Global Population at a Glance: 2002 and Beyond

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Global Population at a Glance: 2002 and Beyond Global Population at a Glance: 2002 and Beyond Issued March 2004 International Brief WP/02-1 At the dawn of the new millennium, of these trends through 2050. The material International global population continues to discussed here, as well as demographic sta- Population increase rapidly … tistics for every country of the world, come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Global Reports … even though both the global rate Population Profile: 2002. of growth and net additions each year are decreasing, Global Population Growth … even though AIDS is devastating the populations of a number of According to U.S. Census Bureau esti- African countries, mates, world population hit the 6-billion mark in June 1999. This figure is over …even though 88 countries now 3.5 times the size of the earth’s popula- have fertility levels lower than those tion at the beginning of the 20th century required for replacement of their and roughly double its size in 1960. The populations in the long run. time required for global population to This brief highlights several of the most grow from 5 to 6 billion — 12 years — important global population trends in 2002 was shorter than the interval between and describes the continuation and impacts any of the previous billions. Figure 1. Annual Additions and the Annual Growth Rate of Global Population The growth of global population has peaked. Population in billions Total world population 10 2048 9 8 2028 2013 7 1999 6 20 years 1987 15 5 years 1974 14 4 years 12 1959 3 years 13 1922 years 2 15 years 1804 1 37 years 118 years 0 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision; U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data Base and unpublished tables. Demographic Programs U.S. Department of Commerce U S C E N S U S B U R E A U Economics and Statistics Administration U.S. CENSUS BUREAU Helping You Make Informed Decisions In 2002, global population stood at 6.2 billion and was growing at Figure 2. 1.2 percent per annum. This is The Components of Yearly equivalent to a net addition of World Population Growth: 2002-2050 about 200,000 people per day, Fertility's contribution to global growth about 74 million people per year, will cease by 2050. and about 371 million people over Fertility effect a 5-year period (or nearly the size Annual average percent growth — Mortality effect of all of Western Europe in 2002). total and contribution of components Population momentum effect 1.4 However, as Figure 1 indicates, the 1.19 pace of global population increase 1.2 actually peaked some years ago. 1.06 The 74 million people added in 1.0 2002 is a substantially lower incre- 0.88 ment than the high of 87 million 0.8 people added in 1989-90, and the 0.69 growth rate was well below the high 0.6 0.55 of 2.2 percent in 1963-64. Census 0.42 Bureau projections show this slow- 0.4 down in population growth continu- ing into the foreseeable future. 0.2 The slowdown in the growth of the 0 world’s population can be traced primarily to declines in fertility. In -0.2 1990, the world’s women, on aver- 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 age, were giving birth to 3.3 chil- Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data dren over their lifetimes. By 2002, Base and unpublished tables. the average was 2.6 — less than one-half of a child more than the level needed to assure the replace- Figure 3. ment of the population. Although Age-Sex Structure of World Population: 2002 and 2050 Global population will change markedly fertility rates in some parts of the over the next 50 years. 2050 world are expected to remain above 2002 replacement level for quite some Male Female time (e.g., in Sub-Saharan Africa), Age 80+ Census Bureau projections suggest 75-79 that the level of fertility for the 70-74 world as a whole will drop below 65-69 replacement level before 2050. 60-64 55-59 Population momentum 50-54 accounts for much of the 45-49 continued growth of global 40-44 population in 2002 35-39 and beyond. 30-34 25-29 National, regional, and global 20-24 declines in fertility are not projected 15-19 10-14 to translate directly into equivalent 5- 9 declines in the growth of population. 0- 4 The lack of correspondence in fertili- 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 ty and population declines is due to Millions the fact that numbers of women in Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data Base. their child-bearing years are 2 U.S. Census Bureau population, on the other hand, is Figure 4. projected to grow considerably in Population Growth of Specific Age Groups: both absolute and relative terms 2002 to 2050 (Figure 4). The elderly are project- The elderly population is projected ed to be more than three times as to grow most rapidly. many in 2050 as today, and to comprise nearly 17 percent of Population in billions 10 global population, compared with 7 percent in 2002. 9 65 years of How fast global population 8 age and older grows over the next five decades will be determined in 7 part by two factors that are relatively difficult to forecast. 6 30-64 These are the pace of fertility years of age 5 decline in parts of the developing world and the 4 future course taken by the AIDS pandemic. 3 15-29 CONTRACEPTIVE years of age 2 PREVALENCE IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1 0-14 years of age High fertility remains the dominant 0 factor dictating the future size, 2002 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 growth, and composition of the Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Programs Center, International Data Base. populations of many developing nations. Contraceptive use, in turn, is one of the primary deter- increasing both in absolute terms outnumbered all other age groups minants of the level of fertility in a and relative to the rest of the popu- in 2002, with each successively population and of differences in lation (as a result of past, higher fer- higher age group being slightly fertility between populations. tility), an effect that demographers smaller (Figure 3). Children made Contraceptive use is also important refer to as “population momentum.” up just under 30 percent of the as an indicator of the extent to The increase in the ratio of women world’s population. which couples have access to of reproductive age to total popula- reproductive health services. Over the next five decades, the tion was responsible for about three- absolute number of children is Though contraceptive prevalence fourths of global population growth expected to remain relatively sta- has risen dramatically since the in 2002. Census Bureau projections ble, but their number relative to 1960s, there are at least 100 mil- suggest that by 2050, virtually all of total global population is expected lion women in the world’s the growth of the globe’s population to decline to 20 percent. The num- developing countries today who will be due to this age-sex composi- ber of women in their childbearing would like to space or limit their tion effect (Figure 2). years is expected to increase by pregnancies but are not using GLOBAL POPULATION more than 25 percent between contraception. These women, con- COMPOSITION 2002 and 2050; however, their sidered to have “unmet need for proportion of total population family planning,” are found in The transition to lower fertility slowly decreases (from 26 percent greater numbers in Asia than in and mortality accounts for the to 23 percent). The population of other world regions but make up aging of global population now labor force age is expected to higher proportions of the popula- and during the coming 50 years. grow steadily while its proportion tions of Sub-Saharan African coun- Largely as a result of past, higher of the total stays approximately tries than of countries in other fertility, children (ages 0-14) the same. The world’s elderly parts of the world. U.S. Census Bureau 3 THE AIDS PANDEMIC IN ST THE 21 CENTURY Figure 5. Since the beginning of the AIDS Adult HIV Prevalence in Africa: December 2001 pandemic two decades ago, more A dozen Sub-Saharan African countries now than 20 million people have died have HIV infection rates in excess of 10 percent of AIDS. Twice that many — 40 of the adult population ages 15-49. million — are now living with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Barring some major breakthrough, most of these people are expected to die during the next 10 years or so. The pandemic continues to have its greatest impact in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, with Sub-Saharan Africa at its epicenter. The latest estimates released by UNAIDS and the World Health Organization show infection rates among the adult population exceed 35 percent in Botswana and 10 percent in eleven other countries Percent seropositive in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5). As Under 1 a result of AIDS mortality, Census 1 to 4 Bureau projections indicate that a 5 to 9 10 to 19 number of African countries will 20 and over experience levels of mortality Not available during this decade that will bring the average life expectancy at birth down to around 30 years by 2010, levels not seen since the beginning of the 20th century.
Recommended publications
  • Population Growth & Resource Capacity
    Population Growth & Resource Capacity Part 1 Population Projections Between 1950 and 2005, population growth in the U.S. has been nearly linear, as shown in figure 1. Figure 1 U.S. Population in Billions 0.4 0.3 0.2 Actual Growth 0.1 Linear Approximation - - - H L Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision. If you looked at population growth over a longer period of time, you would see that it is not actually linear. However, over the relatively short period of time above, the growth looks nearly linear. A statistical technique called linear regression can create a linear function that approximates the actual population growth over this period very well. It turns out that this function is P = 0.0024444t + 0.15914 where t represents the time variable measured in years since 1950 and P represents the (approximate) population of the U.S. measured in billions of people. (If you take statistics, you’ll probably learn how to obtain this function.) The graph of this linear function is shown in the figure above. (1) Just to make sure that you understand how to work with this function, use it to complete the following table. The actual population values are given. If you are working with the function correctly, the values you obtain should be close to the actual population values! Actual Population t P Year (billions of people) (years) (billions of people) 1960 .186158 1990 .256098 2005 .299846 (2) Use the linear function to determine the approximate year when the population of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Utah's Long-Term Demographic and Economic Projections Summary Principal Researchers: Pamela S
    Research Brief July 2017 Utah's Long-Term Demographic and Economic Projections Summary Principal Researchers: Pamela S. Perlich, Mike Hollingshaus, Emily R. Harris, Juliette Tennert & Michael T. Hogue continue the existing trend of a slow decline. From Background 2015-2065, rates are projected to decline from 2.32 to 2.29. These rates are projected to remain higher The Kem C. Gardner Policy Institute prepares long-term than national rates that move from 1.87 to 1.86 over demographic and economic projections to support in- a similar period. formed decision making in the state. The Utah Legislature funds this research, which is done in collaboration with • In 2065, life expectancy in Utah is projected to be the Governor’s Office of Management and Budget, the -Of 86.3 for women and 85.2 for men. This is an increase fice of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, the Utah Association of approximately 4 years for women and 6 years for of Governments, and other research entities. These 50- men. The sharper increase for men narrows the life year projections indicate continued population growth expectancy gap traditionally seen between the and illuminate a range of future dynamics and structural sexes. shifts for Utah. An initial set of products is available online • Natural increase (births minus deaths) is projected to at gardner.utah.edu. Additional research briefs, fact remain positive and account for two-thirds of the cu- sheets, web-enabled visualizations, and other products mulative population increase to 2065. However, giv- will be produced in the coming year. en increased life expectancy and declining fertility, the rate and amount of natural increase are project- State-Level Results ed to slowly decline over time.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Population 2018 Lecture 8 Ecological Footprint
    Human Population 2018 Lecture 8 Ecological footprint. The Daly criterea. Questions from the reading. pp. 87-107 Herman Daly “All my economists say, ‘on the one hand...on the other'. Give me a one- handed economist,” demanded a frustrated Harry S Truman. BOOKS Daly, Herman E. (1991) [1977]. Steady-State Economics (2nd. ed.). Washington, DC: Island Press. Daly, Herman E.; Cobb, John B., Jr (1994) [1989]. For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (2nd. updated and expanded ed.). Boston: Beacon Press.. Received the Grawemeyer Award for ideas for improving World Order. Daly, Herman E. (1996). Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston: Beacon Press. ISBN 9780807047095. Prugh, Thomas; Costanza, Robert; Daly, Herman E. (2000). The Local Politics of Global Sustainability. Washington, DC: Island Press. IS The Daly Criterea for sustainability • For a renewable resource, the sustainable rate to use can be no more than the rate of regeneration of its source. • For a non-renewable resource, the sustainable rate of use can be no greater than the rate at which a renewable resource, used sustainably, can be substituted for it. • For a pollutant, the sustainable rate of emmission can be no greater that the rate it can be recycled, absorbed or rendered harmless in its sink. http://www.footprintnetwork.org/ Ecosystem services Herbivore numbers control Carbon capture and Plant oxygen recycling and production soil replenishment Soil maintenance and processing Carbon and water storage system Do we need wild species? (negative) • We depend mostly on domesticated species for food (chickens...). • Food for domesticated species is itself from domesticated species (grains..) • Domesticated plants only need water, nutrients and light.
    [Show full text]
  • Population Projections for 2020 to 2060 Population Estimates and Projections Current Population Reports
    Demographic Turning Points for the United States: Population Projections for 2020 to 2060 Population Estimates and Projections Current Population Reports By Jonathan Vespa, Lauren Medina, and David M. Armstrong P25-1144 Issued March 2018 Revised February 2020 INTRODUCTION Figure The year 2030 marks a demographic Projections of the Older Adult Population to turning point for the United States. By nearly one in four Americans is projected to Beginning that year, all baby boomers be an older adult will be older than 65. This will expand Millions of people ­ years and older Percent of population the size of the older population so that one in every five Americans is projected to be retirement age (Figure 1). Later that decade, by 2034, we project that older adults will ­ outnumber children for the first time in U.S. history. The year 2030 marks another demographic first for the United States. Beginning that year, because of population aging, immigration is projected to overtake ­ natural increase (the excess of births over deaths) as the primary driver of population growth for the country. As the population ages, the number of deaths is projected to rise sub- Source US Census Bureau National Population Projections stantially, which will slow the coun- try’s natural growth. As a result, net is still expected to grow by 79 million people by 2060, international migration is projected to overtake natural crossing the 400-million threshold in 2058. This con- increase, even as levels of migration are projected to tinued growth sets the United States apart from other remain relatively flat. These three demographic mile- developed countries, whose populations are expected stones are expected to make the 2030s a transforma- to barely increase or actually contract in coming tive decade for the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Population Trends: the Prospects for Stabilization
    Global Population Trends The Prospects for Stabilization by Warren C. Robinson Fertility is declining worldwide. It now seems likely that global population will stabilize within the next century. But this outcome will depend on the choices couples make throughout the world, since humans now control their demo- graphic destiny. or the last several decades, world population growth Trends in Growth Fhas been a lively topic on the public agenda. For The United Nations Population Division makes vary- most of the seventies and eighties, a frankly neo- ing assumptions about mortality and fertility to arrive Malthusian “population bomb” view was in ascendan- at “high,” “medium,” and “low” estimates of future cy, predicting massive, unchecked increases in world world population figures. The U.N. “medium” variant population leading to economic and ecological catas- assumes mortality falling globally to life expectancies trophe. In recent years, a pronatalist “birth dearth” of 82.5 years for males and 87.5 for females between lobby has emerged, with predictions of sharp declines the years 2045–2050. in world population leading to totally different but This estimate assumes that modest mortality equally grave economic and social consequences. To declines will continue in the next few decades. By this divergence of opinion has recently been added an implication, food, water, and breathable air will not be emotionally charged debate on international migration. scarce and we will hold our own against new health The volatile mix has exploded into a torrent of threats. It further assumes that policymakers will books, scholarly articles, news stories, and op-ed continue to support medical, scientific, and technolog- pieces, presenting at least superficially plausible data ical advances, and that such policies will continue to and convincing arguments on all sides of every ques- have about the same effect on mortality as they have tion.
    [Show full text]
  • A Non-Linear Threshold Estimation of Density Effects
    sustainability Article Population Dynamics and Agglomeration Factors: A Non-Linear Threshold Estimation of Density Effects Mariateresa Ciommi 1, Gianluca Egidi 2, Rosanna Salvia 3 , Sirio Cividino 4, Kostas Rontos 5 and Luca Salvati 6,7,* 1 Department of Economic and Social Science, Polytechnic University of Marche, Piazza Martelli 8, I-60121 Ancona, Italy; [email protected] 2 Department of Agricultural and Forestry Sciences (DAFNE), Tuscia University, Via San Camillo de Lellis, I-01100 Viterbo, Italy; [email protected] 3 Department of Mathematics, Computer Science and Economics, University of Basilicata, Viale dell’Ateneo Lucano, I-85100 Potenza, Italy; [email protected] 4 Department of Agriculture, University of Udine, Via del Cotonificio 114, I-33100 Udine, Italy; [email protected] 5 Department of Sociology, School of Social Sciences, University of the Aegean, EL-81100 Mytilene, Greece; [email protected] 6 Department of Economics and Law, University of Macerata, Via Armaroli 43, I-62100 Macerata, Italy 7 Global Change Research Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Lipová 9, CZ-37005 Ceskˇ é Budˇejovice, Czech Republic * Correspondence: [email protected] or [email protected] Received: 14 February 2020; Accepted: 11 March 2020; Published: 13 March 2020 Abstract: Although Southern Europe is relatively homogeneous in terms of settlement characteristics and urban dynamics, spatial heterogeneity in its population distribution is still high, and differences across regions outline specific demographic patterns that require in-depth investigation. In such contexts, density-dependent mechanisms of population growth are a key factor regulating socio-demographic dynamics at various spatial levels. Results of a spatio-temporal analysis of the distribution of the resident population in Greece contributes to identifying latent (density-dependent) processes of metropolitan growth over a sufficiently long time interval (1961-2011).
    [Show full text]
  • E/CONF.60/19: World Population Plan of Action
    19-30 August 1974 World Population Plan of Action UNITED NATIONS POPULATION INFORMATION NETWORK (POPIN) UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) World Population Plan of Action The electronic version of this document is being made available by the United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN) Gopher of the Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. ***************************************************************** WORLD POPULATION PLAN OF ACTION The World Population Conference, Having due regard for human aspirations for a better quality of life and for rapid socio-economic development, Taking into consideration the interrelationship between population situations and socio-economic development, Decides on the following World Population Plan of Action as a policy instrument within the broader context of the internationally adopted strategies for national and international progress: A. BACKGROUND TO THE PLAN 1. The promotion of development and improvement of quality of life require co-ordination of action in all major socio-economic fields including that of population, which is the inexhaustible source of creativity and a determining factor of progress. At the international level a number of strategies and programmes whose http://www.un.org/popin/icpd/conference/bkg/wppa.html 1/46 World Population Plan of Action explicit aim is to affect variables in fields other than population have already been formulated. These
    [Show full text]
  • Westernization of Asian Diets and the Transformation of Food Systems: Implications for Research and Policy
    Westernization of Asian Diets and the transformation of food systems: Implications for research and policy Prabhu Pingali ESA Working Paper No. 04-17 September 2004 Agri cultural and Development Economics Division The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations www.fao.org/es/esa Westernization of Asian Diets and the transformation of food systems: Implications for research and policy Prabhu Pingali1 1. Introduction Rapid economic and income growth, urbanization, and globalization are leading to a dramatic shift of Asian diets away from staples and increasingly towards livestock and dairy products, vegetables and fruit, and fats and oils. While the diversification of diets away from the traditional dominance of rice with rising incomes is expected and observed, current food consumption patterns are showing signs of convergence towards a Western diet. Globalization and the consequent global interconnectedness of the urban middle class, is the driving force behind the convergence of diets. The rapid spread of global supermarket chains and fast food restaurants are reinforcing the above trends. The following six key stylised facts characterize the changes in food demand in Asia: i) reduced per capita consumption of rice; ii) increased consumption per capita of wheat and wheat based products; iii) increased diversity in the food groups consumed; iv) rise in high protein and energy dense diets; v) increased consumption of temperate zone products; and vi) the rising popularity of convenience food and beverages. As the demand profile changes with economic growth and globalisation, so the supply systems must adapt to accommodate this change. Asian agriculture is on an irreversible path leading away from its traditional pre- occupation with cereal crop production, especially rice, towards a production system that is becoming increasingly commercialized and diversified.
    [Show full text]
  • Westernization in China: a Case Study in Processed Potatoes
    Westernization in China: A Case Study in Processed Potatoes by Kynda R. Curtis, Jill J. McCluskey, and Thomas I. Wahl* Paper prepared for presentation at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting Montreal, Canada, July 27-30, 2003 *Curtis (corresponding author): Ph.D. Student, Department of Economics, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-6210, Phone: 509-432-9511, Fax: 509-335-3958, e-mail: [email protected]; McCluskey: Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Washington State University, Pullman; Wahl: Director, International Marketing Program for Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT) Center and Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Washington State University, Pullman. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the IMPACT Center at Washington State University. Copyright 2003 by [Curtis, McCluskey, and Wahl]. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. Westernization in China: A Case Study in Processed Potatoes Keywords: China, potatoes, westernization, food demand, convenience foods Abstract: The demand for convenience foods is growing around the world, especially in China. However, the contributing factors of this change in food preferences are still largely unknown. To measure this westernization trend, data from a survey of Chinese consumers in Beijing is evaluated using a multinomial ordered logit model to determine which consumer attributes influence the probability of consuming western foods such as French fries, mashed potatoes, and potato chips. Results show that higher income levels and positive opinions concerning western food taste have a significant influence on increased consumption of all three processed potato products.
    [Show full text]
  • Population Growth Rate (B) Brief De
    POPULATION GROWTH RATE Demographics Population Change Core indicator 1. INDICATOR (a) Name: Population growth rate (b) Brief Definition: The average annual rate of change of population size during a specified period. (c) Unit of Measurement: Usually expressed as a percentage. (d) Placement in the CSD Indicator Set: Demographics/Population. 2. POLICY RELEVANCE (a) Purpose: The population growth rate measures how fast the size of population is changing. (b) Relevance to Sustainable/ Unsustainable development (theme/sub-theme): Agenda 21 identifies population growth as one of the crucial elements affecting long- term sustainability (see especially paragraphs 5.3 and 5.16). Population growth, at both national and sub-national levels, represents a fundamental indicator for national decision-makers. Its significance must be analyzed in relation to other factors affecting sustainability. However, rapid population growth can place strain on a country’s capacity for handling a wide range of issues of economic, social and environmental significance, particularly when rapid population growth occurs in conjunction with poverty and lack of access to resources, or with unsustainable patterns of production and consumption, or in ecologically vulnerable zones (paragraphs 3.14, 3.25 and 3.26 of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD)). The dramatic growth of urban populations is of concern in many countries. Between 2005 and 2030, almost all of the population growth expected for the world will be concentrated in the urban areas of the less developed regions (United Nations, 2003). The causes of rapid urban growth include high rates of natural increase (excess of births over deaths) in urban areas as well as migration from rural to urban areas and the transformation of rural settlements into urban places.
    [Show full text]
  • World Population Growth by Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina[Cite] First Published in 2013; Updated April, 2017
    For Semester 2 (H) Geography Students Paper – CC3 (TH) Topic -7 Web based Material compiled by Dr. Rajashree Dasgupta, Asst. Professor, Dept. of Geography World Population Growth by Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina[cite] First published in 2013; updated April, 2017. 200 years ago there were less than one billion humans living on earth. Today, according to UN calculations there are over 7 billion of us.1 Recent estimates suggest that today's population size is roughly equivalent to 6.5% of the total number of people ever born.2 This is the most conspicuous fact about world population growth: for thousands of years, the population grew only slowly but in recent centuries, it has jumped dramatically. Between 1900 and 2000, the increase in world population was three times greater than during the entire previous history of humanity—an increase from 1.5 to 6.1 billion in just 100 years. How the world population is changing is of great importance for humanity’s impact on the Earth’s natural environment, but it also gives reasons to hope for a good future. This is because we have a bigger team of better educated people who can contribute to the solutions that improve global well-being. A picture of the world population in the very long-run shows extremely rapid growth. Indeed, for a long time the world population grew at an increasing rate. However, if we focus on the last couple of decades, we see that this pattern no longer holds, as the annual rate of population growth has been recently going down.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethical Implications of Population Growth and Reduction Tiana Sepahpour [email protected]
    Fordham University Masthead Logo DigitalResearch@Fordham Student Theses 2015-Present Environmental Studies Spring 5-10-2019 Ethical Implications of Population Growth and Reduction Tiana Sepahpour [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/environ_2015 Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Natural Resources and Conservation Commons Recommended Citation Sepahpour, Tiana, "Ethical Implications of Population Growth and Reduction" (2019). Student Theses 2015-Present. 75. https://fordham.bepress.com/environ_2015/75 This is brought to you for free and open access by the Environmental Studies at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Theses 2015-Present by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Ethical Implications of Population Growth and Reduction Tiana Sepahpour Fordham University Department of Environmental Studies and Philosophy May 2019 Abstract This thesis addresses the ethical dimensions of the overuse of the Earth’s ecosystem services and how human population growth exacerbates it, necessitating an ethically motivated reduction in ​ human population size by means of changes in population policy. This policy change serves the ​ goal of reducing the overall global population as the most effective means to alleviate global issues of climate change and resource abuse. Chapter 1 draws on the United Nations’ Millennium ​ Ecosystem Assessment and other sources to document the human overuse and degradation of ​ ecosystem services, including energy resources. Chapter 2 explores the history of energy consumption and climate change. Chapter 3 examines the economic impact of reducing populations and how healthcare and retirement plans would be impacted by a decrease in a working population.
    [Show full text]