US Diplomatic History in Brief

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US Diplomatic History in Brief U.S Diplomatic History in Brief – a Foreign Service Perspective Jack Zetkulic Note: This text is adapted from a one-hour lecture given to classes of newly-hired Foreign Service Officers in 2005/2006 during their first week of training at the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Zetkulic is a Senior Foreign Service Officer who was then serving as Executive Director of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Introduction Welcome to the Foreign Service family! Like any family it has a history, a long history. Your predecessors have been busy. They have had a front row seat as world events have unfolded. Indeed, many of your predecessors have made quite a bit of history themselves. This is a basic introduction to U.S. diplomatic history, during which I’ll also present some sidebars describing how the Foreign Service as an institution has developed and how the hard work of American diplomats is woven into the broader tapestry of American history. For those of you who have studied international relations or diplomatic history, you’ll hear some familiar themes. Some of these themes echo across more than two centuries. There is the enduring struggle between so-called realists and idealists. Or the debate between isolationists and those supporting international engagement that has split generations: Jefferson versus Madison, Lodge versus Wilson, Helms versus Albright. For those of you who have not studied IR or diplomatic history, these will be new concepts. Indeed, many of you are as new to these topics as you are new to the diplomatic corps. Some surveys of recent A-100 classes show that anywhere from one-third to one-half of you may not have engaged in any rigorous study of international relations before starting this new career. But you need to know the basics. Why? I’ll give you two reasons. First, context: Knowing where you fit in the scheme of our history is beneficial to you personally. If you were in the military -- let’s say if you were at West Point preparing to be an Army officer instead of at FSI studying to be a diplomat -- you would get several semesters’ worth of military history. After that you would feel that you were part of -- as Army officers call it -- “the long gray line.” Maybe in the Foreign Service we should call it “the long gray flannel line.” But the more you know about how you and your daily work fit into a broader context, the greater will be your individual job satisfaction and your esprit d’corps. Even on those bad days, when you’ve had a tough stint on the visa line or you’ve written yet another numbing Congressionally-mandated report or escorted yet another clueless visitor from Washington, you’ll understand why you’re doing what you’re doing. And you’ll know how you fit into American diplomacy and where you are in the flow of American history. Second, fireproofing: When you’re posted abroad, I guarantee that some of your foreign colleagues will know more than you about American history, and they’ll know more than you about international relations theory and the structures of international affairs. For example, if they have studied at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna or at ENA in Paris, or for that matter if they have studied to become members of the foreign service of most countries, they will have studied American history – and lots of it. And you? You don’t want to get hosed by your foreign counterparts. A quick personal vignette: Early in my second overseas posting, I was standing at a reception in Munich in the old Bavarian royal chambers. It was during the Reagan Administration so the Europeans were all fidgety about America’s strong profile. The topic of the day was short-range nuclear missiles in Central Europe. Nearby, a Swedish colleague was pontificating about his country’s more sensible approach, and he went on to say, “Oh, well, you know, we are historically a peaceful and cautious people, and we’re nervous when big powers intrude into the affairs of other countries.” I looked at him and said, “Hey wait a minute! Your king sat on that throne, right over there, when his troops marched all the way down to the Alps during the Thirty Years War.” Well, he looked at me, winced, and said, “I really hate it when foreigners know our history.” Touché. I hope that those of you who are new to diplomatic history won’t rely on this lecture alone to give you what you need to know about the topic. This is just a brief overview and a springboard into the subject, as is www.usdiplomacy.org. Many resources are available to you. For instance, if you’re interested in the individual experiences of officers who have served in your prospective posts, you should go to the Library of Congress website to see ADST’s many interviews with diplomats who have preceded you. For broader background, the State Department Historian’s office has some basic materials online. Now to our overview: Colonial American Diplomacy By late in the colonial period, different colonial leaders and legislatures sent agents and business representatives to London and some other capitals on behalf of individual colonies. Pennsylvania sent our favorite and most famous diplomat, Ben Franklin, to London. He gained valuable experience in the art of diplomacy, and his treatment there cemented his view that he had become a new breed, an American. He was also hired by other colonies that recognized the utility of having a representative in place in London rather than communicating to the royal court and Parliament through the King’s governors. But the King did not agree with this approach. Colonial representatives were redirected to their respective governors. Revolutionary Diplomacy With the establishment of the Continental Congress and especially after the Declaration of Independence, our diplomatic efforts shifted very quickly from respectful submissions of grievances and polite requests to His Majesty the King to fevered efforts aimed at our very survival. The Continental Congress established a “Committee of Secret Correspondence” to exercise control over foreign affairs. Despite its really cool name, the Committee functioned as well as any committee during a time of crisis, which is to say not very well at all. During this period, we were blessed with several diplomatic stars, the first I mentioned already: Franklin, who served in Paris from 1776 to 1778. French aristocrats and intellectuals embraced Franklin as the personification of the New World Enlightenment. The French king, however, kept him at arm’s length. France saw Franklin as the potentially helpful representative of a rebellious British colony that could vex and weaken France’s rival England. But at the same time, France did not want to associate itself too closely with Franklin’s mission; it didn’t want to be drawn into premature war with England. So, as a result, France provided covert assistance to the United States in the form of often useful intelligence information and, increasingly, weapons. After the Battle of Saratoga, things changed, and France eventually did recognize the United States and offer its navy to serve the American cause. Franklin’s experience in Paris offers an instructive example about how to negotiate from a standpoint of weakness or, in poker terms, how to win with a losing hand. Basically, Franklin hoodwinked the French with his diplomacy. He knew that his legation was a den of spies. So he invited a British representative to what he called a secret meeting. The fact of the meeting was quickly found out, although the actual words exchanged (which were inconsequential) were not, thus giving the French the impression that Franklin might be cutting a deal with the British to end the war, which would not be to the advantage of France. This encouraged the French to increase military and other support to the U.S. and to recognize the United States earlier than they otherwise would have. Those of you who are heading out to your first post may want to remember how Thomas Jefferson referred to old Ben. When Jefferson was sent to Paris to take over the American mission, the Comte d’Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, asked him, “It is you who will replace Dr. Franklin?” And Jefferson, always the gracious Virginia gentleman, replied, “No one can replace him, sir. I am only his successor.” You might want to keep that line in mind when you’re introduced on your first day on the job. A less heralded but equally important representative during the Revolutionary period was John Adams, who while posted in Paris took the initiative to travel to Holland. While Franklin was negotiating French recognition and getting good intelligence and arms, it was Adams who was in Holland getting the cash to pay for the fight. He extracted from the Dutch a series of loans that kept the Revolution financially alive. Interestingly, he did this with little or no guidance from the Continental Congress. He realized while in Paris that the need existed, knew that the Dutch were the best and most likely source of cash, traveled to Holland, and cut the deal. Today, you’d call this forward-leaning approach “transformational diplomacy.” Survival of the New Republic The Treaty of Paris ended the Revolutionary War in 1781. The Continental Congress then established the Department of Foreign Affairs. While aptly named, the Department was rather weak. The Secretary’s role was not very clearly defined. This is probably why we don’t have any statues around FSI of Robert Livingston or John Jay.
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