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Exposure to Moral Relativism Compromises Moral Behavior

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Exposure to Moral Relativism Compromises Moral Behavior Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 995–1001 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Experimental Social Psychology journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior Tage S. Rai a,⁎, Keith J. Holyoak b a Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, USA b Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, USA HIGHLIGHTS • We examined whether exposure to moral relativism would compromise moral behavior. • Participants who read a relativist argument were more likely to cheat. • Participants who read an absolutist moral definition were less willing to steal. • The subjectivity of morality implied by relativism appears to compromise behavior. article info abstract Article history: Across two studies we investigated the relationship between moral relativism versus absolutism and moral Received 7 May 2013 behavior. In Experiment 1, we found that participants who read a relativist argument for tolerating female Revised 30 June 2013 genital mutilation were more likely to cheat to win an incentivized raffle than participants who read an Available online 10 July 2013 absolutist argument against female genital mutilation, or those in a control condition. In Experiment 2, participants who read a definition of morality phrased in absolutist terms expressed less willingness to engage Keywords: in petty theft than those who read a definition of morality phrased in relativist terms, or those in a control Moral Ethics condition. Experiment 2 also provided evidence that effects were not due to absolutist arguments signaling Relativism that fewer behaviors are morally permissible, nor to relativist arguments defending more disagreeable moral Absolutism positions. Rather, the content of the philosophical positions themselves—the fact that relativism describes moral- Metaphysics ity as subjective and culturally-historically contingent, whereas absolutism describes morality as objective and Tolerance universal—makes individuals more likely to engage in immoral behaviors when exposed to moral relativism compared to moral absolutism. © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Introduction less absolutist positions on morality in light of evidence that people across cultures and time periods differ radically in their moral beliefs The philosophical position of moral absolutism holds that some moral (Flanagan, Sarkissian, & Wong, 2008; Haidt, 2007; MacIntyre, 1984; Rai beliefs are objectively true, and reflect facts that are independent of any & Fiske, 2011; Wong, 2006). In the present paper we examine what social group's specific preferences. Under this view, a statement such as effects, if any, exposure to these different moral perspectives may have “killing is wrong” is similar to the statement “2+2=4.” The statement on moral behavior and moral intentions. is either true or false; it is not a matter of opinion. On the other end of the The inherent subjectivity of moral relativism may imply that people spectrum, the philosophical position of moral relativism holds that the can have no basis for making moral judgments against those with truth or falsity of moral beliefs are products of our traditions and cultural whom they disagree, as relativism provides no objective criteria for de- histories, rather than objective statements based on logic, or facts about termining who is right (Gowans, 2012). For example, whereas human the state of the world independent of our own opinions or perspectives. rights advocates have argued that female genital mutilation harms According to moral relativism, if we had different traditions and cultural women's bodies and is therefore intrinsically morally wrong, defenders histories we would have different moral beliefs, which would be no of the practice have argued that moral judgments must be made relative more “right” or “wrong” thanthosewenowhold(Harman, 1975). In to the social groups in which practices take place, and therefore we must recent decades, philosophers and psychologists alike have adopted tolerate female genital mutilation because it carries important meaning for the people who practice it (Gruenbaum, 2001; James, 1994). Impor- tantly, those who fear the consequences of moral relativism believe that if people lose their objective basis for judging others, they will even- ⁎ Corresponding author at: Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Jacobs Center 501, Evanston, IL 60208, USA. tually direct this attitude inward and become more likely to engage in E-mail address: [email protected] (T.S. Rai). immoral behaviors themselves. 0022-1031/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.06.008 996 T.S. Rai, K.J. Holyoak / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 49 (2013) 995–1001 Note that there is no intrinsic reason why a relativistic conception of engagement in immoral behavior, nor have any studies elucidated the morality need adopt all of these positions. In philosophy, meta-ethical causal mechanisms that might underlie such effects. relativism accepts that our moral beliefs are ultimately subjective, but In the present paper, we examine whether exposure to moral does not hold the normative position that this subjectivity forces us to relativism versus moral absolutism shifts our willingness to engage tolerate behaviors that we find morally disagreeable, nor that our own in immoral behavior. We hypothesized that if moral beliefs derive behavior should necessarily be impaired (Wong, 2006). And yet, is it their motivational strength from being perceived as universal and possible that the folk conception of moral relativism carries less weight rooted in facts about the state of the world rather than in subjective for laypeople than does moral absolutism, because the former is preferences, exposure to moral relativism will lead people to engage thought to imply that nothing is definitively right or wrong? And in immoral behavior, whereas exposure to moral absolutism will might this perspective weaken the moral motivation we need to refrain make people refrain from engaging in immoral behavior. From this from engaging in immoral behaviors ourselves? perspective, to be absolutist in our moral beliefs increases motivation Previous research has found that priming participants' sense of to behave in accord with them, whereas the inherent subjectivity of morality in some way (e.g., by having them write down the Ten morality implied by moral relativism reduces this motivation and Commandments or reminding them of their school's honor code) increases the likelihood of engaging in immoral behavior. reduces their willingness to engage in immoral behavior (Mazar, In Experiment 1, we investigated whether exposing participants Amir, & Ariely, 2008). However, this line of research has not distin- to either a moral relativist argument in favor of tolerance toward a guished between more absolutist and more relativist conceptions of culturally disagreeable practice, or a moral absolutist argument against morality. Goodwin and Darley (2008) found that people often view tolerance of the practice, would influence their cheating behavior in a their moral values in more absolutist, factual terms than their non- subsequent incentivized task. In Experiment 2, we investigated whether moral values, such as aesthetic preferences and tastes. However, there exposing participants to either relativist or absolutist definitions of is considerable variability in the perceived objectivity of moral beliefs, morality would influence their willingness to engage in a petty theft and perceived consensus regarding the moral status of an act and the while testing between competing hypotheses regarding the causal negativity of the act both predict more absolutist beliefs in regard to mechanisms underlying our effect. the act (Goodwin & Darley, 2012). Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) have argued that this quality of Experiment 1 strongly held moral beliefs, which they refer to as moral conviction,is crucial to their functioning. Specifically, they have argued that deeply Experiment 1 investigated whether exposure to arguments for held moral values derive their strength to motivate moral behavior moral relativism and moral absolutism could impact moral behavior. from being experienced as universal and rooted in facts about the We presented participants with either a moral relativist argument for state of the world, rather than in subjective opinions that differ across tolerating the practice of female genital mutilation or a moral absolutist time and cultures. Skitka and colleagues have found that greater argument for banning the practice. If adopting more relativist perspec- moral conviction is predictive of more strongly held beliefs and judg- tives weakens moral motivation by making morality more subjective, ments on a range of moral–political issues, greater willingness to act then exposure to an argument for moral relativism should make partic- on moral beliefs (e.g., to vote), and greater intolerance of those who ipants more likely to engage in an immoral behavior: specifically, lying disagree with them (for reviews, see Bauman & Skitka, 2009; Skitka, in order to increase their chances at winning a cash prize. 2010). However, only one experimental study has provided support for a causal link between moral absolutism and actual behavior. In a Method study of donating behavior, Young and Durwin (2012) found that participants primed with an absolutist question about
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