Securing ARP From the Ground Up Jing (Dave) Tian Kevin R. B. Butler University of Florida University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA Gainesville, FL, USA daveti@ufl.edu butler@ufl.edu Patrick D. McDaniel Padma Krishnaswamy The Pennsylvania State Federal Communications University Commission University Park, PA, USA Washington, DC, USA
[email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT can subsequently enable more sophisticated denial-of-service The basis for all IPv4 network communication is the Address (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MitM) [15] attacks. Resolution Protocol (ARP), which maps an IP address to a While numerous methods have been proposed to secure device's Media Access Control (MAC) identifier. ARP has ARP [35,9, 18, 16, 30], they fall short of offering a compre- long been recognized as vulnerable to spoofing and other hensive solution to these problems. First, a successful secu- attacks, and past proposals to secure the protocol have often rity solution must ensure that the basic ARP protocol itself involved modifying the basic protocol. remains unchanged. There is no \flag day" on which all ARP This paper introduces arpsec, a secure ARP/RARP pro- implementations embedded into the large variety of Internet- tocol suite which a) does not require protocol modification, connected IPv4 devices will change. Second, the overhead of b) enables continual verification of the identity of the tar- the implementation should be as small as possible in order get (respondent) machine by introducing an address binding to optimize system performance. Third, the ARP security repository derived using a formal logic that bases additions mechanism should be flexible and reliable.