Philosophy of Mind

The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality Terence Horgan and John Tienson 1

What is the relationship between phenomenolo- firm the following theses, both of which are re- gy and intentionality? A common picture in re- pudiated by separatism: cent philosophy of mind has been that the phenomenal aspects and the intentional aspects of The Intentionality ofPhenomenology: Mental mentality are independent of one another. Ac- states of the sort commonly cited as cording to this view, the phenomenal character of paradigmatically phenomenal (e.g., certain mental states or processes-states for sensory-experiential states such as which there is "something it is like" to undergo color-experiences, itches, and smells) them-is not intentional. Examples that are typ- have intentional content that is insepa- ically given of states with inherent phenomenal rable from their phenomenal character. character are sensations, such as pains, itches, The Phenomenology ofIntentionality: Mental and color sensations. This view also asserts, on states of the sort commonly cited as the other hand, that the intentionality of certain paradigmatic ally intentional (e.g., mental states and processes-their being about something-is not phenomenal. Beliefs and de- cognitive states such as beliefs, and sires are the paradigm cases of intentional men- conative states such as desires), when tal states. Although they are intentionally direct- conscious, have phenomenal character ed-i.e., they have aboutness-these mental that is inseparable from their intention- states are not inherently phenomenal. There is al content. nothing that it is like to be in such a state by virtue In addition to these two theses (henceforth, IP of which it is directed toward what it is about. and PI), we advocate another important claim We will call this picture separatism, because about the interpenetration of phenomenology it treats phenomenal aspects of mentality and and intentionality: intentional aspects of mentality as mutually independent, and thus separable. Although there Phenomenal Intentionality: There is a kind of may be complex states that are both phenome- intentionality, pervasive in human nal and intentional, their phenomenal aspects mental life, that is constitutively deter- and their intentional aspects are separable. mined by phenomenology alone. Many philosophers who hold this picture have thought that these two aspects of mentality lead We use the expression 'constitutively deter- to quite different sorts of problems with respect mined' to mean that this kind of intentionality is to the project of "naturalizing the mental." Pro- not merely nomically determined; rather, inten- ponents of separatism often hold that while the tional mental states have such intentional con- problem of naturalizing phenomenology poses tent by virtue of their phenomenology. great difficulties, the problem of naturalizing in- So-called "representationalist" theories of tentionality is much more tractable.2 phenomenal properties are a currently influential Separatism has been very popular in philoso- departure from separatism.3 Although extant phy of mind in recent decades, and is still wide- versions of representationalism embrace thesis ly held. Those who oppose it regard it as a view IP, typically they do not embrace thesis PI. against which they need to characterize their Nor do they embrace the thesis of Phenomenal own positions-a common picture that they Intentionality, since they hold that intentionality must explicitly reject. In this paper we argue is prior to phenomenology. So our position that separatism is profoundly wrong. We depart differs significantly from standard representa- from it quite thoroughly, in ways importantly tionalism.4 different from other recent departures. We af- We argue for the three theses set out above

This paper is published here for the first time.

520 INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 521

(sections 1-3), in part by way of introspective perienced as a unity in space, as all belonging to description of actual human experience. If you a single object. The taste is in your mouth; the pay attention to your own experience, we think smoothness and roundishness that you feel- you will come to appreciate their truth. 5 Our po- with parts of your mouth as well as your hand- sition has important consequences, when com- are there, too. Second, it is important to notice bined with the plausible thesis (argued for in sec- that what is experienced tactilely are various tion 4) that phenomenology is "narrow," i.e., it spatial properties of the object, not sensations. does not depend-except perhaps causally- One has, of course, tactile sensations as well, upon what goes on "outside the head" of the ex- though one does not normally attend to them. periencer. One consequence is that there is a kind (The tactile sensations are, when noticed, expe- of narrow intentionality that is pervasive in rienced as the sort of things that can only belong human mental life-a form of intentional direct- to a sentient being.) The properties of smooth- edness that is built into phenomenology itself, ness, firmness, etc. are experienced as the sorts and that is not constitutively dependent on any of things that can only belong to an "external" extrinsic relations between phenomenal charac- object in space.? Third, the apple is encountered ter and the experiencer's actual external environ- as moving. The experience is of a temporal ob- ment. A further consequence is that theories that ject, an object that endures. The same is true ground all intentionality in connections to the ex- when you see another person take a bite of an ternal world, such as causal and teleological the- apple. Experience is not of instants; experience ories of intentionality, are deeply mistaken. is temporally thick. This is obvious in the case of hearing tunes or sentences, where the temporal pattern is a palpable feature of the experi- 1. The Intentionality ence. The temporal pattern is also a palpable of Phenomenology feature of the seen moving apple, though less frequently noted as such.8 But it is no less true The mental states typically cited as paradigmati- that stationary objects are seen as enduring and cally phenomenal have intentional content that is as unchanging.9 inseparable from their phenomenal character. For any experience involving a specific shade Let us consider some examples: first, experi- of red, one can abstract away from the total ex- ences of red as we actually have them. You might perience and focus on the distinctive what-it's- see, say, a red pen on a nearby table, and a chair like of that shade of red per se-a phenomenal with red arms and back a bit behind the table. aspect of this total experience that it has in com- There is certainly something that the red that you mon with innumerable other total experiences see is like to you. 6 But the red that you see is seen, that differ in the perceived location of the expe- first, as a property of objects. These objects are rienced red or in the shape of the red surface, seen as located in space relative to your center of etc. But even considered in isolation from any visual awareness. And they are experienced as total visual-experiential state, the what-it's-like part of a complete three-dimensional scene-not of experiencing red is already intentional, be- just a pen with table and chair, but a pen, table, cause it involves red as the intentional object of and chair in a room with floor, walls, ceiling, and one's experience. Again, redness is not experi- windows. This spatial character is built into the enced as an introspectible property of one's own phenomenology of the experience. experiential state, but rather as a property of vi- Consider too the experience of seeing an sually presented objects. 10 apple on the table, picking up the apple, and tak- Of course, in typical cases of experiencing ing a bite out of it. There is the look and smell of red, the overall phenomenal character of one's the apple. Then (as you grasp it) there is the feel visual experience is a structurally rich what-it's- of the apple, its smoothness, roundishness, and like of experiencing a visually presented scene, firmness. Then there is its weight (as you pick it a scene that contains a whole array of apparent up). Finally there is the feel of the apple in your enduring objects with various properties and re- mouth, followed by the crunching sound, taste, lations-including the property redness instan- and feel of juiciness as you take a bite. We will tiated on the surfaces of some of these objects. not attempt to write the small book one could The total visual experience with this overall write describing this simple experience. But we phenomenal character is richly intentional, need to note some highlights. First, the look, since it presents a temporally extended scene feel, smell, sound, and taste of the apple are ex- comprising various objects that instantiate vari- 522 CONTENT ous properties and relations at various spatial 10- ness. I I Let us now focus on the thesis of the phe- cations relative to one's center of visual aware- nomenology of intentionality (PI): consciously ness. This total visual experience is also richly occurring intentional states have phenomenal phenomenal, because there is an overall what- character that is inseparable from their intention- it's-like of experiencing the whole scene. (Any al content. visually noticeable alteration in the visually Intentional states have a phenomenal charac- presented scene would be a phenomenal differ- ter, and this phenomenal character is precisely ence in one's total visual experience.) the what-it-is-like of experiencing a specific Another commonly cited example of phe- propositional-attitude type vis-a-vis a specific nomenal consciousness is the distinctive phe- intentional content. Change either the attitude- nomenal character of pain. Experiences of pain type (believing, desiring, wondering, hoping, are thoroughly intentional: pain is experienced etc.) or the particular intentional. content, and as a particular feeling at a certain place in one's the phenomenal character thereby changes own body. (This is why there can be such a thing toO.12 Eliminate the intentional state, and the as phantom-limb phenomena, in which pain is phenomenal character is thereby eliminated too. experienced as located in a limb that has been This particular phenomenal character could not amputated. ) be present in experience in the absence of that More generally, the overall phenomenal char- intentional state itself. acter of one's experience includes a structurally Consider, for example, an occurrent thought rich what-it's-like of tactilely and kinesthetical- about something that is not perceptually pre- ly experiencing one's presented body, an appar- sented, e.g., a thought that rabbits have tails. ent body containing a whole array of tactile1y Quine notwithstanding, it seems plainly false- and kinesthetically distinguishable apparent and false for phenomenological reasons-that parts, many of which are experienced as parts there is indeterminacy as to whether one is hav- that one can voluntarily move. The total tac- ing a thought that rabbits have tails or whether tilelkinesthetic experience with this overall phe- one is instead having a thought that (say) collec- nomenal character is richly intentional, by virtue tions of undetached rabbit parts have tail- of the complexity of the body as presented. This subsets. It is false because there is something total experience is also richl y phenomenal, since that it is like to have the occurrent thought that it has the what-it's-like-ness of tactilely and rabbits have tails, and what it is like is different kinesthetically experiencing one's whole body. from what it would be like to have the occurrent (Any tactilely or kinesthetically distinguishable thought that collections of undetached rabbit alteration would be a phenomenal difference in parts have tail-subsets. 13 one's total tactilelkinesthetic experience.) The overall phenomenology of these kinds of The full-fledged phenomenal character of intentional states involves abstractable aspects sensory experience is an extraordinarily rich which themselves are distinctively phenomeno- synthetic unity that involves complex, richly logical. For example, if one contrasts wonder- intentional, total phenomenal characters ofvisu- ing whether rabbits have tails with thinking aI-mode phenomenology, tactile-mode phenom- that rabbits have tails, one realizes that there enology, kinesthetic body-control phenomenol- is something common phenomenologically- ogy, auditory and olfactory phenomenology, and something that remains the same in conscious- so forth-each of which can be abstracted (more ness when one passes from, say, believing that or less) from the total experience to be the focus rabbits have tails to wondering whether rabbits of attention. This overall phenomenal character have tails, or vice versa. It is the distinctive phe- is thoroughly and essentially intentional. It is the nomenal character of holding before one's mind what-it's-like of being an embodied agent in an the content rabbits have tails, apart from the ambient environment-in short, the what-it's- particular attitude type-be it, say, wondering, like of being in a world. hoping, or believing. This aspect of the overall phenomenology of intentionality is the phenomenology of intentional content. 14 2. The Phenomenology In addition, there is also a specific what-its- of Intentionality likeness that goes with the attitude type as such. There is a phenomenological difference between We have been describing the intentionality wondering whether rabbits have tails on one of sensory-perceptual phenomenal conscious- hand and thinking that rabbits have tails on the INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 523 other. This aspect is the phenomenology of atti- Galen Strawson (1994). Strawson discusses tude type. Attentive introspection reveals that what he calls "understanding experience." He both the phenomenology of intentional content contends that understanding and other related and the phenomenology of attitude type are phe- kinds of occurrent intentional mental states and nomenal aspects of experience, aspects that you processes are very commonly, if not always, cannot miss if you simply pay attention. laden with distinctive what-irs-likeness. He One might reply that although there is indeed points out, for example, the phenomenological a phenomenological difference between think- difference between hearing speech in a lan- ing that rabbits have tails and thinking that col- guage that one does not understand and hearing lections of undetached rabbit parts have tail- speech in a language that one does understand. subsets, this difference merely involves the fact Imagine two people side by side hearing the that we often think in language. Thus, the phe- same spoken sequence of sounds, with one of nomenological difference between the two them understanding the language and the other thinking experiences involves not the different one not. At a certain relatively raw sensory contents, but rather the fact that the auditory im- level, their auditory experience is phenomeno- agery that goes with thinking that rabbits have logically the same; the sounds are the same, and tails is different from the imagery that goes with in some cases may be experienced in much the thinking that collections of undetached rabbit same way qua sounds. Yet it is obvious intro- parts have tail-subsets. spectively that there is something phenomeno- However, nonperceptual intentionality in nor- logically very different about what it is like for mal humans does not always involve language each of them: one person is having understand- and/or auditory imagery. For instance, con- ing experience with the distinctive phenomenol- scious, unverbalized beliefs about the locations ogy of understanding the sentence to mean just of nearby unperceived objects are just as ubiqui- what it does, and the other is not. tous in human life as is the explicit or imagistic Consider, as a similar example for a single verbalization of one's focal train of thought. speaker, first hearing "Dogs dogs dog dog Think for example, of cooking, cleaning house, dogs," without realizing that it is an English or working in a garage or woodshop. In any sentence, and then hearing it as the sentence of such activity, you might spontaneously move to English that it is. The phenomenal difference retrieve a needed tool that is out of sight. There between the experiences is palpable. (If you do is something that it is like to think that a certain not grasp the sentencehood of the "dogs" sen- tool is just there-in that cabinet, say-but such tence, recall that 'dog' is a verb in English, and beliefs are typically not verbalized either vocal- compare, "Cats dogs chase catch mice.") ly or subvocally or by way of verbal imagery. Consider also hearing an ambiguous sen- (Your verbal energies might all the while be di- tence. One typically hears it as meaning some rected toward ongoing philosophical discussion one thing in particular, often without realizing with a companion, uninterrupted by your selec- that it is ambiguous. There is a phenomenologi- tion of an appropriate tool.) You also, of course, cal difference, for example, between hearing frequently have unverbalized thoughts about the "Visiting relatives can be boring," as a remark locations of objects in distant familiar locations. about the people who are visiting, vs. hearing it In any event, the what-it's-likeness of inten- as a remark about visiting certain people one- tionality that we are talking about-even when self. Again, imagine hearing or saying "Time it is specifically tied to certain words in English flies" as a cliche about the passage of time, vs. or some other natural language-does not at- saying or hearing it as a command at the insect tach to those words simply as sequences or pat- races. The actual sound or auditory imagery terns of sounds, or even as syntactic structures. may be the same, but the total experiences are It attaches to awareness of those words qua con- phenomenally quite different. The sound may tentful; it is the what-irs-like of hearing or say- have some role that would make it appropriate ing those words when they mean just that: that to call it a vehicle of intentionality, but its mean- rabbits have tails. So the basic point holds: even ing what it does, having the intentional content if thinking did always involve auditory imagery, that it does, is an entirely different aspect of the the auditory imagery would be intentionally overall phenomenal character of the experience. loaded in the experience, not intentionally In sum: Cognitive intentional states such as empty. consciously occurrent thoughts, and conative This point is illustrated and defended by intentional states such as consciously occurrent 524 CONTENT

wishes, are phenomenal qua intentional. The states and processes have intentional content overall phenomenal character of such a state that is inseparable from their phenomenal char- comprises both the phenomenology of its spe- acter. These states present an apparent world cific intentional content and the phenomenolo- full of apparent objects that apparently instanti- gy of its specific attitude-type. These are ab- ate a wide range of properties and relations, and stractable phenomenal aspects of the state's they present oneself as an apparently embodied unified phenomenal character: the what-it's-like agent within that apparent world. Since this of undergoing this specific propositional atti- kind of intentionality is inseparable from phe- tude vis-a-vis that specific intentional content. nomenal character, your phenomenal duplicate will have an apparent world presented to it in exactly the same way. 3. Phenomenal Intentionality To make the general point with a representative example, suppose that you have the experi- The intuitive considerations in the last two sec- ence of seeing a picture hanging crooked. Each tions can be developed into an argument for the of your phenomenal duplicates has a phenome- thesis of phenomenal intentionality: there is a nally identical experience. Some of these expe- pervasive kind of intentionality that is constitu- riences will be accurate and some will be inac- tively determined by phenomenology alone. curate. Whether or not a given duplicate's One way to articulate and sharpen this claim is picture-hanging-crooked experience is accu- the following. Let two creatures be phenomenal rate-that is, whether or not things are as the ex- duplicates just in case each creature's total experience presents things as being-will depend perience, throughout its existence, is phenome- upon the duplicate's actual environment. Thus, nally exactly similar to the other's. We can then the sensory-phenomenal experience, by itself, state the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis this determines conditions of accuracy: i.e., a class way: of ways the environment must be in order for There is a kind of intentional content, perva- the experience to be accurate. 16 In order for sive in human mental life, such that any two such an experience to be accurate, there must be possible phenomenal duplicates have exactly a picture before oneself, and it must be crooked. similar intentional states vis-a-vis such That these phenomenally identical experiences all have the same truth conditions is re- content. flected in the fact that each of the experiences is We will call this type of content phenomenal in- subject in the same way to investigation as to tentional content. The full range of a creature's whether it is accurate. 17 For example, you and phenomenal intentional content is determined your phenomenal duplicate each might have the and constituted wholly by phenomenology. experience of seeming to oneself to be testing Consider any creature who is a complete phe- one's perceptual experience for accuracy by nomenal duplicate of yourself-its mental life is making measurements or using a level. You and phenomenally exactly like yours. Assume noth- your phenomenal duplicate each might have the ing else about this creature. The thought experi- subsequent experience of seeming to oneself to ment thus builds in an epistemic "veil of igno- discover that the picture merely appears to be rance" about this creature, in order to filter out crooked because of irregularities of the wall, or any factors other than phenomenology itself. So tricks of light. Or, you and your phenomenal du- for all you know about this arbitrary phenome- plicate might, in the course of seeming to one- nal duplicate of yourself, its sensory-perceptual self to be attempting to perform these tests, have experiences-including its tactile-kinesthetic the experience of seeming to discover that there experiences and its embodied-agency experi- actually is no picture-say, by seeming to one- ences-might be very largely illusory and hallu- self to discover that one has been looking at a cinatory concerning the real nature of itself and clever holographic image cooked up to make it its surroundings. (It may be helpful to imagine appear that there is a picture hanging on the the phenomenal duplicate as a brain in a vat or a wall. 18 disembodied Cartesian mind.) We will argue There is also, of course, a sense in which that you and your phenomenal duplicate share a these crooked-picture perceptions of you and pervasive kind of intentional content-phenom- your duplicate have different truth conditions. enal intentional content. IS You and your duplicate are looking at different As argued in section 1, sensory-phenomenal pictures. So the accuracy of your own percep- INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 525

tion depends on the specific picture you your- something that it's like to have the thought that self are seeing, whereas the accuracy of your there's beer in the fridge, something that it's like duplicate's perception depends on the specific, to hope that one's spouse isn't angry that one is and different, picture that it is seeing. There are coming home late from the Philosophy Depart- thus two ways of thinking of truth conditions: as ment party. These occurrent states in the phe- detennined wholly by phenomenology, and as nomenal duplicate have all the same "proposi- detennined in part by items in the experiencer's tional attitude-ish" phenomenology as they do environment that satisfy the experiencer's phe- in you. They are experienced as having exactly nomenology. We return to this distinction in the same causal role vis-a-vis the phenomenal section 5.2. duplicate's apparent embodied behavior in its Your phenomenal duplicate accepts the pre- apparent world as you experience them as hav- sentations delivered by perceptual experience- ing. It seems intuitively clear that states with all accepts, for example, that there is a picture and these features qualify as full-fledged proposi- a wall-just as you do. These "belief-wise" ac- tional attitudes in your phenomenal duplicate, ceptance states have exactly the same phenome- just as they do in you. nology, the what-it-is-like of occurrently believ- In addition, for each such propositional- ing that thus-and-so (where one's occurrent attitude state in yourself and in your phenome- sensory experience presents things as being nal duplicate, the two states have the same thus-and-so). The states also are phenomeno- phenomenal intentional content, i.e., the same logically integrated with those ongoing, richly phenomenologically detennined truth condi- intentional, sensory-perceptual experiences in tions. Consider, for example, two phenomeno- exactly the same way as yours. Thus, they are logically identical belief-states that you and experienced as having the same belief-specific your phenomenal duplicate would both express role: the same apparent input conditions, in- by the string of words "The picture behind me is volving apparent deliverances of the apparent crooked." In order for such a belief to be true, body's apparent senses, and the same apparent there must indeed be an object in a certain rela- effects, involving experiences of apparently tion to oneself-behind, no intervening walls, acting appropriately with regard to the apparent etc.-that satisfies the phenomenologically de- world as presented. It seems intuitively clear tennined criteria for being a picture, and that that a belief-wise acceptance state with these picture must be hanging crooked. Considered in phenomenological features is a genuine belief. this way, your belief and that of your phenome- The phenomenal character of these states, nological duplicate have exactly the same truth which includes the phenomenology of role, conditions.2o These occurrent states in the phe- constitutively determines that they are genuine nomenal duplicate, by virtue of having the same beliefs. 19 And as we argued above, the sensory- phenomenologically determined truth condi- presentational content of these states is the same tions as yours, are thereby subject to the same for you and your phenomenal duplicate. methods of accuracy assessment: for instance, So far we have been discussing perceptual ex- you and your phenomenological duplicate perience and perceptual belief. But since the might each experience turning around to see if phenomenal consciousness of your phenomenal the picture is still crooked. If it still appears duplicate would provide very rich perceptual crooked, you might then experience going presentations of a world of numerous apparent through the tests mentioned above. The possi- objects instantiating numerous apparent proper- bility of such tests is in some sense understood, ties and relations, such presented items would if not explicitly phenomenologically given, in thereby figure in a wide range of propositional- having the conscious belief that there is a pic- attitude states whose content goes well beyond ture hanging crooked behind oneself. the presentations of perceptual experience it- Since your phenomenal duplicate shares with self. Here the phenomenology of intentionali- you all the phenomenal intentionality so far ty-the what-it's-like of occurrent proposition- described, it thereby possesses significant con- al attitudes as such-enters in full force, quite ceptual resources to speculate and theorize-for apart from the presentational content of one's instance, about what is very distant spatio- current sensory-perceptual experience. For your temporally, about what is very small, about the phenomenal duplicate, no less than for you underlying causes of experience and of the ap- yourself, there would be something that it's like parent ambient environment. It can reason to wonder whether to cook meatloaf for dinner, causally, fonn abstract theoretical concepts, for- 526 CONTENT mulate scientific hypotheses and theories, and dergoing this phenomenology would thereby experience itself as an apparent embodied agent instantiate the belief-state, even if its overall actively engaged (in apparent cooperation with phenomenology is otherwise quite different other apparent embodied agents) in the apparent from your own. empirical corroboration or disconfirmation of Although each occurrent intentional state such hypotheses and theories. It can have experi- with phenomenal intentional content is consti- ences as of apparently reading about such mat- tutively determined by its own phenomenal ters or apparently hearing lectures about them, character, at least in the context of a full-fledged and thereby can acquire a body of well warrant- cognitive system, it is important to appreciate ed scientific beliefs about itself and its world. In that this does not mean that phenomenal inten- these respects too, your phenomenal duplicate is tionality somehow guarantees infallible knowl- like yourself, even though the experiential basis edge about what one's first-order intentional upon which it bootstraps its way up to well states are. Beliefs about one's own intentional warranted, semantically evaluable, scientific be- states are second-order intentional states, and liefs might be highly (or even completely) non- the Phenomenal Intentionality thesis is compat- veridical. Thus, for each of your propositional- ible with the possibility that such beliefs are attitude states about such theoretical entities, sometimes mistaken. Indeed, the thesis is com- your phenomenal duplicate has a propositional- patible with the possibility that some creatures attitude state of the same kind. And for each pair who have phenomenal intentionality-say, cer- of corresponding states in you and your dupli- tain kinds of nonlinguistic animals-entirely cate respectively, the two states have the same lack any capacity to undergo second-order in- phenomenal intentional content-i.e., the same tentional states at all. What-it's-likeness is one phenomenally determined truth conditions, thing; discursive judgments about it are another. linked via the same phenomenally determined Such judgments are fallible (as are judgments "web of belief" to the same kinds of experiential about most anything), even though humans do methods of accuracy-assessment. 21 possess especially reliable capacities to form Virtually everything we have been saying is accurate introspective discursive/classificatory really just attentive phenomenological descrip- judgments about their own phenomenology.22 tion, just saying what the what-it's-like of experience is like. It is just a matter of introspective- ly attending to the phenomenal character of 4. The Narrowness of one's own experience. You and your phenome- Phenomenology and of nal duplicate share a pervasive kind of mental Phenomenal Intentionality intentionality-viz., phenomenal intentionality. We take it that this thought-experimental ar- Phenomenology does not depend constitutively gument supports the idea that each specific oc- on factors outside the brain. Now, it is obvious current intentional state with phenomenal inten- enough that in normal humans, phenomenology tional content is constitutively determined by its does depend causally on some such factors; but own distinctive phenomenal character-viz., one need only consider how this causal depen- the what-it's-like of undergoing that particular dence works in order to appreciate the lack of attitude-type vis-a-vis that particular phenome- constitutive dependence. First, phenomenology nal intentional content. That is, specific phe- depends causally on factors in the ambient envi- nomenal character determines specific inten- ronment that figure as distal causes of one's on- tional states, provided that the experiencing going sensory experience. But second, these creature has a sufficiently rich network of actu- distal environmental causes generate experien- al and possible phenomenal/intentional states. tial effects only by generating more immediate Suppose, for example, that you are now under- links in the causal chains between themselves going a psychological state with the distinctive and experience, viz., physical stimulations in phenomenal what-it's-like of believing that a the body's sensory receptors-in eyes, ears, picture is hanging crooked on a wall directly be- tongue, surface of the body, and so forth. And hind you. Then you thereby believe that there is third, these states and processes causally gener- a picture hanging crooked on a wall directly be- ate experiential effects only by generating still hind you; undergoing this phenomenology con- more immediate links in the causal chains be- stitutively determines that you are instantiating tween themselves and experience-viz., affer- that belief-state. Any experiencing creature un- ent neural impulses, resulting from transduction INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 527 at the sites of the sensory receptors on the body. tent of the so-called "hard problem" of phenom- Your mental intercourse with the world is medi- enal consciousness. ated by sensory and motor transducers at the pe- riphery of your central nervous system. Your 5.1. Strong Externalist Theories of Mental conscious experience would be phenomenally Intentionality Are Wrong just the same even if the transducer-external causes and effects of your brain's afferent and We certainly do not deny that there is such a efferent neural activity were radically different thing as "wide content" in language and in from what they actually are-for instance, even thought. Important lessons have been learned if you were a Brain in a Vat with no body at all, from Kripke, Putnam, Burge, and others about and hence no bodily sense organs whose physi- the relevance of the external environment in cal stimulations get transduced into afferent contributing both to the meaning of certain neural inputs. 23 Among your logically possible terms in natural language (e.g., natural-kind phenomenal duplicates, then, are beings whose terms like 'water') and to certain aspects of the sensory experience is radically illusory, in the content of thought (e.g., aspects of thought that manner of the famous Evil Deceiver scenario in one would express verbally by employing the Descartes' First Meditation-or its contempo- term 'water'). But Putnam's famous slogan that rary version, the Brain in a Vat. "meaning ain't in the head" is properly con- Thus, phenomenology is narrow, in the sense strued as asserting that not all meaning is in the that it does not depend constitutively on what's head; it doesn't begin to follow from this, or outside the skin, or indeed on what's outside of from the considerations adduced in support of the brain. We can now make the central argu- it, that no meaning is in the head. We will return ment: to the topic of wide content presently. However, a number of current theories of (1) There is pervasive intentional con- mental intentionality are strongly externalist: tent that constitutively depends on they assert that all intentionality is grounded in phenomenology alone. causal connections between states of the cogni- (2) Phenomenology constitutively de- tive system and states of the external world; pends only on narrow factors. there can be no intentionality without some suit- So, (3) There is pervasive intentional con- able kind of actual connection between what is tent that constitutively depends only going on in the head and the wider environment. on narrow factors. Strong externalist theories of intentionality include (i) causal theories of content that find the That is, the theses of phenomenal intentionality necessary connection in the causal antecedents and the narrowness of phenomenology jointly of the state, (ii) covariational theories that find entail that there is kind of narrow intentional the connection in certain kinds of systematic content (the kind we have dubbed phenomenal correlations between occurrences of an internal intentional content), pervasive in human life, state and occurrences of an external state of af- such that any two creatures who are phenome- fairs, (iii) teleosemantic theories that look to en- nal duplicates must also have exactly similar in- vironmentally situated proper functions that tentional states vis-a-vis this kind of narrow certain internal states possess in virtue of evolu- content. Phenomenal intentional content is per- tionary design, and (iv) learning-based theories vasive and narrow. Any adequate philosophical that invoke internal adaptational changes in the and scientific conception of mind should ac- creature's own history.25 commodate this conclusion.24 Given our conclusions in sections 1-4, it fol- lows that strong externalist theories of intentionality are wrong. They are not just slightly 5. Some Philosophical wrong, not just wrong in detail. Rather, they are Morals fundamentally mistaken, because they claim to naturalize the entire phenomenon of mental in- We now draw some morals from the preceding tentionality and yet there is a rich and pervasive discussion, first about strong externalist theories kind of narrow intentionality-phenomenal in- of intentionality, second about how phenomenal tentionality-that is constitutively independent intentional content is related to mental refer- of external factors. Strong externalist theories ence and to wide content, and third about the ex- therefore cannot successfully naturalize the full 528 CONTENT phenomenon of mental intentionality, because that Santa Claus does not exist. Similarly, sup- they utterly fail to aim at one crucial aspect of it. pose you hope or fear that an object of a certain Ideas employed by strong externalists might description will be found. There is a clear phe- still have a useful role to play, however, in con- nomenal difference between the case in which tributing to philosophical understanding of phe- you know full well that there is such an object nomena like wide content and mental reference, and the case in which you do not know whether topics to which we now tum. or not there is such an object. Phenomenal intentional content presents to consciousness an apparent world that goes far 5.2. Phenomenal Intentionality, Mental beyond what one is conscious of at anyone time; Reference, and Wide Content presuming so is itself an aspect of the overall Suppose Alfred and Bertrand are looking at two phenomenal character of experience. Phenome- different barns, and each of them says, "That's nal intentionality thereby determines a complex an old bam." Do their statements have the same set of presuppositions concerning the existence truth conditions? Yes and no. In one way, they of, the persistence of, and various features of, have different truth conditions. Alfred's state- the sorts of entities presented in experience: pre- ment is made true or false by the age of the barn suppositions about individuals (including flora, that he is looking at, while Bertrand's statement fauna, and other creatures like yourself), kinds, is made true or false by the age of the distinct properties, relations, processes, and events of bam that he is looking at. Following recent that world. For reasons that will become clear, usage, we will call such truth conditions, which we call these presuppositions grounding presup- depend on the actual entities referred to in a positions. They have the phenomenology of ac- statement or thought, wide truth conditions. But ceptance discussed in the previous paragraph. In in another way, Alfred's and Bertrand's state- making a grounding presupposition, one takes it ments have the same truth conditions. In each that there really exists an entity of a certain sort; case the truth condition is that there must be an and normally, one also presupposes that the (pu- actual barn that he is looking at (and not, for ex- tative) entity in question has certain specific at- ample a papier-mache mock up of a barn, or tributes. If there is an actual entity satisfying that only the facing side of a stage "barn" on a movie presupposition (or satisfying it near enough), set), and that bam must be old. Such truth con- then one's thoughts that are intentionally direct- ditions are narrow truth conditions. They are ed toward such a putative entity will refer to the determined skin-in, so to speak, and are com- actual entity in question; and so the properties of pletely determined by phenomenology. In our the satisfier will determine whether the beliefs view, the situation is similar with respect to phe- about it are true or false, whether hopes and de- nomenologically identical intentional states sires about it are satisfied, and so forth. Thus, shared by phenomenal duplicates. wide truth conditions for those beliefs are deter- In section 3 we discussed belief-wise accep- mined by phenomenal intentionality plus the ac- tance of the deliverances of perceptual experi- tual satisfiers of the relevant presuppositions. ence. Such acceptance is the normal, default at- However, what it takes to be a satisfier of the pre- titude. But it can be cancelled. If you have a suppositions is determined by phenomenal in- lump on a finger, then objects that are smooth tentionality alone. So, when these presupposi- and flat will feel as though they have a lump tions are included in truth conditions, we get where that finger touches them. But you soon narrow truth conditions that are thereby deter- learn not to believe that the object is lumpy. mined solely by phenomenal intentionality.26 There is similar phenomenology of acceptance Consider, for example, thoughts about indi- concerning propositional attitudes. There is a viduals. 27 You, your Twin Earth doppelganger, relevant phenomenal difference, for instance, and your Cartesian duplicate all have certain between these two states: (i) believing that Bill phenomenologically identical thoughts that you Clinton was U.S. President, and (ii) the state each take to be about a person named "Bill Clin- you are in when you say (without believing) that ton."28 Hence these thoughts presuppose the ex- Santa Claus brings presents. The salient differ- istence of such a person. Your own thoughts are ence turns on the fact that the phenomenal char- about the actual Bill Clinton. Your Twin Earth acter of the first state includes the what-it's-like doppelganger's thoughts are about a different of accepting the existence of Bill Clinton, person on Twin Earth. You and your Twin Earth whereas the phenomenal character of the sec- doppelganger have thoughts about different in- ond state includes the what-it's-like of believing dividuals, of course, because what a person's INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 529 thoughts are about-or refer to--depends not tent determines wide content, an adequate ac- only on phenomenal intentional content, but also count of wide content requires a prior account on certain relations between the thinker and the of narrow content. thing the thought is about. Your Cartesian dupli- Because of relevant similarities between sin- cate also has thoughts that purport to be about a gular reference and natural-kind categories, sim- person named "Bill Clinton," but since the ilar observations can be made concerning the Cartesian duplicate has not been in the right sort narrow and wide truth conditions of thoughts of relations to any such person, the Cartesian du- about natural kinds. 31 You, your Twin Earth dop- plicate's thoughts are not about anyone-they pelganger, and your Cartesian duplicate all have lack reference. 29 Referring to something, men- phenomenally identical thoughts with the same tally or linguistically, requires appropriate rela- narrow truth conditions. For all three of you, tions to that thing; but having thoughts that are these thoughts are intentionally directed toward intentionally directed toward such a thing- certain small, common furry critters that meow, thoughts purporting to refer to such a thing- rub legs, drink milk, etc. For all three of you, does not. these thoughts have the grounding presupposi- Straightforwardly, your thoughts about Bill tion that there is a natural kind of which these Clinton are made true or false by facts about critters are members. But because of differences Bill Clinton, and your Twin Earth doppelgan- concerning the satisfiers (if any) of the common ger's phenomenologically identical thoughts grounding presuppositions, these phenomenally are made true or false by facts about the person identical thoughts have different wide truth con- who satisfies your duplicate's corresponding ditions. Your own thoughts are made true or false presupposition. There is no person who satis- by cats; your Twin Earth doppelganger's phe- fies your Cartesian duplicate's correspond- nomenologically identical thoughts are made ing presupposition, so there is nothing that true or false by cat-like critters of the kind that can be a truth maker for its thought that she or he and others in her or his community have would be expressed by, say, "Bill Clinton is a encountered. Suppose that Putnam's story in womanizer."3o which cats are spy robots controlled from Mars The differing truth conditions just mentioned is true concerning Twin Earth: the critters called are wide truth conditions. But again, there are "cats" on Twin Earth are robots controlled from two ways of thinking about the truth conditions Twin Mars. Then your belief that cats are of the phenomenologically identical thoughts of animals is true; your Twin Earth doppelgan- you and your duplicates. In one way, the truth ger's corresponding belief is false. That is, there conditions depend upon what is actually re- are wide truth conditions for these thoughts ferred to (if anything) in those thoughts; this that are partially determined by features in makes them "wide." But in another and more the environment that may be unknown to the fundamental way, the truth conditions are nar- thinker. But again: these wide truth conditions, row, because what can be referred to in those differing as they do for your thoughts and your thoughts is determined by phenomenal inten- Twin Earth doppelganger's phenomenally iden- tionality-in particular, by the phenomenally tical thoughts, are grounded on shared narrow given grounding presuppositions. The thought truth conditions. will have wide content only if something in the Your Cartesian duplicate has thoughts that are thinker's environment satisfies the phenomenal phenomenally identical to your cat-thoughts, intentional grounding presuppositions of that and that have the same narrow truth conditions as thought. That is, wide content is grounded by yours do. Your Cartesian duplicate's thoughts, phenomenologically determined presupposi- like yours, are intentionally directed toward- tions, which are an aspect of phenomenal inten- and thus presuppose-small furry critters of a tionality and hence are narrow. certain kind. But there are no such critters that As a consequence, the strong externalist the- the Cartesian duplicate has encountered, direct- ories of intentionality discussed in the previous ly or indirectly, so there is no kind to which the subsection are not wrong just because they Cartesian duplicate'S thoughts refer. This being leave out a kind of intentionality-viz, phenom- so, those thoughts do not have wide truth condi- enal intentionality. They are wrong because tions. So the Cartesian duplicate's thoughts that what they leave out is the fundamental kind of are phenomenologically identical to your own intentionality: the narrow, phenomenal kind that cat-thoughts lack the kind of wide content that is a prerequisite for wide content and wide truth your own thoughts possess and your Twin Earth conditions. Because narrow phenomenal con- doppelganger's thoughts also possess. 530 CONTENT

5.3. The Whole Hard Problem ing and very puzzling conundrum. But its scope We are among those who believe that what is considerably broader than it has often been David Chalmers (1995, 1996) has called "the thought to be. If separatism were correct-i.e., hard problem" of phenomenal consciousness is if phenomenology were indeed non-intentional, indeed a very hard problem. This is the problem and intentionality were indeed non-phenome- of explaining why it should be that such and such nal-then the hard problem would be limited to mental state should be like this-that is, why it the what-it-is-like of non-intentional sensory should have the specific what-it's-like aspect it experience, and would not infect the intentional does, rather than having some other phenomenal aspects of mentality. Indeed, discussions of the 33 character or having none at all. Presumably what hard problem often presuppose separatism. it is like for you to undergo a particular mental But the whole hard problem incorporates phe- state depends nomologically on what is going nomenal intentionality. Phenomenal conscious- on in your brain, inside of the transducers. But ness is intentional through and through. why what depends on this brain process should This adds a dimension to the hard problem be like this, rather than being some other way that often goes unrecognized. Conscious inten- or being no way at all, seems inexplicable. tional states are intrinsically, by their very nature, directed toward whatever they are directed Standard materialistic treatments of phenome- 34 nal consciousness in philosophy and in cognitive toward. Thus, the hard problem includes this: science do not close this "explanatory gap" (as it why should a mental state that is grounded in is dubbed by Joseph Levine 1983); rather, they this physical or physicaUfunctional state be by appear to just leave out the intrinsic what-it's- its intrinsic phenomenal nature directed in this like aspect of mentality.32 precise manner? And this is a very hard problem 35 In our view, the hard problem is a very press- indeed.

I. This paper is thoroughly co-authored; order of au- not of the seeing-although. of course, there is thorship is alphabetical. something that it is like to see, as opposed, e.g., to 2. For example, J aegwon Kim (forthcoming) argues, in hear or imagine. a way that firmly presupposes the separatist frame- 7. See Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind on work, that we can get more than half way to natural- the Principles of Common Sense, Chapter 5. izing the mental, but not all the way. The leading 8. For a recent exception, see Lamb (2001). idea is that the intentional aspects of mentality can 9. See Van Gelder (1999) and Varela (1999) for at- be naturalized via "functionalization," but that the tempts to account for the temporal thickness of ex- phenomenal aspects resist naturalization. perience in cognitive science terms. 3. For instance, Dretske (1995), Tye (1995, 1999), 10. We think that the right view of these matters is at Lycan (1996), and Carruthers (2000). least very close to that expressed by Laird Addis 4. Another serious difference is worth mentioning. (1989): "The idea of the mental is exhausted in all Representationalists typically regard the problem of interesting aspects by (I) states of consciousness naturalizing intentionality as tractable, and they seek [primary mental entities]; (2) sensations, emotions. to bring phenomenal character within the purview of and perception-related entities [secondary mental this putatively tractable naturalization project by entities]; and (3) dispositional mental states [tertiary construing it as a species of intentionality. We, on the mental entities-i.e., beliefs, etc., that are not other hand, regard the problem of naturalizing phe- presently occurrent] .... [O]nly states of conscious- nomenal character as presently intractable, and we ness are literally intentional entities. On the other maintain that because of the interpenetration of phe- hand, what makes the secondary and tertiary mental nomenology and intentionality, the scope of this in- entities mental is their relation ... to states of con- tractability includes mental intentionality. Our rea- sciousness. Secondary mental entities cannot exist sons for holding this view will emerge as this paper except as objects of states of consciousness ...." (p. progresses. 7). Thus, sensations and sensory qualities exist as, 5. For several recent treatments of the relation between and only as, objects of conscious intentional states. phenomenology and intentionality that are similar in This is essentially Brentano's view in the famous- spirit to what we say here, see the discussions of but widely unread---chapter of Psychology from an McGinn (1991), Flanagan (1992), Strawson (1994), Empirical Standpoint in which he introduces the Siewert (1998), and Loar (forthcoming). word 'intentional' and distinguishes between mental 6. This formulation is more accurate that the usual, phenomena and physical phenomena. Brentano's "there is something that it is like to see red" because, mental phenomena are Addis' primary mental enti- we take it, the something-that-it-is-like that is re- ties. Brentano's physical phenomena are Addis' sec- ferred to is the something-that-it-is-like of the seen ondary mental entities, not physical things. INTENTIONALITY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTENTIONALITY 531

11. We do not know exactly when the phrase "the inten- a matter of course-just as they are in you. Exam- tionality of consciousness" first appeared, but one ples include default assumptions about experiential- does well to remember that this was the phrase that ly presented objects: that these objects have back characterized issues concerning intentionality early sides that are not directly presented; that they persist in the twentieth century. when they are temporarily obscured from view by 12. We are talking about psychological changes dis- interposed objects or when one has the experience of cernible to the experiencer-not changes such as the looking away from them; that they normally persist experiencer's being unknowingly transported to when they cease to be presented in experience; and Twin Earth and gradually coming to have 'water'- so on. thoughts about XYZ that are internally indistin- 20. Of course one can also think of the truth conditions guishable from earlier 'water' -thoughts that were of these states as involving the actual, and different,

about H20. pictures referred to phenomenologically by you and 13. See Ross (1992) for a nice discussion, congenial to your duplicate, if there are such pictures. There are what we are saying here, that focuses not on two kinds of truth conditions for propositional atti- Quineian indeterminacy but on the "Kripkenstein" tudes, just as there are for perceptual states. Truth thesis (set forth in Kripke 1982) that there is no fact conditions of one kind are determined phenomeno- of the matter whether the symbol '+' means plus or logically, as we have been discussing in the text. And quus. truth conditions of the other kind incorporate the re- 14. Part of what makes this aspect of phenomenology spective objects or kinds (if any) in your own and essentially a what-it's-like of holding before one's your phenomenal duplicate's respective ambient en- mind a specific intentional content is that semantic vironments that are the respective satisfiers of the re- evaluability is involved: specific truth conditions are ferring concepts in the respective, phenomenologi- attached to it. We expand on this important point in cally identical, thoughts. We explore the relationship section 3. between these two kinds of truth conditions in sec- 15. For an excellent discussion that is complementary to tion 5.2. what we will say here and that has considerably 21. The remarks in the preceding footnote apply to these more detail about phenomenal intentionality, see propositional-attitude states too, and to the various Siewert (1998), Chapters 7 and 8. For another ad- components of the relevant web of belief. mirable and pertinent discussion, also complementa- 22. The fact that there is something epistemically spe- ry to ours, see Silverberg (1995); although phenom- cial about first-person introspective access to the enological considerations are less prominent in phenomenal character of experience is, of course, Silverberg's discussion, note his emphasis on how the basis for the kind of reflective inquiry often things seem, for each member of a group of beings called "phenomenology." But being epistemically who in etfect are phenomenal duplicates respective- special does not make such introspective judgments ly inhabiting a variety of different Twin Earthly en- infallible. For insightful discussion of this complex vironments. issue, see Chapters 1 and 2 of Siewert (1998). 16. Siewert (1998) emphasizes the idea that a creature's 23. Moreover, phenomenology does not depend consti- intentional features are ones for which the creature is tutively on anything beyond phenomenology itself. asses sible for accuracy, and he argues in detail that (Of course, phenomenal character presumably does both perceptual and cognitive experiences are as- depend nomically on certain states whose nature is sessable for accuracy by virtue of their phenomenol- describable in non-phenomenological language-in ogy. humans, certain brain states.) In this sense, phenom- 17. We are not here presupposing verificationism, or enal character is intrinsic. We submit that the intrin- "procedural semantics," or anything of the sort. The sicness of phenomenology (as thus understood) is point is that differences in sensory-phenomenal con- self-evident to reflective introspection. What-it's- tent normally are reflected by differences in confir- like is what phenomenal consciousness is. And mation/disconfirmation procedures. Thus, sameness what-it's-like is what-it's-like no matter what is of confirmationldisconfirmation procedures pro- going on outside of phenomenology itself. vides strong evidence for sameness of content (even 24. At the scientific level, this means that cognitive sci- though it certainly does not constitute sameness of ence should construe the mind as a "control system" content). for effectively operating a potential body in a poten- 18. Of course, even if all these first-person tests for ac- tial world, regardless of whether or not the control curacy are successfully passed, this does not guaran- system is actually embodied or en-worlded in the tee that the sensory-phenomenal experience one is kind of body and world for which its functional ar- testing really is accurate; experiential warrant does chitecture is appropriate. This is a common view not guarantee truth. Also, the reason we talk of seem- among cognitive scientists themselves. Such a scien- ing to oneself to be performing tests and observing tific enterprise is important and tractable, even outcomes is that a given phenomenal duplicate of though it presupposes intentionality rather than ex- yourself might be one whose experiences-includ- plaining it, and even though it does not address the ing its accuracy-assessment experiences-are sys- so-called "hard problem" of phenomenal conscious- tematically non-veridical. This would be so, for in- ness (cf. section 5.3). stance, for a phenomenal duplicate who is a brain in 25. See Stich and Warfield (1994) for a representative a vat. sample of such theories. McGinn (1989) distinguish- 19. There are various further default assumptions in- es two kinds of externalism that he calls "strong" volving the intentional objects of perceptual experi- and "weak"; he argues against the former, while em- ence that would be psychologically operative in your bracing a teleosemantic approach to the latter." Al- phenomenal duplicate-normally automatically, as though the approach to mental intentionality advo- 532 CONTENT

cated in Fodor (1987) did acknowledge narrow con- paragraph to which this note is appended, and as we tent, and hence was not a form of strong externalism, will continue to do below. Both uses can be appro- it also reflected Fodor's separatism about the phe- priate in context, but it is important not to conflate nomenal and intentional aspects of mentality. Be- them. cause of this, by our lights his construal of narrow 30. There is a longstanding dispute over whether in such content was insufficiently robust, and was a step a case we should say that the thought is false or that down the garden path toward strong externalism. He it merely lacks a truth value, but this dispute does not has since gone further down that path; see Fodor affect the issues we are concerned with in this paper. (1990,1994,1998). 31. For a discussion of both similarities and differences 26. Our distinction between narrow and wide truth con- between singular reference and natural-kind cate- ditions has some kinship to the approach of so-called gories, see Tienson (1986). two-dimensional modal semantics, which also posits 32. We ourselves have pressed this concern recently; see two kinds of truth conditions-one kind narrow and Graham and Horgan (2000), and Horgan and Tien- the other kind wide. See Davies and Humberstone son (in press). (1980); Chalmers (1996), section 2.4, especially pp. 33. Chalmers himself, however, has not presupposed 63-65; Jackson (1998), chapters 2 and 3, especially separatism and has left open the question of which pp. 75-77; and Chalmers (this volume, chapter 56). aspects of mentality are by their nature phenome- 27. Here and below we talk about thoughts for ease of ex- nal-and in particular, whether this is true for inten- position, but our remarks will apply to occurrent tional states like occurrent beliefs and desires. See, propositional attitudes in general. If one person for instance, section 3.3 of Chalmers (1996), espe- doubts what another believes, then their proposition- cially pp. 19-22. al attitudes have the same truth conditions-the truth 34. In "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" Husser! criti- conditions for what is believed by one and doubted by cizes naturalists for holding that intentional states the other. Similarly for other propositional attitudes. have natures. Conscious intentional states have 28. Your Cartesian duplicate is an exact phenomenal du- essences, he says; they are essentially directed to- plicate of you that is in the First Meditation situa- ward what they are directed toward. This is, in effect, tion, thoroughly deluded. You do not really have an the point we are making. When we say that inten- exact phenomenal duplicate on Twin Earth, howev- tional states are directed by their very nature toward er, because on Earth people sometimes have the oc- what they are directed toward, we do not mean that

current thought that water is H20, whereas on Twin intentional states have natures in the way in which Earth they have instead the thought that water is chemical and physical, and perhaps biological, kinds XYZ. But we will use the useful term "Twin Earth have natures. Thus, we concur with Husser!'s point, doppelganger" for a person who is as much like you although we do not adopt his terminology. as is consistent with this difference. 35. We thank William Lycan, Michael Lynch, Brian 29. It is very common in philosophy of mind to gloss the McLaughlin, Steve Tammelleo, Mark Timmons, and "intentional directedness" constitutive of intention- audiences at the University of Arizona and the 2000 ality by saying that intentional states have about- Society for Philosophy and Psychology for com- ness. (We did so ourselves in the opening paragraph ments and discussion. Special thanks to David of this paper.) But the word 'about' also is often used Chalmers and George Graham for their extensive to express the relation of reference-as we do in the and especially valuable help.

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