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Economics Review of Radical Political Review of Radical Political Economics http://rrp.sagepub.com/ Structure and Practice in the Labor Theory of Value Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles Review of Radical Political Economics 1981 12: 1 DOI: 10.1177/048661348101200401 The online version of this article can be found at: http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/12/4/1 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Union for Radical Political Economics Additional services and information for Review of Radical Political Economics can be found at: Email Alerts: http://rrp.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://rrp.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://rrp.sagepub.com/content/12/4/1.refs.html >> Version of Record - Jan 1, 1981 What is This? Downloaded from rrp.sagepub.com by guest on July 29, 2012 The Review of Radical Political Economics Structure and Practice in the Labor Theory of Value Herbert Gintis and Samuel Bowles* ABSTRACT: The Marxian labor theory of value has been criticized in recent years by neoclassical and Sraffian economists as superfluous to the analysis of capitalist economies. It is argued in this paper the usual presentations and de- fenses of the labor theory of value are indeed faulty, but the theory itself is never- theless indispensable. We develop a defense of the labor theory of value based on the proposition that both labor and labor-power fail to reduce to generalized commodity relations. Introduction simply to reflections, transpositions, or phe- nomena of the economic base.44 Marxian social theory today contains two oppos- ing tendencies, each marked by a methodological com- But the labor theory of value is economistic in a second, mitment to a of historical causal- specific conception distinct, but little noted sense: by excising political and ity. One holds the dynamics of social life to be struc- cultural practices from the internal constitution of the turally determined, the social totality submitting to &dquo;economic,&dquo; it reduces the site of capitalist production laws of motion or even constitut- independent from, to a restricted - indeed impoverished - subset of the ing, the political practices that mark the content of so- variety of practices which jointly determine the dy- cial struggles.’ Another holds these dynamics to be the namics of accumulation. The economism of the clas- of the of product self-constituting political practices sical formulations of the labor theory of value is ex- class and coalitions in the classes, fractions, society, pressed at least as much in its economistic treatment of of &dquo;structure&dquo; a mere formalism for concept being the economy as in its analysis of the articulation of the regulating our knowledge of the outcomes of social economy with other instances of the social formula- conflict.2 We believe this dichotomy to be unproduc- tion.55 tive, and suggest that a more unified approach be de- The roots of economism in the classical Marxian veloped in which neither &dquo;practice&dquo; nor &dquo;structure&dquo; be labor theory of value lie in two unwarranted reduc- reduced to an effect of the other.3 Our of reappraisal tions. First, the classical theory represents labor as the the labor theory of value is undertaken in this spirit. use-value of labor-power to the capitalist. It thereby In classical formulations, we shall suggest, the abstracts from the political and cultural practices of labor theory of value is economistic. Economism, the working class and reduces the dynamics of capital- Etienne Balibar notes, ist production to the structural imperatives of prop- erty and commodity exchange relations.6Second, it claims precisely to reduce all the non-economic represents labor-power as a commodity. By so doing, it instances of the social structure purely and abstracts from the theoretically indispensible articu- lation of radically distinct structures - family and state - with the structure of capitalist production. *This paper has benefitted greatly from our conversation m recent We will not here deal with the shortcomings of years with John Eatwell, Richard C. Edwards, Ann Ferguson, David economistic as a Gordon, Stephen Marglin, Michael Reich and R.P Wolff We would Marxism theoretical basis for under- like to thank Geoff Hodgson, Nancy Folbre, and the editors of this standing those aspects of social practice and social joumal fortheirmsightful comments. structure traditionally deemed&dquo; superstructural&dquo;.77 1 Downloaded from rrp.sagepub.com by guest on July 29, 2012 Rather, we will confine ourselves to a demonstration Exactly. Steedman continues: that the classical formulation of economic life itself is unable to illuminate even run internally inconsistent and ... such an explanation must necessarily in the most elementary dynamics of capitalism. The clas- terms of the determinants of the condition of own de- sical labor theory of value is inadequate to its production and real wages. Marx’s value mag- signated object of analysis: it is bad economics. Indeed nitudes, however, far from being determinants of in its economistic form the labor theory of value is those factors, are precisely derivative from them: merely a particularly cumbersome theory of the rela- consequently they can play no essential role in the tionship between the technical conditions of produc- theory of why profits are positive.13 tion and the structure of wages, prices and profits. Its formal excision and replacement by the Sraffian or While not necessarily contesting the body of Marxian von Neumann systems would matter little to the body social theory, the Sraffian school rejects its application of Marxian economic theory. to the purely formal task of analysing price and profit. Yet we do not recommend such a course. Indeed, The second critique argues that value theory must we believe that reformulated in noneconomistic terms, be ignored rather than changed. In an era marked by the labor theory of value provides a necessary frame- the rejection of economism within Marxian social work for analysing the articulation of practices at the theory, the labor theory of value has remained largely site of capitalist production, and of the articulation of untouched. The pride of Marx’s system, value theory capitalist production with other sites of social practice. has figured little in the major contributions to Marxist Our aim thus is to purge the theory of its economistic theory of the past several decades. Such central figures its consis- underpinnings, thereby enhancing logical as Lukacs, Habermas, Colletti, Thompson, Althusser, to illuminate the of ad- tency, its ability dynamics and Gramsci have forged powerful new theoretical vanced capitalist social formations, its general com- tools without substantial resort to the labor theory of patibility with contemporary Marxian social theory, value. Once the cornerstone of Marxian theory, the la- to inform interventions to- and its capacity political bor theory of value has been relegated to an increas- wards a socialist transformation. ingly marginal position within the entire body of From its inception, Marxian value theory has been Marxian thought. Indeed, E.P. Thompson, in his al- the object of bitter disputation between socialist econ- ways polemical and often incisive critique, The omists and their critics.8 Given the incompleteness of Poverty of Theory, can say: its early formulations, the labor theory of value has been a relatively easy mark. Yet in recent years, with Capital... remains a study of the logic of capital, the’aid of modern mathematical techniques, and in the not of capitalism, and the social and political di- hands of able theoreticians, value theory has attained a mensions of the history, the wrath, and the more precise and internally consistent form than it has understanding of the class struggle arise from a heretofore enjoyed.9 Indeed, most of the traditional ob- region independent of the closed system of eco- jections to the Marxian approach can no longer be nomic logic ... A unitary knowledge of so- taken seriously.’° ciety ... cannot be won from a &dquo;science&dquo; which, Increasingly, however, new assaults on the labor as a presupposition of its discipline, isolates cer- theory of value come precisely from within the social- tain kinds of activity only for study, and provides ist camp. The major critiques are two in number. On no categories for others. 14 the one hand, from the school of thought inspired by Piero Sraffa’s The Production of Commodities by We believe both of these critiques to be wholly Means of Commodities,&dquo; we learn that the &dquo;detour salutary. The Sraffian school has thrown down the through value&dquo; is unnecessary to the determination of gauntlet: justify the need for a concept of &dquo;value&dquo; as profit, price, and the distribution of income, even distinct from &dquo;price&dquo; in understanding the dynamics within a class analysis of capitalism,.12 Steedman of price and profit. Thompson, by contrast, queries writes: how any analysis of price and profit abstracting from class practices can comprehend the dynamics of the Thus the only possible role, in a theory of profits, capitalist system. We agree that it cannot, and propose for the statement &dquo;r [the rate of profit] is positive that the fundamental categories of the labor theory of if and only if S [surplus value] is positive&dquo; is as value be reconsidered in light of this objection. An ade- the final line in an argument, the earlier stages of quate reinterpretation of value categories will in turn, which show why 5 is positive.... a Marxist we believe, provide a compelling answer to the ques- theory of profits must (thus) be directed to ex- tion which over the years has been the recurrent theme plaining why the social, political and technical of debates on Marxian economics: why should labor be condition are such that (surplus value is positive).
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