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Mixed Migration Monthly Summary APRIL Mixed Migration APRIL Monthly Summary DECEMBER 2017 Middle East This summary is produced by the Mixed Migration Platform (MMP) and covers inter- and intra-regional displacement and displacement-induced mobility, drawing widely from available sources. Given the complexity of current migration trends in the Middle East, this summary gives a consolidat- ed snapshot of mixed migration in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. Current mixed migration issues in Israel/oPt fall within the remit of the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS). A note on terminology: Throughout the report the term ‘refugees and other migrants’ is used to include all persons in mixed migration flows (this may include asylum seekers, trafficked persons, refugees, migrants, and other people on the move). Any reference to specific groups is consistent with the original source. Cover photo: A mother bakes bread for her children in an Iformal Tented Settlement in Zahle, Lebanon. Credit: Dara Al-Masri / Danish Refugee Council, Jan 2017. To be added to MMP’s monthly migration summary mailing list, please contact [email protected] Visit our website at: http://www.mixedmigrationplatform.org/ APRIL 2017 INTRODUCTION April was marked by changing dynamics in the in- tion. Syrians and others, however, continue to move ternal displacement situations in both Syria and Iraq. through and from Turkey to Greece, facing high risks Displacement in Syria’s Al-Raqqa governorate surged, along the journey: 24 deaths-at-sea were recorded in with over 66,000 people displaced during the month April, 16 of them in a single incident on 24 April off the due to the intensification of fighting around Tabqqa, coast of Lesbos. In Jordan, the situation at the berm, close to Al-Raqqa city. In Iraq, heavy fighting contin- where an estimated 85,000 Syrians live in dire con- ued in west Mosul, inducing large-scale displacement ditions, remains precarious. After an April car bomb to camps in the north and west of the city. Although attack that left three people dead near the border the trend of people returning from camps to east at Rukban, it is unlikely that access to the displaced Mosul was interrupted towards the end of April with population there will improve quickly, despite their a spike in new camp arrivals, this movement contin- urgent need for humanitarian assistance. ued, including from neighouring countries. In April, a The following sections of this report describe group of around 250 Iraqis were assisted to return monthly developments related to mixed migration from Turkey to east Mosul, the first such movement by country, including reported arrivals, departures, since the Iraqi security forces launched their opera- internal displacement relevant to cross-border tion to recapture Mosul in October 2016. In Turkey, movement, and discussion of relevant policy the government continues to emphasise its progress changes. towards the completion of its border wall with Syria, completing the 556 kilometre first phase of construc- SERBIA RUSSIA !Dimitrovgrad !Sofia !Presevo BULGARIA Skopje GEORGIA ! T'Bilisi !Edirne ! FYROM ! !Gevgelija Istanbul Turkey! !Thessaloniki ARMENIA TurkeyBu rcompletedsa the 556km first phase of a wall !Canakkale ! ! Yerevan that will cover the entirety of! Athenk a911ra kilometre Iraq GREECE border with Syria. On 27 April, Iraqi authorities reported assisting 250 TURKEY people to voluntarily return from Turkey to east Van !Izmir Mosul. ! !Cesme !Athens Kahramanmaras ! !Hakkari CIzre! ! Bodrum Seyhan Gaziantep Nusabin Silopi ! Antalya ! ! Ceylanpinar ! IRAN ! ! !Dohuk !Mersin !Kilis Kobani ! !Al-Hasakah Turkey Antakya Aleppo !Mosul ! ! !Erbil Idlib !Raqqa IOM reported the deaths of 24 people at sea along the ! Kirkuk !Sulaymaniyah Deir ez Zor ! eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece, includ- Nicosia ! ! !Hama SYRIA T!artus ing 16 in one incident on 24 April off the coast of Lesbos. !Homs Beirut ! ! Damascus R!amadi Baghdad LEBANON IRAQ ! As Sweida Syria Dar'a! ! Amman In April, the vast majority of people were displacedJerus fromalem ! Al-Raqqa governorate (66,000), followed by Hama gover! - Jordan norate (32,000). JORDAN Three people, including a child, were killed during a car bomb attack and ensuing shoot-out at the Rukban !Cairo LIBYA refugee camp at the beginning of April. EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA !Kuwait Figure 1: Overview of key developments across the Middle East (April 2017) 3 MIXED MIGRATION MONTHLY SUMMARY | MIDDLE EAST MIXED MIGRATION MONTHLY SUMMARY | MIDDLE EAST APRIL 2017 IRAQ Arrivals: Although the overall number of refugees recent months, from approximately 3,700 new arrivals and other migrants arriving in Iraq in April was not re- in February to 941 in March, and 700 in April. ported, there are indications that Iraqis are returning Turkish Land Forces apprehended 87 Iraqis at land home, not only from Europe as previously reported, borders in April, a sharp decrease from the figure of but now also from Turkey. On 27 April, Iraqi authorities 1,355 in March, though continuing a trend of monthly reported assisting 250 people to voluntarily return variations: there were 1,577 apprehensions in Feb- from Turkey to east Mosul. Overall Assisted Volun- ruary, 234 in January, and 114 in December. Though tary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) figures of Iraqis these figures do not indicate where specific appre- from Europe were not reported in April. IOM Finland hensions were made, Silopi and Çukurca are the reported that 539 persons returned from Finland to main entry points from Iraq to Turkey. No explanations Iraq in 2017 under its AVRR programme, including 114 of variations in the number of apprehensions per in April. month have been published. Elsewhere in Turkey, Departures: Although security forces report recaptur- authorities carried out widespread arrests in the week ing some 60% of the territory previously held by the following the April referendum. so-called Islamic State, ongoing fighting in Mosul and As of 30 April, UNHCR reported that neighbouring other regions of Iraq continued to displace thousands countries in the region host 253,992 Iraqi refugees, of people both within Iraq (see Internal Displacement an increase of 3,040 since 2 March. No update was below) and internationally throughout April. As of 30 available for the number of Iraqi refugee and asylum April, 15,411 Iraqis had been received at Al-Hol camp seekers in Turkey at the time of reporting, but recent in Syria since October 2016. Growth in the camp pop- months have seen a steady increase, which likely ulation at Al-Hol continues, though it has slowed in continued in April. 140,000 135,000 130,000 125,000 120,000 115,000 May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16 Oct-16 Nov-16 Dec-16 Jan-17 Feb-17 Mar-17 Apr-17 May-17 Figure 2: Trendline of estimated figures for Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers in Turkey in April (source: IOM Migrant Presence Monitoring UNHCR) The number of Iraqis registered in Jordan contin- refugees registered in Syria was 24,970 according to ued to grow, but only by around 400 people, in line figures from the December 2016 Humanitarian Needs with the rates seen in recent months. As of 30 April, Overview. However, the number is expected to have 62,830 Iraqis were registered in Jordan, compared grown as displacement from Iraq to Syria’s Al-Hol to 62,445 at the end of March. 28,260 Iraqi refugees camp continues. were registered in Iran as of early 2016, but updates As of 30 April, at least 1,007 Iraqis have arrived in Eu- are infrequently reported. The total number of Iraqi rope via the Mediterranean Sea this year. Iraqi arrivals 4 MIXED MIGRATION MONTHLY SUMMARY | MIDDLE EAST MIXED MIGRATION MONTHLY SUMMARY | MIDDLE EAST APRIL 2017 by sea to Greece increased slightly in April, from 163 ber 2016, there were still 317 civilians killed and 403 to 185, representing 16% of total arrivals of all nation- injured. Just 38% of casualties occurred in Ninewa alities for the month. In contrast to recent trends, the province in April, compared to 65% in March. De- number of Iraqi arrivals grew, while overall arrivals spite the slight reduction and diffusion of violence, decreased, resulting in a higher proportion of Iraqis displacement due to the Mosul offensive remained among the overall flow. Although at least 275 Iraqis significant. As of 30 April, IOM’s Displacement Track- arrived to Italy by sea in the first two months of 2017, ing Matrix had identified 339,558 people displaced data on arrivals only presents the top ten nationalities, due to the Mosul offensive, a 10.4% increase on end which excludes Iraqis. Key drivers for people leaving of March figures. Iraq include security concerns, lack of social justice, Although the displaced population continues to grow political and economic instability, the threat of the overall, there is significant movement both into and so-called Islamic State, and the risk of kidnapping by back from IDP camps surrounding Mosul. As of end both state and non-state actors. April, most new arrivals were reported in camps south Refugees and Other Migrants in Iraq: As of 30 April, and west of Mosul, while arrivals to camps in the north 239,639 Syrian refugees were registered in Iraq, slowed. Returns outpaced new arrivals to camps east mostly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), com- of Mosul for most of the month, although the arrival of pared with 236,772 at the end of March (an increase 3,067 individuals between 26 and 27 April reversed of 1.2%). The number of Syrian refugees in Iraq has that trend. In total, 580,384 people have been dis- been increasing steadily since September 2016, placed since 17 October 2016, including 419,000 from but remains below the peak population of 251,690 western Mosul alone.
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