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Assemblée Générale GÉNÉRALE NATIONS UNIES A Distr. Assemblée générale GÉNÉRALE A/HRC/3/2 23 novembre 2006 FRANÇAIS Original: ANGLAIS/FRANÇAIS CONSEIL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME Troisième session Point 2 de l’ordre du jour provisoire APPLICATION DE LA RÉSOLUTION 60/251 DE L’ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DU 15 MARS 2006 INTITULÉE «CONSEIL DES DROITS DE L’HOMME» Rapport de la Commission d’enquête sur le Liban établi conformément à la résolution S-2/1* du Conseil des droits de l’homme * En raison de leur longueur, les notes du texte sont rassemblées à la fin du document et, comme les annexes au présent rapport, distribuées uniquement dans la langue dans laquelle elles ont été reçues. GE.06-15098 (F) 060307 090307 A/HRC/3/2 page 2 Résumé 1. Le 11 août 2006, à sa deuxième session extraordinaire, convoquée pour examiner le conflit en cours au Liban, le Conseil des droits de l’homme a adopté la résolution S-2/1, intitulée «La grave situation des droits de l’homme au Liban causée par les opérations militaires israéliennes», dans laquelle il a décidé «d’établir d’urgence et d’envoyer immédiatement une commission d’enquête de haut niveau». L’objectif, aux termes du paragraphe 7 de la résolution S-2/1: «a) qu’elle fasse enquête sur le ciblage et le meurtre systématique de civils par Israël au Liban; b) qu’elle examine les types d’armes utilisés par Israël et leur conformité avec le droit international; et c) qu’elle évalue l’étendue et les effets meurtriers des attaques israéliennes sur les vies humaines, les biens, les infrastructures essentielles et l’environnement». 2. Le 1er septembre 2006, le Président du Conseil des droits de l’homme, Luis Alfonso de Alba, a annoncé que João Clemente Baena Soares, Mohamed Chande Othman et Stelios Perrakis avaient été nommés membres de la Commission d’enquête. La Commission s’est réunie à Genève, avec son secrétariat, et a commencé ses travaux le 11 septembre. Elle a convenu de présenter un rapport au Conseil dans un délai de deux mois. 3. À Genève, la Commission a eu des réunions avec le Président du Conseil des droits de l’homme, la Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, les Missions permanentes du Liban et d’Israël, des organismes des Nations Unies et des organisations non gouvernementales (ONG). Elle s’est rendue au Liban du 23 septembre au 7 octobre et du 17 au 21 octobre. Elle a rencontré le Président et le Premier Ministre libanais, des membres du Gouvernement et d’autres hauts fonctionnaires, des membres du Parlement, des responsables locaux, des représentants du secteur privé et des hôpitaux, des victimes et des témoins ainsi que des représentants d’organisations non gouvernementales, d’organismes des Nations Unies, des représentants de l’ONU, de la Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban (FINUL) et de l’Organisme des Nations Unies chargé de la surveillance de la trêve (ONUST). Elle s’est rendue dans la banlieue sud de Beyrouth, dans la vallée de la Bekaa ainsi qu’à Byblos, et a fait un long circuit dans toute la région sud du Liban. 4. Le rapport expose le mandat, les méthodes, la démarche et les activités de la Commission. Il décrit dans ses grandes lignes le conflit qui a duré 33 jours en le replaçant dans son contexte historique et s’attache à définir la qualification de celui-ci et les lois qui s’y appliquent. Il porte ensuite sur les questions de fond que la Commission a estimé devoir étudier en détail conformément à son mandat. Il analyse également les divers aspects des répercussions du conflit sur la vie au Liban et contient enfin les conclusions de la Commission et ses recommandations. 5. Il ne rentre pas dans les attributions de la Commission de faire des observations au sujet du contexte politico-juridique de l’adoption de la résolution S-2/1 ni d’émettre un jugement concernant la teneur de son mandat. Il est clair que le mandat de la Commission est limité rationae personae (actions menées par les militaires israéliens) et rationae loci (sur le territoire libanais) et qu’il ne l’autorise pas à procéder à un examen exhaustif de tous les aspects du conflit ni ne permet d’analyser le comportement de toutes les parties. La Commission est liée par le mandat que lui a confié le Conseil des droits de l’homme (ci-après dénommé «le Conseil») qu’elle interprète très largement, à la lumière des principes et des règles du droit international, du droit international humanitaire et du droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme, en ayant A/HRC/3/2 page 3 présente à l’esprit la nécessité de respecter la vie et la dignité humaines, compte tenu des problèmes complexes qui se posent dans le contexte d’un conflit armé. 6. Un élément fondamental, en ce qui concerne le conflit et le mandat de la Commission tel qu’il a été défini par le Conseil, est le comportement du Hezbollah. La Commission estime que toute investigation indépendante, impartiale et objective quant à un comportement particulier lors d’hostilités doit nécessairement tenir compte de l’ensemble des parties au conflit. Ainsi, une enquête sur la conformité des actes spécifiques des Forces de défense israéliennes (FDI) au Liban avec le droit international humanitaire exige de tenir compte également du comportement de l’adversaire. 7. Ceci dit, le mandat de la Commission est expressément limité et elle ne peut, même si elle le souhaite, l’interpréter comme lui permettant également d’enquêter sur les actions menées par le Hezbollah en Israël. En agissant ainsi, elle outrepasserait sa fonction interprétative et s’arrogerait des pouvoirs qui sont ceux du Conseil. 8. Les hostilités qui se sont déroulées du 12 juillet au 14 août constituent un conflit armé international auquel s’appliquent le droit international humanitaire conventionnel et coutumier et le droit international relatif aux droits de l’homme. 9. En analysant les caractéristiques du conflit, la Commission met en lumière sa particularité qui est que les hostilités actives n’ont eu lieu qu’entre Israël et les combattants du Hezbollah. Bien que le Gouvernement libanais ait soutenu qu’il n’était pas responsable des opérations menées par le Hezbollah à l’intérieur du territoire israélien le 12 juillet 2006 et qu’il n’en a rien su avant leur déclenchement, le Gouvernement israélien a déclaré officiellement que la responsabilité lui en revenait. La Commission est d’avis que les hostilités ne concernaient en fait, pour l’essentiel, que les FDI et le Hezbollah. Le fait que les Forces armées libanaises n’aient pas pris activement part aux hostilités ne retire pas au conflit son caractère de conflit armé international juridiquement reconnu comme tel ni n’enlève quoi que ce soit à la réalité qui est qu’Israël, le Liban et le Hezbollah y étaient parties. 10. La Commission souligne que, d’une manière générale, le principe d’humanité et les considérations humanitaires (clause de Martens) n’ont pas été respectés pendant le conflit. Conclusions 11. Le conflit qui s’est déroulé au Liban pendant 33 jours a eu des conséquences catastrophiques, en particulier dans le sud du pays. Il a provoqué la perte de nombreuses vies humaines. D’après les autorités libanaises, le conflit a fait 1 191 morts et 4 409 blessés; plus de 900 000 personnes ont fui leur foyer. 12. Les hostilités, qui se sont déroulées du 12 juillet au 14 août 2006, constituent un conflit armé international auquel s’appliquent le droit international humanitaire conventionnel et coutumier et le droit relatif aux droits de l’homme. 13. La Commission souligne que les FDI ont utilisé massivement et systématiquement la force, de manière excessive et disproportionnée et sans discernement contre des civils et des biens de caractère civil libanais, sans faire la distinction entre civils et combattants ni entre les biens de A/HRC/3/2 page 4 caractère civil et les cibles militaires. La Commission a été en mesure de vérifier par elle-même les circonstances d’un certain nombre de faits qui se sont produits pendant le conflit. 14. En ce qui concerne les précautions prises par Israël pour minimiser les pertes civiles, la Commission est parvenue à la conclusion que les FDI n’avaient pas appliqué les mesures d’avertissement prévues par le droit international humanitaire. Lorsqu’il y a eu des avertissements, ils n’ont souvent pas été donnés suffisamment tôt pour permettre à la population de s’en aller ou de s’en aller sans risquer d’être attaquée et d’atteindre des couloirs humanitaires protégés. La Commission examine des cas d’attaques dirigées contre des convois de civils, comme ceux de Marouahine et de Marjayoun, dont les FDI ne pouvaient pas ignorer qu’il ne s’agissait pas de cibles militaires légitimes. Souvent les avertissements ont contribué à créer un climat de peur et de panique au sein de la population civile. 15. De la même manière, la Commission a documenté plusieurs cas d’attaques directes contre le personnel médical et chargé des secours. Elle a entendu plusieurs témoignages faisant état d’obstacles et de difficultés rencontrés par le personnel médical et les équipes de secours alors qu’ils tentaient d’apporter à des civils des soins médicaux et l’assistance humanitaire dont ils avaient besoin, en raison de contraintes imposées par les FDI. Le système parallèle adopté pour satisfaire aux exigences des FDI ne permettait pas une assistance humanitaire efficace. En plusieurs occasions, les FDI ont attaqué directement ou indirectement les équipes de secours.
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