Willard Skousen Part 6 of 7
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I l E . 1. 0 W. Clean Skousen E » e l 1 1 has ' é BA been ahandonedto 1 i J Communism? 51 ni i I The EnsignPublishing C0. 4 SaltLake City, Umh n -- 0O~lQv9ie.'-.- .. "M C 9 _m hE __U H Pn mu S n E B __m M Z 6 9 1 1m Q HY Mr C @JQM _ * W Mm M vM _ W_ W lllliu__4{ilglht El_;_ F _ I __ l il '1 it i 1 l | i it 0 ii In allthe excitementoverOctober. the crisis Cuba. 1962, in 5: many Americansapparently missedthe factthat thePresident ofthe I United Statespaid an appalling pricefor the Russian promiseto dismantle theCuban missilebases. Nearly allthe newspaperscanied headlinessuch as "Khrushchev l92 Backs Down,"or "]FK Gets RussianAccord." Down in the small v print-which too few peoplereadwas the shocking disclosurethat President Kennedyhad madetwo commitmentsto Khrushchevwhich Cuban freedomghters couldscarcely believe: _ 1. A personal guarantee bythe Presidentthat theUnited States ¢ would notattempt toliberate Cuba. 2. A personal guarantee bythe Presidentthat theUnited States would notallow anyother WesternHemisphere countryto liberate Cuba. l Khrushchevs Victory pi The New York Times for October 29, 1962, carried the full text of Khrushchevsreply to the Kennedycommitments. Heshrewdly spelled outthe embarrassingdetails ofthe amazingand completely unnecessary capitulationwhich PresidentKennedy hadmade inhis secret letterto Khrushchevtwo daysearlier. SaidKhrushchev: "l regardwith respectand trustthe statementyou madein your ' l / 11 I I ,| message onOctober 27,1962, thatthere wouldbe no attack, noin»- vasion ofCuba, andnot only on the part of the UnitedStates, hut I also onthe partof othernations ofthe WestemHemisphere, you as havesaid in the same messageof yours." The NewYork Times, K Western Edition,October 29,1962, p.4.! . | Those whocaught thefull impact of this tremendouslegal and l diplomatic victoryfor Khrushchevwondered howthe Presidentand | his advisorscould havebeen socompletely outmaneuvered.Only a few daysbefore. PresidentKennedy hadmade himselfa wbrld hero l| by standingup to Khrushchev andcommanding themilitary might t of the U.S. armed services to throw a blockade around Cuba. Khrush- 4 chev hadimmediately triedto conciliatethe Presidentby promising 1 that theSoviet Unionwould notindulge in "any rash act."It was ohvious that Khrushchev was afraid of the brink. Note: Fora brief haclzground onCastro's conquestoriginal ofCuba see The NakedCommunist, chapterI1. Military authoritieshad alreadyadvised theWiute Housethat the Soviet leaders would not dare make a war issue out of Cuba be- cause ofAmericas vastsuperiority in re power. Latin American countries hadassured theUnited Statesof their complete supportin this new posture of U.S. rmness. Thousands ofCuban freedom ghters hadbeen encouragedto join "Spanish speakingunits of the U.S. Anny with the condence thatthe liberationof Communist- conquered Cubawas onlydays away.Members ofCongress openly assured the President that this was the hour to invoke the Monroe Doctrine andthe Rio Pact to show the SovietUnion that foreign conquests of independent nationsin North and South America would not be" tolerated. H With such manifest forcesoi unity and strengthbehind the United States,why did the Administrationallow Khrushchevto extort from ita promise that therewould beno attemptto liberateCuba theif Soviets wouldjust dismantletheir illegal missile bases?And by what authority did the President committhe military might and 2 1 i r prestigeof the United Statesto a policy of preventing any other country inthe WesternHemisphere from liberating Cuba? There wasalso thevery seriouspossibility thatthe Presidenthad entered intoa secret pact whichamounted toa treaty agreement with~ out providingany opportunityto have the Senateapprove itas required by the Constitution. The treaty approving powerof the Senate wasintended bythe foundingfathers tobring the facts out in the open wherethe peoplecould havea chance to examinethe issues beforeany sweeping commitments made.were Inthis spirit Woodrow Wilsonhad stronglyadvocated "opencovenants, openly arrived at." The meritsof such a policy were demonstratedin the Kennedy~Khrushchev negotiations.If Khrushchev had notpublished these cornmitmelits,the American people mightnever haveheard of them. UndoubtedlyKhrushchev knewhe wasembarrassing theAmen? can presidentby publishingwhat wasto haveremained asecret agreement betweentwo headsof state. p Citizens wondered what was in the Presidents mind when he deliberately tiedthe handof the American forcesand committedthe United Statesto a permanent policyof neutrality toward Soviet~ conquered Cuba. S ls President Kennedy Following the Schlesinger-Acheson Line? Among theclosest advisorsto PresidentKennedy isArthur M. Schlesinger, ]r.,who hasopenly opposedany anti-Sovietpolicy. He also saysthe UnitedStates cancome tosocialism "througha series of New Deals." He has referredto the freedom ghtersbehind the iron curtain as "reactionaries" and called their lost liberties obsolete t prerogatives. Asfar backas 1947Dr. Schlesingerboasted thatthe State Departmentwas followingthe policieswhich he advocated: Though thesecret hasbeen keptpretty muchfrom the readers of the liberal press,the StateDepartment hasbeen proceeding S 1 3 |i -. 1 1 it 1? for some time somewhatalong theselines. Both Bymes and Marshall haveperceived theessential need~tohe rm without being rancorous,to check Soviet expansionwithout making unlimited commitments to an antiSoviet crusade. to invoke power tocounter powerwithout engagingin senseless intimida- l 1 tion, to encourage thegrowth of the democratic left.The per- formance hasoften fallenbelow theconception; hut the direction hasbeen correct. Men like Ben Cohen,Dean Acheson,Charles Bohlen, havetried toworlz outdetails andwhip up supportfor this admittedlyrisky program." Congressional Record.Septem- t ber 26, 1961,p. 20125, romansadded.! It was risky indeed.By the end of1948 all of Eastern Europe had beenpnlledbehind theIron Curtainwith a loss of over 100 million allies.By the endof 1949, we had lost Chinawith its teeming population ofbetween 450and 600million. Congressionaltestimony revealed thatthe sametragic policycontinued throughoutthe Korean w War. Evenwhen therewas achange of administration in 1952 the 1 men whowere master~mindingthe foreignpolicy behindthe scenes 1 continued tofollow the stubborn. almostblind, convictionthat the Communistswould change. -As Dr. Schlesinger pointedout in his book, The Vital Center 949!, the objectis to have Communismmellow and the free democracies cometogether withit under peaceful socialism.That is what he meansby stating that we should contain theSoviets but push the rest ofthe Worldtoward the"democratic left.He believes the Communistleaders shouldnot be looked uponas enemiesbut as ovetzealonsallies whosebrutalities mustbe temperedso that they behave more like true socialists. And because the Communists are allies inthis sense. Dr. Schlesingeris not in favor of liberating any of theCommunist~conquered countries.He makes this veryclear in his statement: "At the some time, the United States must not succumb to demands foron anti~Sovietcrusade norpermit reactionariesin 11 A 4 .. i ll 1 the buffer states to precipitate conflicts in defense of their own obsolete prerogatives." Ibid.!t l Notice that the freedom ghters behind the iron curtain are F referred to as "reactionaries" and their longing for liberty as "obso- t lete prerogatives." t These views are prevalent among a certain body of powerful policy makers who serve in the State Department and the Vxfhite I House. Their inuence seeps to the surface on numerous occasions t where it may be easily observed. V a The Policy_of Soi-tness Toward Communism in the Cuban crisis of October. 1962, the President was ap-I patently guided by these policy~mal<ers who followed the Schlesinger line as outlined above. It was characterized by a determination to remove the threat of Russian military conquest but smother the rising ride of popular demand for the liberation of Cuba from Communism. l It was the same kind of thinking during the previous administration which guided the State Department in supporting Castro in spite of reliable warnings that he was a Soviet agent. Men of this persuasion do not seem to fear the cunning of Communists the way most ordi- 1 nary people do. They somehow feel that the Communists can be controlled, they can be manipulated, they can be forced to "mellow." They therefore approach them in a spirit of accommodation and appeasement which often violates the most elementary aspects of I protecting American interests. This is evident in the following inci~ dents which have occurred during the past 18 months. These incidents shocked many Americans at the time they occurred, but only on rare occasions were enough citizens paying attention to do anything about it. Every one of these incidents created circumstances favorable to the Communist position and detrimental to that of the United States: I. Official State Department proposal to disarm the United I States and transfer its military, naval and air force equipment includingnuclear weapons! to the United Nations. 2. Refusal by the President to proclaim the third week in Iuly as the traditional "Captive Nations Weeh" because it was "an unnecessary irritant in relations with the Soviets." Public pres- .1t -t| sure finally prevailed but the proclamation was extremely weala. :1 _ l. making no reference to Communism and the slave states under it. 3. Ordered the dismissal of charges against indicted Russian spy, lgor Y. Meleleh, to improve