Peloponnesian War- Explain the campaigns of the Athenian Caputre of Pylos and Brasidas in Thrace.

The Athenian capture of Pylos instigated the Spartan Thracian campaign led by Brasidas , resulting in as Thuc describes the deaths of two people on each opposing side ‘who had been most opposed to peace’. These campaigns not only resulted in the deaths of Brasidas and Cleon, but also Athenians adoption of more aggressive campaigns, Spartans surrender, Cleons popularity, Athens loss of Amphipolis in addition to an end of possible negotiated peace in 423 BC.

The Athenian capture of Pylos ultimately resulted in the Athenians to adopt more aggressive campaigns throughout the course of the war. In 425BC the Athenian General Demosthenes fortified the promontory of Pylos as it was in close proximity to a harbour in addition the fact that it was uninhabited in the surrounding countryside. Demosthenes formed an effective garrison (supported by 5 tiremes and 40 hoplites) however, the Spartans ‘awakened to the danger’ (Pritchard) of occupation of their own territory dispatched forces against the Athenians. Demothesenes adopted an offensive strategy against these ‘simulatenous’ assaults and with the aid of naval reinforcements (Spartans failure to blockade the harbour) the Athenians gained a decisive victory. Additionally, success at Pylos also resulted in the capture of 420 Hoplites and 120 Spartan spartiate elites (one tenth of the elite class to which the Spartan government was based) on the island of Sphacteria which influenced a truce to be called and Spartan ambassadors to seek peace. However, as a result of Cleon great influence with the masses (Thuc) the Athenians believed following their decisive victory as a result of their epitichimos strategy that they ‘might secure far better terms in the future by pressing their advantage.’ (Kagan) This resolution resulted in the possibility of peace to be denied and the Athenian blockade to continue under Cleon, influencing Spartan surrender. As Bradley contends the capture of Pylos and Spartan hoplites ‘was turning point in the first phase of the war’. Not only did Spartan prisoners were used as leverage to influence the Spartans to cease annual invasions of Attica but also the Spartans surrender which caused ‘surprise among the Hellenes’ (as ‘Spartans would never surrender their arms’) resulted in a mood of ‘overconfidence’ among the Athenian war party (Bradley). As Lendon contends, Athens decisive advantage as Pylos encouraged the Athenians to foolishly grasp for more” which resulted in the Athens to look further afield, initiating more aggressive campaigns and disregarding the sound policy of Pericles. (Bradley)

Cleon’s actions in regard to his success at Sphacteria resulted in his political power to increase in addition to preventing any attempts at negotiated peace. Following, Cleon’s influence among the Athenians to deny Spartan offers of peace, the continued blockade became hard to maintain and as a result ‘the demos regretted not making peace and Cleon, the instigator of this policy, lost his popularity.’ (Bradley) However, through the aid of Demosthenes at Spachteria Cleon ‘met his self imposed deadline without apparent difficulty’ (Pritchard) influencing the Spartan surrender to regain his popularity and be relected as general. This power which Cleon attained allowed him to appeal to the ‘emotions, self interest and prejudices of the people’ (Thuc) persuading the Assembly to oppose the peace party of Nicias instead to adopt the aim of ‘winning more’. In his play Peace Aristophanes states ‘let sleeping Cleon’s lie’ reflecting both Thuc and his own views that as a result of Cleons popularity instigated by success at Sphacteria, possible peace between Sparta and Athens following the Athenian campaign at Pylos was suppressed.

In response to the Athenian capture of Pylos, the Spartans conducted a campaign in Thrace which resulted in Athenians loss of Amphipolis and crucial allies. In 424 BC Sparta conducted a campaign in Thrace, led by the Spartan general Brasidas, in order to divert Athenians from Spartan territory and place an offer on exchange for Spartan hostages. As part of the Thracian Campaign, Brasidas who was ‘not at all a bad speaker’ (thuc) through offering terms such as guaranteeing full political rights gained Amphipolis. Brasidas’s taking of Amphipolis caused fear among Athenian forces as had they lost an ally which provided a significant amount of resources in regard to gold and timber for ship building. In addition, the loss of Amphipolis ‘would encourage the other allies to revolt, with a reluctant loss of revenue for Athens’ (Bradley) as demonstrated in Torone, Scione and Mende’s diversion to a Spartan alliance. Therefore, as a result of Brasidas skills in oratory and diplomacy, Athens lost a crucial ally of Amphipolis, the diversion of other allies also justifying Mytilennes reasoning behind her revolt in 428 being Athens poor treatment its allies.

The Thracian Campaign not only resulted in the deaths of Cleon and Brasidas but also prevented any chances of negotiated peace. As a result of Brasidas influence in Thrace causing crucial Allies of Athens such as Acanthus, Amphipolis and Torone the Athenains fearing loss of support and disadvantage in the war signed an Amristice with Sparta in 423. As Thuc contends The Athenians calculated that through the treaty ‘Brasidas would not be able to win over any more of their dependencies before they has time to take measures for their own security’ suggesting that this peace was only temporary. As Lazenbury contends that main purpose of the armistice was to ‘bring about a lasting peace’ (returning captured cities to Athens and prisoners to Sparta) however both Brasidas and Cleon’s unwillingness prevented this aim to be fulfilled. While negotiations were in progress and even following the signing of the truce Scione and Mende revolted against Athens and despite being aware of negotiations Brasidas refused to give the cities up. This constituted the end of any form of peace following 423 to be carried out. In response, Cleon adopted the ‘aggressive’ strategy which was influenced by his prior success at Pylos, convincing the Athenians to attack both cities (Mende was retaken and Scione was placed under sieges) in addition to making slaves of the women and children at Torone. The Athenians aggressive response instigated the Battle of Amphipolis between the two powers (Athenians ‘disorganised and panic stricken ( Bradley)) which resulted in the deaths of both Brasidas and Cleon who as thuc contends were the ‘two people who on each side had been most opposed to peace.’ Therefore as result of Brasidas and Cleons actions in Thrace, instigated by the Athenian capture of Pylos, any chance of peace in the first phase of the war was suppressed.

The Athenian capture of Pylos and the Spartan campaign in Thrace were major turning points of the Peloponnesian war. As a result of the Athenian strategy of establishing a forward base, Athens gained significant advantage adopting a more aggressive policy in the second phase of the war, while the Spartans response to lost military resources at Pylos resulted in the Athenian loss of Amphipolis. Perhaps the most significant result of these campaigns was not only Cleon and Brasidas’s deaths as a result of mutually aggressive actions but the conclusion of any possibilities of peace between the two powers following 423 BC.