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Page | 1 CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – December 2015 www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com Page | 2 CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – December 2015 Italian Mafia Warns Islamic State Group to Stay Away from NYC Source: http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Italian-Mafia-Warns-Islamic-State-Group-to-Stay-Away- from-NYC-20151122-0013.html The Gambino mob family said they want to pitch in their grain of sand to protect New Yorkers from extremists and their possible attacks in the city. Giovanni Gambino Jr. is attempting to carve out a career as a Hollywood screenwriter, Reuters added, saying that the crime boss' son said that after the Nov. 13 Islamic State group attacks in Paris, protection in New The Italian mafia in New York has warned York is more important than ever. Islamic State group against carrying out attacks "The world is dangerous today, but people in New York, or otherwise face the living in New York neighborhoods with Sicilian consequences, RT reported Sunday. connections should feel safe," he said. "We The son of a New York mob boss, Giovanni make sure our friends and families are Gambino Jr., said the mafia is in much better protected from extremists and terrorists, position to protect New Yorkers than the especially the brutal, psychopathic organization country's security forces, such as the FBI and that calls itself the Islamic State.” Homeland Security. Gambino Jr assured viewers that the Islamic “They [federal security forces] often act too State group fears the Sicilian mafia, saying that late, or fail to see a complete picture of what's is one of the main reasons why the extremist happening due to a lack of ‘human group has not tried to operate cells out of intelligence,’ ” Gambino told NBC News. Sicily. According to Reuters, Gambino said the "The mafia has a bad reputation, but much of mafia’s knowledge of individual movements that's undeserved," says Gambino, who moved and interaction with locals gives it the upper to Brooklyn in 1988. "As with everything in life, hand, even compared to the latest surveillance there are good, bad and ugly parts – the rise of technologies being used by U.S. security and global terrorism gives the mafia a chance to intelligence agencies. show its good side." EDITOR’S COMMENT: Mafia’s proposal reveals the big existing gap: lack of street intelligence or HUMINT. Extensive reliance on electronics, clouds and drones will never get to know the people on ground. And if Mafia can do it, we can do it as well. SA a 'soft target' Source: http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/stnews/2015/11/22/Terror-SA-a-soft-target As the world reels under a bloody spate of "We remain vigilant as a country and do our terror attacks, State Security Minister David routine work, but we are not on high alert. Mahlobo has told South Africans there is no There is no panic," said Mahlobo. need to panic. "The reality is that there is no Mahlobo told the Sunday Times that the country that is immune to terror, government was working with international so we need to address the root intelligence agencies to ensure that there were causes." no threats to the country's security. www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com Page | 3 CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – December 2015 Friday's attack in Mali's capital, Bamako, during around the world that terrorist groups are trying which at least 21 people were killed, has sent to attract headlines and keep their recruitment shock waves across the globe. The attack strategies alive. came a week after the bloodshed in Paris that "If IS- and al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Africa claimed 130 lives. have changed strategy, then South Africa does face a threat. South Africa's government is not considered a high target for terrorist groups, but we have probably the highest concentration of what would be considered soft targets that would generate the highest level of publicity and fear within Western targets on the continent." On an operational level, South Africa had good counterterrorism capacity in close co-operation with countries such as the UK, US and France, as seen during the World Cup, he said. "But as we saw in Paris, you don't need a highly organised, big group of guys with explosives. You just need three or four people with AK47s, which are freely available in this part of the world, to pull off an attack right under the nose of intelligence. "I don't think we can be complacent. However, Mahlobo said he was confident that The US embassy alert [in September] is a any threats to South Africa would be detected, reminder that we're not off the radar." saying the government was "working with The Department of International Relations communities on a larger scale to fight any yesterday condemned the terror in Mali: "South contact with radicals". Africa stands with the rest of the international Yesterday French minister of foreign affairs community in its condemnation of attacks Laurent Fabius met with President Jacob Zuma targeting civilians and reiterates its stance that to discuss the upcoming COP21 climate terrorism, in whatever form and from whichever conference and co-operation on fighting quarter, cannot be condoned." terrorism. Meanwhile, a US security expert said African Asked about recent terrorist attacks in Paris nations would remain vulnerable to militant and Mali and whether his meeting with Zuma attacks and it would be difficult for them to was related to these events, he said: "Our prevent similar violence in future. countries do co-operate in the fight against "The ability to conduct attacks on soft targets is terrorism, through the exchange of information going to continue to be a challenge," General and sharing our respective analyses. David Rodriguez, the head of US Africa "Although my visit is focused on the COP21 Command, told reporters in Washington on conference, we addressed the fight against Friday. terrorism." In the wake of the attack on Nairobi's Westgate Institute for Security Studies counterterrorism shopping mall in September 2013, which left 67 expert Anton du Plessis said recent attacks people dead, it emerged that "White Widow" around the world indicated a shift in strategy by Samantha Lewthwaite, the alleged mastermind terror groups - one that placed South Africa behind the killings, managed to obtain fake under potential threat of an attack. South African IDs and spent time "What we've seen in the last two weeks is a in Mayfair, Johannesburg, with her serious game-changer in terms of where global two children. terrorist groups are trying to position Boko Haram was this week themselves. It's clear from attacks taking place named the world's deadliest www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com Page | 4 CBRNE-TERRORISM NEWSLETTER – December 2015 terrorist group by the Global Terrorism Index. chemicals and explosives, as the UN The militant group, which has targeted Nigeria unanimously endorsed a resolution urging and its neighbours for years, was responsible nations to combat IS, warning that the terrorist for 6664 deaths last year, more than any other group intends more attacks similar to Paris. terrorist group in the world, including IS, which The Belgian government raised the terror alert killed 6073 people, according to the index. to its highest level, shutting the transit system. Attacks in Nigeria this week alone, including A receptionist at the Radisson Blu in Bamako two female suicide bombers detonating vests described Friday's attack, during which heavily at a cellphone market in the northern city of armed gunmen shouting "Allahu Akbar! [God is Kano, left scores of people dead. In Cameroon great]" stormed the hotel, seizing hostages and yesterday suicide bombers killed six people leaving bodies strewn throughout the building. and wounded dozens. The gunmen barrelled past the hotel's light In Mali, security forces were hunting down at security, using fake diplomatic licence plates to least three people suspected of involvement in confuse guards, and burst into the lobby guns Friday's jihadist attack in Bamako. blazing. "We are actively pursuing three suspects who "They started firing everywhere," said the might have been involved in Friday's attack on receptionist. "They cut someone's throat, a the Radisson Blu Hotel," a source said. white man. I saw four of them, armed to the The Malian government declared a 10-day teeth." state of emergency from midnight on Friday US President Barack Obama condemned the and called for three days of mourning for the assault calling it "another reminder that victims. terrorism threatens many of our nations". Belgium yesterday closed the Brussels metro network after police found an arsenal of Japan to set up terrorism intelligence unit as early as next month Source: http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2015/11/385527.html Nov 22 – Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said Sunday that Japan will set up a new intelligence gathering unit on terrorism as soon as early next month, as the country gears up to host a key summit next year. "Ahead of the Ise-Shima summit, we will boost our counterterrorism measures and bolstering intelligence gathering with the international community is a pressing issue. For this end, we will create a new intelligence gathering unit," Abe said at a news conference, after wrapping up a series of regional summits in Kuala Lumpur. Abe's remarks come as the international community is putting up a united front to combat terrorism in the wake of the Nov. 13 attacks in Paris. Next year's Group of Seven summit which will bring together the leaders of Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States will be held in May in central Japan.
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