(CYEN 04) F1.Indd

The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 4 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbooks: Environment

International Advisory Board Judith Shapiro, American University Guobin Yang, Barnard College

Volume 4

BEIJING 2010 The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 4

Tragedy and Hope: From the Sichuan Earthquake to the Olympics

Edited by Yang Dongping Friends of Nature

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2010 This yearbook is the result of a co-publication agreement between Social Sciences Academic Press and Koninklijke Brill NV. These articles were translated into English from the original《环境绿皮书: 中国环境发展报告 (2009)》 Huanjing lü pi shu: Zhongguo huanjing fazhan baogao (2009) with ﬁ nancial support from China Book International, supported by the General Administration of Press and Publication and the Information Ofﬁ ce of the State Council of China.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1872-7212 ISBN 978-90-04-18241-7

Copyright 2010 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands, and by Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing, China. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands CONTENTS

List of Figures ...... ix

List of Tables ...... xi

Acknowledgements ...... xiii

List of Contributors ...... xv

Preface ...... xix Yang Dongping

Introduction ...... xxiii Arthur P.J. Mol

VOLUME OVERVIEW GENERAL REPORT

We Are All Victims of Pollution and Responsible for Our Planet ...... 3 Li Dun

PART I 2008: AN EVENTFUL YEAR

1. Beijing’s Environment during the Olympic Games and the Post-Olympic Outlook ...... 43 Li Hujun

2. Large Projects in Quake-Stricken Areas after the Sichuan Earthquake ...... 55 Fan Xiao vi contents

PART II ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION

3. Forestry Decentralization May Lead to Crisis ...... 73 Feng Yongfeng

4. Plateau Wetlands: Functions, Values, and Environmental Deterioration ...... 83 Tian Kun

5. Pastoral Industrial Policies and Grassland Ecology ...... 97 Gai Zhiyi

6. Opportunities and Risks of Genetically Modiﬁ ed Crops ...... 107 Zi You

7. Road Construction: Ecological and Social Problems ...... 115 Piao Zhengji and Shen Xiaohui

PART III POLLUTION

8. Air Quality and Quality of Life ...... 131 Peng Yan

9. Agricultural Pollution Zoning and Comprehensive Control Measures ...... 145 Liang Shumin

10. Marine Pollution in China: A Gloomy Outlook ...... 161 Yu Chen

11. A Turning Point in China’s Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction? ...... 175 Qie Jianrong contents vii

PART IV POLICIES

12. Signiﬁ cant Developments in China’s Environmental Legal System in 2008 ...... 193 Feng Jia

13. The Ministry of Environmental Protection: From Organizational Upgrade to Functional Enhancement ...... 207 Zhang Shiqiu

14. Natural Resource and Environmental Issues in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference ...... 219 Chen Hongwei

15. Plastic Bag Restriction: An Unﬁ nished Mission ...... 233 Mao Da

16. Environmental Public Interest Litigation ...... 247 Lü Zhongmei

17. Promoting Open Environmental Information ...... 261 Wang Jingjing and Ruan Qingyuan

PART V GREEN ECONOMY

18. New Developments in Environmental Economic Policy ..... 279 Hu Kanping

19. China’s Comprehensive Engagement with a Low Carbon Economy ...... 293 Zhuang Guiyang

20. Ecological Compensation and Payment ...... 301 Zhang Ke

21. Environmental Performance of Enterprises in 2008 ...... 317 Su Jianhua and Guo Peiyuan viii contents

PART VI APPENDIX

Annual Indexes: Environmental Trends ...... 333

Terminological Glossary ...... 353

Index ...... 357 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1: Increase of the three main types of plant-eating livestock in Inner Mongolia ...... 101 Figure 8.1: Volume of news on air quality of Chinese cities by IHT, BBC, and China Daily 2003–2008 ...... 132

Figure 8.2: Monthly average concentration of PM10 from 2001 to 2008 in Beijing ...... 135 Figure 8.3: Monthly average API in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou in 2008 ...... 136 Figure 9.1: Comprehensive evaluation of major regions of agricultural pollution in China ...... 156 Figure A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2007 ...... 334

Figure A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2007 and the target for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan ...... 334 Figure A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2007 ...... 336 Figure A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 ...... 336 Figure A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007 ...... 337 Figure A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007 ...... 338 Figure A.7: Water quality of China’s seven major water systems, 2007 ...... 339 Figure A.8: Water quality of lakes and reservoirs with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2007 ...... 340 Figure A.9: Coastal water quality, 2007 ...... 342 Figure A.10: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2007 ...... 343 Figure A.11: Total energy consumption in China, 2004–2007 and the controlled amount for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period ...... 344 Figure A.12: China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP, 2005–2007 ...... 345

Figure A.13: CO2 emission in selected major countries ...... 346 x list of figures

Figure A.14: Investment in environmental pollution treatment in China, 2004–2007 ...... 347 Figure A.15: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2007 ...... 348 Figure A.16: Air quality in China’s major cities, 2006 ...... 349 Figure A.17: Days of up-to-standard air quality in Beijing, 1998–2007 ...... 350

Figure A.18: SO2 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007 .... 350

Figure A.19: NO2 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007 .... 351

Figure A.20: NO1 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007 .... 351

Figure A.21: PM10 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007 ... 352 LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Total area of plateau wetlands of 3,000 meters or more in elevation ...... 85 Table 5.1: Inner Mongolia pastoral area arable land increase .... 99 Table 5.2: Decrease in the acreage of pastoral, semi-pastoral, agricultural, and forestry areas of Inner Mongolia .. 99 Table 5.3: The development of secondary and tertiary industries in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia since 1993 ...... 100 Table 5.4: GDP growth rate in the pastoral area of Inner Mongolia since the 1980s ...... 100 Table 5.5: The increase of the three main types of plant-eating livestock in Inner Mongolia ...... 101 Table 8.1: Burden of disease from urban outdoor air pollution in Western Paciﬁ c Region B and China in 2000 ...... 137 Table 8.2: WHO air quality guidelines and interim targets for PM, annual mean concentrations ...... 140 Table 8.3: Chinese standards vs. WHO guidelines and United States standards ...... 140 Table 8.4: Survey results of the public satisfaction rate to urban air quality in 2007 ...... 143 Table 9.1: Comprehensive evaluation of China’s agricultural pollution on the provincial level ...... 152 Table 9.2: Comprehensive evaluation of major agriculturally polluted regions in China ...... 155 Table 17.1: Status of environmental information disclosure in selected cities and districts ...... 266 Table 17.2: Responses and feedback from enterprises upon receiving letters ...... 272 Table 20.1: Geographical range, type, content, and method of eco-compensation ...... 303 Table 20.2: Design of several important eco-compensation methods ...... 306 xii list of tables

Table 22.1: Situation of industrial pollution in China from 2003 to 2007 ...... 318 Table 22.2: Projects ordered to control pollution by a prescribed time and enterprises ordered to close down from 2003 to 2007 ...... 320 Table A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2007 ...... 334

Table A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2007 and the target for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan ...... 335 Table A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2007 ...... 336 Table A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 ...... 337 Table A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007 ...... 337 Table A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007 and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan target ...... 338 Table A.7: Water quality of China’s seven major water systems, 2007 ...... 339 Table A.8: Water quality of lakes and reservoirs with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2007 ...... 340 Table A.9: Water quality of China’s nine biggest lakes, 2005–2007 ...... 340 Table A.10: Coastal water quality, 2007 ...... 342 Table A.11: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2007 ...... 343 Table A.12: Total energy consumption in China, 2004–2007 and the controlled amount for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period ...... 344 Table A.13: China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP, 2005–2007 ...... 345 Table A.14: Energy consumption of seven major industries during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period ...... 345

Table A.15: CO2 emission in selected major countries ...... 346 Table A.16: Investment in environmental pollution treatment in China, 2004–2007 ...... 347 Table A.17: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2007 ...... 348 Table A.18: Air quality in China’s major cities, 2006 ...... 349 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The English edition of The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 4 is now available for our readers, thanks to the hard efforts made by dozens of dedicated volunteers and scholars. Our deepest gratitude and admira- tion are reserved for the article contributors, organized and invited by Friends of Nature, who put together yet another monumental work on current environmental issues in China in the original Green Book of Environment in Chinese published by the Social Sciences Academic Press, as one of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Yearbook series. Our appreciation is also owed to a group of volunteers who provided informational support used in the text: Song Wanzhong, Xu Kezhu, Chu Wangtai, Li Junhui, Huo Weiya, Yi Shui, Bu Xuelin, Su Yutong, Hu Yuanqiong, Zhu Yi, Liang Xiaoyan, Ding Ning, Wang Xiaoping, Yu Jie, Feng Yifan, Chen Xiaochun, Lang Huan, Mao Ju, Wen Ya, Zhao Bin, Hong Xiaoying, Hou Liwei, Bi Kun, Liao Qiang, Yu Yang, Zhou Lingxu, and Dai Xuejing. They gave unreserved support to this project, as they deeply trust Friends of Nature and share with it the same goal of protecting the environment. The task of translation could not have been accomplished without the team work of volunteers mainly from the School of English and International Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU). We are especially indebted to Zhou Yong who translated the long and informative General Report and Cai Jindong who translated Annual Indexes with numerous tables and ﬁ gures. The following volunteers completed the translation of the various chapters of the Green Book (in the order of the chapters translated): Zhu Yekun, Zhang Chunxiao, Pang Xingyu, Hao Mina, Sun Yu, Zha Min, Zhang Yanping, Wang Siying, Guo Yingbin, Liu Yimo, Zheng Qingyi, Liu Yu, Sun Tian, Lin Xue, Cao Jingshuang, Cao Xinyang, Zhang Jieping, Niu Xiaoming, Yang Xiaoli, Tan Shenglan, Liu Qiongge, Liu Li, Yang Shanru, Fu Qi, Zhang Shufang, Pei Wei, Wang Yinshan, Fang Bixia, Pu Yao, Xu Jue, Li Shuo, Wan Feng, Zhong Xiaojin, Xia Meifang, Wu Liuying, Su Yanzhai, Liu Meichen, Zhang Lu, Feng Jiemin, Lin Yun, Zhou Jingnan, Guan Yanjuan, Li Jia, Cheng Guichao, Li Chen, Fan Li, Wang Qian, Huang Feigao, and Liang Ke. xiv acknowledgements

The ﬁ rst-round translation was revised by W. Chad Futrell, Wil- liam White, Wang Lili, Zhai Zheng, Liang Hao, Jia Ning, Zhang Chunbo, Li Jinzhao, Zhao Fang, Sun Fei, Song Ying, Fu Meirong, Zhou Dujuan, Qiu Feng, Gu Qing, Dai Ning, Ke Ke’er, Zhang Baiq- ing, and Wu Wenan. Erika Scull served as the ﬁ nal translator and polisher, providing “translator’s notes” which contextualize events and organizations within the larger processes affecting China’s environment. Erika also prepared the index and a glossary with translations of important concepts, laws, and organization names. We are honored that Judith Shapiro and Guobin Yang have continued to serve on the International Advisory Board for the English edition of The China Environment Yearbook. We are grateful for their own work on China’s environment as well as giving their time and energy towards making the work of on-the-ground Chinese scholars, journalists, and NGOs more accessible to English-reading audiences. Finally, we would like to thank all the individuals and organizations who have offered their warm support to the Green Book translation project. We hope that you will continue to give your attention to the project and become more actively involved in environmental protection, a shared cause for all citizens who cherish nature and have a strong sense of responsibility for our common planet.

The Green Book Project of Friends of Nature Social Sciences Academic Press, Beijing Brill, Leiden LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Throughout this volume, Chinese names are ordered according to standard practice in China, with surnames preceding given names. To clarity this ordering, surnames are in small capital letters in the following list of contributors.

Chief Editor -Yang Dongping (杨东ؓ) is president of Friends of Nature. He is a profes sor at the Beijing Institute of Technology.

Managing Editor Zhang Boju (张伯驹) is head of the research and investigation department at Friends of Nature. He is a former youth advisor on Asia and Paciﬁ c issues for the United Nations Development Programme.

Contributors Chen Hongwei (陈宏伟) is a senior reporter and chief supervisor at the China Economic Times. As a Friends of Nature member, he has conducted many investigations and written relevant reports on environment and resources.

Fan Xiao (范晓) is a geologist from Sichuan Province. He is the general engineer of the Geological Survey Party of the Sichuan Bureau of Geological Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources and also a professor and assistant dean of the School of Tourism at Sich- uan Normal University.

Feng Jia (冯嘉) is an M.A. candidate at the Energy Conservation Law Research Institute of China University of Political Science and Law.

Feng Yongfeng (冯永锋), a member of Friends of Nature and a journalist with Guanming Daily. He has been concerned with China’s environmental protection for a long time and published a great number of articles on environmental protection. He co-launched the Nature Open University. xvi list of contributors

Gai Zhiyi (盖志毅) is the president of the Higher Education Research Institute of Inner Mongolia Agricultural University. His research ﬁ eld covers agricultural and ecological economic management.

Guo Peiyuan (郭沛源), founder and general-manager of Syn Tao, a company aimed at promoting corporate social responsibility (CSR). As a doctor of Engineering Management from Tsinghua University, he has long been devoting himself to the research and consulting of the social responsibilities of enterprises.

Hu Kanping (胡勘平) served as director of the editorial board of China Green Times, and editor-in-chief of Chinese Forestry magazine. Currently he is deputy editor-in-chief of Environmental Protection magazine published by the Ministry of Environmental Protection. As one of the oldest members of Friends of Nature, Hu is one of the ﬁ rst to show concern for environmental protection in China.

Li Dun is a professor and the head of the Experts Network, Tsinghua University Center for the Study of Contemporary China (CSCC) and Executive Director of the Social Policy Research Institute, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University. Professor Li is also the public policy consultant at Friends of Nature.

Li Hujun (李虎军) is a senior reporter at Caijing magazine. His reporting ﬁ eld covers science, technology, environment, and health. He has focused on the environmental condition of the Beijing Olympic Games in the past year.

Liang Shumin (梁书民) is an associate research fellow from the Insti- tute of Agricultural Economics and Development at the Chinese Acad- emy of Agricultural Sciences.

Lü Zhongmei (吕忠梅), S.J.D. Professor Lü is a doctorial tutor at the Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, and the president of the Environmental Law Research Center of the same university. She was the Deputy Chief Justice of the Hubei Supreme People’s Court. Due to her contribution in the ﬁ eld of Environmental Law, she was conferred with the title of “Prominent Young Jurist of China.” list of contributors xvii

Mao Da (毛达) is an M.A. candidate from Beijing Normal University. He is a member of the Non-Governmental Plastic Bag Restriction Research Group and also a member of Friends of Nature.

Peng Yan (彭艳) is the Chinese representative of Clean Air Initiative- Asia (CAI-Asia).

Piao Zhengji (朴正吉) is a senior engineer at Changbaishan Academy of Science.

Qie Jianrong (郄建荣) is a senior journalist with Legal Daily, special- izing in environmental issues. She has been awarded, by Friends of Nature, as one of the Best Journalists Reporting Environmental Issues for three consecutive years.

Ruan Qiangyuan (阮清鸳) is a research fellow of the Public Environ- ment Research Center.

Judith Shapiro is the Director of Global Environmental Politics programs at American University’s School of International Service in Washington, DC. She has published extensively on modern and contemporary China, including Mao’s War against Nature (Cambridge, 2001), an account of China’s political campaigns to conquer the natural world.

Shen Xiaohui (沈孝辉), a member of Friends of Nature, is a Member of the Chinese National Committee for Man and the Biosphere Pro- gram, and senior engineer of the State Forestry Administration. He has worked in the ﬁ eld of protected areas, forests, wetlands, deserti- ﬁ cation, and wild animals and has been an activist in environmental protection. He has published over 300 books, articles, and papers.

Su Jianhua (苏建华) is a project manager of Syn Tao. She is an M.A. student of Business Management at China University of Mining and Technology.

Tian Kun (田昆) is a professor. Dr. Tian is the deputy director of the National Research Center of Plateau Wetlands and his ﬁ eld of research is mainly the study of wetlands. xviii list of contributors

Wang Jingjing (王晶晶) is a research fellow at the Public Environment Research Center.

Guobin Yang is Associate Professor of Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures at Barnard College, Columbia University. He has published over twenty journal articles and book chapters on contemporary social issues in China, including environmental activism, voluntary associations, and the politics of the internet.

Yu Chen (喻尘) is a journalist with the South Metropolis Daily. During his more than ten years as a journalist, he has shown deep concern for environmental pollution and public health.

Zhang Ke (章轲) is a senior journalist with First Financial Daily, council member of the Association of Environmental Journalists in China, the Capital Youth Journalists Association, and the Media Committee in China Environment Culture Promotion Association. He has published a number of inﬂ uential reports on environmental issues.

Zhang Shiqiu (张世秋) is a professor from Peking University. Dr. Zhang is the head of the Environment and Economy Research Insti- tute and the deputy-dean of the College of Environmental Sciences and Engineering. Her research area covers environmental economics and environmental policies and management.

Zhuang Guiyang (庄贵阳) is an associate professor from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Research Center for Sustainable Development. His ﬁ elds are global environmental problems and sustainable development.

Zi You (子由) is an environmental protection volunteer. PREFACE

A new volume of the China Environment Yearbook, which is published annually, is now presented to our readers. Since the book was fi rst planned in 2005, Friends of Nature (FON) has always tried to position it as a book series consisting of reports that present, record, and assess the status of coordination between China’s environment and development. We have managed to publish a volume each year despite all the diffi culties. Volume 4 continues our original idea, as we selected major and hot issues relevant to China’s environment and development that occurred in 2008. For the sake of public interest, we reviewed and analyzed those issues from the perspective of civil society. China’s environmental issues were closely tied to the nation’s destiny in 2008. When it comes to the environment, Beijing performed satisfac- torily during the 2008 Olympic Games. Nonetheless, it was still faced with serious environmental issues, such as air pollution and a shortage of water resources, and it needed to meet numerous challenges, such as climate change. The Sichuan Earthquake that occurred in May 2008 damaged and even destroyed many large-scale works along with having a severe environmental impact and secondary disasters. It also taught the public a lesson about how to live in harmony with nature. With a snow and ice disaster at the beginning of the year and the earthquake in May, more attention was being paid to environmental and ecological issues while the disaster relief work was underway. Meanwhile, cooperation among the government, enterprises, NGOs, communities, volunteers, and even the international community, based on the concept of good governance, also serves as a reference for later environmental rehabilitation. With the fi nancial crisis that began to affect the whole world at the end of the year, people have had a deeper understanding of the tough challenges for environmental rehabilitation. Much space in this volume is devoted to those major environmental issues on the country level, with expatiation on the process of environmental protection in the context of natural disasters, economic crises, and major events. This volume continues to look at the effects of China’s environmental policies and the government’s environmental actions. China faced challenges and opportunities for energy conservation and emissions xx preface reduction in 2008—a year critical for both tasks—when it remained under pressure to achieve its objectives for both of them and could not be optimistic about “the arrival of the turning point.” As a major event in environmental protection for the year, the Chinese government’s restriction on the use of plastic bags saw remarkable effects on reduced use of such bags. Nonetheless, unregulated plastics bags were still overused, as policies such as those relevant to recycling made no substantial progress. The so-called collective forest ownership reform motivated farmers, but it was also likely to bring about negative ecological consequences. The concept of a low-carbon economy entered China across the board, as local governments made aggressive moves along with immediate responses from civil society. 2008 was a milestone in environmental legislation and enforcement in China, when a series of environmental laws with great infl uence were promulgated or amended and with the emergence of local environmental courts and relevant public-interest lawsuits. They not only have had positive effects on the adjusted environmental factors, but also act as a pilot for the improvement and enforcement of numerous environmental laws in the future. The concept of public participation was widely promoted, as environmental legislation itself became one of the major approaches to public participation in environmental protection. Nonetheless, there remained serious problems with environmental legislation in China, where some environmental laws had yet to be promulgated or improved, and, to a greater extent, with the enforcement of such laws. With the arsenic pollution of the Yangzonghai Lake as an example, environmental pollution remained severe in China. The pollution of inland rivers and lakes was not noticeably reduced, while overall offshore pollution was severe. Most of the sewage outlets continued to discharge excessive pollutants into the seas, leading to severe environmental pollution in the sea areas around some of them. Frequent agricultural pollution incidents caused heavy fi nancial losses to both the Chinese economy and farmers; such problems received increasing attention from society at large. The disposal of urban solid wastes had become a long-term problem, while new problems such as noise and electromagnetic radiation pollution were emerging in cities. Given all those complex environmental problems in China, we propose in the China Environment Yearbook, Volume 4 that the government should keep increasing its capacity of comprehensive decision and macro-control while promoting public participation in environmental rehabilitation. preface xxi

The former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) having been upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) indicated another solid step in the transformation of China’s environmental administration system. With a series of environmental economic policies announced by the environmental authority, requirements for environmental protection covered all the aspects of economic policies. That was a bright spot in a new era of environmental protection. 2008 was such a year that anyone who could perceive social and human development, who had a high sense of duty for it, and who was conscientious about it must pay attention to both environmental pollution and ecological damage—part of whose aftermath is irreversible. As a result, environmental rehabilitation cannot be delayed. The China Environment Yearbook values recording, reviewing, and considering China’s environmental conditions from the perspective of civil society. It is based primarily upon data and facts with its focus on demonstration and authenticity, thereby making it authoritative. We hope that this volume can serve as a window through which readers learn about the current status of China’s environment and obtain useful information. We are grateful to the Delta Environmental and Educational Foun- dation (DEEF) for its funding the publication of the China Environment Yearbook, Volume 4.

Yang Dongping August 2009

INTRODUCTION

Arthur P.J. Mol

The international UNFCCC negotiations in December 2009 in Copen- hagen on a new global climate change agreement did not only show the failure of the international community to take their responsibility. It also illustrated the changing international relations and division of power in such negotiations. Since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997, the main players in the negotiations on international climate change policies have been the so-called Annex 1 countries, with the EU representing the leaders in global climate change policies, and the US representing the laggards. Copenhagen, however, showed that a new world order has emerged, where Brazil, India, South Africa and—last but not least—China claim equal infl uence in global climate change politics and have been equally important in determining out- comes. As such, China is not only the world leader in greenhouse gas emissions, but has also moved to the fore as one of the key players in global environmental politics. Hence, following the mounting role of China in global environmental politics, there is an increasing interest around the world to know more on China’s commitment, policies, institutions and activities with respect to environmental protection. Negotiators at Copenhagen, private companies investing in China, global environmental advocates, and media representatives are all increasingly focused on the domestic and global dynamic of China’s environmental politics. This interest is further cultivated with China’s growing efforts in outgoing Foreign Direct Investments (in natural resource industries, but also in numerous other sectors) and in export trade (of among others food, cloth, toys, electronics), all of which are quite relevant for environmental protection. By the same token, there are still too many stereotypi- cal, simplistic and one-sided ideas on China’s environmental policies, practices and performance. Outside China, one easily fi nds one-sided stories condemning China for robbing Africa of its natural resources, for bringing bird fl u and contaminated products to Western markets, and for not allowing any popular participation, media freedom or environmental movements in domestic environmental politics. At the same time, others only applaud China for its massive reforestation xxiv introduction programs; for its leading global role in renewable energy development and implementation, and for its massive closure of polluting industries, unheard of in Western countries. Too easily such stories can present a caricature of China, and fail to look deeper into the internal dynamics, variations, contrasts and diversities inside the country. Understanding environmental politics in China does not allow for simple one-liners, but requires detailed, balanced and refi ned analyses. This English edition of the China Environment Yearbook, Volume 4 offers such insights, deeper understanding and balanced analyses of what is actually happening in environmental protection in China. The volume shows also how the struggles, advances and setback of China’s environmental reform are perceived, analyzed and assessed by Chinese scholars themselves. As such, this volume forms—again, similar to the former three volumes—a unique contribution to our knowledge and understanding of China’s struggles, commitments, and confl icts over environmental protection and improvements. Many of the themes that are covered by its 22 chapters do not sound unfamiliar for environmental scholars, practitioners and activists from other parts of the globe. Industrial pollution, natural resource depletion, nature conservation, genetically modifi ed crops, cars and mobility, marine pollution and plastic bags are all subjects only too familiar to environmentalists, environmental policy-makers and environmental academics and professionals in other countries. But the chapters also give evidence of the typical ‘Chinese characteristics’ in environmental struggles, successes and setbacks. Environmental politics in China have their own dynamics, distinct from what we fi nd in, for instance, the EU, the US or Australia, including: People’s Political Consultative Conferences, environmental policy principles unheard of in the West, specifi c relations between state authorities and market dynamics, particular relations between central Beijing and local regional authorities, media dynamics that can be both surprisingly open and worryingly restrictive, very specifi c land use rights systems, etc. Through the 22 chapters of this book, better insight can be gained about the similarities and differences of Chinese environmental protections and those of other countries. Beside the general appraisal of China’s environmental protection endeavors, this volume also contains quite a few timely chapters on recent developments, innovative practices, and environmental reforms that are equally new in Western countries. This all provides us up to date insights on, for instance: the state of the art in Open Access to Environmental Information following the 2008 law, the ex post introduction xxv facto environmental assessment of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, new experiments with Payment for Environmental Services (in China often referred to as Ecological Compensation), decentralization policies in forest and land management and the advancement of ideas on a low carbon economy. These are all topics that are also high on the agenda and in full development in other economically more advanced countries. The chapters in this volume make us aware of, as well as make us understand and make us appreciate the specifi c dynamics of environmental struggles in China. That is, appreciate in the sense that on the full range of environmental threats, Chinese citizens and professionals show awareness of the issues, develop activities to turn disastrous tides, and develop innovative environmental reform practices and systems. That is hopeful for China itself and also for the international community that is increasingly worried about the global environmental impacts of a rapidly developing China. But by the same token, this volume also reports on the stagnations, failures, obstructions and set backs in environmental protection. It reports on unreliable and falsifi ed statistics, on poor records and poor transparency in company environmental reporting, on the growing challenges in coastal and marine environmental quality, and on the limited public participation and poor enforcement of environmental laws. In addition, the volume quantifi es developments in quite a few environmental indicators over the last years (in air quality and emissions, water pollution and quality, energy consumption). Coming from an Ecological Modernization tradition, my conclusion is that this China Environment Yearbook shows that also in China environmental considerations and interests increasingly become institutionalized in economic, political and civil society practices and institutions. This process of institutionalization is not automatic and goes with ups and down, successes and set backs. The authors that have contributed to this volume have illuminated where these successes and set backs are, and what can and needs to be done to further this process of institutionalization. This is extremely important and helpful for environmentalists, policy-makers and practitioners in China as it helps them to defi ne their strategies priorities and actions. But it is also of key importance for their western equivalents. In our global interde- pendent world, where there are so many economic, political, cultural and environmental interdependencies across the world, one cannot be disconnected from China’s environmental future. xxvi introduction

Arthur P.J. Mol is chair and professor in environmental policy, Department of Social Sciences Wageningen University, the Nether- lands; Director of the Wageningen School of Social Sciences at the same institution; and professor in environmental policy at the School of Environment and Natural resources, Renmin University, China. VOLUME OVERVIEW

GENERAL REPORT

WE ARE ALL VICTIMS OF POLLUTION AND RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR PLANET

Li Dun*

Introduction

2008 was such a moment in human history that anybody who paid attention to social and human development, who had a sense of responsibility, and who had a clear conscience could not help but be concerned about environmental pollution and damage to the ecosystem. The overall trend of environmental deterioration has not been controlled in China, where environmental accidents and disasters keep occurring. China’s environmental problems have already been in a global context since the “reform and opening up period” three decades ago. In other words, these problems are relevant not only to China, but also to the entire globe. During the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Part of China (CPC) held in October 2007, it was proclaimed that China will change its economic growth mode and consumption pattern, control and prevent environmental pollution, and rehabilitate the ecosystem. Why was this announced in such an unprecedented way? Reasons include the new governance philosophies of “human- oriented,” “harmonious society,” “harmonious world,” and “harmony between humans and nature”; opinions and actions from civil society; and the looming environmental problems, accidents, and disasters. For China, 2008 began with an abrupt disaster. Snow and ice nearly paralyzed Southern China where railway and road transportation and power were partially interrupted. One hundred twenty-nine people were killed and four others are unaccounted for.1 A powerful earthquake struck Sichuan Province on May 12th where 69,227 people

* Li Yifang contributed to the analysis framework and information collection for the writing of this article, but the opinions of the report do not represent Li Yifang. 1 The State Council, “Report on Fighting against Low Temperatures, Freezing Rain, Snow, and Ice Disasters, as well as Post-Disaster Reconstruction,” April 22nd, 2008. 4 li dun were killed, 17,923 others were unaccounted for, and 370,000 were injured.2 It was followed by other disasters including an earthquake in Panzhihua, Huili (攀枝花会理) and other areas in Sichuan and Yun- nan Provinces where 41 people were killed;3 rainstorms and resulting fl oods in Southern China where 309 people were killed and 13 others unaccounted for;4 Typhoon Hagupit which killed 13 people, three others were unaccounted for, and 11,530,000 were affected;5 and fi nally, an earthquake that struck Damxung (当雄), Tibet, where ten people were killed, 54 others injured, and 61,231 were affected.6 Not all disasters are relevant to environmental problems, but environmental and ecological problems may induce disasters and cause increased damage from disasters to human beings. Both kinds of problems tend to be connected with secondary disasters (environmental pollution), adding to the damage to human beings. Environmental and ecological problems affect not only the quality and cost of living of the current population, but also the living conditions of their descendents. In addition, they are directly harmful to human health and lives. Environmental pollution is causing an increased number of sick patients. Pollution-caused diseases play a growing role in the total human deaths, and they are even leading to lower reproductive capacity and infertility among more and more people. Back in 2006, malignant tumors overtook cerebrovascular and heart diseases as the leader among the fi rst ten causes of death in rural and

2 “69,227 People Killed and 17,923 Others Are Unaccounted For in the Sichuan Earth- quake,” China News, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/09–25/1394600 .shtml, September 25th, 2009. http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/09–25/ 1394600.shtml, September 25, 2008. 3 Li Wei’Ao, “The Death Toll in an Earthquake Striking Panzhihua, Huili and Other Areas Has Risen to 41,” Caijing Magazine, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-09-06/ 110010785.html, September 6th, 2008. 4 “309 People Have Been Killed in Floods Here in China, Where 62,200,000 People Have Been Affected,” China News, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-07-14/ 151715929838.shtml, July 14th, 2008. 5 Li Fei, “The Ministry of Civil Affairs Said Typhoon Hagupit Killed 13 People, with Three Others Unaccounted For,” The Chinese Central Government’s Offi cial Web Portal, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008–09/25/content_1106008.htm, September 25th, 2008. 6 “More than 9,000 People Have Been Moved to Safety in the Quake-Stricken Damxung, Tibet,” Huaxia, http://www.huaxia.com/xw/gdxw/2008/10/1192050 .html, October 16th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 5 urban areas in China.7 The mortality rate of malignant tumors has increased by 83.1% from the mid-1970s and 22.5% since the early 1990s. The lung cancer mortality rate has increased by 530% over the past three decades. All those were relevant to both the environment and ways of living, said the Ministry of Health (MOH) when it published the result of the third survey on causes of death among citizens. At a critical moment, the Action Plan on Environment and Health (2007–2015) (国家环境与健康行动计划 2007–2015) was launched in November 2007, and an inter-ministerial work leading group was established in January 2008. This work leading group consists of nearly twenty ministries, commissions, and offi ces, such as the MOH, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the National Development and Reform Commis- sion (NDRC), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the State Admin- istration of Work Safety (SAWS). It was established at a time when the Chinese economy was booming, but lower environmental quality, ecological imbalance, and damage to public health—all of which are caused by environmental pollution—are becoming increasingly critical factors against sustainable economic growth and social harmony. The group announced that it will give the highest priorities to environment- and health-related work of the government; work hard to address major environmental problems harmful to public health and make sure that both the environment and public health are well protected; defi ne standards for drinking water, indoor air, electromagnetic radiation (EMR), and biological contamination of soil; conduct measurements of loads on the human body, such as major environmental chemical pollutants and ambient EMR, and assess characteristics that affect health; build networks that monitor drinking water safety and security, air pollution, soil environment, extreme weather and climate events, and public health; build networks that monitor public-space sanitation and particular-space biosafety; conduct real-time, systematic monitoring of environmental pollution and its damages to health; improve the information release system; build a national environment- and health-information sharing and service system; and

7 Reported by Zeng Liming in the China News on May 8th, 2007. 6 li dun

provide adequate information services to decision makers, administra- tors, researchers, and the public. Everyone who cares about human health and lives should pay attention to environmental and ecological problems and endeavor to save our planet from this point on.

I. Environmental Problems

Problems related to the environment, resources, and ecology in 2008 primarily included climate change; water pollution and a shortage of water resources; air pollution and acid rain; soil contamination, farmland decrease, soil erosion, and desertiﬁ cation; solid waste pollution; noise and light pollution; radiation and other pollution; and a decrease in forests, grasslands, and biodiversity.

A. Climate Change Climate change received much attention in 2008. There were 20 consecutive warm winters across China from 1986 to 2005.8 The annual average temperature in China was 1.3% higher in 2007 than before.9 Climate change has led to less precipitation in North China, Northwest China, and Northeast China, among which both North China and Northeast China suffer from droughts. Climate change has also led to more precipitation in South China and Southwest China. Extreme weather and climate events, such as ﬂ oods along the lower and middle reaches of the Yangtze River and in southeast regions, have brought notably greater effects on human lives. The annual average sea level around China is increasing at a rate higher than the global average. Glaciers in mountainous regions are receding quickly.10

8 China’s National Climate Change Program issued by the NDRC in June 2007. 9 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. 10 China’s National Climate Change Program issued by the NDRC in June 2007. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 7

The average temperature will rise faster in China. The annual average temperature will keep rising in China. The drought-stricken area may increase and desertiﬁ cation may become more intense, while the annual average precipitation across China is increasing. The sea level will continue increasing. Glaciers on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and the Tianshan Mountains will recede faster and smaller ones will dis- appear altogether. According to China’s National Climate Change Program (CNCCP), the resulting extreme weather and climate events will have a great impact on economic and social development, as well as human lives. The annual average increase of the total greenhouse gas emission was 4% in China in the period of 1994–2004. Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide accounted for 83%, 11.8% and 5.4% of the total greenhouse gas emissions in 2004, respectively. The greenhouse gas emission per capita in China is lower than the global average, but it ranks second in terms of the total emission and will likely overtake the United States in the near future. When it comes to climate change due to human activities in China, the greatest cause is coal mining and its use in power generation and heating; the second is deforestation; the third is the use of petrochemical products by vehicles such as aircraft and automobiles; and the fourth is waste piling or pyrophoric-gas discharging. We should also note different opinions about climate change, its aftermath, and policy response. “The panic about ‘global warming’ is nothing but hype . . . China should not reduce energy consumption for it,” said Huo Yuping (霍裕平), a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) National Committee, an academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), and professor at Zhengzhou University, in an interview during the annual sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the CPPCC in 2007.11

B. Water Resources and Water Shortages12 There are several serious problems related to water that the Chinese people are aware of and that affect the quality of their living and even

11 Wu Yanxia, “Is Global Warming Being Hyped by Groups of Interest?”, Yanzhao Urban News, March 5th, 2007. 12 Data in this section is from “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environ- ment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. 8 li dun threaten their survival. These include water pollution, a serious shortage of water resources, soil erosion that causes muddy water, and fl ooding. Rivers, lakes, reservoirs, water diversion projects, groundwater, and seas in China have long been polluted, leading to an increasing shortage of drinking water required for human survival. Drinking water is unavailable in some areas for particular periods of time. Both drinking water pollution and contamination of foods such as grains, vegetables, and aquatic products caused by water pollution lead to diseases and deaths. “The overall water quality of the seven major river systems is the same as last year,” said an offi cial report published in June 2008. In other words, the status of water pollution remains unchanged. In general, river systems are moderately polluted. Among them, the Liaohe (辽河) and Haihe (海河) Rivers are both heavily polluted; the section of the Minjiang River (岷江) that runs through Meishan City (眉山市), which is part of the Yangtze River system, is heavily polluted; and tributaries of the Yellow River are all heavily polluted. Level IV and V water and worse than Level V water account for 26.5% and 23.6%, respectively, according to measurements from 407 cross-sections of 197 rivers of the seven river systems.13 In other words, those levels combine to represent 50.1%. Levels IV and V represent 59.49% of the quality of water in regions included in the water resource survey and assessment in China, according to the latest fi gures.14 Lake eutrophication is prominent. As of the end of 2008, 75% of the lakes in China were eutrophic.15 In addition, four of the 28 state-controlled lakes (reservoirs), or 14.3% of them, were at Level IV in water quality; fi ve others, or 17.9%, were at Level V; and eleven, or 39.3%,

13 Translator’s note: The Surface Water Quality Standard passed by SEPA in 1988 rates water in fi ve categories. Level I refers to river source water in nature reserves. Level II is suitable for drinking water without treatment, swimming, Grade I Protected Areas, and rare and sensitive aquatic life. Level III is suitable for drinking water with some treatment, swimming, Grade II Protected Areas, and ordinary and unprotected aquatic life. Level IV is suitable for non-body contact recreational use. Level V is suitable for agricultural and landscaping. Worse than Level V refers to water completely toxic and unusable. Note that Grade I Protected Areas include river source areas and national level nature reserves. 14 Ru Xin et al., The China Society Yearbook, Volume 3, p. 217, published by Social Sciences Academic Press (SSAP) in December 2008. 15 Ru Xin, et al., The China Society Yearbook, Volume 3, p. 217, published by SSAP in December 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 9 were worse than Level V. In other words, 20 of those lakes, or 71.5% of them, had Level IV or lower water quality. Specifi cally, the Taihu (太湖), Dianchi (滇池), Baiyangdian (白洋淀), Dalai (达赉湖), and Hongze (洪泽) Lakes were worse than Level V; Chaohu (巢湖) and Nansi (南四湖) Lakes were at Level V; the Dongting (洞庭湖), Poyang (鄱阳湖), Jingbo (镜泊湖), and Xingkai (兴凯湖) Lakes were in Level IV; and among city lakes, the Xihu (西湖) (in Hangzhou), Donghu (东湖) (in Wuhan), Xuanwu (玄武湖) (in Nanjing), and Daming (大明湖) (in Jinan) Lakes were worse than Level V. Among large reservoirs, the Laoshan Reservoir (崂山水库) and the Menlou Reservoir (门楼水库) were worse than Level V; the Dahuofang Reservoir (大伙房水库), Yuqiao Reservoir (于桥水库), and Songhuahu Reservoir (松花湖水库) were at Level V. Among the ten cross-sections monitored along the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, those with Levels IV and V water quality accounted for 40%, and those with worse than Level V water quality accounted for 30%. Level IV water refers to water that is unsuitable for drinking and bodily contact; Level V water refers to water that is not suitable for industrial use and that can be used only for farmland irrigation; worse than Level V water is toxic and even unsuitable for farmland irrigation. Nonetheless, poor quality water with these levels tends to be widely used in fi elds where its use is prohibited. Most of the areas with decreasing quality of groundwater were in North China, Northeast China, and Northwest China, according to an offi cial report. Among the Bohai (渤海), Huanghai (黄海), Donghai (东海), and Nanhai (南海) Seas around China, the Donghai Sea, as a whole, the Liaodong Bay (辽东湾) and Bohai Bay of the Bohai Sea, the Jiaozhou Bay (胶州湾) of the Huanghai Sea, and the Zhujiang River (珠江) mouth of the Nanhai Sea were heavily polluted, also according to an offi cial report. As for offshore sea areas around China, Levels I and II seawater accounted for 62.8%, or 4.9% lower in 2008 than in 2006; Level III accounted for 11.8%, or 3.8% higher; Level IV and lower accounted for 25.4%, or 1.1% higher. This suggests that seawater pollution has worsened. The overall water quality at 169 cross-sections of rivers that fl ow into the seas was quite poor. The amount of pollutants discharged into the seas from rivers was larger than the one of pollutants directly from their sources, according to the latest data from relevant authorities 10 li dun that refl ects both the status of pollutants discharged into the seas from the land and pollution incidents. The total amounts of major pollutants into the seas included 4,432,100 tons of permanganates, 841,500 tons of ammonia nitrogen, 60,200 tons of petroleum pollutants, and 249,700 tons of total phosphorus. The total amount of discharged sewage directly into the seas from 707 industrial and domestic pollutant sources and all-in-one discharging outlets each with a daily amount of discharged sewage greater than 100 tons reached 415,900 tons. The amounts of discharged pollutants included: 414,900 tons of chemical oxygen demand (COD), 2,842 tons of petroleum pollutants, 50,560 tons of ammonia nitrogen, 4,812.8 tons of total phosphorus, 0.23 tons of mercury, 27.13 tons of hexavalent chromium, 14.5 tons of lead, and 2.24 tons of cadmium. There were 107 pollution incidents caused by watercraft on the seas. Seventy-three pollution incidents occurred in marine fi shery water areas. There were 82 red tides on the seas, including 25 toxic ones. “Cancer villages” caused by water pollution in areas such as the Huaihe River Basin have received much attention after they were covered by the offi cial media, including China Central Television (CCTV). The result of a joint investigation by the MOH and the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) has yet to be announced. Both the Songhua River toxic spill crisis at the end of 2006 and the blue algae outbreak in water areas such as the Taihu, Dianchi, and Chaohu Lakes in the summer of 2007 made it impossible for the affected areas to use water from existing sources. Instead, local residents had to use water from elsewhere. The outbreak put both the governments and residents under heavy pressure. That was why the issue of aquatic environment rehabilitation for Taihu Lake was addressed at an executive meeting of the State Council in 2008. Meanwhile, an inter-ministry joint conference for environmental protection was held to tackle the Songhua River (松花江) toxic spill crisis. It was pointed out at the executive meeting of the State Council that problems with the aquatic environment of Taihu Lake remained serious, that pollution continued while the rehabilitation efforts were under way, and that the aquatic environment was still deteriorating.16

16 “Wen Jiabao Chaired a State Council Meeting to Study and Deploy Water Pol- lution Control and Prevention for Taihu Lake,” www.xinhuanet.com, http://news .xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008–04/02/content_7906833.htm, April 2nd, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 11

Relevant local regulations were revised after the meeting. The Jiangsu provincial government invested two billion RMB and the Wuxi (无锡) municipal government decided to try its best to rehabilitate the aquatic environment. Thirty-three monitoring stations were set up to enhance monitoring, while mutual and surprise inspections were conducted. Top offi cials were responsible for pollution control and prevention for 64 rivers. An offi cial accountability system was implemented. Nine hundred polluting enterprises were shut down. Moreover, the water source for the city of Wuxi was extended by three kilometers toward the center of Taihu Lake and water was also diverted to the city from the Yangtze River 40 kilometers away in order to avoid unacceptable water quality and pollution at the source of drinking water. An action against water pollution named “753” (“7” refers to seven major cities including Harbin, Jilin, Changchun, Mudanjiang, Qiqihar, Daq- ing, and Jiamusi; “5” refers to fi ve rivers including the Ashi, Hulan, Yinma, Yitong, and Mudan Rivers; and “3” refers to three sources of drinking water) was carried out along the Songhua River.17 While water-related problems were being addressed in areas such as Taihu Lake in 2008, they occurred in Anhui Province, Yunnan Province, and the Yangtze River basin. The area of blue algae bloom in Anhui Province’s Chaohu Lake was larger than in the corresponding period of the previous year, as the quality of the water in the lake remained heavily polluted for fi ve consecutive months. Yangzonghai Lake, one of the nine largest lakes in Yunnan Prov- ince, had such high arsenic content that the Yunnan Provincial government issued a ban in September prohibiting people from drinking water from the lake, swimming or bathing there, or fi shing for aquatic life. Water blooms occurred in the Xiangxi River (香溪河), a branch of the Yangtze River, and the local government of Xingshan County (兴山县), Hubei Province, had to issue a ban prohibiting humans and livestock from drinking water from the river or eating fi sh from sections where water blooms occurred.18 Water has been fl owing more slowly in the Yangtze River since the Three Gorges Dam began to store water, leading to water blooms in backwater areas in all 12 of

17 Wang Xiaodong, “The Blue Algae in the Taihu Lake—Water Problems from Land,” People’s Daily, June 18th, 2008. 18 “Water Blooms Occurred in the Xiangxi River Again—What Happened to the Branch of the Yangtze River,” Southern Weekend, June 22nd, 2008. 12 li dun its branches with Level I water quality. Water blooms occurred more frequently year by year after 2004.19 There are concerns that more severe water pollution may occur in both the Three Gorges Reservoir areas and the Yangtze River basin during the fl ood season. As a result, the Chinese government regards environmental rehabilitation in those areas as one of its major tasks. Reasons for large area water pollution include discharge of untreated sewage from industries such as textile, chemical, papermaking, iron and steel, electroplating, food, mining, and quarrying (sewage from coal washing and selection by nationwide coal mines alone is up to 40 million tons per year, as sewage from them account for 25% of the total in China); discharge of untreated domestic sewage; chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and feedstuffs; and toxic substances from solid wastes piled in the open air. Seawater pollution resulted from the sedimentation of atmospheric pollutants and crude oil leakages in addition to sewage discharged into seas from the land, industrial waste, and radioactive substances. Water pollution causes more diseases and threatens human health and even life. “Cancers have risen to rank the fi rst among the fi ve major chronic diseases, according to a report from the MOH in 2007. Both urban pollution and environmental deterioration are the main reasons for the high occurrence of cancers.”20 “There are more than 50 and 60 kinds of organic pollutants in the Yangtze and Jialing Rivers.” “Organic pollutants tend to be toxic and may adversely affect the reproductive system and even cause cancer.”21 “MCRST, one of the secondary metabolites from blue algae blooms, can damage the liver and cause cancer.” It threatens human beings through drinking water and the food chain.22 In addition, both water that contains excessive fl uorine and arsenic, or schistosoma ova and saline water, threaten human health. In 2008 alone, the Chinese government planned to

19 Yang Guishan, Weng Lida and Li Lifeng, Yangtze Conservation and Development Report 2007, Changjiang Press, 2007. 20 Zhang Chunwei, “Li Fuxing Said ‘I Object to Formulating National Standards for Puriﬁ ed Water,’ ” Southern Weekend, March 26th, 2008. 21 The Third Military Medical University, “Information Analysis and Countermea- sure Research on Safety Technologies for Water Resources in Chongqing,” October 2004. 22 “Water Blooms Occurred in the Xiangxi River Again—What Happened to the Branch of the Yangtze River,” Southern Weekend, June 22nd, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 13 solve the problem of the drinking water supply for 32.05 million people who had been drinking such water.23 Ocean pollution causes frequent red tides, damage to mangrove forests, a sharply decreasing output of sea products, and damage to human health. Water pollution also triggers interregional disputes and mass incidents in China and even international disputes.24 Such environmental pollution has lead to a 29% annual average increase of mass incidents. Public visits to governmental agencies due to environmental pollution increased by twelve times from 1995 to 2005: there were about 700,000 such visits in both 2006 and 2007.25 The People’s Daily reported that “The average number of environmental emergencies is one every two days, while complaints about environmental pollution are increasing at a 30% annual rate.”26 A decreasing total amount of water resources with increasing water consumption is another serious problem that coexists with water pollution. (The total amount of water resources in 2006 decreased by 8.9% yearly, while water consumption increased by 1.5%.) Sichuan Prov- ince suffered a severe spring drought, as more than 100,000 people had to rely on water from elsewhere to meet daily needs.

C. Air Pollution and Acid Rain Air quality data show that heavily polluted cities are mostly in Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Sichuan, Beijing, Jiangsu, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Liaoning, Hunan, Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, Henan, and Chongqing by annual average concentration of particles, according to an ofﬁ cial report. Cities with high annual average concentration of sulfur dioxide are mainly found in Shanxi, Guizhou, Inner

23 Yao Runfeng, “32.05 Million Villagers Will Gain Access to Safe Water This Year,” Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008–01/24/content_7489784.htm, January 24th, 2008. 24 Translator’s note: “Mass incident” is a Chinese euphemism for a large protest, riot, demonstration, or mass petition. 25 Zhang Hui and Xie Yunfei, “Survey Report on Protection of Public Interest in Water Pollution Accidents in the Three Gorges Reservoir Areas—Legal Architecture Analysis of Class Action Lawsuits on Environmental Pollution,” Nanfengchuang Maga- zine, December 7th, 2008. 26 MEP Vice Minister Zhou Jian’s Address at the Asian Environmental Auditing Seminar, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/info/ldjh/200812/t20081215_132397.htm, Decem- ber 15th, 2008. 14 li dun

Mongolia, Yunnan, Chongqing, Hunan, Hebei, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Gansu, Anhui, Henan, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Tianjin by annual. Cities with high annual average concentration of nitrogen dioxide are mostly in Xinjiang, Beijing, Guangdong, Zheji- ang, Jiangsu, and Shanghai. In 2007, the emitted amounts of major air pollutants included 24.681 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 9.863 million tons of soot, and 6.99 million tons of industrial dust—all of which were smaller than in 2006. Acid rain occurred mostly in regions south of the Yangtze River and east of both Sichuan and Yunnan, including Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Hunan, Fujian, Chongqing, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Zhu- jiang River Delta. They occurred in 281 of the 500 cities that were monitored, or 56.2% of them. Among them, 171 cities, or 34.2% of them, had a frequency of acid rain occurrence of at least 25%, and 65 cities, or 13% of them, had a frequency of at least 75%.27 As for the air quality in cities at the prefecture level that were monitored, 3.4% of them were below the national Level III standards, 36.1% of them met the Level III standards, 58.1% of them met the Level II standards, and only 2.4% of them met the Level I standards. Up to 90.94% of the major industrial enterprises were able to consistently meet relevant standards for the average emitted amount of soot, but fewer than 20% of such enterprises in many cities such as Wusu (乌苏) in Xinjiang, Guiping (桂平) in Guangxi, Erguna (额尔古纳) in Inner Mongolia, Fuquan (福泉) in Guizhou, Wuchuan (川) in Guangdong, and Qingyang (庆阳) in Gansu were able to do so. Up to 90.73% of the major industrial enterprises were able to consistently meet relevant standards for the average emitted amount of sulfur dioxide, but fewer than 20% of such enterprises in many cities such as Wusu in Xinjiang, Luxi (潞西) in Yunnan, Wuchuan in Guangdong, Erenhot (二连浩特) in Inner Mongolia, both Suzhou and Liu’an (六安) in Anhui, Baishan (白山) in Jilin, and Fuquan in Guizhou were able to do so. Up to 90.16% of the major industrial enterprises were able to consistently meet relevant standards for the average emitted amount of dust, but fewer than 10% of such enterprises in many cities such as

27 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 15

Hotan (和田) in Xinjiang, Jieshou (界首) in Anhui, Erenhot in Inner Mongolia, Fuquan in Guizhou, and Pu’er (普洱) in Yunnan were able to do so.28 A speciﬁ c study reveals the effects of coal mining on the air quality in China. Coal mining, transportation, and utilization all cause severe environmental pollution. The gas (primarily methane) from coal mining is one of the major gases that cause climate change, and its greenhouse effect is 21 times that of carbon dioxide. The emitted amount of the gas from nationwide coal mines reached 15.33 billion cubic meters in 2005, which was equivalent to 2.2 billion tons of carbon dioxide. There are more than 1,500 coal gangue dumps in China’s state- owned coal mines alone, including 389 dumps with long-term spontaneous combustion, which produce large amounts of toxic or harmful gases, such as sulfur dioxide, carbon dioxide, and carbon monoxide. There are more than 6,000 coal yards in China, and most of them are open-air ones that are short of dustproof and sedimentation equipment. They lead to about ten million tons of coal dust every year, with another eleven million tons from coal transportation. Coal combustion is the major source of air pollution in China, where it accounts for 70% of the soot emission, 85% of the sulfur dioxide emission, 67% of the nitrogen oxide emission, and 80% of the carbon dioxide emission. The lung cancer mortality rate had the highest gray correlation with the total suspended particles (TSP) nine years ago, according to the conclusion of an analysis on data about the lung cancer mortality rate of the population and the annual average concentration of the TSP in the atmosphere conducted by Chen Shijie (陈士杰) and other researchers. The effects of air pollution on the mortality rates of respiratory and cardiovascular system diseases among Beijing citizens are 41 and 59 more people per day, respectively. This data comes from the conclusion of an analysis on data about mortality causes, air pollution, and weather in all the eight districts of Beijing and its suburbs in the period of January 2004 to September 2005 conducted by Dr. Zhao Yue (赵越) from the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (CAEP) under the MEP.

28 “Report on Urban Environment Management and Comprehensive Rehabilita- tion in China (2007)” published by the MEP on October 17th, 2008. 16 li dun

“The biggest problem for cities today is complex air pollution from photochemical smog and ﬁ ne particles, rather than sulfur dioxide,” said Zhang Yuanhang (张远航), the head of the College of Environ- mental Sciences at Peking University. The main component of haze—atmospheric particles smaller than

2.5µm in aerodynamic equivalent diameter (PM2.5)—are not factored into air quality measures; yet, they are the most “toxic” ones, according to Yang Zhongyi, the head of the Institute of Environment and Ecology at Sun Yat-sen University. When it comes to haze in China, problems are now more serious in the Zhujiang River Delta, the Sich- uan Basin, the Yangtze River Delta, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei Province, and the Northeast China Plain than in the other regions. A report published by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in November 2008 warned that Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and some other regions in China have been enveloped by atmospheric brown clouds (ABCs). Such pollution causes not only lower visibility in the atmosphere but also a series of problems such as damage to human health.29 ABCs refer to a cloud-shaped mixture of pollutants consisting primarily of ﬁ ne particles, including carbon and organic particles, sulfates, nitrates, ammonium salts, sand, and dust in the troposphere. ABCs reﬂ ect the same atmospheric condition as hazes do. Nonethe- less, hazes may affect only a particular city, while ABCs may envelop broader regions. Brown clouds called Asian brown clouds, for example, have appeared above the Indian Ocean, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Southern China. With a thickness of about three kilometers, they had a total area equivalent to the land area of the United States.

The ABC crisis reminds us that PM2.5 is not included in China’s national air quality standards. A good example was the rare heavy air pollution that occurred in the Yangtze River Delta on January 19th, 3 2007. The concentrations of PM10 and PM2.5 in the air reached 744µg/m and 466µg/m3 in Shanghai on that day, while the daily average concentrations recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) are no more than 50ug/m3 and 10ug/m3. It was difﬁ cult for people to breathe in Shanghai’s environment on that day, which was totally unsuitable for living. Fine particles PM2.5, which are neglected by

29 Li Hujun, “The Atmospheric Brown Cloud Crisis,” No. 227 Issue of Caijing magazine, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 17

China’s current standards, can enter the blood and affect lung tissues, inducing chronic respiratory system diseases or even cancers. In addition to damage to human health, ABCs may change the monsoon pattern in East Asia, worsen the situation in China where northern regions suffer droughts while southern ones suffer fl oods, and accelerate glacier melting in places such as the Himalaya Mountains. Both black carbon aerosol and sulfates in ABCs are largely from the burning of carbon-rich fuels, such as coals and crop stalks. Today, China is believed to be the world’s largest emitter of black carbon, according to an article in Caijing magazine in December 2008. The rate of good air quality in Beijing was 100% throughout the 2008 Olympic Games. Beijing achieved its blue-sky objective for the year (256 days with blue skies, or 70% of the year) on November 30th. For this objective, the Air Quality Assurance Coordination Team for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was established with participation by Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei Province, Shanxi Province, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong Province, as well as the former SEPA, the Environ- mental Protection Administration of the People’s Liberation Army, the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). Up to 149 billion RMB had been invested in environmental protection by Beijing alone after seven years of efforts.30 Moreover, the Air Quality Monitoring and Warning Scheme for Beijing, Other Olympic Cities, and Surrounding Areas during the Bei- jing Olympic Games (奥运期间北京和协办城市及周边地区环境空气质量预警监测方案) was issued by the Chinese government. Specifi c production suspension and emission reduction schemes were developed by major enterprises in the metallurgical, construction materials, and petrochemical industries of Beijing, as well as the fi ve cities and provinces around it. More than 150 enterprises with heavy pollution suspended production during the Olympic Games.31 All those efforts enabled Beijing to fully deliver on its environmental commitment that it had made when it was bidding for the Olympic Games. However, after the close of the Beijing Olympic Games, some newspapers and citizens questioned whether Beijing would be able to maintain its environment

30 Ru Xin, et al., The China Society Yearbook, Volume 3, p. 213, published by SSAP in December 2008. 31 Zhang Miaomiao, “Pollution Control and Emission Reduction Measures Are Ready for Beijing Olympic Games,” Xinhua News Agency, July 15th, 2008. 18 li dun in post Olympic days and whether people in the other cities could enjoy the same environment as that of Beijing.

D. Soil Pollution and Erosion, Farmland Decreases, and Desertifi cation Soil pollution is more diffi cult to tackle than water and air pollution. Farmland pollution threatens human health since crops are directly polluted. There are about 20 million hectares of polluted farmland in China, or 20% of the entire farmland in the country, estimated by The China Society Yearbook, Volume 3. Today’s farmland pollution in China is tied to the restriction of urbanization and development of industrialization in the 20th century and subsequent urban-rural dualism. Farmers use excessive chemical fertilizers and pesticides. There are numerous small-sized township enterprises that waste resources and cause heavy pollution. Rural areas are unable to dispose of domestic garbage as cities do due to lack of disposal facilities. Industrial and urban pollution has been moving to rural areas. Consequently, rural areas have come under threats from both environmental pollution and ecological damage. They are suffering from increasing domestic garbage, heavier area-source pollution, severe pollution caused by plants and mines, potential safety problems with drinking water, and ecological deterioration.32 Meanwhile, rural pollution moves to cities through agricultural products, threatening more people. Research shows that foods with residual pesticides are not the only problem, as poultry, livestock, and aquatic products from polluted environments tend to come with harmful or even toxic substances. Problems coexisting with soil pollution include farmland decrease, soil erosion, and desertifi cation. An offi cial report revealed that China’s farmland, cash-crop land, woodland, and pastoral grassland decreased by 0.03%, 0.04%, 0.002%, and 0.03%, respectively, in 2007 compared with 2006. The land for residential areas/plants/mines, transportation and water-resources facilities increased by 1.11%, 2.05%, and 0.37%, respectively. The net decrease of farmland was about 40,667 hectares. The farmland quality deteriorated at a higher rate, as the deteriorated area accounted for more than 40% of the total farmland area.

32 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 19

Soil nutrients were out of balance, as the areas of farmland with insuffi cient phosphorus or potassium accounted for 51% and 60% of the total, respectively. Organic fertilizers accounted for only 25% of the total amount of used fertilizers. Wastes from both plants and mines caused severe pollution to farmland soil. There were still cases where farmland was used for non-agricultural purposes and replaced with poorer farmland as compensation. The total area of farmland involved in cases where farmland was occupied by means of leasing rather than expropriation, where the area of farmland occupied for industrial purposes was larger than the one specifi ed in the overall land use plan, and where farmland was occupied without prior permission was more than 220,000 hectares, according to known fi gures. The reality is worse since it is impossible to fi nd out all such cases. The area of soil erosion was 3,560,000 kilometers squared, or 37.08% of China’s total land area. Also, according to an offi cial report, the water- and wind-erosion areas accounted for 17.18% and 19.9%, respectively.33 In addition, the total areas of desertifi ed and sandifi ed land in China were 2,636,200 kilometers squared and 1,739,700 kilometers squared. Unoffi cial reports say that both sandstorms and sandifi ed land have increased. The annual average increase of desertifi ed land area was 1,560 kilometers squared from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s, 2,100 kilometers squared from the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, and 3,460 kilometers squared in the late 1990s. The desert area has increased to about 166.67 million hectares from about 100 million hectares since 1949. Up to 667,000 hectares of farmland, 2,350,000 hectares of grassland, and 6,390,000 hectares of woodlands have turned into sand. The annual average increase of desertifi ed land is more than 4%. Many places have become unsuitable for living due to dust and sandstorms, and this has lead to eco-refugees. More ter- ribly, the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau has become a new source of dust and sandstorms. The area of desertifi ed land there has reached more than 500,000 kilometers squared, or 20% of the plateau. The net increase

33 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. 20 li dun is 40,000 kilometers squared over the 1970s, or an annual average increase of more than 8%. Qinghai Lake is shrinking.34 Mining, quarrying, gold mining, herb picking, and lime/cement/ brick production all contribute to heavier soil pollution, reduced farmland area, and quicker soil erosion. A study reveals the land effects of coal mining in China. On average, the mining of every 10,000 tons of coal leads to 0.2 hectares of subsiding land. The total area of subsiding land caused by nationwide coal mines has exceeded 700,000 hectares. The mining of every 100 million tons of coal leads to 245 kilometers squared of land area affected by soil erosion. The mining of every ten million tons of coal leads to the resettling of 2,000 people due to land subsidence. There are more than 1,600 coal gangue dumps in China that store 4.2 billion tons of gangue and cover about 173.33 kilometers squared of area. There is an annual gangue increase of up to 70 million tons, or an increase of more than two kilometers squared to the covered land area. Surface subsidence and gangue storage caused by coal mining are among the major causes of loss of farmland. In addition, such surface subsidence brings damage to things like surface buildings, roads, bridges, and power transmission lines, while triggering mudfl ows. However, the news from the government was rather good: up to 20% of the desertifi ed land has been more or less rehabilitated in China;35 380,000 kilometers squared of land area has seen preliminary ecological rehabilitation;36 and the total area of farmland that had been rehabilitated, returned, reclaimed, or supplemented reached 1,526,000 hectares in a fi ve-year period up to 2008.37

E. Solid Waste Pollution Solid and hazardous wastes can spread diseases, cause cancer, and pollute soil, water, and air. According to an ofﬁ cial report, solid waste

34 Si Yuan, “The Status Quo and Prospect of Environmental Protection in China,” Issue 11 of Yanhuangchunqiu magazine 2008, p. 46. 35 Lu Yuliang and Dong Jun, “The State Forestry Administration Says 20% of the Desertifi ed Land in China Sees Preliminary Rehabilitation,” http://news.xinhuanet .com/newscenter/2008–01/23/content_7481044.htm, January 23rd, 2008. 36 Gao Yuncai, “380,000 Square Kilometers of Land Sees Preliminary Ecological Rehabilitation,” People’s Daily, April 18th, 2008. 37 “Report on the Work of the Government (2008)” published by the State Council on March 5th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 21 generated by China’s industries reached 1.76 billion tons in 2007, of which the dumped, stored, disposed, and recycled volumes accounted for 0.68%, 13.7%, 23.5%, and 62.8% (including stored waste from previous years), respectively. Hazardous waste generated in the year reached 10.79 million tons, of which the dumped, stored, disposed, and recycled volumes accounted for 68.2%, 14.27%, 32% and 60.2% (including recycling of stored wastes from previous years), respectively. In addition, the average disposed and recycled rate of solid wastes from industries in Chinese cities was 92.26% in 2007, which was 1.89% higher than the previous year. Nonetheless, that rate was below 20% in eight cities including Longnan (Gansu), Fuquan (Guizhou), Aletai (Xinjiang), Liaoyang (Liaoning), Gejiu (Yunnan), Yunchun ( Jilin), Genhe (Inner Mongolia), and Yuzhou (Henan). The average disposed and recycled rate of hazardous wastes from industries in China was 94.71% in 2007, which was 1.01% lower than 2006. Thirty-one cities failed to dispose of such wastes as per relevant requirements, including 14 cities at the prefecture level or higher.38 The average innocuous disposal rate of urban domestic garbage was 67.58% among cities included in a nationwide city assessment in 2007, which was 8.1% higher than in 2006.39 One hundred fi fty-eight cities failed to conduct innocuous disposal of municipal garbage as per relevant requirements, including 38 cities at the prefecture level or higher. The average centralized disposal rate of hazardous medical wastes was 73.63% among cities included in the city assessment. One hundred fi fty-fi ve cities failed to conduct centralized disposal of hazardous medical wastes as per relevant requirements, including 61 cities at the prefecture level or higher ones. Among cities included in the city assessment, more than 50% of the cities in Shanxi, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Hainan, and Xinjiang failed to conduct innocuous disposal of domestic garbage, as per relevant requirements. More than 60% of the cities in Liaoning, Hubei,

38 The former SEPA, “Report on Urban Environment Management and Com- prehensive Rehabilitation in China (2007),” http://www.zhb.gov.cn/cont/city/csgl/ 200810/t20081017_130185.htm, October 17th, 2008. 39 Translator’s note: “City assessment” is the shortened form of “quantiﬁ ed assessment on the comprehensive improvement of city environments.” 22 li dun

Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, and Tibet failed to conduct centralized disposal of medical wastes, as per relevant requirements. The average innocuous disposal rate of municipal garbage was 87.94% among the four municipalities directly under the central government: Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing. Their average centralized disposal rate of medical waste was 83.48%.40 It is reported by the Beijing Youth Daily that urban garbage disposal has been a long-term problem, and a local Chinese government apolo- gized to citizens for odors from garbage dumps in 2008. Before that, garbage had also been dumped into the Yangtze River and piled up against the Three Gorges Dam. Changes in the ways of development and living have also highlighted garbage problems in rural areas. Some villages have been surrounded by garbage, primarily including production-caused garbage, domestic garbage, construction garbage, and medical garbage.41 On the one hand, garbage that is not disposed of is harmful. On the other, buried garbage emits gases such as methane, carbon dioxide, and sulfur dioxide, polluting the surroundings. In the past less attention was paid to waste from mining, quarrying, or lime and cement production. In fact, gangue from coal mining alone is equivalent to 10% of the annual coal output in China. There are now up to 3,600 million tons of stored coal gangue across China, or more than 40% of all the dumped solid wastes from industries in the country.42 The other mining industries also cause large quantities of wastes. A waste dump collapsed at Jianshan Iron Mine (尖山铁矿), Shanxi Province on August 1st, 2008, killing 41 people. A reservoir of tailings collapsed at Tashan Mine (塔山矿区), Shanxi Province on September 8th, 2008, killing 267 people. Both accidents were initially downplayed as natural disasters, before they were uncovered as negligence-caused accidents with suppressed death tolls. Also uncovered were more than 9,000 reservoirs of tailings across China. More than half of them had not been granted work safety certiﬁ cates. Most of them were

40 The former SEPA, “Report on Urban Environment Management and Com- prehensive Rehabilitation in China (2007),” http://www.zhb.gov.cn/cont/city/csgl/ 200810/t20081017_130185.htm, October 17th, 2008. 41 Wang Minghao, “Villages Surrounded by Garbage Should Never Be Neglected,” People’s Daily, January 22nd, 2008. 42 Mao Yushi, Sheng Hong, Yang Fuqiang, et al., “The True Cost of Coal,” China Coal Industry Publishing House, October 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 23 hazardous.43 All of this suggests that waste from mining industries not only pollutes the environment, but may also kill people directly. Another example was an accident where a reservoir of tailings at Din- gyang Mining Co., Ltd. (鼎洋公司) in Haicheng City (海城), Liaoning Province collapsed on November 25th, 2007, killing six people and seven others were unaccounted for.44 The number of closed reservoirs of tailings that had been built at forbidden locations or those impossible to reinforce was up to around 1,000 in 2008, when the number of reinforced ones was about 1,500, according to an ofﬁ cial report.45 There was encouraging news about how to dispose of wastes in 2008. Taizhou (台州), a coastal city with few minerals and no metallurgical plants, has an annual non-ferrous metal output of up to 2.3 million tons. Local people used strong acids or even toxic cyanides to dissolve and extract precious metals when they began recycling industrial garbage, such as scrapped electric equipment many years ago. Toxic heavy metals and chemicals went into water, soils, and the air in the process by means of sedimentation or being washed away by rain; thus, it threatened human health. With increased understanding of threats from pollution and improvements in processes, Taizhou still imports garbage (it is now ranked the number one city in the world in terms of the imported volume of scrapped motors, as local scrap metal recyclers have ofﬁ ces in countries such as Japan and Russia) and purchases scrap metal across China. With minimized pollution, a scrap metal recycling industry consisting of more than 40 companies is providing the market with inexpensive and high-quality materials such as copper, aluminum, and stainless steel. “There is no garbage in the world at all. It is just something put in the wrong place,” said Ding Guopei (丁国培), a successful local entrepreneur, who received encouragement from top Chinese leaders such as Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Wen Jiabao (温家宝).46

43 Tong Dahuan, “China Needs More Stringent Judicial Accountability,” Zhujiang Evening News, September 29th, 2008. 44 Xinhua News Agency, “A Collapsed Reservoir of Tailings in Haicheng, Liaoning Kills Six People with Seven Others Unaccounted for,” Guangzhou Daily, November. 26th, 2007. 45 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. 46 Shu Mei, “Unlimited Renewing of Limited Resources—Taizhou Has Become the Home of Renewed Metals,” Southern Weekend, July 31st, 2008. 24 li dun

The Chinese government also launched a pilot program for declaration and registration of medical waste in 2008, along with an action against illegal import of waste into China.

F. Noise and Light Pollution Noise brings harm to human beings who live in environments with noises at 70–80 decibels for a long period of time. These include tin- nitus, signifi cantly lower hearing levels or even deafness, lower vision, effects on respiratory and digestive systems, higher blood pressure, micro-blood-vessel contraction, insuffi cient blood supply to limbs or induced coronary heart disease, fi dgeting, headache, dizziness, lower working effi ciency, central nervous dysfunction, and effects on human incretion, metabolism, and immunologic function. In the case of women, endocrine dyscrasia and effects on menstrual cycles and ges- tation are known; in the case of children, underdevelopment can be a problem. Noise pollution affecting human lives is primarily comprised of industrial noise, construction noise, traffi c noise, and community noise (such as those from loudspeakers, goods handling, shouts, and other sources). According to an offi cial report, in China slightly and moderately polluted cities accounted for 26.6% and 1.4%, respectively, among 350 cities where regional environmental noise was measured. Slightly, moderately, and heavily polluted cities accounted for 5.7%, 1.1%, and 0.9%, respectively, among 353 cities where road traffi c noise was measured. Slightly polluted cities accounted for 7.1% of the key environmental protection cities. Cities where nighttime and daytime measurements did not meet relevant standards accounted for 35.9% and 15.3% among the 175 cities where noise in urban functional zones was measured.47 Workplace noise from textile production and machine work is usually overlooked, although it tends to damage workers’ (primarily migrant workers) health. Both construction noise and traffi c noise in cities are often complained about, but are diffi cult to address.

47 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 25

According to Professor Wang Jianghua (王江华) from the Con- struction Environment Test Center at Tsinghua University, a rapidly urbanized China is facing the outbreak of noise pollution, while both improper city planning and low-quality construction of residential buildings are rubbing salt into the wounds. He pointed out that more than one million citizens in a city like Beijing were affected by traffi c noise. Road sections where nighttime noise exceeds limits already accounted for more than 80% of the main arteries in Shanghai. Noise from trains running through cities might exceed 100 decibels.48 Light pollution hurts human corneas and irises and adversely affects the functioning of retinal photorecepter cells, leading to visual fatigue and vision decline. It also affects the central nerves in the cerebrum, thereby bringing harm to human lives and work effi ciency. Artifi cial daylight adversely affects the human biological clock, as well as the reproduction and growth of both animals and plants. It is believed by some people that low melatonin levels of night-shift workers are directly associated with high probabilities of particular cancers among them. More attention has been paid to the fact that it is diffi cult to stop the wide use of glass curtain walls on city buildings. Meanwhile, there is insuffi cient attention to sky glow, as well as excessive lights from shops, recreational places, and even houses that also affect human health.

G. Radiation and Other Pollution The level of ambient ionizing radiation basically remains stable, according to an ofﬁ cial report. As for ionizing radiation around nuclear power plants, the report says that the tritium concentration in some environmental media in critical residential areas around Qin- shan Nuclear Power Plant (秦山核电基地) in Zhejiang Province has increased, while those in the sea areas near the discharging outlets of Dayawan Nuclear Power Plant (大亚湾) and Ling’ao Nuclear Power Plant (岭澳核电厂) are higher than the reference points. Nonetheless, it contributes a very low additional radiation dose to the public. The radionuclide concentrations at individual measurement points in the environment around few uranium mines and hydrometallurgical

48 Ma Changbo, “Fierce Noise,” Southern Weekend, May 14th, 2008. 26 li dun systems are on the high side and some associated radioactive mineral resource exploitation activities have certain effects on the local environment. With a sharp increase of electromagnetic radiation (EMR) sources, there is excessive EMR in some areas, but the overall quality of the EMR environment remains good. The report also states that the overall ﬁ eld intensities at some points in sensitive buildings around individual TV and radio towers and medium-wave radio transmitter sites exceed 40 volts per meter, the derived limit of public exposure. One major radiation accident and 23 minor ones occurred in 2007, when no safety event or accident at Level I or higher occurred. The government spent 413 million RMB building urban radioactive waste warehouses and conducting ﬁ nal disposal of locally stored radiation sources and radioactive wastes.49 After the Sichuan Earthquake in 2008, some structures of retired nuclear facilities cracked, while some radiation sources were buried or had serious potential safety problems. Nuclear and radiation facilities were affected to a certain extent, according to the Status of Environ- mental Protection in 2008 (2008 年环境保护形势) and The China Society Yearbook, Volume 4. During the period of 2007–2008, public objection to the Shanghai- Hangzhou maglev train project saw no results, while much attention was paid to nuclear power projects in Rushan City (乳山), Shandong Province; Dafan Town in Xianning City (咸宁大畈), Hubei Prov- ince; and Taohuajiang County (桃花江) and Yiyang City in Hunan Province.50 When it comes to spaces for human activities, such as the indoor and in-vehicle ones, increasing attention is being paid to the radon concentration in the soil around buildings, the contents of harmful pollutants in materials, and their contents in the air in the aforementioned spaces. Those problems involve radioactive pollutants (such as radon), chemical pollutants (such as formaldehyde), ammonia, benzene, and total volatile organic compounds (VOC). VOCs refer to organic compounds that are involved in photochemical reactions in the atmosphere and that generate ozone. They irritate

49 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. 50 Chai Huiqun, “There Is No National Standard for Electromagnetical Pollution from Maglev Trains,” Southern Weekend, January 16th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 27 eyes and generate smog and toxic oxidants (especially ozone) after they are emitted into the air. Their effects on human beings include: unpleasant smells and dry skins; headache, weakness, and sleepiness because they suppress the central nervous system by entering the blood and the brain tissues through eye and nose mucous membranes, respiratory tracts, skin, and others; and cancers. In addition, potential threats to human health caused by pollution from apparel production and washing have also received attention. Compounds in textile fi bers and chemical processing agents (dye with azo or anthraquinone structures, quinoline-type reducing and acidic dye, fi nishing agents for purposes such as shrinkage reduction and whitening, and additives against moths and mould) used in the production of apparel materials may cause pollution to apparel. This can result in skin allergies and dermatitis. Some detergents for apparel contain nickel that causes allergies and some dry-cleaning solvents contain perchloroethylene, with the former likely to cause skin infl ammations (especially in infants) and the latter, when inhaled excessively, causing diffi culty of breathing, irregular heartbeats, or even cancers.

H. Ecosystems: Reduction of Forests, Grasslands, and Biodiversity The forest coverage in China is 18.21%, according to the latest nationwide forest inventory. Primary functions of forests include: oxygen production, carbon dioxide absorption, climate regulation, water and soil conservation, habitat provision for wildlife, and wood provision for human beings. Uncontrolled development of human activities has caused forest areas to decrease and even an extinction of tree species. Resulting threats include poor water conservation function, species reduction, soil erosion, and the greenhouse effect caused by less carbon dioxide absorption. The Chinese government announced the “returning farmland to forest” policy in 1998, when it launched the Natural Forest Protection Project (天 (然林) 保 (护) 工程). It announced a policy that encourages full use of domestic and overseas markets and resources in 2003.51 It claimed that the cumulative total area of planted trees was 30.67

51 “Decision on Accelerating Forestry Development” jointly issued by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council in June 2003. 28 li dun million hectares (an annual average of six million hectares), that the urban vegetation coverage rose to 35.11% from 29.5%, and that the average green space area per capita rose to 8.6 meters squared from 6.49 meters squared by the end of 2008. In addition, the cumulative area of farmland returned to forestation was 31.91 million hectares.52 Meanwhile, it stressed that China remains a country lacking forests and other green spaces without substantial improvements in the suffi ciency and quality of forest resources. Ecological problems such as sandifi cation, soil erosion, and decreasing biodiversity are still outstanding. China is under heavy pressure to maintain achievements in land greening and to push it further.53 Meanwhile, various ways of investment and operation, whether legal or not, keep emerging in China’s forestry industry. Cooperative forestation cases involving companies such as Yilin Forestation Hold- ings Limited (亿霖), Extensive Forest (万里大造林), and Dongzhaoxu Forestry (东朝旭林业) have surfaced. In addition, Guizhou Academy of Forestry was involved in a case relevant to a house building project named Fuhai Ecological Garden (福海生态园), where about 133.33 hectares of state-owned woodland managed by the academy had been occupied. Other governmental agencies issued more than ten documents in an attempt to stop the project. Such cases keep occurring across China.54 As for the status of grasslands, an offi cial report says that there are nearly 400 million hectares of various grasslands across China, or 41.7% of its total land area (2.5 times that of the forest area and 3.2 times that of the farmland area). The overgrazing of livestock on major natural grasslands was 33% in 2007, or 1% lower year by year. That percentage was 38%, 38%, 39%, 39%, and 40% in Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Sichuan, and Tibet.

52 “Report on the Work of the Government (2008)” published by the State Council on March 5th, 2008. 53 “Promote Land Greening for Creation of an Ecological Civilization,” People’s Daily, April 3rd, 2008. 54 Wang Zhiqiu, “Fuhai Ecological Garden Case—the Developer Broke into the Forest Park,” People’s Daily, September 11th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 29

Up to 15,677 cases relevant to grasslands occurred in 2007, when 108,000 hectares of grasslands were damaged. There were 87.5% of the cases put on ﬁ le, while 85% of them were settled.55 In addition, grasslands in Northern China have receded about 200 kilometers northward and about 100 kilometers westward since the beginning of the last century. Ninety percent of the natural grasslands have been degraded to a certain degree. The annual average reduction of grasslands is about 1.5 million hectares in China over the past few years. That trend remains ongoing.56 The primary reason is improper management of grassland resources leading to a vicious circle between grassland degradation and poor production performance of livestock. Moreover, nearly all the attention is paid to the number of livestock, while its production performance is neglected. As a result, China has a tiny share of the global market for animal products from grasslands, although it is one of the world leaders in terms of grassland resources.57 A cumulative total area of 34.6 million hectares of pasture had been returned to grasslands by 2008.58 There are more than 65.9 million hectares of wetlands, including marshes, wet grasslands, shallow lakes, river wetlands, shallow beaches, and artiﬁ cial wetlands in China, or about 10% of the world’s wetland area. There are 260 natural wetland reserves across China with a total area of more than 16 million hectares. Urban wetlands have nearly vanished in the process of urban development in China. Meanwhile, a number of natural wetlands have become dry lands due to farming and the expansion of residential and industrial areas. Dam construction has led to the shrinkage of downstream wetlands. Harmful substances from aquaculture, livestock breeding, industrial wastewater, solid wastes, municipal sewage, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides have been polluting wetland environments, lowering the water quality, and damaging biodiversity.

55 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. 56 Chai Hailiang and Wu Rihan, “Grasslands in Northern China Have Receded 200 kilometers Northward,” Shanxi Daily, July 7th, 2008. 57 Wu Rihan and Chai Hailiang, “Experts Say Quick Recession of Grasslands Results More From Management Than From Climate,” Xinhua Daily Telegraph, July 4th, 2008. 58 “Report on the Work of the Government (2008),” published by the State Council on March 5th, 2008. 30 li dun

Some species have disappeared or are endangered due to the loss of habitats. All those have led to a sharp decrease of the wetland area in China. The Chinese government opened 20 new national wetland parks in 2008, bringing the number of such parks to 38 with a total area of 360,000 hectares. The restoration of the wetlands at the mouth of the Hulan River (呼兰河), which is claimed to be the largest urban wetlands in China, was also included into the government’s action plan. According to this plan 125 hectares of wetlands is going to be restored with the total area of the project being 19,262 hectares.59 As for the issue of biodiversity, the worst news is the failure to fi nd the Chinese river dolphin, which may now be extinct. The fake photos of wild South China tigers, which disappeared long ago, caused a sen- sation. There are deep concerns about the fate of Tibetan antelopes because of the fl ow of vehicles on the Qinghai-Tibet Road and poach- ers lurking near passageways for the antelopes under the Beijing-Lhasa Railway.60 There are about 4,000 to 5,000 kinds of higher plants threatened or even endangered in China, or 15% to 20% of all the higher plants in the country. This is higher than the global average, according to an offi cial report. When it comes to invasion of alien species, the Chinese government has established a database of information about 120 kinds of alien species, along with a survey on ten kinds of dangerous invasive agricultural plants. It claimed that more than 65% of the invasive species have been eradicated.61 Reduced biodiversity causes the reduction of genetic diversity (genetic information is contained in genes), species diversity (some animals and plants become extinct), and biological-system diversity (forests, grasslands, wetlands, and aquatic habitats are damaged). Con- sequences include ecological imbalance, effects on sources of human foods, shortage of medicinal wild animals and plants for human beings

59 Wu Qiqiang, “Harbin Restores China’s Largest Urban Wetlands,” People’s Daily, May 8th, 2008. 60 Wan Qing, “Survey on Tibetan Antelope Survival Status in Hoh Xil—Cross the Railway or Be Killed on the Road,” Nanfengchuang Magazine, November 2008. 61 “The 2007 Report on the State of the Environment in China” issued by the MEP on June 5th, 2008. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 31

(60% of human beings rely on wild animals and plants as medicines), and an undersupply of production materials needed by humans.

II. Summary and Recommendations

1. The severity of environmental problems was recognized and the goal of changing both the economic growth mode and the consumption pattern was announced, but actions failed to catch up The international community paid unprecedented attention to environmental problems in 2008, but it was still short of effective moves. The Chinese government conducted the fi rst ever nationwide survey of pollution sources and implemented the fi rst ever Action Plan on Envi- ronment and Health (2007–2015). Nonetheless, people from all walks of life were not fully aware of the severity of environmental problems, so there was no active collaboration and effective response. An authoritative poll revealed that the environmental issue was continually ranked eighth among the more than ten social issues that the Chinese thought must be solved (those before it included medical care, the income gap, employment, housing, corruption, and post- retirement living). Nonetheless, environmental pollution was ranked the third social issue that the public was most concerned about, second only to prices and food safety, according to a survey conducted by the China Environmental Culture Promotion Association (CECPA). The survey made it clearer that Chinese citizens were not highly aware of environmental protection, not to mention environmental actions. Only 2.6% of the CPC and governmental offi cials thought that ecological deterioration was the number one domestic factor affecting economic and social development, as well as the construction of a harmonious society in China, while 53% others thought it was minor, according to The China Society Yearbook, Volume 3. Instead of having no knowledge of environmental problems, people think that potential disasters from such problems are still far from us and are not something urgent. That will delay environmental rehabilitation and fundamental improvements in the relationship between human beings and nature. They have not realized that neither environmental pollution nor ecological damages are irrevocable or diffi cult to reverse. Human beings will reap what they have sown due to con- formism, temporization, and inaction. 32 li dun

2. Environmental and ecological rehabilitation is tied to the realization of citizens’ environmental rights; they involve equality between individuals and harmony between human beings and nature People’s livelihoods were not considered as the primary issue for a long period of human history. Instead, achievements, wealth creation, defeating others, and conquering nature were valued. Today, mankind has been able to enter outer space, make weapons of mass destruction, create thousands of synthesized substances, and decode genes. Social wealth has increased by hundreds of times within merely several hundred years; yet, we have still been unable to remove poverty, realize equality, and allow everyone to stay healthy. Mankind has also polluted the environment and damaged the ecosystem, leaving a considerable amount of other species endangered or even extinct. Ultimately, our own survival may even be in danger. Radical changes in values are needed. On the one hand, to be truly human-oriented by recognizing, respecting, and protecting the equal rights of everyone, includes the rights to health and environment. Human beings should no longer be regarded as a production element in economic activities, as a combative force, or as an “input” into struggles for interests. Instead, the ultimate “output” should be human beings who lead better lives because they make choices on their own, respect each other, and work together. On the other hand, mankind should realize their role as a part of nature, rather than its master. We should live in harmony with nature and other species.

3. Changes in the goal result from changes in our values and judgment on the situation; those changes should lead to changes in our development strategy, planning, specifi c actions, and ways of doing things. China is far from fi nishing those consequent changes In addition to the selection of values, both being human-oriented and harmonious are based on the understanding that peace and development are the themes of the age and that cooperation is the general trend. China did not realize it until more than a decade ago. Before that, it took class struggle as the key link and continued the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Development strategies, plans, specifi c actions, and ways of doing things all vary with goals. The Chinese thought that environmental problems were unique to capitalist countries when those problems began to emerge. They thought that the planned economy was free from such problems. Common people were unaware of such problems at all when they victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 33

fi rst appeared in China in the 1970s. The decision-makers responded to them by establishing the Environmental Protection Leading Group of the State Council in 1973. It was announced in 1974 that “pollution problems will be controlled within fi ve years (by 1979) and basically resolved within a decade (by 1984).” And it was announced four years later, in 1978, that “we are resolved to control pollution by the end of 1980 and basically solve pollution problems by 1985.” Nonetheless, both 1984 and 1985 have been long gone. It was in 2007, 22 years after 1985, when China fi rst achieved reduction of both the COD and the sulfur dioxide emissions. But it is still far from achieving the goal of “basically solving pollution problems.” The overall trend of the environment being polluted and the ecosystem being damaged remains changeless; environmental pollution has brought obvious threats to human health and life. It is because the environment was always behind development on the government’s list of priorities at times when it worked for a different goal. Meanwhile, environmental rehabilitation is merely an end-of-pipe control. Is development a good or bad thing? It all depends on whom it is for and how it is done. It is merely something that pollutes the environment and damages the ecosystem if it is for achievements and interests of particular persons without properly considering the development of all. On the contrary, development that balances interests and propositions of all parties and that is shared among all, confl icts with neither pollution prevention and control, nor ecosystem protection. Moreover, it fundamentally matches them in terms of goals. As for environmental rehabilitation, both the up-to-standard pollution discharge in parallel with development under the old goal and the rehabilitation mode that focuses merely on more severe punishment can only play a limited role. The radical solution is to change both the growth mode and the consumption mode after changing the goal (from the report for the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC). Our goal is to address people’s livelihoods under the ideas of being human-oriented and human beings living in harmony with nature. Our development strategy is to change both the growth mode and the consumption pattern. Under this is planning, and under planning are projects. It is necessary to take into account environmental problems. Environmental impact assessment is not merely about projects and plans, as it must start from the goal and go down to the development strategy and planning. Only in this way will specifi c projects not pollute the environment or damage the ecosystem. 34 li dun

4. A mechanism for balancing interests is needed to contain pollution and protect the ecosystem, thereby, avoiding the scenario where the government fails to achieve the goal of environmental and ecosystem protection due to unaffordable costs For particular individuals and enterprises, benefi ts at the expense of polluting the environment and damaging the ecosystem are immediate, while those who suffer the damages and losses may be neither particular nor related to the former. For that reason, their costs tend to be borne by society. On the other hand, the costs of controlling pollution and rehabilitating the ecosystem have to be paid immediately by individuals, enterprises, as well as local and central governments (money from enterprises or governments is indirectly from individuals). Their benefi ts may be seen only after a long period of time and may be uncertain. Persons who benefi t from them will not necessarily be those who pay for them. Given that fact, individuals, enterprises, and local governments, out of their respective self-interest, all tend to increase immediate benefi ts and decrease payment, while meeting only the lowest requirements required by law or even breaking laws to such an extent that they will not be punished62 It is extremely diffi cult to manage and maintain victims’ rights to the environment only by the government (even if it is a very good one that serves the people heart and soul), when quite a few people may be both environment and ecosystem destroyers, or those without a sense of responsibility, and victims of environmental pollution and ecological damages. That is because the costs of such management and maintenance are too high for the government to afford. A million “environment policemen,” for instance, need to work night and day, not to mention the fact that it is impossible to guarantee the freedom from jobbery. The fi ght between culprits and victims of environmental and ecological problems acts as a mechanism for balancing interests. It is possible for a third party to mediate and the government to coordinate interests and arbitrate disputes only when the victims have access to relevant information, make complaints, put pressure on the culprits, and make their opinions known to the public. Moreover, the administration of the law may serve as the ultimate balancer for social justice. Therefore, both the victims and those who are concerned about environmental and ecological problems should be granted freedoms of

62 See Xue Lan, “Institutional Inertia and Policy Morass,” Southern Weekend, January 15th, 2009. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 35 speech, publication, assembly, association, protest, and demonstration, as well as the right to ﬁ le lawsuits for public interest written in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. That is an indispensable institutional guarantee for containing pollution and rehabilitating the ecosystem.

5. A combination of good governance and overall planning with all factors taken into account is an institutionalized structure and mechanism that matches market economies and countries under the rule of law. It has yet to be formed in the comprehensive reform in China Today, there are things that the government, enterprises, or civil society cannot do alone in China or the world. Instead, a governance structure is needed in which the government, enterprises, NGOs, nonprofi t organizations, communities, the public, and even the international community and the global civil society cooperate and col- laborate with each other. Good governance is derived, not from an ideal design, but from real-world needs. It is now impossible to solve problems, such as environmental and ecological ones, without good governance that features multilateral balancing and cooperation. Good governance requires the following as a minimum: implementation of the rule of law; information disclosure; effective public participation in decision and policy implementation; the government’s fi scal spending on two precondi- tions—benefi ting the people and being just; and offi cials answering to the people and being supervised by both citizens and the media. Balancing interests is possible only with good governance with multilateral participation and cooperation. It is also true for the CPC and governmental agencies to achieve overall planning with all factors taken into account. Like any other public affair, both environmental protection and ecological rehabilitation rely on a good institutional guarantee.

6. Technologies needed for pollution control and prevention and ecological r ehabilitation can be developed only in a good institutional environment It was long ago when China was one of the largest knowledge cre- ators in the world. None of the major scientiﬁ c and technical achievements has been from China over the past one hundred odd years, not to mention thoughts and strategies. As for any way of production that leads to pollution, restriction, and rehabilitation are of course important when we address environmental and ecological problems. 36 li dun

Yet, isn’t it better if we can fi nd an alternative way free from pollution? Energy and resource conservation are of course important, but isn’t it better if we can fi nd renewable energy sources to achieve a circular economy? Scientifi c and technical advancements are from those with free will, but such people can be nurtured only in an institutional environment that facilitates creation. Without all those, we can do nothing for pollution control and prevention and ecological rehabilitation but follow suit, buy technologies from others, or covet the unaffordable ones.

7. Good institutions are also needed for withstanding disasters, avoiding disasters resulting from environmental and ecological damage, and reducing post-disaster secondary environmental disasters Disasters were associated with environmental problems in China in 2008. Disasters are not from the viewpoint of natural phenomena, but from that of mankind. Since we live in the natural environment, we human beings cannot be free from disasters. For society, however, disasters may be combinations of natural disasters and human-caused ones. Causes of natural disasters alone and their damages to mankind may vary with historical period, institution, civilization, mode of survival (including production), and nationality, not to mention human capacity and mode of withstanding disasters. Therefore, we need to think carefully about how to avoid disasters caused or triggered by environmental pollution and ecological damage, as well as secondary environmental pollution and epidemics due to human action or inaction.

8. The government’s environmental protection system needs vertical leadership along with more staff, powers, and responsibilities It is unimportant that the environmental authority of the Chinese government was escalated to a ministry from an administration: the MEP has had merely average performance. Nonetheless, it remains necessary to give the MEP more staff, outlay, powers, and responsibilities. Government reform is not always about reduction. As for the ongoing transformation in China, agencies of direct economic administration should be reduced, and functional changes are more important than reduction. Nonetheless, governmental functions of protecting environments, guaranteeing food safety, and promoting public health should be increased rather than being reduced. Since they are tied to people’s livelihoods, it is impossible to guarantee citizens’ health victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 37 without a system matching the situation, as well as sufﬁ cient staff, outlay, and powers. Therefore, the environmental authority should come with a team that is commanded by the central government and that is capable enough to respond to environmental problems. It should address pollution with uniform standards across China and respond to environmental and ecological disasters with other organizations. Its staff and outlay should both come from the central government.

9. Despite the current fi nancial crisis, the established goals of pollution control and prevention and ecological rehabilitation should never be neglected, and relevant policies should never be loosened during implementation The subprime fi nancial crisis from the United States swept the globe at the end of 2008 and is likely to turn into an economic crisis. There- fore, the environment versus economic growth and crisis is a topic that we should not parry. Unlike developed countries and other developing ones, China is a country in transformation. The manifestation and effects of the subprime fi nancial crisis in China are different from in other countries. China felt the coming of the “winter” later than other countries; it made a different move (a budget of 18 trillion RMB to 25 trillion RMB, including 4 trillion from the central government) to continue economic growth. China saw slower economic growth in the second half of 2008; its fi s- cal revenues suffered negative growth in both October and November. Export-oriented enterprises in coastal regions went bankrupt, while migrant workers became jobless and went back to their hometowns. Some large enterprises in cities cut jobs and wages, while graduates found it diffi cult to get jobs. Were they caused merely by the overseas fi nancial crisis or was there something wrong with the Chinese economy itself ? While China sees continuous economic growth and its national power rise sharply to be among the fi rst few in the world, we should be sober to see that: were it not for the Cold War between the former Soviet Union and the United States that began in the 1950s, the planned economic system formed in a then isolated China and the Cultural Revolution, made us miss opportunities. Such economic growth of China as a big country should have appeared long before. We should also note that, besides opening up to the outside world and the reform, the continuous and fast economic growth of China benefi ts from: 1) fi nancial operations such as an infl ux of foreign investments, 38 li dun bank loans, and the opening of the stock markets; 2) reduced expenditures due to delays in the payment of the reform cost and an incomplete social security system with low coverage; 3) excessively low wages of migrant workers and a lack of social security for them; 4) capital- ization of resources, such as land; and 5) high costs of environment and resources that have yet to be included into settlement. While the Chinese economy keeps growing rapidly, the “comprehensive reform” (from the report for the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC) fails to keep up with it, as there is an increasingly wide gap between urban and rural areas, between regions, and between the rich and the poor; a social security system that resolves or shift risks, that covers all the citizens, and that integrates urban and rural areas has yet to be established; there are a growing number of confl icts in transformation that have yet to be removed; the mindset formed in the period of the planned economy remains; and a mechanism that facilitates communication and understanding between groups with different interests and propositions, that enables them to reach a consensus through dialogues, that remove confl icts through negotiations and mediations, that follows the principles of the rule of law, and arbitrates disputes through justice to build an increasingly harmonious society, has yet to be created. Under such circumstances, the fast economic growth in China needs a solid basis and stability for the social development of China and human development. Since it has yet to fi nish the comprehensive reform, China is probably only a lame giant. How should we then look at the expectation that the fi nancial crisis, which is already global, is affecting China, but its threats to the country are not fatal yet or that the Chinese economy will keep growing as a whole and, although slower than before, its growth rate will still likely be the world’s fastest one? We should be extra alert. Such a scenario is far from good for China. As for environmental rehabilitation and ecological damages alone, China has never given suffi cient importance to environmental and ecological problems in terms of action. Environ- ment has been highlighted over the past few years, sometimes only as an instrument after land and credit that is available for controlling the overheated economy. It was in 2008 when the transformation of both the growth mode and the consumption pattern began and the specifi c annual task was to prevent economic growth on the fast side from becoming excessively fast and prices on a structural rise from becoming an obvious infl ation. victims of pollution and responsible for our planet 39

Both environmental protection and consumption reduction were among the four cornerstones stressed by the Chinese government early in the year. It also stressed that guidance should be given so that all sectors focus on changing the way of growth, deepening the reform, and stepping up social development in order to avoid comparison only by economic growth rate. Owing to changes in the economic situation at home and abroad, however, the aforementioned work plan and guideline for economic development, based on the “comprehensive reform” strategy, were changed several times in the year from preventing an overheated economy and infl ation to maintaining steady and rapid economic growth and preventing prices from rising too fast. They were then changed to implementing aggressive fi scal policies and moderately loose monetary policies and, fi nally, to maintaining growth, increasing domestic demand, and adjusting the economic structure. It is hard to say whether the structure can be improved and where the increased domestic demand is from, but economic growth can be maintained for sure. Effects of such policy changes on environmental and ecosystem protection deserve extra attention. It was rumored that some small coal mines, which had been closed, were expected to resume mining due to a shortage of coal caused by the ice and snow disaster early in the year. The budgeted 4 trillion RMB, 18 trillion RMB, or even 25 trillion RMB is more for infrastructure development than for the improvement of people’s livelihoods. The increased consumer demand will be mostly about home appliances, vehicles, and houses. Will our far-reaching strategic plan of energy conservation and emissions reduction, as well as changing the way of growth and the consumption pattern, be affected? We are deeply concerned. What is the future of human beings after we have developed to what we are today? It is also tied to why we should rehabilitate the environment, for us human beings and for the ecosystem we rely on for survival. Someone proposed a creed around life, living, and ecosystems. “Equality, freedom, and cultural diversity are possible only when we respect life . . . All the political and social changes are not groundless only when we respect the living . . . Sustainable development of human civilization is possible only when we respect the ecosystem.” It reminds us of the fi rst paragraph of chapter one of the Human Development Report fi rst launched by the United Nations in 1990: 40 li dun

“People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. This may appear to be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate concern with the accumulation of commodities and ﬁ nancial wealth.” PART I

2008: AN EVENTFUL YEAR

BEIJING’S ENVIRONMENT DURING THE OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE POST-OLYMPIC OUTLOOK

Li Hujun

During the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, Beijing’s environment showed noticeable improvements from the past. However, the city still faces serious environmental problems, including air pollution, water shortages, and the impending challenges of climate change. Maintaining the “environmental legacy” of the Beijing Olympic Games is a critical concern for the sustainable development of Beijing and the rest of China.

Key words: Beijing Olympic games, air quality, water resources, carbon emissions

I. The Environment during the Beijing Olympics

Prior to the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, the international community had voiced concerns over Beijing’s environmental quality. Some even wondered if the air pollution in Beijing would be the worst ever experienced at the Olympic Games. On the contrary, others argued that a strong government would be capable of adopting extraordinary measures within a short period of time; thus, ensuring the success of the Beijing Olympics. In fact, Beijing’s environmental quality during the Olympics proved, to a large extent, to be quite satisfactory. Beijing fulﬁ lled the commitment it made when bidding for the Olympic Games. According to the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) ﬁ nal report on November 27th, 2008, improvements in public transportation and environmental conditions are an important “legacy” of the Beijing Olympic Games.

A. Beijing’s Best Air Quality in Ten Years Beijing’s air quality continued to be a major concern as the opening ceremony approached. For several days following the ceremony, Bei- jing’s sky was still shrouded in haze and smoke, attracting the attention of the international media. According to reports released by the Beijing Environmental Protec- tion Bureau, the air quality in Beijing during the Olympics reached a 44 li hujun level designated as “good.” Specifi cally, the Air Pollution Index (API) fell between 80 and 100, with the primary pollutant being particulate matter of 10 micrometers or less (PM10). Nevertheless, this did not meet the air quality standards set by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2005. According to these newly revised guidelines, the daily average concentration of PM10 should not exceed 50 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3), while the annual average concentration should not exceed 20 µg/m3. An API of 50 corresponds with 50 µg/m3 of 3 1 PM10, and an API of 100 with 150 µg/m . While bidding for the Olympic Games, Beijing announced that during the Games, the indices of the four main pollutants, including PM10, would reach the standards of both China and the WHO. However, Achim Steiner, the United Nations under-secretary general and the executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), pointed out in an interview that WHO was using the 1997 version of the air quality guidelines when Beijing made the commitment in 2001. These guidelines did not yet provide standards for the concentration of PM10. Moreover, the 2005 version of the air quality guidelines did not establish universally applicable standards, but set specifi c goals for three stages of a transitional period. This method is intended to allow places all over the world to set different targets based on their own objectives and policies. In the fi rst stage of the transitional period, the goal is for the concentration of PM10 to be below 150 µg/m3, which is equivalent to the level of “good” in the present national standards of China.2 Fortunately, it rained on August 10th and 11th, 2008, temporarily dispelling the pollutants in Beijing’s air. According to the offi cial report, the API on August 12th, after two consecutive days of rain, was 32, which is classifi ed as the level “excellent.” In other words, 3 the concentration of PM10 was less than 50 µg/m , which is the upper limit of the daily average concentration set by the WHO air quality guidelines. On the same day, UNEP released a public notice stating

1 WHO Air Quality Guidelines, 2005. 2 Li Hujun, “United Nations Under-Secretary-General on the Air Quality of Beijing,” The Financial Network, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2008-08-08/110003637. html (accessed August 8th, 2008). beijing’s olympic games and the post-olympic outlook 45 that the air quality in Beijing had improved on the fourth day of the Olympics. For the seventeen days of the Beijing Olympics, the air quality in Beijing was the best for any corresponding time period over the last ten years. Not only did the air quality reach or exceed the level of “good” everyday, but there were ten days when the air quality reached the level of “excellent,” meaning that the concentration of

PM10 dropped below the target value of the WHO’s third stage of the air quality guidelines. In 2008, Beijing’s air quality reached or exceeded the level of “good” on 274 days, which is an improvement of 28 more days than in 2007. There were 61 days of “excellent” air quality in 2008, which is 29 more days than in 2007. This marked the best record of the last ten years.

B. Carbon Balancing Efforts Air quality is not the only standard for evaluating Beijing’s environment during the Olympics. Against the backdrop of global warming, much attention was given to what kind of climate record Beijing would turn in and whether or not they could maintain a carbon balance. A carbon balance means that varied measures are adopted to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide. Considerable amounts of greenhouse gases are brought about when members of the delegations to the Olympics and the audience make their long journeys to the games. The number of athletes alone exceeded ten thousand. Moreover, as predicted by the Beijing Tour- ism Administration before the games, the number of foreign tourists reached hundreds of thousands during the Olympics. Another factor contributing to an abundant emission of greenhouse gases is the substantial amount of resources and efforts that would be devoted to constructing and using the new Olympic venues and equipment as well as the torch relay. The 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin and the World Cup in Ger- many had already set good examples of climate protection for the Beijing Olympics. Unlike Italy and Germany, China is viewed as a developing country and is not obligated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Nevertheless, in an October 2007 report examining the environment of Beijing for the Olympics, UNEP explicitly suggested 46 li hujun that “the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) should publicly commit itself to climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gases.”3 BOCOG did not directly respond to the suggestion by UNEP. Afterwards, however, the Chinese government set about evaluating the emissions and reduction of greenhouse gases during the Olympics. At a press conference held by the Information Offi ce State Council in May 2008, the Minister of Science and Technology, Wan Gang (万钢), stated that the emission of greenhouse gases would be kept in balance during the Beijing Olympic Games. Before the Beijing Olympics, Xu Huaqing (徐华清), a researcher at the Energy Institute of the National Development and Reform commission, revealed at an international symposium the preliminary assessment his team had made concerning the emission of greenhouse gases during the Games. They estimated that the gases emitted would be equivalent to about 1,180,000 tons of carbon dioxide, with the overwhelming majority—almost 1 million tons—resulting from audience activities. The remainder of the emissions was estimated to come from the construction and use of the Olympic venues (100,000 tons), the activities of the athletes and offi cials from various countries (20,000 tons), and the torch relay (80,000 tons). Conversely, it was also estimated that various measures being adopted as part of the “Green Olympics” would contribute to curbing the emissions of greenhouse gases. For instance, for two months, vehicles whose license plates ended with even numbers could use roads only on even-numbered dates, while those with odd numbers could only be used on odd-numbered dates. Such traffi c control prevented around 850,000 tons of greenhouse gases from being emitted. Similarly, some environmentally harmful enterprises were shut down, reducing emissions by 146,000 tons. Urban landscaping would reduce emissions by 65,000 tons. The reduction of emissions through the use of clean-energy vehicles during the Olympics would be around 20,000 tons, and the use of renewable energy products, such as solar photo- voltaics in the Olympic venues would be around 1000 tons.4

3 UNEP, “2008 Beijing Olympics—Environmental Evaluation,” October 2007. 4 Li Hujun, “The Concern for a ‘Carbon Balance’ in the Beijing Olympic Games,” CAIJING Magazine, no. 219, (2008). beijing’s olympic games and the post-olympic outlook 47

However, Xu Huaqing emphasized at the time that these numbers should all be re-examined using more explicit criteria on how to calculate greenhouse gas emissions and how to defi ne a “carbon balance.” For example, there was a considerable dispute regarding the amount of emissions caused by the air travel of the audience, athletes, and offi cials. The carbon emissions calculator of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provided a number which was ¼ of that provided by the calculator of Climate Friendly, a non-governmental organization (NGO). Currently, the Chinese government has still not publicized the precise data regarding the “carbon balance” of the Beijing Olympics. Additionally, UNEP did not assess the environment during the Bei- jing Olympics in its fi nal report. Nevertheless, as the NGO Green- peace argued in its report assessing the environment during the Beijing Olympics, “Whatever the fi nal cut of greenhouse gas emissions during the Games are, the data undoubtedly demonstrated the efforts Beijing made to minimize their energy consumption.”5

II. The Environmental Legacy of the Beijing Olympics

The Chinese government has done its utmost to guarantee the quality of the environment during the Olympic Games. In his article written in August 2008, Achim Steiner listed many of the measures taken by the Beijing municipal government and those of neighboring provinces and municipalities to protect the environment. For example, as a result of a $17 billion investment, over 90% of the city’s wastewater is now treated. Natural gas now accounts for 60% of the city’s energy supply, up from 45% in 2000. At the same time, Beijing adopted new vehicle emission standards that meet the most stringent European standards and are higher than those in the United States. Fifty thousand old taxis and ten thousand buses have been replaced with new ones. Four thousand of these buses are powered by natural gas—now the largest ﬂ eet of its kind in the world. Furthermore, over the past seven years,

5 Greenpeace, “China after the Olympics: Lessons from Beijing,” July 28th, 2008. 48 li hujun some 200 polluting industries have been closed, have switched to new kinds of cleaner production, or have moved out of the city.6 From July 20th to September 20th, 2008, Beijing also imposed trafﬁ c controls which only allowed vehicles with even or odd numbered plates to run on alternate days in the city. In this way, millions of vehicle owners contributed to achieving the goal of a “Green Olym- pics.” Another measure used to reduce pollution was the temporary closing of several factories and construction sites in Beijing and the neighboring provinces and municipalities during the Games. On November 30th, 2008, Du Shaozhong (杜少中), deputy director of the Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau, revealed several positive results of the measures taken by the government. According to Du, the total motor vehicle emissions were reduced by about 60%, as a result of the vehicle control measures. At the same time, factory emissions were reduced by about 30%, due to such measures as halt- ing heavily polluting operations on construction sites, putting restrictions on the main enterprises that discharge pollutants, and shutting down heavily polluting production procedures. To some extent, the measures mentioned above can be regarded as a large-scale “environmental protection experiment,” leaving China with numerous contributions to the protection of the environment. As the Olympic Games came to an end, the life of the citizens of Beijing returned back to normal. Factories and construction sites reopened and the restrictions on vehicles were lifted. Because of this, Beijing’s air quality in 2009 may not be as good as it was in 2008. In fact, Beijing was very prudent in setting the goal for 2009 at 71% of the days of the year having good air quality, compared to 75% in 2008. At the same time, some of the ideas from the “Green Olympics” have been maintained after the Beijing Olympic Games. For example, although the odd and even license plate rule was lifted, a new vehicle control mechanism was adopted. Using another system based on license plate numbers, motor vehicle owners are not permitted to drive in the city on one workday every week. Furthermore, Beijing will continue to put restrictions on high-emission, or “yellow label” vehicles, which are petrol vehicles that do not meet the National I

6 Achim Steiner, “Give Beijing Some Breathing Space,” United Nations Environ- ment Programme, August, 2008. beijing’s olympic games and the post-olympic outlook 49

Emission Standard and diesel vehicles that do not meet the National III Emission Standard. Beginning on October 1st, 2009, all “yellow label” vehicles will be banned from entering the area within Beijing’s Sixth Ring Road. In the mean time, relevant enterprises are being encouraged to form “green” vehicle teams that meet emissions standards and will take up the task of transportation, for both production and city life. Beijing’s government has also required that all construction sites operating within the capital substantially curb dust pollution and meet the Green Construction Standards (绿色施工标准) before March 1st, 2009. In order to reduce coal pollution, all coal-ﬁ red stoves in the historic districts of Beijing’s inner circle will be switched to electric stoves by the end of 2009. Simultaneously, the government is actively promoting a shift from coal burning boilers that are 20 tons or larger to ones that run on clean energy. In the ten districts and counties of the Bei- jing countryside, the conversion to central heating must be completed before the winter season of 2010. Clean energy, such as solar power and bio-fuels, will be actively promoted during this time. Efforts will be carried out to replace the combustion of raw coal with clean energy or high-quality coal. In addition, Beijing will implement emergency pollution control measures during times of extreme weather conditions or severe pollution of the atmosphere. These include plate-number based vehicle controls on both city and non-city residents, the halt- ing of earthwork and demolition operations, and full and partial shut downs of highly-polluting factories. More importantly, the notable improvements in Beijing’s air quality during the Olympics, and the efforts made to cut greenhouse gas emissions, all serve as the best examples for policy-makers to learn from. The Beijing Olympics demonstrated that on many occasions, environmental improvement, economic development, and political achievements can go hand in hand. In a Hebei Daily newspaper article by the director of the Hebei Provincial Environmental Protection Bureau, Ji Zhenhai (姬振海) contends that the various measures taken by Hebei Province to achieve the goal of a “Green Olympics,” not only guaranteed Beijing’s air quality during the Games, but also effectively facilitated carbon emission reduction. This laid the foundation for a shift in Hebei’s economic pattern from a high-carbon economy to a low-carbon economy. For example, Hebei’s capital, Shijiazhuang (石家庄), is expanding its use of high-quality natural gas and the main urban area will bid farewell to “the era of coal gas” by the end of 2008. At the 50 li hujun same time, cities like Chengde (承德) and Zhangjiakou (张家口) are actively developing wind power, and clean energy is projected to take up more than 50% of their total energy generation in 2010.7 For citizens of Beijing, and even the rest of China, the “Green Olym- pics” has brought more awareness of their environmental responsibilities and rights. In its air quality guidelines for permanent residents, the

WHO formulated that when the concentration of PM10 is increased by 10 µg/m3, the mortality rate will rise by 0.4%. Beijing’s residents hope to keep their air clean even after the Olympic Games, while residents in other parts of China are expecting more cities to make every effort to combat pollution. The participation of civil society was also a striking aspect of the “Green Olympics.” The BOCOG was rather open and cooperative with both domestic and international NGOs. In its environmental review of the Beijing Olympics released in October 2007, UNEP “noted with pleasure the cooperation between BOCOG and a sig- niﬁ cant number of NGOs, including the Chinese Society for Envi- ronmental Sciences (CSES), Conservation International, the Chinese Environmental Protection Association, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Friends of Nature, and Greenpeace.8

III. Post-Olympic Outlook

During the Olympic Games, Beijing residents enjoyed long-missed clean air and certainly hope to maintain it long after the conclusion of the Olympics. In what way will Beijing’s environment be protected after the Olympic Games?

A. Limitations of the “Blue-Sky Goal” The municipal government of Beijing has not shifted its attention away from environmental protection since the Olympics. Starting on October 11th, 2008, Beijing implemented a new trafﬁ c control scheme, whereby, each day of the week, motor vehicles with certain numbers

7 Ji Zhenhai, “Green Olympics and Low-Carbon Economy,” Hebei Daily, August 26th, 2008. 8 UNEP, “Beijing 2008 Olympic Games—An Environmental Review,” October 2007. beijing’s olympic games and the post-olympic outlook 51 do not run. Furthermore, the Beijing Olympic Games have left behind considerable “green legacies,” including new metro lines, regulations on car exhaust, and the relocation of the highly contaminating Capital Iron and Steel Company (首都钢铁公司). By November 30th, 2008, there had been 265 days in total, or 70% of the entire year, in which Beijing’s air quality reached or transcended the level of “good.” The “blue-sky goal” was reached one month ahead of schedule; the ﬁ rst time in a decade that a yearly blue-sky goal was reached that far ahead of schedule. However, as explained above, reaching the goal only meant that the API was beneath 100, or the 3 concentration of PM10 was 150 µg/m . The standards that Beijing used were far from the air quality guidelines of the WHO, which required that the average daily and annual PM10 concentrations do not exceed 50 µg/m3 and 20 µg/m3, respectively. After the Olympic Games, two million motor vehicles returned to the roads of Beijing, and the factories and building sites which had been temporarily closed during the Games reopened. It should also be noted that Beijing, like other places in China, has not incorporated

PM2.5 (particulate matter that is less than 2.5 micrometers) into the daily monitoring system. Dr. Shi Guangyu (石广玉) and his colleagues at the Institute of Atmospheric Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, concluded that from 2006 to the summer of 2008, the concentration of course aerosol particles in Beijing’s atmosphere was remarkably less than the previous two years. However, the concentration of fi ne aerosol particles was no less than that of the previous years. Moreover, the concentration of particles with diameters between 0.3 and 0.5 microns had increased instead. These types of fi ne particles mainly come from car exhaust pollution. Further magnifying people’s anxieties was a UNEP report released on November 13th, 2008, concerning “Atmospheric Brown Clouds” (ABC), also known as Asian Brown Clouds. Mostly the product of fossil fuel and biofuel combustion, ABCs consist of carbonic particulate matter, organic particulate matter, sulfate, nitrate, and ammonium salt. UNEP has identifi ed 13 cities in the world as ABC hotspots, three of which are located in China. Those three cities are Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. ABCs are not only harmful to human health, but may have serious effects on the economic development of many countries. If PM2.5 concentrations increase by 20 mg/m3, an estimated 340,000 people will die every year in China and India. In addition, it is estimated that 52 li hujun

ABC-related PM2.5 will cause economic losses of 3.6% of China’s GDP and 2.2% of India’s GDP.9 Consequently, the blue-sky goal of 70% of the days in a year to be at the level of “good,” is no more than a starting point for abating the air pollution problem in Beijing.

B. The Concern over Water Resources Besides air pollution, an even more severe challenge that Beijing faces is the shortage of water. The per capita availability of water resources in Beijing is 300 m3, which is far below the internationally recognized per capita minimum of 1000 m3. Despite such extreme water scarcity, Beijing is still expanding rapidly. By the end of 2006, the population of Beijing reached 15.81 million. This is an increase of 430,000 people—the size of a medium-sized city—from 2005. At the same time, new skyscrapers, roads, and bridges appear daily in Beijing. Such rapid growth not only increases traffi c congestion and air pollution in Beijing, but also puts more pressure on water resources. In order to safeguard Beijing’s water supply, provinces like Hebei and Shanxi—short in water resources themselves—have been making great sacrifi ces by transferring water to Beijing. However, Beijing’s demand for water has yet to be satisfi ed. Currently under construction is the South-to-North Water Diversion Project—a long-distance, inter-basin water transfer project. The central route of this project starts from Danjiangkou Reservoir, located in the border area of Hubei and Henan, and ends in Beijing. This route is expected to be completed around 2010, at which time, water from the Han River will be diverted all the way to the north. Originally planned as an emergency water supply during the Beijing Olympics, a part of the central route called the Shijiazhuang-Beijing channel began to transfer water in September 2008. The South-to-North Water Diversion Project still remains highly controversial. Looking at the central route as an example, not only will the interests of the residents near the Danjiangkou Reservoir and the Han River Basin be sacrifi ced, but the ecology will be enormously impacted. Additionally, the cost of transferring water from the Han

9 UNEP, “Atmospheric Brown Clouds: Regional Assessment Report with Focus on Asia,” November 13th, 2008. beijing’s olympic games and the post-olympic outlook 53

River to the North is considerably high. Whether or not Beijing, Tianjin, and other regions in North China will be willing and able to fully compensate the regions that are providing the water remains to be seen. Looking at other ways for Beijing and Tianjin to tackle their water crises, sea water desalinization has been offered as a possible solution. In an interview with Ms. Cristina Narbona Ruiz, Spain’s former Minister of the Environment, she explained that upon taking ofﬁ ce, her party—the Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party—halted an expen- sive long-distance water transfer project called the Ebro River Project. Instead, the government proposed an alternative €3.8 billion water plan called AGUA, which will increase the water supply of Spain by more than one billion cubic meters through the desalinization of sea water. Although the ﬁ rst section of the 900 kilometer long Ebro River Project would have been cheaper than desalinization, the cost would have increased beyond that. At full length, the cost of the Ebro River Project would have been four times as much as the desalinization project. At the same time, the cost of desalinization is gradually declining.10 It is the author’s hope that China will also have an independent assessment of the real cost of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, as well as the cost of large-scale desalination alternatives in coastal cities like Tianjin. Of course, these are not necessarily the only solutions to Beijing’s air pollution and water shortage problems. The present author has previously proposed “decentralization” as a way to ease some of Beijing’s pressures. Part of a decentralization plan would include reducing the importance of Beijing’s central city zone. One way would be to compel certain institutions and companies, through the use of executive orders and market mechanisms, to move to satellite cities like Tongzhou (通州) and Shunyi (顺义). Thus, not only will the residents of these satellite cities be relieved from commuting, but some environmental pressures will also be eased. Another aspect of decentralization would be to reduce the importance of Beijing by encouraging institutions and

10 Li Hujun, “Spanish Minister of Environment: Inter-Basin Water Transfer Should be ‘the Last Resort,’ ” The Financial Network, http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-10-16/ 100033796.html (accessed October 17th, 2007). 54 li hujun residents to move to China’s southern regions, where water resources are richer.11

C. Learning from Beijing’s Lessons Compared to most other cities in China, Beijing is relatively well- off. As the capital city, Beijing enjoys many advantages in terms of environmental protection. However, if not made proper use of, these advantages can cause resources to be wasted. An example of this can be seen when Beijing attempted to promote clean energy to address climate change by installing solar powered street lights in certain areas. According to some of the people involved, a large portion of the solar street lights are not in service. Due to poor management, lack of supervision, and excess subcontracting, the project ended up in the hands of construction teams with little knowledge of solar power. The energy-saving lights turned out to be “blind lights.”12 In the future, efforts at environmental protection and combating climate change should avoid blind policy-making, while supervision of such projects should be enhanced. Blind policy-making was certainly not the case with the vehicle control measures enacted during the Olympics. Beijing prepared for the restrictions with a practice run in August 2007. Numerous scientists were involved in the preliminary research of this policy and provided scientiﬁ c support for the ﬁ nal decision by the municipal government. Other parts of China should learn from the experiences and lessons of Beijing. Although China has done some work in protecting the environment and addressing climate change, more important work is yet to be done. Listening to the opinions of stakeholders, promoting more participation of civil society, and ensuring the transparency of environmental governance are all essential if sustainable development is to be achieved.

11 Li Taige, “What Happens after the Olympics?” China Dialogue, August 29th, 2007. 12 Yuan Yue, “How to Regularize Solar Power?” Science Times, November 16th, 2008. LARGE PROJECTS IN QUAKE-STRICKEN AREAS AFTER THE SICHUAN EARTHQUAKE

Fan Xiao

The Sichuan Earthquake that occurred on May 12th, 2008, caused severe damage to many large projects, brought about secondary disasters, and had serious impacts on the environment. China needs to draw profound lessons from the disaster and refl ect on its heavily invested reconstruction scheme. The goal is to fulfi ll the task in a manner that is people-oriented, balanced, scientifi c, and that respects the laws of nature.

Key words: 5.12 Sichuan Earthquake, hydropower project, heavy chemical industry, environmental impact, post-disaster reconstruction

I. Pre-Quake Conditions of Large Projects in Longmen Shan, Western Sichuan, and the Neighboring Areas

During the several years prior to the May 12th, 2008, Sichuan Earth- quake (also known as the 5.12 Earthquake), China was experiencing unprecedented growth in its GDP and a rapid increase in investment in state-funded large construction projects. This resulted in a surge of hydropower projects, heavy chemical projects, and industrial parks.

A. Hydropower Projects An example of the abundance of hydropower projects can be seen in Southwestern China. The rich water resources in almost all river basins and tributaries there have been exploited by companies big and small. Tax revenues are controlled by different levels of government, ranging from provincial and city levels to county and township levels. The development follows the cascade model, namely, reservoir power stations are built one after another like a cascade, with no part of the river untouched.

B. Heavy Chemical Projects Thanks to the signiﬁ cant contribution to GDP growth by heavy chemical projects, and the implementation of a production value-added-tax 56 fan xiao

(VAT) in China’s current ﬁ scal and tax system, these projects generate much larger tax revenues than other projects with the same amount of investment. Hence, the heavy chemical industry has become an important sector for local governments to enlarge their base for local taxation. Since 2003, a “fever” in developing heavy chemical projects has swept across the nation. Driven by ﬁ nancial returns, local governments have competed to develop heavy chemical projects as government-invested pillar projects. This is in spite of the heavy strain on resources and the environment, the inability to create more job opportunities than other projects, and the over-consumption of energy, arable land, and fresh water, that these projects are causing. The following is a description of the pre-quake conditions of heavy chemical projects in Sichuan and Chongqing, both of which are located in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River.

1. Chengdu Plain, Sichuan Province As early as 1988, Sichuan planned to transfer crude oil from Xinji- ang Autonomous Region and build an oil refi nery in the province. With numerous revisions, the plan kept growing larger. According to Chengdu’s city government plan, the Pengzhou City Mega Petro- chemical Project (四川彭州建设巨型石化城) will include two ethylene plants, with an annual capacity of 800,000 tons for the fi rst plant and one million tons for the second, an oil refi nery with an annual capacity of 22 million tons, and an aromatic hydrocarbon plant with an annual capacity of one million tons.1 Covering an area of 15.3 square kilometers, the entire project is expected to be completed by 2020 with a total investment of nearly 80 billion RMB. The fi rst ethylene plant was approved by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) on December 13th, 2005 and its foundational stone was laid in Pengzhou on February 28th, 2006. It is reported that the NDRC offi cially approved the construction of the oil refi nery with an annual capacity of 10 million tons on April 21st, 2008, in the Of fi cial Reply to Approve the 10-million-ton Oil Refi nery in Sichuan (Fagai Gongye 2008 No. 961) (关于四川 1000 万吨/年炼油项目核准的批复 (发改工业 (2008) 961号)).

1 Yue Zhanye, “The Westward Move of PetroChina: An Ethylene Production Site with an Annual Output of 80,000 tons in Pengzhou City,” The Economic Observer, 2006. large projects in quake-stricken areas 57

Other chemical projects in the Chengdu Plain include Xinjin Chem- ical Park (新津化工园区), Qionglai County’s (邛崃) largest phosphate chemical base, Longmen Shan Area Chemical Belt (龙门山磷化工产业带), the high energy consumption industrial park in the upper reaches of the Minjiang River (岷江), and Luzhou’s (泸州) “Western Chemical City”.

2. The Three Gorges Dam Area of Chongqing The Chongqing government plans to construct an integrated petrochemical base in Changshou, consisting of the Changshou Chemical Park (长寿化工园区) and the Yanjia Industrial Park (晏家工业园区). The former, with a planned area of 31.3 square kilometers, includes a natural gas chemical area, a ﬁ ne chemicals area, a petrochemicals area, and an ethylene-processing area. Its aim is to become the largest comprehensive chemical base on the upper stream of the Yangtze River in the next 10 to 15 years. The sales revenue targets are 30 billion RMB and 120 billion RMB in 2010 and 2020, respectively. The Yanjia Industrial Park, with a planned area of 43 square kilometers, is to be the home of metallurgy, machinery, and building material plants. Already, the park has 90 industries, with a total investment of 29 billion RMB. Two other chemical parks in the region include the Fuling Chemi- cal Park (涪陵化工园区) and the Wanzhou Chemical Park (万州化工园区).

II. Quake Damage to Large Projects

The devastating 5.12 Earthquake caused serious damage and great losses to irrigation projects, hydropower projects, heavy chemical projects, infrastructure, and industrial parks in Longmen Shan and the neighboring areas.

A. Damage to Irrigation and Hydropower Projects Irrigation and hydropower projects suffered tremendous damage during the earthquake. No hydropower station survived the quake in the Longmen Shan area. In addition, a large number of irrigation and hydropower facilities in the vast neighboring areas were affected. According to Jiao Yong (矫勇), vice minister of the Ministry of Water 58 fan xiao

Resources, of the 2,473 reservoirs that were damaged by the quake nationwide, 1,803 were in Sichuan Province. Among them all, four were large reservoirs, 60 were medium-sized reservoirs, 331 were small “size 1” reservoirs, and 1,601 were small “size 2” reservoirs. Sixty-nine faced collapse, 310 were highly dangerous, and the rest were in a fairly dangerous state. The Lianhuadong Reservoir in Pengzhou (彭州莲花洞水库), the largest among the “ten highly dangerous reservoirs” in Chengdu, had part of its spillway blocked due to landslides on the left side. Additionally, its wave wall collapsed, its dam fell apart, and the dam side of the impervious wall had major cracks. Power grids were also severely damaged. For instance, the 220-KV Yinxing Power Substation (银杏变电站) in the upper reaches of the Minjiang River was completely submerged and the 220-KV and 110- KV steel towers with incoming and outgoing wires between Yingxiu Township (映秀) and Taipingyi (太平驿) collapsed. In Sichuan Prov- ince, more than 100 substations were damaged by the quake, 14,000 areas within the grid had power cuts, and the grid in the Abazhou (阿坝州) area was almost destroyed. The damages to power stations led to huge economic losses for many companies. For instance, the Zipingpu Power Plant (紫坪铺电厂) suffered from a direct loss of 297 million RMB, and the estimated loss of the Minjiang Water and Electricity Company (岷江水电公司) was over one billion RMB. Statistics from the Sichuan Electricity Department show that 470 hydropower stations were damaged (with a total installed capacity of 3.3 million KW), and the direct economic loss was 5.39 billion RMB. The damages to power transmission lines and grid facilities led to a loss of 1.9 billion RMB. According to another report, the loss of power assets in the upper reaches of the Minjiang River alone exceeded 10 billion RMB. As 62% of Sichuan’s electricity is generated by hydropower, the severe damages to hydropower stations, as a result of the earthquake, have dealt a heavy blow to the development of the local economy.

B. Damage to Large Industrial Parks As a large phosphate chemical base shared by Yingfeng Chemical Co., Ltd. (蓥峰集团) and Hongda Chemical Co., Ltd. (宏达集团), the Chuanxindian Chemical Park in Shifang (什邡穿心店化工基地) was completely destroyed by the earthquake. Factory buildings were large projects in quake-stricken areas 59 almost leveled to the ground and many facilities collapsed. The direct losses of Yingfeng and Hongda were over one billion RMB and 700 million RMB, respectively.2 The Shuimo (水磨), Taoguan (桃关), and Xuankou (桃关) Indus- trial Areas in the Aba Industrial Park (阿坝工业园区) also suffered signifi cant losses, with most plant buildings fl attened. In the Aba Aluminum Plant (阿坝铝厂), the largest factory in the park, all offi ce buildings and old plants collapsed and the new electrolytic aluminum production facility that was to be launched on May 13th, 2008, was also seriously damaged. This resulted in an estimated direct economic loss of more than 500 million RMB.3 The Pengzhou Petrochemical Project was still under construction in Jingshan Township (景山镇) and Longfeng Township (隆丰镇) when the earthquake hit. This was one of the worst hit areas where most civilian buildings were destroyed. Although construction of the 800,000 ton ethylene plant had not yet started, the offi ce building which was about to be completed suffered from severe damages and heavy cracking.

III. Environmental Impact and the Threat of Quake-Damaged Large Projects

Quake-damaged large projects are causing major threats to the environment, including lakes caused by landslides, the release of harmful substances, secondary disasters, and pollution. These problems became the focus of the post-quake emergency rescue and disaster relief.

A. Quake-Damaged Hydropower Projects Were the Major Source of Secondary Disasters In addition to the direct economic loss and the signiﬁ cant impact on electricity-consuming industries, damaged irrigation and hydropower projects have become the major source for secondary and post-quake disasters.

2 “The Devastated Phosphate Chemical Industry,” China Business Times, May 20th, 2008. 3 Ding Rui, “In Urgent Need of Land for Industrial Reconstruction: A Probe into the Reconstruction of the Aba Economic Zone,” Beijing News, June 4th, 2008. 60 fan xiao

After the 5.12 Earthquake, dam locks in most damaged reservoirs did not function, causing their water levels to rapidly rise. Landslides, land collapses, and mud-rock fl ows caused the water level in Hong- song Hydroelectric Power Station (红松一级电站) and other places to surpass their dam’s height. In particular, the Zipingpu Reservoir (紫坪铺水库), the largest one in the upper stream of the Minjiang River, was of great concern because it had direct implications for the Chengdu Plain and the cities downstream. Even more alarming is the possibility of a chain reaction taking place because of the cascade model of hydropower development. In other words, once a reservoir in the upper stream experiences a major problem, the downstream ones would also face a huge risk. The Tian- longhu (天龙湖), Tongzhong (铜钟), Taipingyi, Yingxiuwan (映秀湾), and Gengda (耿达) Power Stations all faced such potential risks. Another risk is that polluting substances can easily gather in the reservoirs because of the slow fl ow of water and the blockage of dams. For instance, there were a large number of fl oating objects in the Zip- ingpu Reservoir and many other reservoirs in the quake-hit areas. In addition, a large area of the Zipingpu Reservoir suffered from oil pollution caused by a severe oil leakage from damaged power stations, electricity transmission facilities in the upper reaches of the Minjiang River, damaged vehicles, high-speed boats, barge containers, and other engineering machinery that was widely used during the rescue efforts. The polluted area was two square kilometers at its peak, or over 1/10 of the total area of the reservoir, posing a threat to the water resources of Chengdu.

B. Severe Leakage of Quake-Damaged Chemical Plants At the press conference held by the State Council Information Offi ce on May 23rd, 2008, Wu Xiaoqing (晓青), the vice minister of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), publicly announced four chemical plant leakage accidents in Sichuan caused by the earthquake, involving liquid ammonia and sulfuric acid, as well as, the burning of yellow phosphorus. He pointed out that the quake-stricken areas happened to be places where high-risk industries were clustered. There were over a hundred chemical plants in cities large projects in quake-stricken areas 61 like Chengdu, Deyang (德阳), and Mianyang (绵阳), among which 45 were key state- or province-controlled plants.4 One of these was the Yingfeng Chemical Plant, where two huge spherical tanks fi lled with liquid ammonia, with storage capacities of 1000m3 and 100m3, slid horizontally, causing cracks in the pipes under the valves. A huge quantity of liquid ammonia leaked and evaporated and a fi re erupted that lasted for two days, causing severe damages. A similar accident happened at the Hongda Chemical Plant, where a fi re at the sulfuric acid production line, about 100 meters away from the leakage point, erupted. In addition, several thousand tons of sulfuric acid leaked from Hongda’s fi fteen 260 ton sulfuric acid pools that ruptured during the quake.

IV. Reﬂ ections on the Decision-Making for Large Post-Quake Reconstruction Projects

Besides causing a large amount of damage and bringing trauma to millions of people, the 5.12 Earthquake also exposed hidden problems, in aspects like industrial layout, protection measures against earthquakes, disaster-mitigation measures, and emergency rescue plans. It has become a major concern for the entire society to solve these problems and improve our ability to protect ourselves against earthquakes.

A. Reﬂ ections on the Layout of Hydropower Projects in Southwest China At a press conference held by the State Council Information Ofﬁ ce on May 25th, 2008, Liu Ning (刘宁), the chief engineer for the Min- istry of Water Resources, said that revisions of hydropower plans in Southwest China—an important base for hydropower development— would be made to consider geology, earthquakes, construction, and the environment. The Ministry of Water Resources is now drafting a comprehensive plan for seven river basins, including a special plan for hydropower projects. Once the comprehensive plan is done, the special plan will be amended as well.

4 Li Yan and Jia Jingfeng, “Environmental Protection Ministry: Toxic Leak at Chemical Plants in Sichuan, Remains of the Dead Cause Water Pollution,” http://www.chinanews .com.cn/cj/hbht/news/2008/05–23/1260577.shtml (accessed on May 23rd, 2008). 62 fan xiao

In June 2008, over 40 experts, scholars, reporters, and non-governmental organization (NGO) members, as well as 18 NGOs jointly issued an open letter appealing for the reassessment of the safety of large dams in geologically unstable areas of Southwest China. They suggested that three important questions to be taken into account during the post-disaster reconstruction: Is it acceptable to build large dams on rift zones? Were there any mistakes in assessing the seismic intensity when designing the dams? Is it possible that building large dams on fault lines will trigger massive earthquakes? A fi eldtrip to Sichuan and Yunnan Provinces, led by Shao Bingren (邵秉仁), the vice director of the Committee of Population, Resources, and the Environment of the CPPCC, was made by a group of experts from the State Electricity Regulatory Commission and the Yangtze River Water Conservation Commission in October 2008. The study investigated the environmental impact of hydropower projects, with special attention paid to seismic monitoring of large hydropower stations. According to the Regulation on the Administration of Earthquake Monitoring (地震监测管理条例) promulgated by the State Council, a special earthquake monitoring network shall be built for reservoirs with a dam height over 100 meters, a storage capacity that is 500 million cubic meters or more, and that is likely to induce an earthquake of at least fi ve degrees on the Richter scale. What the experts learned from the Sichuan Seismological Bureau, however, was that severe problems with the monitoring network still existed in some reservoirs with high dams. They found that the proprietors either kept their budgets as low as possible or simply did not include a monitoring network in their reservoir designs at all. When plans did include seismic monitoring networks, most were designed by hydropower engineers rather than seismic professionals, resulting in a low budget and inadequate monitoring facilities. Moreover, without proper supervision and examination by seismic authorities, the existing networks often fail to function. For instance, four of the seven sub-networks in the Zipingpu Reser- voir failed to collect data because of cable damage prior to the 5.12 Earthquake. Many scholars at home and abroad, as well as the general public, believe that the Zipingpu Reservoir may have triggered the 5.12 Earthquake. This claim has been fi rmly denied by the hydropower authorities, the proprietors, and other related agencies. However, up until this point, they have merely denied the possibility without large projects in quake-stricken areas 63 presenting any research results supported by observational data. Experts from the Chinese Academy of Sciences have already started an in-depth study on this issue, and access to data and other materials of the Zipingpu seismic monitoring network will be crucial. Although the Sichuan Seismological Bureau committed itself to saving all the observation data and providing it to research institutes in October 2008, the promise of data sharing has not been honored yet. Among those who deny any connection between the Zipingpu Reservoir and the earthquake is Pan Jiazheng (潘家铮), an expert on hydropower projects. He grounds his argument mainly on the fact that there is no precedent in the world that a water reservoir could have triggered a tectonic earthquake of 8 degrees on the Richter scale. He also claims that even if Zipingpu had triggered the earthquake, it would have merely brought the earthquake ahead of time and thus, mitigated the main shock.5 If we follow basic scientifi c thinking and logical reasoning, it is absurd to arrive at the conclusion that “something will never happen” just because “it has never happened before.” In fact, before the 1962 earthquake that was induced by the Xinfengjiang Reservoir (新丰江), people had no idea that water conservation projects could trigger earthquakes of over 6 degrees on the Richter scale. What’s more, there are a number of precedents of this kind in weak seismic regions. What magnitude of earthquakes can reservoirs trigger if they are located on seismic zones where there have been historical records of massive earthquakes? This question has not been answered in a scientifi c manner yet. Nevertheless, existing precedents show that reservoirs can trigger earthquakes at magnitudes that are higher than the highest magnitudes of known natural earthquakes in the area. Since the present regional anti-seismic systems in China are based on the seismic data of natural earthquakes, there would be a large death toll and huge property losses if reservoirs triggered an earthquake that is above the upper limit of known natural earthquakes.6 As a result, hydropower authorities have begun to attach greater importance to the quake-resistance levels of reservoirs and dams since the 5.12 Earthquake. However, this should not be the only lesson we

5 Xia Shuang, “Suggestions on Hydropower Development,” Science Times, December 15th, 2008. 6 Fan Xiao, “Suggestions on Hydropower Development,” Peking University, http:// www.csc.pku.edu.cn/art.php?sid=3866 (accessed January 5th, 2009). 64 fan xiao learn from the disaster. As mentioned above, if the reservoir-triggered earthquake turned out to be much more intense than known natural earthquakes, the dam would still be in grave danger. Even if the dams were safe, the quake-affected regions would still incur great losses, and possible secondary disasters like landslides and mud-rock ﬂ ows, would also pose great threats to the dam and the lower reaches of the river. Given that many dams and reservoirs much larger than Zipingpu are still under construction in earthquake-active rift zones in West- ern China, it is urgent for us to conduct in-depth research to explore whether the 5.12 Earthquake was triggered by the Zipingpu Reser- voir. Meanwhile, the current layout of hydropower projects and the regional quake-resistance levels (not limited to that of dams) also need reexamination and adjustment.

B. Reﬂ ections on the High Energy-Consuming and Highly Polluting Industrial Parks in the Minjiang River’s Upper Reaches Before the 5.12 Earthquake, a number of electrometallurgy-dominant industrial parks were set up in Abazhou, an autonomous region in the upper reaches of the Minjiang River. The electrometallurgy industry is known for high production costs, high energy consumption, heavy pollution, low scientiﬁ c and technological content in products, poor economic return, and poor competitiveness. Consequently, the sustainable development of this region has been hindered by the electrometallurgy industry. Due to the low environmental capacity of the upper Minjiang River valley and watershed, these enterprises have undoubtedly posed great threats to both western Sichuan’s ecology and the Chengdu Plain in the lower reaches. However, no alteration has been made in the post-quake reconstruction plan. Instead, these enterprises are to be rebuilt.

C. Reﬂ ections on Large Chemical Projects in the Chengdu Plain The Pengzhou Petrochemical Base drew huge public attention and triggered all kinds of protests in Chengdu and elsewhere, in late April 2008 and on May 4th, 2008.7

7 Zou Zhiying and Shi Shi, “Doubt from Citizens towards Pengzhou Petrochemical Project,” Nanfang City News, May 11th, 2008. large projects in quake-stricken areas 65

The Pengzhou Petrochemical Base, located in the heart of Chengdu Plain is 4.5 kilometers away from the city of Pengzhou (with a population of over 130,000) and 36 kilometers away from Chengdu (with a population of 4 million). Within a 40 kilometer radius, there are six other populous counties—Dujiangyan (都江堰), Pixian (郫县), Wen- jiang (温江), Xindu (新都), Guanghan (广汉), and Shifang (什邡)— each with over 100,000 people. As the ﬁ nancial center of Sichuan, the Chengdu Plain is densely populated with people, towns, and industrial properties. The average population density in this area is 1,100 people per square kilometer. The environmental impact assessment (EIA) reports for this project repeatedly emphasized that all pollutants discharged were within the prescribed limits. However, this assertion is somewhat misleading, as discharge “within limits” does not equal “no discharge” of pollutants. The environmental capacity of this region will still be threatened, while the environmental safety will be a challenging task.

1. Air Pollution Pengzhou Petrochemical Base’s hourly waste gas emissions of its ten million ton oil reﬁ nery alone, amounts to 1,170,547 cubic meters. The main pollutants are: SO2, NOX, fumes, dust, NMCH, benzene, tolu- 8 ene, xylene, methanol, H2S, and NH3. According to statistics of the Chengdu Municipal Weather Bureau, static wind is the most common type in the Chengdu Plain throughout the year (annual frequency: 43%) with north and northeast wind following behind (annual frequency: 11%). Lying on the leeward side of the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base, the city of Chengdu is prone to air pollution during windy times. As a result, the Chengdu Plain is not a suitable place for heavy petrochemical industries.

2. Water Pollution According to estimates, the amount of sewage discharged in one day from the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base is 120,000 tons (or 43.8 million cubic meters per year). This represents 5.8% of the total annual runoff of the two water sources—the Qianjiang River (湔江) and the Renmin Canal (人民渠) of the Dunjiangyan Dam—for this base. The amount of water consumed per year by the base reaches 146 million

8 “Environmental Impact Assessment of the 10-million-ton Oil-Refi nery Project (Bamboo Edition),” http://www.pengzhou.gov.cn, October 2007. 66 fan xiao cubic meters, representing 19.4% of the total annual runoff of both the Qianjiang River and the Renmin Canal.9 The Tuojiang River (沱江) is already the most polluted river in Sichuan. The water quality of most of its branches is worse than Level V. The water quality of the main river is mostly Level IV or worse than Level V during the dry season. The EIA report for the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base further acknowledges that: “The Tuojiang River has no extra environmental capacity. Urgent actions must be taken to reduce pollutant discharge and fi ght against pollution. The construction plan of the petrochemical base in Sichuan is environmentally feasible only if protective measures are implemented effectively.” With water resources in the Qianjiang River and the Minjiang River over-exploited and unevenly distributed throughout the year, the petrochemical base will either face the danger of no available water resources or use water originally allocated for other purposes, both of which would mean lip service for the fi ght against pollution.

3. Solid Waste Pollution The amount of industrial solid waste produced by the ten million ton oil reﬁ nery alone is 8,799.72 tons per year. Of this, general industrial solid waste is 1,209.99 tons per year and hazardous waste is 7,589.73 tons per year. Of all the waste produced in a year, 2,880.77 tons are planned to be recycled, 3,400 tons burned, 1,374.1 tons sent to the Chengdu Disposal Center for Hazardous Waste, and the remaining 1,144.85 tons shipped to the slag yard at the base.10 No matter how the solid waste is disposed of, it will not only continue to take up more and more precious land resources in the Chengdu Plain, but it will also pose a great threat to soil and underground water resources.

4. Encroachment on Farmlands and the Ensuing Social Problems Most of the 15.3 square kilometer area planned for the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base is on high-quality arable land. Apart from direct encroachment on farmland, more land is being indirectly encroached

9 Announcement of Planning Environmental Impact Assessment of the Petro- chemical Base in Sichuan, http://www.pengzhou.gov.cn, September 2006. 10 “Environmental Impact Assessment of the 10-million-ton Oil-reﬁ nery Project (Bamboo Edition),” http://www.pengzhou.gov.cn, October 2007. large projects in quake-stricken areas 67 upon. For example, many peripheral areas and townships had to be relocated because of the pollution. As a result, not only is one of Chi- na’s major bases of vegetable production being sacriﬁ ced, but a large number of rural residents have lost their main source of livelihood, leading to a deterioration in living standards and poverty.

5. The Future of Pengzhou Petrochemical Base after the 5.12 Earthquake There were still uncertainties about the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base in the wake of the 5.12 Earthquake.11 On May 15th, 2008, just three days after the earthquake, Jiang Jiemin (蒋洁敏), president of PetroChina, said: “A group of experts has been dispatched to study the direct impact of the quake on the Pengzhou Oil Refi nery Project. If the result shows that the circumstances still pose a great threat, we will defi nitely give up this project. Otherwise, we will move ahead as planned.” At a press conference on May 23rd, 2008, Wu Xiaoqing, the vice minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), said that relevant departments were undertaking a professional evaluation on the damages done to the Pengzhou area. If the geological conditions of the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base changed dramatically after the earthquake, the ministry, on the basis of professional evaluations and other information, will specify detailed requirements for the project. Clearly, the local government does not want to abandon the Peng- zhou Petrochemical Base. The government is extremely sensitive towards public opinion and has taken measures to curtail the free fl ow of information during the critical time of project re-evaluation. For example, in September 2008, on hearing that an NGO was to hold a symposium on the communication mechanism between the government and the public about the petrochemical project, the government prevented some scholars from delivering their speeches at the meeting. Despite the fact that no dissenting voices are allowed in the press, the debate is intense on the internet. On September 11th, 2008, MEP released a report, proclaiming that the risk prevention measures taken by the Sichuan Pengzhou Petro- chemical Project had met the requirements of earthquake prevention.

11 “Assessment on the Geological Conditions of the Pengzhou Petrochemical Base by the Environment Protection Department,” http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/ news/2008/05–23/1260419.shtml, May 23rd, 2008. 68 fan xiao

It also replied in writing to PetroChina on September 24th, that the risk prevention and the environmental protection measures meet the requirement for environmental protection, as long as the earthquake prevention requirements are adjusted according to the new ground motion parameters, and the anti-seismic level for key units and facilities is raised. By now, the entire re-evaluation process has been completed.12 For the public, who has paid close attention to the project, however, things are far from over. At the end of 2008, residents in Chengdu wrote letters to relevant governmental departments of Chengdu and Sichuan, advocating a peaceful expression of public opinion and seeking to protect the public interest. In fact, never for a moment, have the dissenting voices disappeared from the public.

D. Refl ections on Post-Disaster Reconstruction, Expansion of Domestic Demand, and the Mode of Development According to The State’s Overall Reconstruction Plan after the 5.12 Earthquake (国家汶川地震灾后恢复重建总体规划), the Chinese government is to channel one trillion RMB to the quake-stricken area. Against the background of a global fi nancial crisis, the government, in order to expand domestic demands and to stimulate the economy, also planned to invest four trillion RMB before the end of 2010 by carrying out ten specifi c measures. With such a huge investment and need for construction, it is crucial for us not to develop our economy at the cost of social justice and the environment. A high economic growth rate should not be our only goal. Instead, we should put people fi rst, respect the laws of the nature, have the big picture in mind, and seek scientifi c development. Unfortunately, decisions that are damaging the environment and intensifying social confl icts are only more rampant during reconstruction times. The local governments, rather than channeling funds to offer direct aid to the people in the quake-hit areas, or to projects that will improve the livelihood of the people and boost consumption, have chosen to focus on projects that are likely to increase their tax revenues, the local GDP, and “achievement projects.” Sadly, high

12 “Rechecking the Possibility of the Earthquake in This Area and Risk-Prevention Measures,” http://www.pengzhou.gov.cn, April 29th, 2008. large projects in quake-stricken areas 69 energy-consuming and highly polluting industries that are restricted by the state, that should be abandoned during reconstruction, or that are relocated from the coastal areas have become popular investment projects. As for hydropower projects, many stations are being constructed at an unprecedented scale in the cascade style, along the Dadu River (大渡河), the Yalong River (雅砻江), and the Jinsha River (金沙江). In the second half of 2008 alone, a number of river closure projects, including the Shenxigou Power Plant (深溪沟), were completed. The exploitation of hydropower along the Nujiang River (怒江) and the Yarlung Zangbo River (雅鲁藏布江), despite strong protests by the public, has been progressing in secret over the past few years. What’s more, medium- and long-term plans for hydropower development has envisaged cascade style hydropower stations on the upstream area of the Nu River in Tibet (1 reservoir, 10 dams), the Parlung Zangbo River Basin (帕隆藏布流域) (11 dams), the Yi’ong Zangbo River Basin (易贡藏布流域) (11 dams), the upstream area of the Lan- cang River (澜沧江) (9 dams), the upstream area of the Jinsha River (金沙江) (15 dams), and the downstream area of the Yarlung Zangbo River (9 dams).13 The plan to raise the water level of the Three Gorges Dam Project to 175 meters was fi rst moved up to 2009 and then to 2008. Water storage was stopped on September 4th, 2008, when the water level in the reservoir reached 172 meters, and when the water level in Chongqing, the tail side of the reservoir exceeded 175 meters. Many environmental problems emerged during the water storage process. First, there were 93 geological hazards, causing a direct economic loss of 360 million RMB. Second, an estimated 0.2 million cubic meters of rubbish gathered in the reservoir area, and 40,000 tons of rubbish were collected during the two-month water storage period, which is unprecedented in history. Third, the water level in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River below the Three Gorges dropped dramatically, strand- ing many ships and making navigation more diffi cult.14 Navigating the reservoir area has become complicated because the confl uence area between the main river and its branches is now up

13 Luo Ke, “The Hydropower Project in Southwest Caused the Earthquake?” Phoe- nix Weekly, 2008. 14 Rao Guojun, “The Largest-Scale of Floating Substances Got out of the Water,” http://yy.cq.gov.cn/sy/tpbd/5533.htm, December 1st, 2008. 70 fan xiao to six kilometers, which lengthens the distance and increases the risk of boats traveling across the river.15 The rise in the water level has also reduced the vertical clearance between the water and bridges or overhead cables and the navigation area around bridges has become smaller as piers, skewbacks, and arch rings are submerged. A 4.1 magnitude earthquake, the highest since the water storage began for the Three Gorges Dam, took place on November 22nd, 2008 in Quyuan Township, Zigui County (秭归县屈原镇). This was 29 kilometers away from the Three Gorges Dam.16 That area is regarded as the most dangerous earthquake fault triggered by the Three Gorges Dam. When the water level was at 135 meters and 156 meters, earthquake activities triggered by the dam were weak; but when the water level reached 175 meters, such activities were evidently stronger. Extending the railway and highway networks are also a major component of the reconstruction work in the wake of the earthquake. Spe- cial attention should be paid to two railways: the Chengdu-Lanzhou Railway, which runs through Minshan Mountain (岷山) and Long- men Mountain (龙门山), and the Sichuan-Tibet Railway, which runs through Hengduan Mountain (横断山). Such concern is warranted because they run through, not only several national nature reserves, global biodiversity hotspots, major habitats for pandas, but also earthquake belts and areas with high incidences of geological hazards. If we fail to learn a lesson from the 5.12 Earthquake or do not to commit ourselves to scientiﬁ c and sustainable development, we will face more severe ecological and social disasters in the future.

15 Jiang Shiqiang and Xu Ye, “The Water Level of the Middle Stream in the Yangtze River Recedes,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008–10/07/con- tent_10159709.htm, October 7th, 2008. 16 “The Navigation Conditions in Three Gorges Dam Faces New Challenges,” China Transportation Press, September 13th, 2008. PART II

ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION

FORESTRY DECENTRALIZATION MAY LEAD TO CRISIS

Feng Yongfeng

The decentralization of forest management that is currently being implemented in China may lead to environmental harm. Forests have multiple functions, but their ecological function should be regarded foremost. Using the Household Contract Responsibility System (农村土地联产承包责任制) as a policy model, the reform regards forest land as ordinary land or merely for the purpose of producing forest products. Thus, it is inevitable that natural forests will be turned into man-made forests of a single species. While the state-run projects, such as the Natural Forest Protection Project (天然林保护工程), are not free from problems, they at least discourage the overall replacement of natural forests with man-made commercial wood. The decentralization reform may do harm to forest biodiversity and ecosystems, and bring a deepened forest crisis. Although forests will still exist in China, natural forests and the natural forest ecosystem will eventually collapse.

Key words: decentralization reform of forest management, natural forest protection, discouraging the growth of man-made forests, establishing non-governmental reserve, reducing tree planting

On July 22nd, 2008, Jia Zhibang (贾治邦), the director of the State Forestry Administration of China (国家林业局), delivered a speech at a press conference on the decentralization of forest management, announcing that the Chinese central government had made a decision to implement this reform using a comprehensive strategy. Under this policy, 2.5 billion mu (approximately 167 million hectares) of state-owned forests will be leased to rural households in an effort to rally their enthusiasm to exploit the mountainous areas. It is claimed that with such an effort, productivity in rural China will experience another great development, representing a new milestone in China’s rural reform as a whole. However, viewed from an ecological standpoint and from the rural residents’ perspective, will the decentralization reform of forest management become, as it is claimed, a perfect policy that will increase local residents’ income, guarantee the supply of forest products, and at the same time, protect the ecosystem and lay a foundation for its future rehabilitation? 74 feng yongfeng

I. Illegal Logging in Henan Province and China’s Forest Crisis

Nanyang City (南阳市) is the source area of the Huaihe River (淮河) in Henan Province, and the starting point of the central line of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project. Over the past few years, the municipal government has been proudly upholding its status as an “Eco-City.” One of Nanyang’s counties, called Tongbai (桐柏), was awarded the title of “National Green County,” and claims that the protection of the local environment remains its most outstanding achievement. Ironically, despite all the boasts, large numbers of trees have recently been illegally cut down in Tongbai County: felled pines are mainly sold to Pingdingshan (平顶山市), where they are used as the supporting pillars in the mine tunnels, and oaks are sold to Hubei Province as the base materials for growing edible fungus. The same problem also prevails in neighboring counties. Neither the county offi cials nor the municipal government have ever taken any effective measures to combat the rampant illegal logging.1 This massive illegal logging has directly harmed the interests of the forest contractors and managers. Although many of them have Forest Authority Certifi cates (林权证) in hand, they are incapable of protecting their rights and thus cannot prevent illegal loggers from stealing their trees. With full-sized pine trees being cut down, forests have started to suffer from a much lower shade density, a sparser landscape, and a continuously degrading forest quality. Illegal logging is putting the local ecosystem in jeopardy. Unfortunately, what is going on in Nanyang refl ects what is currently happening to forest resources across the entire country. The idea to decentralize the management of forest resources was inspired by a similar type of reform in China’s rural agriculture. This reform successfully increased rural productivity and promoted China’s reform in general. The success of this reform led policy- makers to believe that the same approach could be adopted to increase China’s forest productivity, improve local residents’ living standards, and ensure the protection of the local ecology.

1 Feng Yongfeng, “Forest Disappeared in the National Ecological County,” Sohu Green Channel, March 21st, 2008, http://fengyongfeng1108.blog.sohu.com/82395552 .html. forestry decentralization may lead to crisis 75

However, forest land is unlike farmland. Beginning with the emergence of agriculture, farmland has had only one function, namely to produce a certain kind of crop like rice or wheat. In this context, it is vital to eliminate or suppress the growth of other plant species in the ﬁ eld. Yet, forestry is by nature an industry which should generate both economic and ecological beneﬁ ts. Unlike farmland, forests have long been considered a public utility. Even in ancient China when private ownership was the rule, people could only claim ownership of farmland, while mountains, hills, forests, and lakes remained public property. Therefore, it will be a big mistake to apply the agricultural reform approach, which is intended for a resource with a unitary function, to the management of forests, a resource with multiple functions. No doubt, such an attempt is motivated by economic concerns only.

II. Mass Planting Campaign and Its Problems

Over the past six decades, the forest coverage in China has seemingly experienced an increase. However, due to an over-emphasis on forest planting, the area of man-made forests continues to increase, while that of natural forests has decreased sharply. For a forest to be of good quality, it should be left undisturbed from human activities for at least a few hundred years. If human disturbance is inevitable, such a disturbance should be limited to a degree that no catastrophic result should occur. Unfortunately, in the past decades, the area of undisturbed natural forests in China has decreased to about 50,000 square kilometers, which is only one-ﬁ ftieth the size of 60 years ago.2 Today, man-made forests are rapidly taking the place of natural forests and seriously undermining the quality of China’s forests. Still, some forestry ofﬁ cials seem to be inclined to attach more importance to the rate of green area and forest coverage growth than to work for improving the “forest’s quality.” What is often overlooked is the critical truth that if forests are frequently harvested and replanted like farmland, it will be impossible to produce fully grown trees with rich natural genes. China is becoming a country with no big trees.3

2 Green Peace’s Report on Common Responsibility of Saving the Forests, March 2006. 3 Translator’s note: The author wrote a book titled A Country without Big Trees (2008) in which he deﬁ nes “big trees” as those grown together in a forest capable of inheriting and passing down natural genes. 76 feng yongfeng

The substitution of natural forests by man-made forests is most active in areas where no other natural resources are available. The mountainous region of Northern Fujian Province is one such area. Statistics show that Fujian used to have the highest rate of forest coverage among all the provinces in China. However, since 1980, a campaign of “Hilly Land Allotted for Private Use” has pushed the local residents to extensively exploit local mountainous and hilly land resources and replace natural forests with man-made commercial forests composed of fruit trees, bamboos, pines, and Chinese fi rs. Nowadays, it is hard to spot any natural broad-leaved forests in Fujian Province except in the state-run nature reserves. Fujian is becoming a province without big trees. With no effective supervision, some forestry offi cials, driven by personal or departmental interests, label some natural forests as “wild hilly land suitable for afforestation.” As a result, natural forests originally grown on such land are cut down and in their place various cash trees are planted. It should be noted that these cash trees are also included in the calculations of forest coverage. For economic benefi ts, some people plant eucalyptus in Hainan Province, rubber trees in Yunnan Province, or Italian poplars in Hubei Province. All this has led to one result, that is, natural forests composed of different varieties of trees are being rapidly replaced by single-species forests for commercial purposes. The deterioration of China’s ecosystems is caused by logging, as well as, planting trees. Planting is no less of a human disturbance than logging. Planting means you put something you deem useful into a certain place, not considering the needs of the local ecological system. Planting requires the suppression of the growth of other species in order to have a good harvest of what you plant on the land. Fujian has been set as one of the national models for forestry decentralization reform and Nanping (南平) is one of its counties actively spreading its experience in reforming forest management. Neverthe- less, what have we witnessed there? All the natural forests have been substituted by man-made forests, causing soil erosion. Consequently, mountain torrents burst forth from every tributary of the Minjiang River (闽江). Meanwhile, various parties from the government, businesses, individuals, and illegal elements are exploiting forests through various means, showing no concern for any benefi t other than their own economic profi t. All the natural forests are labeled as “woods with forestry decentralization may lead to crisis 77 mixed trees” or “wild hilly land suitable for afforestation.” Thus, they are eagerly cut or burned down to make room for the planting of cash trees and cash crops. Furthermore, the Forest Authority Certifi cate, the most important document in the implementation of the decentralization reform, has not been delivered to all the rural residents at this point. There were two reasons for this delivery failure. First, since the 1980s, due to various mountain exploitation campaigns, nearly all the mountains and hills in Nanping City have been virtually taken and fully developed by various parties. Caught between “actual occupation” and “forest authority distribution,” the local governments have no idea how to solve this problem. Second, the government is hesitant in allotting forests to rural residents because they clearly understand that forests are different from farmland by nature and function. While farmland can be divided up neatly, and a piece of farmland can have a clear boundary, it’s hard to divide up a forest into clear-cut pieces. What’s more, farmland has a unitary benefi t, which is producing a certain crop, but the benefi ts and functions of forests are multiple and harder to manage. Other provinces in China are taking Fujian as an example. In learning from Fujian, they will soon launch a “Tree Planting Cam- paign.” Is this the original intention of the forestry reform? Unfortu- nately, the reform is taking a bet on the future of China’s ecological system, with a slim chance of winning.

III. The Dilemma of Giving the Ownership of Forests to Farmers

It is predicted that with the overall implementation of the decentralization reform, China’s forests will soon be concentrated into the hands of a few commercial afforestation companies that will replace natural forests with various agricultural cash trees, like bamboo and fruit trees, and industrial economic trees, such as pines and fi rs. As mentioned before, the ecological and social benefi ts of natural forests will be lost. What is left is a small economic gain. To make things worse, business groups could run away with huge profi ts and leave all the damage to the local communities. Some local government offi cials, either out of ignorance or intentionally ignoring the possible risks, are dedicated to attracting “investment” by giving 78 feng yongfeng away local natural resources. The result is that local residents not only have no chance to share the economic gains of such a policy, but also have to bear the long-term ecological damage and social ills. In May 2008, an incident such as this was exposed by the media. The Mantu Afforestation Group (曼图林业国际公司), a “so-called” international corporation, and Chenming Paper Company (晨鸣纸业公司) signed a contract with the government of Huanggang (黄冈市), Hubei Province, claiming to help the local government “develop forestry.” But then, the two companies replaced several million mu (one mu equals 0.0667 hectares) of natural trees with cash trees, mainly Ital- ian poplars for paper making. When these activities were reported by the media, the local government refused to admit that the natural forest had been destroyed. Instead, offi cials insisted that the cooperation not only helped protect the environment, but also attracted foreign investment to increase the income of the local rural residents. What concerns us about the Huanggang incident is that government offi cials make reckless decisions in the name of local residents. The decentralization reform aims to take a participatory approach so that no single interest group or individual can control a large piece of land or forest. Moreover, the rise of investment costs could indirectly increase the local residents’ income. However, the government’s deprivation of local residents’ participation in the policy-making process not only led to cheap land leasing, but also a serious infringement on the democratic rights of the local residents. Such a decision-making process should undoubtedly be condemned. At the same time, we should also keep in mind the “risk” of allotting forest resources to local residents. “Mass incidents” related to the decentralization reform of forest management in provinces like Fujian, Yunnan, Jiangxi, and Heilongjiang have shown that local residents strongly desire ownership of the forests. The desire itself is reasonable; however, their spontaneous replacement of natural trees with commercial man-made forests may exert a negative impact on China’s ecological system, much more serious than the damage made by government land leasing and the purchase of forests by businesses. Once the local residents were granted the ownership of forests, the fi rst thing they would do is turn the natural forests into man-made ones. In areas with easy transportation, agricultural commercial trees, such as fruit trees, will be their fi rst choice. In places with no convenient transportation, industrial commercial trees, such as fi r trees or poplar forestry decentralization may lead to crisis 79 trees, will be their favorite. Regardless of this, the question is: Is it good for the ecological system or not?

IV. Seeking New Ways of Establishing Non-Governmental Nature Reserves

Despite all of the problems mentioned above, the decentralization of forest management does provide a potential opportunity to protect local ecological systems. Since the reform, several sectors of society have been allowed to participate in managing forest land. Some people believe this will encourage individuals, enterprises, and social groups to purchase forest land from local residents and turn it into “non- governmental nature reserves” by sealing off the forests from human disturbance and allowing forests to rehabilitate freely. For this purpose, Professor Hou Mingming (侯明明) from Kunming University of Sci- ence & Technology called on the Chinese public to purchase and protect mountainous land in Yunnan Province. Professor Lü Zhi (吕植), a conservation biologist from Peking University has encouraged enterprises to turn their enthusiasm for reducing their “carbon footprint” into action by protecting whole areas of forests. In China, nature reserves are run on the national and provincial levels. However, since the 1980s and 1990s, small nature reserves have been established in Wuyuan County (婺源县), Anhui Province. If a piece of land is worth conserving, however small it is, the county government will set up a small nature reserve on it. Wang Chundong (王春东), the director of the Hainan Wildlife Protection Center, contends that China’s nature reserves tend to be located in places where the natural environment is better preserved and the level of human disturbance is comparatively low. While these places surely need to be protected, human-affected places, that have the ability to be restored, should also be put on the list for protection. “From now on,” he anticipates, “protection of such places will rely on the participation of the public.” Long Yongcheng (龙勇诚), the deputy director of The Nature Con- servancy (TNC) at the Yunnan Project Offi ce, argues that decentral- izing forest management can provide benefi ts to local residents and increase the costs of destroying natural forests. But if not properly handled, the reform can spur a rush to replace natural forests with man-made ones. So, in order to implement the reform, two measures 80 feng yongfeng should be taken. First, the public should be encouraged to invest in the development of non-governmental nature reserves. Second, “right to protect transfers” should be promoted. Recently, TNC and the Yunnan Provincial Forestry Department drafted a memorandum aiming to launch a pilot project in four or fi ve locations in Yunnan. Yushichang Village (玉狮场村) in Lanping County (兰坪县) is one of the pilot village locations. The local residents of the Pumi nationality in this area have a special affection for forests. They fought against timber companies and refused to build roads connecting the village to the outside. By doing so, they managed to preserve a natural forest covering around 80,000 mu. Professor Lü Zhi noted that successful preservation of forests largely depends on the integrity of the forests’ ecological system and biodiversity. The crisis that the world’s forest ecosystems face is not the depletion of trees, but the extinction of natural forests. China’s man-made forests rank the fi rst in the world in terms of size. But China’s natural forests are dwindling day by day, leaving only about 50,000 square kilometers. In the future, natural forests will only be found inside nature reserves. Feasible measures should be taken to address this issue. Under “contract conservation” and “community co-management,” local people should be inspired and trained to learn to protect natural forests, while social support and conservation funds should be provided for protecting forests and helping the villages nearby. Villagers should be the guardians of natural forests rather than their enemies. A good method to achieve these means is for villages to become sustainable non-governmental nature reserves.

V. Reducing Tree Planting and Conserving the Wilderness

A key index in measuring a country’s capacity for environmental protection is its ability to conserve the natural environment. This involves the conservation of natural forests, wetlands, mountainous regions, grasslands, deserts, seas, rivers, and lakes. It can be measured by the proportion of “wilderness” coverage in the territory of a country. A country’s capacity for natural forest conservation is measured mainly by the quality of its forests. It is far from enough for a country to merely have a high rate of forest coverage, but rather, these forests should play roles in maintaining ecological balance and biodiversity, conserving water and soil, absorbing carbon dioxide, and serving as forestry decentralization may lead to crisis 81 natural landscapes. Man-made forests are of little use to the ecology, but rather contribute to ecological deterioration. To environmentalists, the word “wilderness” means wild lands, reserve lands, or weed lands with huge numbers of diverse species interrelated with each other; but to resource developers, it means “virgin lands” to be exploited. Only if a country has the capacity to keep enough “wilderness,” especially during times of rapid economic development, can it be recognized as a country with the capacity for natural conservation. Of all the kinds of “wilderness,” natural forests play a critical role in maintaining an ecological balance. If the level of a natural forest’s wildness is low, the diversity of fl ora and fauna, landscapes, genes, biological communities, and cultures will diminish accordingly, while the capacity for water and soil conservation, carbon dioxide absorption, oxygen supply, and energy and matter supply will also decline. Even viewed from the perspective of trees, diversity is also of great value. Both the variety and the age of the trees in the same species need to be as diverse as possible. In human society, a healthy family should be composed of three generations of people—the elderly people, the middle-aged people, and the youth. Similarly, a healthy variety of trees should consist of young trees, old trees, and even dead trees. The fallen dead trees make room for the living ones, become the breeding ground for microorganisms, and offer sanctuary for insects and birds. The old trees pass the “genes of nature” to the young ones, for only in this way, can the ecological system maintain a good order and the natural environment will not be doomed to an early demise caused by human intervention. In the decentralization of forest management, the fi rst to be affected are the logging and forestry workers. Many people support tree planting out of goodwill for those workers, believing that it can help drag them out of poverty. But such a good intention can only lead to bad infl uences on the ecological system and it will do no good to the role- shift on the part of the workers. In order to protect ecosystems, people as a whole need to invest a large sum of money on forestry and the government should continue with major forestry projects. Therefore, we should adhere to the ultimate goal of natural forest protection, and make increasing investments into the protection of natural forests in terms of knowledge, energy, and wealth. To protect natural forests and rehabilitate ecosystems, the role of forestry workers should change: they should cease to be tree planters 82 feng yongfeng and instead, they should become forest rangers and researchers. With fi rsthand knowledge of natural forests, these workers can be trained to be forest rangers, serving as guardians of natural forests. More experienced and professional workers can serve as researchers. Thus, they can successfully assume a positive role in China’s nature conservation efforts. PLATEAU WETLANDS: FUNCTIONS, VALUES, AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERIORATION

Tian Kun

In 2008, the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands and the Forum on the Himalayan Wetlands Conservation Initiative Strategy have both placed new emphasis on the ecological functions and the conservation of plateau wetlands in China. They have further consolidated the international dedication to world wetland conservation since the Eighth Conference of the Parties and a series of workshops by the Himalayan Wetlands Initiatives. However, improper utilization of the resources in wetlands still widely exists due to the public’s lack of understanding of their functions and values, certain regions’ economic- and proﬁ t-driven development plans, and the local population’s basic needs for community survival. Improper utilization has caused serious environmental deterioration and the new characteristics of this deterioration have posed challenges and threats to wetland conservation.

Key words: plateau wetlands, functions and values, wetland conservation, wetland management

I. Overview of China’s Wetlands and Their Importance

A. Defi nition, Classifi cation, and Characteristics Plateau wetlands, which are different from high altitude and mountainous wetlands, refer to all of the wetlands that are dispersed over the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, and Mongolia-Xin- jiang Plateau. China’s abundant plateau wetlands are full of diverse and unique features. According to the Ramsar Classifi cation System for Wetland Type, wetlands are grouped into fi ve major categories: coastal wetlands, lake wetlands, river wetlands, marsh wetlands, and human-made wetlands. China’s plateau areas claim all wetland types, except for the coastal type. Wetland types in the plateau regions were formed mainly in catchment areas, such as plateau basins and lake basin valleys on hills and mountains, during the process of uplifting of the earth’s crust. Wetlands are also found in landforms that are developed through glacial till and diluvium formation processes. In addition, the soil that melts and then freezes under cold temperature is apt to store water and form wetlands. Lakes, marshes, meadows, and river wetlands are often formed in this fashion. Wetlands, especially lake wetlands, are mainly located in ecotones where human activities 84 tian kun greatly exploit the natural environment. Therefore, wetland ecosystems are extremely fragile and unstable.1

B. Size and Location China’s plateau wetlands—accounting for about half the country’s wetland area—are mainly located on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, and Mongolia-Xinjiang Plateau. Accord- ing to China’s First National Wetland Resources Survey, the total area of plateau wetlands with an elevation of 3,000 meters or more is 9,246,600 hectares (see table 4.1). This survey, however, does not contain complete information on China’s plateau wetlands because it does not include thousands of plateau wetlands smaller than 100 hectares or below 3,000 meters in elevation. The total area of plateau wetlands in China is estimated to be more than 18 million hectares.

C. Important Ecological Functions and Diverse Values Plateau wetlands have a wide variety of important ecological functions, including water permanence and soil retention, water purifi cation and quality maintenance, regulation of the climate, fl ood control and drought prevention, regulation of water recharge, maintenance of biodiversity, and sustainment of local communities. In addition, they are valuable in developing tourism and promoting scientifi c research and education. More importantly, plateau wetlands are vital in providing water resources, maintaining biodiversity, reducing greenhouse gases, and sustaining local culture. They play a critical role in the development of China’s ecological security and the sustainability of its socio-economic growth. Plateau wetlands also play a signifi cant role in maintaining the regional and global ecological balance, as well as, harmony between human beings and their natural environment.

1. “Water Tower” for Three Billion People The Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is abundant with rivers, wetlands, and glaciers. It is the origin of over ten major rivers, as well as numerous lakes, marshes, and glaciers. Major world-famous rivers include the Mekong River, the Honghe River, the Salween River, the Irrawaddy River, the Ganges River, the Indus River, the Yangtze River, the

1 Tian Kun ,“A Study of the Ecological Structure of Plateau Wetlands and the Functions of Wetland Reserves,” Wetland Science and Management, no. 1, 2005. plateau wetlands 85

Table 4.1: Total area of plateau wetlands of 3,000 meters or more in elevation Wetland Area* (Unit: hectare) Types Tibet Qinghai Xinjiang Gansu Sichuan Yunnan Total Area Autono- Province Uygur Province Province Province mous Autono- Region mous Region Freshwater 569,300 248,675 38,050 9,000 6,442 3,420 874,887 Lakes Salt Lakes 1,942,437 874,629 180,718 2,997,784 Herbaceous 540,400 27,505 410,000 341,519 1,319,424 swamps Swamp 1,681,400 1,901,400 25,000 410 3,608,210 Meadows Inland Salt 225,400 225,400 Swamps Geothermal 14,500 14,500 Wetlands River/ 1,100 101,245.9 104,000 206,345.9 Stream/Creek Wetlands Total Area 4,974,537 3,125,949.9 246,273 548,000 347,961 3,830 9,246,550.9 Proportion 53.80% 33.81% 2.66% 5.93% 3.76% 0.04% 100.00% Source: The First National Wetland Resources Survey * Only includes the wetland sites of 10 hectares or more.

Yellow River, the Pearl River, and the Tarim River. They have given birth to civilizations, generated economic development, and provided for the lives of three billion people, or half of the world’s current population. But if the plateau wetlands and glaciers stop providing water resources, the ecological systems along these rivers will collapse, hindering activities in agriculture, animal husbandry, and ﬁ shery in the river areas and threatening the survival and development of human lives in these regions. Therefore, as the “Water Tower,” the Qinghai- Tibet Plateau holds the key to the ecological security of China, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

2. Crucial Biodiversity Sites China’s plateau regions have rich natural resources, complex terrains, and diverse natural environments. These regions provide unique 86 tian kun

habitats for animal and plant growth, and a vast living space for wild vegetation. Therefore, plateau wetlands claim some of the world’s rich- est biodiversity, especially those located in the Hengduan Mountains (横断山) on the eastern end of the Himalayas. The unique natural conditions of the Hengduan Mountains, with the sudden uplift of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, the north-south ﬂ ow of the rivers, and the gradual change of climate from south to north in the valleys, have all provided a distinctively favorable condition for the convergence of the southern and northern habitats and the formation of rich biodiversity. The convergence is also seen by ancient and new species thanks to the continuous but gradual geographical changes to the environment since ancient times. In fact, due to relative geographic isolation and exclusion, this region has developed six different biota types, namely, the World Common, the Old World Tropics, the Northern Mid-Lati- tude, East Asia, High-Altitude Mountains (elevation of more than 5000 meters), and Freshwater Lakes. It is now one of the top 25 key regions of biodiversity in the world.2

3. Maintenance of the Plateau Ecosystem and Global Environmental Stability In this highly vulnerable and sensitive ecosystem of the plateau area in China, high-altitude wetlands are the most stable component. They provide for a vast area of plateau alpine meadows. They also regulate regional climate, maintain moisture, prevent desertiﬁ cation, reduce droughts, and slow down environmental degradation. More importantly, plateau wetlands revitalize the plateau ecosystem. Melted water from plateau glaciers balances the water recharge between wet years and dry years, which is vital for agricultural sustainable development in the arid areas of Western China. Furthermore, the peat reserves in plateau wetlands—especially the alpine marshes, which can be as deep as ten meters or more—are the major source of carbon sinks and global climate stabilization.

4. Special Cultural, Economic, Scientiﬁ c, and Educational Values Unique wetlands, snow-capped mountains, complex habitats, unique human settlements, and diverse land forms of forests, lakes, rivers, marshes, and meadows, have all contributed to the special value of

2 Editor’s note: “The Old World Tropics” is a technical term that refers to those regions that used to be tropical zones before the crustal movement in the region. plateau wetlands 87 the plateau. The plateau civilization has evolved for millennia, boast- ing extraordinary historical sites, traditions, customs, and folklores, and developing into a distinctive plateau culture system that mixes tradition and modernity. The ecological and human environments of the plateaus have been better preserved than elsewhere and have presented complete records on the processes of climate and environmental changes. This region can serve as an unparalleled scientiﬁ c laboratory and research base for study on the protection, development, and sustainability of natural habitats and resources.

II. Problems and Threats Facing Plateau Wetlands

In spite of their biodiversity and numerous functions, plateau wetlands are facing grave threats and problems. Harsh climate and difﬁ cult terrains have caused these ecosystems to be exceptionally vulnerable and sensitive. However, the major threats and problems come from rising temperatures, melting glaciers, and receding snowlines. In addition to climate change, human activities have contributed to the shrinkage of plateau wetlands. Through improper usage of resources, such as mismanaged tourism and excessive herding, humans have led the wetlands to degradation. Wetland drainage has drastically shrunk them, changed the ecological environment, and disrupted the landscape. Urbanization and the discharge of untreated wastewater have resulted in water pollution. Urbanization and infrastructure construction have also blocked migration patterns, disconnected natural habitats, and disrupted landscape. Fast economic development, population expansion, and an increasing need for natural resources will surely bring more pressure to the environment of plateau wetlands and threaten the biodiversity and ecosystems in the wetlands of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, and Mongolia-Xinjiang Plateau.

A. Loss or Change of Wetland Habitats The main causes for the loss or change of plateau wetland habitats are global climate change and improper human activities, such as exploitation of habitats, drainage, over-expansion of pastures, excessive herding, and improperly developed tourism. In 2008, several events caught the attention of the media. Due to climate change, shortage of water recharge, and an increase in evaporation in the last 100 years, Qinghai 88 tian kun

Lake (青海湖) lost 13 meters of its water level (that is 700 square kilometers of surface area or 55 billion cubic meters of water). The Dalai (or Hulun) (达赉湖) Lake in Inner Mongolia, a major stopover site for birds on the North Asia to Australia migration route, was illegally ditched and drained. If this illegal act continues, the migratory birds will be forced to ﬁ nd a new stopover site.3 Aibi Lake (艾比湖), the largest salt lake in Xinjiang, suffered its most severe drought in 50 years. It shrank to less than 400 kilometers squared in size, or lower than 2 meters in depth, posing a great threat to the survival of migratory birds, brine shrimp, and such rare animals as the crane, stork, gull, swan, and wigeon.4 The Ulungur River (乌伦古河) in Northern Xinjiang—due to the long-term decline of snowfall in the Altai Moun- tains—experienced zero-ﬂ ow for as many as 160 days, reaching a new historical record. As a result, many beavers living in the lower stream of the wetlands were found dead. Other wild animals that are listed under the First Category for State Protection are also facing similar threats to their lives.5

B. Environmental Degradation In 2008, the environmental degradation of plateau wetlands was startling. Due to eutrophication and a rise in water temperatures, the Wul- iangsuhai Lake (乌梁素海) in Inner Mongolia had one-third of its surface covered by an outbreak of yellow-green algae.6 In Xinjiang, Kanas Lake (喀纳斯湖), Tianchi Lake (天山天池), and Sayram Lake (赛里木湖) were found to have deteriorated from their original Level II and Level III quality of water—after years of tourism expansion in the lake regions. Aibi Lake, Ulungur Lake, and Chaiwobao Lake

3 “The Dalai Lake National Nature Reserve Suffers from Illegal Ditching and Draining,” Wetlands International, China, June 19th, 2008, http://www.wetwonder.org/ shownews.asp?news_id=3770. 4 Liu Bing, “Draught Causing Drastic Shrinkage of the Aibi Lake in Xinjiang,” Xinjiang Channel, Xinhuanet, September 10th, 2008, http://www3.xinhuanet.com/chinanews/2008–09/10/content_14362837.htm. 5 Yan Wenlu, “Over 160 Zero-ﬂ ow Days of Downstream Wulungu River in Xin- jiang Province Threatens Ecological Security,” China News, September 9th, 2008, http://www.xjnews.cn/newsshow.asp?id=58554&ntitle=5e45d67741269ef168edb88f5 7c4ac0e. 6 Duan Yijuan and Zhang Ping, “Yellow-Green Algae Bloom in Wuliangsuhai Lake, Inner Mongolia,” Xinhuanet, July 15th, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008–07/15/content_8549476.htm. plateau wetlands 89

(柴窝堡湖), located closer to human residential areas and industrial areas, are even more severely polluted and were reported to have reached a Level V quality of water.7 Bohu Lake (博湖湖), another lake located in Xinjiang, had an increase of salinity from 0.5 g/kg 50 years ago to 1.43 g/kg in 2008. Bohu Lake also had a decrease in water quality from Level I in the 1970s to Level IV at present because of the in-pouring of untreated industrial effl uents, domestic sewage, and farm drainage.8 In Sichuan Province, the Zoige (Ruo’ergai) Plateau Wetlands (高原湿地若尔盖) are so dry that they only receive 10 to 20 millimeters of surface water in the summer. Some swamps there are barely wet or even in dry conditions, indicating severe degradation of the ecosystem and desertifi cation.9 Simultaneously, the overabundance of rats and rabbits in this region has further accelerated desertifi cation. Consequently, dust and sand—now only 400 kilometers away—are encroaching upon the city of Chengdu and its vicinity.10 In Yunnan Province, Cuihu Lake (翠湖) in the city of Kunming became a dump site for urban sewage effl uent in recent years and suffered an outbreak of blue-green algae.11 Around Sanbihai Lake (三碧海湖) in the Qianhu Mountains (千湖山) of Northwest Yunnan, more than 10,000 hectares of Aibes Forest has been destroyed by the encroachment of the European pine sawfl y (Neodiprion sertifers), and the destruction still continues.12 Many other plateau lakes in Yun- nan are experiencing severe environmental degradation. The famous Dianchi Lake (滇池) has been attacked several times by the excessive

7 He Zhanjun, “Xinjiang: Better Water Quality in Plateau Lakes, Heavy Pollu- tion in Plain-Area Lakes and Reservoirs,” Tianshannet, June 6th, 2008, http://www .tianshannet.com/news/content/2008–06/06/content_2628212.htm. 8 Dong Shaohua, “The Salifi cation of the Largest Inland Freshwater Lake in China,” Xinjiang Economy, February 29th, 2008. 9 Editor’s note: “Overwet” is a technical term which refers to a kind of state of the plateau wetland caused by the rise of groundwater level. The overwet phenomenon is a signal of wetland degradation. 10 Zhang Ou, “2,250,000 Yuan Investment for Zoige Plateau Wetland Protection,” Chengdu Wangbao, April 8th, 2008. 11 Zuo Xuejia and Pu Leren, “Two Areas in the Cuihu Lake Suffer Blue-Green Algae Bloom, City Effl uent Threatens the Cuihu Lake,” Chuncheng Wanbao, June 19th, 2008. 12 Li Hailing, “Aibes Forest Suffers Insect Attack in Three Parallel Rivers Region,” Yunxinnet, August 8th, 2008, http://www.ynxxb.com/content/2008–8/8/56364.aspx. 90 tian kun growth of blue-green algae and duckweed.13 Also in Yunnan, Xingyun Lake (星云湖) experienced the growth of water hyacinth and water lettuce that was so rampant it fi lled the entire lake in 2008.14 In yet another lake, Fuxian Lake (抚仙湖), the destruction of man-made wetlands and the dumping of untreated wastewater caused a new round of pollution threats.15 In fact, as many as 35 rivers in the province have been heavily polluted.16 Even Erhai Lake (洱海), which serves as a national model of successful water treatment, was reported to have patches of blue-green algae. In August 2008, heavy pollution caused by an excessive arsenic level in Yunnan Province’s Yangzonghai Lake (阳宗海) has contaminated the drinking water system of nearly 26,000 civilians living in three major counties. The follow-up investigation led by the Envi- ronmental Protection Bureau of Yunnan Province revealed that eight enterprises were responsible for that accident. The primary source of arsenic contamination turned out to be the Yunnan Chengjiang Jinye Industrial and Trade Co., Ltd. (云南澄江锦业工贸有限公司). This enterprise had not followed the national regulations for environmental protection to build the necessary industrial effl uent treatment facility that makes arsenic-containing wastewater circulate within the factory. Consequently, the arsenic pollutant that accumulated year after year began to percolate into the groundwater and fi nally caused severe pollution to Yangzonghai Lake. This event drew great attention from both within and outside China as Yangzonghai Lake—a rift valley lake formed by karst plateau geomorphology—has a vital, but deli- cate ecological function. Once polluted, water replacement could take more than 10 years.

13 He Guangya, “Successive Cleanups Restrained the Wild Growth of Duckweed in Caohai, the Dianchi Lake,” Yunnan Daily, August 7th, 2008. 14 Li Jisheng, “Water Quality Management Problem: Rampant Growth of Water Hyacinth and Water Lettuce Is Choking the Xingyun Lake,” Chuncheng Wanbao, Octo- ber 23rd, 2008. 15 Li Jisheng, “Wetland Degradation, Untreated Wastewater Endangers the Fuxian Lake in Yunnan,” Yunnan Wanbao, April 4th, 2008. 16 Zuo Xuejia, “Startling Investigation Results about the 35 River Channels Run- ning in Yunnan Province,” Chuncheng Wanbao, June 25th, 2008. plateau wetlands 91

C. Decline of Biodiversity Many wetland plants of great commercial value have suffered excessive exploitation. Wetland animals, such as migratory birds, have been the target of illegal hunting. Inappropriate exploitation of wetland resources, illegal behavior, habitat destruction, and ecological deterioration, have posed a great threat to biodiversity and have led to a decline in plateau wetland species.

D. Confl ict between Recourse Protection and Utilization The rich natural resources in plateau wetlands are the material basis for local economic development. The relatively low, fl at, and accessible landscape makes wetlands important sites for agricultural production and infrastructure construction. However, due to irrational and unsus- tainable exploitation, people’s pursuit of economic growth has done great harm to the ecosystem and the ecological value of the plateau wetlands. In some natural protection zones—although certain measures have been taken for wetland preservation—unscientifi c management has also limited the proper utilization of those wetlands and hindered local economic development. This has added more tension to the confl ict between preservation and the utilization of wetlands and prevented the progress of management and utilization of wetlands.

E. Impediments to Wetland Conservation

1. Lack of Understanding the Importance of Wetland Conservation Lack of environmental education, insufﬁ cient public awareness of environmental conservation, and lack of understanding of the functions of plateau wetlands have all hindered society-wide recognition and consensus over the importance of wetland conservation. Some local governments have prioritized economic development and neglected environmental protection, which is a great impediment to the protection of plateau wetlands.

2. Lack of Ecological Compensation Mechanism The plateau wetland ecosystem is public property and should be provided and fi nanced by the government. In China, however, there is no suffi cient state support for the funding, fi nancial allocation, and 92 tian kun payments needed for wetland conservation. The funds the national government has allocated are far from enough to meet the full needs of plateau wetland protection. To improve the situation, the government should consider an implementation of a market economy in the conservation of natural resources, or more specifi cally an economic policy of eco-subsidy and eco-compensation in plateau wetland conservation. A government conservation subsidy and compensation will give the local residents and communities incentives for inputting local fi nancial sources and investment in wetland growth and sustainability. It will pull more people out of poverty through ecological production and relieve their sole dependence on natural wetland resources. An ecological compensation mechanism is benefi cial not only to the protection of the environment, but also to the promotion of social equity.

3. Insuffi cient Technological Input in Conservation and Management Most conservation sites face problems with insuffi cient funds, lack of qualifi ed permanent staff, and outdated equipment. This has severely constrained the development of wetland protection.

4. Underdevelopment of Scientifi c Research As research on plateau wetlands is a new fi eld in China, there is only a small number of specialized institutions engaged in this particular research. Their fi ndings, limited in depth and scope, are still unable to meet the needs of wetland protection and face the challenge of climate change and fast socio-economic development.

5. Ineffective Institutional Management At present, there is no institutionalized managing system for plateau wetland conservation. Various governmental departments have been involved in wetland management and have implemented separate policies and measures that might not be in accordance with each other. In some natural reserves, even a specialized government department in charge of wetland management cannot avoid affi liation with or even dependence upon other offi cial departments. Consequently, different executive orders from different departments have resulted in low effi ciency. For many wetlands that spread across several administrative districts, rights and responsibilities are not clearly divided between the relevant administrative districts. As a result, when an environmental accident happens, those different administrative districts try to pass the plateau wetlands 93 responsibility on to their counterparts, which is defi nitely unfavorable to wetland protection.

III. Suggestions for the Conservation of Plateau Wetlands

A. Change the Policies That Neglect the Conservation of the Overall Wetland Ecosystem Establishing nature reserves is an effective way to protect the plateau wetland ecosystem. However, the current wetland management mechanism measures the effectiveness of wetland conservation only by the survival of rare species, thus neglecting the overall wetland ecosystem that fulﬁ lls many other functions and roles in biodiversity and ecological security. A truly effective conservation policy best protects the overall ecosystem of plateau wetlands, prevents the shrinkage of wetlands and the decline of their functions, and best guarantees their sustainable growth.

B. Change and Update Concepts and Perspectives on the Utilization of Plateau Wetlands When deciding on the use of plateau wetlands, priority should be given to conservation and should take into consideration national interests and global strategies. We should classify plateau wetlands by separating the ecologically sensitive areas from the ecologically functional areas. In the sensitive areas, we should prohibit any form of exploitation by enforcing controlled use and restrictive protections. In the functional areas, we can encourage the wise use of resources and proper economic development. Only through classiﬁ cation can we achieve effective management and conservation, and change the old conservation policies that emphasized the protection of rare species but overlooked the overall wetland ecosystem.

C. Improve Financial Support Systems and Measures The state should establish a desirable system for wetland conservation by appropriating their usage. The state should also make wetland protection an integral part of national and local government budgets in order to provide long-term and steady ﬁ nancial support 94 tian kun for wetland conservation. On the other hand, the state should establish a wetland ecological compensation mechanism. The government should re-evaluate the ecological functions and values of plateau wetlands and design corresponding compensation policies for wetland development.

D. Strengthen Plateau Wetland Research We must strengthen scientiﬁ c research on plateau wetlands and investigate the processes and resources of biodiversity. We must intensify the study of plateau wetland degradation under human inﬂ uences and of environmental menaces, such as climate change, patterns of changes, and of future trends. We must also explore the relationship between the plateau’s environmental changes and human activities, especially between plateau wetlands and global climate change. All of this research will be conducive to resolving the problems arising from the conservation and management of plateau wetlands.

E. Properly Classify Plateau Wetlands into Protective or Functional Purposes There are many drawbacks to wetland management and conservation that come from the three-layer classiﬁ cation of terrestrial ecosystems. It is important to develop a classiﬁ cation system that combines different academic disciplines. We should strengthen the study of the ecological structure and functional features of plateau wetlands so as to properly re-classify the wetlands and achieve a dual emphasis on wetland ecosystem conservation and species protection.

F. Establish and Improve Laws, Regulations, and Managing Systems The most important step in the effective conservation and management of plateau wetlands is to establish and improve speciﬁ c laws and regulations concerning wetlands and to straighten out the managing mechanism. On the other hand, the state should treat all types of plateau wetlands, such as lakes, mires, and rivers, as one type of ecosystem with connections and common attributes so that their management and conservation should be interrelated and integrated. The practice of minding one’s own business should be replaced with a mechanism of coordination and cooperation, under which each relevant department—in accordance with the duties deﬁ ned by the State plateau wetlands 95

Council—should cooperate with the division of labor, attend to its own duties, and be responsible for its own action. The mechanism for overall planning and joint governance will promote accountability and effective conservation and management of plateau wetlands in a comprehensive manner.

PASTORAL INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND GRASSLAND ECOLOGY

Gai Zhiyi

For a long time, the Chinese government’s industrial policies in pastoral areas have had clear preferences for grassland crop farming, traditional industrial development, and high livestock density, all of which have damaged the environment of the grasslands. The reasons for these policy preferences are that the external cost of the grassland development has not been internalized, government offi cials pursue profi t maximization, and the performance evaluation of the local offi cials focuses more on economic development indicators, rather than on the ecological and environmental protection ones. The evaluation of local offi cials’ accomplishments should be multi-dimensional to achieve the internalization of the ecological costs, and then achieve the industrial policy objectives to protect the grassland environment.

Key words: grassland pastoral areas, industrial policy, environment

The pastoral area has been extensively reclaimed to develop crop farming. In order to pursue GDP growth, traditional industries that are highly energy consuming and polluting have been heavily developed. In addition, the large number of livestock has surpassed the carrying capacity of the grasslands. The direct consequences of all the above phenomena are the shrinkage and degradation of the grasslands, which weakens its ecological function and hinders the sustainable development of the grazing land industry, economy, and culture.

I. Three Grassland Pastoral Area Policy Preferences

A. Policy Preference for Farming Industry Development in the Pastoral Area Throughout China’s history, except for the dynasty that was ruled by pastoral ethnic groups, the governments of successive dynasties have continuously shown policy preference for the development of farming in pastoral areas. The earliest grassland reclamation under governmental support can be traced back to the Qin State (778 BC–207 BC). Ever since the founding of New China, the government has also carried out a similar grassland farming policies. The ﬁ rst Constitution referred to grasslands as a wasteland. Having no concept of grasslands, the grasslands were equated with useless land throughout the 98 gai zhiyi

ﬁ rst three constitutions. For example, Article Two, Section Six of both the 1954 and 1975 Constitution states: “Mineral resources, water, and state-owned resources like forests, wasteland, and other resources, are all owned by the people.” It was the same in Article Two, Section Six of the 1978 Constitution that “Mineral resources, water, state- owned forests, wasteland, and other marine and land resources, are owned by the people.” The grasslands were classiﬁ ed as “wasteland” in each of these three Constitutions. Since grasslands were not given an appropriate status even in the Constitution—the fundamental law of China—there is no doubt that it was not given proper recognition in other laws or regulations. This situation is related not only to the scarcity of grassland at that time, but also to the discrimination against the grassland by Chinese traditional culture. After the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), although the national government had once made an effort to contain the cultivation of the pastoral area, extensive farming was still carried out in pastoral areas. (Refer to Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 for data on the increase in arable land and the decrease in grasslands in pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia.)

B. Policy Preference for Traditional Industrial Development in the Pastoral Area Since the 1990s, industry has been rapidly developing in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia, especially in the heavy chemical industry and other highly energy consuming traditional industries. In 2006, the percentage of traditional animal husbandry in the industrial structure decreased from 53% in the early 1990s to 19%, whereas the percentage for industry increased from 27% to 53% (see Table 5.3). Industry development has led to the rapid growth in GDP and GDP per capita in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia. Table 5.4 shows the changes in GDP and GDP per capita in 33 pastoral cities since the 1980s, reﬂ ecting rapid economic growth in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia.

C. Policy Preference for High Livestock Density in the Pastoral Area From 1979 to the 1990s, grasslands were regarded as the foundation for livestock husbandry, making their sole function the basis for raising livestock. Generally speaking, China’s land area and livestock carrying capacity are similar to that of the United States. However, there are pastoral industrial policies and grassland ecology 99

Table 5.1: Inner Mongolia pastoral area arable land increase (Unit: kilo hectare) Year Actual arable land acreage by the end of the year 1992 601.71 1995 703.56 1997 1014.27 2000 960.25

Source: Statistical Documentary for Livestock Husbandry in Inner Mongolia (1991–2000), Ofﬁ ce for Livestock Husbandry, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region

Table 5.2: Decrease in the acreage of pastoral, semi-pastoral, agricultural, and forestry areas of Inner Mongolia (Unit: kilo hectare) 1980s 2000s Acreage of grassland Decreased Percentage of acreage total decrease (%) Grassland acreage in 65269.93 63470.05 1799.89 46.09 pastoral area Semi-agricultural and 7565.65 6297.42 1268.23 32.47 semi-pastoral area Agricultural and 6362.92 5525.58 837.34 21.44 forestry area Total 79198.50 75293.05 3905.46 100

Source: Ecological Consequences of Grassland Cultivation by Xing Qi, thesis for the China- Korea Meeting on Desertifi cation Prevention in 2007. only 98 million heads of cattle and 9 million sheep and goats in the United States, whereas China currently has 127 million heads of cattle and 279 million sheep and goats. So far, the Chinese pastoral and semi-pastoral areas have been overloaded by 36.1% on average. The theoretical livestock bearing capacity for 3.7 billion mu of grassland is 280 million units of sheep; yet, in reality it is 380 million units.1 This refl ects the increasingly intensive confl ict between the economy and ecology.

1 Translator’s note: 1 mu=1/15 of a hectare or 0.1644 of an acre. 100 gai zhiyi

Table 5.3: The development of secondary and tertiary industries in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia since 1993 (Unit: million yuan, calculated at the price of that year) First Secondary Tertiary Year Percentage Percentage Percentage industry industry industry 1993 4680.93 0.53 2422.82 0.27 1763.92 0.20 1995 7122.36 0.53 3617.95 0.27 2730.46 0.20 1997 8988.70 0.47 5599.43 0.29 4583.97 0.24 1999 12651.71 0.52 5423.26 0.22 6074.51 0.25 2001 10246.39 0.38 8821.35 0.32 8153.06 0.30 2003 12811.01 0.32 15356.76 0.39 11603.34 0.29 2005 15666.02 0.24 32189.09 0.49 18385.09 0.28 2006 16751.95 0.19 46969.37 0.53 24598.09 0.28

Source: Based on historical data collected from 33 pastoral cities from the Inner Mongolia Statistical Yearbooks.

Table 5.4: GDP growth rate in the pastoral area of Inner Mongolia since the 1980s GDP Growth rate GDP per capita Growth rate Year (million yuan) (%) (yuan) (%) 1987 3264.21 – 897.70 – 1989 4890.33 8.08 1442.65 6.74 1991 6261.59 13.22 1655.65 13.41 1993 8867.67 19.70 2318.08 18.69 1995 13470.77 20.61 3628.77 20.76 1997 19172.10 9.78 5056.27 18.48 1999 22946.63 7.83 6420.24 13.71 2003 39771.11 25.16 10885.73 26.77 2005 67950.67 30.29 20254.85 40.51 2006 88319.40 29.98 26650.58 31.58

Source: Based on historical Inner Mongolia Statistical Yearbooks

There has been a massive increase in the number of sheep, goats, and cattle in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, especially in the number of sheep and goats (see Table 5.5). pastoral industrial policies and grassland ecology 101

Table 5.5: The increase of the three main types of plant-eating livestock in Inner Mongolia (Unit: head) Year Goat Sheep Cattle 1947 2282 3426 1746 1957 7214 9925 3532 1967 11878 19528 4367 1977 8726 21835 4123 1987 8546 23653 4452 1997 18799 32850 4880 2001 20197 34081 4314 2005 28087 59043 7219

7000.0

6000.0

5000.0

4000.0

3000.0

2000.0

1000.0

0.0 Y 11111111111111111111111111222 e 99999999999999999999999999000 a 45555566666777778888899999000 r 80246802468024680246802468024

Cattles Sheep Goats

Source: Inner Mongolia Statistical Yearbooks Figure 5.1: Increase of the three main types of plant-eating livestock in Inner Mongolia (Unit: 10,000 heads)

II. Causes for the Problems of Development in Pastoral Areas

A. The External Cost of Grassland Development Has Not Been Internalized With the current policy, those who are exploiting the grasslands have not borne the “external” cost caused by their economic activities. 102 gai zhiyi

Therefore, the corresponding social cost is being carried by other parties, with the former being the plunderer of the latter. The activities between these two opposing interest groups have led to a more intensive confl ict in interpersonal relationships, which is ultimately embod- ied in the deterioration of the relationship between human beings and nature. The rationality and effi ciency of the cost is assessed from the perspective of the cost to the exploiters, i.e., profi t maximization, rather than from the social perspective. This is then made into the source of acquiring more illegal income under the condition of “rent-seeking,” by which the overall cost is far greater than the actual benefi ts. This is referred to by the author as a “negative external transfer/shift,” which in nature is the plunder of the public’s interest. Consequently, the ecosystem of the grasslands has been greatly damaged during this process, by those with different material interests.

B. Government Offi cials Pursue Profi t Maximization The pastoral area in Inner Mongolia is located in a typical arid and semi-arid climate zone, with an extremely fragile and infl exible grassland ecosystem. Therefore, the extensive development of industries easily leads to an irreversible breakdown of its ecology. However, the result from the activities between the local pastoral government and the central government is to adopt a “catch-up-with-and-surpass” mode and an extensive economic growth pattern, characterized by “high growth, high benefi ts, high investments, high consumption, high emissions, and heavy pollution.” This is often used as an attempt to resolve the local government’s insuffi cient fi nancial income. Under the present administrative management system, local governments are shouldering the heavy responsibility of local economic development, and at the same time facing an environment of increasingly fi erce competition for regional development. In order to attract and keep these enterprises, as well as to ensure their survival, local governments usually turn a blind eye to environmental pollution caused by those companies, instead of carrying out their job of environmental supervision seriously. Especially for those highly polluting companies that support the local economy and people’s livelihood, local employment, fi nancial income, and industrial development, local governments usually will not order companies to make corrections or to close down according to the law. Instead, local governments usually exert their own infl uences and take various means to absolve, cover up, or water pastoral industrial policies and grassland ecology 103 down the environmental pollution caused by these companies. They will even go as far as intervening in the environmental law enforcement when these companies are running environmental risks or are stuck in environmental trouble.

C. Evaluating Local Ofﬁ cials: Indicators of Economic Development Are More Obvious Than Those of Ecological and Environmental Protection Generally speaking, economic effects are more rapid, direct, and easier to be perceived, while ecological and environmental effects are slower, more indirect, and take a relatively longer period to become visible. Many ecological and environmental problems are long-term accumu- lations, and it may be hard to say which speciﬁ c economic activity caused it. If the economic effect of resource development is regarded as a present good and the environmental effect as a future good, people tend to underestimate the future demands and goods, while placing more value on present demands and goods. This has also led to differences in people’s assessment of ecological and environmental construction and economic growth effectiveness.

III. Strategies to Improve the Grassland Pastoral Area’s Environment

A. Inspecting Pastoral Area Offi cials’ Performances in a Multi-Dimensional Way The provincial characteristics of pastoral areas in China are related to objective physical factors, like geographic space, ecological environment, and natural resources, as well as, subjective factors like personal, community, and political preferences. As a result of this complexity, assessment of the performances of local offi cials should be broad and multi-dimensional. It should also consider the offi cials’ economic contributions to local areas from a development perspective, a national economic perspective, and an economic-anthropological perspective. It should be extended beyond the traditional concept of development which is mainly measured by GNP—which simply emphasizes economic development—to a completely new concept of development that attaches importance to the Human Development Index (HDI). GNP growth should no longer be the only key indicator for the local cadres’ evaluation. Instead, an indicator system promoting sustainable development should be introduced. The adopted indicators should not 104 gai zhiyi only cover economic and social aspects, but also aspects of natural resource capacity and utilization rate.

B. Realizing the Internalization of Grassland Environmental Costs In 1993, the United Nations Statistics Division released the System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA) for China. In it, environmental costs were defi ned as: 1) economic losses resulting from the consumption and deterioration of natural resources; and 2) actual expenditures in environmental protection, including costs for environmental pollution prevention, environmental improvement, and natural resources quantity and quality restoration. By reasonably levying a fi ne on profi teering enterprises with production activities in grassland pastoral areas—such as coal mining companies—it can to a certain extent, contain the environmentally damaging activities. The key to realizing a grassland environmental protection policy is to ensure that the infl uential groups fi nd it diffi cult to externalize the internal costs of using the grasslands.

C. Choosing Industrial Policies that Protect the Grasslands Some Western countries have a greater respect for the ecological functions of grassland pastoral areas, and China should learn from them. Take the state of Arizona in the Western United States, for example. In Arizona’s desert—with an annual precipitation of less than 200 millimeters—the natural condition is well maintained and wild animals live in harmony with human beings. The United States’ position is that environmental protection is more important than agricultural production. The potential arable land of America can be turned into farmland again at any time in accordance with the state of the country and the need for international trade. However, the restoration of agricultural land is based on the premise of its effects on the environment, for in principle, the American public is unwilling to support the development of market trade at the price of the environment. China’s industrial policy, which is characterized by indiscriminate cultivation, ought to be abandoned. The changes of the grassland environment in the pastoral areas of Inner Mongolia have proved that destructive farming is the wrong choice. History has shown that under the reign of the nomads, a large area of grassland was well kept and regional ecological deterioration was effectively contained. pastoral industrial policies and grassland ecology 105

However, with the reign of agricultural peoples, the grasslands have deteriorated and the ecological system has been damaged. In 1962, Tan Qixiang (谭其骧), a famous historical geographer and professor at Fudan University, wrote a statistical report on the Yellow River’s water problem over different periods in history. He concluded that the Yellow River’s relative stationary phases were mainly due to nomadic people’s massive immigration to the middle reaches of the river. During these periods, the nomadic peoples turned a fairly large part of farmland into pastoral area again and transformed the land from crop farming dominance into animal husbandry dominance. The transformation effectively prevented erosion and water and soil loss. Therefore, on the whole, the lower reaches of the Yellow River tended to remain stable in spite of occasional dyke breaching, causing no disastrous consequences. We should not rashly change indigenous vegetation-covered areas into artiﬁ cial grassland. The inappropriate industrial policy that is being carried out in pastoral areas should be discarded. In recent years, some government leaders have blindly pursued industrialization in pastoral areas. This is especially true of the mining activities on the grasslands. In fact, most of the mine exploration activities on the grasslands have not gone through any environmental assessments or legal procedures. These activities have damaged the ecology of the grasslands to a startling degree. Even if the already cultivated grasslands can be effectively recovered within the next several years, the grasslands that have been polluted and damaged by mine explorations and chemical plants may not be recovered for hundreds of years.2 The restoration of the lands in mining areas must be consistent with its construction planning and mining technology. Only in this way, can we fundamentally tackle mining’s encroachment, damage, and pollution to land resources. Firstly, measures such as leveling, slope cutting, cultivation of subsoil, and covering of surface soil should be taken to restore the land which has been damaged by mining. Next, engineering measures, chemical measures, and biotechnical measures are needed to cultivate soil fertility and plant vegetation. Furthermore, land utilization in a scientiﬁ c manner and the development of clean industries

2 “Keeping a Vigilant Watch on the ‘Great Leap Forward’ during the Industrializa- tion Process in the Pastoral Area: Its Flourishing is Unacceptable,” Fortnightly Discussion, Issue 24, 2005. 106 gai zhiyi are preferred. Among clean industries, wind power is probably a better choice than mining or other high pollution industries. The exploration of mines at the cost of the environment to receive short-term benefi ts should be discouraged and the rich wind power in this region needs to be encouraged. Wind power can continuously provide green energy and revenue. We should desert the industrial policy preference for animal husbandry. Zhang Xinshi (张新时), a member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences has said: “According to our calculations, in the last fi fty years, the gross economic output of animal husbandry in the Inner Mongolia grasslands is less than the losses from ecological damage caused by natural calamities and grassland degeneration. The ratio of the former to the latter is 1:1.42.” According to statistics, 1.67 million hectares of Inner Mongolia’s grasslands shrink per year, while 3.2 billion RMB of the value of ecosystem services are lost. If calculated over 30 years, the loss of ecosystem services are 142% of the gross outputs of the Inner Mongolia grassland animal husbandry of 50 years. That is to say, every 10,000 RMB made from animal husbandry costs 14,200 RMB in the price of ecology. This fi gure will rise to 168,000 RMB if the grassland investments are factored in. At present, the annual losses from grassland disasters amount to 2,791,400 RMB. Furthermore, the cost of pastoral animal husbandry production is constantly increasing, while the ecological costs are 1.4 times the outputs of pasture animal husbandry of 50 years. If calculated by the evaluation criteria of global desertifi cation losses set by the United Nations Environment Programme, the direct and indirect economic losses brought about by the desertifi cation of the Inner Mongolia grassland, between 1986 and 2000, are 1.3 times the output of pastoral animal husbandry of 50 years. We should advance with the times by developing modern nomadic pasture husbandry. Under the circumstances of modern society, developing modern nomadic herding is not something we can’t achieve. On the basis of retaining and carrying on rotation herding, measures for improving and modernizing the material conditions of nomadic labor and nomadic life should be taken. The modernization of “hardware” is to improve all the material conditions of nomadic labor and life by means of modern science and technology. The modernization of “software” means building an economic management system, a legal system, and an organizational system to achieve the sustainable development of the grassland eco-economic system with advanced concepts. OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS

Zi You

China is among the ﬁ rst countries where genetically modiﬁ ed (GM) crops have been grown experimentally. However, the scope of their commercialized growth is relatively limited. A large amount of China’s GM crops are imported from aboard. There are two opposing views among China’s academic circles and the general public concerning GM foods. Nowadays, the success of GM rice brings both opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it may solve the food supply problem. Conversely, wild rice and traditionally cultivated rice may become contaminated by GM rice.

Key words: GM foods, biosafety management, GM contamination

The application of genetic engineering to crops and the entering of genetically modifi ed (GM) crops into human’s food chains have led to heated debates around the world. There are two opposing policies concerning GM crops. Countries like the United States have tried vigorously to promote the growth of GM crops, while the European Union and other countries use the “precautionary principle” in regards to genetically modifi ed organisms (GMOs). No large-scale commercialized planting of GM crops has been tried in these countries, and a policy of compulsory labeling for GM foods and feeds has been implemented. At the executive meeting of the State Council chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) in June 2008, an important scientifi c research project for cultivating new varieties of GM crops was considered and passed in principle. Before 2020, China will invest 20 billion RMB in this project. Some scholars are concerned about the possible GM contamination of cultivated varieties, in particular on wild rice, since the damage to its genetic diversity would be disastrous. The high risk lies in the one unknown. We must strengthen our efforts on the research and evaluation of the safety of GM crops, and be cautious in the examination and approval of GM crops’ commercialization and growth. At the same time, appropriate laws and regulations should be made to ensure ecological security and people’s health. 108 zi you

I. A Survey of the Research, Development, and Introduction of GM Crops in China

China’s research and development into GM fauna and fl ora was initiated during the 1980s. Transgenic experiments on fi sh were fi rst conducted successfully in China. China is also among the fi rst countries where GM crops—such as GM antiviral tobacco—have been grown experimentally for commercial purposes. In 1996, GM crops were fi rst grown for commercial purposes in China. At this time only three crops—cotton, tomato, and pimiento—were approved by the government. Nowadays, China’s chief GM crop is pest-resistant Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) cotton. In 2006, Bt cotton was grown by 4 million individual farmers and its acreage reached 3.5 million hectares, taking up 30% of the total cotton fi elds in China. Nearly half of all Bt cotton is developed by China, and the seeds of another half come from biotechnology companies in the United States. Many other GM crops are in the process of being commercialized in China, like antiviral rice and potato, pest-resistant corn, herbicide- resistant rice, and oil-rich soybean and rapeseed. There are also GM animals in China, like carps with modifi ed growth hormones. According to a report in 2006, China’s Ministry of Agriculture had issued 424 safety certifi cates for agricultural GM organisms, including 18 types of raw materials like GM soybean, rapeseed, cotton, and corn. Among these, more than 100 types were functional genes and most of them were pest-resistant, antiviral, herbicide-resistant, or nutrient composi- tion improved. China imports a large amount of soybeans and rapeseeds from abroad. Every year, over 20 million tons of soybeans are bought from Argentina, America, and Brazil, and nearly one million tons of rapeseeds are bought from Canada and Australia. Most of the two oil crops in these countries (except for Australia) are genetically modifi ed. As a result, most of China’s imported soybeans and rapeseeds are genetically modifi ed. For oil extraction, there are more imported soybeans than domestic ones. It is estimated that more than 80% of soybean oil on the market is made from GM soybeans.

II. The Management System for China’s GM Products

The ﬁ rst regulation for the safe management of GM organisms was the Safety Administration Regulation on Genetic Engineering (基因工程安全管 opportunities and risks of genetically modified crops 109

理办法), issued by the former Science and Technology Commission of China in 1993. With this, the safe operation of genetic engineering technology was formulated in principle. Based on this regulation, China’s Ministry of Agriculture issued the Implementation Rules on the Safe Administration of Agricultural Genetic Engineering (农业生物基因工程安全管理实施办法) in July of 1996. In order to strengthen the administration and implementation of agricultural genetic engineering safety, the State Council issued Regula- tions on Safety of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms (农业转基因生物安全管理条例) in May 2005. There are numerous GM organisms and products covered in these regulations: GM animals, plants, and micro-organisms (including seeds, aquatic products, domestic animals, and birds); the products of GM animals, plants, and micro-organisms; directly processed products of GM agricultural products; seeds containing GM animals, plants, and micro-organisms; or other GM ingredients of seeds, domestic animals and birds, aquatic products, farming chemicals, veterinary chemicals, fertilizers, additives, etc. The above-mentioned regulations formulated clear rules for the safe supervising, assessing, labeling, and classifying of GM organisms. Based on these regulations, the Ministry of Agriculture designed and issued a series of documents on the administration of GM organisms. For example, the Implementation Regulations on Safety Assessment of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms (农业转基因生物安全评价管理办法) and Implementation Regulations on the Safety of Import of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms (农业转基因生物进口安全管理办法) were issued in 2001, and Provisional Measures on the Administration of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Products (转基因农产品安全管理临时措施) in 2002. China’s Ministry of Agriculture has issued two documents on the issue of labeling GM animals, plants, and micro-organisms: Implementa- tion Regulations on Labeling Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms (农业转基因生物标识管理办法) issued in March 2002, and The Labeling of Agricultural Genetically Modifi ed Organisms (农业转基因生物标签的标识) issued on August 1st, 2007. In China, GM products and raw materials are mandatorily labeled, whether or not there are any GM ingredients in the fi nal products. The regulations are as follows: GM animals, plants, and micro-organisms (including seeds, young aquatic products, breeding stock, and birds) should be labeled as “Genetically Modifi ed XX.” The direct products of GM agricultural products should be labeled as “Processed Products of Genetically Modifi ed XX” or “Raw Material Is GM XX.” For the fi nal products whose raw materials are, or include, GM organisms or ingredients, but no distinguishable GM ingredients 110 zi you can be found, the labels should read “This Product Is Processed from GM XX, but There Is No Such Ingredients in the Final Product,” or “The Raw Material of this Product Contains GM XX, but the Final Product Contains None of These Ingredients.” As for the fast-food and retail businesses, it is very hard to label every product. Such information can be shown at their display counters or on the price labels. Concerning the issue of the safety to health from GM foods, the Ministry of Health issued the Administrative Health Measures for Genetically Modifi ed Food (转基因食品卫生管理办法) in 2001. The aim of this decree is to strengthen the supervision and administration of GM foods, and to ensure consumers’ health and their right to know. Foods included in these measures are products of GM animals, plants, micro-organisms, processed products, and food additives. The safety and nutrition of GM foods will be measured by principles such as danger-evaluation, essence-equating, individual case treatment, etc. Concerning food safety analysis and testing issues for GM agricultural products, a series of national standards have been issued in recent years. For example, since August 1st, 2007, the Ministry of Agriculture has been implementing national standards for food safety analysis of protein stability in GM foods. Meanwhile, national standards have been applied to detect modifi ed genes in 12 types of GM crops, including Bt-cotton and herbicide-resistant rice.

III. Social Reaction to GM Foods

There are opposing views on GM foods in Chinese society. In 2004, Greenpeace commissioned Ipsos ASI, the Advertising Research Com- pany to conduct a survey on GM foods in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. The ﬁ ndings revealed that 57% of people surveyed were against GM foods and only 16% would eat GM foods. What concerns the Chinese people most are the following aspects:

A. The Pessimistic Prospect for Native Chinese Soybeans China, where soybeans originated, is rich in soybean variety. There are over 840 varieties of cultivated soybean, and there are even more varieties of wild soybean. The state gene pool has collected and preserved over 6500 kinds of wild soybeans. China has always been a major soybean producing country, with plant acreage of about 10 million opportunities and risks of genetically modified crops 111 hectares. However, a large quantity of soybeans has to be imported for the production of edible oil. Most of the imported soybeans are GM breeds, as the foreign GM soybeans have a higher oil extraction rate. To produce the same amount of oil, the growing cost of the native Chinese soybean is 33% higher than that of the American soybean. The soybean growing industry is thus losing its competitive edge, and has been shrinking. What people worry about today are: Will the Chi- nese soybean growing industry, together with the soybean growers be wiped out by the large foreign soybean corporations? Will the Chinese soybean, with a long-standing history and rich variety, be so frail in the competition with foreign GM soybeans?

B. The Unendurable “Double Standard” Many products of famous foreign enterprises in China were found to have GM ingredients, while the same products in Europe and Japan were claimed to be GM-free. These reports have caused public anger and indignation among the Chinese people, as this “double standard” is among the most unendurable for the Chinese people. People are also concerned that the foreign biotech companies are trying to “transfer risks and potential dangers onto the Chinese consumers.” However, several cases of such lawsuits ended up either in the defeat of the consumers or with nothing deﬁ nite. A careful study of these cases reveals that the problem mainly lies in the lack of a uniform international standard concerning the supervision and inspection of GM foods. However, in these cases, the consumers did not lose for nothing. For the Chinese market at least, dozens of food companies—some of which are world famous food production giants—have promised not to use GM raw materials.

C. The Future of GM Rice as a Staple Food In the United States and many other countries, people have eaten GM foods for over ten years. However, GM foods have never been the Americans’ staple food; they are used only as additives in food processing, and most are used as feedstuff. Americans don’t eat GM soybeans as their staple food. Although Americans eat a lot of pop corn in cinemas, that kind of corn is not genetically modifi ed. Several kinds of pest- and disease-resistant GM rice have been successfully developed in China, and are awaiting state approval for 112 zi you commercial planting. It is unanimously agreed that this is of “extraordinary” signifi cance, because it will be a GM staple food. However, there are different interpretations of “extraordinary.” For supporters, it is “extraordinary” because the GM rice can solve the problem of rice production in China, increase grain production, and guarantee the supply of staple food for the Chinese population. While to opponents, “extraordinary” means that more caution should be applied to the use of GM rice as a staple food. Rice is very important to the Chinese population and no research has been conducted to investigate if long- term use and large amounts of GM rice will result in any side-effects for the human body. Environmentalists contend that China is one of the original cultivators and the center of varieties for rice (as well as soybeans); therefore, the abundant wild rice is the best source of rice crossbreeding in China, which should not be contaminated by genetic modifi cation. The economists, on the other hand, are concerned about the affect of growing GM rice on China’s rice exports. Each seems to have its point. What is the attitude of the ordinary people in China then? According to the survey by the Ipsos Research Company commissioned by Greenpeace in February 2006, among the 800 people in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Wuhan surveyed, 79% clearly indicated that they would not choose GM rice.1

IV. GM Food in Hong Kong and Taiwan

The raw material for food in Hong Kong mainly comes from main- land China and a few other countries. As an international metropolis, its food sources are quite complicated. People in Hong Kong are very concerned about GM foods, terming genetic modiﬁ cation as genetic transformation. In 2006, the Hong Kong Food and Environmental Health Department issued the Guidelines on Voluntary Labeling of Geneti- cally Modiﬁ ed Food (基因改造食物自愿标签指引), specifying that products with GM ingredients should undergo safety evaluation before sales, and if GM ingredients account for 5% or more, should be labeled voluntarily. It further stipulates that if GM foods are distinctly different from the corresponding conventional foods, additional explanation on

1 Zhou Yang, “Heinz Rice Cereal Accused of Containing Illegal GM Ingredients,” Chongqing Morning Post, March 15th, 2006. opportunities and risks of genetically modified crops 113 food tags is suggested. As for the reason that the Hong Kong government should establish a “voluntary labeling system,” the Hong Kong Legislative Council has explained that the compulsory labeling system would increase the cost of foods by 16–91 million Hong Kong dollars. However, environmental protection organizations and consumer com- mittees in Hong Kong still suggest that a compulsory labeling system for GM foods should be established, and the voluntary labeling system “makes no headway.” Like Hong Kong, in Taiwan gene modifi cation is termed “gene transformation” in academic circles. Taiwan also imports large amounts of grain, feedstuff, and oil plants each year. As soybeans and corn are not grown in Taiwan, they have to be imported from the United States, most of which are GM products. Taiwan has so far approved the import of 12 kinds of American GM products, among which eleven are corn and one is soybean. Although considering itself a big consumer of GM food, Taiwan only consumes edible oil, bean products, bean powder, and cornstarch used as food additives. An agricultural offi cial in Taiwan alleged that in Taiwan “almost every one eats GM foods every day,” while also warning that the potential danger that GM rice might cause should not be neglected. Taiwan has always attached great importance to rice breeding; there are over ten laboratories taking part in the research on rice genes. The GM rice in Taiwan has reached the fi eld trial phase, and it was declared that in 2007 “GM rice might be planted in ordinary farms with proper precautionary measures.” The “proper precautionary measures,” according to the offi cial in charge, refer to “the control of pollens and seeds of GM rice, so as not to make any impact on the ecology.” In addition, the GM crops developed by Taiwan such as pawpaw, tomato, and potato, have entered or passed the fi eld trial phase. Virus-resistant pawpaw is going to enter the food safety evaluation phase, most probably to be the fi rst case of a GM crop entering the Taiwan market. However, GM pawpaw has already been illegally planted on a large scale in Taiwan before it passed the food safety inspection of the Taiwan Department of Health, resulting in the contamination of “transferred genes” on some organic pawpaw growing farms. Experts pointed out that this illegally planted GM pawpaw not only might do harm to people’s health, but also would affect pawpaw exports. It has caused great anger among the Taiwanese pawpaw growers. Furthermore, in 2006, after being successfully developed and passing the fi eld trial bio-safety evaluation, a type of phytate GM rice that could enhance the absorption of iron was rejected by Taiwan’s 114 zi you

Agriculture and Food Agency during the application for commercial planting. The censor committee held that: “Rice is a staple food crop. In addition to bio-safety, the spread of rice pollen which might impact the whole rice production should also be taken into consideration.” Concerning the legislation of GM crops and its products, the Taiwan Council of Agriculture issued Norms on Field Experiment Management of Genetically Modifi ed Plants (基因改造植物田间试验管理规范) and Norms on Field Experiment Management of Genetically Modifi ed Animals (基因改造动物田间试验管理规范) in 1998 successively, and the National Sci- ence Council implemented the Basic Law of Genetically Modifi ed Products (基因改造产品基本法) in 2004. Taiwan’s Department of Health has released the Safety Evaluation Methods of Genetically Modifi ed Foods (基因改造食品之安全性评估方法) and the Labeling Methods of Genetically Modifi ed Foods (基因改造食品标示方法). Since January 2005, it has required that farm produce with over 5% of GM ingredients must be labeled. At present, Taiwan’s Department of Health regulates that if raw food material contains GM soybean or GM corn, it should be labeled. Products with no GM ingredients, if labeled as “GM free,” should produce evidence. As to the Taiwanese’s attitude toward GM foods, a survey conducted by Taiwan’s Academia Sinica revealed that 90% of people surveyed would not buy GM foods for fear of potential danger, even if the prices were lowered. ROAD CONSTRUCTION: ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Piao Zhengji and Shen Xiaohui

Roads are greatly inﬂ uencing the function, structure, and integrity of ecosystems. As roads are being built into networks and road surfaces are being replaced by hard materials, their impacts on ecosystems, wilds animals, and society is increasing. There has been a lack of ecological and sociological consideration in the planning and design of roads in China. More research needs to be done on the impacts and ecological improvements of roads, especially in protected areas. Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve is one of the many places where road construction has damaged the habitats and lives of wild animals.

Key words: Changbaishan Mountain, road ecology, wild animals, environmental impact assessment (EIA)

Roads are important infrastructure for both the national economy and social development. Over the past thirty years, road construction has expanded quickly in line with rapid economic growth, while the quality and technical standard of road construction has also improved. A large number of dirt and gravel roads have been transformed into asphalt and cement roads, which in turn, have been replaced by modern highways with protection fences on both sides. In recent years, along with the large-scale development of tourism, mining, and hydropower, roads have been constructed and upgraded in nature reserves, scenic spots, World Heritage Sites, and national parks. This has caused severe damage to the ecological and biological diversity of forests, deserts, wetlands, and grasslands. Research on the ecology of roads began in the 1960s, but didn’t start in China until much later. Up to now, very few research projects have been carried out. No research has been done on the ecological system of forests and wildlife-speciﬁ c nature reserves. The authors of this article launched a case study of the ecology of road building in the Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve (长白山保护区) in Northeast China. 116 piao zhengji and shen xiaohui

I. The Impact of Road Construction on Wildlife in Nature Reserves

A. The “Empty Forests” of Changbai Mountain Changbai Mountain is a typical temperate forest of global signifi - cance, and is, thus, designated as a national and international nature reserve. It is an ideal place for research on the ecology of road building because all types of roads can be found there. At present, over 400 kilometers of roads have been constructed in the nature reserve and its surroundings. We selected fi ve sample zones on four out of the fi fteen main roads, monitoring them for two consecutive years. The 66 surveys conducted in the sample zones from April 2007 to October 2007 showed that 43 species and 1,867 total animals were killed on three of the roads due to traffi c accidents. On average, 2.8 animals were killed per kilometer every day. The seasonal migration of frogs and toads lead to the high casualty rate of wildlife. Furthermore, the peak casualty rate coincides with peak tourist season in August every year. The four major roads going through the reserve divide it into fi ve main parts and many minor areas. This road network has fragmented animal habitats. For instance, the roads and trestles in scenic spots have disrupted deer’s migration patterns, search for food, and reproduction. Meanwhile, the improvement and increase in transportation has brought humans closer to dense forests, making wild animals more vulnerable to hunting. Data from studies on wildlife in Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve from 2006 to 2008 show a sharp decrease in the number of animal species. The number of red deer has decreased from 5,000 to about 50. At present, there are only 20 bears and one lynx. Sadly, Siberian tigers, sika deer, musk deer, gorals, and otters have all disappeared. In general road construction has the several impacts on wildlife. First, road construction and renovation increases the number of vehicles coming into the area, contributing directly to the death toll of wild animals. Second, the roads fragment and isolate habitats within the nature reserve, disrupting ecosystems. Third, road construction makes it easier to illegally poach wild animals. If we fail to take action, the forests of Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve will be gone within ten years, taking the wildlife with them. The Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve is not alone in having endangered wild animals. In fact, because of a lack of sufficient road construction 117 ecological research in the planning stage, most roads do not have passages reserved for wildlife or warning signs for drivers. Those few roads that have taken the need for wildlife migration into consideration are ill-designed and accidents still occur from time to time. The subsequent sections examine the impact of road construction on the following national nature reserves: Karamori Mountain Nature Reserve (卡拉麦里保护区), a desert in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region; Ruo’ergai Marshes (若尔盖保护区), wetlands in Sichuan Province; Hoh Xil (可可西里保护区), plateau grasslands in Qinghai Province, and Xishuang- banna (西双版纳), a tropical forest in Yunnan Province.

B. Karamori Mountain Nature Reserve—Wild Horses Die under the Wheels Karamori Mountain Nature Reserve is a wildlife conservation area located in a desert area and is designed to protect Przewalski’s horse (Equus przewalskii). In 1878, Przewalski’s horse was discovered by a Rus- sian explorer named Przewalski in the Junggar Basin. Due to over- hunting, Przewalski’s horses died out in their natural habitat. In 1985, the Chinese government imported 18 Przewalski’s horses. The fi rst group of horses was released back into the wild in 2000, continuing an experiment to restore the wild population. State Road 216 separates the conservation area into two parts. Traffi c on the road has increased dramatically since 2006, killing a number of animals as they crossed the road to feed. The average speed of vehicles reaches up to 160 kilometers per hour—twice the speed limit. According to statistics, many wild animals were killed on the road in the latter half of 2007, including fi ve horses, at least three wild donkeys, twenty goitered gazelles, and a large number of birds. The evolutionary history of Przewalski’s horse stretches back more than 6,000 years. As the only existing wild horse, it has the original genes of horses. The released horses in Karamori Mountain Nature Reserve are the only species of horse still extant in its original habitat. It is a felony to kill a wild horse in China. Presently, State Road 216 is the biggest killer of wild horses. However, it is not justifi able to put all the blame on the drivers when an accident takes place.

C. The Roads of Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve—A Hell for Amphibians At an altitude of 3,400 meters, Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve protects what international wetlands experts call the “largest, most pristine 118 piao zhengji and shen xiaohui high plateau wetlands in the world.” Situated in the eastern part of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve stands at the center of the Ruo’ergai Marshes, one of the most beautiful wetlands in China. It provides habitat for numerous species of birds, amphibians, and mammals. Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve is now cut by three roads: State Road 213 (213 国道), Provincial Road 209 (209 省道), and the Tangke-Re’erba Highway (唐克到热尔坝). State Road 213 was constructed in the 1960s, and goes from Ruo’ergai County (若尔盖县) to Langmu Temple (郎木寺), extending over 90 kilometers across the conservation area. Provincial Road 209 was built in the 1980s, with 84 kilometers of road within the reserve. The Tangke-Re’erba Highway, which runs through the west of the reserve, was not put into use until recent years. The three roads cut the nature reserve into several small zones. Of the three main roads, the heaviest traffi c is seen on State Road 213. Provincial Road 209 does not have as much traffi c, but there are more marshes on both sides of the road. There are large numbers of endemic species on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, including Rana kukuno- ris, Bufo minshanicus, and Nanorana parkeri. These amphibians cross the roads in search of breeding grounds in May and places to hibernate in September. A survey showed that 4,400 to 5,400 amphibians die after each rainfall. As roads inside and around the nature reserve have been put into use in recent years, many animals have been killed on the roads, including plateau pikas (Ochotona curzoniae), Himalayan mar- mots (Marmota himalayana), yellow-throated martens (Maartes fl avigula), and steppe polecats (Mustela eversmanni). Birds such as the black-necked crane (Grus nigricollis), white-tailed sea eagle, and red-billed chough are also declining due to the impact of roads. Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve, a representative alpine wetland ecological system, is an important site for maintaining the fauna and biodiversity of Tibet and the Himalayas. Its unique combination of biodiversity and historical value make it an important site as well. Fan Zhiyong, director of the World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) Species Program, pointed out that people used to only care about “well-known” wild animals and that the survey of wildlife killed on Ruo’ergai roads began to draw public attention to previously neglected small animals. When the number of amphibians starts to diminish, it shows the heavy environmental cost we are paying for economic development as well as the advent of an ecological crisis. road construction 119

D. Roads in Hoh Xil Nature Reserve—Death Traps for Tibetan Antelopes As punctual as a clock, Tibetan antelopes appear on mountains southeast of the Qinghai-Tibet Highway (青藏公路) in mid-June each year. Most of them are pregnant females; by instinct, they migrate to the west of Hoh Xil, trudging to Zhuonai Lake (卓乃湖), Taiyang Lake (太阳湖), and Baozi Gorge (豹子峡) to give birth. In August, they bring their baby antelopes back to Hoh Xil. For centuries, there has been no mention of a “passageway” facilitating the migration of Tibetan antelopes, for the whole of the Qinghai- Tibet Plateau was a free space. Even 100 years ago, Tibetan antelopes were distributed evenly across the plateau, but today they are separated into four areas: A’erjin (阿尔金山) in Xinjiang, Chiangtang Plateau (羌塘高原) in Tibet, the Three River Source Nature Reserve (三江源) in Qinghai, and Hoh Xil in Northern Tibet. After the Qinghai-Tibet Highway was built in the 1950s, the migration of Tibetan antelopes in Hoh Xil was restricted to 100 kilometers between the Kunlun Moun- tain Pass (三江源) and Wudaoliang (五道梁). Moreover, due to the construction of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway (青藏铁路) beginning in 2003, their range was further restricted to ten kilometers. Hence, the Tibetan antelopes must traverse one highway and one railway in their breeding and winter migrations. As the rail is built on a permanently frozen layer, the railway bed is high and steep. It, therefore, acts as a wall, obstructing the vision of Tibetan antelopes and their traditional migration route. The Tibetan antelopes that pass the winter near the Three Rivers’ Source area suffer most from the Qinghai-Tibet Railway. During the fi rst years of the railway, these antelopes had to give up migrating because they could not fi nd the reserved passageways under the railway. Presently some wild animals in Hoh Xil have become accustomed to using the Wubei Bridge (五北大桥), a 100 meter-wide bridge opening. However, no Tibetan antelope has ever passed through the other fi ve bridge openings “designed” for Tibetan antelopes. Since some Tibetan antelopes have gradually adapted to a human- altered environment and changed their migration route, an unforeseen problem has occurred. In the two kilometer-wide and ten kilometer-long zone between the parallel Qinghai-Tibet Highway and Qinghai-Tibet Railway, wolves and eagles have learned more quickly than the antelopes how to fi t in with their surroundings and change their preying route; they wait here for the pregnant Tibetan antelopes coming from 120 piao zhengji and shen xiaohui far away. Thus, defects in the road and railway design make it diffi cult for the Tibetan antelopes to migrate, creating a death zone. Before the Qinghai-Tibet Railway was built, the migratory passage of Tibetan antelopes was over 100 kilometers wide, so carnivores such as wolves and eagles had less success in preying on Tibetan antelopes due to long sight-lines and the fatigue of running long distances. However, today the roads help them prey upon the Tibetan antelopes. No one has yet produced statistics on how many Tibetan antelopes are killed in one migration in the death zone between the Qinghai-Tibet Highway and Qinghai-Tibet Railway, but an environmental protection volunteer once found 12 baby antelopes in an aerie that fell from the pier of Wubei Bridge. This shows how serious the matter is.

E. Roads in Xishuangbanna Mengyang Nature Reserve—“Angry Elephants” The highway from Simao (思茅) to Xiaomenglun (小勐仑), built in 2006, passes through the Asian elephant habitat in Mengyang Nature Reserve (勐养自然保护区). The 18 kilometers of road within the reserve divides the 150,000 hectare reserve into two parts. The direction of Simao-Xiaomenglun Expressway (思小高速路) in the reserve is the same as State Road 213, avoiding a second division to the reserve. The reasoning behind this is correct. However, the two roads obstruct wild animals in different ways. State Road 213, built in the 1950s, is merely ten meters wide and has no protection fences. Because the road zigzags and the road surface is of poor quality, people drive slowly. The average speed in Mengyang Nature Reserve is 30 kilometers per hour. In contrast, the Simao-Xiao- menglun Expressway, a totally enclosed road protected by fences, is 22.5 meters wide and the designated speed limit is 60 kilometers per hour and above. Thus, the design of the Simao-Xiaomenglun Expressway puts wild animals in danger. In late June of 2006, three months after the Simao-Xiaomenglun Expressway opened, a vehicle collided with an elephant. More such accidents have occurred since then, injuring vehicles, people, and elephants. The injured wild elephants, which ﬂ ed from the road, waited to exact revenge. It later attacked, injuring and even killing some people. In a collision between a vehicle and an elephant in October 2007, the elephant attacked the passengers out of anger. Sixteen bridge passages and two tunnel passages were designed into the construction of the Simao-Xiaomenglun Expressway, but most road construction 121 of them were inconsistent with the behavior of wild elephants, so no elephants passed through them. On the contrary, there are no passages in places the elephants frequent. Elephants have been photographed passing across the expressway 29 times in one year. In addition, a research monitor recorded 44 events of wild elephants moving around on the expressway during a six-month period. These facts make clear that even though animals and ecology are considered, the road planning and design still suffer from serious defects in fundamental research. The number of wild elephants that live in Xishuangbanna is less than 300. They are divided into nine colonies by the roads, living separately in enclosed areas of the jungle. The collisions between humans and elephants have gradually become more frequent. Given the number of incidents of elephants hurting people in the ﬁ rst half of 2008, scholars and local residents agree that “the elephants are angry.”

II. Lack of Ecological and Sociological Considerations in the Planning and Design of China’s Roads

There are now over two million kilometers of roads in China. Recently, in order to address the fi nancial crisis and to stimulate economic growth, the State Council invested four trillion RMB—about a quarter of which is planned to be used in road construction. Highway and railway construction still holds a signifi cant position in the investment blueprints of all local governments. The Ministry of Communications also says it will promote infrastructure construction, such as roads and airports, in the years ahead. Undoubtedly, China will start a new “Leap Forward.” Given this, ecological research on the effects of road construction is even more important and urgent. Based on experience in road construction from home and abroad, we propose the following fi ve suggestions in connection with the planning and design of roads in nature reserves.

A. Restrict Roads in Nature Reserves to What is Necessary and Appropriate Inside nature reserves, it is mistaken to think that more roads are better and that road networks should be dense. On the contrary, roads should be restricted to what is necessary and appropriate. Roads block the migration and distribution of wildlife, divide animal habitats, and decrease the exchange of genes among populations, and, thus, their 122 piao zhengji and shen xiaohui long-term viability. According to research conducted by the Chengdu Institute of Biology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (中科院成都生物所) in the Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve, the inﬂ uence of roads on ecosystems goes far beyond the area that the road occupies. Calculated by 500 meter blocks, the two million kilometers of roads in China take up a total area of as much as one million square meters. Moreover, the quality of habitats near roads is damaged by vehicle exhaust emissions. Research shows that pollution from roads can radiate to an area twenty times larger than the road area. Building roads to every village and town is beneﬁ cial to people, but if this idea is implemented inside nature reserves, the environment will be damaged. The planning and design of road construction in natural reserves must take into account research on the ecological impacts of road construction when making decisions, restricting the number of roads to what is necessary and appropriate.

B. Roads Should Be Ecological In nature reserves, it incorrect to think that roads should be straight and that pavement should be high-grade. On the contrary, earthen and rock roads should be used to make ecological roads. Roads become physical barriers to the migration of wild animals partly because, as the quality of roads gets higher, the gutters are dug deeper and the roadbeds and guardrails are higher—creating man-made barriers. Although the straight and ﬁ rm pavement enables much higher vehicle speeds, the roads become animal “killers.” In Brazil’s Pantanal Conservation Area—the largest marsh in the world—there are no highways, cement roads, or even asphalt. There are only earthen and rock roads. This is done to protect the wild animals living in the reserve. One can see innumerable green parrots foraging and emu families lounging by the roadside. From this, it can be seen that well-designed earthen and rock roads are not barriers to the activities and migration of wild animals. Quite the reverse, they serve as “special spaces” to the animals, where they reside and ﬁ nd food. Similarly, it can be seen that the earthen roads and rock roads, which are washed out and reconstructed on an almost annual basis, are ecological roads. We can say that in and near nature reserves, protecting earthen and rock roads is protecting ecology, and the construction of them is “ecological construction.” When planning and designing road construction 123 a road, we should, as much as possible, avoid passing through nature reserves and distribution areas of wildlife. If a road must pass through one, it should be an earthen or rock road rather than a highway. By doing so, funds are saved and the local ecology is protected.

C. Learn from Foreign Experiences and Achievements In order to make roads in protected areas more ecologically sound, we can learn from foreign experiences and achievements by doing some of the following:

1) When located in high-risk ecological areas, adopt remedial measures customized for that area. 2) Build systematic fences and passageways for wild animals. Fences should not only be useful in keeping away from stepping onto roads, they should also be useful in leading animals to the passageways designed for them. Passageways should be planned in accordance with the animals’ regular movements and migration trails, so as to ensure that animals can use this system effectively during migrations without putting themselves in danger. 3) Fences and passageways should be designed according to the needs of different animals and the environmental features of the local area. For instance, naturalization of fences and passageways into the local vegetation is a good way to attract wild animals. 4) Animal passageways consist of underpasses, culverts, and overpasses. The individual heights of animals and their behaviors should be taken into consideration when building underpasses. Overpasses should be wide enough to mitigate the detrimental effect that transport may have on the animals, and vegetation coverage should imitate the indigenous surroundings. The decision to build underpasses, culverts, or overpasses should depend on local animal types and terrestrial features. Passageways should resonate with the characteristics and regular movements of the local wildlife. We cannot assume that animals will do what humans want, and that they will use the passageways once they are built. 5) When animals do not act as people want, people are to blame, not animals. Canada reduced the number of deer killed by trafﬁ c accidents by 96% through the introduction of fence-passageway systems. We suggest that a nation-wide survey of the ecology of the 124 piao zhengji and shen xiaohui

roads in all protected areas be conducted, so that we can have a comprehensive understanding of the infl uence of roads on animals. Then we can use this scientifi c evidence to refl ect before planning new roads and restoring old roads. 6) Long-term monitoring is necessary for completed fences and passageways. This data would provide evidence for further optimization and valuable lessons for future road construction. 7) Strict speed limits should be imposed in nature reserves and the areas with a high distribution of wild animals. Signposts and other auxiliary facilities of transport should be set up around animal habitats. We should also strengthen legal and environmental awareness among drivers. 8) Out-of-service roads should be ecologically restored. Surveys show that once the surface of out-of-service roads is covered with vegetation, the number of species and total population of birds are larger than around roads in operation, even larger than in forests. Medium- and small-sized animals frequent these roads looking for food. Nevertheless, out-of-service roads cannot be compared with natural habitats since some animals do not know how to use them. Out-of-service roads continue to infl uence the local ecology—especially roads with a hard surface—because vegetation grows slowly on such roads. Although they do not threaten animals, their poor ecological quality can still be an obstacle to migration. Therefore, ecological recovery is needed. We should pulverize the roadbed and road surface, restore the original landscape and vegetation, and recreate suitable environments and habitats for wild animals.

D. Tunneling Is Better Mu Xingmin, a professor at the Institute of Soil and Water Conserva- tion, Chinese Academy of Sciences (中科院水土保持研究所), pointed out, “building new highways and railways is one of the reasons for soil erosion.” Soil erosion caused by road construction is more serious in mountainous areas. Road construction damages vegetation, and triggers landslides and mud fl ows. Therefore, in mountains and canyons tunneling is preferred when planning and designing road construction. Tunnels reduce the amount of damage caused by roads winding up the mountain, and limit the amount of soil erosion and damage to vegetation and wildlife. Moreover, tunnels save time and are fuel- effi cient and safe. Tunnels are not infl uenced by bad weather like winding roads. road construction 125

After the completion of a tunnel we should restore the ecology of out- of-service roads and restore the original habitat.

E. Take into Account Sociological Reﬂ ections on Road Construction Ecological and sociological concerns are not taken into account when roads are built in China. Since ecology and sociology are interactive, inseparable disciplines, we should pay attention to the sociological impacts of road construction while conducting research on its ecological impacts. Here are a few examples of road sociology:

1. Nomads and Roads Tibetans in the region of Ruo’ergai, Sichuan still lead a traditional nomadic life. The local transportation department ofﬁ cials have often complained that herdsmen demolish the newly-built fences along National Road 213 when they relocate their yaks and Tibetan antelopes. But if we look at the past, the truth is that in Ruo’ergai, nomadism has a much longer history than roads, and the roads did not include passageways for wild animals or for herdsman and their livestock when they were planned and built. Similar cases can be found in western provinces such as Xinjiang, Qinghai, Tibet, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia. Some herdsmen still maintain the nomadic or rotation pasturing way of production and travel long distances every year to other pastures. So the scientiﬁ c, reasonable planning of roads should also take into account the needs of livestock husbandry, leaving more passageways for the transfer of livestock.

2. Cultural Heritage As an objective of building a new socialist countryside, “to let farmers walk on the roads of asphalt and cement” is one-sided. Allowing no fl exibility and imposing one standard for the whole country is absurd. A case in point is that the upgrade of the surface of country roads in Wuyuan, Jiangxi (江西婺源), devastated the historically-signifi cant stone paths, and replaced them with concrete. The road from Gong- shan County (贡山县) in Yunnan to Walong County (瓦龙) in Tibet destroyed an ancient tea-trading and pilgrimage path for Tibetans because no efforts were made to protect the cultural heritage when designing the road. Some ancient, beautiful retreats and sacred sites with abundant cultural traditions of ethnic minorities have been demystifi ed by the 126 piao zhengji and shen xiaohui convenience of transportation. Mingyong Village (明永村) at the foot of Kawagebo Mount (云南卡瓦格博神山) in Yunnan and villages of the Tuwa people (图瓦族) near Hanasi Lake (哈纳斯湖) in Xinjiang are the victims of easy access and increased tourism. Roads are like cultural conveyor belts. When powerful modern culture intrudes upon ancient villages, traditional lifestyles tend to disintegrate, and the harmonious ties between nature and human, as well as social relations, are broken. Local people have more money in their pocket, but at the cost of less happiness, peace, and harmony in their minds and their previously preserved ecological environment. Villages are villages in nature; they should not be like cities and towns. “A long, zigzagging trail” is perhaps more poetic.

3. Roads Bring Logging The catchy slogan “building the road is the ﬁ rst step to becoming rich” often turns into “building the road is the ﬁ rst step to logging.” In countless villages in Diqing (迪庆州) and Nujiang (怒江州) Coun- ties in Yunnan Province, as soon as a road was completed, local woods disappeared. In the 1980s, Nujiang and all of its sub-counties opened their own forestry companies. They built roads and cut down trees; wherever roads extended, hills became bare. Yushichang (玉狮场) is an old mountain village in Hexi Village (河西乡) where the Pumi people (普米族) (an ethnic minority) have lived for generations. Most of the 29,043 acres of village-owned forests are towering old-growth trees. Seeing roads coming nearer and nearer, the only way villagers could protect their forest was to stop the road construction. They fought the logging company in 1986 and forced them to stop cutting trees in Yushichang. The crux of the problem does not lie with road building itself, but rather the relative position of forests and the environment within our consciousness. The people of Yushichang also yearn for a good transportation infrastructure, but they fear that roads would irresistibly bring loggers because the main purpose of the road construction sponsored by government and companies is to develop the local economy through logging. Yushichang villagers would rather be burdened by heavy loads and walk on rugged trails than see their home ruined by axes and saws. The Dragon Mountain (龙山) of the Dai people (傣族) is believed to be the resting place of their ancestors and the residence of gods road construction 127 and spirits. It is also a mini-nature reserve tended by the religious, communal, and moral powers of villagers. Not long ago, a road was being built to cut through Dragon Mountain of Man’e Village (曼俄村), MengLun County, Xishuangbanna. The villagers unanimously objected to the project, eventually forcing the road to be built around the mountain, preserving Dragon Mountain. Obviously, the problem lies also in the initial planning and design process. The two cases above broaden our horizon. Road construction doesn’t only affect wildlife habitats and nature reserves, and thus, requires the consideration of ecological and sociological studies. Otherwise, problems will arise.

4. Road Investment Road construction in our country blindly pursues high investment, which not only causes a colossal waste of capital, it also breeds corruption and squanders valuable land and ecological resources and worsens biodiversity and environmental protection. The crux of the problem lies in the scanty recognition of the signifi cance of the ecological and sociological impact of road construction and the almost non-existent research in these fi elds. We suggest that 10% of the one trillion RMB earmarked for road construction should go to the comprehensive study of these impacts and ecological improvement of roads, particularly in protected areas. We believe that such investment would bring immea- surable benefi ts. It would lay a solid foundation for being friendly to the environment in road construction and contribute to building a harmonious society under the direction of scientifi c principles. The days when road construction was the job of the transportation department alone are gone. It needs support from the natural and social sciences. Interdisciplinary studies should serve as the theoretical basis for decision-making and planning. Of course, what needs to be studied includes a planned road’s infl uence on wildlife, on plants and vegetation, on invasive species, on the aquatic environment and scenery, on the chemical and physical properties of the soil on both sides of the road, and on traditional communities and traditional cultures. All these are in burning need of government and academic attention and they should be included in the researching programs in the near future.

PART III

POLLUTION

AIR QUALITY AND QUALITY OF LIFE

Peng Yan

In 2008, air quality garnered more attention than it ever had over the last fi ve years. On the one hand, increased confi dence in air quality was reported both in Chinese and international media, due to the successful Olympic Games in Beijing and the other six Olympic cities in China. On the other hand, there are confl icting views on the air quality management measures taken during the Olympic Games—sustainability being one issue—and concerns about the impacts of air pollution on the quality of life.

Key words: air quality, air pollution, health effects, public participation

The year 2008 was a milestone in several aspects of China’s history, especially in air quality management (AQM). With Beijing and six other Chinese cities hosting the 29th Olympic Games, air quality in Chinese cities, especially Beijing, was the central focus of China and the world. A number of remarkable observations were found during 2008: 1) Chinese cities strengthened their monitoring of urban air quality and were signiﬁ cantly increasing the quality and quantity of air quality data to the public; 2) Chinese urban air quality management is increasingly building a consensus that improving and protecting public health shall be the ultimate purpose of AQM; and 3) There is an increasing demand by the public for AQM knowledge and air quality (AQ) information.

I. Air Quality beyond the Olympic Games

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games fostered a great move on air quality discussions from the academic and scientiﬁ c community and government agencies to the general public and media in China and other Asian countries. Figure 8.1 presents the increasing news volume from 2003 to 2008 on AQ in China by the International Herald Tribune (IHT) and the BBC. 132 peng yan

50 300

45 International Herald Tribune BBC 250 40 China Daily 35 200 30

25 150

20 100 15

10 50 Articles quantity in China Daily Articles quantity in International media 5

0 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Figure 8.1: Volume of news on air quality of Chinese cities by IHT, BBC, and China Daily 2003–2008

The Clean Air Initiative-Asia Center (CAI) established a dedicated page on its website to the Beijing Olympic Games and released a special newsletter every day during the Olympics’ 24 days on the air quality of the seven cities hosting Olympic Games activities.1 By visit- ing the dedicated page, one can access AQM data and measures taken by China, and research reports on China covering a variety topics related to air quality, particularly how air quality affects quality of life. These efforts facilitated the transformation from general interests on air quality data into more awareness of individual actions contributing to better air quality. Increasing care and interest in understanding the implications of the air quality index by the general public was observed through the news in 2008. This is no doubt encouraging. Based on the observations and analysis of a variety of sources, the year 2008 will be recorded as a historical year with intensive and transparent air quality monitoring and reporting. First, the Beijing Environ- ment Protection Bureau (EPB) established an expert team—consisting of specialists from Europe and the United States, as well as, leading scientists in China—aimed at providing overall guidance and advice

1 Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia Center), www.cleanairnet.org/ China. air quality and quality of life 133 for air quality management. The team was structured into ten groups deployed in various monitoring sites of the Olympic Games activities. The monitoring sites included both travel route and game sites. On the Beijing EPB website, the real time air quality of the 18 districts and counties within the greater Beijing area was available. Second, a number of signifi cant multi-disciplinary research projects presented—through the China International Forum on Environment and Development in 2008—a Sino-US Regional AQM Workshop and a Better Air Quality Conference. Among the fi ndings, research on the effects of air pollution on public health attracted enormous attention from policy- and decision-makers in China and internationally.2 The Olympic Games were not the only driving force to AQM efforts. According to the annual compendium of AQM projects and research collected by the CAI-Asia Center since 2004, attention by the media and the public to China’s air quality increased year by year. The dominant attitudes about air quality in the Chinese and international media has gone through three periods: suspicion and concern before the Olympic Games, focus and anxiety during the Olympic Games, and positive recognition and compliments after the game. The good air quality during the Olympic Games brought many awards to the Beijing EPB. For example, the director general of the Beijing EPB, Shi Hanmin, was granted the fi rst “Kong Ha Award” due to his outstanding efforts in improving air quality in Beijing at the 2008 Better Air Quality Conference in Bangkok.3 This award is signifi cant as it refl ects the recognition by the international community that is dedicated to improving air quality. Chinese AQM capacity was greatly strengthened over the last few decades, especially since 2001 when the host city for the 29th Olympic Games was awarded to Beijing. However, the challenges for AQM—to continue and deepen the management of air quality in China—remain quite fi erce, especially under economic development with rapid urbanization and motorization.

2 Findings on health effects are available at presentations at ww.baq2008.org. 3 A description of the Kong Ha Award is available on www.baq2008.org. 134 peng yan

II. What Does the Air Quality Data Tell Us?

Air quality is assessed by calculating the concentration of air pollutants contained in ambient air. The lower the pollutant concentration is, the better the air quality is. Most countries in the world have formulated their ambient air quality standards by defi ning the categories of pollutants and their concentration limits. However, understanding the concentration limits of pollutants would require substantial specialized knowledge. Therefore, many countries have formulated Air Pollutants Index (API) categories based on the concentration levels, aiming to help more non-scientifi c people to understand air quality. The average daily API in Beijing during the Olympic Games was 36% lower than the average during the preceding eight years.4 People have become so familiar with this air quality index term that it can now be often heard talked about in daily life. One can easily fi nd air quality information by checking out API data for a specifi c city, which is reported on daily basis. Through a little bit more analysis of the API for a city, available at the city EPB website or Ministry of Envi- ronmental Protection (MEP) website, one can have the API curve for the whole year. Air quality assessments by API have often been questioned because the API does not provide absolute concentration data for air pollutants and is subject to the country specifi c classifi cations. It is important to understand the API under Chinese classifi cations. The API in Chinese cities shows information on the main pollutant, rather than all the criteria pollutants. While PM10 is the dominant pollutant in many Chinese cities, in some cities, such as those in Shanxi

Province, SO2 is the most important pollutant. This is very likely due to the high-sulphur coal mining activities located there.

Looking at Beijing and Shanghai as examples, PM10 is the dominant pollutant in recent decades. Based on the deﬁ nition of the API, the monthly average concentration of PM10 in recent years can be calculated easily. Figure 8.2 gives the monthly average concentration of PM10 in Beijing from 2001 to 2008. For the whole year, the PM10 concentration reached bottom in July, August, and September caused by helpful weather conditions, such as more precipitation. In 2008,

4 www.cleanairnet.org/caiasia/1412/article-72991.html. air quality and quality of life 135

) 0.3 3 Average of 2001–2007 2008 0.25 (mg/m 10 0.2

0.15

0.1

Concentration ofConcentration PM 0.05 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Source of API data: MEP website(http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn/TestRunQian/air/ airMain.jsp)

Figure 8.2: Monthly average concentration of PM10 from 2001 to 2008 in Beijing

the PM10 concentration was the lowest it had been in the last eight years, especially in August, September, October, and November 2008. This shows the positive effect of the Air Quality Guarantee Measures for the Olympic Games (奥运会空气质量保障措施) to the air quality during and after the Olympics. Figure 8.3 indicates the monthly average API in three main cities in 2008: Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou. According to the API data, the air quality in Beijing was relatively worse in 2008, while those in Shanghai and Guangzhou were better. In March, April, and May, the average API in Beijing exceeded Level II standards, and the maximum API even reached 304 and 463, exceeding Level III standards, which means heavy pollution. However, the air quality improved greatly in July, August, and September in all three cities due to the Air Quality Guarantee Measures for the Olympic Games. After the summer, the air quality became worse because of the variation of atmospheric circulation and the beginning of the indoor heating season, but the concentration of pollutants was still under control. The air quality monitoring system in China can produce three kinds of data: annual average value, concentration data of criteria pollutants, and API. The monitoring is done through a monitoring network located in most of the cities. The monitoring site locations were deﬁ ned using the national guidelines on the selection of sites. The criteria pollutants being monitored include PM10, SO2, and NOX. Urban air quality in 136 peng yan

500 Beijing Shanghai Guangzhou 450 Grade I Standard 400 Grade II Standard 350 300 250 API 200 (Max API) 150 100 50 0 (Min API) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Source: MEP website(http://datacenter.mep.gov.cn/TestRunQian/air/airMain.jsp)

Figure 8.3: Monthly average API in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou in 2008

Chinese cities is assessed by Ambient Air Quality Standards and API. For example, one of the criteria for an “environmental model city” set up by the MEP is at least 85% of the days in a year have an API equal to or less than 100.5 Currently, attention by the media, researchers, and government ofﬁ cials in China focuses on the compliance rates, number of blue sky days, and input. However, the real concerns about air quality are air quality itself assessed by pollutant concentrations in the air and their relations or effects on public health, which ultimately affects quality of life. The Chinese public is increasingly aware of and understands the implications of AQ data, and will consequently demand better air quality. This demand will push air quality data management from data monitoring, interpretation, and respective control measures to be more livelihood-oriented.

III. Air Pollution and Health

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that urban air pollution contributed to approximately 355,000 deaths and 2,504,000

5 http://www.zhb.gov.cn/cont/mhcity/cjmfcs/cmdt/200812/t20081204_131975 .htm, accessed on December 12th, 2008. air quality and quality of life 137

Table 8.1: Burden of disease from urban outdoor air pollution in Western Paciﬁ c Region B and China in 2000 Region Health End-Point Age Group Deaths YLL (000s) (000s) World Total 799 6,404 Western Cardiopulmonary disease >30 years 317 1,992 Paciﬁ c Lung cancer >30 years 32 309 Region B Acute respiratory infections 0–4 years 6 204 Total 355 2504 China Cardiopulmonary disease >30 years 263 1,653 Lung cancer >30 years 27 256 Acute respiratory infections 0–4 years 5 169 Total 295 2,078

Source: Cohen AJ, Anderson HR, et al., 2004. years of life lost in 2000 in the “Western Paciﬁ c Region B.”6 Since China makes up 83% of this region, the health impact of outdoor air pollution in China is substantial and warrants the attention of policy makers (see Table 8.1). A Chinese study on the health impacts of air pollution mainly focuses on the diagnostics corresponding to death rate and respiratory diseases, while literature on biomarker, birth status, inpatient and out- patient, incidence of lung cancer, and economic loss were also available.7 In the past few years, there were cases of health impacts from air pollution reported and researched, but the conclusions were debated and it did not become credible evidence or widely quoted. Nevertheless, there were changes in 2008. Open discussions on the health impacts of air pollution drew great attention to the public through news headlines in the Chinese media. Leading Chinese scientists and some government ofﬁ cials called for different perspectives on the review and improvement of the existing air quality assessment system in China. A prominent voice came from a famous epidemic disease scientist and medical doctor, Dr. Zhong Nanshan (钟南山), who revealed at an international conference on air quality held in China: “Among the surgery operation cases, Guangzhou patients more than 50 years old were found to have black lungs, although not necessarily

6 World Health Organization, 2002. 7 Health Effects Institute, 2006. 138 peng yan lung cancer.”8 Fu Jiamo (傅家谟), a leading scientist from the Chinese Academy of Engineering, further revealed ﬁ ndings from a survey by the Ministry of Health that 25% of deaths in Chinese cities were caused by cancer, among which, lung cancer increased signiﬁ cantly in past

30 years by 465%. In Guangzhou, 75% of PM10 was actually PM2.5. This is an enormous phenomenon from a health perspective since lung cancer has close correlations with environment and lifestyle. Using U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards, the total number 9 of days exceeding PM2.5 would be more than 70%.” The Guangzhou “Black Lung” fi nding was indeed disappointing, but can also contribute positively to raise public awareness and improve public policy. With an increased shared understanding that the correlations between air pollution and lung disease have fi rmly been established, the focus of discussion started diverting to actions. Scientists and senior offi cials started to advocate for integrating more health-telling parameters into the air pollution monitoring and assessment system. It was also observed that environmental health has been on the Chi- nese government’s agenda since 2005 with the fi rst Chinese National Forum on Environmental Health conference. Since then, progress has been made with a few landmark activities described below. In November 2007, the National Action Plan on Environment and Health 2007–2015 (国家环境与健康行动计划 2007–2015) (hereafter, called the Action Plan), was jointly formulated and published by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. It announced that China would build up a monitoring network on air pollution and health. Since then, a number of institutional arrangements were established to ensure the implementation of the Action Plan under the leadership of the National Leading Group of Environment and Health. In January 2008, a joint national offi ce for environment and health was set up to coordinate and ensure the operation of environment and health activities. This is an innovative action and good news for health-oriented

8 Xuan Feng, Peng Xiaoyun, and Luo Xiaoyan, “Guangzhou-Style Black Lung,” Southern Metropolis Weekly, June 27th, 2008. 9 Pearl River Delta Air Pollution Prevention Forum “Smoking Rate Declined, While Lung Cancer Rate Quadrupled; Black Lung Is Related to Haze,” Guangdong Environmental Protection Bureau public website, http://www.gdepb.gov.cn/ztzl/lt/ bd/200806/t20080613_53881.html. air quality and quality of life 139 air quality management. Professionals, scientists, non-governmental organizations, and the media, are encouraged to participate in debates and discussion on what kind of public policies and measures can lead to better solutions for AQM without having to exert as much effort and wisdom on the absolute medical causal effect linkages or tactical skills when trying to provide cases or arguments for better air quality for public health. This is because it will take a very long time for medical science to establish the linear causal effect linkage between air pollution and diseases. Hindering on this aspect will delay the incentives for action. However, taking the statistically established correlation would direct the efforts and knowledge into forward-looking and preventative solutions. This is a much more proactive and responsible approach. Hence, it was a milestone year for air quality and health. Although many countries use API to tell air quality, the interpretations vary and are subject to how the APIs are defi ned by pollutant criteria and how the pollutants are monitored. For example, in China, “compliance” of air quality means the concentration of the pollutants contained in the air is the ceiling limits defi ned in our ambient air quality standards. While compliance, as a regulatory term, is governed by each sovereign country, possible health threats by air pollutants were mainly assessed with reference to WHO Guidelines, which is also updated with new scientifi c fi ndings. The most scientifi c and authoritative references on health risks by air pollutants are the guideline values published by WHO. In 2005, WHO published Air Quality Guidelines for PM, Ozone, NO2, SO2 (Risk Assessment Summary), which updated the new value based on new fi ndings from scientifi c research. Taking PM, the main pollutant with health impacts, as an example, the air quality value for interim targets are outlined in the Table 8.2.

Comparatively, the PM10 limits defi ned for urban residential areas (Class II) in the China national ambient air quality standards is 0.1mg/ m3, which is fi ve times the WHO guideline value (0.02mg/m3), and 1.4 times the WHO transitional value. In this context, urban air quality compliance in the existing AQM framework (meeting Class II standards) is far from satisfactory for health exposure. Furthermore, secondary pollutants, such as ozone and fi ne particulates, are more of a concern because they have not yet been systematically monitored in China. 140 peng yan

Table 8.2: WHO air quality guidelines and interim targets for PM, annual mean concentrationsa

PM10 PM2.5 Basis for the selected level (µg/m) (µg/m) Interim target-1 70 35 These levels are associated with about (IT-1) a 15% higher long-term mortality risk relative to the AQG level. Interim target-2 50 25 In addition to other health benefi ts, (IT-2) these levels lower the risk of premature mortality by approximately 6% [2 11%] relative to the IT 1 level. Interim target-3 30 15 In addition to other health benefi ts, (IT-3) these levels reduce the mortality risk by approximately 6% [2–11%] relative to the IT 2 level. Air quality 20 10 These are the lowest levels at which guideline (AQG) total, cardiopulmonary and lung cancer mortality have been shown to increase with more than 95% confi dence in

response to long-term exposure to PM2.5 a The use of Pm2.5 guideline value is preferred.

Table 8.3: Chinese standards vs. WHO guidelines and United States standards (mg/m3) Pollutant Averaging Class I Class II Class III WHO(a) US Time

SO2 1 year 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.05 0.08 24 hours 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.125 0.365 1 hour 0.15 0.5 0.7 10 min – 0.5 TSP 1 year 0.08 0.2 0.3 0.06–0.09(b) 24 hours 0.12 0.3 0.5 –

PM10 1 year 0.04 0.1 0.15 0.02(c) 0.05 24 hours 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.07(d) 0.15

NO2 1 year 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.1 24 hours 0.08 0.12 0.12 – 1 hour 0.12 0.24 0.24 0.20 air quality and quality of life 141

Table 8.3 (cont.) Pollutant Averaging Class I Class II Class III WHO(a) US Time

CO 24 hours 4 4 6 – 8 hours 10 10 1 hr 10 10 20 30 40 30 min – – – 60 15 min 100

O3 8 hours 0.12 0.157 1 hr 0.12 0.16 0.2 – 0.235 Notes: Class I standards apply to specially protected areas such as natural conservation areas, scenic spots, and historical sites. Class II standards apply to residential areas, mixed commercial/residential areas, cultural, industrial, and rural areas. Class III standards apply to special industrial areas. Source: GB 3095-199610 and its ﬁ rst amendment and (a) WHO (2000); (b) WHO (1979); (b) WHO, 2005; and (d) WHO (1987).

IV. Turning Knowledge into Action: Advancing AQM

Updated scientiﬁ c results, together with increased public awareness and knowledge about air quality, will demand better AQM. It is important to note that better air quality cannot be improved by the government alone. It has to be a shared and common responsibility of all of society. The bottom line is that we all live “downstream” of air pollution and are key stakeholders in air quality. As the key stakeholders, each of us who breathes air will have an impact on air quality by our actions and be affected by the actions of all of us. Therefore, everyone has a role to play in AQM. For instance, NGOs can play an active role in raising awareness and knowledge of the health impacts of air quality. So when participating in annual surveys on public views of the environment’s quality, the public will make their point more effective if it is based on the right knowledge. NGOs can also become an observer or watchdog of new research ﬁ ndings and national policy trends. NGOs can conduct analysis on the health impacts of air pollution with a more historical, objective, and positive approach. NGOs can also initiate and organize public

10 The Chinese version can be downloaded at http://www.sepa.gov.cn/image20010518/ 5298.pdf. 142 peng yan campaigns or infl uence behavior changes which can lead to the dual benefi ts of air quality improvement and climate change mitigation. Since 2007, the MEP has included “public satisfaction” as one of the indicators for urban environmental performance.11 This is an important channel for the public to express their views about the environment’s quality in their cities. This can be instrumental in providing feedback to the government on the different aspects of AQM measures, but only if the comments from the public are informative and based on strong AQM knowledge. There are two sets of factors that affect air quality: 1) the driving forces of air pollution, such as increased urbanization, mobilization, population, and energy consumption; and 2) the AQM capacity in monitoring, prevention, and the control of air pollution. It is certain that the former set of factors will continue to exist and very likely to further grow. There were real cases demonstrating that the latter set of factors can contribute to air pollution reduction, if effectively implemented. The environmental NGOs and the general public should focus their attention on the impact of all AQM policies, rather than individual policies alone. The core questions to formulate their comments should be: How do these environmental policies affect air quality? And what kind of health impacts might they generate? According to the “Annual Report of Urban Environmental Manage- ment and Comprehensive Improvement in 2007” (2007年全国城市环境管理与综合整治年度报告), the public satisfaction rate became a formal examination index for the fi rst time. Seventy percent of the 617 cities that attended the city examination carried out the survey of public satisfaction based on uniform requirements. It was constituted by 20 items, including fi ve single items: air quality, water environment, noise conditions, garbage collection and disposal, and environmental education and urban comprehensive satisfaction rate. All items were surveyed and analyzed by the National Statistics Bureau. Taking the air quality satisfaction rate as an example, in 109 main cities in China, the average Level I and II air quality days rate was 89.55% in those cities which the public satisfaction rate reached 80% and above. But the relationship between good air quality days and

11 Ministry of Environmental Protection Pollution control Department, “Description of Assessment Indexes in the 2007 Municipal Test,” Website of the Ministry of Environ- mental Protection, http://www.zhb.gov.cn/cont/city/ckzb/200710/t20071022_111650 .htm, October 22nd, 2007. air quality and quality of life 143

Table 8.4: Survey results of the public satisfaction rate to urban air quality in 2007 City Level I and II air Percentage Public satisfaction quality days increase rate Jinchang, Gansu 78.9% 10.13 84.6% Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 90.96% 6.03 83.3% Linfen, Shanxi 83.56% 28.22 46.22% Source: http://www.mep.gov.cn/cont/city/zxdt/200810/t20081029_130627.htm the public satisfaction rate is different based on different cities. This shows that the public has clear standards for local air quality. When the basic air quality situation is good, even with no obvious improvement for annual comparison, the public satisfaction rate can still be very high. Whereas, the basic situation is bad, even if a large improvement happened, the public was still not satisfi ed, such as in Linfen (临汾), Shanxi Province (see Table 8.4). The city examination has made signifi cant progress, showing a great vitality. It will continue to play a role in urban environmental management. In 2009, it is expected to fully cover more than 660 cities across the country. The mission for better air quality remains challenging and requires both long-term strategic planning and short-term fi x measures. While the Beijing Olympic Games’ success has brought international awards and recognitions for Beijing’s efforts in AQM and sustainable transport, it has also received a number of comments regarding the sustainability of some of the measures taken by Beijing. For example, good air quality in Beijing benefi ted from the contribution of neighboring areas (not only the direct efforts of Beijing) and the efforts were through administrative orders, which were meant to be short measures for a special period of time. These concerns make the Beijing success a unique case and diffi cult to replicate. Nevertheless, Beijing’s experience has contributed to at least three transformations in AQM. The fi rst is the regional approach to addressing urban air pollution. The regional approach for AQM started in 2005 when formulating scientifi c AQ objectives for the Beijing Olympics and analyzing air pollution in the Pearl River Delta. The institutional mechanism to facilitate the regional approach in scientifi c research and control measures started with the preparation for the Beijing Olympic Games. Regulatory and policy support for the regional approach started 144 peng yan in 2008 and is very likely to be stipulated in the amendment to China’s Law on Air Pollution Prevention and Control (大气法).12 Second is the health-based AQM approach. The rationale and assessment of specifi c AQM measures started focusing on the relevance for public health and livelihoods. For example, Beijing AQM measures during 1998–2008 were assessed so that cleaner energy and stricter vehicle emissions standards have long-term measures in emissions reduction and in improvement of environmental quality, and thus, quality of life. Last is the reassessment of the ambient air quality standards. During the fi rst week of the Beijing Olympics Games, MEP announced that from 2009, PM2.5 and ozone will be added to the Criteria Pollutants Monitoring category. Consequently, this will lead to a series of research and measures such as amending the ozone value in the standard by adding an eight hour average value limit, adding a PM2.5 standard, and adding opacity as an auxiliary indicator.13 It is clear that China is moving towards integrated AQM, especially in their 12th Five Year Plan period, which will echo CAI-Asia Center’s prediction: “Perhaps surprisingly to the outside world, China is now starting to become a role-model for other Asian countries in fi nding ways to go beyond the mere formulation of air quality laws, standards, and policies and to make a start with their actual implementation.”14

12 PM2.5 standard was adopted in Europe in 2008 and in the U.S. in 1997. See the presentation at ACEF forum on November 6th, 2008, made by Chai Fahe, Director of Ambient Environment Studies of China Academy of Environment Sciences, China 13 Ibid. 14 CAI-Asia Center Article: http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/226851, megacities-look-at-public-transport-trafﬁ c-jams-increase.html. AGRICULTURAL POLLUTION ZONING AND COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES

Liang Shumin

By examining the current agricultural pollution in various regions, this study classiﬁ es the sources of this pollution in China, and then conducts the zoning of and a comprehensive evaluation on China’s pollution of agriculture. It also presents agricultural pollution control measures in light of different sources of pollution and different patterns of use of agricultural land.

Key words: comprehensive evaluation, agricultural pollution, agricultural pollution control, agricultural pollution zoning

I. The Increasingly Exacerbated Farmland Pollution in China

In recent years, frequent farmland pollution occurrences have caused great losses in both the national economy and farmers’ personal property. Issues pertaining to pollution of agriculture have caught the increasing attention of the academic fi eld, as well as the whole of society. According to the September 18th, 2008 report in Zhejiang Online, a factory in Wucheyan Village (五车堰村)—on the border between Shangyu (a county-level city) of Shaoxing City and Yuyao (a county-level city) of Ningbo City—surreptitiously discharged pollutants into nearby rivers at night. Their act not only led to the death of fi sh in the river, but also the withering of more than 200 mu (about 13.3 hectares) of single- crop rice whose life depended on the irrigation water from the river. The environmental protection departments of both cities conducted a sample inspection, and the pollutants discharged into the river turned out to be glyphosate, widely known as a killer of green plants. In 2007, similar incidents occurred in Fujian Province, where the villagers’ tea harvest was almost wiped out by dust pollution from a cement plant. Sanyuan Village (三元村), in Jingu Town of Anxi County, lies in the vicinity of a cement plant. As a result, all of its houses, trees, tea gardens, and vegetable fi elds alongside highways were covered with dust. Furthermore, a total of 150 mu (10 hectares) of fertile farmlands, 146 liang shumin where the renowned “Tieguanyin Tea” is grown, were shrouded in cement dust, which led to a loss of more than three million RMB. In 2008, the blue-green algae bloom incident in Taihu Lake (太湖) aroused intense national attention. Dr. Jiang Wenlai (姜文来) from the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (中国农业科学院) referred to the incident as a man-made disaster, for which agricultural pollution was the major contributing factor. There are three sources of pollution in Taihu Lake: 1) Discharge of domestic sewage into rivers, lakes, and seas without proper treatment; 2) Industrial pollution. During the process of wastewater disposal, attention was only paid to the pollutant indicators of bio-chemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen demand (COD), while the negative effects of nitrogen and phosphorous were never mitigated; 3) Agricultural diffused pollution (or non-point source pollution), such as fertilizers. Some residual fertilizers are washed into rivers, lakes, and seas together with runoff or via some other channels. Additionally, some large-scale farms that raise chickens, ducks, and geese fail to have their wastewater properly disposed of. Of the three sources, the agricultural diffused pollution ranks fi rst in amount, followed by urban domestic pollution, and then industrial pollution.

I. Classiﬁ cation of Farmland Pollution Sources

The sources of farmland pollution in China consist of emissions from the “three industrial wastes” (wastewater, waste gas, and solid waste), urban and rural domestic sewage and garbage, and pollution from the agricultural production itself.1 Emissions of the three industrial wastes and urban domestic sewage and garbage—primarily distributed in city suburbs—cause pollution through underground water irrigation, wastewater irrigation, air pollution, and direct soil contamination. Rural domestic sewage and garbage and pollution from agricultural production are mainly distributed in rural areas, where pollution is brought about by ﬁ eld irrigation using surface water or underground water, wastewater irrigation, direct soil contamination, and the improper use

1 National Bureau of Statistics of China, State Environmental Protection Adminis- tration of China, “China Environmental Statistics Yearbook,” China Statistics Press, 2007. agricultural pollution zoning 147 of fertilizers, pesticides, and agricultural mulch. Agricultural production pollutes not only the agricultural environment but also the living environment of human beings. This can be in the form of water pollution caused by aquaculture; water and gas pollution caused by livestock and poultry excrement; eutrophication of water bodies because of the excessive use of fertilizers; the greenhouse gas methane emitted from paddy fi eld, livestock, and poultry breeding; air pollution; and the increase of the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide as a result of straw incineration. The pollution of agricultural products directly caused by agricultural production is characterized by non-point source pollution, which is diffi cult to control under the primary family contracts system in China and has, therefore, become a major concern. The quantifi able indexes of agricultural pollution sources include the amount of pesticide usage, the amount of chemical fertilizer usage, the amount of livestock and poultry excrement, total aquaculture area, amount of agricultural mulch used, total paddy fi eld area, and amount of crop straws.

A. Pesticides Pesticides are a direct source of pollution of agriculture. Pesticide contamination is mainly reﬂ ected in the excessive amount of pesticide residuals in vegetables.2 The source of pesticide contamination can be monitored through such major macro-indicators as the total amount of pesticide used and the amount of pesticide used per unit of arable land and per unit of land area. Pesticide contamination mainly occurs in various forms of vegetable and fruit production, including advanced greenhouse, vinyl house, open-air-grown vegetables, and orchards of various fruits.

B. Chemical Fertilizers Chemical fertilizers bring about water quality deterioration, eutrophication, and nitrates in ground water and vegetables exceeding the standards. Eutrophication and water quality deterioration lead directly

2 Liu Fengzhi and Li Yujin, “The Situation of and Solution to Agricultural Envi- ronment Pollution in China,” Intensifi ed Agricultural Environment Problems and Solutions, China Agricultural Science and Technology Press, 2001, pp. 12–20. 148 liang shumin to the pollution of humans’ living environment. Excessive nitrates in ground water are detrimental to the health of infants, and excessive accumulation of nitrates in vegetables—as a result of improper vegetable storage—threatens human health. The macro-indicators that can be used to monitor sources of fertilizer pollution include the total amount of fertilization, the amount of nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium used, and the amount of fertilizer used per unit of arable land and per unit of land area. Fertilizer pollution is also related to land use patterns. Fertilizer pollutes irrigated fi elds the most, followed by irrigable land, and, fi nally, dry land the least. This is because the fl uidity of fertilizers varies in different kinds of soil.

C. Livestock and Poultry Excrement Livestock and poultry excrement endangers the living environment of humans by polluting water and air in the surrounding area. Livestock and poultry pollution, mainly due to sewage disposal in large-scale farms, is primarily distributed in the outer suburbs of big cities. This is the result of the trend in recent years that modernized livestock and poultry farms tend to congregate towards major agricultural areas. The total amount of livestock and poultry excrement can be calculated based on the quantity and raising pattern of livestock and poultry in every administrative region. Then, the amount of livestock and poultry excrement per unit of land area and per person can be calculated.

D. Animal Husbandry Animal husbandry emits greenhouse gases. Methane emitted by large animals is one type of greenhouse gas, which exerts an indirect inﬂ u- ence on global climate change. The amount of methane exhausted by large animals can be obtained by calculating the amount of livestock in each region. In this way, the amount of methane emitted from livestock per unit of arable land and per unit of land area can be calculated and then considered as the monitoring indicators.

E. Paddy Fields Paddy fi elds are also a major source of greenhouse gases form agriculture. The emission of greenhouse gas in the paddy fi elds can be agricultural pollution zoning 149 monitored through the distribution of paddy fi elds and the amount of greenhouse gas calculated according to the area of paddy fi elds. The sub-indictors consist of the area and ratio of paddy fi elds and the emission of greenhouse gas per unit of paddy fi eld and per unit of land area.

F. Aquaculture Water pollution caused by aquaculture is indicated by chemical residue in aquatic products and water eutrophication. Furthermore, aquaculture is susceptible to the three industrial wastes, urban domestic pollution, and agricultural pollution. The ratio of aquaculture area to administrative region area can demonstrate the intensity of the aquaculture pollution source.

G. Residual Agricultural Mulch Residual agricultural mulch leads to soil contamination and endangers the physical characteristics of soil. The intensity of soil mulch pollution sources can be monitored through such indicators as the amount of soil mulch used and the amount of soil mulch used per unit of arable land and per unit of land area.

H. Straw Incineration Incinerating agricultural crop straw leads to air pollution. This act not only hinders land, water, and air transit, but also increases carbon dioxide levels in rural areas and raises greenhouse gas emissions. The straw incineration pollution sources can be monitored through the following macro-indictors: the amount of major crop straw and the amount of crop straws per unit of arable land and per unit of land area.

III. The Current Agricultural Pollution Situation in Different Regions of China

In order to conduct a comprehensive evaluation on agricultural pollution in China, the present study investigates the amount of fertilizers and pesticides applied and soil mulch coverage per unit of arable land. 150 liang shumin

First, the pollution level of each item is to be evaluated in various regions. During the evaluation process, each region will be referenced to the most polluted area, which will serve as the benchmark, and non-dimensionalization on pollution will be conducted in different regions. The intensity of fertilizer pollution can be measured by the amount of fertilizer applied per unit of arable land. In China, Fujian Province ranks the highest in fertilizer application amount per unit of arable land, reaching 895 kilograms per hectare. This is followed by Jiangsu, Guangdong, Henan, Beijing, Hubei, Shandong, Hainan, Shanghai, and Hunan. The fertilizer application amount in Tianjin varies between 514 and 699 kilograms per hectare. Those regions centered on single-crop rice, such as Guizhou, Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet, rank the lowest in their amount of fertilizer application, ranging from 111 to 165 kilograms per hectare of arable land. Pesticide pollution intensity can be discerned from the application amount of pesticide per unit of arable land. In China, pesticides are used at the highest rate in Fujian Province, where the rate of pesticide application per unit of arable land amounts to as high as 39.3 kilograms per hectare, followed by 31.7 kilograms per hectare in Zhejiang Province, 28.7 kilograms per hectare in Hunan Province, 28.0 kilograms per hectare in Guangdong Province, and 19.2–24.0 kilograms per hectare in Hubei, Shanghai, Jiangxi, Beijing, Hainan, Shandong, and Jiangsu. Pesticides are used in the least amount, ranging from 1.6 to 3.5 kilograms per hectare, in such provinces as Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia. Soil mulch pollution can be measured by the ratio of soil mulch coverage on arable land area. The soil mulch coverage rate is comparatively higher in the northern part of China and high-altitude regions, among which, Xinjiang Autonomous Region has its coverage rate of soil mulch being as high as 36.8%, followed by 25.3% in Shandong Province, and 23.1% in Tianjin. The plastic coverage rate ranges from 12.9% to 23.1% in Anhui, Hebei, Gansu, and Hunan. The lowest coverage rates are between 0.5% and 1.7% in Hainan, Qinghai, and Tibet. The below evaluation demonstrates that two regions, Fujian and Shandong, have the most serious agricultural pollution (with extremely heavy pollution); seven regions, Hunan, Beijing, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Hubei, have heavy agricultural pollution; seven regions, Tianjin, Anhui, Xinjiang, Henan, Hebei, Hainan, and Jiangxi, agricultural pollution zoning 151 have moderate to heavy agricultural pollution; the three regions of Guangxi, Sichuan, and Chongqing, have moderate to light agricultural pollution; the ﬁ ve regions of Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Gansu, and Yunnan, have light agricultural pollution; the seven regions, Ningxia, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet, have extremely light pollution (Table 9.1).

IV. Zoning of Agricultural Pollution

Agricultural pollution is the result of an excessive degree of intensive farming. The degree of pollution is closely related to the local natural conditions, land use, economic development, agricultural production level, cultivation pattern, farming history, agricultural production conventions and habits, and the farmers’ scientifi c-technological and educational background. This study divides China into eight major regions of agricultural pollution, namely Northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang), North China (Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi), Central China (Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhe- jiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan), South China (Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Fujian, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao), South- west China (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan), Middle North China (Inner Mongolia, Gansu, and Ningxia), Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and Qinghai-Tibet Plateau (Qinghai and Tibet). An evaluation of agricultural pollution in each main area is then conducted with reference to relevant indexes. Three indexes were adopted in conducting a comprehensive evaluation of the eight major regions of agricultural pollution: the amount of chemical fertilizer applied per unit of arable land, the amount of pesticide used per unit of arable land, and the soil mulch coverage rate. The fi rst step is to evaluate each pollution index in every major region. The most convenient evaluation method is to set the most polluted region as the benchmark and make non-dimensionalization on pollution degrees in different regions. The region with the highest pollution index (the most seriously polluted area) is set as the base (index=1) of a dimensional analysis. The indexes of other regions are the ratio (0 to 1) of each region’s pollution degree to that of the most seriously polluted region. Then the three indexes of each region are added together with the same weight (each index accounts for one third) to acquire the 152 liang shumin pollution Grading of agricultural heavy heavy heavy heavy heavy heavy heavy heavy light index Average Average index Fertilizer Fertilizer pollution index pollution Soil mulch Soil mulch index pollution Agricultural application Amount of fertilization fertilization rate coverage coverage Soil mulch Soil mulch pesticide amount of Table 9.1: Table of evaluation Comprehensive level agricultural pollution on the provincial China’s South ChinaNorth China FujianCentral China ShandongNorth China HunanSouth China BeijingCentral China GuangdongCentral China Zhejiang 20.4 39.3Central China Jiangsu 28.7Central China Shanghai 28.0North China Hubei 22.7 0.253 0.073 31.7 TianjinCentral China 0.129 19.2 Anhui 23.6 0.034 598.1 0.111 895.0Xinjiang 0.077 532.4 24.0 662.9North China 0.097 0.116 613.3 6.9 0.52 Xinjiang 466.8 1.00 HenanNorth China 14.8 0.083 0.73 699.2 538.5 0.71 HebeiSouth China 0.231 0.58 0.69 0.20 0.81 600.9 0.168 Hainan 3.1 0.35Central China 12.8 0.49 0.60 0.09 513.9 0.67 Jiangxi 1.00 0.30South China 0.21 483.8 0.59 11.7 0.61 0.368 0.62 0.74 Guangxi 0.73 0.26 0.110 0.32 0.69 21.3 heavy 6 Extremely 0.17 heavy 6 Extremely 0.56 0.52 0.51 5 Heavy 0.37 23.2 246.4 0.161 0.23 0.78 0.52 0.60 622.2 5 Heavy 0.51 5 Heavy 0.017 0.63 11.8 5 Heavy 0.51 0.67 449.1 0.51 0.46 0.039 0.08 5 Heavy 5 Heavy 0.32 0.57 561.3 0.50 0.057 0.54 431.9 5 Heavy 0.30 0.46 1.00 0.30 to 4 Moderate 0.54 453.0 0.46 to 4 Moderate 0.28 0.59 0.44 0.70 0.05 0.30 0.45 0.50 0.44 to 4 Moderate 0.11 to 4 Moderate 0.63 0.41 0.15 0.48 to 4 Moderate 0.40 to 4 Moderate 0.51 0.39 to 4 Moderate 0.32 to 3 Moderate Major regions Provinces Application agricultural pollution zoning 153 pollution e rate refers to e rate Grading of agricultural light light index Average Average index Fertilizer Fertilizer pollution index pollution Soil mulch Soil mulch index pollution Agricultural application Amount of fertilization fertilization rate coverage coverage Soil mulch Soil mulch 1.7 0.077 149.6 0.04 0.21 0.17 0.14 light 1 Extremely pesticide amount of Mongolia .) cont Major regions Provinces Application ofthe ratio land area. to arable area coverage soil mulch Table 9.1 ( Table Southwest Sichuan 9.2 0.116 356.3 0.23Note: Thethe amount of unit for pesticides and fertilizers applied is kilograms of per hectare coverag land; soil mulch arable 0.32 0.40 0.32 to 3 Moderate Southwest Southwest Northeast Liaoning ChongqingNortheast ShaanxiNorth ChinaNorth central Shanxi YunnanSouthwest 8.5 11.1 GansuNorth central 2.3Northeast NingxiaNorth central 0.118 0.050 Inner Jilin 4.8 5.1 Southwest 0.091 3.5Northeast 336.6 287.7Qinghai-Tibet Guizhou 1.6Qinghai-Tibet Qinghai 344.5 0.100 0.112 Heilongjiang Tibet 0.150 0.22 0.28 0.070 4.6 224.2 227.9 4.0 0.06 2.1 155.3 3.2 0.32 0.14 250.2 0.023 0.12 0.13 2.0 0.25 0.027 0.045 0.09 0.38 0.32 0.011Light 287.3 0.04 0.38 123.3 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.25 164.6 0.005Light 0.41 121.8 to 3 Moderate 2 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.12 2 110.8 0.10 0.17Light 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.22 0.06 2 2 Light 0.05 0.07 2 Light 0.12 0.17 0.03 light 1 Extremely 0.32 0.14 0.18 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.10 light 1 Extremely 0.12 0.12 light 1 Extremely 0.08 light 1 Extremely light 1 Extremely 0.06 light 1 Extremely 154 liang shumin average agricultural pollution index (0 to 1) of each major region. After that, the eight major regions are labeled with six grades of agricultural pollution with reference to their average indexes. The results of the evaluation are as follows: Qinghai-Tibet has extremely light pollution; Middle North and Northeast have light pollution; Southeast has moderate to light pollution; Xinjiang has moderate to heavy pollution; North China has heavy pollution; Central China and South China have extremely heavy pollution (Table 9.2 and Figure 9.1). This study monitors nine key indexes of agricultural pollution: methane emission of paddy fi elds, methane emission of big livestock and poultry, the amount of pesticides applied, the amount of chemical fertilizer applied, the amount of greenhouse mulch used, the amount of soil mulch used, freshwater aquaculture area, the amount of straw by-products and excrements produced. Based on the degree of agricultural pollution occurring per unit of arable land, fi ve indexes of Central China—methane emission of paddy fi elds, the amount of pesticides applied, the amount of chemical fertilizers applied, freshwater aquaculture area, and the amount of straw by-products—exceed the national average pollution level by over 20%. These statistics show that Central China is the most heavily polluted area nationwide. After that, South China ranks the second, with four indexes exceeding the average level, and North China ranks the third with three indexes. Based on the degree of agricultural pollution occurring per unit of land, Central China also ranks the fi rst, with all nine indexes exceeding the national average pollution level by more than 20%. In addition, North China ranks the second with eight exceeding indexes, and South China ranks the third with seven indexes. The nine indexes are an extension of the original three indexes mentioned above. The evaluation results (ranking of pollution degree), based on the nine indexes approximate tallies with that based on the original three indexes, proves that the simplifi ed evaluation method does not lose its accuracy and credibility.

V. Adopting Multiple Measures to Cope with Different Pollution Sources

Measures used to cope with urban and industrial pollution mainly consist of recycling and safe disposal of solid waste; reducing the pollution of soil caused by garbage dumps; strategically mapping out and controlling the emissions pattern of sulfur dioxide (SO2); moving the agricultural pollution zoning 155 pollution Grading of agricultural index Average Average pollution Soil index mulch pollution index fertilizer fertilizer pollution Chemical index Pesticide Pesticide pollution rate coverage coverage Soil mulch Soil mulch fertilizer fertilizer Chemical Amount of Application pesticide application Amount of Table 9.2: Table of evaluation Comprehensive major agriculturally in China polluted regions Major Regions Northeast 5.6 198 0.03 0.253 0.334 0.081 0.223 2 light 2 Qinghai-Tibet Northeast 5.6Middle North 0.223 Southwest 2.8Xinjiang0.081 North China 198 2.3South China Central China 1170.334 6 0.03 12 21.7 160 3.1 22.1 0.01 0.253 266 0.1 0.127 489 593 246 550 0.197 0.104 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.37 0.027 0.11 0.270 0.271 0.543 0.117 0.982 0.140 1.000 0.270 light 1 extremely 0.449 0.825 1.000 0.415 0.927 0.215 0.243 2 light 0.405 0.135 1.000 0.297 0.321 0.591 0.706 0.518 to light 3 moderate 0.742 5 serious Serious 6 extremely to serious 4 moderate Serious 6 extremely 156 liang shumin

W E 0.223 S 0.518

0.215

0.591

0.117

0.742 0.321

0.706

An Evaluation of Agricultural Pollution in the Eight Major Regions

1 2 3 4 5 6 National Sea Borders

0 400 800 Kilometers

Figure 9.1: Comprehensive evaluation of major regions of agricultural pollution in China agricultural pollution zoning 157

industries with high SO2 emissions in South China to two controlling areas in North and Northwest China, so as to reduce the damage to agricultural production bought by acid rain; adopting advanced wastewater treatment technologies to improve the treatment of urban and industrial wastewater; enhancing the effi ciency of water recycling; reducing wastewater drainage; adopting biological treatment measures to purify urban and industrial wastewater; building artifi cial wetland buffer zones; making use of purifying microorganisms, such as heterotrophic bacteria, photosynthetic bacteria, nitrifying bacteria, together with purifying plants, such as Water Hyacinth (Eichhornia crassipes), Phalaris arundinacea, and reed to purify wastewater; strengthening the monitoring of heavy metal pollution in the urban wastewater used to irrigate fi elds; and formulating standards of heavy metal control over wastewater irrigation to exert mandatory purifi cation on polluted wastewater or forbidding the use of polluted wastewater to irrigate, so as to effectively control the agricultural pollution brought by wastewater irrigation.3 Prevention of the agricultural pollution caused by pesticides should start with the source. In 2002, the No.199 Notice of China’s Ministry of Agriculture (中华人民共和国农业部公告第199号) released a list of the names of pesticides that were forbidden or should be used with restrictions on vegetables, fruit trees, tea, and plants of herbal medicine. Safety Controlling Methods of Agricultural Production Origins (农产品产地安全管理办法) has been in effect since November 1st, 2006. A series of rules and regulations on the production, use, and management of pesticides has been gradually improved. The key to pesticide pollution control is to monitor and supervise the implementation of relevant rules and regulations. The strengthening of pesticide pollution monitoring and examination can help eliminate any harm done in the process of agricultural production. By training farmers to improve their production skills, the effi ciency of pesticide use will be raised, the use of pesticides will be reduced, and green agricultural production can be developed. With certifi cation of organic agricultural products, the market of organic agricultural products can be actively constructed to ensure that high quality products will be sold at a good price. In addition, organic

3 Wang, Shengrui et al. “Choice of Plants in Artiﬁ cial Wetlands,” Lake Science 16(1), 2004, pp. 91–96. 158 liang shumin agricultural production with biological treatment, instead of pesticides, should be encouraged so as to eradicate pesticide pollution. The following is a list of actions to be taken in order to prevent and control agricultural pollution based on source:

A. Chemical Fertilizers The crucial step is to promote soil-testing and fertilizer recommendations nationwide, so as to improve the effectiveness of fertilizer use and reduce the amount of fertilizer used in fi elds. Nitrogen ranks fi rst in the amount of chemical fertilizers used in China. To balance fertilization, the farmers should reduce the use of nitrogen fertilizer and increase the use of phosphate and potassium fertilizer. A composite of micronutrient fertilizers with reference to the crops’ needs should also be chosen. Organic fertilizer is an effective alternative to chemical fertilizer, which resolves the problem of excrement contamination and air pollution brought about by straw incineration. The development of agricultural mechanization will greatly boost the adoption of straw returning to the fi eld. The government can encourage farmers to store and use organic fertilizer by offering subsidies. In addition, promoting green manure crops can help reduce the amount of chemical fertilizers applied, hence, reducing agricultural pollution brought about by chemical fertilizer.

B. Livestock and Poultry Excrement With the increase of large-scale livestock breeding and the decrease of scatter-feed domestic livestock, excrement pollution has gradually evolved from non-point sources to point sources in distribution. Treatment of excrement on large-scale livestock and poultry farms has become the key issue in the prevention and reduction of excrement pollution. The major measures consist of: developing marsh gas; reducing the pollution of ground water, surface water, and air caused by excrement dumping and overfl ow; appropriately controlling the scale of livestock and poultry breeding; wisely planning the layout of large livestock and poultry farms, so that each farm has enough fi elds nearby to treat the excrement and avoids the increase of costs due to long-distance transportation of organic fertilizers. Additionally, artifi - cial wetlands can be built near the pollutant outlets to purify wastewater with aquatic or wetland plants. agricultural pollution zoning 159

C. Aquaculture Conventional base-pond aquaculture should be encouraged, such as the mulberry-based fi shponds in the Yangtze River Delta and the sugarcane-based fi shponds in the Pearl River Delta. A base-pond is an isolated and ecological way of agricultural production. The waste from aquaculture will be cleared up by the pond itself and will not drain elsewhere.4 Purifying aquatic plants and microorganisms, such as heterotrophic bacteria, photosynthetic bacteria, and nitrifying bacteria, can purify the water used for aquaculture.5,6 At the same time, it is recommended that fi sh, shrimp, and shellfi sh be raised together so as to improve the water’s self-purifi cation capabilities and achieve ecological aquaculture.

D. Residual Mulch Soil mulch can adjust the water and temperature conditions of soil and control weeds. Therefore, it still has great potential for future use. A survey among farmers shows that greenhouse mulch can be used for a long period and recycled easily, so it is not the main source of mulch pollution. The main source is soil mulch. Since the income of Chinese farmers is low and the mulch is sold by weight, some producers of soil mulch purposely reduce the thickness (mostly under the national standard of 8 microns) to attract poor farmers, making it extremely difﬁ cult to recycle the mulch. This leads to great damage to the soil, as well as the economy. Therefore, the key issue here is to develop cheap and recyclable mulch. Currently, degradable mulch used domestically and abroad include: photo-degradation soil mulch, photo-bio-degradation soil mulch, and bio-degradation soil mulch. Developing bio-degradation mulch with a controllable degradation period and low cost by adopting natural polymers, synthesized polymers, or a combination is the ultimate trend in dealing with soil mulch pollution in China.

4 Ding, Jianghua, “The Infl uence of Base-Ponds on Nitrogen and Phosphorus,” The Environmental Problems of and Solutions to Intensifi ed Agriculture, China Agricultural Science and Technology Press, 2001, pp. 223–227. 5 Cao, Liye, “Aquaculture Pollution and Measures of Prevention and Reduction,” The Environmental Problems of and Solutions to Intensifi ed Agriculture, China Agricultural Sci- ence and Technology Press, 2001, pp. 213–217. 6 Dong, Keyu, “A Study of the Purifi cation Capability of the Wastewater Purifi - cation Floating System Composed by Different Plants,” Beijing Agricultural Science, 5, 2001, pp. 18–21. 160 liang shumin

E. Straw Crop First of all, the incineration of straw should be banned nationwide, so as to prevent smoke and ash pollution in the rural areas. Straw can be used in multiple ways. For instance, it can be used as raw materials for paper making, livestock fodder and poultry feed, base materials for edible fungi production, or domestic fuels in rural areas. Straw can also be used to produce organic fertilizers, marsh gas, or biological gas after gasiﬁ cation, or returned to the soil directly as fertilizer. Straw should be synthetically used as a valuable resource based on the characteristics of local crops and the plantation system. MARINE POLLUTION IN CHINA: A GLOOMY OUTLOOK

Yu Chen

China’s State Oceanic Administration has been stepping up actions against marine pollution in recent years with tougher policies. As a result, the marine environment has slightly improved. Nevertheless, new problems have emerged, such as a wave of new development along the coastline in northern China, a strip of chemical industry parks along the coastline in Eastern China, and the discharge of pollutants into the seas. This is in addition to the multi-year existing environmental problems that have yet to be solved, such as red tides and the environmental problems caused by the aquaculture industry in the Bohai Sea. Moreover, several incidents related to the marine environment, a massive green algae bloom (Enteromorpha prolifera) in Qingdao as a typical example, occurred in 2008. Therefore, marine environment protection remains a challenging task.

Key words: marine environment, pollution, new development areas

I. Major Incidents of Marine Pollution in 2008

A. Massive Green Algae Bloom Off of Qingdao’s Coast Based on aerial images from the North Sea Branch of the State Oceanic Administration (国家海洋局北海分局) and reports from ﬁ sh- ermen who were on the sea on May 31st, 2008, a large amount of algae appeared on the water about 60 nautical miles east of Dagong Island, Qingdao (青岛市大公岛). The Qingdao municipal government assigned technical personnel to track down and monitor the algae. After a preliminary test, the algae that had drifted in were identiﬁ ed as Enteromorpha prolifera. According to surveillance results from satellite remote sensing, the aggregated Enteromorpha prolifera came from the central waters of the Yellow Sea. It affected an area of about 13,000 square kilometers. The actual coverage of the algae was about 400 square kilometers, mainly concentrated in the offshore waters of Laoshan (崂山) in Qing- dao, an area of about 160 square kilometers. Large areas of algae 162 yu chen entered the coastal waters of Qingdao in the middle of June 2008, turning the blue sea near Qingdao completely green.1 Enteromorpha prolifera appeared once in Qingdao in 2007. However, this time it attracted special attention from all over the world because Qingdao, a well-know coastal city in China, was to be the venue for the 2008 Olympic sailing competition. Prior to 2007, Enteromorpha prolifera had never appeared in Qingdao. Marine experts point out that the causes of this bloom are as follows: (1) Jiaozhou Bay (胶州湾) is adjacent to land on three sides, so the sea water has little mobility. Furthermore, there are many factories, shipyards, tourist boats, and oil pipelines around Jiaozhou Bay, resulting in a great quantity of pollution. (2) Due to global warming and the approach of the summer season, the temperature of the sea water is rising. (3) Domestic garbage is freely discarded into the sea as a result of the uncivilized behavior of some residents. (4) The use of sea water aquaculture feed is out of control, also contributing to the rapid proliferation of Enteromorpha prolifera. (5) Torrential rains in the south bring the heavy pollution of the inland rivers and lakes into the sea, where the water is also eutrophic. It, thus, provides a favorable environment for the propaga- tion of algae.

B. Crude Oil Pollution Incidents An oil spillage was found on Weizhou Island of Beihai City (北海市涠洲岛), Guangxi Province on August 16th, 2008. A considerable number of oil stains appeared along the coast around the island. The relevant departments suspected that the pollution might have been caused by the leakage of crude oil. On September 17th, aquaculture shellfi sh and fi sh died in large quantities in the waters west of Guan- touling Bay (冠头岭), Beihai City. The pollution caused great damage to marine fi shery resources in the city. According to preliminary statistics, the marine fi shery of the city suffered a total economic loss of nearly 20 million RMB.2

1 Liu Baosen and Li Zihuan, “Enteromorpha Prolifera Covering an Area of 400 Square Kilometers, Tens of Thousands of People in Qingdao Working to Clear It,” Xinhua Net, http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2008–06/29/content_8460137.htm (accessed June 29th, 2008). 2 Deng Lin and Feng Shumin, “The Oil Stain Incident in Beihai City of Guangxi Province Is Suspected to Be Caused by Crude Oil Leakage,” China News Service, http:// marine pollution in china 163

It is reported that since the 1980s, the number of offshore oil spill incidents in China has been on the rise. Data show that from 1976 to 2000, 2353 oil pollution accidents from ships occurred in China’s coastal waters, 54 of which were major ship pollution accidents of more than 50 tons of oil. The total oil spill volume was about 30,000 tons. However, in the year 2006 alone, 124 oil pollution accidents from ships occurred in China’s coastal areas, with a total oil spill volume of 1216 tons. Of these 124 incidents, fi ve were over 50 tons of oil or chemical pollution. In 2006, a total of 89 marine fi shery water pollution accidents occurred nationwide, contaminating an area of about 69,000 hectares and causing an immediate economic loss of 3.065 billion RMB. Among them, eight accidents were major fi shery pollution accidents with an economic loss of over 10 million RMB.3

II. China’s Current Marine Pollution Situation

According to the Bulletin of Marine Environmental Quality of China in 2007 (2007 年中国海洋环境质量公报), released by the State Oceanic Administration, the overall marine pollution in China was still grim despite a slight improvement in the water quality of offshore marine areas compared with 2006. The outlets where the discharge of pollutants exceeds the state standards take up 87%, some of which face serious environmental pollution in adjacent sea areas. The total amount of pollutants carried by rivers into the sea continued to increase. The degradation of ecological health in offshore marine areas had not been effectively alleviated. Most of the ecosystems like gulfs, estuar- ies, and coastal wetlands were still in sub-healthy or unhealthy states, with problems such as water eutrophication, imbalances of nitrogen and phosphorus, environmental pollution, habitat loss or transference, degradation of estuarial spawn sites, and irregular biogenesis.4 The overall situation of China’s offshore marine areas is still severe. The discharge of industrial and municipal sewage in large quantities www.chinanews.com.cn/sh/news/2008/09–27/1397457.shtml (accessed on Septem- ber 27th, 2008). 3 Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China, “Bul- letin of China’s Offshore Sea Environmental Quality, 2006,” http://www.mep.gov .cn/tech/hjjc/jcxx/jagb/2006jah/ (accessed on March 26th, 2007). 4 State Oceanic Administration “Bulletin of Marine Environmental Quality of China, 2007,” http://www.coi.gov.cn/hygb/hjzl/2007/ (accessed in January 2008). 164 yu chen into the sea has caused great impacts on the adjacent sea areas around the outlets. In 2007, the sea areas bordering monitored outlets were 940 square kilometers, 530 square kilometer of which was Level IV or worse than Level IV in water quality.5 The total amount of major pollutants discharged from outlets was about 12.19 million tons, of which the tested chemical oxygen demand using potassium dichromate K2Cr2O7 as an oxidant (CODCr) was 5.39 million tons, accounting for 44.2% of the total major pollutant discharge. Suspended solids were 6.52 million tons. Ammonia nitrogen was 160,000 tons. Phosphate was 17,000 tons. Oil was 3000 tons. Heavy metals were 6000 tons and volatile phenol, cyanide, aniline, nitrobenzene, and sulﬁ de together were 6000 tons. Around 14.5% of the pollutants were discharged into the Bohai Sea, 52.5% into the Yel- low Sea, 13.8% into the East China Sea, and 19.2% into the South China Sea. By the end of 2007, the sea areas that failed to reach the clean water standards took up about 145,000 square kilometers. The polluted areas were mainly distributed in Liaodong Bay (辽东湾), Bohai Bay, the Yellow River estuary, Laizhou Bay (莱州湾), the Yangtze River estuary, Hangzhou Bay, the Pearl River estuary, and partial offshore areas in some big and medium-sized cities. The main pollutants were inorganic nitrogen, active phosphate, and oil. In 2007 there were 82 red tides in China, affecting an area of 11,610 square kilometers. Although compared with the previous year the number and size of red tides decreased, they are still in a high frequency period. The red tide prone areas are mainly concentrated in the East China Sea. Partial beach areas of the Bohai Sea have been severely intruded by sea water.

A. Pollution in the Bohai Sea The Bohai Sea is the Yellow Sea’s innermost gulf. Its eastern part is conterminous with the sea areas of North and South Korean. In recent years, increased pollution in the Bohai Sea has aroused the concern of neighboring countries. South Korean media once gave its pollution problem wide coverage under the headings of “China’s Bohai

5 Ibid. marine pollution in china 165

Sea—Connected with South Korea’s West Sea—Is Severely Polluted” and “The Bohai Bay Is a Dead Sea.”6 South Korean media quoted the research fi ndings announced by Gao Zhiguo, a delegate to the National People’s Congress, that the Bohai Sea has become the most polluted sea in China. Every year large quantities of hazardous waste and solid garbage are discharged into the Bohai Sea, which leads to the partial destruction of the Bohai Sea’s marine ecosystem, depletion of fi shery resources, and frequent occurrences of marine environmental disasters like red tide and oil spills. The marine ecosystem of the Bohai Sea is almost ruinously destructed. Many fi sh have nearly disappeared, such as the fl atfi sh, the yellow croaker, and the cuttlefi sh. The area of sea that fails to reach the clean water standards are about 24,000 square kilometers, taking up 31% of the entire Bohai Sea area. This is an increase of around 4,000 square kilometers compared to 2006. Seriously polluted, medium-polluted, lightly polluted, and relatively clean marine areas are 6,000, 5,000, 6,000, and 7,000 square kilometers, respectively. Seriously polluted and medium-polluted marine areas both increased by around 3,000 square kilometers compared with the previous year. Seriously polluted marine areas are mainly concentrated in the offshore areas of Liaodong Bay, Bohai Bay, Laizhou Bay, and the mouth of the Yellow River. A change to the Bohai Sea’s basic hydrological conditions cannot be neglected. The Bohai Sea is a shallow sea, dominated by three major rivers, the Liaohe River, the Haihe River, and the Yellow River, which together have formed the unique natural environment of the Bohai Sea in the process of natural evolution. The Bohai Sea is basically the hatchery and nursery ground for the commercial fi sh of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. However, due to a variety of man-made reasons, less freshwater fl ows from the three rivers into the Bohai Sea. This has resulted in an increased salinity of the Bohai Sea, major changes in natural systems, and impacts on the spawning, migration, and nursery of the fi sh and the shrimp. Ecological problems in the Bohai Sea fi rst appeared at the end of the 1970s and were formed in the mid 1990s. Experts point out

6 Gan Yulan, “South Korea Worrying about the Impact of the Pollution of the Bohai Sea on its Own Country,” International Herald Leader, March 20th, 2007. 166 yu chen that its pollution is getting much more serious, to the degree that it may become a “Dead Sea” in a short time if there is no timely treatment. The Bohai Sea only takes up 2.6% of China’s total sea area, but receives 40% of the direct discharged sewage from the country every year.

B. The Environmental Conditions of the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea The areas of the Yellow Sea that fail to meet the clean water quality standards are about 28,000 square kilometers, which is a reduction of about 15,000 square kilometers from 2006. Seriously polluted, medium-polluted, lightly polluted, and relatively clean marine areas are respectively 3,000, 4,000, 12,000, and 9,000 square kilometers. Seriously polluted marine areas have decreased sharply compared with 2006. The seriously polluted marine areas of the Yellow Sea are mainly concentrated in the mouth of the Yalu River (鸭绿江), the Dalian Bay, and the coast of Northern Jiangsu Province. The main pollutants are inorganic nitrogen, active phosphate, and oil. The offshore marine areas of the Yellow Sea near Jiangsu Province face environmental degradation. The areas of sea that fail to reach the clean water standards are about 17,800 square kilometers, taking up 47.5% of the overall provincial sea areas. It rose by around 4,270 square kilometers compared with 2006. Relatively clean, lightly polluted, medium-polluted, and seriously polluted marine areas are 2,490, 11,190, 2,960, and 1,160 square kilometers, respectively. The seriously polluted marine areas are mainly concentrated from the northern coast to the adjacent sea areas of Haizhou Bay.7 The sea area of Lianyungang City (连云港) has the highest content of inorganic nitrogen among the offshore marine areas in Jiangsu Province. The quality of sea water there is worse than Level IV, which is seriously polluted, and the sea water quality in Yancheng City (盐城) is worse than Level III, which is medium-polluted. There has been a signiﬁ cant increase in inorganic nitrogen content in the marine areas of Lianyungang.8

7 The State Oceanic Administration, “Bulletin of Marine Environmental Quality of Jiangsu Province, 2007,” http://www.soa.gov.cn/hyjww/hygb/yhsshyhjzlgb/yearlq/ webinfo/2008/09/1218785755024865.htm (accessed on September 1st, 2008). 8 The State Oceanic Administration, “Bulletin of Marine Environmental Quality of Jiangsu Province, 2007,” http://www.soa.gov.cn/hyjww/hygb/yhsshyhjzlgb/yearlq/ webinfo/2008/09/1218785755024865.htm (accessed on September 1st, 2008). marine pollution in china 167

The areas of the East China Sea that fail to reach the clean water standards are about 71,000 square kilometers, an increase of around 4000 square kilometers compared to 2006. Seriously polluted, medium- polluted, lightly polluted, and relatively clean marine areas are 17,000, 6,000, 26,000, and 22,000 square kilometers, respectively. Seriously polluted and lightly polluted marine areas both increased compared with 2006. Seriously polluted marine areas are mainly concentrated in the Yangtze River estuary, Hangzhou Bay, Zhoushan Islands (舟山群岛), Xiangshan Harbor (象山港), the Minjiang River estuary (闽江口), and the coastal waters of Xiamen City (厦门), Fujian Province. The main pollutants are also inorganic nitrogen, active phosphate, and oil. The Regional Bureau of the East China Sea Fishery Management under the Ministry of Agriculture (农业部东海区渔政渔港监督管理局) claims that about fi ve million batteries from the fi shing industry are dumped into the East China Sea yearly. Those batteries are continuously eroding, and the metals contained within are gradually dissolving, causing great harm to the marine environment. The Regional Bureau commissioned the East China Sea Fishery Research Institute (海水产研究所) to conduct research on the impacts of the batteries’ pollution on the fi shing industry. The aim was to detect the heavy metals being emitted from the batteries, the toxic- ity of the leachate to organisms in the sea, and the amount of heavy metal residue remaining in the organisms. The results of the experiments show that the total amount of metals leached from one battery is enough to lead to the acute deaths of 50% of the organisms in the polluted body of water.

C. Coastal Environment of South China It is reported that 350 million people live in the coastal areas of the South China Sea. The areas of sea that fail to reach the clean water standards are about 22,000 square kilometers, which is an increase of 4,000 square kilometers from 2006. Seriously polluted, medium-polluted, lightly polluted, and relatively clean marine areas are 4,000, 2,000, 4,000, and 12,000 square kilometers, respectively. Seriously polluted marine areas have increased by 2,000 square kilometers compared with the previous year. The seriously polluted marine areas are mainly concentrated in the Pearl River estuary. The main pollutants are inorganic. The offshore marine areas of Guangdong Province that failed to reach the clean water standards are about 20,770 square kilometers, 168 yu chen the same as the previous year. Relatively clean, lightly polluted, medium-polluted, and seriously polluted marine areas are, corre- spondingly, 11,460, 3,570, 2,100, and 3,640 square kilometers. Seri- ously polluted marine areas have increased by 1,930 square kilometers compared with the year before. The seriously polluted marine areas are mainly concentrated in the Pearl River estuary and the sea port of Zhanjiang City (湛江港), with the main pollutants being inorganic nitrogen, active phosphate, and oil. The offshore marine areas of Guangxi Province that fail to reach the clean water standards are about 880 square kilometers, which is a decrease of 1500 square kilometers compared to 2006. Relatively clean marine areas are about 820 square kilometers, taking up 93.2% of the overall areas of sea. Contaminated areas are mainly distributed in partial coasts of Fangcheng Harbor (防城港) and Qinzhou Bay (钦州湾). The main pollutants are inorganic nitrogen and petroleum. The overall water quality of the offshore marine areas in Hainan Province maintains a good level. The sea areas that fail to reach the clean water standards are about 160 square kilometers, which is a decrease of 60 square kilometers compared with the previous year. Marine scientists warn that over-fi shing, habitat loss, and land-based pollution are the main factors that damage the marine environment of the South China Sea. The United Nations (UN) believes that in a decade this area has lost 16% of its coral reefs and coastal mangrove forests and 30% of the sea grass. The American Associated Press reports that due to private and industrial deep-sea trawling, the fi sh resources of the South China Sea—which millions of people depend on—will face the danger of depletion. Vo Si Tuan, the Vietnamese representative for the “South China” project of the United Nations Environment Programme said, “In the sphere of ocean basins, habitat degradation, habitat loss, over-fi shing, and land-based pollution are the key issues.”

D. Sources and Classiﬁ cation of Marine Pollution

1. Land-Based Contaminants The land-based pollutants that rivers discharge into the sea are mainly industrial and agricultural wastewater. Industrial wastewater generally contains acid and alkaline waste, coal ash, and metal components. This pollutes groundwater, lakes, rivers, oceans, and seriously threatens marine pollution in china 169 the ecological environment. In 2007, China’s total discharge of sewage was up to 35.9 billion tons. Chemical fertilizers and pesticides used on coastal farmlands also affect the marine environment. The excessive inﬂ ux of nutrients leads to phytoplankton. This subsequently causes oxygen deﬁ ciencies which will eventually turn the sea into a “dead zone” where marine organisms cannot survive. The herbicides and insecticides widely used in agriculture that contain mercury, copper, and organic chlorine, as well as the highly toxic pesticides applied in industry, like PCBs, accumulate in marine life.

2. Maritime Production Pollution Maritime oil exploration, mining, shipping, and collision accidents all result in severe oil pollution. Every month, China’s marine monitoring agencies report oil pollution incidents. Rubbish on beaches, waste washed by rain into the sea, ships, fi shing boats, drilling oil wells, abandoned fi shing nets, daily necessities, and plastics all have great impacts on the marine ecology. In sum, the main marine pollutants are petroleum and petroleum products, metals, acid, alkaline, radioactive substances, organic pollutants, sewage, thermal pollution, and solid waste. Many of the above contaminants can concentrate in organisms and then transfer through the food chain by the effect of bio-magnifi cation, producing great toxic effects on the human body.

III. The Impact on the Marine Environment from “New Area” Development along the Coast

The development of the Bohai Sea Rim, as represented by the Tian- jin Binhai New Area (天津滨海新区), will create huge new urban communities around the Bohai Sea. New areas around the Bohai Sea under development by various provinces and cities at present are as follows: the Binhai New Area in Tianjin; the Beihai New Area in Binzhou, Shandong Province (山东滨州北海新区); the Yellow River Delta Economic Development Zone in Dongying (东营黄河三角洲经济开发区); the Laizhou Bay Development Zone (莱州湾开发区); and the Binhai New Area in Weifang, Shangdong Province (潍坊滨海新区). The new areas of development in Liaoning Province include the Changxing Island Industrial Zone (长兴岛临港工业区), the 170 yu chen

Yingkou Coastal Industrial Base (营口沿海产业基地), the Jinzhou Bay Economic Zone in Liaoxi (辽西锦州湾经济区), and the Hua- yuankou Industrial Park in Dalian (大连花园口工业园区). Those in Hebei Province include the Caofeidian Industrial Zone in Tangshan (唐山曹妃甸工业区) and the New Bohai Sea Area in Cangzhou (沧州渤海新区). All the new areas and development zones stretch several hundred kilometers around the Bohai Sea. Looking at what is currently under construction, the large-scale industries, heavy industries, and high polluting industries around the Bohai Sea the surrounding provinces and cities. The new areas also function as cities that will become densely populated areas in the future. Municipal pollution brought by the population pressure will defi nitely affect the sea. The Tianjin Binhai New Area, with a planned area of 2,270 square kilometers, is located in the center of the circum-Bohai Sea region. It includes the Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (天津经济技术开发区), Tianjin Port Free Trade Zone (天津港保税区), Tianjin Port (天津港区), parts of Dongli District (东丽区) and Jinnan District (津南区), and three administrative regions, namely, the Tanggu District (塘沽区), Hangu District (汉沽区), and Dagang District (大港区).9 The New Bohai Area—with Huanghua Port (黄骅港) at its center— in Hebei Province is affi liated with Cangzhou City. Crossing over the Dakou River (大口河), it connects with the Lubei Hi-Tech Develop- ment Zone in Shandong Province (山东省鲁北高新开发区) through the Bohai Bridge. The New Bohai Area, which used to be the Huan- ghua Port Development Zone, was approved to be set up by Hebei Province on July 20th, 2007. The new area possesses a total area of 8.3 million square kilometers, with a coastline of 130 kilometers. Caofeidian Industrial Zone of Hebei Province is affi liated with Tangshan City. In 2007, the National Development and Reform Com- mission authorized and submitted to the State Council for approval the establishment of Caofeidian as an industrial clustering city with four major functions: as an international port for the gathering and distributing of raw energy materials in the North of China; as a

9 General Ofﬁ ce of the State Council, “The State Council on the Development of Tianjin Binhai New Area (State (2006)20),” the Ofﬁ cial Website of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2006–06/05/content_300640.htm (accessed on June 5th, 2006). marine pollution in china 171 world-class base for the heavy chemical industry; as a national reserve and deployment center of energy for commercial use; and as a national demonstration zone for a circular economy. In the future, Caofeidian will become a major industrial port covering an area of more than 300 square kilometers.10 The Binzhou Beihai New Area in Shandong Province is located in the northernmost part of the province and the southwestern coast of the Bohai Bay. It has a coastline of 180 kilometers with a total area of 1200 square kilometers. With a population of 46,000, it is one of the coastal regions with the most land per capita. In addition, other large-scale new areas and development zones around the rim of the Bohai Sea are also under intensive construction. It is foreseeable that in the next decade the area around the Bohai Sea will see urban communities closely linked to each other with densely extending heavy industries, which will inevitably impact the Bohai Sea.

A. Direct Pollution by Iron, Steel, and Petrochemical Enterprises Hebei Province plans to reduce their steel production capacity from 120 million tons at the end of 2007 to 80 million tons by 2020. The layout of their industry will be gradually transferred to Caofeidian, Jingtang Port (京唐港), and Huanghua Port. Caofeidian Zone, Hebei New Bohai Sea Area, Shandong Beihai New Area, and Binhai New Area have all planned a large number of petrochemical enterprises, some of which have already been put into production. This will inevitably result in direct pollution to the Bohai Sea.

B. Land Reclamation Will Cause Decrease in the Size of Bohai Sea Caofeidian Industrial Zone is formed mainly by land reclaimed from the Bohai Sea. By the year 2020, 310 square kilometers of land reclamation projects will be completed. Large-scale land reclamation is bound to affect the marine biological environment. No department has

10 National Development and Reform Commission, “The Overall Planning of Caofeidian Industrial Zone as a Demonstration Zone for Circular Economy,” July 2007. 172 yu chen so far assessed the impacts of projects like long-term sand-blowing and long-haul transportation of stones on the marine environment.

C. The Disappearance of Large Areas of Wetlands The fact that almost all the new area development projects around the Bohai Sea are able to obtain the status of national projects is due to the coastal wetlands, tidal ﬂ ats, and saline-alkali soil in those areas. Those types of lands are considered cheap, and, thus, can be occupied and used. But these actions will result in the loss of kilometers of natural buffer zones between the inland and the ocean. Wetlands enjoy the reputation of “the lung of the earth.” The disappearance of large areas of wetlands around Bohai Bay will not only have an impact on the marine environment, but also affect the climate and environment in North China. The construction of the Bohai Economic Rim has been identiﬁ ed, after the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta, as the future economic development engine for China. However, keeping the balance between the protection of the marine environment and economic development will be a new issue for policy-makers.

IV. The Pollution of the Coastline by the Chemical Industrial Cluster

As early as a few years ago, Dalian City in Liaoning Province proposed to build China’s largest oil processing and petrochemical products deep processing base over the next ten years. Tianjin planned to construct the Binhai Chemical Zone with an area of 50 square kilometers.11 In recent years, from Dalian City in the North to Guangxi Province in the South, there has been a craze for petrochemical development in the coastal provinces and regions. The petrochemical giant projects led by oil reﬁ ning and ethylene production can be seen everywhere, with extremely rapid development momentum. According to incomplete statistics, large-scale petrochemical projects completed and under construction include: the Dalian Petrochemical Project (大连石化) with a

11 Chu Guoqiang, Fu Piyi, and Guo Jiaxuan, “With the Concept of Offi cial Achievement, Large Petroleum Refi ning Projects Boom,” Economic Information Daily, November 21st, 2005. marine pollution in china 173 refi ning capacity of ten million tons per year at present; the integration project of a ten million ton oil refi nery in Dalian; 100 tons of ethylene production in Dalian; Tianjin City with an 11.5 million ton per year oil refi nery project; Sinopec with a 12.5 million ton refi nery project and a one million ton ethylene project in Tianjin; the fi rst part of the ten million ton oil refi nery project in Qingdao; a ten million ton oil refi nery project and a 1.2 million ton ethylene production project in Jiangsu; an 18 million ton oil refi nery expansion project and a two million ton ethylene production project in Shanghai; Zhenhai with a 20 million ton oil refi nery expansion project; and Formosa Plastic Corpo- ration in Ningbo with a ten million ton oil refi nery and 1.2 million ton ethylene project. The oil refi ning capacity of Guangdong will be raised to 63 million tons; the Beihai and Qinzhou projects in Guangxi will have an oil refi nery capacity of 18 million tons. Along the coastline, the number of oil refi nery projects with a capacity of over ten million tons is nearly 20 and the number of ethylene production projects with a capacity of over one million tons is close to ten. Besides these large-scale petrochemical projects, the layout of the numerous chemical industrial parks and chemical industry zones by the coastal provinces and cities along the coastline is shocking. With the transfer of industry, the high polluting industries—such as chemical industries which have been refused by the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta regions—have now been accepted by regions like Northern Jiangsu and Northern Shandong. With Lianyungang and Yancheng in the Northern Jiangsu Province as the center, stretch- ing to Liaoning Province in the North, and to Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi provinces in the South, continuous intensive industrial zones and tens of thousands of large and small chemical plants, form a chain along the coastline. Sewage produced by the chemical plants is mostly discharged into the sea without any treatment. Waste gases pollute the air in the local region, and a large number of beaches and wetlands have disappeared. In addition, the discharge of waste liquid by the nuclear plants and the nuclear radiation from the operation of the nuclear power plants built near the sea exert potential and long-term impacts. In recent years, China has invested in ongoing construction of nuclear power plants. Currently, China has eleven generating units from four nuclear power plants in operation. In December 2008, the construction of another three coastal nuclear power plants is scheduled to start. 174 yu chen

According to China’s long-term plan, 40 sets of nuclear power generating units will be built by the year 2020. China’s rapid economic growth over the past years has depended on the quick economic development of coastal areas. Along with economic prosperity, China’s marine environment has been seriously polluted, with the occurrence of a series of severe environmental incidents. Will future economic growth still be achieved at the expense of the marine environment? This question is worthy of consideration. Seen from the layout of the current development, the local governments have not paid enough attention to the destruction of the marine environment, and in fact, the plundering of the seas has intensiﬁ ed. This model of development, with no concern for the future, will surely bring more environmental risks and become a harmful root cause for the endangerment of public health. A TURNING POINT IN CHINA’S ENERGY CONSERVATION AND EMISSIONS REDUCTION?

Qie Jianrong

In 2008, a key year for energy conservation and emissions reduction, China was faced with both opportunities and challenges in an effort to make efﬁ cient use of energy and reduce pollution. By analyzing the current state of energy conservation and emissions reduction in China, this paper argues that there is still enormous pressure for meeting the targets set for both, and the so-called turning point is still a long way off. Precau- tions should be taken to prevent the falsiﬁ cation of statistics and explores the prospects for energy conservation and emissions reduction in a time of economic crisis.

Key words: energy conservation, emissions reduction, economic crisis, turning point, target

The year 2008 is the third year of China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan and a key year for energy conservation and emissions reduction. In March of 2008, it was announced at the First Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress (NPC) and the First Session of the Elev- enth Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) that for the fi rst time ever, there was a simultaneous reduction in China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP and the two indicators of main pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD). In September, China’s Ministry of Environmental Protec- tion (MEP), National Development and Reform Commission, and National Bureau of Statistics issued their respective reports on key environmental indexes, all confi rming a downward trend in China’s energy consumption and emission of pollutants. Consequently, some optimists believed that a turning point had appeared in China’s effort to control energy consumption and emission of pollution. However, the fi nancial crisis that engulfed the world in 2008 has had grave consequences in China as well, adding uncertainties to an already tough environmental situation. In December, the MEP estimated that even if the targets set in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan were accomplished and the emission of main pollutants was reduced by 10%, these emissions would still exceed the capacity of the environment. With the uncertainties brought about by the fi nancial crisis and the diffi culties in further reducing the emission of major pollutants, it remains to be 176 qie jianrong seen if China can really meet the targets set by its Eleventh Five-Year Plan without the falsifi cation of statistics.

I. Simultaneous Reduction in China’s Energy Consumption and Major Pollutants

In 2005, China did not accomplish its goal—set during the Tenth

Five-Year Plan—to reduce the emissions of SO2 and COD by 10% of the previous ﬁ ve-year plan’s level. However, this did not prevent the central government from releasing even stricter inspection and evaluation measures. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan stipulates clearly that by 2010 energy consumption per unit of GDP should be reduced by 20% and the emission of main pollutants by 10%. Meanwhile, it is emphasized that both indicators are binding and have equal force with the law.

A. Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction in 2007 In 2006, the fi rst year of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, efforts at energy conservation and emissions reduction were met with formidable challenges. Both energy consumption per unit of GDP, which decreased by a mere 1.23%, and emissions of SO2 and COD, which increased by 1.8% and 1.2% respectively, failed to reach the yearly reduction goal previously set. Such a discouraging start set the media, governmental agencies, and NPC refl ecting on the possible causes of the problem. This refl ection led to the formation of a State Council steering group for energy conservation and emissions reduction headed by Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) at an April 25th executive meeting. With the establishment of a target system for energy conservation and emissions reduction, a monitoring system, an evaluation system for policy implementation, and an accountability system for meeting targets, hopes were high that the situation would improve. In his Report on the Work of the Government (政府工作报告) delivered at the First Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress on March 5th, 2008, Premier Wen Jiabao announced that the goals set in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan—a 20% reduction in energy consumption per unit of GDP and a 10% reduction in the emission of main pollutants—had, for the fi rst time ever, been simultaneously met. Compared a turning point in china’s energy conservation 177 with 2006, there was a 3.27% drop in energy consumption per unit of GDP, a 3.14% reduction in the total discharge of COD, and a 4.66% 1 reduction of SO2 emissions.

B. Further Drop in Energy Consumption and Pollutant Emissions in the First Half of 2008 On September 24th, 2008, China’s Ministry of Environmental Pro- tection, National Bureau of Statistics, and National Development and Reform Commission jointly issued the Communiqué on the Emis- sion of Primary Pollutants for the First Half of 2008 (2008 年上半年各省自治区直辖市主要污染物排放量指标公报). According to calculations, the total emission of major pollutants in China’s provinces, autonomous regions, and municipal cities was 6,742,000 tons of COD and 12,133,000 tons of SO2. This represented a 2.48% drop from the 6,913,000 tons of COD emissions and a 3.96% drop from the

12,634,000 tons of SO2 emissions from the same time period of the previous year.2 Before releasing the joint communiqué on emission reduction, these three agencies had also issued the Communiqué on National Energy Con- sumption per Unit of GDP in the First Half of 2008 (2008 上半年全国单位国内生产总值能耗等指标公报). According to this announcement, China’s national energy consumption per unit of GDP was reduced by 2.88% compared with the same period of the previous year. Both communiqués conveyed the same message: the phased goals set in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan had been achieved by the ﬁ rst half of 2008.

II. Pressure for Reaching Targets Still High

Due to the encouraging statistics released by the various agencies, some optimists believe that the turning point in energy conservation and emissions reduction has appeared. However, this assumption has been

1 An Bei, Zhou Yingfeng, and Wang Youling, “Interpreting Report on the Work of the Government: An Important Turning Point for Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction,” Xinhuanet, March 6th, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008- 03/06/content_7731567.htm. 2 Ministry of Environmental Protection, National Bureau of Statistics, and National Development and Reform Commission, “Communiqué on Main Pollutants Discharge for the First Half of 2008,” September 24th, 2008. 178 qie jianrong disputed since it was ﬁ rst brought to public attention. Some experts further point out that even if the targets for energy conservation and emissions reduction are reached, the pressure to reduce even more will still remain high.

A. Controversy Surrounding the Turning Point The “turning point” theory had been proposed as early as 2007, following the fi rst simultaneous drop in energy consumption and emissions of major pollutants in China. In 2007, the Chinese government issued a series of environmental policies to enhance the enforcement of environmental laws, institutional strengthening, implement the “regional restricted approval system,” and control the excessive growth of industries with high energy consumption and waste emissions. The central government allocated 23.5 billion RMB to support energy conservation and emissions reduction, demonstrating an unprecedented determination to protect the environment. All of this seemed to suggest the advent of a favorable turning point.3 Has the turning point really arrived? The answer is defi nitely not. In late March 2008, an article called “Still Too Early to Talk about the Arrival of a Turning Point” (节能减排出现下降拐点还为时过早) drew wide attention on the internet. The article pointed out that, in actuality, some provinces and autonomous zones did not achieve a “double drop” in 2007, and were still under enormous pressure to reach their targets for energy conservation and emissions reduction. For example, according to national statistics for the fi rst half of 2007,

Hainan Province’s COD emissions increased by 3.48% and their SO2 emissions increased by 15.45%. In addition to Hainan, other provinces and regions such as, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Qinghai, and Xinjiang also lagged behind the national average in energy conservation and emissions reduction, and it was unclear whether or not they could reach their targets. The article also maintained that in 2006 and 2007 energy consumption per unit of GDP only dropped by 1.23% and 3.27% respectively, leaving a further 5% drop to be accomplished between 2008 and 2010. With China’s GDP per capita at $2000 U.S. dollars, the demand for automobiles and housing is expected to

3 Friends of Nature, “The China Environment Yearbook, Volume 3,” China Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008, p. 171. a turning point in china’s energy conservation 179 continue to grow, creating a huge market demand for industries with high energy consumption. Therefore, it is unrealistic that a reduction in energy consumption and emissions of pollutants will be achieved by solely using administrative pressure. China is still facing a formidable task in energy conservation and emissions reduction, and the situation in some regions is getting worse, not better.4 According to Tan Zuoren (谭作人), the vice-secretary of the environmental NGO Green River in Sichuan Province, a turning point will not arrive until there are some fundamental changes in major indicators of pollution. “At present, water pollution is especially serious in China, and the aquatic environment continues to deteriorate. Even though there may be improvements in some areas, such as energy conservation and air pollution reduction, if there are no distinct improvements in some key indicators, it is simplistic to suggest the arrival of a turning point,” says Tan.5 He also argued that if there was only an improvement in monitoring these indicators, but not in social institutions, there could hardly be any real turning point. Tan’s grave warning was echoed by Zhang Zhikui (张智奎), the deputy director of the Chongqing Environmental Protection Bureau. In an article published in the Study Times on November 3rd, 2008, Zhang suggested that it was still too early to draw any deﬁ nite conclusions on turning points. The “double drop” in 2007 and the continued decrease in the ﬁ rst half of 2008 could only be interpreted as a demonstration of the early achievements of the structural reform in key industries and the improvement of environmental quality in some regions and river basins.

B. Concern from All Walks of Life Despite the “double drop” in 2007 and the continued decrease in the ﬁ rst half of 2008, people from all walks of life were still concerned about whether the targets set in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan could be reached.

4 Qiu Lin, “Still Too Early to Talk about the Arrival of a Turning Point,” Guang- ming Daily Online, March 26th, 2008, http://guancha.gmw.cn/content/2008-03/26/ content_753651.htm. 5 Ya Wei, “ ‘Turning Point’ in China’s Environmental Communiqué Questioned by Experts,” Voice of America, June 6, 2008, http://www.voanews.com/chinese/w2008-06- 06-voa65.cfm, 2008-6-6. 180 qie jianrong

Zhang Quan (张全), an NPC representative and director of the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau, observed: “It should be noted that the achievements so far are minor, and we are faced with huge challenges in changing the mode of economic growth. Conse- quently, there is still a long way to go before we reach the target of energy conservation and emissions reduction.”6 Some experts also pointed out that apart from the implementation of various policies, another important reason for the double drop in 2007 was the relatively high level of 2006 indicators. Therefore, if real improvements are to be made in accordance with the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the challenges being faced should not be underestimated. According to Zhang Zhikui from the Chongqing Environmental Pro- tection Bureau, the decrease in the emission of pollution was largely a result of efforts to “pay back debts from past policies, left by the old days,” when industries failed to reach the target of emissions reduction. After China initiated the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the discharge of SO2 was reduced by 6.9 million tons within two and a half years, and the discharge of COD was reduced by 2.5 million tons within two years. This was 27% of the total COD emissions in 2005 and 17.7% of the total SO2 emissions. Such a rapid reduction was largely a result of key industries and projects rushing to pay back the old debts of emission reduction. Zhang warned that in the future, room for further reduction in the emission of major pollutants would gradually shrink, yet China’s rapid economic development would continue to increase emissions. In addition, institutional barriers to solving energy and environmental related problems in China were still in existence. Therefore, the turning point in the emission of major pollutants might only be a temporary phenomenon.7

III. Emissions Reduction in the Next Three Years: An Extremely Tough Task

On December 11th, 2008, Ling Jiang (凌江), the deputy director of the Department of Pollution Prevention in the Ministry of Environmental

6 An Bei, Zhou Yingfeng, and Wang Youling, “Interpreting the Report on the Work of the Government: An Important Turning Point of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction,” Xinhuanet, March 6th, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2008-03/ 06/content_7731567.htm. 7 Zhang Zhikui, “Pushing Forward Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction: Problems and Suggestions,” Study Times, November 3rd, 2008. a turning point in china’s energy conservation 181

Protection, analyzed the obstacles to the reduction of major pollutants over the next three years. He argued that currently the water pollution problem in China is very serious. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan aimed for a 10% reduction in major pollutants, yet only 2.3% had been reduced in the ﬁ rst two years of this ﬁ ve-year period. Behind the slow progress in controlling emissions was the colossal volume of pollution that more than doubled the environmental capacity. In other words, the situation would only improve when the volume of the existing emission of pollutants was cut in half. As Ling pointed out, the task of achieving this target on time—a 7.7% reduction in pollutants over the next three years—was already tough. Even if the goal could be successfully accomplished, the pollution emitted would still exceed the environmental capacity.

A. Obstacle One: China’s Heavy Chemical Industrial Pattern Would Be Diffi cult to Change Before 2020 Zhang Zhikui also analyzed the obstacles to achieving the emissions reduction target set by the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. Based on the development history of industrialized countries, there exists a positive correlation between economic growth (represented by per capita GDP) and per capita energy consumption. During the acceleration stage of industrial development, energy consumption increases rapidly, along with the emission of pollutants. China is still considered a developing country and will not leave the period of heavy chemical industrial development before 2020. Driven by increased exports, growth of mid-end demands, and an upgrade in domestic consumption patterns, China’s energy consumption and emissions of pollutants is expected to increase signifi cantly. A major reason behind China’s current environmental problems is the confl ict between the heavy chemical industries and the limited capacity of natural resources and the environment. This problem will only get worse as this industry expands.

B. Obstacle Two: Transformation of Growth Pattern Cannot Be Realized Overnight Transforming China’s growth pattern, in order to solve the problem of energy consumption and pollution, will be a long-term process. It is China’s urgent priority to change its growth pattern of high energy consumption and high pollution. Yet, the transformation process will 182 qie jianrong require a long period of time and some important issues will have to be carefully tackled, including rectifying distorted prices, improving the assessment index and mechanism of economic and social development, and nurturing a systematic and administrative environment conducive to innovation. During this process, many factors that have been supporting China’s economic growth thus far will need to undergo substantial changes. Posing an unprecedented challenge to the transformation of China’s growth pattern, these necessary changes include: increasing the cost of labor, land, and other modes of production; escalating the pressure from energy, natural resources, and the environment; and reducing ﬁ nancial volatility. Thus, it will be difﬁ cult to fundamentally solve the problem of high energy consumption and high pollution within a short period of time, especially if problems that have already been solved, reoccur.

C. Obstacle Three: China’s Energy Consumption Enters a Period of High Growth Experts say that China is presently experiencing accelerated industrialization, which is causing heavy energy consumption and large amounts of pollution. This is exacerbating the already bitter conﬂ ict between economic growth and the environment and natural resources. An increase in per capita GDP will lead to an increase in per capita energy consumption, which will in turn drive up total energy consumption. During the development of industrial countries, energy consumption usually displays a cyclical pattern characterized by slow growth, a turning point, and then rapid growth. Because China’s per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power has exceeded $5000, energy consumption in China will undergo accelerated growth for an extended period of time. In fact, over the past few years, China has already shown signs of accelerated growth.

D. Obstacle Four: Investment Is Still Not Fully Guaranteed China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan set up the goal of a 10% reduction in SO2 and COD emissions. It is estimated that an investment of more than 430 billion RMB will be needed in order to achieve this goal. To a large extent, this is paying for unfi nished tasks and goals of the past. During the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, only 65% of the a turning point in china’s energy conservation 183 management projects of key drainage basins were completed, such as the “Three Rivers and Three Lakes” project. Only 53% of the planned funds were invested, and only 54% of all projects were fi n- ished, including the “Two Control Zones.”8 Thus, during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, in addition to controlling new increases in pollution, payment still had to go to these unfi nished tasks of the previous planning period. Together, the new and old investments will require a considerable amount of money. If investments cannot be ensured, energy conservation and emissions reduction will be negatively affected.

E. Obstacle Five: Less Than One-Third of the Goal Accomplished by the Middle of the Eleventh Five-Year Period On December 25th, 2008, the State Council submitted a mid-term report to the Eleventh NPC Standing Committee on the execution of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Outline. This report was subsequently evaluated by the Development Research Center of the State Council, the World Bank, and the Center for China Study at Tsinghua Uni- versity. They concluded that enormous work remained to be done in order to reduce the two main indicators of energy conservation and emissions reduction. Energy consumption per unit of GDP was down by 5.38%, achieving only 26.9% of the goal in the plan. The situation for emissions reduction was no better. Only 32% and 22% of the general goals for SO2 and COD emissions were accomplished over the past two years.9 Based on this mid-term report, Zhang Ping (张平), the director of the National Development and Reform Commission, pointed out that in the next two years, as pressure for the environment and natural resources increased, it would become a Herculean task to achieve the goals for energy conservation and emissions reduction in China. On top of that, the situation is only getting worse. More gravely, in recent years, industries with high energy consumption and waste emission had grown rapidly, while mechanisms for energy conservation and

8 Translator’s note: The three rivers refer to the Huaihe River, the Liaohe River, and the Haihe River, and the three lakes refer to Taihu Lake, Dianchi Lake, and Chaohu Lake. 9 Liu Zheng and Zou Shengwen, “Chinese Population Totaled 1.32129 Billion,” Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-12/24/content_10554031 .htm, December 24th, 2008. 184 qie jianrong the elimination of outdated production modes had not yet been fully established. This could eventually lead to even worse situations for environmental protection.

IV. Falsiﬁ ed Statistics Should Be Guarded Against

The problem of falsifi ed statistics of energy conservation and emissions reduction appeared in the media as early as 2007. That year, it was reported on the People’s Daily Online website that Panxian (盘县), a county in Guizhou Province with serious pollution problems, fraudu- lently reported their statistics for energy conservation and emissions reduction to appear as if their targets were achieved.10 In March 2008, around the time that the “double drop” in pollution indicators was reported, Wang Yuqing (王玉庆), the former vice minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection and a committee member of the CPPCC, issued a clear warning during an interview with the China Youth Daily that falsifi ed fi gures should be guarded against. Wang and other committee members were worried that the reduction in the pollution data might not refl ect real improvements to the environment and doubted the sustainability of the decline in pollution for the remaining years of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. They contended that the reduction in the statistics did not mean that a solution to environmental problems had been found.11 On November 25th, 2008, a report titled “Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Is Becoming a Game of Numbers” (节能减排正成为一种数字游戏) in the Economic Information Daily revealed that in China, emissions reduction was quickly becoming a game of falsifi ed fi gures. The volume of statistics used for emissions reduction was bewildering, and given the enormous pressure on local governments to reach reduction targets, the statistics had become extremely muddled.

10 “Guizhou Province Pan County—A Seriously Contaminated County—Practiced Fraud to Accomplish the Task of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction,” People’s Daily Online, http://env.people.com.cn/GB/5589867.html, April 10th, 2007. 11 Liu Shixin and Li Song, “Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consulta- tive Conference: Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Must Guard Against Falsiﬁ ed Figures,” China Youth Daily, March 12th, 2008. a turning point in china’s energy conservation 185

Ofﬁ cials from Jiangxi Environmental Protection Bureau told a reporter that in 2005, pollution data submitted by the counties and cities varied greatly. Some cities reported huge COD emissions and could, therefore, easily reach reduction targets after setting a relatively low standard for themselves. Yet other cities had reported much smaller initial emissions and were subsequently under immense pressure to achieve their reduction targets. Local environmental protection ofﬁ cials worried that as the pressure for emissions reduction increased, many sewage treatment plants would deliberately pump sewage into the intakes in order to increase the COD difference between the intakes and the outtakes. Thus, the total reduction in COD emission would appear to be higher.12

V. The Financial Crisis Adds to Uncertainty of Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction

Consequences of the global ﬁ nancial crisis have been increasingly apparent since 2008. Experts believe that as the crisis spreads, revital- ization of the economy will be the focal point for an extended period of time, which will pose new challenges to the realization of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan.

A. Stimulus Plan Will Likely Reduce Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Efforts On November 9th, 2008, the Chinese government announced the Ten Measures for Boosting Domestic Demand (进一步扩大内需的十项措施) and a stimulus plan with a total investment of 400 billion RMB over two years. A number of construction projects sponsored by the central and local governments will be carried out in the next two to three years. This has triggered speculation about a possible loosening of energy conservation and emissions reduction efforts. Will a proactive ﬁ scal policy and moderate monetary policy decelerate the momentum of energy conservation and emissions reduction in the next few years?

12 Luo Yufan, Guo Mingyuan, and Wei Mengjia, “Energy Conservation and Emis- sion Reduction Is Becoming a Game of Numbers: A Bewildering Account Behind the Task,” Economic Information Daily, November 25th, 2008. 186 qie jianrong

Will some areas sacriﬁ ce environmental regulation in the name of economic development? How can this huge investment play a role in environmental protection? How can we ensure that the investment will be green? Although regulatory authorities and experts are trying to reassure the public, lessons from the past have shown the possible environmental consequences of such a commitment to economic growth.

B. The Financial Crisis May Bring Opportunities for Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction On the other hand, there is also the contention that as the fi nancial crisis slows down China’s economic growth, new opportunities will emerge for its energy conservation and emissions reduction efforts. On October 29th, 2008, while presenting China’s White Paper on Actions for Climate Change (中国应对气候变化的政策与行动 (白皮书)) at a news conference, Xie Zhenghua (解振华), the deputy director of the National Development and Reform Commission, said that the fi nancial crisis would bring about opportunities for energy conservation and emissions reduction. The fi nancial crisis would spur China’s domestic structural adjustment, as well as bring about opportunities for transforming the world in aspects such as changing the modes of production, changing consumption and lifestyle patterns, and adjusting economic and industrial structures. China should seize this chance to boost domestic demand, while increasing investments for energy conservation and emissions reduction in construction projects, the environment, and infrastructure.13 On January 5th, 2009, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee announced that due to a host of factors, such as natural disasters, the fi nancial crisis, and policy-related profi t reduction, the estimated annual profi t of state-owned enterprises in 2008 was 700 billion RMB. This was a 30% reduction from 2007 and the fi rst drop in annual profi ts since 2002. Industries such as metallurgy, transportation, chemical, electrical power, automobile, and tourism, were especially hard hit.14 Experts reckoned that profi t reduction

13 Wu Qingbin, “Development and Reform Commission Introducing the Situation on China’s Policies and Actions on Climate Change,” People’s Daily Online, http:// ﬁ nance.people.com.cn/GB/8215/57906/118360/8294238.html, November 6th, 2008. 14 Shang Wen, “The First Drop of the Central Enterprises in the Six Years an Estimated 700 billion Yuan Proﬁ t in 2008,” Shanghai Securities News, January 6, 2009. a turning point in china’s energy conservation 187 in industries such as metallurgy, chemical, and electrical power, would reduce pollutant emissions and bring about opportunities for energy conservation and emissions reduction.

VI. Suggestions for Enhancing Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction

Legislation is an important means of pollution control in industrialized countries. To achieve the energy conservation and emissions reduction objectives set in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, the Chinese government should also enhance its legislation, establish a market-based policy system of environmental protection and economic development, and implement a diversiﬁ ed investment mechanism for environmental protection.

A. Formulation and Revision of Laws Related to Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction Should Be Fast-Tracked Experts suggest that the government should revise the Environmental Protection Law (环保法) as soon as possible, and start drafting and revising other environment-related laws such as the Energy Conservation Law (节约能源法), the Law on the Prevention of Air Pollution (大气污染防治法), and the Law on Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution by Solid Waste (固体废物污染防治法). Meanwhile, there needs to be a formulation and revision of administrative regulations for environmental protection, such as energy conservation for civil construction, recycling and management of old household appliances, supervision over the operation of environmental protection facilities, sewage discharge permits, control of livestock and poultry breeding pollution, water drainage and sewage disposal, and recycling of old tires and packages. Moreover, China should also step up efforts to construct a stan- dardized system of energy conservation and environmental protection, formulate energy consumption limits for production processes and large-scale public construction, modify water consumption limits, and improve the inspection standards of clean production and the pollutant emissions standards in key industries. Supervision and law enforcement should also be strengthened. The government should enhance the supervision of fume gas desulfurization (FGD) facilities and sewage treatment and waste disposal plants. 188 qie jianrong

They should also strengthen the enforcement of laws and regulations concerning energy conservation and emissions reduction. Daily inspection of enterprises and institutions with high energy consumption and emission of pollutants should be intensiﬁ ed, while any violations of environmental laws and regulations should be penalized. In this way, ideas such as “violation of the law costs little, but observance of the law costs dearly,” can be corrected, and the wrongful practices of neglect and lax implementation of laws can be rectiﬁ ed.

B. Market-Based Policy System of Environmental Protection and Economic Development Should Be Established Experts also suggest that China should learn to employ environmentally-friendly economic policies, including ﬁ nancial subsidies or incentives, tax reduction or exemption, emission trading, a deposit system for industries with high environmental risks, preferential credit, and fees and taxes for sewage discharge. Judging from the experience of industrialized countries, implementation of such policies will be more efﬁ cient, reasonable, and cost-effective in reducing pollution than administrative means. In addition, the cost calculating mechanism of coal in electricity production should shift away from planned pricing, while reforms of the pricing mechanism of petroleum products and natural gas should also be accelerated. The government should improve policies that encourage the generation of electricity from renewable resources, residual heat and pressure, coal gangue, and even garbage. It should also rationalize water pricing and accelerate the implementation of a scaled pricing system. The government should raise charges for pollutants to encourage voluntary emissions reduction on the part of enterprises. Emission trading should also be established so that the use of emission rights can be more effective.

C. A Diversiﬁ ed Investment System for Environmental Protection Should Be Established

In terms of SO2 emission, it is essential to improve the desulphurization capacity of coal-fi red power plants. According to offi cial estimates, during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, there will be an increase of 118 million kilowatts of de-sulphurized electricity produced by the a turning point in china’s energy conservation 189 existing generators, which will require an increased investment of 30 billion RMB and a desulphurization capacity of 4.44 million tons. Newly installed generators will be equipped with desulphurization facilities to produce 180 million kilowatts of de-sulphurized electricity, which will require an investment of 72 billion RMB and a desulphurization capacity of 6.3 million tons. In total, another 102 billion RMB will be invested and the total desulphurization capacity will reach 10.7 million tons, accounting for 85% of the SO2 emissions to be reduced.15 With regard to COD emissions, it is essential to improve the sewage treatment capability of cities and towns. It is estimated that during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, the sewage treatment rate will reach 70% in all Chinese cities, and the treatment capacity should reach 100 billion cubic meters per day and 30.2 billion cubic meters per year. This will reduce COD emissions by 3.4 million tons, accounting for 70% of the general goal of COD emissions reduction. A total investment of 332 billion RMB will be required to achieve these goals. Based on these estimates, a 430 billion RMB investment will be required to meet the targets for the reduction of the two main pollutants. Undoubtedly, this is a huge investment. Yet, how can we guarantee that this investment will be carried out? Experts believe that new sources of investment should be tapped in addition to existing ones. Experts from the NPC Environment and Resources Committee point to fi ve areas for additional sources of investment. First, government at all levels should increase investment in environmental protection. Second, enterprises are to be urged to increase investments in pollution control. Third, the existing pollution charge system should be improved. Fourth, a compensation system for the use of environmental capacity should be explored and established so that a control system based on environmental capacity can gradually be set up. Fifth, the establishment of a market-oriented system of environmental protection should be accelerated. On January 5th, 2009, Pan Yue (潘岳), the vice minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, said at the ceremony marking

15 Luo Jianhua, “Challenges and Answers to Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction in China,” China Environment Service Industry Association, http://www.cesia .org/view/viewinfo.aspx?i=1021&n=37, January 17th, 2008. 190 qie jianrong the 25th anniversary of the China Environment Paper (中国环境报) that “though half of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period has passed, we have not reached half of our goal for emissions reduction. There is still a long way to go.”16

16 Qie Jianrong, “Half of the Eleventh Five-Year Is Gone But the Emission Reduc- tion Goal Has Not Been Met: Challenging the Turning Point,” People‘s Daily Online, http://www.022net.com/2009/1–12/433668222214758.html, January 1st, 2009. PART IV

POLICIES

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN 2008

Feng Jia

China’s environmental legal system made signifi cant developments in the year 2008. A series of infl uential environmental laws were promulgated and amended. This not only contributed to fulfi lling the environmental regulation objectives, but has also cleared the way for improving China’s future environmental legislation. Meanwhile, the concept of public participation has been widely advocated, while environmental legislative activities have become an important tool for public participation in environmental protection. However, problems still exist in China’s environmental legal system. These problems lie in the loopholes or defi ciencies in the legislation, and more importantly, the enforcement of environmental laws. Hence, an ambiguity and lack of strictness in legal responsibilities, an immature legislative process for public participation, and poor coordination of management in environmental administration are the major factors restraining China’s environmental legal system from functioning effectively.

Key words: environmental legal system, developments of environmental legal system, problems with environmental legal system

The year 2008 represents a signiﬁ cant stage in the development of China’s environmental legal system. The country’s legislators are striving to incorporate sustainable development, as evident in the stricter laws. The legal rules and regulations are more effective. A typical example is the amendment and implementation of China’s Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (水污染防治法). To enforce the law, the legislators have attached increasing importance to the establishment and operation of the enforcement mechanism, helping to enhance its workability in terms of allocation of rights and duties, public supervision, distribution, and fulﬁ llment of legal responsibilities.

I. The Revision of China’s Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution

The revision of the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution was a signiﬁ cant part of the development of China’s environmental rule of law in 2008. The revised law clearly states its purpose as “safeguarding drinking water safety and enhancing the comprehensive, harmonious, and sustainable development of economy and society.” However, the 194 feng jia most important amendment is not the “outlook on sustainable development” (the purpose as clariﬁ ed in Article 1), but rather a variety of highly feasible regulations and measures, formulated so as to achieve the purpose of this law.

A. Legalization of Ecological Compensation In Article 7 of the amended Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, the term “ecological compensation” has for the fi rst time been included and granted force. This move is profound, as it closely combines the environmental protection measures with a benefi ts guarantee mechanism. Before that, ecological compensation measures were at work tentatively in some areas and had produced positive effects. Nevertheless, lack of uniform legal rules, ambiguous scope of application of the ecological compensation mechanism, and weak enforce- ability, posed impediments to the progress. Meanwhile, the effect of ecological compensation was abated as accepted practices like fi scal transfer payments, special funds, and water resources exchanges, are yet to be legally confi rmed and supported. Thus, the legal stipulation on the scope of application of the ecological compensation mechanism, as well as the specifi c measures, provide a clear legal basis for the establishment of a compensation mechanism, which will play a vital role in the ecological protection of water.

B. Legalization of Regional Permit Restrictions During an interview in 2007, Pan Yue (潘岳), the vice minister of Environmental Protection, said that “regional permit restrictions” were an extremely harsh measure of the country’s environmental protection department, but it had never been used in its 30 year history. The implementation of this measure has proved very effective. It has severely punished many areas and enterprises accused of major environmental violations, meanwhile helping enhance the authority of environmental protection departments. Nevertheless, this extreme measure was ﬁ rst inadequate in legal justiﬁ cation, thus raising a question of legitimacy. Therefore, it needs to be legalized through a swift move of legislation. As stipulated by this revised law, “regional permit restrictions” are based on the system of control over total discharge. To areas where the total discharge volume of major water pollutants exceeds the prescribed level, the environmental protection department china’s environmental legal system in 2008 195 shall suspend the approval of the environmental impact assessment documents of construction projects with an increase in total discharge of major water pollutants. This provides a clear legal basis for implementing such a measure.

C. Strengthening Supervision over Local Governments: Empowering Environmental Regulators with Final Say Concerning Pollution Treatment within a Time Limit For a long time, local governments at or above the country level have exercised command over the enterprises that have caused severe environmental pollution to take measures to treat pollution within a time limit. The environmental protection departments could do nothing but present a proposal to the local government. When some enterprises discharge water pollutants illegally, or even cause water pollution accidents, the local government would reject the proposal simply due to its concerns for local economic growth or some other factors. This situation has prevented the environmental protection departments from taking effective mandatory actions against these enterprises’ illegal behavior, leaving the measure of treatment within a certain time invalid. In order to address this problem, the current law clearly stipulates that the environmental protection departments, in lieu of the local government, exercise direct control over the measure of treatment within a time limit; thus, strengthening its control and supervision of the violators.

D. Strengthening Penalties for Illegal Behaviors The original Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution and its Detailed Rules of Implementation (实施细则) did not strictly stipulate the legal liability and exerted little punitive impact on the violators. This is largely due to the fact that the fi ne was too modest. The original law did not specify the amount for fi nes. According to these detailed rules, even if a serious economic loss is caused, the fi ne shall only be up to 30% of the direct losses, with the maximum not exceeding one million RMB. Second, for an entity or individual who heavily discharges water pollutants and jeopardizes public security, there were no rules concerning penalties or criminal liability. Third, the law contained no rule on penalties for the person in charge of an entity. 196 feng jia

The current law, based on its principle of not allowing the law breakers to take advantage of their illegal behaviors, has increased the size of the penalty to offenders:

1. It raises the fi ne for ordinary violators who will face severe punishment. 2. While the fi ne should be meted out in proportion to or several times the amount, it removes the maximum fi ne. 3. It employs the double punishment system, whereby any enterprise or public institution violates the law and causes a water pollution accident, a fi ne shall be imposed. In addition, each of the directly liable persons in charge and other directly liable persons should be given a fi ne of not more than 50% of the income obtained from the enterprise or public institution in the previous year. 4. It stipulates that any offender shall incur punishment regarding management of public security or criminal liability. The imposition and enforcement of such penalties, therefore, have a legal basis.

E. Greatly Strengthening the Stipulation on Seeking Civil Liability China’s environmental laws used to have a common weakness: they stressed administrative law, but neglected civil procedures. While these laws were mainly comprised of administrative rules and measures, they were short in stipulations that directed citizens to civil law to protect their own rights and interests, as well as to protect the environment. Consequently, the environmental protection departments had to work in isolation, while those who suffered from pollution were unable to confront the polluters with legal support. The original law only contained two symbolic provisions concerning environmental torts and civil liabilities. Furthermore, they are abstract and diffi cult to carry out. The rules in the current law regarding environment civil liabilities and procedures are prominent. The number of provisions was increased to fi ve and they are specifi c, creative, and highly feasible, highlighting the protection of pollution victims. They play an exem- plary role in the improvement of other environment civil liability regulations and the Environmental Damage Compensation Law (环境损害赔偿法) to be promulgated in the future. Specifi cally, the rules of civil liability mainly contain the following: china’s environmental legal system in 2008 197

1. Regarding exemption from liability, if the damage is caused by force majeure or by the victim himself, the party discharging pollutants bears no liability for compensation. 2. It stipulates that the “burden of proof ” should be employed in the environmental tort lawsuit concerning water pollution. 3. It reiterates that the litigant in a collective action may select a representative to fi le an action. For the fi rst time, the litigation system has been specifi ed in laws besides the Civil Procedure Law (民事诉讼法). This will set a good example for the trial procedure during an environmental tort lawsuit. 4. It has introduced and encouraged the legal aid system, environmental protection departments, social activist groups, lawyers, and legal services to provide support to the parties whose legiti- mate rights and interests are damaged by water pollution. Such professional support will reduce the diffi culty in fi ling a legal action and in winning the case. 5. Environmental monitoring offi ces are entrusted to supervise and are obligated to truthfully report the monitoring results to the environmental protection authorities.

Of course, the revised Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution is not without defi ciencies. Firstly, although ecological compensation has been written into the amended version, it has only appeared in its General Provisions. Furthermore, although fi nancial transfer payments are a major means of ecological compensation, there is no specifi c regulation on fi nancial transfer payments between governments of different administrative regions. In other words, no particular law or regulation has yet been enacted to ensure the feasibility of the principle of ecological compensation. Secondly, the lawmakers attempted to empower local environmental protection departments to control pollution within a specifi ed time limit, so as to contain the prevailing local protectionism. However, they failed to introduce a supplementary mechanism into this power deployment process. Given the fact that the local government is in charge of the personnel and fi nancial management of local environmental protection departments, the latter can hardly fulfi ll the pollution controls within a specifi ed time limit. Thirdly, although the amended Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution has greatly increased the magnitude of the pollution penalty, the punishment has yet to be intensifi ed. For the enterprises 198 feng jia making a large profi t while generating heavy pollution, even if the penalty is up to a one million dollar penalty, it does not compare to the benefi t they have reaped from the illegal production. However, the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution hasn’t yet adopted the method of “punishment by day,” which has been working well abroad.

II. Establishing Legal Guarantees for the Development of a Circular Economy

Another important environmental legislative practice in 2008 was the enactment of the Circular Economy Promotion Law (循环经济促进法), which provides a fundamental legal guarantee for constructing a resource-effi cient and environment-friendly society. “Resource-effi cient” means economizing on and reusing resources in the process of production, distribution, and consumption—with recycling and reusing playing the most important part. The Circular Economy Promotion Law goes a step beyond the Cleaner Production Promotion (清洁生产促进法) by extending the concept of resource recycling and reusing to the whole process of production, circulation, and consumption. This move provides institutional support for a model integrating social production activities into circular economic development. This not only leads to effective reduction of pollution discharge, but also an exploration of new resources for economic development. Moreover, the production costs of both business and society can be greatly trimmed down, thereby generating huge economic benefi ts. The Circular Economy Promotion Law established a series of legal systems and mechanisms to promote the development of a circular economy, such as a circular economy planning system, a total fl ux control of pollutants system, a system of extended polluter liability, a monitoring system of enterprises with heavy pollution, a government supervision mechanism, and an economic stimulus mechanism. Nota- bly, the system of extended polluter liability has a profound impact on changing enterprises’ production and operation method, as well as consumer preference. Article 15 of the law stipulates that producers of the catalogue-listed articles and packages for mandatory recycling are obliged to recycle their waste. It also stipulates consumers’ obligation to retrocede the discarded listed articles and packages to the producers. To make it imperative, the article avoids encouraging language; instead, it uses words like “must” and “ought to” to convey the obligation of recycling. china’s environmental legal system in 2008 199

In addition, this article stresses the role of retailers and other inter- mediaries in recycling waste items and packages, and stipulates a recycling commission mechanism to engage them. It also established a system to ensure that discarded products and packages can be recycled by organizations entrusted by the producers. The systems and mechanisms mentioned above play a positive role in at least three aspects. First, the recycling efforts can be enhanced, which will directly reduce the amount of pollution discharge. Second, producers are encouraged to develop advanced production technologies which will help to produce environmentally friendly products and alleviate their obligations to recycle discarded articles and packages. Third, customers will be enticed to buy environmentally friendly products or products less harmful to the environment. Of course, the effi cient implementation of an extended polluter responsibility system also relies on a supportive market mechanism which connects the compulsory recycling obligations of enterprises and customers with their economic interests. Otherwise, this system cannot work well in the long run, enforced by administrative stipulations or legislative regulations. In fact, market mechanisms played a vital role and accumulated a wealth of experience in recycling discarded articles and packages before the implementation of the Cir- cular Economy Promotion Law. For example, in the case of beer bottle recycling, economic stimulation and market mechanisms were both employed, which enabled the bottles to be recycled within the time limit of reuse. This greatly reduced the solid waste pollution from the bottles. The implementation of an extended polluter responsibility system and the establishment of a supporting market mechanism shall draw on the above experience. However, it should also be noted that the Circular Economy Promotion Law, while stressing the state policy level, had clear weaknesses in its detailed provisions on the plan and method of carrying out this law in different areas and economic development zones. Moreover, the effect on the law’s implementation by the 2008 global fi nancial crisis should be fully noted. The fi nancial crisis started in the United States in September 2008 and soon spread worldwide, and it has seriously struck China’s domestic industries. The consumption capacity dwindled dramatically in Western countries as a result of the economic meltdown, leaving enterprises in China under their production capacity. Unemployment once again became a focal issue in Chinese society, posing a huge impediment to local economic development. In order to stimulate domestic demand, to spur economic 200 feng jia growth, and to solve the unemployment problems, China’s central government and governments at different levels expanded fi nancial spending on infrastructure construction. As a result, the building materials industry, including steel and cement, has had more opportunities to develop. To some extent, this may hamper the implementation of the Circular Economy Promotion Law. Worse yet, some local governments have lessened their environmental appraisal in order to increase the scale of investment and stimulate economic growth. Projects that were not up to the standards of the circular economy, or that might produce heavy pollution, have been allowed to start under the pretext of “stimulating domestic demand.” The phenomenon of pollution discharge exceeding the national standard has, consequently, been on the rise in recent years. This trend not only threatens the implementation of the Circular Economy Promotion Law, but also makes China’s efforts in energy conservation and pollution reduction to be in vain.

III. Increasingly Speciﬁ ed Legal Support to Public Participation

A. The Trial Period for the Formal Implementation of Measures on Environmental Public Information As people’s daily life is closely related to the environment, the public should be able to participate extensively in preventing and solving environmental problems. The right to get environment related information is a precondition of public participation in environmental protection. Only if the public is fully aware of the environment conditions, the status of pollution, the measures of the environmental departments, and the country’s environmental laws, regulations, and policies, can they participate in a planned and organized way. When pollution accidents or environmentally damaging activities occur, and the public is shielded away from the relative information under the pretext of protecting state or business secrets, public participation will become a blind and fruitless action. Therefore, the right to know about environment related information is the premise for encouraging the public to get involved in environmental protection. In 2007, the former State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) of China (now the Ministry of Environmental Protection) issued the Measures on Environmental Public Information ( for Trial Implementation) (环境信息公开办法(试行)) and was formally put into practice on May 1st, 2008. china’s environmental legal system in 2008 201

This measure guaranteed the people’s basic right to get environmental information. Ever since the implementation of the Measures on Environmental Pub- lic Information ( for Trial Implementation), the public can obtain relative environmental information lawfully if they want to get involved in the environmental appraisal of certain construction programs or plans, or to participate in the environmental administrative approval or administrative punishment of environment pollution. Furthermore, in an environmental litigation the measures can help the public to get evidence which would otherwise be obtained through a lawyer or the People’s Court; thus, greatly reducing the cost and difﬁ culty of litigation.

B. The Classiﬁ ed Management Catalogue for Environmental Impact Assessment of Construction Projects Besides the right to get environmental information, the law needs to enable effective public participation, which requires legal provision of detailed participation processes. China’s legal tradition emphasizes substantial provisions, while neglecting procedural provisions, and attaches importance to distribution of rights and obligations, while paying scant attention to the mechanism of implementation. When it comes to public participation, China’s environmental legislation does emphasize the formulation of procedural provisions. A typical case in point is the Classiﬁ ed Management Catalogue for Environmental Impact Assess- ment of Construction Projects (建设项目环境影响评价分类管理目录) put into practice on October 1st, 2008. The catalogue is closely related to provisions in the Environment Impact Assessment Law (环境影响评价法) concerning public participation and environmental impact assessment. The promulgation of this catalogue has soundly ensured the possibility of public participation in environmental impact assessment. The reason for this is that Article 21 of the Environmental Impact Assessment Law does not prescribe public participation as a compulsory procedure of environmental impact assessment for every construction project. According to the law, only projects that are expected to produce written reports on environmental impact should involve public participation and voice opinions before submitted and approved. As for those expected to complete report forms or registration forms of environmental impact, no compulsory procedure of public participation is required. Thus, many construction units deliberately confuse the difference between written reports and report forms, and only compile 202 feng jia report forms for projects that should produce written reports to dodge public participation in environmental impact assessment. The new catalogue stipulates detailed and quantitative criteria for dis- tinguishing the application scopes (categories of environmental impact assessment) of written reports, report forms, and registration forms of environmental impact assessment. It states that construction projects on a considerable scale or located in environmentally sensitive areas should compile written reports of environmental impact assessment, but should not substitute them with report forms and registration forms. The catalogue prescribes clear and reliable criteria to correctly measure categories of environmental impact assessment for construction projects and estimate the necessity for public participation; thus, enhancing the workability of the Environment Impact Assessment Law and clarifying the legal basis for public participation in environmental protection.

IV. Increasing Public Participation and Environment Legislation Efforts

Besides the development and process of the legislation itself, the process of environmental legislation is becoming more open and transparent. In 2008, the public participated in making many environmental laws, rules, and regulations. The Circular on Public Opinion Solicitation on Regulations for Safety Control of Dangerous Chemical Products (Draft for Solicit- ing Opinions) (<危险化学品安全管理条例 (征求意见稿) >公开征求意见的通知) was released on February 29th, 2008 by the Legislative Affairs Offi ce of the State Council (国务院法制办公室发布). It publicized the legislative specifi cations and the draft for soliciting opinions to society, so as to solicit opinions from various parts of the public. The public can put forward comments or suggestions to concerned departments by logging on the China Legislative Information Network System, or by sending letters or emails. In addition, the drafts for soliciting opinions and legislative specifi cations of many laws, rules, and regulations, such as the Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, Energy Conservation Law (能源法), Regulations on Administration of the Discharge Permit System (排污许可证管理条例), Regulations on Environmental Impact Assessment of Plans (规划环境影响评价条例), and Administration Measures on Treatment of Envi- ronmental Pollution Within a Limited Time (环境污染限期治理管理办法), were publicized to solicit opinions from all walks of life. Public participation in environmental legislation has contributed to an increasing china’s environmental legal system in 2008 203 legislative openness and transparency. With the wisdom of the public pooled together, not only the quality of the legislation has been improved, but also the support of the public is secured—reducing the resistance confronted in the enforcement of the legislation.

V. Major Problems in China’s Environmental Rule of Law

China’s environmental legislation scored some encouraging achievements and made some huge strides in 2008. However, there are still many problems in China’s environmental rule of law.

A. The Stipulation on Legal Liability Is Not Stringent Enough Although the provisions of the newly revised and formulated environmental laws and regulations on legal liability are much more stringent than those enacted in the 1980s and the 1990s, they are still too modest for the environmental risks and damages caused by illegal environmental acts. The violators are still able to profi t from engaging in illegal activities despite the burden of legal liability. First, various environmental laws fail to stipulate the measures of “penalty calculated by days” and the system of “punitive compensation for damages.” Under the current environmental legislation, only one-time punishment, rather than multiple punishments, is executed on repeated illegal acts. In this case, despite some pressure, the penalty is bearable for the violators, as the intervals between two continuous penalties always allow the violators to make enough profi ts to cover the cost of violation and sustain the illegal acts. This system of punishment cannot ultimately put an end to the illegal acts. To avoid such instances, some countries have adopted the system of “penalty by day” in determining legal liability. This means, if the polluter continues to violate the law after a one-time penalty has been imposed upon them, each ensuing daily act will count as an independent illegal act, subject to separate penalty or compensation. This punitive process has a huge deterring effect on the violators, who will be very likely to refrain from illegal acts. The United States Environmental Protection Agency once executed “penalty by day” on DuPont Company for its continuous production of non-stick frying pans with Tefl on components. The total penalty added up to 102.5 million U.S. dollars—effectively deterring its illegal acts. 204 feng jia

Second, the investigation for accountability in environmental criminal cases has been inadequately carried out. Section 6, Chapter 6 of the Criminal Law of China (刑法) has speciﬁ cally stipulated several criminal acts damaging environmental resources. But according to statistics, since 2005, there have been only one to two cases which were subject to criminal prosecution because of serious damages to the environment. The empty shell of the criminal accountability system in environmental cases has greatly reduced the deterring effect of the law and fostered the occurrence and spread of acts seriously damaging the environment.

B. Lack of Legislation Engaging the Public to Trace Legal Liability for Environmental Damage A notable characteristic of China’s environmental rule of law is downward management, which is a lack of legislation engaging the public to trace legal liability for environment damage. While some laws, such as the newly revised Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, have started to pay attention to this problem, their contents are far from sophisticated and comprehensive, and their scope of application is very limited. Most critically, there has been no rule of environmental litigation system for public interest. This situation makes it very difﬁ cult for the public to play an important role in environmental protection. In the United States, the major players of environmental protection are thousands of American citizens, rather than the Environmen- tal Protection Agency. These people continuously exert pressure on enterprises by voluntarily forming non-governmental organizations, participating in activities overseeing enterprises in abiding by the environmental protection laws, and ﬁ ling environmental lawsuits for public interest at the right time. Their activities have not only reduced the government’s burden of supervision, but also forced business operators to cautiously contemplate the possible harmful effect of their practices on the environment and the environmental rights and interests of the public. In China, there have been no laws encouraging the public to bring environmental lawsuits for public interest, or tracing legal liability of environmental damage. Thus, the right of the public to participate is not yet fully under legal protection. china’s environmental legal system in 2008 205

C. Problems in the Administrative Mechanism for Environmental Protection Stipulated by Law The administrative systems for environmental protection stipulated by various environmental protection laws, represented by the Environment Protection Law (环境保护法), exhibit the following two features, which are also the main problems. First, local environmental protection departments succumb to local governments, hardly able to rid the interference of local protectionism. The personnel and fi nancial affairs of the local environmental protection departments are controlled by local governments. There- fore, they can hardly make the right choice to comply with the pollution laws when the investment projects were introduced by the local governments. Second, responsibility and authority of the environmental protection departments and other administrations in the fi elds of forestry, agriculture, water resources, development and reform, oceanic affairs, and communications are not clearly divided or specifi ed, and often overlap or contain a vacuum. This is a manifestation of an old Chi- nese saying: “nine dragons harnessing the same river.” When there are profi ts to reap from a project, various parties concerned will com- pete to intervene, otherwise, none of them will have the motivation to enforce administration. Thus, the consequence will no doubt be confused functions and chaotic administration. China’s environmental legal system achieved some progress in 2008, but some grave problems remain unsolved. Therefore, continuous efforts must be made by all scholars, government offi cials, volunteers, and ordinary citizens dedicated to environmental public interest.

THE MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: FROM ORGANIZATIONAL UPGRADE TO FUNCTIONAL ENHANCEMENT

Zhang Shiqiu

China’s environmental protection administration underwent several institutional and functional changes in 2008. On the change of the former State Environmental Pro- tection Administration (SEPA) to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), the core change lies in the capabilities of comprehensive decision-making and macro- control after the establishment of MEP.

Key words: the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), management functions, system changes

On March 15th, 2008, the ﬁ fth plenary meeting of the First Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the plan for restructuring the State Council, in which the original State Envi- ronmental Protection Administration (国家环境保护) (SEPA) was upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection (环境保护部) (MEP). This means that the government’s function of environmental protection is further valued and strengthened. However, we must be fully aware that for effective environmental protection, institutional upgrading is only part of the task, as it only removes one of the many obstacles. More importantly, a reform in the management system of environmental protection should be achieved.

I. Institutional and Functional Changes in China’s Environmental Protection Administration

During the past three decades, the organization of China’s environmental protection administrative changed once almost every ten years and it has now developed into the Ministry of Environmental Protec- tion from the original Environmental Protection Ofﬁ ce. This shows that the government function of environmental protection is gradually strengthening and also that China hopes to control further deterioration of the environment by strengthening the government function of environmental management. 208 zhang shiqiu

In 1973, the State Council convened the fi rst national meeting on environmental protection. It examined and approved China’s fi rst document on environmental protection titled Several Provisions on Protecting and Improving the Environment (关于保护和改善环境的若干规定), and established the Environment Protection Leading Group of the State Council and its offi ce, which was China’s fi rst temporary environmental protection organization. In the 1982 restructuring of the State Council, the Environment Protection Leading Group of the State Council and its offi ce were transformed into the Environmental Protection Bureau under the Envi- ronmental Protection Department of Urban and Rural Construction. In practice; however, it was very diffi cult for this bureau to coordinate with other departments and local governments. In 1984, the State Council made great efforts to remove non-permanent bodies. But as an exception, it decided to establish the Envi- ronmental Protection Committee of the State Council (without an authorized size). The Environmental Protection Committee of the State Council worked as a coordinating body for the Environmental Protection Bureau and helped the latter to break through institutional limitations. In 1988, the State Council underwent restructuring again with the State Environmental Protection Bureau separated from the Ministry of Construction and put directly under the State Council, which was an essential adjustment. In 1998, while the State Council removed more than ten industrial management administrations, the State Environmental Protection Bureau was upgraded to the State Environmental Protection Admin- istration under the State Council and, thus, a historical change was completed. The State Council announced the “Three Determines Plan,” which established SEPA’s function as law enforcement and supervision, covering the areas of pollution prevention and control, ecological protection, and nuclear safety regulation.1

1 Translator’s note: The “Three Determines Plan” is part of the institutional reform of some ministries under the Chinese State Council. The “Three Determines” refers to determining the functions, the organizations and posts, and the staff sizes of the ministries. the ministry of environmental protection 209

In 2008, the ﬁ rst session of the Eleventh NPC approved the Plan for Restructuring of the State Council (国务院机构改革方案), in which the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China was established and SEPA was removed. The main tasks of the ministry include developing environmental protection plans, policies, and standards, ensuring their implementation, working out the environment functional regions, supervising pollution prevention and control, and coordinating the solution to serous environmental problems. This indicated that the ministry’s functions of coordination, macro-control, law enforcement supervision, and public service would be strengthened. Participation in the state’s macro decision-making has become the core function of the MEP.

II. Further Strengthening Comprehensive Decision-Making and Macro-Control Capabilities

China’s economic growth over the last three decades, to a large extent, has been based on a “large-scale development mode,” which not only has consumed enormous resources, but has also done great damage to the environment. Though great efforts by the government have been made in environmental protection, the trend of over-consumption of natural resources and deterioration of the environment has not been curbed. Due to the accumulative feature of environmental pollution and with unsolved existing environmental pollution and newly emerging pollution in its economic development process, China, at present and in the near future, will be confronted with serious environmental problems. Damage by environmental pollution will be more outstanding and incidents related to environmental problems will happen more frequently. What’s worse, it will cause confl icts of interest. That is, confl icts between “environmental rights of living,” “environmental rights of production,” and “environmental rights of development.” The confl ict has spread widely in our daily life and is likely to become more serious with class stratifi cation in Chinese society. Due to the lack of effective management, powerful groups in society may seize cheaper environmental resources by using their power (including economic power and political power) and rake in exorbitant profi ts, which will cause injustices in environmental resource possession and usage. Even- tually, the injustice will be refl ected in the fi nal result of social benefi t 210 zhang shiqiu distribution. It will also reduce the potential for further economic growth and keep China’s economic growth quality at a relatively low level, which will make it diffi cult to form core competiveness.2 The marginalized arrangement under the current environmental management system can hardly cope with these problems. When dealing with the relationship between development and environment, the arrangement did not hold a holistic view on long-term interests, short-term interests, partial interests, or interests of the entire nation’s people. Due to the absence of appropriate channels, many scattered claims of rights and interests can hardly be satisfi ed. The added value of natural capital, in the form of environmental resource quality and quantity, cannot be ensured. What’s worse, natural capital is gradually consumed up. Since the implementation of “Top-Cap Control Requirement” in 1996, China has drawn up goals and requirements for the main pollutant being emitted during the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Five-Year Plan periods. In the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, China, for the fi rst time, prescribed restraining indices—requesting a decrease of 20% of energy consumption per unit of GDP by 2010 and a reduction of 10% of the volume of the main pollutants being emitted. However, due to various reasons, the goals of the Ninth and Tenth Five-Year Plan regarding reduction in pollutants emitted weren’t realized and pollutants even increased. It was not until 2007 when China achieved a reduction in both the chemical oxygen demand (COD) and sulfur dioxide emissions. This was the fi rst time that China achieved its scheduled goals for pollution reduction. In the fi rst half of 2008, the two indices continued to decrease. Though China has made progress in energy conservation and emissions reduction in general, we shouldn’t be too optimistic about the situation of China’s energy consumption, pollutant emissions, and environmental pollution. We must be aware of the following two points. Firstly, energy consumption and pollutant emissions per unit of output in China are still much higher than that in developed countries. Secondly, despite a series of powerful measures adopted, China’s unbalanced industrial structure has yet to change. Thus, effective and

2 Zhang Shiqing. “Analysis on the Low Effi cient Allocation of Environmental Resources and the Facts that the Advantaged Groups Capture the Natural Capital.” China Population, Resources, and Environment, 17, no. 6 (2007). the ministry of environmental protection 211 systematic measures and polices have yet to be established to boost industrial restructuring and to change the means of production. From 2008 to 2009, infl uenced by the fi nancial crisis, China’s economic development slowed down and when economic recovery begins, China will once again face the same serious situation of energy consumption and emissions control problems. In order to implement the scheduled goals effectively and to protect the foundation of society’s sustainable development—which is natural capital, the maintenance of natural capital stock, meeting people’s demand for environmental quality in an effi cient and fair way in the process of economic development, poverty reduction, income gap reduction, and urbanization acceleration—the core change after the establishment of the MEP will surely be refl ected in its increased importance and full engagement in the function of environmental protection in the state’s decision-making, concerning economic and social development, enhanced macro-control capabilities, and gradually improved law enforcement capabilities.

III. Promoting the Transformation of China’s Environment Management System

A. Problems and Challenges Facing MEP One of the major functions of MEP is to raise the status of environmental protection during the process of decision-making on China’s economic and social development. This puts forth requirements for the full engagement of MEP’s administrative function in environmental protection. As early as the restructuring of the State Council in 1998, there was advice from the department on strengthening SEPA’s comprehensive decision-making function. One recommendation was that by establishing and practicing a set of procedures and systems, SEPA should participate in the decision-making process concerning economic and social development which have big infl uences on the environment, and in the meantime propose environmental protection measures for decision- making departments when they deal with environment issues. Another recommendation was for SEPA to build an environment examination system on important economic decision-making and strengthen the basic functions of the environmental protection administration when 212 zhang shiqiu participating in comprehensive decision-making. But later, the plan for comprehensive decision-making did not work well. As stated in The Report on the Functioning of State Environmental Protection Administration (关于国家环保总局职能运行情况的报告) by SEPA, “when performing the environmental evaluation function on state’s policies and plans, SEPA still lacks the necessary guarantee mechanism and measures, and has a defi ciency in participating in comprehensive decision- making on social and economic development, which mainly accounts for the poor performance of comprehensive decision-making.”3 Now with the establishment of MEP, the proposal on improving the participation of environmental protection in comprehensive decision-making comes up again. The newly-established MEP has to solve the remaining problems and face the oncoming challenges so that the administrative capabilities of responsible departments for environmental protection can be enhanced and the comprehensive decision- making and environmental protection functions can practically come into operation. According to major research reports on China’s environment management system in recent years, the remaining problems mainly include the following: 1) The environmental protection management system lacks necessary and strict legislation, suffering from ambiguous legal provisions and contradictions between executive and judicial legislation; 2) Environmental protection lacks the necessary approaches for participating in the comprehensive decision-making process of social and economic development; 3) There is a setback in the comprehensive coordinating ability for environmental protection, as well as a lack of power and competence in the related departments on planning, performing, and coordinating environmental protection; 4) There is an unreasonable labor division among environmental protection and resource management departments, which leads to the failure of an overall supervision and management of ecological protection with the same standards. Problems such as “administration division” and “different systems at different levels” make “unifi ed supervision and management” impossible; 5) The unsound environmental protection measures and over-reliance on commanding and controlling

3 Xia Guang. “Strengthening the Capability of the Ministry of Environmental Pro- tection Participating in State Macro Decision-making.” China Environment News, May 12th, 2008. the ministry of environmental protection 213 administrative measures result in the limited effectiveness of environmental policies; 6) The absence of powerful environment management administrations across regions affects the response to the spread of environmental problems among different regions; and 7) Channels for the public to take part in decision-making needs improvement, and the transparency of environment-related information and the citizens’ environmental rights should be guaranteed.4 The problems of the existing environmental protection system are as follows: Environmental policies and the related environment management system detach themselves from the social operation and administrative body, and this marginal situation hampers the infl uence of environmental policies. The operation patterns of environmental protection attach too much importance on the government’s role. The top-down decision-making and implementation modes, together with the neglect of the basic economic rules and fundamental needs and interest of the society, make environmental protection become the burden of government and enterprises and intensify the confl icts between environmental protection and economic development. The government departments may become commission-seekers due to the benefi t-oriented departments in charge of public resources. These will not only increase the managing costs, but also, more probably, lead to the concentration of public resources in the hands of certain groups. What’s more, there is a lack of evaluation, monitoring, and examination of the management performance of administrative departments, as well as an absence of checks and balances on powers. MEP has the same sphere of jurisdiction as SEPA, but a higher status. The institutional change is only the fi rst step on the long journey. The core problem facing this new department is the legislative integration of functions on a horizontal basis and powers on a vertical basis

4 “China’s Environment: The Next Move of Administrative Reform,” World Bank; “China’s Environmental Performance Assessment,” Organization for Economic Coopera- tion and Development; “Research on China’s Environmental Administrative Capability,” China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development; “Accelerating the Reform on Environmental Supervision System, Achieving Energy Conservation, and Environmental Protection ,” The China Sustainable Energy Program; “China Environment Management: Advice on Reform Based on International Experiences,” The Natural Resources Defense Council; “The Research on China’s Reform on Environment Manage- ment System,” Policy Research Center for Environment and Economy, Ministry of Environmental Protection. 214 zhang shiqiu in environmental protection. The following are suggestions to address these problems:

1. Build an information-sharing environmental monitoring system, strengthen environmental monitoring management, unify monitoring data, improve monitoring quality and reinforce the monitoring power of responsible administrative departments for environmental protection. These are new requirements for environmental monitoring after the protection work enters the new stage of optimization of economic growth pattern from the environment perspective. 2. Integrate functions of different environmental protection executive powers. At present more than ten departments share different functions concerning environmental protection: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of negotiation on international treaties of environmental protection; the National Development and Reform Commission is in charge of policy-making on the environmental protection industry and industry restructuring and the work related to climate change; the Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for water resources protection; the State Forestry Administration manages forestry and ecological protection; the State Oceanic Administration is responsible for ocean environmental protection; China Meteorological Administration monitors climate change and air quality; the Ministry of Agri- culture is in charge of water and soil protection in rural areas; the Ministry of Construction manages the drinkable water and garbage in urban areas; the Ministry of Land and Resources administers water and soil conservation and soil protection; and the Ministry of Health guarantees the sanitation and security of drinkable water in both urban and rural area. The systematic functions of environmental protection are divided artiﬁ cially, which greatly affects the efﬁ ciency of environmental protection and the work of environmental protection departments.

Horizontally, there is function overlapping, which weakens the environmental protection of the executive power. Vertically, similar problems also exist, for the power is divided by governments at all levels and in some places the power is so widely distributed that no real power goes to local environmental protection departments, which are subject to local governments in terms of the staff, budge, and the ministry of environmental protection 215 equipment. The “treatment (or even non-treatment) after pollution” development mode adopted by some local governments extremely hinders the implementation of executive measures and scientiﬁ c and fair environmental monitoring of local environmental protection departments.5 This problem certainly needs to be addressed by coordinated approaches from a macro-level.

B. Promoting the Reform of China’s Environment Management System Currently, environmental resources are still the main contributor to economic growth. For a long time to come, secondary industry featured by intensive environmental resources will still play a leading role in China’s economic structure. Future-oriented reform on a macro- environment management system should strike a balance between economic growth, the environment’s quality, and environmental resource basis. This means to preserve the natural resources and maintain the environment’s quality in a manner of coordinating both efﬁ ciency and justice, in the context of developing the economy, getting rid of poverty, narrowing the income gap, and accelerating urbanization. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary for MEP not only to integrate department functions and perform the uniﬁ ed supervision and management function, but also to make the following transformations:

1. The transformation of governmental roles and functions from an enterprise type and department type, to a public service and managing type; 2. Lay emphasis on administration according to the law, approving administration efﬁ ciency and guaranteeing citizens’ rights by giving full engagement to the government rights; 3. The transformation of management goals from an economic- oriented and local economy-oriented style to one focusing on sustainable development with consideration for the economy, society, and the environment; 4. The transformation of the management mode and pattern from the “short-period intensive work” management mode and commanding manipulative pattern to a combination of multiple

5 “Integrating Powers and Functions to Give the Ministry of Environmental Protec- tion a Fair Position,” The Beijing News, March 28th, 2008. 216 zhang shiqiu

patterns and the establishment of encouraging and balancing management systems with a long-term effect; 5. The transformation of the decision-making mode from the top- down one to an interactive one, emphasizing democratic and comprehensive decision-making on a scientiﬁ c basis; 6. Guarantee public participation and its channels, enhance government credibility, and strengthen the capability of comprehensive decision-making and regulation-making monitoring.

MEP’s capability for comprehensive decision-making and macro- control mainly aims at the transformation from a pursuit of GDP to “greening” of the economy and a realization of Green GDP, which is the key to China’s sustainable development. Therefore, the breakthrough point in China’s reform of the environment management system and policies in the future should be—on the basis of recognizing environmental resources as important assets and capital—placing it in the market economy environment after clarifying the environmental rights and benefi ts. With the help of the market, this aims at developing the economy while not decreasing (even increasing) natural resource reserves and realizing effi cient and fair distribution of environmental resources between various interest groups. The core is to have the polluter, resource user, and benefi ciary pay the bill, which could make the responsibility of protecting the environment match the right to enjoy the environmental service. To fulfi ll this objective, fi rst we should recognize environmental resources as assets and apply this recognition to policy-making and social and economic management. We should promote the theoretical research and practice on product pricing based on the whole society’s cost instead of production costs, strengthen the making and performing of environmental policies, create an environment-friendly competition atmosphere for enterprises and technologies, and reduce the chances for any person or organization to occupy environmental resources at a low price or for free. Second, we should realize that as publicly owned property, environmental resources belong to all the Chinese people instead of only to the government. The government is the agency of realizing people’s environmental rights and interests and in charge of managing and adding value to environmental resources. So we should strive to achieve democratization and checks and balances of powers during the process of environmental decision-making. the ministry of environmental protection 217

Third, we should change the GDP- and growth-oriented development modes, reconsider China’s regional developing strategy from the perspective of overall capital, including artifi cial capital, human capital, natural capital, and even social capital, and update our knowledge of comparative advantage of regional development. Only in this way can we fully engage the regional function and protect important regions from destruction. Fourth, we should regulate the market by policies so as to effectively distribute environmental and economic resources based on the whole society’s costs, including the establishment of a unifi ed taxation system and environmental resource market. The tax policy on the environment and natural resources should be made and carried out as soon as possible. On one hand, this could encourage effective distribution of environmental resources, stop the occupation of environmental resources at a low price, and stimulate environment-friendly technological innovation and the transformation of growth patterns. On the other hand, this could promote equity of income distribution and prevent the over-concentration of natural capital. Fifth, we should give full play to the redistribution function of the government and establish an ecological compensation mechanism. By changing the mode of payment and coordinating the macro-fi scal, environmental, and economic policies, those areas and people could be compensated for the economic loss that resulted from the ecological protection, especially in the Western regions. In this way, over- consumption of the weak ecological system in these regions can be avoided and the interests of people living there protected. Finally, we should encourage market-oriented environmental and ecological services and help those who are unable to make money out of their environmental resources to shake off poverty, so that the ecological service providers could, as providers of other products, get the rewards they deserve.

NATURAL RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL AND CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE

Chen Hongwei

The proposals received and placed on ﬁ le after being reviewed at the 2008 sessions of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) add up to 4,663. Among these, 96 proposals were on natural resources and the environment, accounting for 2.06% of the total. These proposals focused on issues like resource prices and tax reform, revision of resource regulations and laws, adjustment of resource beneﬁ t distribution, development and management of water resources, protection of biodiversity, energy supply management, development and management of renewable energy, environmental protection management, and public participation in environmental protection. Many of the problems concerning natural resources and the environment remain unsolved, mainly because of inadequate laws and mechanism. Therefore, these proposals emphasize legal means and mechanisms for solutions. In comparison with administrative measures, most proposals favor market-based instruments. Relatively speaking, the role of public participation in environmental protection has not received due attention.

Key words: energy, environmental protection, proposals for the Chinese People’s Politi- cal Consultative Conference, natural resources

As the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) are the two major institutionalized channels for public participation in and deliberation of state affairs, proposals submitted to the CPPCC provide an important perspective on social issues and public participation. During the Eleventh CPPCC held in March 2008, 4,963 proposals were submitted, in total, and 4,663 proposals were placed on fi le after being reviewed. At the closing ceremony of the Eleventh CPPCC, a preliminary classifi cation of the 4,526 proposals to be placed on fi le showed that 1,863 of them were on economic construction, accounting for 41.16%; 1405 were on education, science, culture, health, and physical education, accounting for 31.04%; and 1,258 were on politics, legislation, and social security, accounting for 27.8%. For proposals on people’s livelihood, 509 were on agriculture, farmers, and rural areas; 389 were on medical and health care; 310 were on education; 177 were on natural resources and environmental protection; 287 were on employment and social security; 193 were on food and medical safety; and 139 were on housing. 220 chen hongwei

After the conference sessions, the relative department further checked these proposals and confi rmed that the number of proposals on natural resources and the environment were 121. The author of this article carefully went through the 121 proposals and found that the actual number was 96, accounting for 2.06% of the total. Compared with the percentage of proposals on economic construction (41.16%), this fi gure is much smaller. The 96 proposals covered various aspects of natural resources, energy, and environmental protection. Forty-fi ve of them were on resources, accounting for 46.9%; 36 were on energy, accounting for 37.5%; and 15 were on environmental protection, accounting for 15.6%. Some of the proposals covered more than one topic. Several important and hot issues attracted more attention from CPPCC members. Some examples include natural resource prices and tax reform, resource benefi t distribution, mineral resources management, water resources coordination and protection, biodiversity protection, energy supply and demand management, renewable energy strategies, new energy vehicles, institutional improvement of environmental protection management, and public participation in environmental protection.

I. Natural Resource Prices and Tax Reform

Regarding natural resource prices and tax reform, CPPCC members hold that as a result of a resource management monopoly in China and ambiguously defi ned property rights in resource sectors, the resource price and tax rate have long been too low. It covers only development and transportation costs, but not environmental restoration costs, infrastructure construction costs, work safety costs, or exit and change costs of enterprises. The natural resource price and tax rates are not in line with market supply and demand and resource scarcity. Irrational exploration and use of resources at a nominal cost have resulted in a great many social and economic issues. This includes the huge waste of resources as a result of low extraction rates, severe damage of to the environment caused by cost externalization and socialization of enterprises, insuffi cient compensation for the interests of resource-abundant areas, and resource benefi ts transferred at a very low price. As for natural resource prices, it has been suggested in related proposals that property relations in resource sectors should be clarifi ed in clearer terms, monopolistic management of resources should be natural resource and environmental issues 221 broken, and market competition should be encouraged. Financial management of resource product costs should be placed on a scientifi c basis to ensure that resource prices are in line with production costs and resource scarcity. The social security system should be improved to make sure that the livelihood of low-income people is not affected by rising resource prices. As for tax reform, it has been proposed that China’s Provisional Regu- lations on Resource Taxes of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国资源税暂行条例) should be formulated as soon as possible. The range of resource taxes should be expanded. Various kinds of similar taxes and fees like the current usage fees of mineral resources, land use tax, and usage fees of water resources should be combined and incorporated into resource taxes so as to regulate development and effi cient usage of non-renewable resources. Formulation of resource taxes should be based on a combination of quantity and price instead of being based solely on quantity. Resource tax rates should be raised, so as to promote sustainable development of resources. A mechanism for proper use of funds as earmarked should be set up to make use of resource tax income to promote resource conservation, to adjust industrial structures, and to improve the quality of economic development.

II. Suggestions for the Amendment of China’s Mineral Resources Law

Six proposals concern facilitating the amendment of China’s Mineral Resources Law (中华人民共和国矿产资源法) and related issues. It is considered that with social and economic development, the current version of the law is out of date. The role of the market in resource allocation is not given full play to. The systemic operability for the paid acquisition of mineral resources is problematic. The legal status of the overall planning of mineral resources is too low and its legal obligation is far from being complete. The protection of the environment and the common people’s interests by local governments in the process of planning, management, and development of mineral resources is insuffi cient. Suggestions for amendment of the law include: to set up a system for acquisition and circulation of mining rights that suits the market economy; to properly distribute benefi ts of mineral resources among governments at all levels; to formulate assessment and approval procedures 222 chen hongwei for land used for mining and a mode of transaction and management that suits the market economy; to defi ne clearly the nature and legal status of mining rights as a special ownership of property; to adjust procedures for transfer, extension, examination, approval, registration, and certifi cation of exploration rights and mining rights; and to strengthen the leading role of planning of mineral resources at all levels and ensure scientifi c development and ordered use of mineral resources. Moreover, it is proposed that enterprises should play the leading role in resource compensation, ecological and environmental protection and restoration, and that a system of security deposits for restoration and management of the geographical environment in mining areas should be set up.

III. Adjustment of Resource Beneﬁ t Distribution

In proposals related to resource benefi t distribution and resource compensation, it is held that since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, guided by the strategic thinking that the development of heavy industry should be given top priority, areas and cities with rich resources contributed greatly to the establishment and perfection of the industrial system and national economic construction in China. However, there are also some serious problems with the industrial system and structure in these areas and cities—regarding resource support, sustainable development, people’s livelihood, and the environment—which deserve attention from the central government and should be solved by policy, legal, and market measures. As for the development of cities with resources, the State Council enacted Suggestions on Promoting Sustainable Development of Cities with Resources (关于促进资源型城市可持续发展的若干意见). It contains policies on several aspects, including fi scal revenue, fi nance, and establishment of a resource development and compensation mechanism. Based on this document, which takes into consideration the different situations of various areas and cities, related proposals put forward suggestions like formulating policies to support the development of newly-rising industries, adopting preferential policies for land use, establishing a resource exploration and compensation mechanism, and establishing an ecological restoration and compensation mechanism. As for an ecological compensation mechanism in resource-exporting areas, it is proposed that funding for ecological compensation should natural resource and environmental issues 223 be set up with transfer payment from central fi nancing. Ecological compensation fees should be levied on outgoing resources and be managed and used by local governments. Trial work for an ecological compensation mechanism should be carried out in representative areas. Related departments should adopt policies requiring that enterprises engaged in oil, charcoal, and non-ferrous minerals should protect the ecological environment and treat water waste in resource exploration and development areas. It is also proposed that under-developed areas that heavily rely on resources for growth should take into consideration the issue of sustainable development. For resource exploration in areas with minority populations, the interests of minority areas should be prioritized in benefi t distribution. Local enterprises should be registered. The issue of compensation to the migrant population should be dealt with properly. Enterprise owners should pay resource compensation fees in full as required.

IV. Water Resource Exploration and Management

It is held in some proposals that water shortages and water waste are very serious in China and should be paid great attention to by the central government. Although water diversion across areas has drawn strong criticism, some CPPCC members still suggest commencing the project to “divert water from the Brahmaputra River to the Yellow River” and have provided detailed feasibility reports. In the legislative and judicial perspective of water pollution prevention and management, some proposals suggest: representatives for public interest subjects in lawsuits for environmental protection should be defi ned at an early date, efforts should be put into research on public interest lawsuits for environmental protection, and it should be made clear that maritime courts should be in charge of lawsuits related to water pollution. Some CPPCC members also put forward that ecological protection programs for the Yangtze River basin should be drawn up as soon as possible. Attention should be paid to the problems of low effi ciency, fl oods, water loss, and soil erosion in water exploration, use, and protection on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Efforts should be made in the positioning of water recourse exploration, use, and protection in Tibet. 224 chen hongwei

Regarding water resources in Beijing, some proposals contend that a water compensation mechanism should be set up as soon as possible. Measures include establishing a special fund for ecological compensation for water resource protection in Beijing and neighboring Hebei Province, prioritizing environmental construction with treasure bonds or a special fund, thoroughly establishing a long-term trans-provincial capital compensation mechanism based on existing water protection projects in Beijing and Hebei, carrying out trial work on market compensation for water protection, and providing technological project compensation to improve renewable resource capabilities of the upper reaches of the Yangtze River.

V. Protection of Biological Diversity

The development and protection of biological resources attracted great attention from CPPCC members. According to the Proposal on Formulating Biological Genetic Resources Management Rules at an Early Date (关于尽快出台, <生物遗传资源管理条例>的提案), owing to the gap in bio-technology developments and applications, China is a free genetic recourse provider. Thus, China is suffering a heavy loss of many important genetic resources. Therefore, it is imperative to legiti- mize the management. The Proposal on Strengthening the Protection of Wild Arethusa in China (关于加强保护我国野生兰科植物资源的提案) emphasizes that the 1247 varieties of arethusa (a type of orchid) have suffered three extensive explorations and the fourth is beginning on a scale more intensive than the last three times. If no actions are taken, the last chance to save the wild arethusa will be lost. So it has been suggested to revise the Regula- tions on Wild Flora Protection (野生植物保护条例) or elevate it to Law on Wild Flora Protection (野生植物保护法) as soon as possible. The Proposal on Strengthening the Protection of Crop Diversity in Ethnic Group Areas (关于加强我国少数民族地区农业生物多样性资源保护的提案) points out that the varieties of the crop related wild species are gradually reducing and large quantities of genetic resources are disap- pearing. The problems have resulted from deforestation, overgrazing, land degradation, single-crop farming, irrational utilization of water resources, exotic species invasion, and the impacts of tourism, mining, and marsh draining. First of all, comprehensive research should be conducted on crop species distribution in order to enhance both in-situ natural resource and environmental issues 225 and extra-situ conservation. Secondly, laws concerning the protection, research, and exploration of biological diversity should be formulated. Thirdly, a warning system should be set up to prevent invasion of new species. According to the Proposal on Protection of Flora Resources in Hainan Province from the Perspective of National Biological Safety (关于从维护国家生态安全的高度加强对海南植物资源保护的提案), Hainan has substantial biological resources thanks to its geographical and climate conditions, but they are also faced with challenges. First, population increases and economic growth have pushed many species to the edge of extinction. Second, the invasion of exotic species gravely threatens local biological safety. Therefore measures should be taken to establish nature reserves, build a seed bank for the protection of seed plants, set up a management system against exotic species invasion, provide public service against tropical forest and plant diseases, and devote more efforts to research on the speedy reproduction of endangered plants. The Proposal on Scientiﬁ c Utilization of Medicinal Resources in Qinghai Province (关于做好青海省药材资源制定科学利用规划的提案) warns that biodiversity in Qinghai is undermined by illegal digging and collecting of medicinal herbs. It suggests that the State Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine (国家中医药管理局), together with other relevant departments, make scientiﬁ c and sustainable planning based on a survey of medicinal resources.

VI. Enforcing Management of the Supply of Energy Resources

Altogether, there were 36 proposals on energy resources. They covered a wide range of various topics, including reforming China’s energy resource supply mode to promote regional emergency responding capacities, improving the existing management mechanism to promote the development of a distributed generation (DG) system, enhancing “contract energy management,” establishing the principle of “extensive conservation of energy resources,” enforcing the demand side management (DSM) of energy resources by setting up a market-oriented mechanism for energy conversation, setting indicators for measuring energy resource consumption, promoting energy conversation, environmental protection, and green life as a basic state policy, establishing a green consumption mode focusing on energy conservation, and establishing the Ministry of Energy. 226 chen hongwei

Some proposals maintain that a lesson should be learned from the energy problems revealed in the snowstorm that hit South China in early 2008. These proposals suggest that the traditional centralized supply model should be replaced by a new energy supply system with centralized supply as the main mode and regional supply as a sup- plement. Other proposals were about promoting diversifi ed regional energy resources in accordance with different local conditions and adopting a fl exible mechanism, so as to encourage enterprises and individuals to participate in energy reform. There were several other suggestions concerning the establishment of a distributed generation energy source system. They urged that the revised version of the Electric Power Law (电力法) should add new articles to emphasize the development of distributed generation energy sources and the technology of putting power on the national grid, to set down the technological criterion of putting power on the national grid, and to make sure that each year a certain percentage of newly increased gas supplies by gas enterprises should be devoted to distributed generation energy source projects. The proposals on an energy management contract (EMC)1 suggest giving more fi nancial support to and adopting preferential policies for EMC, paying more attention to the examination of saving energy and emissions reduction, and encouraging EMC operations in different places. Some proposals maintain that scientifi c indicators measuring energy source consumption levels should be set, which means that the relevant governmental departments should set comprehensive indicators for energy consumed in production and per capita energy consumption.

1 Translator’s note: EMC is short for energy management contract. Since the middle of the 1970s, a brand new market-oriented energy conservation mechanism, “energy management contract” (EMC), has been developing gradually in countries with a market-directed economy. This professional energy conservation service company (ESCO for short in the west), which is operated based on this new energy conservation system, has developed extremely fast, especially in the USA, Canada, and Europe. Thus, ESCO has become a new and rising energy conservation industry. EMC is a kind of professional company which is operated based on “contract energy management” mechanism and aiming directly at gaining profi ts. EMC will sign a contract with any customer who is willing to improve its energy conservation system, providing it with energy effi ciency audits, energy conservation project designing, purchase of rough material and facilities, construction, training, operation maintenance, energy conservation monitoring, and so on, and will share with the customer the profi t made by the energy conservation after the project is carried out. (Source: www .powerU.cn) natural resource and environmental issues 227

A table on China’s import and export of energy sources should be made. Some proposals emphasize the importance of demand side management of energy sources. Its application in China is constrained by many factors such as policy, system, and market. Therefore, an overall plan should be made with all factors taken into consideration when applying demand side management in the key domain. A rational electric power price structure should be built. The demand side management on construction consumption should be enforced. Based on the structure, consumption rations should be set, and the part higher than the ration should be charged at a higher price. Other proposals suggest promoting resource-conserving green consumption, including green purchasing by the governments on all levels and green consumption by individuals.

VII. Development and Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources

The proposals concerning renewable energy sources amount to more than 20, accounting for over two thirds of those on energy sources. According to the proposals, the increasingly severe problems of the shortage of traditional fossil fuel energy resources and environmental protection have become the bottleneck of China’s economic and social sustainable development. If renewable resources like solar energy, wind energy, hydro energy, and geothermal heat can be better utilized, the problems of fossil fuel resource shortages and irrational proportion of energy resources will be solved. Dependence on exported fossil fuel energy will be reduced so that national energy resource security can be guaranteed. Additionally, grave environmental pollution can be lessened. The exploration and management of renewable resources in China, though they have witnessed some progress, remains in the primary phase of development. Large-scale promotion and application is very difﬁ cult because of an underdeveloped industrial base, shortage of talents and technologies, uneven product quality, and an inadequate service system. The situation has mainly resulted from three factors. First, there is no clear strategy, goal, or long-term layout of renewable energy development, as its strategic position is not clearly deﬁ ned. Second, there are no detailed implementing rules in accordance with China’s 228 chen hongwei

Renewable Energy Law (可再生能源法) and there are no related industry standards and mature systems of examination and attestation. Third, there is not enough funding and no incentive mechanism to stimulate renewable energy development and utilization. These proposals contend that renewable energy development and utilization should be considered from a strategic perspective and added into national special projects. Large sized state-owned enterprises of new energy resources should be established. Detailed and feasible stimulus measures should be taken in accordance with different varieties of renewable energy technologies, such as tax exemption, duration, and price subsidies. Relevant enterprises should straighten up the current standards to form a system of technology standards of renewable energy resources and to complete the making of standards of various levels. Specifi c proposals focus on the development of wind energy, solar energy, and biological energy. Some CPPCC members expressed their concerns about the tendency of blind growth of biological energy, which not only infl uences agricultural demands on other biological resources, but brings little benefi t to farmers. Hence, these proposals suggest giving priority to agriculture, rural areas, and farmers in biological energy development and making biological energy a new industry in the countryside and an attempt for industry to repay agriculture and to let the city support the countryside.

VIII. Development of New Energy Automobiles

With rapid economic growth, the automobile industry has become China’s pillar industry. In 2007, China produced 8.5 million automobiles. Currently, there are more than 30 million automobiles, making China the third largest automobile producer and the second largest market around the world. Fuels consumed by automobiles have reached 80 million tons, accounting for almost one quarter of the total demanding quantity of petroleum in China. At the same time, the import volume is increasing annually, with the dependence ratio as high as 47%. Moreover, the environmental pollution caused by fuel burning and greenhouse gas emissions is attracting increasing attention from the international community. The emission of greenhouse gases is a hot topic related to many ﬁ elds such as international politics, economics, and diplomatic relations. natural resource and environmental issues 229

Now it is an urgent and practical choice to develop new energy automobiles and to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels so that there will be less environmental pollution. A proposal points out that there are only two joint ventures in China with the ability to produce new energy automobiles, but there are no encouraging or subsidizing policies for fear of inﬂ uencing the traditional automobile industry. Addi- tionally, the government is reluctant to make supporting policies for the sake of the local brand automobiles. Therefore, hybrid vehicles produced by local enterprises take a small proportion of the total. Some proposals suggest intensifying research on technology and resources when developing new energy vehicles, setting technological emission standards for new energy vehicles, implementing policies of restraining the production and consumption of traditional engines, promoting the production and consumption of new energy automobiles, strengthening research and development of the core technology of new energy automobiles, and giving more support to producers of automobile parts. Some proposals emphasize raising awareness of environmental protection and resource conservation. They propose many methods to encourage the development of cars with small engine displacement, such as making it a state policy to encourage the development of low emissions cars. According to this policy, a series of laws and regulations favorable for production and use of low emission cars should be issued. Furthermore, the government should set an example by using low emission cars.

IX. Enforcing Environmental Protection Management

Among all the proposals concerning environmental protection, the Proposal on Upgrading the State Organizations of Environmental Protection (关于大力加强国家环保机构建设的提案) have attracted the greatest attention. At the NPC and CPPCC sessions, the decision to upgrade the State Environmental Protection Administration to the Ministry of Environmental Protection was declared. This proposal, jointly put forward by twelve CPPCC members, argued that development of environmental protection in China is confronted with many diffi culties with rapid economic growth at home and the acceleration of environmental protection globally. Under such circumstances, environmental protection departments have a strong 230 chen hongwei responsibility. However, they are faced with many problems in terms of structure, functions, and capabilities. Moreover, the outbreaks of regional and national environmental incidents cause striking confl icts in management, put great pressure on these agencies, and constrain them from giving full play to their role. Therefore, the proposal suggests restructuring environmental protection departments, establishing a ministry of environmental protection to strengthen functions of comprehensive supervision and service, and enhancing the authority of environmental management to overcome institutional obstacles that hamper environmental protection from developing. As for the management of environmental protection, one of the proposals suggests adopting preferential fi nance and tax policies for environmental protection. It contends that China’s environmental protection has progressed from the phase of construction to the phase of both construction and operation. The state preferential fi nance and tax policies in the fi eld of environmental protection are no longer suitable for this new change. The old concept attaches more importance to facility manufacturing and project construction than operation management. The proposal suggests changing the principle of “those who pollute the environment should treat the problem” to that of “those who pollute the environment should be held responsible.” This change will allow the polluter to hire a third party to treat the problem. According to this proposal, environmental subsidies should be given equally to construction and operation, preferential tax policies should be implemented in environmental operation, and operation contractors of environmental protection should be encouraged to participate in infrastructure construction on franchise.

X. Public Participation on Environmental Protection

On the one hand, environmental protection relies on a series of policies, laws, systems, and technologies. On the other hand, it also needs public participation. The Proposal to Bring About Public Participation in Environmental Protection (关于充分发挥社会力量在环保中的重要作用的提案) holds that only when there is sufﬁ cient public participation, can the deteriorating environment be improved. Therefore, environmental protection departments should conduct in-depth investigations and research, produce a comprehensive guide book for environmental natural resource and environmental issues 231 protection, encourage enterprises and the public to participate in environmental protection, provide incentives for pollution reporting, state clearly how environmental protection departments practice surveillance out of ofﬁ ce hours, and give more law enforcement power to environmental protection departments.2 The Proposal on Opening a Hot Line for Environmental Pollution Reporting (关于设立环保统一举报电话的提案) holds that it is not enough to protect the environment purely with supervision and management by local environmental protection departments. There also needs to be supervision from the public. Therefore, the proposal suggests opening a hot line for environmental incident reporting.3 Finally, The Proposal to Introduce Environmental Education into the Com- pulsory Education System (关于将环保节能常识纳入义务教育必修课的提案), suggests that energy conservation and environmental education should be included in the teaching syllabus of the nine-year compulsory education system.

2 Translator’s note: This suggestion is directed at the fact that many polluting enterprises discharge waste water at night to escape surveillance when environmental protection departments are out of ofﬁ ce hours. 3 A nation-wide hotline numbered 12369 for environmental protection was opened in June 2001. However, according to a public survey, less than 20% of interviewees know this number. Most ordinary people are not aware of this, including CPPCC members who submitted this proposal.

PLASTIC BAG RESTRICTION: AN UNFINISHED MISSION

Mao Da

In 2008, China’s “plastic bag restriction policy” was a big event in the sphere of environmental protection. Though the policy has made some achievements in reducing plastic bag consumption, shoddy plastic bags still prevail, and there has been no substantial advance in recycling plastic bags. The difﬁ culties of the policy’s implementation and its unsatisfactory results are mainly due to the absence of accountability, poor transparency, and lack of resource guarantees. However, it is a good opportunity to combine improving the policy with fostering a new type of public policy culture in China.

Key words: plastic shopping bag, plastic bag pollution, charged use, public policy

Plastic bags are light and ﬂ imsy, but they are very important for the environmental protection of China. The plastic bag restriction policy was a signiﬁ cant environmental event in China in 2008, aiming to reduce plastic bag pollution and change people’s consumption habits. By making the plastic bag restriction policy and investigating its effects, common understandings about Chinese environmental protection policies could be reached.

I. Evolution and Analysis of the “Plastic Bag Restriction Policy”

An integrated plastic bag restriction policy should include several things:

1. The Notice Issued by the State Council on the Limitation of Production and Consumption of Plastic Bags (国务院办公厅关于限制生产销售使用塑料购物袋的通知), which demands that all supermarkets, grocery stores, and open markets stop providing free plastic bags beginning June 1st, 2008; 2. The three national standards declared by the National Standard Committee (国家标准委);1

1 The three standards include the General Technique Requirements for Environ- mental Protection, Security, and Sign of Plastic Shopping Bags (GB/T21660-2008), 234 mao da

3. Measures on Charged Use of Plastic Shopping Bags in Commodity Retail Sites (商品零售场所塑料购物袋有偿使用管理办法) jointly issued by the Ministry of Commerce, the National Develop- ment and Reform Commission, and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce; 4. Opinions on Relevant Issues about the Measures (关于<商品零售场所塑料购物袋有偿使用管理办法>有关问题的处理意见); 5. The interpretation of these documents by the authoritative government ofﬁ cers.

A. Aims and Goals The Notice Issued by the State Council on the Limitation of Production and Consumption of Plastic Bags (henceforth, called the Notice), issued on December 31st, 2007 can be seen as the legal basis for the plastic bag restriction policy. Just as the ﬁ rst paragraph of the Notice declares, the purpose of proclaiming the policy is to put a scientiﬁ c outlook on development into effect, build a resource-conserving and environmentally friendly society, take effective measures to cut pollution from the source, improve comprehensive utilization of resources, protect the environment, and further promote energy conservation and emissions reduction. Therefore, the plastic bag restriction policy is an environmental protection policy based on eliminating the source of pollution. The three basic goals of the policy are:

1. To supervise plastic bag manufacturing factories, making them produce durable and easily recyclable plastic shopping bags; 2. To guide and encourage the public to use plastic shopping bags in a restricted way; 3. To increase the recoverability rate of used plastic bags.

However, as public policies, the Notice and Measures on Charged Use of Plastic Shopping Bags in Commodity Retail Sites (henceforth, called Measures) emphasize the qualitative rather than quantitative aspects. Though

the recommended national standard Plastic Shopping Bags (GB/T 21661-2008) and the Quick Test Method and Evaluation of Plastic Shopping Bags (GB/T21662- 2008). plastic bag restriction: an unfinished mission 235 both documents require the local governments to detail implementation measures, they have not proposed a quantitative policy goal, nor have they demanded that local governments do so.

B. Speciﬁ c Measures and Policies

1. Banning Ultra-Thin Plastic Bags The Notice imposed “zero existence” for ultra-thin plastic bags. It regulates that plastic shopping bags less than 0.025 millimeters in thickness are prohibited from being produced, sold, or used across the country beginning June 1st, 2008. Through investigation, it was recognized that it is problematic to decide whether a plastic bag is environmentally friendly or not based on its thickness. Thick plastic bags use more resources, but the quality of plastic bags with 0.01–0.03 millimeters in thickness can also reach a durable standard as thick plastic bags do. In 2003, Taiwan implemented a regulation that the thickness of plastic bags should not be less than 0.06 millimeters, but this regulation was cancelled in 2007. It is unreasonable to think that only ultra-thin plastic bags cause plastic bag pollution. In fact, all plastic bags, regardless of their thickness, might contain poisonous and hazardous substances and can bring about visual pollution, while the ecological impact of their recycling is still a problem. Opinions on Relevant Issues about the Measures (henceforth, called Opin- ions), which was introduced in July, also provides a supplementary provision about the quality of food prepackaging bags. It reiterates that “prepackaging bags used for fresh food such as meat or seafood are free of charge on condition that they cannot be lifted as shopping bags.” However, many shop owners at farm produce markets pack fresh meat or sea food with plastic shopping bags. Should this be restricted? No one has given an explanation on this issue.

2. Charging Plastic Bags The plastic bag restriction policy speciﬁ es that a charge system for plastic bags should be set up. It requires marking the price for plastic bags and charging them separately from commodities. A charge system intends to guide consumers to use plastic shopping bags in a restricted way or as little as possible. However, different parties interpret the system differently. 236 mao da

Charging for plastic bags can help reduce using them. Firstly, marking a price and charging for those bags deliver a message to the public that plastic bags also cost money. Secondly, these measures can alert consumers to problem of plastic bag pollution and raise their awareness of environmental protection. Thirdly, the charge system provides fairness for environmental protection behavior: those who use plastic bags more should pay more.

3. Establishing an Account System for Plastic Bags The third aspect of the plastic bag restriction policy is establishing an account system for plastic bags, with the purpose of urging businesses to accept the supervision of functional departments on their own initiatives. Thus, making them stop the usage of non-standard plastic bags and achieve quantitative management for the turnover consumption of plastic bags. Carrying out the account system is an effective means to accomplish these goals if we strive to implement the quantitative goal of reducing plastic bag usage.

4. Recycling Used Plastic Bags The last aspect of the plastic bag restriction policy is strengthening the recycling of used plastic bags. In the document’s wording, this is the weakest section of the policy. It only consists of very general principles, without any speciﬁ c guidelines.

C. Plastic Bag Restriction Policy as a General Public Policy As a regulatory document of the central government, the plastic bag restriction policy has some ﬂ aws in the public policy making process. For example, it demands that the local governments further establish detailed rules of implementation. Though the policy mentions public participation and supervision, it fails to provide speciﬁ c implementation guidelines to guarantee its actualization. Just as many other public policies, it only emphasizes requirements and responsibilities, but lacks the arrangements in terms of resource guarantees. As a result, despite declaring the date of its coming into effect and the date of withdraw- ing food prepackaging bags from markets, the plastic bag restriction policy offers no schedules for completing its various tasks. plastic bag restriction: an unfinished mission 237

II. Evaluation of the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy’s Implementation

The plastic bag restriction policy has brought about signiﬁ cant changes to social and economic life since it was put into effect on June 1st, 2008. To assess these changes, we should evaluate several aspects.

A. Effect of the Ban on Ultra-Thin Plastic Bags The ﬁ rst objective of the plastic bag restriction policy is to promote the production of plastic bags that meet international standards, while eliminating the production of non-standard bags—mainly ultra-thin ones. The policy cut the production of plastic bags considerably. It is reported that in Xiong County (雄县), Hebei Province, which is North China’s manufacturing center of plastic bags, 50 out of the 208 plastic bag manufacturing companies have stopped production since June. Among those that are still operating, 149 factories make their products in accordance with the state standards, with another nine disobeying the rules. At least 50% of the small-sized enterprises in the county are likely to shut down because of the high costs of changing the line of production.2 It is notable that in the process of being compelled to shutdown, some manufacturers told reporters that they were not going to abandon the equipment for producing ultra-thin plastic bags. Instead, they believe that there will still be a demand for ultra-thin plastic bags, and the ban might be lifted after the Beijing Olympic Games. There were reports on the illegal production of ultra-thin plastic bags in late June. However, there were no more reports on the production of plastic bags after July. Ultra-thin plastic bags can be found everywhere, especially in farm produce markets and private stores. Therefore, it can be assumed that the production of non-standard plastic bags never stopped. Fur- thermore, non-standard bags labeled as “environment-friendly” can be seen everywhere. On September 4th, the Ministry of Commerce announced the result of a sample survey on the plastic bag supply market in Shanghai, with the rate of standard bags being only 56.5%.

2 China Plastic Industry, “A Survey in Xiong County: the Plastic Industry Expects a Turnaround under the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy,” http://www.sujiao.cc/ TradeNews/ViewTradeInfo.aspx?InfoId=8636 (accessed June 19th, 2008). 238 mao da

The situation is probably worse in other areas, given the relatively strong public administration of Shanghai. In mid-November, media in Hainan Province reported that, since August, non-standard plastic bags had occupied the markets to such a great extent that “legal manufacturers face massive shutdown.” The cases in Shanghai and Hainan reﬂ ect the situation of the whole country. Yet, the existence of large quantities of ultra-thin plastic bags cannot completely deny the effect of the plastic bag restriction policy. In fact, there are two supply chains of plastic bags in China. One runs from standard manufacturers to major retailers, with the standard rate of around 90%. The other runs from illegal small manufacturers to farm produce markets and private stores, which are left out by the plastic bag restriction policy.

B. Effects of Charging for Plastic Bags The regulation to reduce the consumption of plastic bags is much more effective than the ban on ultra-thin plastic bags. Experts say that by July 2008, the use of plastic bags had decreased by 80%—this is 90% in department stores and supermarkets across the country and around 50% in farm produce markets. The daily consumption of plastic bags was reduced by two-thirds, or from one billion to two or three hundred million. This drop, in turn, reduced the amount of plastic littering, which decreased by about 20% one month after the policy was introduced, according to the sanitation authorities in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Suzhou, and Haikou (海口).3 The above statistics show that the policy had initial outcome of curbing the consumption of plastic bags. But the consumption increased after four or ﬁ ve months, not only at farm produce markets, but also in supermarkets. According to two surveys conducted in June and from September to October by non-governmental organization (NGO) researchers, over 90% of the chain supermarkets in Beijing observed the regulation of the use of paid plastic bags.4 The situation in major shopping centers and department stores became better, while less than 20% of the farm produce markets followed the policy, as

3 Wang Ran. “Plastic Littering Decreased 20% One Month after the Introduction of the Restriction Policy,” Consumption Daily, July 17th, 2008. 4 Here NGO researchers are members of the NGO Action Group for the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy, made up by NGO workers and university personnel. plastic bag restriction: an unfinished mission 239 opposed to 40% when it was fi rst implemented. It is similar in shops selling one particular product, of which less than 25% observed the rule, compared with 30%–40% when the policy was initiated. There- fore, the effect of the implementation of the policy to charge for the use of plastic bags was weakening in retailers from mid-June to late October 2008. As time goes by, the effect of curbing the use of plastic bags through charging for them declined gradually. A sample survey conducted by an NGO shows that about 25% of the customers at supermarkets bought plastic bags in June, which increased to an average of 37.27% by September and October. At some supermarkets, 70% of the customers would buy plastic bags. On November 27th, the International Food Packaging Association announced that among the investigated supermarkets in Beijing, 40% saw an increase in the use of plastic bags.5 Meanwhile, many big shopping centers and department stores began giving out free non-woven shopping bags or paper bags, which were not covered by the restriction policy. This totally went against the initial purpose of the policy, as nearly the same amount of resources was consumed by those bags. As a result, the effect on environmental protection was severely undermined.6 The same problem occurred when local governments and enterprises distributed shopping bags which can be repeatedly used. During each activity to promote the plastic bag restriction policy, tens of thousands of cloth bags (including non-woven bags) were given out freely. The Snowfl ake Environmental Protection Campaign, supported by the Beijing Environmental Pro- tection Bureau, was launched in March. The organizer claimed to distribute ten million “environment-friendly shopping bags” to citizens in Beijing. Indeed, this is a new type of waste in the name of environmental protection. According to surveys conducted by NGOs, environmental protection organizations, and university clubs, the regulation charging for the use of plastic bags has signifi cantly altered people’s shopping

5 Dou Hongmei, “Six Months after Implementation of Plastic Bag Restriction Policy: the Use of Plastic Bags Increased in 40% of the Supermarkets, and the Use of Ultra-thin Bags Increased in 80% of the Markets,” Beijing Daily, November 28th, 2008. 6 NGO Action Group for Plastic Bags Policy, “Report on the Effect of Plastic Bag Restriction Policy in Beijing and Customers’ Feedback,” http://napbp.blog.sohu .com/107842285.html (accessed November 2008). 240 mao da habits. Seventy to eighty percent of supermarket customers bring their own shopping bags, or buy plastic shopping bags as little as possible. Therefore the regulation has considerably cut down the use of plastic bags. However, not fully aware of the signifi cance of the policy, most customers think that, though the policy is necessary, the implementation should be fl exible in different cases. In their opinion, supermarkets and department stores ought to closely observe the regulation, while farm produce markets and other shops don’t have to. Besides, consumers feel that they are subject to fi nancial loss due to the policy, so most of them would accept free plastic bags provided by shops. Statistics in Beijing show that female, middle-aged, and elderly people are more willing to avoid the use of plastic bags than males and the young. However, income has no signifi cant effect on the consumption habits of plastic bags users.7

C. Implementation of the Account System for the Purchase and Sale of Plastic Bags Soon after the policy came into effect, local industrial and commercial bureaus carried out inspections to ensure the implementation of the account system. Many retailers received penalties or warnings due to the delay in setting up the account system. But there have been few related reports since June; thus, how the account system was implemented remains unknown.

D. Recycling Used Plastic Bags The effect of the policy on recycling used plastic bags is also unclear. In July, Dong Jinshi (董金狮), a plastic expert, leader of the plastic business association and a member of the experts group of the plastic bag restriction policy, told the media that endeavors on recycling will not start before the ultra-thin bags ceased to exist, the quality of plastic bags was ensured, and the market supervision system was perfected. By the end of November 2008, no speciﬁ cation on the implementation of the policy had been issued by the government, and plastic

7 NGO Action Group for Plastic Bags Policy. “Report on the Effect of the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy in Beijing and Customers’ Feedback,” http://napbp.blog.sohu .com/107842285.html (accessed November 2008). plastic bag restriction: an unfinished mission 241 bags were recycled basically in the same way as they were before the restriction was put forth.

III. Plastic Bag Restriction Policy and Public Policy Culture

A. Public Policy Culture behind the Plastic Bag Restriction Policy On the one hand, the successful implementation of the plastic bag restriction policy in supermarkets tells us that an environmental protection policy is able to make a big difference if the policy goes well with reality. On the other hand, the overall implementation of the plastic bag restriction policy is unsatisfactory, which indicates that there exists some problems in terms of speciﬁ c measures. An effective implementation of a public policy requires the integration of the objective, methods, and practical situations. The practical situation that the plastic bag restriction policy relies on mainly involves “people,” namely, the policy audience including lower levels of governments, plastic bag producers, circulators, consumers, and users and recyclers of plastic bags. Besides “people,” the “practical situation” of the policy also involves “things,” which includes plastic bags, natural resources, and the environment. It is hard for the people concerned to cooperate and implement the policy if the policy fails to express their will and their “practical situation.” It seems that during the making and implementation of the plastic bag restriction policy, there was more closed-door policy-making rather than transparency, more administrative ordering and passive observing rather than interactive participation, and more blind complaints rather than sober-minded resources guarantee. These faults directly hinder the making and implementation of the detailed measures of the plastic bag restriction policy.

1. The Ambiguous Responsible Party After the implementation of the plastic bag restriction policy, the responsibility of relative departments was limited to just answering some questions raised by the media. Dong Jinshi became the sole spokesman of the policy. Yet, some of his remarks do not seem to conform to the regulations of the policy or the explanations made by some government ofﬁ cials. No wonder the public and the media complain about the interpretation of the policy. Moreover, since it is 242 mao da not clear which party is responsible for the policy, the communication of information is inefﬁ cient—thus, impeding an effective participation of the public.

2. Lack of Democratic Decision-Making Process On the aspect of encouraging the participation of all parties and a democratic decision-making process, the Notice was not publicly dis- cussed before it was issued. There were also no platforms like commissions, public hearings, or symposiums for the interaction between the policy-makers and the policy audience. At the same time, although Measures underwent an opinion collection process (mainly about the issue of charging for plastic bags), the process lasted only seven days. Therefore, it is clear that the policy has faults, including a lack of quantitative goals, schedules, implementation plans, and implementation procedures.

3. Lack of Policy Means and Resource Guarantees Some public opinions regard the hastily issued plastic bag restriction policy as one of the “Olympic Games Policies.” But from a long-term perspective, an efﬁ cient implementation of policy needs more than just the short-term political motivation and determination. A lawyer in Beijing has criticized that without resource guarantees and enough legal workers to enforce the policy, this policy exists in name only.

B. Cultivation of a New Public Policy Culture To make the plastic bag restriction policy effective, ﬁ rst of all, we need to change the public policy culture. The following suggestions on cultivating a new public policy culture are proposed to improve the situation.

1. Clarify the Coordinating Body and Responsible Parties The promulgation and implementation of the plastic bag restriction policy gives no clear identiﬁ cation of its authority. People do not know which party is in charge of giving orders and coordinating all of its related parties. Judged from its feature, the plastic bag restriction policy should be an environmental protection policy, but environmental protection authorities have never stepped out on the front stage. Therefore, the institute in charge of this policy must be clariﬁ ed and the channels for contact made open. Hereafter, this institute will be plastic bag restriction: an unfinished mission 243 responsible for the implementation and improvement of this policy, and it will respond to concerns by the public and the media.

2. Set Up a Platform for Democratic Decision-Making To set up a platform for democratic decision-making, we need not only to reach a consensus, but also to set up a mechanism to balance the interests of all parties. Direct stakeholders obviously include local governments, plastic bags producers, retail businesses, and customers. These stakeholders currently have their representatives, like business associations and customer associations, all of which could be taken as objects for policy participation. Besides, we should specially protect the representative rights of some small but legal producers and retailers, and introduce representatives of recycling businesses, professional scholars, and NGOs, especially environmental NGOs to the decision- making platform. The government may have counseled quite a few experts for suggestions and advice before the promulgation of the plastic bag restriction policy, but this kind of old inner circle counseling model is not perfect, as proved by the implementation of the policy. The suggestion collecting process should be more open and inclusive, so that the experts’ ideas and the decision-making process can be more transparent.

3. Work on Key Issues The priority is to get a clear understanding of the present situation and work on key issues, covering plastic bag production, plastic bag management and uses in retailing departments, customers’ use and disposal of plastic bags, and the collection and recycling of used plastic bags. We need to work on the following key issues:

a. The correlation between plastic bag consumption, resource consumption, and environmental pollution; b. The relationship between the material, quality, price, and recycling of plastic bags; c. Whether it is appropriate to use the thickness of plastic bags as the qualiﬁ cation standard; d. The practical effect and scope of application of the system of charging for plastic bags; e. Research and evaluation on alternative measures; f. The study and evaluation of similar plastic bag restrictions abroad. 244 mao da

There is practically no study of these issues in our country. New studies should break the monopoly of the government and a few academic institutes. The government may consider the possibility of choosing a third party and entrusting its research and study project to this independent party, which may help to form a diversiﬁ ed and independent intellectual production system.

4. Make Practical Goals to Be Achieved Gradually Based on thorough research and study, we need to avoid setting big and unrealistic goals. All stakeholders participating should resume a share of responsibility for the result of the policy, which may also help to enhance the reliability of the whole plan.

5. Urge the Implementation of Detailed Rules To work out the implementation details of the policy is a good opportunity for the local departments to study thoroughly their local situations and make rational implementation details accordingly, under the encouragement and supervision of the policy authority. Ningbo (宁波市) is one of the few cities to work out implementation details. According to these details, vendors in the market should not provide shopping bags except for prepackaging bags. If a customer needs a shopping bag, he/she has to buy it in a designated place in the market, not from the vendors. No matter how well this measure works, this is a good attempt to solve the problem from the perspective of the local practical situation. This kind of brave, innovative spirit is worthy of emulating in other cities.

6. Explain and Illustrate the Policy to the Public If the authorities do not give full explanations and illustrations of the plastic bag restriction policy, the media—which has the power of dis- course—may interpret the policy according to their own understanding. Their interpretation may differ from the reality or the original intention of the policy-makers, which will inﬂ uence the effect of the policy’s implementation. Misunderstandings on “charged use” and inaccurate reports on the scope of the application of charges both reveal such kinds of problems. In the future, related parties should strengthen their work in terms of explanations, illustrations, and promulgations of the plastic bag restriction policy to give the public accurate information and avoid spreading ambiguous views. plastic bag restriction: an unfinished mission 245

7. Policy Goals Should Unite and Match with Resources In the implementation of the plastic bag restriction policy on all levels of executive bodies, speciﬁ c implementation plans should be made, including the shifting of work focuses, the making of schedules and working procedures, and allocation of funding, human resources, and materials. If the implementation is still in trouble, it means that we still need to reach a consensus and make adjustments on our priorities or goals and implementation scales, to relieve the demand on resources. In a word, in the process of cultivating a new type of public policy culture, the plastic bag restriction policy demands clearly deﬁ n- ing the responsible party, a platform for democratic decision-making, thorough research and study, measurable goals, a schedule and implementation procedures, the lower levels’ initiatives and participation, accurate explanations, and a guarantee of resources. Moreover, a few pilot programs may be launched to provide detailed suggestions and guidance to other cities through practice and analysis. Finally, overall coordination is needed to solve problems concerning different departments and areas.

ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

Lü Zhongmei

This paper introduces the history and background of environmental public interest litigation and illustrates the status quo, problems, and challenges it faces in China. This paper conducts a case study and envisions the prospect for environmental public interest litigation. The practice of environmental public interest litigation as a legal system is dependent on various factors, including the nature of the system itself and its supporting systems.

Key words: environmental public interest litigation, environmental protection court, environmental public interests, judicial protection

In 2008, environmental public interest litigation in China made a long-expected jump from theory to practice. The establishment of environmental protection courts opened the judiciary door to environmental public interest litigation. However, few of the cases accepted by these courts, which were established specially for environmental public interest litigation, are targeted at environmental public interest. Consequently, queries concerning the environmental protection court arise along with praise for it. How will environmental public interest litigation develop in China?

I. History of Environmental Public Interest Litigation

Environmental public interest litigation is a system in which certain state organs, related organizations, or individuals bring an action against civil or administrative infringement on environmental public interest, and the court pursues legal liability of the acting party according to the law. The system was originally introduced to China along with the environmental protection legal system of the United States.1 Scholars made consequent studies on this system and proposed

1 Wang Xi, “An Introduction to American Environmental Laws,” Wuhan Univer- sity Press, 1992, 151–152. 248 lü zhongmei the establishment of an environmental public interest litigation system in China. Results from theoretical studies on the system have the following two major impacts:

A. Legislative Practices of Environmental Public Interest Litigation in China China’s Law on Environmental Impacts Assessment (环境影响评价法) promulgated in 2002 explicitly defi nes the concept of “environmental rights” and “public environmental rights and interests.” Article 11 of the law states: In case a program may cause unfavorable environmental impacts or directly involve the environmental interests of the general public, the organ that works out the special programs shall, prior to submitting the draft of the programs for examination and approval, seek the opinions of the relevant entities, experts, and the general public about the draft of the report for the environmental impacts by holding demonstration meetings or hearings or by any other means. This is regarded as the earliest legislation in China that defi nes environmental public interests. According to the legal principle that “where there is a right, there is a remedy,” environmental public interest shall certainly be protected. Environmental public interest litigation shall be included in the litigation mechanism that protects environmental public interest. On December 3rd, 2005, the State Council (国务院) issued the “Decision on Implementing the Scientifi c Outlook on Development and Strengthening Environmental Protection” (关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定). The decision requests the “establishment of an environmental civil and administrative public prosecution system,” and explicitly provides that “giving play to the role of social organizations, encouraging reporting and disclosing illegal acts against the environment, and promoting environmental public interest litigation.” This was the fi rst time that the concept of environmental public interest litigation was clearly defi ned in China’s administrative laws and regulations. In 2005, the then State Environmental Protection Administra- tion (国家环保总局) (SEPA) consulted the opinions of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) in the process of drafting decisions on environmental protection. On August 5th of the same year, the SPP replied: environmental public interest litigation 249

In recent years, there has been a sharp increase of cases caused by environmental pollution. However, due to the lack of a litigation remedy system, cases of environmental pollution that endanger the public and result from an apparent illegal administration and abuse of power of administrative licensing by administrative organs, fail to be resolved through litigation. It is therefore necessary and feasible to establish an environmental civil and administrative public prosecution system. As to the establishment of an environmental public prosecution system, the SPP also suggested that “the State establishes an environmental civil and administrative public prosecution system through revision and improvement of related laws, and clearly provides for a civil and administrative public prosecution procedure.” This was the ﬁ rst time that the state judicial organ of China explicitly expressed its attitude to and made suggestions on the establishment of an administrative public prosecution system. At the Third Session of the Tenth China People’s Political Consul- tative Conference (CPPCC) held in March 2005, 28 members of the CPPCC, including Liang Congjie (梁从诫), an environmental activist in China, and several Chinese celebrities submitted a joint-proposal entitled “Proposal on Promptly Establishing and Improving the Envi- ronmental Protection Law for Public Interest Litigation” (关于尽快建立健全环保公益诉讼法的提案). It was written in the proposal that “We earnestly call for the establishment of a civil litigation system for environmental public interest as soon as possible, so as to guarantee the environmental rights of the public and protect social public interest and state interest in a more effective way.” This proposal, listed as Proposal No. 1223, was later submitted to the Legislative Affairs Com- mission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and SEPA for consideration and processing. At the Fourth Session of the Tenth NPC held in March 2006, 30 deputies, including the author of this paper, proposed the “Motion on the Establishment of an Environmental Public Interest Litigation Sys- tem” (关于建立环境公益诉讼制度的议案). In it, they stated: “China should establish an environmental public interest litigation system, so as to guarantee environmental rights of the public, protect social public interests and state interests in a more effective way, and provide a systemic guarantee for building a social environment that features the harmonious coexistence between humans and nature.” The proposal gave a detailed outline on how to build an environmental public interest litigation system and suggested the establishment of a public interest 250 lü zhongmei litigation system in China through revising the Civil Action Law (民事诉讼法) and the Administrative Action Law (行政诉讼法). The motion was listed as Motion No. 691 of the NPC. In March 2008, at the First Session of the Eleventh NPC, Deputy Wang Enduo (王恩多) put forward a motion entitled “Establishing a Public Interest Litigation System and Protecting State, Social, and Special Groups’ Interests” (建立公益诉讼制度, 以更好维护国家、社会和特殊群体利益), in which he called for wide practices of environmental protection public interest litigation, so as to protect vulnerable social groups including consumers, women, and minorities and other common social interests. Another deputy to the NPC, Han Deyun (韩德云), also suggested that a public interest litigation system should be established in China and that citizens or groups should be allowed to start public interest litigation. Legislation on public environmental rights and interests, explicit attitudes on environmental public interest litigation made by administrative and judicial organs, as well as proposals and motions on establishing an environmental public interest litigation system made by NPC deputies and CPPCC members, have all provided legislative and judiciary guidance to the practice of environmental public interest litigation in China.

B. Tentative Practices of Environmental Public Interest Litigation Since 2000, there have been various litigation cases initiated by citizens on the protection of public environmental rights and interests. On December 30th, 2000, three hundred residents in Qingdao (青岛市), a coastal city in Northern China’s Shandong Province, sued the Municipal Planning Bureau. They accused the bureau of approving residential quarters to the north of the Music Square of the city that would destroy the landscape around the square and infringe the citizens’ rights to enjoy the beauty of the environment.2 On October 17th, 2001, two professors, Shi Jianhui (施建辉) and Gu Dasong (顾大松), from the Law Department of Southeast Univer- sity in Nanjing, in the capital of Jiangsu Province, sued the Municipal

2 “300 Qingdao Residents Sue Planning Bureau, Asking for ‘Environmental Rights,’” People’s Daily Online, December 22nd, 2000, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/ channel4/27/20001222/359231.html. environmental public interest litigation 251

Planning Bureau at Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court. They claimed that the construction of a scenic overlook stand on Purple Mountain would impair their “enjoyment of the natural landscape” and requested the Planning Bureau’s revocation of the planning license to build the stand.3 In June 2002, a farmer named Chen Faqing (陈发庆) in Hangzhou, the capital of Zhejiang Province, sued the Environmental Protection Bureau of Yuhang District (余杭区) for administrative omission. Chen accused them of taking no efforts to punish the mining enterprises that produced dust and noise. The prosecution was dismissed by the court. In December 2003, Chen sued both the Zhejiang Provincial Govern- ment and the Environmental Protection Bureau of Zhejiang Province for the same accusation.4 In February 2003, Jin Kuixi (金奎喜), a lawyer from Hangzhou, sued the Municipal Planning Bureau at the West Lake District Court, requesting the revocation of the license for building a university for senior citizens, so as to protect the scenic spots around the West Lake.5 Although the above cases appear to have touched upon the protection of public environmental rights and interests, one thing that they share in common is that these plaintiffs took the litigation only for their individual rights or interests. Therefore, in reality, these cases should not be considered as public interest litigation. On November 13th, 2005, an explosion in Jilin Petrochemical Company (吉林石化), a branch of China National Petroleum Corpo- ration (CNPC) in the Northeastern province of Jilin, caused the spill of about 100 tons of nitrobenzene into the Songhua River. The accident severely polluted the water body. Cities along the lower reaches were victimized in this accident, including Harbin, the capital of Heilongji- ang Province, and even the Russian city of Khabarovsk.

3 Jiang De. “University Teachers Take Administrative Litigation against Building of Reviewing Stand on Purple Mountain,” Legal Daily, October 23rd, 2001; Huang Jinrong, “A Burgeoning Campaign of Practicing Public Interests Law: Observations on Practices of Public Interests Law in Contemporary China,” China Reform, no. 10 (2006). 4 Zhang Xiangfang, and Zhang Huihuang, “Farmer Chen Faqing—An Environ- mental Safeguard Luckier than Don Quixote,” Youth Times, May 27th, 2005; A Qing, “Chen Faqing—The Farmer who Tries to ‘Repair’ Environmental Protection Aware- ness,” China Industry & Commerce News, May 31st, 2005. 5 Wei Huabing, “Residents Take Planning Bureau to Court for Irrelevant Con- struction by West Lake,” Zhejiang Online, March 28th, 2003, http://www.zjol.cn. 252 lü zhongmei

According to news reports, after the accident, people took litigation to demand compensation for damages. For example, there were residents who demanded a refund of ﬁ fteen RMB for buying water when the supply was cut off. Restaurants and bathhouses asked for compensation for their losses during the water cut and decline of customers thereafter. Water suppliers claimed losses of water fees caused by the water cut, and local governments tried to demand compensation for taking emergency measures. On December 7th, 2005, three professors and three post-graduate students from the Law School of Peking University brought a lawsuit to Heilongjiang Higher People’s Court. This was the ﬁ rst environmental public interest litigation in China in which non-humans—the Songhua River, Sun Island, and huso sturgeon—were co-plaintiffs. The court was asked to force the accused to pay ten billion RMB to establish a fund for tackling pollution in Songhua waters, so as to restore the ecological balance in the area and guarantee huso sturgeons’ rights of existence, the rights of the Songhua River and Sun Island to a clean environment, and people’s rights enjoy and experience the beauty of nature. However, none of these cases against the Songhua pollution was accepted by courts and none of them had the chance to enter litigation proceedings. Legal issues around the Songhua River chemical spill accident has started in-depth discussions and evoked a direct and deep understanding about possible damage to public interests caused by pollution. In this sense, environmental public interest litigation has already obtained its social foundation.

II. Judicial Door Opened to Environmental Public Interest Litigation

Since environmental public interest litigation is still theoretical and experimental, courts tend to take a cautious attitude by not accepting cases that are against current procedural law. However, such attitudes changed at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008. The court opened the judicial door for environmental public interest litigation.6

6 Unless otherwise speciﬁ ed, all sources in this paper are quoted from on-the-spot research results of “Remedy Mechanism Studies on Infringement to Environmental Rights in an Environmentally Friendly Society,” a state-funded key social sciences project conducted by the author of this paper. environmental public interest litigation 253

In November 2007, an environmental protection tribunal was established by the Intermediate People’s Court of Guiyang, the capital city of Guizhou Province. At the same time, an independent environmental protection court was set up in the People’s Court of Qingzhen (清镇市), a city under Guiyang. The court was specially created to deal with cases on water resources in Hongfeng Lake (红枫湖), Bai- hua Lake (百花湖), and Aha Reservoir (阿哈水库), as well as water, land, or forest protection in areas under the jurisdiction of Guiyang. The Administration Bureau of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir, the Environmental Protection Bureau, the Forestry Bureau, and the Procuratorate were qualifi ed as subjects of starting environmental public interest litigation. On May 6th, 2008, with the approval from the Higher People’s Court of Jiangsu Province, the fi rst environmental protection tribunal of the province was established in the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi (无锡市). At the same time, environmental protection collegiate benches were set up in the districts of Binhu (滨湖区), Xishan (锡山区), and Huishan (惠山区), and two cities under the jurisdiction of Wuxi, Jiangyin (江阴) and Yixing (宜兴). In the “Regulations on Handling Cases by Environmental Protection Judicial Tribunals” (关于环境保护审判庭审理案件管辖的若干规定) released by the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi, the domain of acceptable cases of environmental public interest litigation and plaintiff subjects were clearly defi ned. The domain of acceptable cases is public interests litigation against acts that may have impacts on environmental protection in conservation areas; on environment in residential communities; on environmental protection in conservation waters of Taihu Lake (太湖水域), the Yangtze River, and the ancient Beijing-Hangzhou Canal; and on environmental protection in conservation areas of key tourist areas. Plaintiff subjects are procuratorial organs and environmental protection administrative departments at all levels, environmental protection organizations, and logistics segments in residential communities. In addition, it has been reported that there were already environmental protection courts established in some parts of Northern China’s Hebei Province in 2004. In November 2008, there came news that in Kunming, Yunnan Province, “environmental protection police, environmental protection courts, and an environmental public interest litigation system” were to be established. Faced with law-enforcement problems in dealing with a series of environmental 254 lü zhongmei pollution incidents in recent years that have aroused strong social responses, Kunming is going to enact the “Suggestions on Establishing an Environmental Protection Law Enforcement Coordination Mecha- nism” (关于建立环境保护执法协调机制的实施意见). It will be the fi rst cooperative law-enforcing mechanism in China that combines efforts from police, procuratorial organs, courts, and environmental protection departments. Once again, environmental public interest litigation is clearly defi ned in the portfolio of environmental protection courts. It can be said that environmental protection courts are established not only as a result of the serious environmental pollution at present, but also for environmental public interest litigation. In our investigation we learned that the establishment of any environmental protection judicial tribunal, collegiate bench, or court has direct bearing on the seriousness of local pollution. For example, the establishment of an environmental protection judicial tribunal in Guiyang is the result of the deterioration of the waters of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir, all being the source of drinking water for the city. In the past three years, waters in these areas deteriorated to Level V (non-drinkable) and even worse than Level V, which is toxic. The environmental protection tribunal in Wuxi was also established as a result of the serious pollution in Taihu Lake in recent years and an environmental protection court in Kunming was established due to this year’s severe pollution in Yangzong Lake (阳宗海). These incidents put forward the question of who should advocate for environmental public interest and how it should be protected. Theoretically, the establishment of environmental protection courts is a way for the settlement of this issue. Therefore, environmental public interest litigation spontaneously becomes the responsibility for these courts.

III. A Case of Environmental Public Interest Litigation

On December 27th, 2007, the Guiyang Administration Bureau of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir brought environmental public interest litigation against Guizhou Tianfeng Chemical Com- pany (贵州天峰化工有限责任公司) to the environmental protection court of Qingzhen People’s Court. This was the ﬁ rst case accepted by this environmental protection court. environmental public interest litigation 255

Tianfeng Chemical Company is located in Pingba County of Ans- hun (安顺市平坝县), a city more than 40 kilometers away from Gui- yang. For years, phosphogypsum residue discharged by the company had piled up in a phosphogypsum gangue about 3 kilometers away, creating a 4.5 meter high waste heap, the size of several football fi elds. About 800 meters away from the heap is Yangchang River (羊昌河), on upper reaches of Hongfeng Lake. The river is within the drinking water supply conservation area of the lake. Due to a lack of water- proofi ng, anti-seepage, and waste-water-processing measures, residue spilled into the river and fi nally gathered in Hongfeng Lake. In the past ten years, pollution had deteriorated the lake. However, since the company was out of the jurisdiction of Guiyang, it managed to get away with the pollution. After the establishment of an environmental protection court in Qingzhen, the case was accepted after receiving the determination of designative jurisdiction issue by Guizhou Higher People’s Court, in accordance with methods approved by the latter. It was fi nally determined that: From the day that this judgment becomes effective, Guizhou Tianfeng Chemical Company shall stop immediately all damages to the environment done by its waste material fi eld at the phosphogypsum gangue, namely, by stopping the usage of the waste material fi eld at the phosphogypsum gangue. Prior to March 31st, 2008, they shall take measures to remove any impediment or danger to the environment that may be caused by the fi eld. The judgment recognized the qualifi cation of the plaintiff subject of the Administration Bureau of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir, which is also an apparent indication of its support of environmental public interest litigation. The method of designative jurisdiction by Guizhou Higher People’s Court skillfully solved problems caused by administrative divisions and subordination relations of the area of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir. Meanwhile, it should be noted that compensation for damages was not mentioned. The litigation and the judgment of this case concerned only stopping damages, removing impediments, or dangers to the environment. It has been reported that the execution of the judgment had been completed by July 2008. 256 lü zhongmei

IV. Environmental Public Interest Litigation: Where to Go From Here?

A. Low Case-Handling Volume of Environmental Protection Courts While environmental public interest litigation in 2008 gave us great hopes, it brought disappointment, too. Environmental protection courts were originally designed to mainly handle environmental public interest litigation, accompanied by other cases. To date, however, the number of environmental public interest lawsuits accepted by those judicial tribunals or courts remains too small. Of cases accepted by the environmental protection court in Qing- zhen since its establishment, 85% are concerning illegal forestry acts and only 5% are concerning water pollution. Among these cases, criminal cases are the majority. This seems ironic because the court was originally set up to deal with “water” issues and environmental public interest litigation. It is also out of tune with the status quo of water pollution in Guiyang. After the public interests litigation of Tian- feng, the Administration Bureau of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir have not taken any more public interest litigation. As to other institutes qualiﬁ ed as the plaintiff subjects, no environmental public interest actions have been taken up to this point. According to frank comments made by the leadership of the Administration Bureau of Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes and Aha Reservoir, polluting enterprises out of its jurisdiction may be directly sued in the environmental protection court, while those within its jurisdiction could not be easily dealt with in the same way, unless all administrative means have been exhausted. If an environmental supervisory organ initiates such litigation, it would indicate the organ’s administrative omission, and would give people a reason to accuse itself. Likewise, no environmental public interest litigation has yet been taken in the environmental protection court of Wuxi since its establishment, though the domain of plaintiff subjects has been extended to environmental protection organizations and logistics segments in residential communities. This phenomenon has attracted close attention.

B. The Problem of “Zero Cases” Faced with the embarrassment of too few litigations in environmental protection courts, some have begun to doubt the environmental public interest litigation system itself. They regard it as a castle in the air, environmental public interest litigation 257 which is not worth its great expectation. But some take the current situation as only temporary and suggests a long-term perspective. The author suggests that the situation should be examined with rational understanding. At ﬁ rst glance, it seems that “zero cases” is due to the fact that no one bothers to be engaged in a lawsuit. In fact, it is not as simple as this, since a lot of systemic problems are yet to be resolved. For example, although procuratorial organs and environmental protection organizations are already qualiﬁ ed as plaintiff subjects, the former’s enthusiasm is often dampened by the cost of public interest litigation. Likewise, although lawyers and lawyers associations are the best representative of class litigation, they—as the subjects of public interest litigation—are also impeded by potential costs, as well as obtainment of authorization. There are practical problems, too. Take the pollution in the Taihu Lake for example. Three provinces—Anhui, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu— and a number of cities are involved. Even if the boundaries of administrative divisions could be broken, for example, by appointing a certain maritime court within one drainage area to handle cases, there are still problems, including a lack of judges, untimely evidence collection, and over-extended jurisdictional areas. What is more, other problems would come up even if the plaintiff eventually wins the lawsuit. Should the compensation for infringement of environmental rights be paid directly to the plaintiff or to the public who suffered from environmental damages? Who should pay for the costs involved in the public interest litigation, such as litigation fees, lawyer’s fees, expert evaluation fees, and personnel costs of public interest litigation organizations for lawsuits?7 The above analysis shows that the practice of environmental public interest litigation as a legal system is dependent on multiple factors, including the nature of the system itself and its supporting systems. First of all, let us examine the public interest litigation system itself. Theoretical studies of environmental public interest litigation still focus on the necessity of its establishment in China and the introduction of such systems in foreign countries. Studies on fundamental issues of environmental public interest litigation—not to mention in-depth research on environmental legislation and adjudication in China—are

7 Ding Guofeng, “Why Does the First Environmental Protection Court in Jiangsu Meet ‘Zero Case’?”, Legal Daily, July 7th, 2008. 258 lü zhongmei still insuffi cient. There lacks the design of a complete system of both substantive and procedural laws and a systematic study on norms of substantive and procedural laws. Problems that must be addressed in the practice of environmental public interest litigation include plaintiff qualifi cation, the connection between public power of the state and individual rights of citizens, litigation participants, burden of proof, evidence verifi cation, causal relations, remedy methods, and compensation for damages and litigation expenses. In practice, there is, in China, neither established legislation on environmental public interest litigation, nor procedural regulations to ensure the smooth proceedings of such litigation; it is impossible for courts to handle environmental public interest cases in accordance with the Civil Procedural Law (民事诉讼法). In a civil law country like China, it is against the legal principle for a court handling cases with no defi nite legal basis. The judicatory working mechanism is another important factor. Whether to set up environmental protection judicial tribunals or how to meet the demands of the operation of environmental public interest litigation system through the reasonable distribution of judicial resources within the court, calls for an overall solution to the working mechanism of the operation of public interest litigation. At present, local environmental protection judicial tribunals, collegiate benches, courts, and circuit courts bear the same problems regarding the distribution of judicial power and judicial resources. Is a higher people’s court, in the absence of legal regulations, entitled to decide the establishment of a new judicial organ within the court? Is an intermediate court entitled to decide the party to preside over a case or its plaintiff subject qualifi cation? Is a people’s court, in the absence of legal basis, entitled to defi ne the qualifi cation of plaintiff subjects of an environmental public interest case in the form of a written order? The answer is clear: judicial resources, as state resources, should not be distributed by local authorities at their own will. Because of the absence of a rational systemic arrangement and judicial working mechanism, the current practices apply only to individual cases. They are too diffi cult to be sustainable or extended.

C. The Future of Environmental Public Interest Litigation Although due to various reasons, environmental public interest litigation is in a diffi cult stage, it does not mean that those diffi culties cannot be overcome. It depends on whether we are confi dent enough in the environmental public interest litigation 259 environmental public interest litigation system. The author contends that with “scientifi c development” being the only option for China’s future, environmental public interest litigation is irreplaceable. It is an important means to protect environmental public interests, safeguard ecological security, and realize the harmonious co-existence between humans and nature. Great importance should be attached to the functions of environmental public interest litigation. In terms of legislation, substantive rights and procedural rules related to environmental public interest litigation should be established and the legal basis of citizen litigation should be defi ned through the revisions of laws including the Environmental Protection Law (环境保护法), the Civil Procedural Law, and the Administrative Procedural Law (行政诉讼法). At the same time, feasible systems, including plaintiff qualifi cation, remedy methods, incentive mechanism, rules of evidence, verifi cation of litigation participants, and special procedures should be established so as to improve the environmental public interest litigation system and change the status quo of defi cient judicial basis. In terms of the judicial working mechanism, we should keep up with the ongoing national reform of the judicial system and working mechanism, integrate national standards for setting up environmental protection tribunals, collegiate benches, and environmental protection courts, and defi ne the party to preside over environmental protection cases. The Supreme People’s Court should exercise the judicial interpretation power in accordance with related laws and regulations, and guide and supervise the adjudication of environmental public interest litigation nationwide. In addition, problems concerning the integrated exercise of judicatory power should also be resolved to guarantee the smooth operation of a judicatory working mechanism. At the same time, efforts should be taken to enhance the public’s environmental protection awareness through widely conducting educational activities. Social organizations and individuals should be actively encouraged to participate in environmental protection. Citi- zen participation procedures should be improved, too, to guarantee citizens’ rights to know, express, and participate and to push forward environmental democracy. Through combined efforts from the whole society, there surely will be a better future for environmental public interest litigation.

PROMOTING OPEN ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

Wang Jingjing and Ruan Qingyuan

The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs issued a brief review at the end of 2008 on the implementation of the Measures on Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation) which became effective in May 2008. The review has a special focus on the level of government disclosure of non-complying enterprises and their discharge data. Efforts have been made by stakeholders to facilitate the implementation of these measures and by local governments in expanding open environmental information. Meanwhile, not one polluting enterprise disclosed their discharge data in accordance with the measures, and none of them were punished by local environmental agencies for violating environment regulations.

Key words: environmental information disclosure, government, enterprise, NGO

On May 1st, 2008, the Measures on Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation) (环境信息公开办法(试行)), the fi rst regulation on information disclosure in China, came into effect; thus, marking the signifi cant progress in promoting the general public’s right to environmental information. The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPEA) has been keeping close watch on the implementation of the Measures on Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation) (hereafter referred to as the Measures). Based on the information it has obtained, a review was made on the general situation since the Measures became effective six months earlier. We found that a number of local governments had acted in accordance with the Measures. They doubled their efforts in facilitating environmental information disclosure. However, we also discovered that no enterprise has disclosed the discharge data as required by the Mea- sures, and no polluting enterprise has been punished by local governments for violating environmental laws and regulations. Nevertheless, progress was being made in the implementation of the Measures. Some government departments joined hands with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in setting up training programs for their offi cials. Individual citizens and NGOs sent out applications to governments requiring open information. Some NGOs jointly wrote to the polluting enterprises, demanding them to publicize their discharge data. 262 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan

We believe that local governments should take on the responsibility to execute their power, to disclose information about the polluters in a comprehensive, systematic, and timely way, while compelling polluters to release discharge information accurately.

I. Related Regulations of the Measures

According to Article 2 of the Measures, environmental information refers to environmental information from the government and enterprises. “Government environmental information means information made or obtained by environmental protection departments in the course of exercising their environmental protection responsibilities and recorded and stored in a given form.” Article 11 of the Measures states explicitly:

Environmental protection departments shall, within their scope of responsibilities and authorization, disclose on their own initiative the following government environmental information to the public: 13) List of enterprises with severe pollution and whose emission of pollutants is greater than the national or local emission standard or whose total emission of pollutants is greater than the quota of total controlled emissions determined by the local people’s government; 14) List of enterprises that have incurred serious or extraordinarily serious environmental pollution accidents or events, and list of enterprises that refuse to enforce effective environmental administrative penalty decisions.

The Measures stipulate that “government environmental information to be disclosed on environmental protection departments’ own initiative shall be disclosed by means of government websites, government gazettes, press conferences, as well as through newspapers and other publications, radio, television, and other methods that make it convenient for the public to be informed.” In addition to its regulations on information disclosure on the government’s part, the Measures also features requirements for enterprises to abide by, which state that the enterprises should disclose their environmental information on both a voluntary and mandatory basis in a timely and precise way. promoting open environmental information 263

As stated in Article 20 of the Measures, enterprises included in the list referred to in item 13 of the ﬁ rst paragraph of Article 11 of these measures shall disclose to the public the following information: 1) their names, addresses, and legal representatives; 2) name of major pollutants, method, content and total volume of emissions, and information on emissions that have surpassed the standards or the total emission that has surpassed the prescribed limits; 3) information on the construction and operation of their environmental protection facilities; and 4) emergency plans for sudden environmental pollution accidents. Enterprises shall not refuse to disclose the environmental information referred to in the above under the excuse of conﬁ dentiality of trade secrets. Falling into the category of polluters whose discharge has exceeded the national or the regional limits, or has exceeded the discharge limits set by the regional governments in terms of total amount, these enterprises should disclose discharge information on a mandatory basis. Meanwhile, the state encourages enterprises to disclose their environmental information voluntarily.

II. The Implementation of the Measures by Government Departments and Enterprises

A. Environmental Information Disclosure by Governments Government departments in many areas have acted in accordance with the Measures and stepped up their efforts in facilitating environmental information disclosures. However, the work is not being done evenly, with a few economically developed, but pollution-plagued regions, still lagging behind. The IPEA began to collect environmental data in 2006. From it, we can clearly see that, though the issue had attracted increasing attention, the work of disclosing environmental information of polluting enterprises was rather unsystematic. Back in 2006, when only a small number of cities fulﬁ lled their tasks in a systematic way, the Shang- hai Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB) was doing it best. Using a special column on its website since 2004, called the “Column of Environmental Law Enforcement,” SEPB has publicized a biannual list of polluting enterprises that violated environmental laws and had been investigated and prosecuted by the environmental protection 264 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan department.”1 In other places, like Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui provinces, governments have also taken actions since the Measures were issued in April 2007. They have devoted great efforts to the disclosure of environmental information, leading to the remarkable progress in these regions, especially in provinces and cities in the Yangtze River Delta Area. Environmental protection bureaus of Jiangsu and Zheji- ang provinces released large amounts of environmental information concerning those enterprises with heavy pollution. To be more spe- ciﬁ c, environmental protection departments of the cities of Suzhou (苏州), Wuxi (无锡), Changzhou (常州), Nanjing (南京), Taizhou (泰州), Yancheng (盐城), Ningbo (宁波), Hangzhou (杭州), Shaoxing (绍兴), and Jiaxing (嘉兴) have all publicized on their websites the names of polluting enterprises and the penalties given to them. In these two provinces, actions of disclosing environmental information were even carried out at the county level in Yuyao (余姚), Cixi (慈溪), Beilun (北仑), and Yuhuan (玉环) counties of Ningbo. Though incomparable with the Yangtze River Delta Area in terms of the scale of environmental information disclosure, cities and provinces in other regions have also made substantial progress in disclosing the data of the enterprises which have exceeded discharge limits. For example, the Environmental Protection Department of Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA)—a sub-division of Tianjin Environment Protection Bureau—has managed to put up a special column on its website called the “Column for the Disclosure of Environmental Information.” Hence, they have outperformed their superior, the Tianjin Environment Protection Bureau, which has failed to put much environmental information on its website. The Environ- ment Protection Department in TEDA has included information about visits and petitions by the public, administrative penalties, pros- ecutions and reconsiderations, lists of enterprises exceeding discharge limits, and lists of enterprises that caused pollution incidents around the whole area of TEDA. All of this information has been collected since 2008 and publicized in a systematic way.2 Likewise, in Hubei

1 Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau, “Public Notice of Environmental Protection Law Enforcement,” the website of Shanghai Environment Protection Bureau, http://www.sepb.gov.cn/zhifa/main.jsp. 2 TEDA (Tianjin Economic-technological Development Area) Environment Pro- tection Bureau, “Column for the Disclosure of the Environmental Information,” the website of the Management Committee of TEDA, http://www.teda.gov.cn/cms/ cms/website/hjbhj/hjxxgkzl/index.jsp?channelId=1869&siteId=5. promoting open environmental information 265

Province, although the data publicized by the provincial environmental protection bureau is limited, the environmental department of Wuhan City, the capital of Hubei Province, has established the “System for Open Information of the Major Pollution Sources,” through which, the department is able to disclose information of waste water and gas emissions from major polluters, to provide previous records, and to help to establish a system for online video monitoring.3 Meanwhile, Weihai City (威海市) of Shandong Province also set up a column on its website, publicizing daily the excessive discharge by sewage treatment plants or any enterprise in question.4 Similarly, Zibo City (淄博市), in Shandong Province, also publicized large amounts of environmental data. The Pearl River Delta Region, however, has not yet disclosed as much information as the Yangtze River Delta Area. Nevertheless, there are still signs of improvement, though largely invisible. For example, Shunde District in Foshan City (佛山市顺德区), Guangdong Province has publicized the lists of enterprises subject to administrative penalties on a regular basis since August 2008, while Bao’an District of Shenzhen City (深圳保安区) has also taken similar actions monthly since April 2008.5,6 In disclosing the environmental information of enterprises, local governments have created special websites disclosing names of the enterprises guilty of excessive discharge, enterprises that have been demanded to make improvements within a prescribed limit of time, and enterprises subject to administrative penalties. These actions have been a major push for environmental information disclosure efforts. At present, more than 7,000 records of polluting enterprises since May 1st, 2008 have been collected by the China Water Pollution Map, the

3 Wuhan Environment Protection Bureau, “System for the Information Dis- closure of the Major Pollution Sources,” Wuhan Environment Protection Bureau, http://59.173.11.93/whhbp/. 4 Weihai Environmental Protection Agency, “Reports of the Data by Online Moni- toring,” the website of Weihai Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.whep .gov.cn/list.php?classid=18. 5 Environment Protection Bureau of Shunde District, Foshan City, “The list of enterprises which were to be subject to administrative penalties,” the website of Environment Protection Bureau of Shunde District, http://epb.shunde.gov.cn/wzly .php?page=0&&singleid=7. 6 Environmental Protection Bao’an Shenzhen, “The list of environmental protection law enforcement and law infringement,” All in one Net for Bao’an Enterprises: http://business.baoan.gov.cn/fwpt/bays/bgqy/huanbao/index.shtml?CID=27788. 266 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan

ﬁ rst database concerning water pollution in China. Meanwhile, about 2,000 records have been collected by the China Air Pollution Map. All statistics are constantly being updated.

Table 17.1: Status of environmental information disclosure in selected cities and districts Cities and Districts Status of Information Disclosure Website of Shanghai Environmental Columns established to Protection Bureau publicize information twice a year about enterprises violating http://www.sepb.gov.cn/zhifa/main environmental regulations. Websites .jsp of environmental protection departments in subordinate districts such as Qingpu, Songjiang, Baoshan, Fengxian, Zhabei, and Minhang Districts put up similar bulletins. Website of Ningbo City Bulletins are put up to publicize Environmental Protection Bureau environmental administrative penalties to enterprises since 2003, http://www.nbepb.cnnb.net/Punish with information updated frequently. .aspx?ClassID=22 Website of Weihai Environmental A bulletin of daily reports on Protection Agency pollution sources has been set up since May 2008, disclosing http://www.whep.gov.cn/list online monitoring data on major .php?classid=18 pollution sources including the main pollutants and concentrations. Website of Wuhan Environmental A column is set up to publicize Protection Bureau online monitoring data on major enterprises and to offer access to http://59.173.11.93/whhbp/ previous data and online monitoring videos. Website of Zibo City Environmental The “Disclosure” column posts Protection Bureau enterprises guilty of excessive pollution discharge. http://www.zbepb.gov.cn/Category_ 32/index.aspx Website of Huizhou City An environmental protection Environmental Protection Bureau bulletin has publicized notices of administrative penalties since http://www.gdhzepb.gov.cn/zwxx/ October 2007. gsgg/# promoting open environmental information 267

Table 17.1 (cont.) Cities and Districts Status of Information Disclosure All in One Net for Enterprises in A law enforcement column has Bao’an District, Shenzhen City, been set up since April 16th, 2008 Guangdong Province to publicize monthly the list of enterprises violating environmental http://business.baoan.gov.cn/ regulations. fwpt/bays/bgqy/huanbao/index .shtml?CID=27788 Website of Environmental Protection Lists of enterprises subject to Bureau of Deshun District, Foshan administrative penalties have been City, Guangdong Province publicized since August 27th, 2008 on the bulletin of Environmental http://epb.shunde.gov.cn/wzly Protection Department, Shunde .php?page=0&&singleid=7 District. Ofﬁ cial Website of Xiaoshan Records of enterprises violating District, Hangzhou City, Zhejiang environmental laws and regulations Province are publicized. The ﬁ rst disclosure was released on October 20th, 2008. http://xxgk.xiaoshan.gov.cn/ Website of Tianjin Economic- Names of polluting enterprises have Technological Development Area been publicized quarterly since (TEDA) 2008. http://www.teda.gov.cn/cms/cms/ website/hjbhj/hjxxgkzl/second/ index.jsp?channelId=1885&ifr=4&sit eId=10&pic=8&kb=2

B. Mandatory Disclosure of Enterprises Information According to Article 20 of the Measures, polluters whose discharge has exceeded the national or regional limits, or have exceeded the discharge limits set by the regional governments in terms of total amount, should release discharge information on a mandatory basis However, the mandatory information disclosure by polluting enterprises has hardly gained any progress since promulgation of the Mea- sures. Among 9,000 records disclosed since May 1st, 2008, by the Database for Water Pollution in China and the Database for Air Pol- lution in China, there are no data of discharge provided by enterprises as required by regulations. 268 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan

Seventeen environmental protection organizations have jointly delivered letters to 27 polluting enterprises urging them to disclose their discharge data. Among these enterprises, so far only four have responded by releasing their data of pollutant discharge. The indifferent attitude of polluting enterprises can be attributed partly to their weak environmental awareness and deﬁ ance with laws and regulations and partly to the nonfeasance of law-enforcing departments. According to Article 28 of the Measures: If enterprises with serious pollution and whose emission of pollutants is greater than the national or local emission standards or whose total emission of pollutants is greater than the quota of total controlled emissions determined by local people’s government violate Article 20 of these Measures by failing to publish or failing to publish according to the prescribed requirements information on their emission of pollutants, the environmental protection departments of the local people’s governments at the county level and above may impose a ﬁ ne of not more than 100,000 RMB and publish such information in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Promotion of Clean Production (中华人民共和国清洁生产促进法). However, no such penalty or disclosure has been enforced by local government agencies, thus making the Measures, empty talk.

C. Voluntary Information Disclosure by Enterprises Except for enterprises required by the Measures to incur the obligation to publicize their information, other enterprises are free of such obligation. Enterprises are encouraged by the state to voluntarily disclose their environmental information. The compliant enterprises will be rewarded for their willingness and determination to assume social responsibility and to communicate with the public. In the process of data collection, we found some enterprises did publicize information on a voluntary basis, with Guangdong Esquel Textiles Company Ltd. (广东溢达纺织有限公司) as a representative. The company publicized complete discharge data in 2007, including the total discharge of wastewater, reclaimed water usage, reclaimed water consumption per 10,000 RMB of production, the discharge amount of chemical oxygen demand, and of ammonia and nitrogen. IPEA has included this data in the list of enterprises voluntarily disclosing their environmental information which is publicized by the promoting open environmental information 269

China Water Pollution Map.7 PetroChina Company Ltd. (中国石油天然气股份有限公司) has also voluntarily disclosed the environmental discharge data of 2007, including pollution indicators such as the chemical oxygen demand and volatile phenol emissions in 2007 in its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Annals.8

III. Joint Efforts for Open Environmental Information

A. Requiring Environmental Information in Accordance with the Law Citizens, legal representatives, and organizations are entitled to have access to government environmental information from environmental protection departments, according to the Measures. Certain environmental protection departments such as those in Shanghai and Xia- men, offer application forms, through which the public can require and reach this data. Citizens and organizations have pioneered requiring environmental information disclosures. Yan Yiming (严义明), a lawyer from Shang- hai, became “the fi rst to submit the application form asking for a government environmental disclosure” to the environmental protection departments of Anhui and Henan Provinces on May 4th and 5th, 2008. 9 Describing the department as “apparently not ready,” Yan Yiming said: “Offi cials in the department were caught in surprise when I made a request, although they had been given a year for preparation. They didn’t even know who should be in charge of such matters and no offi cial application form was available then.”10 On November 5th, 2008, IPEA traced a fi le on the offi cial website of the Huangyan District government, Taizhou City (台州市黄岩区),

7 The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, “Enterprises Information of Pollutant Discharge,” the website of The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, http://www.ipe.org.cn/myqypwxx/gyqypwinfo.jsp?ID=15. 8 PetroChina Company Limited, “Pollution Information of Enterprises,” the website of PetroChina Company Limited, http://www.petrochina.com.cn/PetroChina/ shyhj07/. 9 Chen, Liang, “A Lawyer From Shanghai Challenges the Environmental Protec- tion Bureau of Henan Province,” East Journal, May 6th, 2008. 10 Zhang, Jun, “Challenge or Encourage?”, Chinese Environmental News, July 16th, 2008. 270 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan

Zhejiang Province, called the “Document Reference and Index of Penalties on Enterprises.” Not being able to fi nd any actual penalty information on it, staff members of IPEA contacted the department by following the guide on the website. They also called the Infor- mation Disclosure Offi ce of the district government, only to be told to expect feedback in 15 business days. The person in charge in the district environmental department informed them that, to protect the reputation of the enterprises, no specifi c penalty measures were to be disclosed. The public could make an inquiry through an application, which would be subsequently approved upon the environmental department’s verifi cation of the applicant’s identity and the would-be usage of the required information. On November 7th, 2008, the IPEA received six notices of administrative penalties, but were required to keep the information confi dential.

B. The Joint-Training Programs Held by Governments and Environmental Protection Organizations on the Disclosure of Environmental Information Seminars are co-sponsored by state and local environmental departments and environmental NGOs to train ofﬁ cials from environmental protection departments, the media, NGOs, and enterprises on environmental information disclosure. Among the environmental NGOs are the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), Green- peace, Green Earth Volunteers, and the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims (CLAPV) at China University of Political Science and Law. In an effort to facilitate the implementation of the Measures, on April 26th, 2008, the international conference on “Public Participation in Environmental Protection” was held in Beijing. The conference was hosted by the Center for Environmental Education and Communica- tions of the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China (CEEC), and co-sponsored and supported by Greenpeace, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and the European Commission’s Del- egation to China. “More than 200 delegates from the Environmen- tal Protection and Resources Committee of China (EPRCC), UNEP, the European Commission, NGOs, research institutes, multinational corporations, and the media attended the conference, discussing all aspects of public participation in environmental protection.”11 In April

11 Han Lin, “Overall Assessment of Public Participation into Environmental promoting open environmental information 271

2008, the Conference on Corporate Social Responsibility and Public Participation was held in Xiamen City, Fujian Province, by Xiamen GreenCross Association and Xiamen Science and Technology Asso- ciation, which was intended to “further the public’s awareness of urging governments in the respect of information disclosure.”12To ensure a more effective implementation of the Measures, the Second Confer- ence on Information Disclosure and Environmental Protection was held from May 9th to 10th, 2008, in Shanghai, sponsored by China Environmental Culture Promotion Association, the NRDC, Green Earth Volunteers, and the Center for Environmental Education and Community of Shanghai. The conference was attended by 50 delegates from the media and environmental NGOs nationwide.

C. Letters to Enterprises from Environmental Organizations “We environmental organizations should write suggestion letters to polluting enterprises urging them to release discharge data so as to promote the implementation of the Measures on Open Environmental Infor- mation ( for Trial Implementation),” proposed Ma Jun (马军), director of the IPEA, at the International Conference on Public Participation in Environmental Protection jointly hosted by the China’s MEP, Green- peace, and other organizations on April 26th, 2008. Discussions were carried out, and an agreement was reached that suggestion letters should be written and sent to polluting enterprises. The IPEA noticed on May 6th, 2008 that the Environmental Pro- tection Bureau of Shenzhen Municipality disclosed discharge data of polluting enterprises in a press release concerning the environmental situation in the ﬁ rst quarter. This was the ﬁ rst list ever released since the implementation of the Measures. Meanwhile, together with ten environmental organizations, the IPEA sent letters to Shenzhen Fuwei Metal and Plastic Products Co., Ltd. (先后向富玮金属塑胶制品(深圳)有限公司), Shenzhen Shenbao Huacheng Foods Co., Ltd. (深圳市深宝华城食品有限公司), and Shenzhen HAMLY Electronic Co., Ltd. (深圳市合美意电子有限公司), urging them to disclose their discharge data.

Protection—for the Seminar of the Public’s Participation into Environmental Protection,” http://www.china.com.cn/txt/2008–04/27/content_15022888.htm, April 27th, 2008. 12 Ibid. 272 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan

Upon receiving the letter, Shenzhen Fuwei Metal and Plastic Prod- ucts Co., Ltd. faxed their environmental information to the IPEA and handed in the monitoring report by the Shenzhen Environmental Monitoring Center on May 12th, 2008, becoming the ﬁ rst enterprise to voluntarily disclose the environmental data under the suggestion of environmental NGOs. Up to now, the IPEA has sent letters to 27 enterprises who reacted differently. Thirteen of them responded to the IPEA, two provided feedback in a formal written form, four provided testing results by environmental departments, four provided discharge data, and only one enterprise passed the evaluation by a third party and, hence, was removed from the Database of China Water Pollution as a polluting enterprise (See Table 17.2).

Table 17.2: Responses and feedback from enterprises upon receiving letters Serial Enterprises Time of Responses and Feedback number Disclosure from Enterprises 1 Shenzhen Fuwei May 7th, Provided discharge Metal and Plastic 2008 data for 2007 and the Products Co., Ltd. monitoring report by the Shenzhen Environment Monitoring Center on May 12th, 2008 2 Shenzhen Shenbao May 7th, Verbal feedback only, no Huacheng Foods Co., 2008 formal reply Ltd. 3 Shenzhen HAMLY May 7th, No feedback Electronic Co., Ltd. 2008 4 Motorola (China) May 15th, Feedback to IPEA; 2008 Provided follow-up monitoring reports by environmental protection department;

No disclosure of discharge data 5 Tianjin Samsung May 15th, Provided discharge Electronics Display 2008 data for 2007 with Co., Ltd. explanations promoting open environmental information 273

Table 17.2 (cont.) Serial Enterprises Time of Responses and Feedback number Disclosure from Enterprises 6 Tianjin Jianfeng May 15th, No feedback Natural Product Co., 2008 Ltd. 7 Dali Brewery Co., June 4th, No feedback Ltd. 2008 8 Shanghai Uchino June 5th, No feedback Co., Ltd. 2008 9 INJELIC Investment June 5th, No feedback (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 2008 10 Shanghai Lafarge- June 5th, Made telephone inquiry Gypsum Co., Ltd. 2008 to IPEA 11 OMNOVA June 5th, No feedback Decorative Products 2008 (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 12 Bluestar Silicons June 5th, Provided discharge data International 2008 for 2007 (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 13 Tsingtao Brewery June 4th, No feedback (Wuhu) Co., Ltd. 2008 14 Liuzhou Zinc Co., June 4th, Closed for losses and Ltd. 2008 bankruptcy and needed restructuring 15 Guanxi Guofa June 4th, No feedback Forestry Pulp and 2008 Paper Co., Ltd. 16 Liuzhou Wuling June 4th, No feedback Motors Co., Ltd. 2008 17 Europe Asia Huadu June 12th, No feedback Enterprise 2008 18 Wuxi Allied Knitting June 12th, No feedback Co., Ltd. 2008 19 Liyang Luodiya Rare July 10th, Verbal communication New Materials Co., 2008 only, no formal feedback Ltd. 20 XiaoYangRen July 10th, Verbal communication Biological Diary 2008 only, no formal feedback Group 274 wang jingjing and ruan qingyuan

Table 17.2 (cont.) Serial Enterprises Time of Responses and Feedback number Disclosure from Enterprises 21 Addchance Holdings July 10th, Verbal communication Limited (Zhang 2008 only, no formal feedback jiagang) 22 Harbin Mauri Yeast October No feedback Co., Ltd. 15th, 2008 23 Energizer (China) November No feedback Co., Ltd. 5th, 2008 24 Chongqing ABB November Provides ongoing Turbocharger System 5th, 2008 monitoring records by Co., Ltd. (western government agencies section) and discharge data of 2007. Passed the third- party evaluation and thus was removed from the Database of China Water Pollution as a polluting enterprise 25 Tianjin Kaidi November No feedback Fasteners Co., Ltd. 5th, 2008 26 Kraft (Tianjin) Co., November No feedback Ltd. 5th, 2008 27 Tianjin Nestle Purina November Provided a formal Pet Food Co., Ltd. 5th, 2008 explanatory letter and (western section) ongoing monitoring records by government agencies

To the disappointment of the IPEA, only 4 out of the 27 enterprises released discharge data at the request of environmental organizations, and only one of them was willing to reform and be evaluated.

IV. Implementation of the Measures Needing Joint Efforts from the Government, Enterprises, and the Public

Despite all the problems in the implementation of the Measures, we believe the mission can be accomplished if the government, enterprises, and the public play their respective roles well. promoting open environmental information 275

First of all, the government should implement these Measures strictly. The government should continuously, promptly, completely, and systematically disclose the list of enterprises with excessive discharge. The government should supervise and urge the polluting enterprises to release environmental data while punishing those who refuse to disclose their environmental information. The government should also respond to the requirements of the public for open environmental information. Enterprises that voluntarily release the relative environmental information and comply with environment laws and regulations should be encouraged and rewarded. Next, enterprises should fulﬁ ll their obligations to release discharge data voluntarily. Those who are compelled to release environment information should do so within 30 days after the environmental department publicizes their names as required by the Measures. As far as the public is concerned, we should pay more attention to environmental information disclosure by governments and enterprises. We should require the government to disclose by law the environmental information that concerns our own interests. The implementation of the Measures on Open Environmental Informa- tion ( for Trial Implementation) marks a new starting point for China’s open environmental information and public participation. Although the implementation of the Measures needs improvement, we believe that with the progress of society and the perfection of the relevant laws on open information, environmental information will be released in a more open manner when concerted efforts are made by the government, enterprises, and the public.

PART V

GREEN ECONOMY

NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMIC POLICY

Hu Kanping

Recent years have seen China’s environmental authorities working together with several economic regulators and issuing a number of environmental economic policies. Environmental considerations are now set to penetrate into multiple spheres of economic policy: production, circulation, distribution, consumption, and external trade. These environmental economic policies are a key theme for the current stage of ecological efforts and enjoy a high public proﬁ le.

Key words: new environmental policies, environmental economic policies

I. New Policies Aim to Mainstream Environmental Considerations into the Economy

China’s environmental problems are multi-dimensional. Pollution and ecological damage are at critical levels. The extensive growth model pursued by local governments and polluting enterprises has become a serious disease. Administrative intervention can only treat the symp- toms; yet, a full set of effective environmental economic policies can cure the disease completely. The main idea of the government’s “new environmental policy” lies in the “three shifts” (三个转变) outlined by Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝总理): 1) a shift from economic development at the expense of the environment to stressing both; 2) a shift from environmental protection lagging behind economic development to developing the two at the same pace; and 3) a shift from relying on administrative means to a comprehensive usage of legal, economic, technological, and necessary administrative measures to solve environmental problems.1 Envi- ronmental issues are closely wedded to the economy, and each of the “three shifts” targets this relationship. A new era is, thus, looming where economic growth is optimized by being made greener.

1 Liu Guocai, “What Is the Balance between Economic Development and Environ- mental Protection?” People’s Daily, March 19th, 2007. 280 hu kanping

Environmental economic policy is an important part of macroeconomic policy. Under the socialist market economy system, the former is essential to the application of a scientifi c outlook on development. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (环境保护部) (MEP) gives high priority to making sure environmental economic policy covers the whole production and recycling cycle. Minister Zhou Shengxian (周生贤) has repeated that we should “move faster and more fi rmly in refi n- ing environmental economic policy, and complete an effective long- term system of environmental protection.”2 Zhou has also emphasized that efforts to refi ne it and achieve full coordination of the economy and environment across the whole industrial cycle are a signifi cant step towards better macroeconomic management, evolution of China’s economic growth mode, and strategic economic restructuring. Environmental economic policy aims to do several things: optimize the role of the market economy in environmental protection; increase policy coordination across departments; achieve green loans, insurance, securities, taxation, procurement, and trade practices; improve applicable price and fee policies; roll out and refi ne the ecological compensation mechanism; ensure environmental economic policy keeps pace with economic development; gradually complete a structured set of environmental economic policies conducive to “fast and healthy” economic growth; and generally work towards a long-term effective mechanism that favors the environment.3 MEP held a national conference on environmental economic policy in Beijing in 2008, with discussions centering on how to make environmental economic policy best serve economic growth and environmental protection nationwide.

II. A Combination of Measures

In their ordinary defi nition, environmental economic policies follow basic value theory and employ pricing, taxation, fi nance, credit, charging, and insurance means to regulate or infl uence the behavior of

2 Zhou Wenying, “Zhou Shengxian in the Fourth Session of National Environmen- tal Consultative Council and MEP Technical Committee calls for resolute implementation of the guidance of the central economic conference, and active exploration of the new environmental protection road under the guidance of the scientifi c outlook on development,” China Environment News, December 24th, 2008. 3 Li Jing, “Environmental Protection Ministry’s Eight Measures to Ensure Eco- nomic Growth,” China Daily, December 11th, 2008. new developments in environmental economic policy 281 market actors. The goal is a balance between economic expansion and environmental protection. Major means and tools include: clarifying property rights pertaining to the environment and resources; pollution taxes, resource taxes, emission fees, and resource compensation fees; and fi nancial and fi scal means such as subsidized loans, an environmental fund, shares, monetary pledge requirements, and liability compensation. Environmental economic policies vary by target: economic pollution controls, such as emission charges; infrastructure maintenance, such as sewage and refuse charges; and the overall environment, such as with ecological compensation and inter-regional fairness policies. By policy type, they break down into: market-establishing policies, such as sewage trading; environmental taxation and fee policies, such as environmental taxes, sewage fees and user fees; fi nancial and capital market measures, such as green credit and insurance; fi scal stimuli, such as tax breaks for development and utilization of environmental technology; and fi nancial transfer payments on ecological compensation grounds. These policies serve to encourage innovation in environmental technology, greater market competitiveness, cheaper environmental treatment, and better administrative monitoring. They aim to correct the current external economic disconnect affecting environmental problems and put the right “inherent constraints” in place. International experience so far points to environmental economic policy as the most effective long-term environmental governance mechanism. Old mechanisms and development modes are ill-suited to the needs of environmental protection. A new policy system needs to change the game rules to achieve a sustainable, across-the-board solution. The “Eleventh Five-Year Plan of National Environmental Pro- tection (国家环境保护 “十一五” 规划),” authored by the then State Environmental Protection Administration (环保总局) (SEPA) and the National Development and Reform Commission (发展改革委), and approved by the State Council (国务院), subdivides the goal of “improving environmental economic policy” into the following:

1. Fully integrate environmental considerations into reform of resource taxation, consumption taxes, and import and export taxation. Explore means to establish an environmental tax system, and use the tax leverage to advance development of a resource-saving, environmentally friendly society. 282 hu kanping

2. Make use of price levers. Establish pricing and fee systems that refl ect the cost of pollution treatment. Where possible, some regions and entities can trade sulfur dioxide emission quotas. Internalize environmental costs, encourage producers to reduce pollution generation, and make pollution treatment more effective. Offer policy preferences, such as raising grid input prices and giving grid priority to renewable energy power plants, those with sulfur removal facilities, and waste incineration generators. Actively manage desulfurized plants’ electricity prices. 3. Levy taxes on the treatment and disposal of municipal sewage, domestic waste, hazardous waste, and medical waste. Levy taxes on the storage of radioactive waste. Ensure the regular functioning of treatment and storage facilities. Strengthen pollution discharge fee assessment and verifi cation. Further refi ne the charging system. Advance the reform of municipal public utilities. Encourage the involvement of a variety of enterprises in the construction and operation of environmental infrastructure. Further marketize pollution treatment. 4. Improve credit policies. Encourage banks, especially policy banks, to give loan support to environmental infrastructure and company pollution treatment projects, as long as they are fi nan- cially viable. Explore the establishment of environmental liability insurance and environmental venture capital. Actively expand the utilization of foreign capital. Continue to seek pro bono assistance and preferential loans from international organizations and foreign governments. 5. In accordance with the principle of “those who develop should be responsible for protection, those who damage should be responsible for repair, those who benefi t should be responsible for compensation, and those who pollute should pay fees,” designate the Three Gorges Reservoir area, the South-to-North Water Diver- sion project reservoir areas, key energy development zones, and state-level nature reserves to take the lead. Engage in more pilot projects. Improve ecological compensation policy and establish an ecological compensation system.

III. A Long-Standing Exploration

The United Nations “Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development” explicitly requires signatories to reshape economic new developments in environmental economic policy 283 policy so that environmental costs are included in the production and consumer sectors. Developed country experience shows that effective and low-cost pollution control can be achieved through a comprehensive macroeconomic policy framework that pays heed to the environment. In the early 1970s, developed countries actively applied environmental economic policies to reshape the environment-economy balance. This international practice rests on two theoretical aspects. The fi rst theory comes from new institutional economics. The “Coase Theorem,” which states that environmental problems result from ill-defi ned market property rights. Property rights should be clearly defi ned, including ownership, use and development rights, and an environmental property rights market encompassing tradable licenses and/or discharge quotas. 4 The second theory comes from welfare economics. The “Pigou Effect,” states that government charging can internalize the environmental costs business creates and force the latter to treat pollution, through means such as taxation and fees, fi nancial penalties and incentives, the fi scal system, monetary compensation, securities, and monetary pledges. 5 Current worldwide practice includes the following in terms of environmental economic means and tools: clearly-defi ned environmental and resource property rights; pollution, resource and environmental taxes, such as pollution discharge fees and resource compensation fees; and fi nancial and fi scal means such as subsidized environmental loans, establishing environmental funds, shares, securities, pledge requirements, and liability compensation. Many OECD member states impose taxes on pollution-generating products such as pesticides, chemical fertilizers, leaded fuel, batteries, and packaging, in order to encourage pollution-free or low-polluting products. Their environmental tax reforms since the 1990s have concentrated on practical and effective policies to improve the environment.

4 Translator’s note: Coase Theorem is attributed to Ronald Harry Coase (1910–), a British economist who is well known mainly for two articles: “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) and “The Problem of Social Cost” (1960). He received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991. 5 Translator’s note: “The Pigou Effect” is attributed to Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877– 1959), an English economist. As a teacher and founder of the school of economics at Cambridge University he trained and inﬂ uenced many economists. His work covered various ﬁ elds of economics, particularly welfare economics. 284 hu kanping

Similar reforms were made in the fi scal sphere, notably, the abolition or revision of environmentally unfavorable tax exemptions or breaks. Starting from the 1970s, an entirely market-driven pollutant emission rights trading scheme has expanded to cover all of the United States. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency passed a plan from 1979 onwards to set up Emission Reduction Credits (ERC) banking, by which credits may be earned in reserve for certain emission types when levels are not yet critical, and the credits can be used or sold at an appropriate time in the future. America’s ever-improving emissions trading scheme has attracted close attention from fi nancial institutions, with banks becoming involved in the storage and circulation of these credits. Pan Yue (潘岳), deputy minister of the Ministry of Environmen- tal Protection, has identifi ed several common features among different countries’ environmental economic policies. First, they all involve government macroeconomic controls to encourage the polluters to take the initiative and improve the environment, via setting up and regulating the rules of the market. Second, economic tools such as taxes, pricing, and credits are used to make companies internalize the costs of pollution under the “polluter pays principle.” Third, there is a closer inter-agency cooperation and a trend towards a cross-cutting management system. Fourth, there has been a change of focus from “post-pollution remedies” to “whole-process monitoring” to ensure that economic measures, such as product-based fees, registration charges, clean technology development subsidies, and monetary pledges, have a greater effect.6

IV. Progress Made through a Cocktail of Measures

In the last ten years, plenty of theoretical research has been done by experts in China on environmental economic policies. However, designing and implementing them is uncharted territory for China. In recent years, environmental authorities have redoubled their efforts concerning green taxation, pollution charging, green capital markets,

6 Pan Yue, “On Environmental Economic Policies,” Qiushi, October 18th, 2007. new developments in environmental economic policy 285 ecological compensation, emission rights trading, green trade, and green insurance. Setting environment-friendly economic policies will move the economy and environmental efforts towards a high degree of integration. A new historical era has dawned for environmental economic policies between the second half of 2007 and 2008, with notable new progress marked:

A. Green Credit Green credit is an effective means to curb highly-polluting industries and promote a healthier economy. It aims to cut off credit lines for companies with poor green credentials and encourage staff in the banking sector to take responsibility for the environment. In July 2007, SEPA unveiled the fi rst environmental economic policies, among which green credit was fi rst to arrive. Along with the People’s Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission (中国银监会), SEPA released Opinions on Implementing Environmental Protection Policies and Regulations and Guarding against Credit Risks (关于落实环境保护政策法规防范信贷风险的意见). SEPA also issued the Notice on Information- Sharing on Enterprises’ Environmental Protection (关于共享企业环保信息有关问题的通知) with the People’s Bank of China, retaining information about the environmental impact of 18,000 enterprises in the bank credit analysis system. The China Banking Regulatory Commission issued banking institutions with a list of regions and rivers where project approvals were restricted by SEPA, and required that they stop loans to law-breaking enterprises causing serious pollution. Incomplete statistics show that the fi ve major banks withdrew a total of 3.934 billion RMB of loans from enterprises violating national energy effi ciency and emissions reduction principles.7 In 2008, the MEP supplemented the People’s Bank of China’s credit analysis system with tens of thousands of pieces of data about environmental damage by individual enterprises, and offered an advisory service to commercial banks and other fi nancial institutions. This information helped banks decide to

7 Yu Liang, “Green Credit Issued by the Five National Banks Amounts to Over 100 Billion in 2007,” China Securities, February 27th, 2008. 286 hu kanping stop or restrict credit to those law-breaking enterprises, forcing them to control their pollution in order to regain credit facilities.8 MEP has also signed its fi rst inter-agency information sharing agreement with an economic agency, in the shape of an accord with the China Banking Regulatory Commission offering effective guidance to enable environmental regulations to be implemented in the banking fi eld. Environmental authorities are also working with the Interna- tional Finance Corporation (IFC) to introduce environmental guidance for 63 industries into China, assisting banks and investors to pay more attention to environmental risks and protection in these sectors.9 Reports also say that MEP is due to enhance information sharing systems with fi nancial institutions and issue a set of Management Rules on Transfer and Exchange of Green Credit Information (绿色信贷信息报送和交换管理办法) together with them.

B. Green Insurance Pollution liability insurance is an effective means to prevent and limit environmental risks. In early 2008, MEP and China Insurance Regu- latory Commission (保监会) (CIRC) issued Guidelines on the Implementa- tion of Pollution Liability Insurance (关于开展环境污染责任保险工作的指导意见), envisaging a market mechanism to improve companies’ ability to guard against environmental risks. The guidelines explain the key areas and items that the insurance applies to: highly dangerous industries, including enterprises that produce, manage, reserve, transport, and utilize dangerous chemical products; petrochemical enterprises where pollution accidents are likely to occur; enterprises dealing with dangerous industrial wastes; and enterprises where fatal pollution accidents have taken place recently. The same year, MEP and CIRC worked with local environmental regulators and insurers in Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan, Shanghai, Ningbo, Shenyang, and Suzhou on a series of local feasibility pilot schemes. Some insurers such as China Life (中国人保) and Ping An (平安保险) have launched complementary products and made progress in determining the scope of liability and

8 Deng Li.,“China Banking Regulatory Commission to Restrict the Scale of Green Credit Again,” 21st Century Business Herald, November 20th, 2008. 9 Wang Ting, “Pan Yue, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Protec- tion: More than Ten Billion Yuan of Credit Stopped for Highly Polluting Projects,” China Securities, September 24th, 2008. new developments in environmental economic policy 287 premium classes.10 MEP and CIRC plan to: extend the pilot schemes and engage in further research and guidance for those in Jiangsu, Hunan, Shanghai, Chongqing, Ningbo, Suzhou and Shenyang; improve insurers’ environmental liability product offerings; provide suggestions on making the products even greener; and draw lessons from the schemes and problems encountered with a view to a gradual full roll-out. China Environment News has reported the ﬁ rst successful environmental liability insurance payout: the pesticide producer Zhuzhou Haohua (株洲昊华公司) signed up for a “pollution accident” policy from Ping An on July 31st, 2008, with coverage of 40,800 RMB set in the light of its production activities and past compensation payout record. On September 28th, a hydrogen chloride leak occurred from the plant, contaminating nearby farmland. This triggered a payout from the insurance company of 11,000 RMB to the affected villagers after provision of the necessary evidence.11

C. Green Trade The two major tasks here for MEP are to restrict the export of products that are high-energy, high-pollution, and resource-intensive, and to deﬁ ne environmental responsibilities for Chinese companies investing abroad. MEP has updated its list of “double high” products (high-pollution and high environmental hazard) and is advocating the abolition of export tax rebates and processing trade terms for their manufacturers. With economic regulators’ support it has also taken certain measures to prevent the phenomenon of mass exports abroad leaving massive pollution at home. SEPA’s June 2007 proposal to cancel export tax rebates on over 50 “double high” products was accepted by the Ministry of Finance (财政部) and State Administra- tion of Taxation (税务总局), leading to 40% lower exports of these products. MEP published a new list in early 2008 of 140 products worth over two billion USD in six sectors, including pesticides, inorganic salt, batteries, paint, and dyes. The list was submitted to the economic regulators and approved. The Ministry of Commerce (商务部)

10 Qie Jianrong, “Pan Yue, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Environmental Pro- tection: Environmental Taxation Is on the Way,” Legal Daily, September 16th, 2008. 11 Xu Qi,“The Number of Enterprises Insured for Environmental Pollution Related Liability Reaches Seven in Hunan Province,” China Environment News, January 7th, 2009. 288 hu kanping included all these “double high” products in an April 2008 update of those banned from enjoying processing trade terms and has also, for the ﬁ rst time, accepted the “double high” status as a criterion for restricting exports. Twenty-six of forty products subsequently stripped of export tax rebate treatment by the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation in July 2008 were “double high” products. Reports suggest MEP’s next step will be to further update the “double high” list and their tariff coding, with a view to helping set up an export management policy for scarce resource-based products, and restricting export of products that are high-energy, high-pollution, and resource-intensive. Finally, applicable authorities are drafting documents such as the Guidelines on Environmental Protection in Outbound Investment (中国对外投资环境保护指南) with the aim of directing and regulating the environmental practices of Chinese enterprises investing overseas.12

D. Green Securities Policy This aims at improving the environmental checking system for company listings. Issued in 2007, the Notice on Further Regulating the Appli- cation for an Initial Public Offering or Reﬁ nancing by the Business Companies in Heavy-Polluting Industries (关于进一步规范重污染行业生产经营公司申请上市或再融资环境保护核查工作的通知) has prevented ten companies with environmental problems from going public. In order to further consolidate the system, MEP in June 2008 issued a Listed Company Industry Categories for Environmental Inspections (上市公司环保核查行业分类管理名录), stipulating mandatory inspection for fourteen highly-polluting sectors: thermal power generation, steel, cement, electrolytic aluminum, coal, metals, building materials, mining, chemicals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, paper, textiles, and tanning. Hundreds of speciﬁ c company types are involved. This measure will prevent polluting enterprises from going public, and encourage companies to take social responsibility. In addition, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (证监会) is strongly supporting environmental disclosure systems for listed companies, with the Shanghai Stock

12 Zhang Wanwu, “Pan Yue: We Will Turn Environmental Economic Policies into Solid Actions,” China Industrial Economy News, September 17th, 2008. new developments in environmental economic policy 289

Exchange’s Working Guide for Environmental Disclosure by Listed Companies (上市公司环境信息披露指引) as a good example.

E. Environmental Taxation Several agencies are reported to have formed a joint environmental taxation working group. Experts in related areas have joined hands in researching and compiling a report on the issue. In conjunction with the Nationwide Energy-Saving Movement, the MEP and applicable industry associations have drafted a proposal to issue a Catalogue of Specialized Environmental Protection Equipment Eligible for Corporate Income Tax Reductions (环境保护专用设备企业所得税优惠目录). The next step for MEP and the fi scal authorities is to move towards environmental taxation with a specifi c implementation plan. MEP will also accelerate the elimination of outdated technologies and equipment through environmental taxation measures, and issue a catalogue of backward technologies and equipment in sectors such as coking and papermaking. At the same time it will complete the corporate income tax reduction catalogue (above).13 The environmental regulators have also issued the Energy-Effi cient Power Generation and Distribution Measures ( for Trial Implementation) (节能环保发电调度办法(试行)), Administrative Measures on Power Prices and Facility Operation for Coal Power Producers with Flue Gas Desulfurization (燃煤发电机组脱硫电价及脱硫设施运行管理办法), and—with the Ministry of Finance—the Interim Measures for Special Central Government Funds for Main Pollutant Emissions Reduction (中央财政主要污染物减排专项资金管理暂行办法) and the Interim Measures for Funds to Replac- ing Subsidies with Awards for Sewage Treatment Equipment Pipe Networks in Urban and Township Areas (城镇污水处理设施配套管网以奖代补资金管理暂行办法). Electricity from coal-fi red power plants with desulfurization equipment will enjoy a price premium of 1.5 fen. These measures have rationalized the distribution of energy-effi cient power and stimulated development of urban and township sewage networks. Lists have been fi nalized of small thermal power generators and outdated iron and steel producers due to be shut down during the period

13 Ma Li, “Ministry of Environmental Protection Declares Environmental Taxa- tion Policy in Drafting, Green Securities Policy to be Implemented,” The Beijing News, September 13th, 2008. 290 hu kanping of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. The Notice on Strengthening Environmental Monitoring of Export Enterprises (关于加强出口企业环境监管的通知) has also been issued and a supervisory information sharing mechanism established. Also issued were the Opinions on Governmental Procurement of Environmentally Labeled Products (关于环境标志产品政府采购实施的意见) and the ﬁ rst Governmental Procurement List of Environmentally Labeled Products (环境标志产品政府采购清单), sparking off green government procurement activities.

V. Public Participation and Supervision

Citizen participation and public supervision are indispensable to the drafting and implementation of environmental economic policies. Non- governmental organizations (NGOs) have special strengths as concerns public supervision and research on local adaptation of environmental economic policies in China. Recent years have seen many NGOs actively exploring effective ways of involvement in and supervision of the drafting process for environmental economic policies, successfully advocating in their favor, and responding to the efforts made by government in drafting and implementation. At the Environmental Protection NGO Conference held in August 2006 by the All-China Environment Federation, Green Watershed introduced domestic NGOs to the concept of green credit policy and the role played by NGOs. In early December that year, Friends of Nature, Green Watershed, Mekong River Review, and Oxfam Hong Kong jointly hosted the fi rst international conference on green credit policy in Beijing. Yu Xiaogang, the director-general of Yunnan Green Watershed, suggested that the green credit policy would open doors for NGOs’ environmental work, as green credit policy requires signifi - cant public supervision. In the afternoon of July 26th, 2008, eight environmental NGOs— Green Watershed, Friends of Nature, Institute of Public and Envi- ronmental Affairs, Green Homestead, Global Environmental Institute, Civil Society Watch, China Development Brief, Green Volunteer League of Chongqing—presented Industrial Bank with China’s fi rst new developments in environmental economic policy 291

“Innovation Award for Green Banks.”14 As the fi rst such award in Chinese fi nance, it will encourage fi nancial institutions to get involved with environmental protection. It was set up by the NGOs and the award process was independently managed by them, contributing to the credibility of the award. At the same time, it represented a fruitful experiment in cooperating with fi nancial institutions and the media. The successful experience of international green banks shows that a fully-fl edged environmental responsibility system for fi nancial institutions greatly depends on public participation and supervision, especially NGOs’ role as a public voice. The “Innovation Award for Green Banking” is an innovative way of engaging banks in environmental protection and also provides an opportunity to explore the higher social role banks can have. The above NGOs have demonstrated an ability to encourage public participation in fi ne-tuning an environmental responsibility system for the fi nance sector. Some international NGOs have also played an active part in designing and applying environmental economic policies in China. To help draft a green credit guide for the paper-making sector—in line with national conditions—and provide technological support for green credit policies, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and MEP’s Research Center launched a project by the name of “Research on Local Adap- tation of the Environment, Health, and Safety Guide for the Paper- Making Industry,” which met the need of the fi nancial system for industry-specifi c environmental information and standards.15 Implementation of Chinese environmental economic policies is still in an introductory phase. Though a variety of forms of environmental economic policy currently exists, only a few have been rolled out nationwide and achieved signifi cant effects. Policies are in dire need of further refi nement. Even though the basic framework of these policies has been established and short-term and localized successes are visible, many barriers rooted in the whole system and technological obstacles still exist and hinder the policies from having their full effect. A journalist from the People’s Daily comments that “The two major obstacles to the environmental economic policies are local protectionism

14 Xie Xiaodong, “From ‘Funding for Energy-Saving and Emissions Reduction Projects’ to ‘Equator Principles,’” Shanghai Securities News, August 13th, 2008. 15 Wang Ting, “Guideline for Green Credit to Be Developed,” China Securities Jour- nal, August 1st, 2008. 292 hu kanping and legal vacuums.”16 Protectionism will affect the efﬁ cacy of these policies, and legal vacuums their effective implementation. Pan Yue, deputy minister of the MEP, contends that apart from general problems rooted in the whole system, four main obstacles have been encountered. First, inter-agency and central-local government communication channels are inefﬁ cient. Without an information sharing mechanism, there is not enough reliable basic information for drafting policies and accurately estimating their true effects. Second, basic research in the area is lacking. Compared to the enormous industrial system, there is a lack of useful catalogues and standards for use in determining the kinds of products, equipments, and technology that should be eliminated, limited, or encouraged on environmental grounds. Existing catalogues and standards are not upgraded frequently enough. Furthermore, since many older economic policies lack consideration of the environment, when severe environmental circumstances call for economic responses, an appropriate policy anchor cannot be found and reliable statistics in the area are also chronically lacking. With no analysis available of the environmental harm done by certain products and industries, the rollout of environmental economic policies is delayed. Third, people in the environmental protection sector have not been prioritizing their own capacity development with a view to getting involved in drafting relevant economic policies. Inadequate investment has led to a lack of experts capable of long-term and in-depth research on environmental economic policies. Fourth, the absence of incentives leads to the absence of preferential economic treatment for companies with good environmental performance, and so enterprises are generally reluctant to commit to environmental measures. Current environmental economic policies still have much room for improvement to keep pace with changes and developments in the market economy and environmental efforts.

16 Wu Weizheng, “Two Major Obstacles to Environmental Protection: Local Pro- tectionism and Legal Vacuums,” The Beijing Daily, February 27th, 2008. CHINA’S COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH A LOW CARBON ECONOMY

Zhuang Guiyang

The concept of low carbon economy (LCE) is an inevitable choice of mankind against the backdrop of climate change, and a future trend for world economic growth. Although not so familiar to the general public, this concept is attracting more and more attention from scholars and policy-makers. Top level policy-makers with forward-looking visions have repeatedly stressed the importance of LCE. Scholars have intensiﬁ ed their research efforts to provide theoretical and policy support for the decision-makers. Local governments have responded with a pioneering spirit. In a word, LCE is a hot issue all around China in 2008.

Key words: climate change, low carbon economy (LCE), low carbon city

With the issue of climate change attracting widespread attention, the concept of a low carbon economy (LCE) has become a hot topic. Consistent with future economic development trends, LCE aims at accelerating economic growth with low carbon consumption. How- ever, the ﬁ nancial crisis in 2008 raised concerns about the development of LCE. Other experts believe that the ﬁ nancial crisis will help to promote LCE. The fuel oil tax soon to be introduced in China, as well as the establishment of three environment and climate exchanges in Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, indicate that China has committed itself to the setting up of a long-term mechanism for energy conservation, emissions reduction, and the development of LCE.

I. Consensus on Low Carbon Economy by Policy-Makers

The concept of a low carbon economy has attracted extensive attention from the international community since its introduction, and triggered a worldwide transition towards LCE. A low carbon economy is characterized by a certain level of carbon productivity (economic output per unit of carbon emission) aimed at high economic growth with low carbon emissions. Low carbon development is the transition towards LCE and it will be achieved through technological breakthroughs and institutional regulation. The results of low carbon development are 294 zhuang guiyang more effi cient energy use, an optimized energy structure, and more rational consumer behavior. The concept of LCE emerges against the backdrop of global climate change. It was brought up during the international debate on whether developing countries should assume the obligation of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. On February 24th, 2003, the UK government released its energy white paper called Our Energy Future —Creating a Low Carbon Economy. It pointed out that developing a LCE is not only feasible technically, but also economically, and it would result in more safe, stable, and sound economic growth. In 2005, the UK government—as the host for the G8 Summit and as the EU Council Presi- dent—listed the issue of climate change as one of the two themes for the G8 Summit. In November 2005, the UK government hosted a high-level meeting dealing with the theme “Towards a Low Carbon Economy,” which was attended by the environment and energy min- isters of 20 major greenhouse gas emitters of the world. In October 2006, it was argued in the Stern Review that if 1% of the world’s GDP was used to mitigate climate change we could avoid a GDP loss of 5% to 20%. The report called for a transition to a low carbon economy. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its fourth report, saying that mankind must take immediate joint action in response to the challenge of climate change. It pointed out in particular that greenhouse gas emission in the future depended on the development paths we had chosen. With consensus on the Bali Roadmap, international action in response to climate change continued to evolve, and LCE attracted more and more international attention. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) chose “Kick the Habit! Towards a Low Carbon Economy” as the theme for World Environment Day 2008, hoping the concept of LCE could become the consensus of policy-makers at all levels. A low carbon economy is suited to China’s specifi c conditions. On the one hand, China needs to put an end to its over-dependency on fossil fuels and to relieve the pressure of high oil prices. On the other hand, China needs to maintain rapid economic growth and solve various development problems. LCE offers a new choice for sustainable development. In December 2006, the Chinese government, for the fi rst time, put forward the idea of developing a LCE in the National Assessment Report on Climate Change (气候变化国家评估报告). In June 2007, the Ministry china’s comprehensive engagement 295 of Science and Technology (科技部) reconfi rmed China’s intention to follow the road of LCE in China’s Special Scientifi c and Technological Actions in Response to Climate Change (中国应对气候变化科技专项行动). Minister Wan Gang (万钢) called for “reinforced efforts to develop LCE” at the Annual Conference of the China Association for Science and Technology in 2007. He pointed out, “A low carbon economy based on low energy consumption and low pollution is China’s future trend, since it can promote sustainable development in China and contribute to the global efforts to respond to climate change.” Wu Xiaoqing (晓青), the vice minister of Environmental Protection of China, suggested at the annual meetings of National People’s Con- gress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 2008 that a LCE should be put on the agenda. Later at the International Forum on Climate Change and Technical Innova- tion, he urged for reinforced efforts to protect the environment and to formulate national strategies for a low carbon economy. Zhou Shengxian (周生贤), China’s Minister of Environmental Pro- tection has said: A low carbon economy is an economic model featuring low energy consumption, low emissions, and low pollution. It is another great progres- sion that will follow primitive civilization, agricultural civilization, and industrial civilization. Its essence is to improve energy use effi ciency and create a structure of clean energy. Its core is technical innovation, institutional innovation, and a change in the development concept. Devel- oping LCE is a global revolution involving production mode, lifestyle, values, and national interests. Developing LCE in China is consistent with global trends and Chinese reality; it is an inevitable choice when we make efforts to materialize the scientifi c outlook on development and achieve sustainable development.1 In September 2007, President Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) pointed out at the APEC meeting that: Efforts are needed to pursue sustainable development, as climate change is ultimately a development issue and it can only be addressed in the course of sustainable development. We should ensure that both production and consumption are compatible with sustainable development. We should optimize the energy structure, promote industrial upgrading,

1 Zhou Shengxian, “Low Carbon Economy,” China Environment Science Press, 2008. 296 zhuang guiyang

develop a low carbon economy, build a resource conserving and environmentally friendly society, and thus, address the root cause of climate change.2

II. Research on LCE in China and Focus of Discussion

Although the term “low carbon economy” was used in literature in the late 1990s, it began to attract worldwide attention only after the publication of the UK’s Energy White Paper in 2003.3 In October 2004, the Research Center for Sustainable Development (可持续发展研究中心) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院) (CASS) and the UK Embassy in China co-sponsored a China-UK roundtable conference on climate change, introducing the concept of LCE to Chi- nese scholars. With the ﬁ nancial support of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁ ce (FCO), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences implemented a project to promote LCE through incentive mechanisms. As a result, the concept of LCE began to attract attention from scholars and policy-makers alike. In June 2008, the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (中国环境与发展国际合作委员会) (CCICED) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) jointly published the China Ecological Footprint Report. According to the report, China has consumed 15% of the world’s biological capacity, and the amount of energy China consumed was twice that of what its own ecological system could provide. It was urgent to promote a low carbon life style and economy in China. In September 2008, the Institute of Low Car- bon Economy (低碳经济研究院) was founded at Tsinghua University (清华大学). With multi-disciplinary expertise and efforts in Tsinghua University, the institute carried out systematic and profound research on LCE and its relevant policies and strategies, contributing greatly to sustainable social and economic development in China and in the world as a whole.

2 President Hu Jintao’s Speech at the 15th Economic Leaders’s Meeting of the APEC forum, Xinhuanet, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007–09/08/content_ 6686906.htm (accessed September 8th, 2007). 3 The term “low carbon economy” appeared earlier in China. In 1999, the U.S. Energy Foundation started a Low Carbon Development Paths Program in China. china’s comprehensive engagement 297

In April 2007, CCICED held a symposium on LCE and China’s energy and environment policies. In June 2008, CCICED launched a research project on “LCE Models in China.” In the same year, the Ministry of Environmental Protection initiated an environmental project called “Development of LCE Models and Their Application in Mitigating Climate Change,” aimed at analyzing the theories and practices of foreign countries in LCE development and identifying areas, directions, and challenges for China’s LCE development. On top of that, the project also hoped to put forward assessment models and future development scenarios for LCE in China, to propose development models, and to safeguard systems and policy suggestions for LCE in China. In 2008, the global fi nancial turmoil triggered by the United States subprime mortgage crisis gave rise to growing concern over climate change. Firstly, people are wondering whether the fi nancial crisis and economic recession issues would replace the issue of climate change on the top of the global agenda for the time being. Secondly, the fi nancial crisis may undermine national efforts to address climate change. Thirdly, the fi nancial crisis may also become an obstacle in the post- Kyoto Protocol negotiations. At present, many hold the view that the real adverse effects of the fi nancial turmoil could come in 2009. How- ever, it is encouraging to see that environmental protection and energy policy have frequently been seen in the economic stimulus packages adopted by many governments and LCE is still being chosen as a future development trend. Take China’s newly released four trillion RMB stimulus package to boost the economy as an example. A considerable sum of money is earmarked for ecological and environmental sectors. China’s experience in tackling the 1998 Asian fi nancial storm and the prevailing academic opinion both suggest that more investment in environmental infrastructure, new energy development, energy conservation, emissions reduction, and LCE contributes to continued and healthy economic growth. Meanwhile, to help combat recession, European enterprises are now ready to offer new energy technologies at a lower price, which is a blessing for China. LCE achieved by energy conservation and emissions reduction is an obvious remedy to solve the problem of global warming. At present, the international research on energy conservation and emissions reduction focuses on three aspects: market access, market transaction, and market exit. Although they have already been put into practice internationally, they are still new in China. While market access and 298 zhuang guiyang market exit can be practiced through administrative measures in China, market transaction calls for special arrangements to reach their full potential. Emission trading is an effective way to control the total amount of pollutants discharged. Today, some developed countries and international organizations expect market-based methods to play a key role in promoting LCE in developing countries. Some Chinese cities are showing great interest in the establishment of environment exchanges. Of them, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin have established environment exchange centers. These centers serve as an open platform for environmental rights trading and represent institutional innovation and service innovation. However, such innovation must be supported by appropriate policies, technologies, and institutions, which are far from satisfactory at the moment. Since China has no mandatory emissions reduction obligations until 2020, greenhouse gas emission trading cannot be done in China now. Nevertheless, there are great expectations of carbon discharge rights trading in the domestic market some day. At the International Workshop on Emission Trad- ing Programs in November 2008, organized by the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (环保部环境规划院), participants agreed that China should begin with sulfur dioxide emission trading in the power industry and include it in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. To offer extensive energy subsidies presently in China goes completely against our economic development needs. The price formation mechanism of some resource-based products does not adequately refl ect scarcity of resources, environmental damage costs, and the supply and demand relations. Also, the polluter-pays principle is not adequately applied, which undermines the readjustment of the industrial structure and the investment in energy conservation and energy effi ciency. China’s realities tell us that China cannot follow the old pattern of developed nations to realize industrialization through massive consumption of energy and raw materials. Our energy pricing reform should begin with power and oil prices. Presently, we should fi rst remove price subsidies. Fortunately, the Chinese government has decided to readjust the resource tax and to introduce an environment tax and fuel oil tax at a suitable point in time. Research suggests that energy and environment taxes can curb energy consumption and prevent the expansion of energy-intensive industries (such as transportation, metal smelting, chemical, and building materials) and help to promote a greener economy. A dramatic plunge in oil prices in response to the fi nancial crisis presents a good opportunity for China china’s comprehensive engagement 299 to introduce a fuel oil tax. In November 2008, the National Develop- ment and Reform Commission (国家发改委) confi rmed that China should introduce a fuel oil tax in the near future. As a result, a wave of debates ensued.

III. Chinese Cities’ Interests and Efforts in LCE

China is undergoing rapid industrialization and urbanization. The number of cities in China has skyrocketed since the reform and opening up period, from just 193 in 1978 to 661 in 2005. The number of megacities and big cities has risen from 13 and 27 to 54 and 85, respectively. By the end of 2006, the urbanization level in China had reached 43.6% and it is expected to reach 75% by 2050. However, while rapid industrialization and urbanization have promoted development and prosperity, they have, conversely, brought about many challenges, of which urban energy shortages stand out. How to push hundreds of large and medium-sized Chinese cities into a LCE is a big challenge deserving a lot of research efforts. Cities worldwide consume 75% of world’s total energy and produce 80% of the world’s total greenhouse gas emissions. Today, many big cities have started to accept the concept of LCE. In early 2008, two Chinese cities, Shanghai and Baoding (保定), joined a new WWF initiative to become China’s fi rst cities to explore ways of low carbon development in urban areas. The initiative focuses on energy effi ciency in buildings, renewable energy, and manufacturing of energy-saving products, hoping to set up a sustainable development model for Chi- nese cities and promote it nationwide. Shanghai has started to collect statistical data on energy consumption in buildings, by measuring energy use of public buildings such as offi ce buildings, hotels and big commercial buildings. These statistics are made public and then audited to improve energy use effi ciency in these public buildings. Meanwhile, training is offered to the building managers to help improve their management skills. Using the United States’ “Silicon Valley” as a reference for a development mode, Baoding in Hebei Province has committed itself to becoming “China’s Power Valley” and has targets to become a green, low carbon city. With the existing industrial capacity in new energy and energy-related manufacturing and some well-established enterprises in the energy sector, Baoding has set up seven different 300 zhuang guiyang high-tech zones, focusing on wind power, solar energy, power transmission and transformation equipments, new energy storage, energy saving products, electronic parts for the power industry, power industry automation, and power industry software. Baoding has been recognized as China’s fi rst and only industrial base for renewable energy development, a national high-tech production base for new energy, a base for international cooperation in new energy, and a model city in integrated use of solar energy. It has a group of new and leading renewable energy enterprises such as Tianwei (天威), Fengfan (风帆), Tianwei Yingli (天威英利), and Huiteng (惠腾). Although Shanghai and Baoding, as part of the WWF initiative, have focused only on a particular aspect of the low carbon development, the initiative has produced a favorable social impact. Now, apart from Beijing, Shanghai, and Baoding, other Chinese cities like Zhuhai (珠海市), Hangzhou (杭州市), Tangshan (唐山市), and Jilin (吉林市) have also showed great interest in building low carbon economic zones. But the transition towards LCE is a complicated process involving the optimization of both the industrial structure and the energy structure, as well as the overall transformation in production patterns and lifestyle. Presently, there is still no mature LCE model worldwide. Hopefully, China can explore some new ways for other developing countries to follow. To seek new ways to build LCE cities and provinces in China’s prosperous Eastern region or the less-developed Western region is of great signifi cance, according to a report by CASS, the National Devel- opment and Reform Commission, and Chatham House in March 2008. Based on the study, several institutions from China and the UK continued to cooperate in 2008 on China’s low carbon development and the city of Jilin was chosen for a case study. At the NPC and CPPCC meetings in March 2008, Chen Lihao (陈利浩), a CPPCC member from Zhuhai City, put forward a motion to build an LCE demonstration zone in Zhuhai. Also, the City of Hang- zhou proposed to develop a low carbon industry and become the fi rst low carbon city in China. Zhuhai has incorporated this into the city’s development programs featuring environmental protection. In October 2008, the Guangdong provincial government launched a research project aimed at putting forward a proposal to take the lead in developing LCE in Guangdong Province and Zhuhai City. ECOLOGICAL COMPENSATION AND PAYMENT

Zhang Ke

In China, an extreme imbalance exists between the environmental protectors and benefi ciaries (or destroyers and victims), in terms of economic benefi ts distribution. The benefi ciaries have enjoyed the eco-benefi ts for free, while the protectors have not received necessary incentives. The benefi ciaries do not shoulder the responsibility and cost of destroying the environment, while the victims have no access to the deserved economic compensation. This distortion in the relationship between ecological protection and economic benefi ts not only endangers China’s environment, but also hurts the harmonious relationship among different regions and stakeholders. At present, establishing an ecological compensation (eco-compensation) mechanism has become a public demand. China has already laid out the scientifi c research, materials, and political foundation to set up such a mechanism. Pilot projects have been in practice on a large scale.

Key words: eco-compensation, ecological beneﬁ t economic stimulation, economic compensation, beneﬁ ciary payment, market compensation mechanism

In terms of ecological protection, a structural lack of policies now exists in China. The existing economic policies in ecological construction fall short of meeting practical needs. This situation has caused an unfair distribution of ecological benefi ts and the related economic benefi ts between protectors and benefi ciaries, destroyers and victims. The benefi ciaries possess the eco-benefi ts for free, while the protectors do not get the deserved economic stimulation. In addition, the destroyers do not shoulder the responsibility and the cost of wrecking the environment, while the victims do not get the deserved economic compensation. This distortion in the relationship of eco-protection and economic benefi ts not only threatens China’s eco-protection, but also affects the harmonious relationship among regions and stakeholders. To solve these problems, an ecological compensation, or eco-compensation, mechanism should be established to regulate the ecological and economical distribution among the stakeholders, to promote ecological and environmental protection, to ensure equality between urban and rural areas and between regions and groups, and to achieve a balanced social development. 302 zhang ke

I. Eco-Compensation and Policy Suggestions

A. Concept The goal of eco-compensation is to protect and ensure a sustainable use of ecological services. It is an institutional arrangement to regulate the relationship among stakeholders, in terms of fi nancial interest, by using economic means. To be more specifi c, eco-compensation is a public institution that aims at protecting the environment and promoting a harmonious relationship between humans and nature in development. It uses administrative and marketing means to regulate the stakeholder relationship in interest according to the ecosystem service value, eco-protection cost, and development opportunity cost.1 According to research conducted by the China Council for Inter- national Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), eco-compensation mainly includes the following: 1) compensation for the cost of the protection (recovery) or the destruction of the ecosystem itself; 2) internalization of the economic externality using economic means; 3) economic compensation for the input in ecosystem and environmental protection made by individuals or local governments and the cost of giving up alternative development opportunities; and 4) making preventative investments in regions or objects with signifi cant ecological values. The establishment of an eco-compensation mechanism is based on the principle of internalizing the external cost. The compensation of ecosystem and environmental protectors is based on their input in improving eco-services and related opportunity costs. The no-compensation principle for ecosystem and environmental protection infringers is due to the cost of restoring the ecosystem and the related opportunity cost endured by the compensated, caused by the destructive behavior of infringers (see Table 20.1). Internationally, “eco-compensation” often takes the form of “Pay- ment for Environmental Services” (PES) or “Payment for Environ- mental Benefi ts” (PEB) which has four main types:

1 This section mainly consulted the “Eco-Compensation Mechanism and Policy” project group report (2006) by China Council for International Cooperation on Envi- ronment and Development (CCICED). ecological compensation and payment 303

Table 20.1: Geographical range, type, content, and method of eco-compensation Geographical Compensation Compensation Content Compensation Range Type Methods International Global, Global forest and bio- Global purchase compensation regional, and diversity protection, under multilateral international pollution transfer, agreement; ecological and greenhouse gas emission, compensation environmental and trans-boundary under regional or issues rivers bilateral agreement; transaction in global, regional, and international markets Domestic River basin Compensation for Local government compensation compensation upper and lower coordination; fi scal reaches of big river transfer payment; basins; compensation market transaction for trans-provincial medium-sized river basins; compensation for small river basin within regional administrative jurisdiction. Eco-system Forest eco-compensation; National (public) service grassland eco- compensation fi scal compensation compensation; wetland transfer payment; eco-compensation; eco-compensation nature reserve eco- fund; market compensation, marine transaction; enterprise ecosystem; agricultural and individual ecosystem involvement Important Water conservation Central, local eco-function areas; biodiversity governmental (public) area reserves; wind check and compensation; NGO compensation sand fi xation, and soil donation; private conservation areas; fl ood enterprise involvement control areas Resource Land reclamation; Benefi ciaries’ exploitation vegetation restoration payment; destroyers compensation and exploiters’ payment

Source: China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 304 zhang ke

1. Direct Public Compensation Similar to China’s natural forest protection project, conversion of cropland to forest and grassland project, and ecological public forest protection, the government directly compensates rural land owners and other providers who offer ecological services. This is also the most common way of ecological compensation. This kind of compensation also includes easement protection, which means to compensate the owners who give up all or part of their land for the purpose of protection.

2. Quota Transaction Plan Similar to the European Union’s emissions right transaction plan, the government or the administrative institution ﬁ rst sets a boundary (“quota” or “base number”) for ecosystem degradation or a certain amount of allowed destruction. The institutions and individuals under the plan can perform their obligations by directly following the rules and regulations, or they can ﬁ nance other land owners to carry out the protection activity to balance their own “quota excess.” They can use this exchange method to trade with the “credit quota” to get a market price, so that compensation is achieved.

3. Direct Private Compensation Except for the fact that non-proﬁ t and for proﬁ t organizations take the place of the government as the ecosystem service buyer, direct private compensation is very similar to the direct public compensation. These compensations are often called “voluntary compensation” or “voluntary market” because the buyers are transacting under the circumstances of no administrative motives. The commercial groups and/or individual consumers can take part in the compensation out of charity, risk management, and/or market administration preparation purposes.

4. Bio-Product Certiﬁ cation Plan Through this plan, consumers can choose a bio-friendly product cer- tiﬁ ed by an independent third party based on standards to provide compensation. ecological compensation and payment 305

B. Several Important Eco-Compensation Mechanism Designs An efﬁ cient eco-compensation mechanism needs to target key areas of the eco-compensation, the compensation subjects, and different responsibilities attached. The targeting of key areas of eco-compensation should be based on national, as well as regional needs, taking into consideration previous work done in the area. The compensation subjects can be classiﬁ ed according to different responsibility scales. Generally, the compensation for important eco-function areas like large areas of forests, wetlands, grasslands, and ecosystem services for national nature reserves should be provided by the central government. The eco-compensation for mineral resource exploitation and transboundary medium-sized river basins should be undertaken jointly by the government and stakeholders. The local government should focus on establishing the eco-compensation mechanism for urban water sources and small river basins under jurisdiction, as well as, cooperating with the central government in compensation for the transboundary medium-sized river basins. As for eco-compensation for trans-regional and important eco-function areas, a comprehensive approach should be taken on the basis of previous eco-compensation for basins and various factors in ecosystem service. Characteristics of different regions and eco-system service contributions should also be taken into account (see Table 20.2).

II. China’s Experience and Lessons Learned in Establishing the Eco-Compensation Mechanism

A. China’s Experience in Establishing the Eco-Compensation Mechanism Research and practice related to eco-compensation started in the early 1990s in China. Eco-compensation for forest and nature reserves began relatively early, receiving many funds from the government and had satisfactory results. Apart from the mechanism of the forest ecological beneﬁ ts compensation fund, the six major ecological projects (such as the protection of natural forests and returning farmland to forestry) are all oriented to compensate for the degeneration of the environment due to long-term destruction. As for eco-compensation related to river basins, local practices have been on the protection of urban drinking water sources and the 306 zhang ke

Table 20.2: Design of several important eco-compensation methods

River Basins Minerals Forestry Nature Reserves The All the regions and The polluted All the The government determination groups that have ecological governmental shall purchase of the subject benefi ted from the environment offi ces, various ecological utilization of water caused by deserted work units, and services of resources within a or outdated individuals who nature reserves. given river basin. mining areas have engaged in Work units and All the individuals, shall be treated the protection and individuals who enterprises and by the central cultivation of forest have engaged work units that government resources. All the in exploitations have discharged with treatment work units and limited by pollutants and, thus, funds. Pollution individuals engaged protection shall affected the waters caused by new in producing pay for their both in terms of mining areas and operational benefi ts. quantity and quality shall be treated activities, who have during processes by infringing benefi ted from the of production or enterprises. forest resources. All everyday life. The the enterprises and responsibilities and individuals who obligations of each have damaged the benefi cial party will forest resources. be determined by the size of the river basin as well as the scope of the upper and lower reaches. Way of With coordination Cash Transfer payment Government compensation of the government, compensation of major projects, purchases, the benefi ciaries and restorative tax relief, transfer shall negotiate treatments. migration subsidies, payment by with each other. market trading, national fi nance, Within the given eco-labeling, and preferential administrative so on. policies, tax area, negotiations relief, subsidies, among relevant setting up parties shall also special funds be held. Methods for eco- such as public compensation payment, one-to-one for nature trading, material reserves, project compensation, compensation, policy-based and compensation, international intellectual support. compensation, eco- labeling, and the like shall be adopted. ecological compensation and payment 307

Table 20.2 (cont.)

River Basins Minerals Forestry Nature Reserves

The source of Collecting eco- The restoration The government Due to its compensation compensation tax fund for the shall continue public goods funds in river basins, environment of to enlarge its nature, nature setting up eco- mining areas investment in the reserves shall compensation funds mainly comes forest eco-projects, mainly be in river basins, from government to further set up supported by implementation of appropriation, special projects the government. preferential credit charges from of ecological In the and loan policies current operating protection and meantime, funds for introduction of mining areas construction, to raised from foreign funds and categorized as develop multiple other social projects, and so on. “compensation channels pooling parties shall be fee of damaged funds for forest increased. environment in ecological benefi ts deserted mining compensation, areas,” and and to establish cash deposits mechanism of specifi cally for “eco-tax.” restoring the environment. The basis of The standard shall The standard In accordance with Three kinds determining be based on the shall be based the two kinds of of basis are compensation direct investment on the value of forests, the newly adopted: the standard of the upper reach the damaged planted forest and fi rst is based areas, the loss of environment in the existing forest, on the value opportunities for the mining area. the determination assessment of development in the In fact, it shall of the standard the ecosystem upper reaches, the be determined shall take into service; the newly built facilities by actual costs consideration second on the for the protection to restore the the following protection cost; of the water sources environment. aspects: the direct and the third within the river investment of on the losses basin in the upper forestation and caused by reaches, the quality forest maintenance, protection. and quantity of the the opportunity infl ow water to the cost to protect the benefi ciary regions, ecological function and so on. of the forest at the expense of economic development, and benefi ts from the service by the forest ecosystem.

Source: China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 308 zhang ke eco-compensation between the lower and upper reaches of middle- or small-sized river basins within a given administrative region. Exam- ples include the cooperative protection of water resources by Beijing and Hebei Province, the eco-compensation paid by the Guangdong provincial government to the upper reaches of the Dongjiang River (东江) within the province, and the eco-compensation paid by Zhe- jiang Province to the river basin of the Xinan River (新安江) within the province. The major policies adopted are the transfer payments from the higher authority to the targeted local authority, consolidating fund channels to support the targeted region, and transfer payments between governments at the same level. Meanwhile, some local governments have experimented with other ways of compensation based on a market mechanism, such as the trading of water resources. There have already been successful examples. After rounds of negotiations, Dongyang City (东阳市) traded the right of permanent use to 50 million cubic meters of Hengjin Reservoir’s (横锦水库) water to Yiwu City (义乌市), in the lower reaches of the same province of Zhejiang. Since the 1980s, China has begun large-scale ecological construction projects, including the construction of shelter forest systems, treatment of soil erosion, the prevention and treatment of desertiﬁ cation, returning of farmlands to forest and grassland, the protection of natural forests, returning of grazing land to grassland, and the ecological protection of the Sanjiangyuan (三江源) area.2 This series of ecological projects all bear the obvious signiﬁ cance of eco-compensation and have received investments of around 100 billion RMB. From 2000 to 2003, 220 billion RMB of funds from treasury bonds have been appropriated by the central government to the construction of infrastructure in the western part of China, accounting for 37% of all the issued treasury bonds within the same period. The amount of transfer payments from the central government increased drastically from 5.3 billion RMB in 2000 to 17 billion RMB in 2003, and the total sum in four years amounted to 45 billion RMB. Funds directed to Western China from the central government’s fund for infrastructure construction increased from 17 billion RMB in 2000 to 24 billion RMB in

2 Translator’s note: Sanjiangyuan refers to the source area of the three rivers Lan- cang, Yellow, and Yangtze on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. ecological compensation and payment 309

2003. From 2000 to 2003, the total amount of aid-the-poor funds to Western China from the central government was 17.5 billion RMB.3 In terms of regional compensation, those funds from fi nancial transfer payments and from development aid policies had little to do with eco-compensation, and were rarely used for ecological construction and protection. However, they did make certain compensations to Western China, in an unobvious way, for the opportunity cost caused by the protection of the ecosystem at the expense of development, or for the cost caused by ecological damages in history. The six major ecological projects such as the protection of natural forests and returning farmlands to forestry are all oriented to the compensation for the degeneration of the ecosystem after long-term damage. In August 2007, in order to carry out the Decision of the State Council on Implementing a Scientifi c Outlook on Development and Strengthening Environ- mental Protection (国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定) and to continue the spirit of the Sixth National Congress for environmental protection, the State Environmental Protection Administration issued Guiding Advice on Carrying out Experimental Work on Eco-Compensation (关于开展生态补偿试点工作的指导意见), which is the fi rst guiding document related to eco-compensation. It defi nes the eco-compensation mechanism to be aimed at environmental protection and the harmonious relationship between man and nature. Based on the service value of the ecosystem, the protection cost and opportunity cost of development, Guiding Advice on Carrying out Experimental Work on Eco-Com- pensation integrates the administrative and market measures and adjusts interest relations between involved parties of environmental protection and economic development. The document also defi nes fi ve basic eco- compensation principles:

1. Developers are responsible for protecting the environment, infringers for restoration, beneﬁ ciaries for compensation, and pollutant dischargers for payment; 2. Responsibilities, rights, and beneﬁ ts shall be integrated; 3. Relevant parties shall cooperate in the construction and sharing of all the achievements to reach win-win development;

3 China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development, “CCICED’s Special Policy Report,” the sixth issue, 2006, http://www.china.com.cn/ tech/zhuanti/wyh/2008–02/13/content_9734279_4.htm, 2006–12. 310 zhang ke

4. Governmental guiding shall be integrated with market regulation and control; 5. Policy-making shall take into consideration the local situation and all shall positively engage in innovation.

In September of the same year, the former SEPA declared that experimental work with eco-compensation should be carried out in nature reserves, major ecologically functional areas, exploitation of mineral resources, and aquatic environments in river basins. Based on these experiments, the standardization system for eco-compensation in key fi elds shall be established, plural modes for eco-compensation shall be explored, and the setting up and perfection of relevant eco-compensation policies and regulations shall be promoted. Moreover, the foundation for an overall mechanism of eco-compensation shall be laid. According to research by Professor Zhang Shiqiu (张世秋) from Peking University, the explorative practices of China’s eco-compensation take on two major characteristics. The fi rst relates to those which have been promoted by relevant ministries and commissions of the central government and which have been implemented in the form of national policies. The second refers to those practices which have been undertaken by active local governments voluntarily. These policies and practices provide rich experiences and lessons for the setting up of a systematic eco-compensation mechanism. She also points out that there are several kinds of current policies at the national level bearing certain relations with issues of eco-compensation. The fi rst kind refers to those that defi nitely aim at eco-compensation, such as the policy of non-commercial forest compensation funds (a compensation fund by the central government for the forest ecological benefi ts), projects returning farmlands to forestry and grassland, projects protecting natural forests, projects returning grazing lands to grassland, the water charging policy, soil conservation, and ecological protection projects in the Sanjiangyuan area. However, most of these policies have relied on various projects with a limited term for implementation, and have, thus, entailed hidden troubles of ineffectiveness after the completion of those projects. Moreover, the designed compensation standards are problematic, which may very well pauperize the interested subjects. The second kind of policies refer to those that could have been good platforms for the mechanism of eco-compensation, but have not been fully utilized (such as natural resource taxes, compensation fees for natural resources, and so on). These policies have been made to ecological compensation and payment 311 facilitate the protection and reasonable exploitation of natural resources, yet the design of the policies did not take into account the issue of eco-compensation of mineral exploitation. The third kind of policies bear the nature of resource compensation but were not strictly designed for eco-compensation, such as the compensation policy for farmland occupancy. The fourth kind refers to those which were not designed for eco-compensation but which have played a certain role in eco-compensation, such as the transfer payment by the central government to the western part of China.4

B. Implications and Lessons Learned in Eco-Compensation According to Zhang Shiqiu and some other experts, a number of these eco-compensation practices turned out to be very successful. China’s largest eco-compensation practice is the project of conceding land to forestry, which was the fi rst offi cial large-scale compensation for an ecological construction project in China. It effectively put the damage of the environment under control, playing an important role in the protection and restoration of forest and grass resources. Addition- ally, in terms of relieving poverty, it was a successful attempt that not only achieved the goal of environmental protection, but also gained economical benefi ts and won the support of the people in general. Other successful examples include the system of compensation for using farmland which has been implemented for many years, major ecological construction projects of protecting natural forests, and the fi nancial subsidies policy for the construction of nature reserves. The project of conceding the land to forestry is by far the most important ecological program in terms of government guidance, investment, scope of coverage, and the number of people involved in China. It was carried out in a few selected areas in 1999 and was fully implemented in 2002, covering 25 provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities under the direct jurisdiction of the central government) and 2,279 counties of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp (新疆兵团) (including county-level units). One hundred and twenty-four million farmers from 32 million households have been involved and

4 Zhang Shiqiu and An Shumin, “The Development and Eco-Compensation of the Western Region” Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in Western China, Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008, pp. 185–210. 312 zhang ke more than 130 trillion RMB has been invested by the central government. From 1999 to 2006, a total of 24,267,000 hectares of farmland was restored to forestry, of which 1.33 million hectares of land were conserved to facilitate afforestation, increasing the forest coverage rate by an average of more than two percentage points.5 Wang Jinnan (王金南), the chief engineer and vice president of the China Environmental Planning Institute, summed up China’s exploration in eco-compensation. He emphasizes that ten relationships should be carefully handled in practices of eco-compensation, including the relationship between the government and the market, the central government and local governments, the general national platform and individual ministry platforms, eco-pay and damage compensation, new problems and old ones, ecological compensation and poverty relief, “making new blood” and “transfusing blood,” the split of responsibility between the upstream areas and downstream ones, compensation standards and compensation by agreement, and ﬁ nancial funds and social funds. According to Wang Jinnan, the key to the eco-compensation mechanism lies in deciding what responsibility the upstream area and downstream area should take. Generally speaking, the government cannot simply demand the downstream to compensate the upstream ecologically. Both upstream and downstream areas have the responsibility to protect the environment, as well as share the responsibility to enforce environmental laws and regulations. Therefore, the upstream and downstream areas should work together to establish an “environmental responsibility agreement” system and adopt a work model of agreement on water quality and quantity in the relevant river basin. Thus, if the upstream area reaches the required water quality and quantity, the downstream area should grant compensation to the upstream. If the upstream fails to reach the targets, or causes water pollution, the upstream should make compensations to the downstream. As for the weakness in the practice of ecological compensation, Zhang Shiqiu and others summarized the following three points:

5 Han Lewu, “An Average Increase of 2 Percentage Points in the Coverage Rate of the Forestry in China,” Legal System Daily, February 5th, 2007; Ding Wenjie, “364 Million Acres of Land is Restored to Forestry,” Zhejiang Province Daily, August 26th, 2007; “National Meetings on Restoring Farmland to Forestry Is Hold in Changsha City,” Hunan Province Forestry, the 9th issue, 2007. ecological compensation and payment 313

Firstly, compensation practices in the form of “projects” have resulted in a lack of stability and continuity in terms of eco-compensation policies, and thus, a lack of sustainability in ecological protection. Policies such as returning farmland to forests or returning the grazing ban to grasslands and forestry are typical eco-compensation policies whose central and starting point is to protect and improve the environment by granting fi nancial compensations for farmers, pasto- ralists, and other direct interest groups who made sacrifi ces for and contributions to ecological protection. However, most of these policies are implemented and organized in the form of projects, programs, and plans with a clear time limit, resulting in a discontinuity in the policy and generating greater potential variance in outcome. There- fore, when the interests of the people involved are no longer taken care of after the deadline of a project, people would no longer restrict their production for the sake of the environment, but resort to activities that meet their basic needs, which imposes great pressure on the local ecological environment. Secondly, the central government is under great fi nancial pressure as a result of the imperfections of the eco-compensation system. Thirdly, it is diffi cult to defi ne compensation responsibilities in real circumstances. Although the current principles of eco-compensation, such as “those who benefi t should make compensations,” “those who pollute restore,” and “polluter pays,” are recognized by all, the relationship between the compensator and the recipient in specifi c compensation situations is not clear. This is especially true at the national level where the eastern part and the western part of China are involved. The western regions of China have made tremendous sacrifi ces and lost a lot of opportunities for development for the cause of China’s environmental protection, while the eastern or downstream areas directly benefi ted as a result. Therefore, the central government or the eastern region should reward the western region based on the principle of “those who benefi t, compensate.” Some experts also argue that China is still in the exploratory stage of eco-compensation due to the complexity of the interest groups involved. Key issues of actual operations, such as how to calculate the ecosystem services of the upstream areas, how to quantify the ecological indicators of compensation, how to decide criteria for compensation, how to clarify water rights, and how to provide legal assistance for ecological compensation, all need to be resolved. 314 zhang ke

III. New Findings and Suggestions for Improvement

A. From Ecological Compensation to Ecological Payment Based on his research on a number of countries, Professor Nick Hanley of Environmental Economics, found that “Provider Gets Prin- ciple” (PGP) has been put into practice in some areas, while the “Ben- efi ciary Pays Principle” (BPP) has rarely been adopted. Although some projects require the benefi ciaries to pay, it is mostly concerned with a single element of compensation and involves only part of the benefi ciaries. With the strengthening of ecological awareness among the people, most people are willing to pay. However, it is still diffi cult to make eco-compensation voluntary and institutionalized. Considering the fact that the regions to be paid are generally poor, there is a risk of ecological degradation if the problem of poverty is not resolved after the compensation stops. Therefore, to implement BPP is the major task for the perfection of the eco-compensation mechanism, as well as a precondition to achieve the transition from the eco-compensation system to the ecological payment stage. 6 The eco-compensation stage is the compensational stage for the development opportunity costs. At this stage, the opportunity costs of main participants in the compensation activities include their direct losses and costs (such as the loss of crop output generated from existing patterns of production or the initial input in the ecological protection). The ecological payment stage is a value compensation phase of ecosystem services via the newly added value of ecosystem services. In order to ensure the continual supply of ecosystem services, the costs for the maintenance and management of eco-services must be paid. According to the PBP principle, how much to be paid is mainly determined by how much one benefi ts. Another important factor of the payment determinant is the “willingness to pay” (WTP). To a large extent, the benefi ciaries’ WTP depends on people’s knowledge of the ecological services and their environmental awareness. The practice of “benefi ciaries pay” can build a lasting supply channel of funds.

6 Zhang Shiqiu and An Shumin, “The Development of the Western Areas of China and Ecological Compensation,” Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development in the Western Areas of China, Social Science Academic Press, 2008, p. 200. ecological compensation and payment 315

Various ways of payment can be adopted, such as fees, designated taxes, and protection funds.

B. Improving the Existing Systems and Policies First of all, the compensation standards must be improved, which is the foundation for improving the compensation mechanism. It involves a compensation subject and the adjustment of its role. The compensation subject should be diversiﬁ ed and the governments in poverty-stricken areas should be included in the body of compensation subjects. Secondly, the ways of achieving eco-compensation should also be improved. Government intervention mechanisms need to be adjusted, market-based instruments gradually introduced, a market oriented mechanism established, and the content and carrier of eco- compensation enriched.

C. Suggestions In 2008, a team consisting of researchers from the Environmental Pro- tection Department and other institutions released “A Study on the Framework of China’s Carbon Balance Transaction” (中国碳平衡交易框架研究). The project team explored how to determine the model of a Carbon Fund collection and payment in China. They put forward a bold and constructive plan: if the total amount of carbon sources is higher than that of the total carbon sink in a province (including autonomous regions and municipalities), it may be a good idea to implement a similar “ecological compensation” policy based on the quantity of the excessive amount. Moreover, cash can be directly paid to the national carbon fund administration to compensate regions which contribute a large amount of carbon sinks and to ﬁ nance the National Clean Production Plan and Energy-Saving and Emission Reduction Plan (国家清洁生产计划和节能减排).

ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES IN 2008

Su Jianhua and Guo Peiyuan

This paper probes into the environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 from a variety of perspectives, such as industrial pollution, energy conservation, pollution discharge reduction, the disclosure of environmental information, green credit, the enterprise’s environmental strategy, and environmental public welfare. On the one hand, as interested parties have intensiﬁ ed their supervision efforts, the environmental performance of enterprises has shown improvement by varying degrees and enterprises’ participation in environmental protection is gradually diversifying as well; on the other hand, industrial pollution remains serious and there is still room for improvement in information disclosure and environmental public welfare.

Key words: industrial pollution, energy conservation and emissions reduction, information disclosure, green credit

Enterprises play a key role in promoting eco-friendly development and adopting a circular economy, and they are facing more and more external pressures. For example, in recent years, some ministries concerned with enterprises’ destructive activities to the environment, such as China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (国家环境保护部), have strengthened their law enforcement. The environmental awareness of the public has also been raised. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the media have been paying more attention to enterprises’ environmental performance, so as to urge them to better fulﬁ ll their environmental responsibility. This paper will present a brief overview of the environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 from multiple aspects such as industrial pollution, energy conservation and emissions reduction, and information disclosure.

I. Industrial Pollution

In September 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) issued the Report of Environmental Statistics of China in 2007 (全国环境统计公报 2007), disclosing the latest industrial pollution statistics (see 318 su jianhua and guo peiyuan

Table 21.1). According to the statistics, from the year 2003 to 2007, under the circumstances of rapid economic development in China, discharge of industrial wastewater, emission of chemical oxygen demand (COD), emission of sulfur dioxide, and yield of solid waste generally increased, while emission of ammonia nitrogen, soot emission, dust emission, and discharge of solid waste experienced a decrease. In addition, both the occurrences of and ﬁ nancial losses from environmental pollution and destruction accidents decreased. On the whole, despite the fact that some pollution activities were under control to some extent, industrial pollution remains severe for the sake of rapid economic growth.

Table 22.1: Situation of industrial pollution in China from 2003 to 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Discharge 2.124 2.211 2.431 2.402 2.466 amount of industrial wastewater (million tons) Emission 5.119 5.097 5.548 5.415 5.111 amount of industrial COD (million tons) Emission 0.404 0.422 0.525 0.425 0.341 amount of industrial ammonia nitrogen (million tons) Emission 17.914 18.914 21.684 22.348 21.40 amount of industrial sulfur dioxide (million tons) Emission 8.462 8.865 9.489 8.645 7.711 amount of industrial soot (million tons) environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 319

Table 22.1 (cont.) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Emission 10.21 9.048 9.112 8.084 6.987 amount of industrial dust (million tons) Yield of 1,004.284 1,200.30 1,344.489 1,515.414 1,760.00 industrial solid waste (million tons) Discharge 19.409 17.62 16.547 13.021 11.967 amount of industrial solid waste (million tons) Environmental 1843 1441 1406 842 462 pollution and destruction accident (times) Direct 33.749 363.657 105.15* 134.711 30.16 economic loss incurred by environment pollution and destruction (million RMB)

* The ﬁ gure doesn’t take the economic losses of the Songhua River Toxic Spill Acci- dent into account. Source: Report of Environmental Statistics of China in 2007

As the MEP is making more efforts in law enforcement, an increasing number of enterprises have been ordered to close down, owing to violations of related laws and regulations. According to the Report of Envi- ronmental Statistics of China of 2007, in the year 2007 a total of 24,113 projects were ordered to control pollution by a prescribed time. This was more than any other year since 2004 (see Table 21.2). Altogether, 25,733 enterprises were ordered to close down—a record high since the statistics began. 320 su jianhua and guo peiyuan

Table 22.2: Projects ordered to control pollution by a prescribed time and enterprises ordered to close down from 2003 to 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Projects ordered to 27,608 22,649 22,126 20,578 24,113 control pollution by a prescribed time Enterprises ordered 11,499 13,348 10,777 10,030 25,733 to close down, suspend operation, merge with others or shift to different lines of production

Source: Report of Environmental Statistics of China in 2007

By the end of November 2008, more than 1.6 million law enforcers had been assigned to examine over 700,000 enterprises, with 15,000 environmental law-breakers for investigation and action, and over 100 people in charge prosecuted according to the law.1 It can be inferred that a great many enterprises must have been ordered to close down or required to make rectiﬁ cations in 2008, and in particular the nationwide industry upgrading led to the closure or transformation of enterprises with outdated production techniques. For instance, in February 2008, Fountain Set Holdings Ltd. (福田实业), a knitted fabric manu- facturer, announced it would considerably reduce the production capability of its branch company in Dongguan City (东莞), Guangdong Province, and transfer some of its production facilities to new factories in other places. This was due in part to the “Environmental Protection Storm.” (In 2006, environmental regulators recovered over 11 million RMB of pollutant discharge fees from this company.) The same is true with other provinces. For example, Liaoning Province closed down 225 paper mills in accordance with national industrial policies.2 By the end of November 2008, 1,798 polluting enterprises had been closed down

1 Zhou Wenying, “Minister Zhou Shengxian Presides over the Standing Meeting of the Ministry of Environmental Protection,” China Environmental News, December 22nd, 2008. 2 Liaoning Environment Protection Bureau, “Liaoning Provincial Government Closes down 225 Paper Mills,” http://www.lnepb.gov.cn/hbj/web/html/100234/ 2008715/1216100594113.shtml (accessed November 13th, 2008). environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 321 in Shanxi Province.3 By the end of October 2008, Hubei Province had closed down 39 small paper mills, 15 small printing and dyeing enterprises, 29 small cement factories, production lines of 58 small iron melting plants and steel-making enterprises, 6 small alcohol enterprises, 1 small monosodium glutamate enterprise, and 13 small power generating units.4 Guangdong Province closed down 2,380 polluting enterprises, ordered 472 enterprises to make measures to control pollution, and ordered 5,469 enterprises to rectify their practices within a speciﬁ ed period of time.5 In addition, the MEP turned in a blacklist to the Ministry of Finance (财政部) and Ministry of Commerce, suggesting the relative departments should take actions to make enterprises shoulder corresponding environmental costs. In February 2008, the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) of China (the current Ministry of Environmental Protection) announced the ﬁ rst group of products with “high pollution and high environmental risk,” involving 141 kinds of highly-polluting and energy-intensive products in six industries. Regarding the 39 kinds of products which enjoy export tax rebates, such as chemicals, paint, batteries, and organo-arsenic products, SEPA proposed to the Ministry of Finance and State Taxation Administration (税务总局) that tax preferential treatment of those products should be removed and suggested to the Ministry of Commerce and the Bureau of Customs that their processing trade should be banned as well.6 The blacklist did serve as a deterrent for the enterprises, and other departments of environmental protection followed suit. In June 2008, Henan Province probed into eleven past environmentally illegal cases and put them on a “blacklist.”7 In October 2008, a blacklist was also made in Kunming City, Yunnan Province. A notice of criticism targeting

3 Ge Haixia, “Shanxi Province Releases the List of 59 Environmentally Illegal Enterprises,” http://www.daynews.com.cn/ (accessed July 2nd, 2008). 4 Wei Mengjia, “Hubei Province Takes Multi-Measures to Reduce the Total Dis- charge Amount,” http://www.hbepb.gov.cn/show.aspx?id=15932 (accessed Novem- ber 20th, 2008). 5 Environmental Protection of Guangdong Province, “State’s Supervision Group Gives Full Credit to Efforts of Guangdong Province in Environmental Protection,” http://www.gdepb.gov.cn/gzdt/shbdt/200811/t20081127_57472.html (accessed November 27th, 2008). 6 Huang Kangsheng and E. Pingling, “Blacklist of the First Group Products with ‘Double Highs,’” People’s Daily (overseas), February 27th, 2008. 7 Shao Lihua, “Blacklist in Henan Province,” China Environmental News, June 12th, 2008. 322 su jianhua and guo peiyuan those enterprises and individuals on the list was to be circulated around the city, and their illegal activities and punishments would be made known to the public.

II. Enterprises’ Energy Conservation, Emissions Reduction, and Concern for Climate Change

In June 2007, the State Council promulgated the General Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Pollutant Discharge Reduction (节能减排综合性工作方案). The objective of this plan was explicit—by the year 2010 the average GDP energy consumption shall be reduced by 20%, water consumption by 30% in relation to the average industrial added value, and the total emission amount of the major pollutants sulfur dioxide and COD by 10%. The year 2008 was considered to be crucial in the campaign for energy conservation and emissions reduction. Efforts paid off: in the fi rst half of 2008 the average GDP of energy consumption in China dropped by 2.88% and energy consumption in relation to the average added value of industrial enterprises above the designated size fell by 5.76%. With regard to the comprehensive energy consumption in major energy-intensive industries, the fi gure decreased by 6.74% in the coal industry, 4.05% in the steel industry, 3.70% in the non-ferrous metal industry, 9.98% in the industry for building materials, 1.58% in the oil/petrochemical industry, 4.76% in the chemical industry, 9.61% in the textile industry, and 3.79% in the power industry.8 With regard to pollution discharge reduction, according to the preliminary calculations of environmental protection departments, in the fi rst three seasons of 2008, the emission amount of both COD and sulfur dioxide continued to drop compared with those of the last year, down by 2.7% and 4.2%, respectively.9 Enterprises are the backbone in the campaign for energy conservation and emissions reduction, and therefore they are required to make improvements. The government’s plan for energy conservation and

8 Zhou Yingfeng, “Unit GDP Energy Consumption Dropped by 2.88% in the First Half of 2008,” http://fi nance.people.com.cn/GB/7633346.html (accessed August 7th, 2008). 9 Wu Zhizheng, “Hard-Won ‘Double Drops,’” People’s Daily, December 10th, 2008. environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 323 emissions reduction started with large-scale enterprises, urging them to participate in the campaign and accept regular examinations. In August 2008, the National Development and Reform Commission announced the inspection results for energy conservation: among the 953 enterprises under examination, 391 were above the standard, accounting for 41%; 456 were up to the standard, taking up 47.8%; 32 were close to the standard, with a proportion of 3.4%; and 74 were unqualifi ed, accounting for 7.8%.10 Likewise, the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (国资委) also encouraged 146 enterprises directly under the central government to participate in energy conservation and emissions reduction. They were divided into three categories: 30 key enterprises, 46 attention-deserving ones, and 70 ordinary ones. At present, in the majority of enterprises, a leading group concerning energy conservation and emissions reduction has been established with the chief leader as the head and the other people in charge as deputy heads. According to the statistics, when compared with the same period in 2005, in the fi rst half of 2008, comprehensive energy consumption per added value of ten thousand RMB (at current prices) dropped by 12.15%, 39,430,000 tons of standard coal was saved, and the emission amount of COD and sulfur dioxide fell by 21.4% and 35.2%, respectively. The comparable energy consumption per added value of ten thousand RMB experienced a considerable drop in seven industries, including the chemical industry, machinery industry, military industry, construction industry, electronic industry, coal industry, and steel industry. Moreover, 70 enterprises directly under central management have their own innovative technologies, equipment, and products of energy conservation and emissions reduction.11 In addition, some leading enterprises have also adopted advanced technologies to promote green production. These measures include technical rectifi cations in major power companies, an environmentally friendly water supply of the Shenzhen Water Group (深水集团), a green supply chain of the COSCO Group, and cleaner production of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).

10 National Development and Reform Commission Statement: No. 58, 2008. 11 Fan Xi, “Central Enterprises Makes Four Breakthroughs in Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008–10/24/ content_10246875.htm (accessed October 24th, 2008). 324 su jianhua and guo peiyuan

Energy conservation and emissions reduction bears a close relationship with climate change. However, many Chinese enterprises tend to treat them as two separate matters, attaching importance to the former at the expense of the latter. According to China’s 2008 Car- bon Disclosure Project (CDP) Report released by SynTao (商道纵横), Chinese enterprises haven’t paid suffi cient attention to climate change. Among the 100 listed companies under investigation, only fi ve fi lled out the questionnaire, and 20 provided some relative information. This research report also includes the analysis of the reports on social responsibility of 24 enterprises, discovering that only fi ve reports reveal that the enterprise takes natural disasters into its crisis management system (these fi ve enterprises come from the power industry, banking sector, and transportation sector). Most reports regard climate change as an environmental risk, and only one enterprise considers climate change as presenting both crisis and opportunity, believing that dealing with climate change can help expand new markets and bring in more economic benefi ts.12

III. Disclosure of Enterprises’ Environmental Information

According to Article 4 of The Measures for Open Environmental Information ( for Trial Implementation) (环境信息公开办法(试行)) which took effect on May 1st, 2008, “Environmental protection departments shall observe the principles of justice, fairness, convenience to the people, objectivity, and shall disclose government environmental information promptly and accurately. Enterprises are one of the major sources of pollution. In order to achieve sustainable development and fulﬁ ll environmental responsibilities, enterprises should actively disclose environmental information to the public. Moreover, most environmental information of listed enterprises—“double-high” (high pollution, high environmental risk) enterprises—is encouraged or compelled to be disclosed. In recent years, due to the relevant regulations and interest-related parties, the situation of environmental information disclosure of Chinese enterprises has been improving, but problems remain.

12 SynTao, “Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Report 2008 China 100,” December 2008. environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 325

Taking China’s Top 500 enterprises as the research subjects, some scholars made a systematic survey and study on the situation of environmental information disclosure in 2006.13 The result shows that among the 500 enterprises, only 104 disclosed certain environmental information on their websites, accounting for 20.8% of the total. Seventy-three enterprises disclosed relatively detailed environmental information, only accounting for 14.6% of the total. Among the 104 enterprises that disclosed certain information, the information was either scattered in different chapters and sections in the enterprises’ sustainable development reports, or unclearly indicated on the websites. Moreover, the environmental information was seldom updated. Qualitative disclosures featured empty words and the formal illustrations far outnumbered quantitative disclosures with actual fi gures. The environmental information released by the enterprises is far from complete, and is hard to compare with each other. Information of items like environmental guidelines, objects, performances, pollutant discharge, improvements, and the safety and health of the employees were not completely disclosed. Most enterprises only briefl y reported events like training employees in this aspect, launching greening activities in a certain community, or providing fi nancial aid to an environmental project. It indicates that most enterprises only disclosed favorable information while seldom releasing negative information. In April 2008, Greenpeace released the Survey on Public Information of Enterprises’ Pollutants (企业污染物信息公开状况调查), which points out that some transnational enterprises did not disclose the pollutant discharge information of some regional or specifi c factories on their offi cial websites, as they did in their own country or some other countries—which is a practice of double-standards. The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs has released the Air Pollution Map, with information up to early 2008. However, only a few enterprises responded to the disclosed information.14 Of course, the defi ciency in enterprises’ environmental information disclosures are largely due to the overall situation in China: China’s

13 Wu Meimei, Zhang Zhenhua, Lin Fengchun, “Empirical Research on Disclosure of Enterprise-environmental Information Based on Internet,” China Population Resources and Environment, Issue 4, 2008. 14 Tian Lingling, Chen Yiqi: “China Pollution Map Records Hundreds of Enter- prises in Dongguan, Guangdong Province,” Southern Metropolitan Daily, November 18th, 2008. 326 su jianhua and guo peiyuan enterprises are not mature in investor relations management. Issued in December 2008, the Annual Report on China’s Investor Relations Manage- ment (中国投资者关系管理年度报告) shows that from the year 2004 to 2007, the investor relations management index of China’s listed companies is 59.66, 61.22, 57.54, and 51.99. Since 2004, no listed company has ever reached 90 points, which is the “Excellence” level. Moreover, among the 811 listed companies involved in the appraisal, 84.96% were below the standards for passing.15 However, enterprises in China are disclosing more environmental information year by year. Targeting the 201 sample companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the Research Report of Environmental Information Disclosure from 2004–2006 (2004–2006 环境信息披露研究报告) reveals that from 2004 to 2006, the environmental information disclosure index has been growing yearly, the ﬁ gures being 5.0881%, 6.9990%, and 9.1135%, and the average ﬁ gure is 7.0669%. This is mainly because a series of environmental laws and regulations have been promulgated, and enterprises’ external interest-related parties (such as investors, analysts, supervision institutions, consumers, and NGOs) have a demand for their environmental information.

IV. Green Credit and Green Finance

In July 2007, SEPA, the People’s Bank of China, and the China Bank- ing Regulatory Commission (CBRC) jointly issued Opinions on Imple- menting Environmental Protection Policies and Rules and Preventing Credit Risks (关于落实环保政策法规防范信贷风险的意见), which indicated green credit, as an economic measure, was going to play a role in combating emissions or discharge of pollutants. According to the Guangming Daily, following the promulgation of the new policy, local environmental protection regulators and ﬁ nancial regulatory institutions in some twenty provinces and cities including Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Qinghai, Shenzhen, Ningbo, Shenyang, and Xi’an

15 China Investor Relation Management Center of Listed Companies, “2008 China Investor Relations Management Annual Meeting Gave Awards of Top 100 Investor Relations to Listed A-Share Companies,” http://fi nance.sina.com.cn/hy/ 20081127/17415562425.shtml (accessed November 27th, 2008). environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 327 jointly issued implementation schemes and detailed rules relating to green credit.16 Many commercial banks gradually implemented green credit policies. For example, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (中国工商银行) issued Opinions on Promoting the Construction of “Green Credit” (关于推进“绿色信贷”建设的意见), claiming to establish an “environmental veto system.” China Development Bank (国家开发银行) strictly controls the loans to those “double high” (high polluting and high environmental risk) industries, meanwhile it established “specifi ed loans for energy conservation and emissions reduction.” In February 2008, SEPA claimed that some achievements had been made in promoting green credit. For example, in Shanxi Province, local fi nancial institutions halted loans to four enterprises, including Xiangfen Xingyuan Group Coking Co., Ltd. (襄汾县星源集团焦化有限公司), Shanxi Shuangren Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. (山西新绛县双人药业有限公司), Shanxi Fengxi Fertilizer Industry (Group) Ltd., Linqi branch (山西丰喜肥业（集团）股份有限公司临猗分公司), and Shanxi Jinyun Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. (山西晋韵钢铁有限公司), totaling 61.7 million RMB. In Sichuan Province, Pangzhihua Com- mercial Bank (攀枝花商业银行) reduced the lines of credit—totaling 440 million RMB—of three enterprises: Sichuan Chuantou Chemical Industry Group Co., Ltd. (川投化工公司黄磷厂), Sichuan Zhuoyue Venture Capital Co., Ltd. (四川省卓越投资有限公司), and Dingjin Coking Co., Ltd. (鼎金焦化有限责任公司). The City Commercial Bank (城市商业银行) refused to loan to these three enterprises with a total of 300 million RMB. Anhui fi nancial institutions also halted loans to Anhui Yuncao Wine Factory (运漕酒厂) (for 12.5 million RMB) and Tongling Tongguanshan Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. (铜陵铜官山化工有限公司) (for fi ve million RMB).17 Green credit urges the Chinese banking industry to pay attention to environmental issues. In October 2008, Industrial Bank (兴业银行) promised to adopt the Equator Principles, thus becoming China’s fi rst “Equator Bank.” Before that, Industrial Bank also received an award

16 Feng Yongfeng, “Analysis on Diffi culties of Advocacy of Green Credit,” Guang- ming Daily, February 13th, 2008. 17 Han Lin, “Pan Yue: Advocacy of Green Credit Yields Periodical Achievements but Is Far From Our Goals”. http://news.china.com.cn/chinanet/07news/china.cgi? docid=15587469340566692400,6614152384570751487,0&server=192.168.9.114& port=5757 (accessed February 13th, 2008). 328 su jianhua and guo peiyuan titled “Innovation Award for Green Bank” granted by eight Chinese NGOs. In 2008, “greenness” also swept the capital market. In January 2008, the fi rst social responsibility index in Chinese securities market was born in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. It is called the Taida Environmental Protection Index. In March 2008, the Industrial Social Responsibility Fund was issued with its main focus on investment objects’ environmental performance. In October 2008, the Chinese Academy for Environmental Planning (环境保护部环境规划院), the Research Institute of Haitong Securities (海通证券研究所), and ABN AMRO Bank jointly released the Environmental Protection Index. Jindong Paper (金东纸业), under the APP Group, met with diffi culties in the process of initial public stock offering (IPO), which aroused public concern. From August 5th to 14th, 2008, the MEP demonstrated the results of a review on Jindong Paper, claiming that “through checking, the enterprise has met the relative environmental requirements of a listed company.” After that, six environmental NGOs including Friends of Nature and Greenpeace fi led an opposi- tion against the result, claiming that Jindong Paper and related enterprises have a record of violating environmental laws and regulations, and demanded that MEP reconsider their negative records. By the beginning of January 2009, the MEP had not fi nished the review of Jindong Paper. This is the fi rst time environmental NGOs intervened in the listing and fi nancing of an enterprise. Whether this action will succeed or not, will be of great signifi cance.

V. Proactive Environmental Strategy of Enterprises

For enterprises, environmental issues mean both challenges and opportunities. A green economy allows more room for development of those environmentally friendly enterprises. Therefore, some Chinese enterprises (including enterprises with major business in China) have adopted proactive environmental strategies to cope with both opportunities and challenges. In July 2008, China Mobile and telecommunication equipment suppliers implemented a “green package” system for telecommunication products. This system can reduce the use of wooden boxes used in traditional ways of transportation and establish uniformed, effi cient, economical package transportation standards and systems to insure environmental performance of enterprises in 2008 329 the repeated use of packages. In November 2008, Huawei declared their intention to join the industry organization Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) and took part in the discussion of environmental strategies, implementation methods, technological standards, and public policies that would impact the development of a global telecommunication industry. Lenovo implemented Basic Environmental Requirements for the Material, Components, and Products Used by Lenovo (关于用于联想产品的材料、部件和产品的基本环保要求) among its suppliers, encouraging all the material and component suppliers to apply ISO 14001 identifi cation, and urging them to meet the Standard of Electronics Indus- try Citizenship Coalition (全球电子行业行为规范准则). In the commercial retail industry, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., gathered global suppliers to hold a meeting in Beijing in October 2008, claiming to establish a “green supply chain,” which would shoulder responsibilities for environmental and social development. Wal-Mart signed new agreements with its suppliers who were urged to fulfi ll their promises of complying with the local laws and regulations, including reducing consumption of water and energy resources, reducing packaging, and developing more environment-friendly products. In the domain of new energy resources, a group of successful enterprises emerged in the surge of a low-carbon economy. By July 2008, the top six solar energy photovoltaic panel manufacture companies occupied a market share amounting to 15 billion USD. Solar water heaters reached a market share of two billion USD, increasing 20% per year.18 In May 2008, Haier Group initiated a “green energy strategy” and “green energy base” and planned to develop into the world’s largest renewable energy supplier and solar water heater production base within ten years.

VI. Public Welfare Performance by Enterprises

According to statistics in the 2007 Analytical Report on Charity Donation in China (2007 年度中国慈善捐赠情况分析报告) and 2008 Blue Book on Charity Donation Development in China (中国慈善捐赠发展蓝皮书), the total amount of charity donations (including money and materials) from the general public and enterprises in China reached 22.31 billion

18 The Climate Group, “China’s Clean Revolution,” August 2008. 330 su jianhua and guo peiyuan

RMB in 2007, about 0.09% of the total GDP. Education, poverty alleviation, and disaster relief took up nearly 60% of charity donations, while environmental protection donations only ranked tenth.19 Not many enterprises donated to environmental protection. In the 2008 China Charity Ranking List (2008 中国慈善排行榜), the number of enterprises that donated to environmental protection was rather limited. In the Hurun’s Charity Chart (胡润慈善榜) issued in April 2008, among the 100 philanthropists, only one donated to environmental protection. However, in terms of absolute amounts and individual cases, 2008 was a year worth celebrating since enterprises donated considerable amounts of money and materials to environmental protection and some enterprises participated in environmental public welfare activities. For example, in 2008, the China Environmental Protection Foun- dation received large amounts of donations from such transnational enterprises like General Motors, TOTO, and Amway. Moreover, the activities enterprises took part in are of great varieties, involving extensive themes such as green investment, green ofﬁ ce guides, and water resources protection. One thing worth mentioning is that an enterprise should uplift its brand worth ﬁ rst by controlling its own environmental impact and then through donations for public welfare. If an enterprise puts the cart before the horse, it may be guilty of “greenwashing” and end up with an undesirable effect. The APP Group serves as a good example of this type of “greenwashing.”

19 Pan Yue, “2007 Analytical Report on Charity Donation in China: Chinese Civil- ians Donate 3.2 Billion Yuan,” People’s Daily, February 1st, 2008. PART VI

APPENDIX

ANNUAL INDEXES: ENVIRONMENTAL TRENDS

The developing trends of China’s major environmental problems during the mid-term of the nation’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010) will be presented with tables and fi gures to produce a direct image, the way it was done in last year’s green book. At the same time it will be compared with the data from 2005, the year selected in the Planning Objectives of Environmental Protection for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Period (“十一五” 环境保护规划目标) as the benchmark, and the objectives for the fi ve years. Among other major environmental problems in 2008 are the emission and treatment of air pollutants, discharge and treatment of water pollutants, energy consumption, and water quality and ecology of rivers and lakes—the data of which are selected and compared. With the changing trends of environmental problems during the mid-term of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, both the effects of governmental efforts and the possibility of reaching the objectives for the fi ve years can, to some extent, be observed.

I. Air Quality

Million tons 10

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Dust 334 annual indexes: environmental trends

Million tons 14

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Domestic Industrial

Figure A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2007

Table A.1: Emission of industrial waste gas in China, 2004–2007 (unit: million tons) Year 2004 2005 The Tenth 2006 2007 Five-Year Emission Plan target Industrial Dust 9.048 9.112 9.00 8.084 6.990 Industrial Soot 8.865 9.489 – 8.645 7.708 Domestic Soot 2.085 2.336 – 2.243 2.155 Total Emission 10.95 11.825 11.00 10.888 9.863

Million tons 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 11th Five-year plan target Year

Total Domestic Industrial

Figure A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2007 and the target for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan annual indexes: environmental trends 335

Table A.2: Emission of SO2, 2004–2007 and the target for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (unit: million tons) Year 2004 2005 The 2006 2007 The Tenth Eleventh Five-Year Five-Year Plan Plan target Emission target Industrial 18.914 21.684 – 22.348 – – Domestic 3.635 3.809 – 3.54 – – Total 22.549 25.493 18.00 25.888 24.681 22.95

SO2 emission in 2007 totaled 24.681 million tons, down 4.66% from a year earlier. Soot emission is 9.863 million tons, and industrial dust 6.99 million tons, down 9.4% and 13.5%, respectively. The former State Environmental Protection Administration and the State Development and Reform Commission jointly compiled the State Eleventh Five-Year Plan of Acid Rain and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution Control (国家酸雨和二氧化硫污染防治 “十一五” 规划) in January

2008, aimed at dramatically cutting SO2 emission, curbing the rising trend of ammonia nitrogen discharge, effectively reducing the intensity of sulfur deposition and the areas of severe acid deposition, easing regional ﬁ ne particle pollution, and lowering the thickness of SO2 in the air of urban areas by the year 2010. Major tasks include allo- cating the quota of SO2 emission control, launching SO2 treatment programs focused on desulfurization of coal-ﬁ red power plants, accelerating industrial restructuring, strictly limiting sulfur content in fuels, controlling ammonia nitrogen discharge, and strengthening capacity building in environmental supervision and administration. 336 annual indexes: environmental trends

II. Water Quality

A. Wastewater

Million tons 6

0 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Municipal Industrial

Figure A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2007

Table A.3: Wastewater discharge in China, 2004–2007 (unit: billion tons) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007

Discharge Industrial Wastewater 22.11 24.31 24.02 24.65 Municipal Wastewater 26.13 28.14 29.66 31.02 Total Discharge 48.24 52.45 53.68 55.67

100 %

80 %

60 %

40 %

20 %

0 % 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Industrial wastewater Recycled industrial Treated municipal discharge up to standard wastewater wastewater

Figure A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 annual indexes: environmental trends 337

Table A.4: Wastewater treatment in China, 2004–2007 Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Percentage Industrial Wastewater 90.7% 91.2% 92.10% 91.7% up to Standard Recycled Industrial 74.2% 75.1% 80.60% 82.0% Wastewater Treated Municipal 45.6% 52% 57% 49.1% Wastewater

Million tons 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Municipal Industrial

Figure A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007

Table A.5: Ammonia nitrogen discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007 (unit: million tons) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Discharge Industrial Ammonia Nitrogen 0.422 0.525 0.425 0.34 Municipal Ammonia Nitrogen 0.908 0.973 0.988 0.983 Total Ammonia Nitrogen 1.33 1.498 1.413 1.323 338 annual indexes: environmental trends

Million tons 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 11th ﬁve-year Year plan target

Total COD discharge in Municipal COD Industrial COD wastewater discharge discharge

Figure A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007

Table A.6: COD discharge in wastewater in China, 2004–2007 and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan target (unit: million tons) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan Discharge target Industrial COD 5.097 5.548 5.423 – Municipal COD 8.295 8.594 8.859 – Total COD in 13.392 14.142 14.282 13.818 12.73 Wastewater

COD discharge in wastewater in 2007 totaled 13.818 million tons, down 3.25% from 2006—which had seen a year-by-year increase of 5.6%—indicating that the situation improved in 2007. The yearly drop was fi rst seen in November 2007 when COD discharge of the fi rst three quarters was down 0.08%, after China stepped up wastewater treatment and industrial pollution source control in the fi rst half of the year. annual indexes: environmental trends 339

B. Water Systems

120 %

100 %

80 %

60 %

40 %

20 %

0 % Yangtze Yellow Pearl Songhua Huaihe Haihe Liaohe River River River River River River River Water System

Worse than Level V Level V Level IV Level I, II, III

Figure A.7: Water quality of China’s seven major water systems, 2007

Table A.7: Water quality of China’s seven major water systems, 2007

Water Yangtze Yellow Pearl Songhua Huaihe Haihe Liaohe System River River River River River River River Water Quality Level I, II, III 81.5% 63.7% 81.8% 23.8% 25.6% 25.9% 43.2% Level IV 3.9% 9.1% 15.2% 52.4% 39.5% 9.7% 10.8% Level V 7.8% 4.5% 0% 4.8% 9.3% 11.3% 5.5% Worse than Level V 6.8% 22.7% 3.0% 19.0% 25.6% 53.1% 40.5%

Water quality of the seven major water systems (Yangtze River, Yellow River, Pearl River, Songhua River, Huaihe River, Haihe River, and Liaohe River) was mostly unchanged compared with the previous year. Water in the Pearl River and Yangtze River was in good quality, while the Songhua River was lightly polluted, the Yellow River and the Huaihe River were moderately polluted, and Liaohe River and Haihe River were severely contaminated. 340 annual indexes: environmental trends

C. Lakes

120 %

100 %

80 %

60 %

40 %

20 %

0 % 2005 2006 2007 Water System

Worse than Level V Level IV, V Level I, II, III

Figure A.8: Water quality of lakes and reservoirs with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2007

Table A.8: Water quality of lakes and reservoirs with close governmental monitoring, 2005–2007 Water Level I, II, III Level IV, V Worse than System Level V Year 2005 28% 29% 43% 2006 29% 23% 48% 2007 49.9% 26.5% 23.6%

Table A.9: Water quality of China’s nine biggest lakes, 2005–2007

Lake Eutrophication Eutrophication 2007 2006 2005 Major Pollutant Index State Taihu 63 Moderate Level V Level V Level V TN Dianchi 74 Moderate Level V Level V Level V TP, TN, Ammonia Nitrogen Chaohu 60 Moderate Level V Level V Level V TP, TN Erhai 42 Moderate Level III Level III Level III – Dongting 58 Light Level IV Level V Level V TP Hongze 56 Light Level V Level V Level V TN Nansi 56 Light Level V Level V Level V TN Boyang 47 Moderate Level IV Level V Level IV TP Jingbo 56 Light Level IV Level IV Level IV Permanganate annual indexes: environmental trends 341

In 2007, among the 28 lakes or reservoirs with close governmental monitoring, two had a water quality of Level II, accounting for 7.1% of the lakes and reservoirs; six had Level III, accounting 21.4%; four had Level IV, accounting for 14.3%; fi ve had Level V, accounting for 17.9%; and eleven had worse than Level V, accounting for 39.3%. The major pollutants were total nitrogen and total phosphorus. Among the 26 lakes or reservoirs with eutrophication monitoring, two (7.7%) had sever eutrophication, three (11.5%) had moderate, and nine (34.6%) had light eutrophication. The water quality of Taihu Lake, one of China’s biggest lakes, was worse than Level V in general. The lake body was in a state of moderate eutrophication, with the major pollutant being total nitrogen. Rivers fl owing in and out of Taihu Lake were moderately polluted. No signifi cant change could be seen in the water quality compared with the previous year and the major pollutants were ammonia nitrogen, BOD5, and oil. Water quality in Dianchi Lake was, in general, worse than Level V. The northern part of the lake, also called Chaohu Lake or Inner Sea, was in a severe condition of eutrophication; while the southern part, or the Outer Sea, had moderate eutrophication. Major pollutants included total nitrogen, total phosphorus, and permanganate. Rivers around Dianchi Lake were generally severely polluted, with major pollutants being BOD5, ammonia nitrogen, and permanganate. Water quality in Chaohu Lake was mostly Level V, which was almost unchanged compared with the previous year. The western half of the lake had moderate eutrophication, while the other half had light eutrophication. Major pollutants were total phosphorus, total nitrogen, and BOD5. Rivers around Chaohu Lake were severely polluted, with major pollutants being oil, ammonia nitrogen, and BOD5. 342 annual indexes: environmental trends

D. Coastal Area

120 %

100 %

80 %

60 %

40 %

20 %

0 % Bohai Yellow East China South China Nationwide Sea Sea Sea Sea Water System

Worse than Level IV Level IV Level III Level II Level I

Figure A.9: Coastal water quality, 2007

Table A.10: Coastal water quality, 2007 Sea Area Bohai Yellow East South Nationwide Water Sea Sea China China Quality Sea Sea Level I 24.5% 35.2% 2.1% 44.9% 26.0% Level II 38.8% 50% 26.3% 38.8% 36.8% Level III 14.3% 9.3% 15.8% 8.2% 11.8% Level IV 10.2% 1.8% 14.7% 1.0% 7.1% Worse than Level IV 12.2% 3.7% 41.1% 7.1% 18.3%

Water quality of the nation’s offshore areas, overall, was lightly polluted: slightly worse than the previous year. Most offshore areas were clean, and water quality of distant sea areas remained good. Offshore areas of Level I and II accounted for 62.8%, which was down 4.9% from the previous year; Level III was 11.8%, up 3.8%; Level IV or worse was 25.4%, up 1.1%. Among the four largest sea areas, the South China Sea and Yellow Sea were of good water quality, the Bohai Sea was lightly polluted, and the East China Sea was severely polluted. annual indexes: environmental trends 343

III. Solid Waste

Million tons 2000

1500

1000

500

0 20042005 2006 2007 Year

Generation Integrated Reuse Disposal

Figure A.10: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2007

Table A.11: China’s industrial waste generation and disposal, 2004–2007 (unit: million tons) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Amount Generation 1200 1340 1515 1757 Integrated Reuse 677.95 770 926 1104 Disposal 17.92 16.54 13.02 11.97

In 2007, production of industrial solid wastes nationwide was up 15.97% from the previous year, while the amount of discharge was down 8.06%. About 1.104 billion tons of industrial solid waste was reused, up 19.22% from a year ago. Production and discharge of solid waste was further restricted by the State Council Notice on the Comprehen- sive Work Plan for Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction (国务院关于印发节能减排综合性工作方案的通知), as well as the revised Energy Conservation Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国节约能源法), both of which went into effect in 2007. 344 annual indexes: environmental trends

IV. Economic Development and Energy Consumption

In 2007, China consumed 2.65 billion tons of standard coal, up 7.86% from 2006. Energy consumption per unit of GDP was 1.167 tons of coal equivalents (TCE) for every 10,000 RMB, down 3.27% from 2006. The goal for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period (2006–2010) is to bring down the energy consumption by 20% from that in 2005 by 2010.

Billion tons of coal equivalent (TCE) 3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0 20042005 2006 2007 11th ﬁve-year plan target Year

Figure A.11: Total energy consumption in China, 2004–2007 and the controlled amount for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period

Table A.12: Total energy consumption in China, 2004–2007 and the controlled amount for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 The Eleventh Five-Year Plan Consumption target Eastern China 2.032 2.224 2.457 2.648 2.7 (billion tons of coal equivalent (TCE)) annual indexes: environmental trends 345

TCE/1,000 yuan 0.123 0.122 0.121 0.120 0.119 0.118 0.117 0.116 0.115 0.114 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.12: China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP, 2005–2007

Table A.13: China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP, 2005–2007 (unit: TCE/1,000 RMB) Year 2005 2006 2007

Energy Consumption per Unit of GDP 0.122 0.1206 0.1167

Table A.14: Energy consumption of seven major industries during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period

Industry Ferrous Transport Chemical Non- Electricity Oil Non- Metal metal Processing ferrous Mineral Metal Energy 17% 8.50% 8.30% 8% 6.80% 5% 3.70% Consumption

The extensive economic growth mode was not fundamentally changed during the Tenth Five-Year Plan period (2001–2005). Since the end of 2002, coal-ﬁ red power plants and the industries of steel, construction materials, and nonferrous metals enjoyed over-heated growth, with the average growth rate being above 15% annually. It is the fast development of these energy-consuming and highly polluting industries that has imposed increasing pressure on the environment.1

1 Source: World Bank and Shenyin and Wanguo Securities 346 annual indexes: environmental trends

V. CO2 Emission

Million tons 7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 IcelandJapan US UK Germany Russia China India Country

1990 2003 2004 2005

Figure A.13: CO2 emission in selected major countries

Table A.15: CO2 emission in selected major countries (unit: million tons) Country Iceland Japan US UK Germany Russia China India Year (1)* (8) (12) (16) (22) (67) (81) (128) 1990** 2 1070.7 4818.3 579.4 980.4 1984.1 2398.9 681.7 2003*** 2.2 1230.8 5941.7 579.8 806.5 1518.9 4248.7 1262.9 2004** 2.2 1257.2 6045.8 586.9 808.3 1524.1 5007.1 1342.1 2005*** 2.2 1231.1 5778.1 545.9 784.1 1502.2 5532.6 1403.3

Notes: * The numbers following the name of the countries are their rankings of Human Development Index (HDI) in 2007. ** Data from Human Development Report 2007/2008 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) *** Data from the US Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) for the year 2007. The original statistics are presented in the unit of metric ton carbon, and are converted into metric ton carbon dioxide based on the conversion formula of the UNDP (the conversion coefﬁ cient is 3.664). annual indexes: environmental trends 347

VI. Environmental Finance System

Billion yuan 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 20042005 2006 2007 Year

Total investment Investment on infrastructure for urban environment Investment on industrial pollution treatment Investment on environmental protection for new projects

Figure A.14: Investment in environmental pollution treatment in China, 2004–2007

Table A.16: Investment in environmental pollution treatment in China, 2004–2007 (unit: billion RMB) Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Investment Total Investment 190.86 238.8 256.78 338.76 Investment on Infrastructure for 114.0 128.97 76.72 146.78 Urban Environment Investment on Industrial Pollution 30.81 45.82 48.57 55.24 Treatment Investment on Environmental 46.05 64.01 131.49 136.74 Protection for New Projects 348 annual indexes: environmental trends

VII. Urban Environment

120 %

100 %

80 %

60 %

40 %

20 %

0 % 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Worse than Grade III Grade III Better than Grade II

Figure A.15: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2007

Table A.17: Air quality in urban areas, 2004–2007 Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 Index Better than Grade II 38.6% 60.3% 62.4% 60.5% Grade III 41.2% 29.1% 28.5% 36.1% Worse than Grade III 20.2% 10.6% 9.1% 3.4%

Air quality nationwide in 2007 is generally ﬁ ne, though pollution remains severe in certain cities. The major pollutants were the inhal- able particulate matters (PM10). Cities severely polluted with PM10 are mostly located in Shanxi, Xinjiang, Gansu, Beijing, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, Hebei, Hunan, Liaoning, Henan, Chongq- ing, Tianjin, and Jiangsu Provinces (including autonomous regions and municipalities). annual indexes: environmental trends 349

mg/m3 25

Xi’an Beijing Harbin Wuhan Haikou Shanghai Kunming Lanzhou Guangzhou Chongqing City

PM10 SO2 NO2

Figure A.16: Air quality in China’s major cities, 2006

Table A.18: Air quality in China’s major cities, 2006

City Beijing Harbin Shanghai Wuhan Guangzhou Haikou Chongqing Kunming Xi’an Lanzhou Index (mg/m3)

PM10 16.2 10.4 8.6 12.1 7.6 4.1 11.1 9.1 13.3 19.2

SO2 5.2 3.4 5.1 5.7 5.4 1.0 7.4 6.2 5.6 5.7

NO2 6.6 4.9 5.5 4.9 6.7 1.2 4.7 4.4 4.2 5.2

PM10 remains the culprit deteriorating air quality. Density of SO2

and NO2 is high in most developed cities. Factories and vehicles are the major polluters of the air in urban areas, and the situation is worsening. 350 annual indexes: environmental trends

days 300

250

200

150

100

0 19981999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.17: Days of up-to-standard air quality in Beijing, 1998–2007

µg/m3 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.18: SO2 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007

In the ﬁ rst half of 2007, SO2 content in the air in Beijing was down 13.06%, the sharpest among the other 30 provincial-level regions. annual indexes: environmental trends 351

µg/m3 78 76 74 72 70 68 66 64 62 60 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.19: NO2 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007

mg/m3 3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.20: NO1 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007

During the four days when a series of events themed “Good Luck Beijing” (competitions prior to 2008 Beijing Olympics) were held in

Beijing, vehicles were restricted from the road, and the NO2 content dropped by 20% from the day before restriction was imposed. 352 annual indexes: environmental trends

µg/m3 170 165 160 155 150 145 140 135 130 125 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Year

Figure A.21: PM10 content in the air in Beijing, 2000–2007

After a serial of treatment measures, contents of SO2, CO1, NO2, and

PM10 dropped signiﬁ cantly in Beijing; however, the drop has been slowing down since 2006. The United Nations Development Pro- gramme applauded the Beijing municipal government for its efforts in improving the air quality and beneﬁ ting the people throughout the Olympics. TERMINOLOGICAL GLOSSARY

Atmospheric brown clouds (棕色云团) (ABCs): A cloud-shaped mixture of pollutants consisting primarily of ﬁ ne particles, including carbon and organic particles, sulfates, nitrates, ammonium salts, sand, and dust in the troposphere. ABCs have the same atmospheric condition as hazes do. How- ever, hazes may affect only a particular city, while ABCs may envelop broader regions. Brown clouds called Asian brown clouds have appeared above the Indian Ocean, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Southern China.

Blue-green algae bloom (蓝藻水华): A rapid increase in the amount of algae in a given body of water. An algae bloom can occur in both fresh and salt water, and is caused by excessive nutrients in the water, especially phosphorus, usually from runoff from farms.

Carbon balance (碳平衡): The term carbon neutral (碳中和) means to have a “net zero” amount of carbon emissions. This can be done by “carbon balancing,” which involves measuring the carbon emissions and then attempting to reduce emissions, as much as possible, and offsetting the rest through activities such as tree planting. Carbon neutral can be extended to include all greenhouse gases by measuring their carbon dioxide equivalents. This may also be known as climate neutral.

Cascade development (梯级开发): Strategy of building several smaller hydropower dams as opposed to one very large dam.

Circular economy (循环经济): The China Daily describes the circular economy as a model for economic growth which aims at environmental protection, pollution prevention, and sustainable development. Under this model, resources are used with higher efﬁ ciency and reused and recycled when possible, so that pollution is minimized and waste is reduced as much as possible. It also involves the transformation of industrial organization and allocation, urban infrastructure, environmental protection, technological paradigms, and social welfare distribution. 354 terminological glossary

An important part in China’s effort toward sustainable development, circular economy was offi cially raised as a target for future growth in 2004. The State Council issued a fi le about promoting it in July 2005, making it a key guideline in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan and to achieve the specifi c goals in energy conservation and pollution reduction before 2020.

Distributed generation (分布式能源系统) (DG): Many small energy sources, such as wind and solar, are used to generate energy. Currently, industrial countries generate most of their electricity in large centralized facilities, such as coal, nuclear, hydropower, or gas powered plants. These plants have excellent economies of scale, but usually transmit electricity long distances. Distributed generation is another approach. It reduces the amount of energy lost in transmitting electricity because the electricity is generated very near where it is used, perhaps even in the same building. This also reduces the size and number of power lines that must be constructed.

Demand side management (需求侧管理) (DSM): The term, also known as energy demand management, entails actions that inﬂ uence the quantity or patterns of use of energy consumed by end users, such as actions targeting reduction of peak demand during periods when energy-supply systems are constrained. The term DSM was coined during the time of the 1973 energy crisis and 1979 energy crisis.

Eco-compensation (生态补偿): The goal of eco-compensation is to protect and ensure a sustainable use of ecological services. It is an institutional arrangement to regulate the relationship among stakeholders, in terms of ﬁ nancial interest, by using economic means. Eco-compensation is a public institution that aims at protecting the environment and promoting a harmonious relationship between humans and nature in development. It uses administrative and marketing means to regulate the stakeholder relationship in interest according to the ecosystem service value, eco-protection cost, and development opportunity cost.

Environmental mass incident (环境污染导致的群体性事件): The def- inition of “mass incidents” (群体性事件) is somewhat ambiguous and varies by province, but environmental mass incidents in general are cases where groups of people converge to express their disapproval of a variety of environmentally related issues. The most common causes terminological glossary 355 for environmental mass incidents are water pollution from speciﬁ c factories or industrial complexes, appropriation of land and displacement of people for industrial and water projects (i.e., dams), and air pollution caused by speciﬁ c factories and power plants.

Green credit policy (绿色信贷): Policy of not issuing credit to heavily polluting companies until they implement environmental protection measures in order to comply with relevant laws. Also, companies that are found to violate environmental standards after receiving loans could have their loans recalled. This policy was implemented in 2007 and strengthened in 2008.

Green insurance (绿色保险): A type of pollution liability insurance that is aimed at preventing and limiting environmental risks. In early 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and China Insurance Regulatory Commission (保监会) issued the Guidelines on the Implementa- tion of Pollution Liability Insurance (关于开展环境污染责任保险工作的指导意见), to establish a market mechanism to improve companies’ ability to guard against environmental risks.

Green securities policy (绿色证券): This aims at improving the environmental checking system for publicly listed companies. In June 2008, the Ministry of Environmental Protection issued the Listed Company Industry Categories for Environmental Inspections (上市公司环保核查行业分类管理名录), stipulating mandatory inspection for fourteen highly- polluting sectors.

Green trade (绿色贸易): This involves restricting the export of products that are high-energy, high-pollution, and resource-intensive, and directing and regulating the environmental practices of Chinese enterprises investing overseas.

Low carbon economy (低碳经济) (LCE): A low carbon economy is characterized by a certain level of carbon productivity (economic output per unit of carbon emission) aimed at high economic growth with low carbon emissions. Low carbon development is the transition towards LCE and it will be achieved through technological breakthroughs and institutional regulation. The results of low carbon development are more efﬁ cient energy use, an optimized energy structure, and more rational consumer behavior. In December 2006, for the 356 terminological glossary

ﬁ rst time, the Chinese government put forth the idea of developing a LCE in the National Assessment Report on Climate Change (气候变化国家评估报告).

Man-made forest (人工纯林): A forest that is mostly populated by a single species of plant. Since 1980, a campaign of “Hilly Land Allot- ted for Private Use” has pushed people to replace natural forests with man-made commercial forests composed of fruit trees, bamboos, pines, and Chinese ﬁ rs. China’s man-made forests contribute to ecological deterioration and rank ﬁ rst in the world in terms of size.

Road ecology (道路生态学): This sub-discipline of ecology aims at understanding the relationships between roads and the natural environment. Research on the ecology of roads began in the 1960s, but didn’t start in China until much later.

Turning point (拐点): The Eleventh Five-Year Plan stipulates that by 2010 energy consumption per unit of GDP should be reduced by 20% and the emission of main pollutants should be reduced by 10%. In 2008, after the unprecedented simultaneous reduction in China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP and the two indicators of main pollutants, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and chemical oxygen demand (COD), some people believed that a turning point had appeared in China’s effort to control energy consumption and emission of pollution. INDEX

12th Five Year Plan period 144 Aquaculture 29, 147, 149, 154, 159, 161–162 Aba Industrial Park 59 areas xvii, xx, 4, 8–12, 19, 26, 54, ABCs 16–17, 51, 353 58, 70, 76, 78, 124, 166–167, 172, ABN AMRO Bank 328 194, 199, 208, 217, 222–223, 245, Achim Steiner 44, 47, 48 n. 6 253–254, 263, 286, 289, 297, Action Plan on Environment and 335 Health (2007–2015) 5, 31 Argentina 108 Administration Measures on Treatment Arizona 104 of Environmental Pollution Within a Ashi 11 Limited Time 202 Asian elephant 120 Administrative Action Law 250 Australia 88, 108 Administrative Measures on Power Prices and Facility Operation for Baihua Lake/s 253–256 Coal Power Producers with Flue Gas Baishan 14 Desulfurization 289 Baiyangdian 9 Administrative Procedural Law 259 Bali Roadmap 294 agricultural pollution xx, 145–147, Baoding 299–300 149–151, 154, 157–158 Beihai and Qinzhou projects in AGUA 53 Guangxi 173 Aha Reservoir 253–256 Beihai City 162 Aibi Lake 88 Beihai New Area in Binzhou 169 Air Pollutants Index (API) 134 Beijing xiv, xix, 13–18, 22, 25, 43–45, Air Pollution xix, 5–6, 13, 15–16, 18, 47–54, 110, 112, 131, 133–135, 43–44, 52–53, 65, 131, 133, 136–139, 143–144, 150–151, 224, 238–240, 141–143, 146–147, 149, 158, 179, 355 242, 270, 280, 290, 293, 298, 300, Air Pollution Index (API) 44 308, 329, 348, 350–352 Air Quality 13–17, 43, 45, 48–51, Beijing Environment Protection 131–137, 139, 141–143, 214, 333, Bureau 132 348–349, 352 Beijing Environmental Protection Air Quality Guarantee Measures for the Bureau 43, 48, 239 Olympic Games 135 Beijing Olympic Games xvi, 17, 43, Air Quality Monitoring and Warning 46, 48, 51, 131–132, 143, 237 Scheme for Beijing, Other Olympic Beijing-Hangzhou Canal 253 Cities, and Surrounding Areas during Beijing-Lhasa Railway 30 the Beijing Olympic Games 17 Beilun 264 Aletai 21 Binhai New Area in Weifang, Altai Mountains 88 Shangdong Province 169 Amway 330 Binhu 253 Anhui 14–15, 150–151, 257, 269 Binzhou Beihai New Area in Shandong Anhui Province 11, 79 Province 171 Anhui Yuncao Wine Factory 327 biodiversity 6, 28–30, 70, 73, 80, 84, Annual Report on China’s Investor 86–87, 91, 93–94, 118, 127, 219–220, Relations Management 326 225 API 44, 51, 134–136, 139 Biodiversity 27, 85, 91 APP Group 328, 330 black lungs 137 358 index blue-green algae bloom 89 n. 11, 146, China Banking Regulatory 353 Commission 285–286 BOCOG 17, 46, 50 China Banking Regulatory Commission Bohai 9 (CBRC) 326 Bohai Bay 9, 164–165, 171–172 China Council for International Bohai Economic Rim 172 Cooperation on Environment and Bohai Sea 9, 161, 164–166, 169–172, Development (CCICED) 302 342 China Council for International Bohai Sea Rim 169 Cooperation on Environment and Bohu Lake 89 Development 213 n. 4, 296, 302, Brazil 108, 122 309 n. 3 Bureau of Customs 321 China Development Bank 327 China Environmental Culture CAI-Asia Center’s 144 Promotion Association (CECPA) 31 Canada 108, 123, 226 n. 1 China Insurance Regulatory Caofeidian Industrial Zone of Hebei Commission 286, 355 Province 170 China International Forum on Capital Iron and Steel Company 51 Environment and Development 133 carbon balance 45, 46 n. 4, 47, 353 China Life 286 Carbon Balancing 353 China Meteorological Administration carbon dioxide emission 15 214 carbon emissions 43, 47, 49, 293, 353, China Mobile 328 355 China National Petroleum Corporation Cascade development 353 (CNPC) 17, 251, 323 cascade model 55, 60 China Securities Regulatory cascade style 69 Commission 288 Catalogue of Specialized Environmental China’s Mineral Resources Law 221 Protection Equipment Eligible for China’s National Climate Change Corporate Income Tax Reductions Program (CNCCP) 7 289 China’s Provisional Regulations on Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Resource Taxes of the People’s Victims (CLAPV) 270 Republic of China 221 Chaiwobao Lake 88 China’s Special Scientiﬁ c and Changbai 115–116 Technological Actions in Response to Changchun 11 Climate Change 295 Changxing Island Industrial Zone Chinese Academy for Environmental 169 Planning 298, 328 Changzhou 264 Chinese Academy for Environmental Chaohu 9 Planning (CAEP) 15 Chaohu Lake 10–11, 183 n. 8, 341 Chinese Academy of Sciences 7, 51, chemical oxygen demand 164, 63, 106, 122, 124 268–269 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences chemical oxygen demand (COD) 10, xiii, xviii, 296 146, 175, 210, 318, 356 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Chen Faqing 251 Conference (CPPCC) 7, 175, 219, 295 Chen Lihao 300 Chinese river dolphin 30 Chen Shijie 15 Chongqing 12 n. 21, 13–14, 22, Chengde 50 56–57, 69, 151, 287, 290, 348 Chengdu 56–58, 60–61, 64–66, 68, Chuanxindian Chemical Park 58 89, 122 Circular Economy 36, 171, 198, 200, Chengdu-Lanzhou Railway 70 317, 353–354 Chenming Paper Company 78 Circular Economy Promotion China (81) 346 Law 198–200 index 359

Circular on Public Opinion Solicitation demand side management 227, 354 on 202 desalinization 53 Civil Action Law 250 desertifi cation 6–7, 18–19, 86, 89, 106, Civil Procedural Law 258–259 308 Civil Society Watch 290 Dianchi 9–10 Cixi 264 Dianchi Lake 89, 90 n. 13, 183 n. 8, Classifi ed Management Catalogue for 341 Environmental Impact Assessment of Ding Guopei 23 Construction Projects 201 Dingjin Coking Co., Ltd. 327 Clean Air Initiative-Asia Center 132 Dingyang Mining Co., Ltd. 23 Clean energy 49–50, 54, 295 distributed generation 226, 354 climate change xix, 6–7, 15, 43, 46, Dong Jinshi 240–241 54, 87, 92, 94, 142, 148, 186, 214, Dongguan City 320 293–297, 324 Donghai 9 CO2 Emission 346 Donghu 9 coal pollution 49 Dongjiang River 308 COD 10, 33, 146, 175–178, 180, Dongting 9 182–183, 185, 189, 210, 318, Dongyang City 308 322–323, 338, 356 Dongzhaoxu Forestry 28 conservation 80, 83, 92–95 Draft for Soliciting Opinions 202 contamination 8, 113, 158 Du Shaozhong 48 COSCO Group 323 Dunjiangyan Dam 65 CPPCC 7, 62, 175, 184, 219–220, 223–224, 228–229, 231 n. 3, earthquake xix, 3–4, 26, 55, 57–64, 249–250, 295, 300 67–68, 69 n. 13, 70 Criminal Law of China 204 East China Sea 164–167, 342 Cristina Narbona 53 Ebro River Project 53 Cuihu Lake 89 Ecological Compensation 91–92, 94, 194, 197, 217, 222–224, 280–282, Dadu River 69 285, 301, 304, 312–315 Dahuofang Reservoir 9 ecology of roads 115, 356 Dai people 126 EIA 65–66, 115 Dalai 9 Electric Power Law 226 Dalai (or Hulun) Lake 88 Eleventh Central Committee of Dalian Bay 166 the Communist Party of China Dalian City in Liaoning Province 172 (CPC) 98 Dalian Petrochemical Project 172 Eleventh Chinese People’s Political Daming 9 Consultative Conference 175 Danjiangkou Reservoir 52 Eleventh Five-Year Plan 175–177, Daqing 11 179–185, 187, 210, 290, 335 Dayawan Nuclear Power Plant 25 Emission Reduction Credits (ERC) 284 decentralization 53, 73, 76–78, emissions reduction 39, 144, 175–181, decentralization of forest management 183–190, 210, 226, 234, 285, 289, 73, 79, 81 291 n. 14, 293, 297–298, 317, Decision of the State Council on 322–324, 327, 343 Implementing a Scientifi c Outlook energy xiv, 36, 56, 81, 171, 175, on Development and Strengthening 180, 182, 219–220, 295, 297–299, Environmental Protection 309 354–355 Decision on Implementing the energy conservation xix, 39, 175–180, Scientifi c Outlook on Development 183–188, 200, 210, 225, 226 n. 1, and Strengthening Environmental 234, 293, 297–298, 317, 322–324, Protection 248 327, 343, 354 deforestation 7, 224 Energy Conservation Law 187, 202 energy management contract 226 360 index

Energy-Effi cient Power Generation Gao Zhiguo 165 and Distribution Measures (for Trial GDP 52, 55, 68, 97–98, 175–178, Implementation) 289 181–183, 210, 216–217, 294, 322, Environmental Damage Compensation 330, 344, 356 Law 196 Gejiu 21 Environmental economic policy General Motors 330 279–281, 291 General Work Plan for Energy Environmental Impact Assessment 33, Conservation and Pollutant Discharge 65, 66 n. 10, 195, 201–202 Reduction 322 environmental information disclosure Genhe 21 261, 263–265, 269–270, 275, geothermal heat 227 324–326 Germany (22) 346 environmental legal system 193, 205 Global Environmental Institute 290 Environmental mass incident 354–355 global fi nancial crisis 68, 185, 199 environmental protection court 247, GM crops 107–108, 110, 113–114 253–256, 257 n. 7, 259 GM food/s 107, 110–114 Environmental Protection Law 187, GNP 103 204–205, 249, 259 Governmental Procurement List of Environmental Public Information Environmentally Labeled Products 200–201 290 environmental public interest litigation grassland farming policies 97 system 248–250, 253, 256, Grassland Pastoral Area/s 97, 258–259 103–104 Erenhot 14–15 Green Algae Bloom 161 Erguna 14 green credit 281, 285, 286 n. 8, 291, Erhai Lake 90 317, 326–327 Establishing a Public Interest Litigation Green credit policy 290, 355 System and Protecting State, Social, Green Earth Volunteers 270–271 and Special Groups’ Interests 250 green energy 106, 329 EU 294 Green Finance 326 Europe 111, 132, 144 n. 12, 226 n. 1 Green GDP 216 European Union 107, 304 Green Homestead 290 eutrophication 88, 147, 149, 163, 341 Green Insurance 286, 355 Green Olympics 46, 48–50 Fan Zhiyong 118 Green Securities Policy 288, 355 Fangcheng Harbor (???) 168 Green Trade 287, 355 farmland pollution 18, 145–146 Green Volunteer League of Chongqing Fengfan 300 290 fi nancial crisis 185–186 Green Watershed 290 Foshan City 265 greenhouse gas emission 7, 45, 47, 49, Fountain Set Holdings Ltd. 320 149, 228, 294, 298–299 Friends of Nature xiii–xiv, xix, 50, 178 Greenpeace 50, 110, 112, 270, 325, 328 n. 3, 290, 328 greenwashing 330 Fu Jiamo 138 Gu Dasong 250 Fuhai Ecological Garden 28 Guangdong 14, 150–151, 173 Fujian 14, 76–78, 150–151, 173 Guangdong Esquel Textiles Company Fuquan 14–15, 21 Ltd 268 Fuxian Lake 90 Guangdong Province 150, 167, 265, 300, 320–321 G8 Summit 294 Guangxi 14, 151, 173 Ganges River 84 Guangxi Province/s 162, 168, Gansu 13–14, 21–22, 28, 125, 172–173 150–151, 348 Guangzhou 110, 112, 135–138, 238 index 361

Guidelines on Environmental Protection Huaihe River 74, 183 n. 8, 339 in Outbound Investment 288 Huanggang 78 Guidelines on the Implementation of Huawei 329 Pollution Liability Insurance 286, Huayuankou Industrial Park in 355 Dalian 170 Guiding Advice on Carrying out Hubei 13, 21, 52, 150–151, 178, Experimental Work on 286 Eco-Compensation 309 Huishan 253 Guiping 14 Huiteng 300 Guiyang 253–256 Hulan 11 Guizhou 13–15, 21–22, 28, 150–151, Hulan River 30 254–255 Human Development Index (HDI) 103 Guizhou Academy of Forestry 28 Human Development Report 39 Guizhou Province 184, 253 Hunan 13–14, 150–151, 178, Guizhou Tianfeng Chemical Company 286–287, 348 254–255 Huo Yuping 7 hydropower 55, 57–64, 69, 115, Haier Group 329 353–354 Haihe 8 Haihe River 165, 183 n. 8, 339 Iceland (1) 346 Haikou 238 Illegal Logging 74 Hainan 21, 76, 79, 150–151, 178, Indias(128) 51–52, 346 225, 238 Indus River 84 Hainan Province 76, 168, 178, 225, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 238 China 327 Haizhou Bay 166 Industrial Bank 290, 327 Han Deyun 250 industrial policy 97, 104–106, 320 Han River 52 Industrial Pollution 146, 154, 317–318, Hangzhou 9, 26, 251, 264, 300 338 Hangzhou Bay 164, 167 information disclosure 35, 261–265, Harbin 11, 251 267, 269–271, 275, 317, 324–325 heavy chemical industry 55–56, 98, Inner Mongolia 13–15, 17, 21, 88, 171, 181 98, 102, 104, 106, 125, 150–151, Hebei 13–14, 49, 52, 150–151, 171, 348 224, 348 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Hebei Province 16–17, 49, 170–171, Change (IPCC) 294 224, 237, 253, 299, 308 Institute of Public and Environmental Heilongjiang 21, 78, 150–151, 326 Affairs 261, 269 n. 7, 290, 325 Heilongjiang Province 251 Institute of Public and Environmental Henan 13–14, 21, 52, 150–151, 326, Affairs (IPEA) 261 348 Interim Measures for Funds to Hengduan Mountains 86 Replacing Subsidies with Awards for Hengjin Reservoir’s 308 Sewage Treatment Equipment Pipe Himalayas 86, 118 Networks in Urban and Township Hoh Xil Nature Reserve 119 Areas 289 Hong Kong 112–113, 151, 290 Interim Measures for Special Central Hongda Chemical Co., Ltd. 58, 61 Government Funds for Main Hongfeng and Baihua Lakes Pollutant Emissions Reduction 289 253–256 International Finance Corporation 286 Honghe River 84 International Olympic Committee’s Hongze 9 (IOC) 43 Hotan 15 IPEA 263, 268–272, 274 Hu Jintao 23, 295, 296 n. 2 Irrawaddy River 84 362 index

Japan 23, 111 Lianyungang 166, 173 Japan (8) 346 Liaodong Bay 9, 164–165 Jia Zhibang 73 Liaohe River 165, 183 n. 8, 339 Jialing Rivers 12 Liaoning 13–14, 21, 151, 348 Jiamusi 11 Liaoyang 21 Jiang Jiemin 67 Linfen 143 Jiang Wenlai 146 Ling Jiang 180 Jiangsu 11, 13–14, 150–151, 173, 257, Ling’ao Nuclear Power Plant 25 264, 286–287, 326 Listed Company Industry Categories for Jiangxi 14, 78, 125, 150–151, 178 Environmental Inspections 288, 355 Jianshan Iron Mine 22 Liu Ning 61 Jiao Yong 57 Liu’an 14 Jiaozhou Bay 9, 162 Long Yongcheng 79 Jiaxing 264 Longmen Shan 55, 57 Jieshou 15 Longnan 21 Jilin 11, 14, 21, 151, 300 low carbon economy xx, 49, 293–296, Jilin Petrochemical Company 251 300, 329, 355 Jin Kuixi 251 Lü Zhi 79–80 Jinchang 143 Luxi 14 Jindong Paper 328 Jingbo 9 Ma Jun 271 Jinsha River 69 Management Rules on Transfer and Jinzhou Bay Economic Zone in Exchange of Green Credit Liaoxi 170 Information 286 Man-made forest(s) 73, 75–76, 78, Kanas Lake 88 80–81, 356 Karamori Mountain Nature Mantu Afforestation Group 78 Reserve 117 marine environment 161, 167–169, Khabarovsk 251 172, 174 Kunming 89, 253–254 marine pollution 161, 163 Mass incidents 13, 78, 354–355 Laizhou Bay 164–165 Meishan City 8 Lancang River 69 Mekong River 84 Lanzhou 70 Menlou Reservoir 9 Laoshan Reservoir 9 Ministry of Agriculture 108–110, 167, Law of the People’s Republic of China 214 on the Promotion of Clean Ministry of Commerce 234, 237, 287, Production 268 321 Law on Air Pollution Prevention and Ministry of Communications 121 Control 144 Ministry of Construction 208, 214 Law on Environmental Impacts Ministry of Energy 225 Assessment 248 Ministry of Environmental Protection Law on the Prevention and Control of (MEP) xxi, 5, 6 n. 9, 15, 36, 67, Water Pollution 193–195, 197–198, 134, 136, 138, 142, 144, 175, 177, 204 184, 189, 200, 207, 209, 211–213, Law on the Prevention of Air 215, 229–230, 270, 280, 284–289, Pollution 187 292, 297, 317, 319, 321, 328, Law on Wild Flora Protection 224 355 LCE 293–300, 355–356 Ministry of Finance (MOF) 5, Legislative Affairs Ofﬁ ce of the State 287–289, 321 Council 202 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 214 Lenovo 329 Ministry of Health (MOH) 5, 10, 12, Liang Congjie 249 110, 138, 214 Lianhuadong Reservoir 58 Ministry of Land and Resources 214 index 363

Ministry of Science and Technology Notice on Information-Sharing on 294–295 Enterprises’ Environmental Ministry of Water Resources 61, 214 Protection 285 Minjiang River 8, 57–58, 60, 64, 66, NPC 7, 175–176, 180, 183, 189, 207, 76, 167 209, 219, 229, 249–250, 295, 300 Minjiang Water and Electricity Nujiang River 69 Company 58 Mongolia-Xinjiang Plateau 83–84, 87 OECD 283 Motion on the Establishment of an Olympic Games xix, 17, 43–44, Environmental Public Interest 46–48, 50–51, 131–134 Litigation System 249 Opinions on Governmental Mu Xingmin 124 Procurement of Environmentally Mudan 11 Labeled Products 290 Mudanjiang 11 Opinions on Implementing Environmental Protection Policies and Nanhai 9 Regulations and Guarding against Nanjing 9, 250, 264 Credit Risks 285 Nanping 76–77 Opinions on Implementing Nansi 9 Environmental Protection Policies Nanyang City 74 and Rules and Preventing Credit National Action Plan on Environment Risks 326 and Health 2007–2015 138 Opinions on Promoting the National Assessment Report on Climate Construction of “Green Credit” 327 Change 294, 356 Opinions on Relevant Issues about the National Clean Production Plan and Measures 234–235 Energy-Saving and Emission Oxfam Hong Kong 290 Reduction Plan 315 National Development and Reform Pan Jiazheng 63 Commission (NDRC) 5, 6 nn. 8, Pan Yue 189, 194, 284, 292 10, 46, 56, 170, 171 n. 10, 175, 177, Pangzhihua Commercial Bank 327 183, 186, 214, 234, 281, 299, 300, Pearl River Delta 143, 159, 172–172 323 Pengzhou 56, 58, 65, 67 National People’s Congress (NPC) 7, People’s Bank of China 285, 326 165, 175–176, 180, 183, 189, 207, PetroChina 67–68 209, 219, 229, 249–250, 295, 300 Ping An 286–287 Natural gas 47, 49, 57, 188 Plan for Restructuring of the State Natural Resource(s) 76, 78, 85, 87, Council 209 91–92, 103–104, 181–183, 209, Planning Objectives of Environmental 215–217, 219–220, 241, 310–311 Protection for the Eleventh Five-Year new area development 169, 172 Plan Period 333 New Bohai Area 170 plastic bag pollution 233, 235–236 NGO(s) xiv, xix, 35, 47, 50, 62, 67, Plateau wetlands 83–89, 91–95, 118 141–142, 238 n. 4, 239, 243, 261, pollution reduction 142, 179, 200, 270–272, 290–291, 328 210, 354 Nick Hanley 314 post-disaster reconstruction 55, 62 Ningbo 173, 244, 264, 286–287, 326 Post-Quake Reconstruction 64 Ningxia 13, 150–151, 348 Poyang 9 Non-Governmental Nature Reserves Proposal on Formulating Biological 80 Genetic Resources Management Notice on Further Regulating the Rules at an Early Date 224 Application for an Initial Public Proposal on Promptly Establishing and Offering or Reﬁ nancing by the Improving the Environmental Business Companies in Heavy- Protection Law for Public Interest Polluting Industries 288 Litigation 249 364 index

Proposal on Protection of Flora rural reform 73 Resources in Hainan Province from Rushan City 26 the Perspective of National Biological Russia 23 Safety 225 Proposal on Upgrading the State Salween River 84 Organizations of Environmental Sanbihai Lake 89 Protection 229 Sanjiangyuan 308, 310 Przewalski’s horse 117 Sanyuan Village 145 Pu’er 15 Sayram Lake 88 Pumi people 126 SEPA xxi, 10, 17, 60, 200, 207, 209, 211–213, 248–249, 281, 285, 310, Qianhu Mountains 89 321, 326–327 Qianjiang River 65–66 Seventeenth National Congress of the Qingdao 161–162, 173, 250 Communist Part of China (CPC) 3 Qinghai 13, 28, 119, 150–151, 178, Shaanxi 13–14,150–151, 326, 348 225, 326 Shan 57 Qinghai Lake 20 Shandong Province 17, 26, 150, Qinghai-Tibet Highway 119–120 169–171, 250, 265 Qinghai-Tibet Plateau 7, 19, 83–87, Shanghai 14, 16, 22, 25, 51, 110, 112, 118–119, 151, 223 134–135, 150–151, 173, 237–238, Qinghai-Tibet Railway 119–120 269, 271, 286–287, 293, 298–300 Qinghai-Tibet Road 30 Shanghai Stock Exchange 326 Qingyang 14 Shanxi 13, 21, 52, 151, 326, 348 Qingzhen 253, 255–256 Shanxi Fengxi Fertilizer Industry Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant 25 (Group) Ltd. 327 Qinzhou Bay 168 Shanxi Jinyun Iron and Steel Co., Qiqihar 11 Ltd. 327 Shanxi Shuangren Pharmaceutical Co., Regulations on Administration of the Ltd. 327 Discharge Permit System 202 Shao Bingren 62 Regulations on Environmental Impact Shaoxing 264 Assessment of Plans 202 Shenyang 286–287, 326 Regulations on Handling Cases by Shenzhen 326 Environmental Protection Judicial Shenzhen Fuwei Metal and Plastic Tribunals 253 Products Co., Ltd. 271–272 Regulations on Wild Flora Protection Shenzhen HAMLY Electronic Co., 224 Ltd. 271 renewable energy 36, 219, 299 Shenzhen Water Group 323 Renewable Energy Law 228 Shi Hanmin 133 Renmin Canal 65–66 Shi Jianhui 250 Report of Environmental Statistics of Shijiazhuang 49 China in 2007 317 Shijiazhuang-Beijing channel 52 Research Institute of Haitong shortage of water xix, 6, 8, 52, 87 Securities 328 Sichuan 4, 13–14, 28, 56, 60, 62, Research Report of Environmental 65–66, 68, 125, 151, 348 Information Disclosure from Sichuan Chuantou Chemical Industry 2004–2006 326 Group Co., Ltd. 327 Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Sichuan Earthquake xix, 26, 55 Environment and Development 282 Sichuan Zhuoyue Venture Capital Co., River estuary 164, 167–168 Ltd. 327 Road ecology 115, 356 Sichuan-Tibet Railway 70 Ruiz 53 Simao-Xiaomenglun Expressway 120 Ruo’ergai Nature Reserve 117–118, Snowﬂ ake Environmental Protection 122 Campaign 239 index 365 solar energy 227–228, 300, 329 sulfur dioxide emission 15, 282, 298 Solid Waste Pollution 6, 199 Survey on Public Information of Songhua River 10–11, 251–252, 339 Enterprises’ Pollutants 325 Songhuahu Reservoir 9 sustainable development 39, 43, 54, South China Sea 164, 167–168, 342 64, 70, 97, 103, 106, 193–194, South Korea 165 n. 6 211, 215–216, 221–222–223, South-to-North Water Diversion 227, 294–295, 299, 324–325, Project 9, 52–53, 74, 282 353–354 Soviet Union 37 Suzhou 14, 238, 264, 286–287 Spain 53 SynTao 324 State Administration for Industry and System of Integrated Environmental Commerce 234 and Economic Accounting State Administration of Taxation (SEEA) 104 287–288 State Administration of Traditional Taihu Lake 10–11, 146, 253–254, 257, Chinese Medicine 225 341 State Administration of Work Safety Taiwan 113, 151, 235 (SAWS) 5 Taizhou 23, 264 State Council Notice on the Tan Qixiang 105 Comprehensive Work Plan for Energy Tan Zuoren 179 Conservation and Emissions Tangshan 170, 300 Reduction 343 Taohuajiang County 26 State Development and Reform Tarim River 85 Commission 335 Tashan Mine 22 State Eleventh Five-Year Plan of Acid Tenth China People’s Political Rain and Sulfur Dioxide Pollution Consultative Conference Control 335 (CPPCC) 249 State Environmental Protection The City Commercial Bank 327 Administration 207–208, 229, 248, The Measures for Open Environmental 281, 309 Information (for Trial Implementation) State Environmental Protection 324 Administration (SEPA) xxi, 10, 200, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) 79 207, 321 The Notice Issued by the State Council State Forestry Administration 73, 214 on the Limitation of Production and State Grid Corporation of China Consumption of Plastic Bags (SGCC) 17 233–234 State Oceanic Administration 161, The Notice on Strengthening 163, 214 Environmental Monitoring of Export State Taxation Administration 321 Enterprises 290 State-Owned Assets Supervision and The Proposal on Opening a Hot Line Administration Commission of the for Environmental Pollution State Council 323 Reporting 231 Stern Review 294 The Proposal on Scientiﬁ c Utilization Suggestions on Establishing an of Medicinal Resources in Qinghai Environmental Protection Law Province 225 Enforcement Coordination The Proposal on Strengthening the Mechanism 254 Protection of Crop Diversity in Suggestions on Promoting Ethnic Group Areas 224 Sustainable Development of Cities The Proposal on Strengthening the with Resources 222 Protection of Wild Arethusa in sulfur dioxide 13–16, 22, 157, China 224 175–178, 180, 182–183, 188–189, The Proposal to Bring About Public 318, 322–323, 335, 349–350, 352, Participation in Environmental 356 Protection 230 366 index

The Proposal to Introduce water quality 8–9, 11, 29, 66, 89, 147, Environmental Education into the 163–164, 166, 168, 312, 333, 339, Compulsory Education System 231 341–342 Three Gorges Dam 11, 22, 70 Water Resources 8, 13, 43, 52, 54–55, Three Gorges Reservoir 12, 282 60, 66, 84–85, 194, 205, 214, Tianchi Lake 88 219–221, 224, 253, 308, 330 Tianjin 14, 16–17, 22, 53, 150–151, water shortages 43, 223 169, 172–173, 238, 293, 298, 348 Weihai City 265 Tianjin Binhai New Area 169–170 Wen Jiabao 23, 107, 176, 279 Tianjin Economic-Technological West Lake 251 Development Area (TEDA) 267 WHO 16, 44, 50–51, 136, 139 Tianshan Mountains 7 wild animal(s) 31, 88, 104, 115–120, Tianwei 300 122–125 Tibet 4, 22, 28, 69, 118–119, 125, wind power 50, 106, 300 150–151, 223 Working Guide for Environmental Tibetan Antelopes 30, 119–120, 125 Disclosure by Listed Companies Tongling Tongguanshan Chemical 289 Industry Co. 327 World Bank 183 TOTO 330 World Health Organization trafﬁ c control 46, 48, 50 (WHO) 16, 44, 136 Tuojiang River 66 World Wide Fund (WWF) 50, 296 turning point xx, 175, 177–180, 182, 356 Wu Xiaoqing 60, 67, 295 Tuwa people 126 Wucheyan Village 145 Typhoon Hagupit 4 Wuchuan 14 Wuhan 9, 112 U.S. Environmental Protection Wuliangsuhai Lake 88 Agency 138, 284 Wusu 14 U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council Wuxi 11, 253–254, 256, 264 (NRDC) 270 WWF 50, 118, 291, 296, 299–300 UK 300, 346 Ulungur River 88 Xi’an 326 UNEP 16, 44–47, 50–51, 270, 294 Xiamen City 167, 271 United Nations 39, 44, 282 Xiangfen Xingyuan Group Coking Co., United Nations Development Ltd. 327 Programme 352 Xiangxi River 11 United Nations Environment Xianning City 26 Programme (UNEP) 16, 44, 270, 294 Xie Zhenghua 186 United States 7, 16, 37, 47, 98–99, Xinan River 308 104, 107–108, 111, 113, 132, 199, Xinfengjiang Reservoir 63 204, 247, 284, 297, 299 Xingkai 9 United States Environmental Protection Xingshan County 11 Agency 203 Xingyun Lake 90 Xinjiang 13–15, 21, 28, 88–89, 119, Wal-Mart Stores 329 125–126, 150, 154, 178, 348 Wan Gang 46, 295 Xinjiang Production and Construction Wang Enduo 250 Corp. 311 Wang Jianghua 25 Xishan 253 Wang Jinnan 312 Xishuangbanna 117, 121, 127 Wang Yuqing 184 Xishuangbanna Mengyang Nature water pollution 6, 8, 10–13, 87, 147, Reserve 120 163, 179, 181, 195–197, 223, 256, Xu Huaqing 46–47 266, 312, 355 Xuanwu 9 index 367

Yalong River 69 Yunnan Province(s) 4, 11, 62, 76, 79, Yalu River 166 89–90, 117, 126, 253, 321 Yan Yiming 269 Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau 83–84, 87 Yancheng 173, 264 Yuqiao Reservoir 9 Yang Zhongyi 16 Yushichang 126 Yangchang River 255 Yushichang Village 80 Yangtze 12 Yuyao 145, 264 Yangtze River 6, 8, 11, 14, 22, 56–57, Yuzhou 21 69, 84, 164, 167, 224, 253, 339 Yangtze River basin 11–12, 223 Zhang Ping 183 Yangtze River Delta 14, 16, 159, Zhang Quan 180 172–173 Zhang Shiqiu 207, 310–312 Yangzonghai Lake xx, 11, 90 Zhang Xinshi 106 Yarlung Zangbo River 69 Zhang Yuanhang 16 Yellow River 8, 105, 165, 223, 339 Zhang Zhikui 179–181 Yellow River Delta Economic Zhangjiakou 50 Development Zone in Dongying 169 Zhanjiang City 168 Yellow River estuary 164 Zhao Yue 15 Yellow Sea 161, 164–166, 342 Zhejiang 14, 150–151, 257, 264, 308, Yilin Forestation Holdings Limited 28 326 Yingfeng Chemical Co., Ltd. 58 Zhenjiang 143 Yingfeng Chemical Plant 61 Zhong Nanshan 137 Yingkou Coastal Industrial Base 170 Zhou Shengxian 280, 295 Yinma 11 Zhoushan Islands 167 Yitong 11 Zhuhai 300 Yiwu City 308 Zhujiang River 9 Yiyang City 26 Zhujiang River Delta 14, 16 Yu Xiaogang 290 Zhuzhou Haohua 287 Yuhuan 264 Zibo City 265 Yunchun 21 Zipingpu Power Plant 58 Yunnan Chengjiang Jinye Industrial and Zipingpu Reservoir 60, 62–64 Trade Co., Ltd. 90 Zoige (Ruo’ergai) Plateau Wetlands 89