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Gramm-Leach Bliley Financial Privacy Rule

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Gramm-Leach Bliley Financial Privacy Rule 17980 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 2, 2008 / Notices bank holding company and all of the (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR Part ACTION: Notice. banks and nonbanking companies 225), and all other applicable statutes owned by the bank holding company, and regulations to become a bank SUMMARY: The information collection including the companies listed below. holding company and/or to acquire the requirements described below will be The applications listed below, as well assets or the ownership of, control of, or submitted to the Office of Management as other related filings required by the the power to vote shares of a bank or and Budget (‘‘OMB’’) for review, as Board, are available for immediate bank holding company and all of the required by the Paperwork Reduction inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank banks and nonbanking companies Act (‘‘PRA’’). The FTC is seeking public indicated. The application also will be owned by the bank holding company, comments on its proposal to extend available for inspection at the offices of including the companies listed below. through July 31, 2011, the current PRA the Board of Governors. Interested The applications listed below, as well clearance for information collection persons may express their views in as other related filings required by the requirements contained in the writing on the standards enumerated in Board, are available for immediate Commission’s Gramm-Leach-Bliley the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the inspection at the Federal Reserve Bank Financial Privacy Rule (‘‘GLB Privacy proposal also involves the acquisition of indicated. The application also will be Rule’’ or ‘‘Rule’’). The current clearance a nonbanking company, the review also available for inspection at the offices of expires on July 31, 2008. includes whether the acquisition of the the Board of Governors. Interested DATES: Comments must be submitted on nonbanking company complies with the persons may express their views in or before June 2, 2008. standards in section 4 of the BHC Act writing on the standards enumerated in ADDRESSES: Interested parties are (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise the BHC Act (12 U.S.C. 1842(c)). If the invited to submit written comments. noted, nonbanking activities will be proposal also involves the acquisition of Comments should refer to ‘‘Paperwork conducted throughout the United States. a nonbanking company, the review also Comment: FTC File No. P085405’’ and Additional information on all bank includes whether the acquisition of the may be submitted by any of the holding companies may be obtained nonbanking company complies with the following methods. If, however, the from the National Information Center standards in section 4 of the BHC Act comment contains any material for website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/. (12 U.S.C. 1843). Unless otherwise which confidential treatment is Unless otherwise noted, comments noted, nonbanking activities will be requested, it must be filed in paper regarding each of these applications conducted throughout the United States. form, and the first page of the document must be received at the Reserve Bank Additional information on all bank must be clearly labeled ‘‘Confidential.’’1 indicated or the offices of the Board of holding companies may be obtained 1. Web Site: Comments filed in Governors not later than April 28, 2008. from the National Information Center electronic form should be submitted by A. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website at www.ffiec.gov/nic/. clicking on the following web link: (Glenda Wilson, Community Affairs Unless otherwise noted, comments https://secure.commentworks.com/ftc- Officer) 411 Locust Street, St. Louis, regarding each of these applications glbprivacyrulepra and following the Missouri 63166-2034: must be received at the Reserve Bank instructions on the web-based form. To 1. Lonoke Bancshares, Inc., Lonoke, indicated or the offices of the Board of ensure that the Commission considers Arkansas; to acquire additional shares, Governors not later than April 6, 2008. an electronic comment, you must file it for a total of 13.91 percent of the voting A. Federal Reserve Bank of New on the web-based form at: https:// shares of First Southern Bank, York (Anne MacEwen, Bank secure.commentworks.com/ftc- Batesville, Arkansas. Applications Officer) 33 Liberty Street, glbprivacyrulepra. B. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas New York, New York 10045-0001: 2. Mail or Hand Delivery: A comment (W. Arthur Tribble, Vice President) 2200 1. National Australia Bank Limited, filed in paper form should include North Pearl Street, Dallas, Texas 75201- National Equities Limited, both of ‘‘Paperwork Comment: FTC File No. 2272: Melbourne, Australia, National P085405’’ both in the text and on the 1. Plains Acquisition Corporation, Americas Investment, Inc., National envelope and should be mailed or Kingwood, Texas; to become a bank Americas Holdings LLC, both of New delivered to the following address: holding company by acquiring 100 York, New York; to become bank Federal Trade Commission/Office of the percent of the voting shares of Plains holding companies by acquiring Great Secretary, Room H-135 (Annex J), 600 State Financial Corporation, Plains, Western Bancorporation, Inc., Omaha, Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Texas, and indirectly acquire Plains Nebraska and thereby acquire Great Washington, D.C. 20580. The Bancshares, Inc., Dover, Delaware, and Western Bank, Watertown, South Commission is requesting that any Plains State Bank, Plains, Texas. Dakota. comment filed in paper form be sent by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve courier or overnight service, if possible. System, March 27, 2008. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, March 27, 2008. The FTC Act and other laws the Robert deV. Frierson, Robert deV. Frierson, Commission administers permit the Deputy Secretary of the Board. Deputy Secretary of the Board. collection of public comments to [FR Doc. E8–6681 Filed 4–1–08; 8:45 am] consider and use in this proceeding as [FR Doc. E8–6682 Filed 4–1–08; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6210–01–S appropriate. All timely and responsive BILLING CODE 6210–01–S public comments will be considered by FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 1 Commission Rule 4.2(d), 16 CFR 4.2(d). The FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION comment must be accompanied by an explicit Formations of, Acquisitions by, and request for confidential treatment, including the Mergers of Bank Holding Companies Agency Information Collection factual and legal basis for the request, and must Activities; Proposed Collection; identify the specific portions of the comment to be The companies listed in this notice withheld from the public record. The request will Comment Request; Extension be granted or denied by the Commission’s General have applied to the Board for approval, Counsel, consistent with applicable law and the pursuant to the Bank Holding Company AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission public interest. See Commission Rule 4.9(c), 16 CFR Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq.) (‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FTC’’). 4.9(c). VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:36 Apr 01, 2008 Jkt 214001 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\02APN1.SGM 02APN1 rmajette on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 64 / Wednesday, April 2, 2008 / Notices 17981 the Commission and will be available to the methodology and assumptions used; U.S.C. 6805 (committing to the the public on the FTC website, to the (3) ways to enhance the quality, utility, Commission’s jurisdiction entities that extent practicable, at www.ftc.gov. As a and clarity of the information to be are not specifically subject to another matter of discretion, the FTC makes collected; and (4) ways to minimize the agency’s jurisdiction). every effort to remove home contact burden of the collection of information The burden estimates represent the information for individuals from the on those who are to respond, including FTC staff’s best assessment, based on its public comments it receives before through the use of appropriate knowledge and expertise relating to the placing those comments on the FTC automated, electronic, mechanical, or financial institutions subject to the website. More information, including other technological collection Commission’s jurisdiction under this routine uses permitted by the Privacy techniques or other forms of information law. To derive these estimates, staff Act, may be found in the FTC’s privacy technology, e.g., permitting electronic considered the wide variations in policy at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/ submission of responses. covered entities. In some instances, privacy.shtm. The GLB Privacy Rule is designed to covered entities may make the required ensure that customers and consumers, FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: disclosures in the ordinary course of subject to certain exceptions, will have business, apart from the GLB Privacy Kellie Cosgrove Riley, Senior Attorney, access to the privacy policies of the Division of Privacy and Identity Rule. In addition, some entities may use financial institutions with which they highly automated means to provide the Protection, Bureau of Consumer conduct business. As mandated by the Protection, (202) 326-2252, Federal required disclosures, while others may Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. rely on methods requiring more manual Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania 6801-6809, the Rule requires financial Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20580. effort. The burden estimates shown institutions to disclose to consumers: (1) below include the time that may be SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Under the initial notice of the financial necessary to train staff to comply with PRA, 44 U.S.C. 3501-3521, federal institution’s privacy policy when the regulations. These figures are agencies must obtain approval from establishing a customer relationship averages based on staff’s best estimate of OMB for each collection of information with a consumer and/or before sharing the burden incurred over the broad they conduct or sponsor.
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