequences- would in general be impossible" (Weber, 1949: 79). But, "(wherever) the causal explanation of a 'caltural phenomenon'-an 'historical individual' is under consid eration, the knowledge of causal laws is not the end of the investigation but only a means" (Weber, 1949: 79). Weber argued that laws are only a means of recognition in sociology. This argument, however, seems to be doubtful if the appropriate feature of exact scientific laws are remembered. It is true that laws are the end of exact science in the sense that every natural phenomenon will gradually be unified into a theory. But laws or theories are the means as well, whenever they are applied to 'recognition', 'expla nation', and 'prediction' of an individual event. It appears that in respect of the function of laws Weber confounded the end of the recognition and explanation process with the end as the ultimate goal of sciences. This confusion results from -141- 32 KatsumiYASUMURA Vol.7
Weber's misunderstanding about laws of exact science. The law of exact science is not a regularity like 'the Procrustean bed' in which individual events are lumped together while proper features of the individual events are abondoned (Cf. Weber, 1949: 94). The real law or theory is formulated in the manner that dynamism is constructed by the mathematical relation with some variables. Each situation of individual events, therefore, is each solution of equations gained by variables of an individual event. Just as ideal types which Weber regarded as the proper con structs of sociology have a certain characteristic, so laws of the exact science founded on the way of occurrence of an individual event are, in principle, in conformity with each situation of an individual phenomenon. Weber, in fact, seems to have attempted to search for dynamism positively.9. The reason why Weber indicated that laws are indispensable for causal explanation, must be that he could not ignore the problem of dynamism, i.e., how causal relation is established. Although he set up the ideal type as the frame of reference of recognition, he did not design it for representing dynamism. Besides, he avoided explaining the relationship between the law and the ideal type (Cf. Weber, 1949: 103-104). For the elucidation of causality Weber thus introduced the 'understand ing' (Verstehen) as the original form of sociological explanation.10. This method of ' understanding' has frequently been discussed among sociologists throughout the history of sociology. 'Understanding', however, is inseparable from the socio cultural limitation because it is necessarily done in language. What is recognized by the method of 'understanding' is at the most accepted intersubjectively only within a social-cultural sphere. As far as the scientific recognition of dynamism is concerned, Weber's epistemology remains noncomittal. Weber adhered to 'histori cal individual', and then attempted to solve the 'imputation' of it in a causal relationship. As a result, the ideal type of the cause and of the effect were emphas ized and the elucidation of the relation between the two elements became mostly dependent upon Weber's bare insight. It seems that Weber did not examine the philosophical problems of causality thoroughly. The causality of scientific recogni tion should be examined not by a simple interpretation, but by logically processed law or theory.
V
Weber's sociological and exact scientific epistemology are mostly identical in their fundamental characteristics. Both Weber and Cassirer made a similar criti cism against the traditional epistemology of natural sciences. However, Weber overlooked that the proper exact scientific epistemology is different from the tradi tional. The sociological epistemology which Weber initiated, nevertheless, approa ched the epistemology of the exact science which Cassirer elucidated. Both epis -142- No.3 Weber'sSociology and the ExactSciences: 33 temologies have common features in that the investigator's 'free invention' inter venes in scientific recognition, and this invention systematically constitutes the ' frame of reference' of scientific recognition. This frame of reference is characteris tic of 'object-thought', it is constructed as the ideal type in Weber's sociology, while as law or theory in the exact sciences. Because of several imperfections, Weber's sociological epistemology could not result in real scientific recognition. His epistemology, however, does give a lot of suggestions for the philosophical foundation of theory construction in contemporary sociology. Could it be considered that the common features on the scientific basis, common to both scholars in their various fields, suggests the philosophical founda tion leading on to scientific recognition? Judging from the comparison and the examination of their epistemology, it can be proposed that the following philosophi cal problems should be considered thoroughly by every sociologist developing theories.11. 1. Laws and theories are not the simple 'description' of phenomenal traits, but the formulation of the 'dynamism' of phenomenal occurence. Only through a law or theory, can a phenomenon be recognized or explained scientifically. 2. Laws and theories are constructed by investigator's 'free invention' on the dynamism, not by the mere accumulation of observed facts. Moreover, such dynamism should be represented by mathematics. By this mathematical represen tation, the logical necessity of laws and theories can be guaranteed. Mathematics applied to sociological laws or theories may be selected or created according to the dynamism of the objects. (Statistics cannot represent the dynamism; therefore statistics is not a mathematics representing laws and theories, but one only arranging data.) In sociology, the problems of 'measurement' must be discussed epis temologically as well as methodologically. 3. Laws can be verfied by experiments, and theories by observations of the results (predictions) derived from theories. The methodological problems of socio logical 'experiments' and 'simulations' by computers should be newly considered in sociology. It is considered that the problems of such scientific foundation are identical between social and natural sciences, regardless of the attributes of their respective object. The proper problems in sociology, which Weber provided, should be solved on this scientific foundation. The difficulties of the scientific foundation in sociol ogy must be examined on the basis of Kant's maxim, i.e., not "whether it can be done or not", but "how it can be done". A theory explaining all social phenomena cannot be created in a single day. The history of the most advanced theory, physics, has related such a fact. In sociology as well, the process of theory construction will develop gradually, from laws of each individual event, to theories holding the wider range of objects.
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Dynamism created in construction of a theory would include much of the dynamism hitherto indicated by laws. Thus, the fact that a new theory is created enables us to recognize and explain what we could not do through the hitherto existant laws or theories. At the starting-point of sociological theory building, it appears that we must yet have a Galilei of sociology.
Notes
1. There are a number of works considering Weber's methodology from the perspective of sociological epistemology. See especially Schelting, 1922. 2. Cassirer's scientific philosophy seems to be imperfect on indeterminism after 'quantum
theory'. This paper, however, will develop the argument from the standing-point of constructing a deterministic theory of sociology, depending on Cassirer's philosophy. For the relations of Cassirer's phiosophy and sociology, see Yasumura, 1987. On the other hand, Weber also referred to the relation of sociology to 'the theory of evolution', including 'historical materialism' of Marx (this problem, however, will not be discussed in this paper). For Weber's criticism about historical materialism, see Weber,
1977 (1907). 3. For a selection of Weber's writings on sociological epistemology, see Tenbruck, 1959: 578-583; Runciman 1972, Chap. l.; & Huff, 1984: 17-19. 4. Another important assumption of Weber's epistemology is 'value-freedom' (Wertfrei heit). Regarding this point, see Weber, 1949 •k1913•l. 5. Translated from the German by the author.
6. Weber's argument on epistemology of the natural science, as he represented it himself, was dependent on Rickert's philosophy. See Rickert, 1913. 7. For the distinction between 'law' and 'regularity', see Lewin, 1936, pp. 5-13; Merton, 1957, pp. 149-153. 8. It has been suggested that Weber's 'ideal types' had several versions in his empirical investigations. Cf. Hekman, 1983. This paper, however, will not deal with this point.
9. On the dynamism of social phenomena, for example, Weber argued that the concept of ' sect' should be grasped genetically "with reference to certain important cultural significances which 'sectarian spirit' has had for modern culture...' (Weber, 1949: 93-
94). Cf. Weber, 1984. 10. For Weber's argument on 'understanding' (Verstehen), See Weber, 1975 (1906); 1981 •k 1913•l. On the discussion of Weber's 'understanding', see Abel, 1948. Abel critically considered the concept of 'Verstehen' in terms of the logical form of explanation. For the counterargument against Abel, see DiQuattro, 1972; Munch, 1975; & Burger, 1977.
11. On this point in detail, see Yasumura, 1983.
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