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Philosophy of Mind The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality Terence Horgan and John Tienson 1 What is the relationship between phenomenolo- firm the following theses, both of which are re- gy and intentionality? A common picture in re- pudiated by separatism: cent philosophy of mind has been that the phe- nomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of The Intentionality ofPhenomenology: Mental mentality are independent of one another. Ac- states of the sort commonly cited as cording to this view, the phenomenal character of paradigmatically phenomenal (e.g., certain mental states or processes-states for sensory-experiential states such as which there is "something it is like" to undergo color-experiences, itches, and smells) them-is not intentional. Examples that are typ- have intentional content that is insepa- ically given of states with inherent phenomenal rable from their phenomenal character. character are sensations, such as pains, itches, The Phenomenology ofIntentionality: Mental and color sensations. This view also asserts, on states of the sort commonly cited as the other hand, that the intentionality of certain paradigmatic ally intentional (e.g., mental states and processes-their being about something-is not phenomenal. Beliefs and de- cognitive states such as beliefs, and sires are the paradigm cases of intentional men- conative states such as desires), when tal states. Although they are intentionally direct- conscious, have phenomenal character ed-i.e., they have aboutness-these mental that is inseparable from their intention- states are not inherently phenomenal. There is al content. nothing that it is like to be in such a state by virtue In addition to these two theses (henceforth, IP of which it is directed toward what it is about. and PI), we advocate another important claim We will call this picture separatism, because about the interpenetration of phenomenology it treats phenomenal aspects of mentality and and intentionality: intentional aspects of mentality as mutually in- dependent, and thus separable. Although there Phenomenal Intentionality: There is a kind of may be complex states that are both phenome- intentionality, pervasive in human nal and intentional, their phenomenal aspects mental life, that is constitutively deter- and their intentional aspects are separable. mined by phenomenology alone. Many philosophers who hold this picture have thought that these two aspects of mentality lead We use the expression 'constitutively deter- to quite different sorts of problems with respect mined' to mean that this kind of intentionality is to the project of "naturalizing the mental." Pro- not merely nomically determined; rather, inten- ponents of separatism often hold that while the tional mental states have such intentional con- problem of naturalizing phenomenology poses tent by virtue of their phenomenology. great difficulties, the problem of naturalizing in- So-called "representationalist" theories of tentionality is much more tractable.2 phenomenal properties are a currently influential Separatism has been very popular in philoso- departure from separatism.3 Although extant phy of mind in recent decades, and is still wide- versions of representationalism embrace thesis ly held. Those who oppose it regard it as a view IP, typically they do not embrace thesis PI. against which they need to characterize their Nor do they embrace the thesis of Phenomenal own positions-a common picture that they Intentionality, since they hold that intentionality must explicitly reject. In this paper we argue is prior to phenomenology. So our position that separatism is profoundly wrong. We depart differs significantly from standard representa- from it quite thoroughly, in ways importantly tionalism.4 different from other recent departures. We af- We argue for the three theses set out above This paper is published here for the first time. 520 INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 521 (sections 1-3), in part by way of introspective perienced as a unity in space, as all belonging to description of actual human experience. If you a single object. The taste is in your mouth; the pay attention to your own experience, we think smoothness and roundishness that you feel- you will come to appreciate their truth. 5 Our po- with parts of your mouth as well as your hand- sition has important consequences, when com- are there, too. Second, it is important to notice bined with the plausible thesis (argued for in sec- that what is experienced tactilely are various tion 4) that phenomenology is "narrow," i.e., it spatial properties of the object, not sensations. does not depend-except perhaps causally- One has, of course, tactile sensations as well, upon what goes on "outside the head" of the ex- though one does not normally attend to them. periencer. One consequence is that there is a kind (The tactile sensations are, when noticed, expe- of narrow intentionality that is pervasive in rienced as the sort of things that can only belong human mental life-a form of intentional direct- to a sentient being.) The properties of smooth- edness that is built into phenomenology itself, ness, firmness, etc. are experienced as the sorts and that is not constitutively dependent on any of things that can only belong to an "external" extrinsic relations between phenomenal charac- object in space.? Third, the apple is encountered ter and the experiencer's actual external environ- as moving. The experience is of a temporal ob- ment. A further consequence is that theories that ject, an object that endures. The same is true ground all intentionality in connections to the ex- when you see another person take a bite of an ternal world, such as causal and teleological the- apple. Experience is not of instants; experience ories of intentionality, are deeply mistaken. is temporally thick. This is obvious in the case of hearing tunes or sentences, where the tempo- ral pattern is a palpable feature of the experi- 1. The Intentionality ence. The temporal pattern is also a palpable of Phenomenology feature of the seen moving apple, though less frequently noted as such.8 But it is no less true The mental states typically cited as paradigmati- that stationary objects are seen as enduring and cally phenomenal have intentional content that is as unchanging.9 inseparable from their phenomenal character. For any experience involving a specific shade Let us consider some examples: first, experi- of red, one can abstract away from the total ex- ences of red as we actually have them. You might perience and focus on the distinctive what-it's- see, say, a red pen on a nearby table, and a chair like of that shade of red per se-a phenomenal with red arms and back a bit behind the table. aspect of this total experience that it has in com- There is certainly something that the red that you mon with innumerable other total experiences see is like to you. 6 But the red that you see is seen, that differ in the perceived location of the expe- first, as a property of objects. These objects are rienced red or in the shape of the red surface, seen as located in space relative to your center of etc. But even considered in isolation from any visual awareness. And they are experienced as total visual-experiential state, the what-it's-like part of a complete three-dimensional scene-not of experiencing red is already intentional, be- just a pen with table and chair, but a pen, table, cause it involves red as the intentional object of and chair in a room with floor, walls, ceiling, and one's experience. Again, redness is not experi- windows. This spatial character is built into the enced as an introspectible property of one's own phenomenology of the experience. experiential state, but rather as a property of vi- Consider too the experience of seeing an sually presented objects. 10 apple on the table, picking up the apple, and tak- Of course, in typical cases of experiencing ing a bite out of it. There is the look and smell of red, the overall phenomenal character of one's the apple. Then (as you grasp it) there is the feel visual experience is a structurally rich what-it's- of the apple, its smoothness, roundishness, and like of experiencing a visually presented scene, firmness. Then there is its weight (as you pick it a scene that contains a whole array of apparent up). Finally there is the feel of the apple in your enduring objects with various properties and re- mouth, followed by the crunching sound, taste, lations-including the property redness instan- and feel of juiciness as you take a bite. We will tiated on the surfaces of some of these objects. not attempt to write the small book one could The total visual experience with this overall write describing this simple experience. But we phenomenal character is richly intentional, need to note some highlights. First, the look, since it presents a temporally extended scene feel, smell, sound, and taste of the apple are ex- comprising various objects that instantiate vari- 522 CONTENT ous properties and relations at various spatial 10- ness. I I Let us now focus on the thesis of the phe- cations relative to one's center of visual aware- nomenology of intentionality (PI): consciously ness. This total visual experience is also richly occurring intentional states have phenomenal phenomenal, because there is an overall what- character that is inseparable from their intention- it's-like of experiencing the whole scene. (Any al content. visually noticeable alteration in the visually Intentional states have a phenomenal charac- presented scene would be a phenomenal differ- ter, and this phenomenal character is precisely ence in one's total visual experience.) the what-it-is-like of experiencing a specific Another commonly cited example of phe- propositional-attitude type vis-a-vis a specific nomenal consciousness is the distinctive phe- intentional content.
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