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Weber's Sociology and the Exact Sciences Weber's Sociology and the Exact Sciences: The Common Characteristics of Both Epistemologies* Katsumi YASUMURA Rikkyo University I Whenever every science is forced to change its own paradigm due to empirical facts, the science seems to be confronted with philosophical problems. At such a time, as Einstein stressed, such problems should be tackled by scientists of the individual sciences themselves. As noted by Einstein: At a time like the present, when experience forces us to seek a newer and more solid foundation, the physicist cannot simply surrender to the philoso pher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; for, he himself knows best, and feels more surely where the shoe pinches (Einstein, 1970; 59). This circumstance in science is arguably the same in sociology as well, as Weber indicated when he accepted that: Only by laying bare and solving substantive problems can sciences be established and their methods developed. On the other hand, purely epistemological and methodological reflections have never played the crucial role in such developments. Such discussions can become important for the enterprise of science only when, as a result of considerable shifts of the 'viewpoint' from which a datum becomes the object of analysis, the idea emerges that the new 'viewpoint' also requires a revision of the logical forms in which the 'enterprise' has heretofore operated, and when, accord ingly, uncertainly about the 'nature' of one's own work arises (Weber, 1949: 116). The advice here for sociologists is that they too should confront the philosophical considerations within their own 'science'. "•kMethodological•l discussions rooted within their own subject matter", Weber argued, "may be more useful for the *I wish to express my gratitude for the advise and. assistance offered me by Profs. Naoharu Shimoda, Scott T. Davis, and the late Prof. Hiroshi Ushikubo. Annals of the Japan Associationfor Philosophyof Science,March 1988 -131- 22 Katsumi YASUMURA Vol. 7 self-clarification of special disciplines in spite of, and in a sense even because of, their methodologically imperfect formulation" (Weber, 1949: 114). In this paper an investigation of the philosophical problems of theory construc tion in contemporary sociology will be attempted by emulating the perspectives of Einstein and Weber respectively. Recently, such schools of antipositivism as phenomenology, ethnomethodology and critical theory, have prevailed in theoretical sociology. The outcome has not only been the decline of research based on the principles of positivism, but a deadlock in the production of sociological theory. With this condition as a background the philosophical problem with which sociolo gists should deal at present could thereby be considered to be the task of inquiring into the logical foundation of scientific recognition in sociology. The primary object of this paper lies in a critical examination of Weber's sociological epistemology, and in a comparison of it with the original epistemology of the exact natural sciences. It has previously been contended that Weber's sociological epistemology is different to that of the natural sciences.1. This prevail ing interpretation of Weber's sociological epistemology shall be questioned here. To this ends the argument will be carried forward in three steps. Firstly, while examining Weber's understanding of the methodology of the natural sciences and presenting its essential characteristics, a comparison of the methodologies of Weber and the natural sciences will be undertaken. While examining this, we shall contend that the foundation of scientific recognition is common to both sociology and the natural sciences and, moreover, that this point brings into relief the philosophical problems to which sociologists must give consideration when develop ing theory in contemporary sociology. When considering the epistemology of the natural sciences, Cassirer's interpretation, because of its insight in relating the thought on physics from Galilei through to Newton and Einstein, shall be the one drawn upon here.2 For an analysis of Weber's thought on sociological epistemology the following seven are, of all his works, perhaps the most important3.: 1. Roscher and Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics (Weber, 1975 •k1903, 1904, 1906•l); 2. "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy" (Weber , 1949 •k1904•l); 3. "Criti cal Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences" (Weber, 1949 •k1906•l); 4. Critique of Stammler (Weber, 1977 •k1907•l); 5. "Some Categories of Interpretative Sociol ogy" (Weber, 1981 •k1913•l); 6. "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics" (Weber, 1949 •k1913•l); 7. "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociol ogy" (Weber, 1947 •k1922•l). Of these writings, numbers 5, on "Interpretative Sociology" and 7, on "Funda mental Concepts" can, although in some parts deal with epistemological and methodological subjects, be considered not so much epistemological as theoretical works, the purposes of which are to define concepts for theory construction. -132- No. 3 Weber's Sociology and the Exact Sciences: 23 However number 2, the paper on "Objectivity" is perhaps the most important of his epistemological works, for it is here that his consideration of sociological recognition is shown most clearly. According to the ruthless criticism of Tenbruck to the effect that: "a series of methodological works after the paper on 'Objectivity' are charac teristics of tendencies such as deteriorating quality, reducing interests, and constrict ing in essence" (Tenbruck 1959: 579), this work on "Objectivity" shall be examined here because of the value of its formulations on 'ideal types'. It is not the intention here to develop a close theoretical exposition of Weber's epistemology, although such a task is of course an important one, instead Weber's ideas shall be examined with the view to employing them as a tool for the further formulation of sociological theory. Weber's epistemology here is not an 'object' of study as much as a 'means' to research the foundation of a scientific sociology. Such an attitude is nothing other than the same as that underlying Weber's own epis temological study. II Weber constructed his sociological epistemology in conformity with the assump tion that the human faculty of recognition has a variety of limitations to the infinite of a given real world.4. This assumption is explicitly presented in Weber's state ment that: All the analysis of infinite reality which the finite human mind can conduct rests on the tacit assumption that only a finite portion of this reality constitutes the object of scientific investigation, and that only it is 'impor tant' in the sense of being 'worthy of being known' (Weber, 1949: 72). Here Weber suggested that human 'thought' conclusively intervenes in scientific recognition. "What sciences alone can provide are concepts and judgements which are neither empirical reality nor production of it but which facilitate its analytical ordering by thought in a valid manner." (Weber, 1949: 111)5. It is as a matter of course that in every kind of recognition the concepts are constructed by means of taking thought as the 'frame of reference' of recognition. From this premise Weber provided the question of 'what' as the frame of scientific recognition and 'how' it should be established. As for the frame of scientific recognition, Weber made a rigid distinction between social and natural sciences according to their logical form, indicated the limitation of the application of the natural scientific recognition to sociology, and attempt to go on to create the proper epistemology. Weber himself did not directly discuss the epistemology of exact natural science in detail. He only indirectly provided it for the purposes of making a comparison with the epistemology of sociology. However, it seems profitable to investigate Weber's argument on the -133- 24 Katsumi YASUMURA Vol. 7 epistemology of the exact sciences as he deals with its limitations when begining to expound his consideration of sociological recognition.6. The frame of exact scientific recognition is, according to Weber, the 'law' (Gesetz). He regarded the lawfulness as the 'regularity' (RegelmaƒÀigkeit) which is abstracted from repeatedly observed facts. Moreover, he considered the ultimate purporse of the study of natural science as the unification of the law formation. It was thus that he called this science the 'nomothetic discipline' (nomotetische Wissenschaft) after the argument of W. Windelband and H. Rickert. The logical operation of such a discipline in the process of recognition was explained by Weber as follows: •c (The) logic of (natural scientific) investigation requires the progressive elimination of individual entities and the deduction of establised 'law'- which only become special cases - from other laws still more general. In consequence, the general concepts become increasingly empty of content and increasingly alienated from empirically intelligible reality. The logi cal ideal of such a science would be a system of formulate of absolutely general validity (Weber, 1975: 64). Here, as a consequence of Weber's idea on the recognitional form of exact natural science, the characteristics of constructive concepts forming the frame which he refered to will be also brought into relief. Weber's logical theory of the concept on exact sciences is considered to be identical with the traditional logic of Aristotele's. Weber reckoned the concept employed in exact sciences as
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