DOCSLIB.ORG

An Introduction to Auctions

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
An Introduction to Auctions Journal of Industrial Organization Education Volume 1, Issue 1 2006 Article 5 An Introduction to Auctions Sofia B. Villas-Boas, University of California, Berkeley Recommended Citation: Villas-Boas, Sofia B. (2006) "An Introduction to Auctions," Journal of Industrial Organization Education: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 5. DOI: 10.2202/1935-5041.1004 An Introduction to Auctions Sofia B. Villas-Boas Abstract These lecture notes provide an introduction to auctions. They can be covered in two or three lectures. This material is appropriate for the last part of a first-year graduate industrial organization course or as an introduction to an auctions course. KEYWORDS: auctions Author Notes: These sets of lectures are based on lecture notes for the course ARE 202, which is a first year graduate course in the PhD program in the Agricultural and Resource Economics Department at U.C. Berkeley. These notes have greatly benefited from material covered in several industrial organization courses offered at the Economics graduate program at Berkeley and from comments from Jeffrey Perloff, James Dearden, and Jen Brown. Villas-Boas: An Introduction to Auctions 1. INTRODUCTION An auction is a public sale of property or merchandise defined by explicit rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from participants. Four main types of auctions are considered theoretically and in practice. In the “First-price sealed-bid auction” (FPSB) a bidder does not observe the opponents’ bids, and the object is won by the bidder submitting the highest bid. The winner pays her bid value and receives the object, and the losers pay nothing and receive nothing. The second type is the “Second-price sealed-bid auction” (SPSB), also called the Vickrey auction. The SPSB auction is like the FPSB auction, with one exception: the winner pays the second highest bid in the auction. The third auction type is the “English” or “Ascending-price drop-out auction”. It works much like the game of chicken; bidders are active in the auction until they decide to drop out. In this auction, the price increases incrementally from 0, and bidders withdraw from the auction when price exceeds their willingness to pay. The auction ends when only one active bidder remains. This winner pays a price equal to the current price when second-to-last person exits. Finally, the fourth type is the “Dutch” or “Descending price auction”, which is similar to the game of chicken in reverse. The price starts high and decreases until the first bidder agrees to pay the current price. In each of these auctions, the winner’s surplus is her value minus the price she pays. Each loser’s surplus is zero. Most auction studies focus on the FPSB and English auctions, although recent studies have examined online auctions such as eBay. Typically, eBay auctions are modeled as SPSB auctions. Other recent work has studied multi-unit auctions and sequential auctions (see, for example, Cramton, Shoham and Steinberg (2005)). The text is structured as follows: First, we analyze participation strategies and auction house revenue under several auction formats. Second, we discuss the main issues in auction design. We then discuss the main positive and normative goals of empirical work in auctions, and also study reduced form and structural approaches that have been developed and applied to empirical work. The last part of these notes presents a formal outline of the main issues in structural estimation of auctions in applied work. Here, we provide a primer on structural auction estimation—for two surveys, see Laffont et al. (1991) and Hendricks and Paarsch (1995). We also introduce the issue of the strategic behavior of buyers and collusion in bidding. We conclude with a paper identifying collusion in procurement auctions by Porter and Zona (1993). Some of the many topics we are not covering formally here are multi-unit issues (see Hansen (1985) for an empirical paper on the topic), the introduction of 1 Journal of Industrial Organization Education, Vol. 1 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 5 entry, risk aversion1, budget constraints (see Klemperer’s (1998) Wallet Game), asymmetries (Hendricks and Porter (1988), Wilson (1994) and Porter (1995)), affiliation and common values (Milgrom and Weber (1982), and Laffont (1996)), and auction design. A (far from complete) list of cited and suggested references is provided in the end of the text. 2. PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES AND REVENUE EQUIVALENCE The Vickrey (Second-Price) Auction is a very popular format, perhaps due to the simple bidding strategy. Bidding one’s true valuation is a (weakly) dominant strategy—the amount a bidder pays is independent of her bid and values are also independent among bidders. The winner’s surplus is equal to her valuation minus the second-highest bid submitted, and decreases as the number of bidders increases. In the first-price auction formats, potential bidders face trade-offs—if a bidder bids her valuation then she has no surplus, and lowering the bid from her valuation increases the surplus but reduces the chances of winning. The optimal bidding strategy is more complicated than in the second-price auction and will consist of bid shading. The degree of bid shading depends upon several factors including the number of bidders and information availability. To motivate auction design, one may ask: Given the optimal bidding strategies of the potential bidders, which type of auction will the seller prefer? For a risk-neutral seller, the answer depends on the expected revenue of each type of auction. Under some assumptions (i.e., if item goes to the person with highest valuation and bidders with lowest possible valuation expect zero surplus), the seller may be indifferent between the four types of auctions because they yield the same expected revenue. What about competition? Does a seller prefer more bidders? More bidders lead to higher prices and less surplus for winners. Figure 1 plots data generated through simulations to illustrate this relationship. The y-axis presents expected price, with bidders’ valuations drawn uniformly from [20, 40] and the x-axis indicates numbers of bidders (Source: author’s calculations). 1 In Vickrey and English auctions with risk aversion, it is still a dominant strategy to bid one’s valuation. However, in Dutch and FPSB auctions, bidders may be more aggressive to increase the probability of winning, as in Holt (1979). DOI: 10.2202/1935-5041.1004 2 Villas-Boas: An Introduction to Auctions Expected Price 40 35 30 25 20 Number 1 10 100 1000 of Bidders We will define another dimension upon which auction theory has developed, namely, the dimension of uncertainty. We will define private and common value auctions. Informally, if you see the signals of the other bidders (or their bids) and it causes you to revise your own valuation of the object, then it is a common value auction. Otherwise, it is a private value auction. In a private value auction, the object is for personal use. Moreover, the object will not be resold and no bidder is speculating about future value. If there are inherent differences among bidders, then any single bidder can have a valuation that differs from the others’ valuations, and each bidder’s value will be private. In contrast, in common value auctions, the item has a single, true value which is unknown at time of bidding. An example of common value auctions are offshore oil leases; the value of oil is the same for every participant, no bidder knows her value with certainty, and each bidder has some information about the value due to exploratory drilling. Let r be the reserve price, n is the number of potential bidders, and m be the actual number of bidders. Consider an example in which bidder i’s utility = σ function is Ui U ( i ,v) , where v is the value of the good that bidder i may or σ may not observe, and i is the private signal of bidder i. Let F be the cumulative σ σ σ ≠ distribution function of ( 1,..., N ,v) . Finally, let Yi be the max{ j : j i} and W be the winning bid. We make the following assumptions: (i) Each bidder wants only one object; (ii) U is non-negative, continuous and increasing; (iii) the signals σ ∈ are one-dimensional, i R ; (iv) F is exchangeable across bidders, because no 3 Journal of Industrial Organization Education, Vol. 1 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 5 σ σ bidder has better information; (v) ( 1,..., N ,v) are positively correlated, and (vi) F, n, U are common knowledge. Independent Private Values (IPV) =σ Ui i for each i=1, …, N and σi are all independently and identically distributed (iid), so that: N F(σ ,...,σ ) = ∏Fσ (σ ). 1 N i i=1 Bidder i’s signal is her payoff. She receives no signal about the other bidders’ values. Pure Common Value (CV) σ σ = σ Ui= v, and the cdf is now F( 1,..., N ,v) . We can v ∑ j and there is j uncertainty about v. Signals of other bidders cause you to revise your valuation, σ i . Bidding Equilibria in a Nutshell: Private Values In a Dutch auction (FPSB), your bid should be lower than your signal—that is, you should shade your bid—and your bid should be increasing in N. Let your σ = σ [ σ] signal be i . Suppose the valuations have support 0, and are uniformly distributed. If we ignore risk aversion, then (N −1) E[next highest bid]= σ N and the equilibrium bid is equal to (N −1) w = σ < σ . N In an English auction with second-price open bidding, each bidder should be willing to pay as much as her valuation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Sotheby's/Christine's Antitrust Scandal and Proposed Changes to Illinois Art Auction Law
    DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law Volume 12 Issue 2 Fall 2002 Article 2 Fix and Tell: The Sotheby's/Christine's Antitrust Scandal and Proposed Changes to Illinois Art Auction Law Donald R. Simon Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip Recommended Citation Donald R. Simon, Fix and Tell: The Sotheby's/Christine's Antitrust Scandal and Proposed Changes to Illinois Art Auction Law, 12 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 269 (2002) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol12/iss2/2 This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Simon: Fix and Tell: The Sotheby's/Christine's Antitrust Scandal and Pro LEAD ARTICLE FIX AND TELL: THE SOTHEBY'S/CHRISTINE'S ANTITRUST SCANDAL AND PROPOSED CHANGES TO ILLINOIS ART AUCTION LAW Donald R. Simon* I. INTRODUCTION For nearly 200 years, auction houses like Sotheby's and Christie's have been the public's gauge for measuring the value of artwork.' These houses act as agents and guides, offering advice to sellers and collectors while making money by taking commissions.- 2 Auctions are the most popular methods of buying and selling art.' Today, some form of auction comprise nearly fifty percent of transactions involving art.4 Internationally, the auction industry takes in nearly $4 billion dollars annually.' Of that amount, Sotheby's and Christie's, the largest and most influential auction houses,6 control more than ninety percent of the world's auction business.' Although there are many other auction * Director, Business and Legal Affairs, Questar, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
    [Show full text]
  • Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement: Report on Implementing the OECD Recommendation 2016
    Fighting bid rigging in public procurement Report on implementing the OECD Recommendation 2016 Fighting bid rigging in public procurement Report on implementing the OECD Recommendation 2016 This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the OECD or of the governments of its member countries or those of the European Union. This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city, or area. Please cite this publication as: OECD (2016), Fighting bid rigging in public procurement: Report on implementing the OECD Recommendation © OECD 2016 1 Foreword The 2012 Recommendation of the Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement recommends to governments to strive for public procurement procedures that are designed to promote competition and reduce the risk of bid rigging. Bid rigging, i.e. agreements between bidders to eliminate competition in the procurement process, thereby raising prices, lowering quality and/or restricting supply, is a major risk to the effectiveness and integrity of public procurement and deprives the public sector of genuine opportunities to achieve value for money. For this reason, the fight against bid rigging has become one of the enforcement priorities of competition authorities around the world. The OECD, through its Competition Committee, developed the Recommendation to consolidate OECD good practices and recommend specific steps to render public procurement processes competitive and free from collusion.
    [Show full text]
  • Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions
    University of Kentucky Gatton College of Business and Economics Institute for the Study of Free Enterprise Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions • Collusion in auctions can take different forms, one of which is refraining from bidding • . Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes • We analyze both the bid participation decision and the pricing decision • We include variables that affect firm’s’ costs as well as variables that capture competitive and strategic effects • Most importantly, we determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and use that information to determine the potential bidders for each paving project • We find that, in geographic markets with only a few feasible suppliers, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid Understanding firms’ attempts to collude drives much of economists’ study of oligopoly. Detection and deterrence of collusion are perhaps the primary challenges of antitrust policy.4 In auction markets, collusion has attracted less attention than a general focus on design mechanisms and other factors affecting the competitiveness of such markets.5 Much of the attention paid to collusion in auction markets has been motivated by price fixing and bid-rigging conspiracies in public procurement auctions Bid-rigging schemes can take a variety of forms. Sometimes all participants in an auction are part of an overt conspiracy, and then the challenge becomes determining which conspirator will win the auction and how other conspirators will be compensated. Things change somewhat if non-conspirators participate in the auction. Accommodating behavior by co-conspirators often takes the form of submitting complementary bids above (in a procurement auction) the predetermined winner’s bid.
    [Show full text]
  • Competition Law in India
    MUMBAI SILICON VALLEY BANGALORE SINGAPORE MUMBAI BKC NEW DELHI MUNICH NEW YORK Research MUMBAI SILICON VALLEY BANGALORE 93 B, Mittal Court, Nariman Point 220 S California Ave., Suite 201 Prestige Loka, G01, 7/1 Brunton Rd Competition Law Mumbai 400 021, India Palo Alto, California 94306, USA Bangalore 560 025, India Tel +91 22 6669 5000 Tel +1 650 325 7100 Tel +91 80 6693 5000 Fax +91 22 6669 5001 Fax +1 650 325 7300 Fax +91 80 6693 5001 in India SINGAPORE MUMBAI BKC NEW DELHI Level 30, Six Battery Road 3, North Avenue, Maker Maxity C–5, Defence Colony Singapore 049 909 Bandra–Kurla Complex New Delhi 110 024, India Mumbai 400 051, India Tel +65 6550 9856 Tel +91 11 4906 5000 December 2020 Tel +91 22 6159 5000 Fax +91 11 4906 5001 Fax +91 22 6159 5001 MUNICH NEW YORK Maximilianstraße 13 375 Park Ave Suite 2607 80539 Munich, Germany New York, NY 10152 Tel +49 89 203 006 268 Tel +1 212 763 0080 Fax +49 89 203 006 450 Competition Law in India © Nishith Desai Associates 2020 [email protected] © Nishith Desai Associates 2020 www.nishithdesai.com Competition Law in India December 2020 [email protected] DMS Code: WORKSITE!570106.1 © Nishith Desai Associates 2020 Competition Law in India About NDA We are an India Centric Global law firm (www.nishithdesai.com) with four offices in India and the only law firm with license to practice Indian law from our Munich, Singapore, Palo Alto and New York offices. We are a firm of specialists and the go-to firm for companies that want to conduct business in India, navigate its complex business regulations and grow.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Cartel Enforcement Report
    Global cartel enforcement report February 2020 allenovery.com 2 Global cartel enforcement report | February 2020 Foreword Antitrust authorities around the world continued to focus on tackling national and international cartels in 2019, with many jurisdictions showing an appreciable upturn in the level of fines compared to those imposed in 2018. The European Commission (EC) once again topped the global leader board, with fines totalling USD1.6 billion (up by 74% from 2018). The U.S., Japan, Germany, Italy and France also saw significant increases in the level of fines imposed in 2018, while a number of authorities with a reputation for aggressive enforcement, including South Korea and Brazil, saw a marked drop in their fine totals. But behind the numbers sit several major questions, the answers to which may impact international cartel enforcement in the future: • Will the ever-increasing spread of private damages actions, including a wave of claimant actions in Europe following on from the EC’s Trucks and Forex decisions, ultimately make leniency an unattractive proposition? To date, leniency remains the key enforcement tool in many jurisdictions. 100% of decisions in the EU, UK and Japan included an immunity/leniency applicant, as did the majority of decisions in Brazil, Spain and Hungary. But notably, immunity/leniency applicants featured in only 13% of decisions in China and 8% of decisions in the U.S. • Does the broad use of settlement agreements, and the lower fines they deliver, reduce the need for an ex ante leniency strategy? In the EU, Germany, the UK and the U.S., all decisions in 2019 involved settlement, with the EC’s approach on the Forex cartel signalling a willingness to continue to pursue ‘hybrid’ settlement decisions in the wake of the ICAP and Pometon judgments.
    [Show full text]
  • Bid Rigging an Analysis of Corruption in Auctions
    BID RIGGING AN ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN AUCTIONS YVAN LENGWILER ELMAR WOLFSTETTER CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1488 CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION JUNE 2005 An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1488 BID RIGGING AN ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN AUCTIONS Abstract In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation, and why both the auctioneer and bidders may have a vested interest in maintaining corruption. Bid rigging is initiated by the auctioneer after bids have been submitted in order to minimize illegal contact and to realize the maximum gain from corruption. JEL Code: D44. Keywords: auctions, procurement, corruption, right of first refusal, numerical methods. Yvan Lengwiler Elmar Wolfstetter University of Basel Humboldt University Berlin Department of Economics (WWZ) Institute of Economic Theory I Petersgraben 51 Spandauer Str. 1 4003 Basel 10099 Berlin Switzerland Germany [email protected] [email protected] This article succeeds our earlier working paper entitled “Auctions and Corruption,” which circulated in various versions since the year 2000. We wish to thank Dirk Engelmann and Nicolas Sahuguet for their comments, and seminar participants at the Universities of Zürich, Bern, Bergen, Melbourne, Queensland, the Stockholm School of Economics, the University of Korea, the SAET meeting 2001, and the FEEM meeting on “Auctions and Market Design” 2002 for interesting discussions.
    [Show full text]
  • Bid Rigging : an Analysis of Corruption in Auctions
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar Working Paper Bid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions CESifo Working Paper, No. 1488 Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar (2005) : Bid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions, CESifo Working Paper, No. 1488, Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18952 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu BID RIGGING AN ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN AUCTIONS YVAN LENGWILER ELMAR WOLFSTETTER CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1488 CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION JUNE 2005 An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded • from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com • from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No.
    [Show full text]
  • Competition in Bidding Markets 2006
    Competition in Bidding Markets 2006 The OECD Competition Committee debated competition in bidding markets in October 2006. This document includes an executive summary and the documents from the meeting: an analytical note by Ms. Sally Van Siclen for the OECD and written submissions: Czech Republic, the European Commission, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as papers from BIAC and Professor Paul Klemperer. An aide-memoire of the discussion is also included. Competition authorities become interested in auctions by a number of routes. In competition advocacy, they may advise other parts of government on how to design auctions in order to improve their efficiency—the degree of competition. They may evaluate mergers and agreements between firms that operate in auction markets. And they may be concerned with collusion and abuse of a dominant position in auctions. Because their formal rules reduce “noise” and make communication among rivals easier, auctions can promote collusion, compared with ordinary “posted-price” markets. But an auction can be designed to reduce collusion or concerted practices or to promote participation. Thus, the design of an auction can be the object of lobbying pressure. Auctioneers can also behave strategically, choosing auction formats or practices that favour competition. Two fundamental prescriptions for effective auction design follow from the theoretical literature: Induce bidders
    [Show full text]
  • Competition News Bulletin
    Competition News Bulletin Delhi • Mumbai • Bengaluru January, 2018 Celebrating over 45 years of professional excellence Inside... I. CARTELS AND ANTI COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS II. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION / MARKET POWER III. COMBINATIONS IV. MISCELLANEOUS For Private Circulation - Educational & Information purpose only Vaish Associates Advocates …Distinct. By Experience. Competition News Bulletin I. CARTELS AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS INDIA Competition Commission of India finds Grasim Industries and others indulging in anti-competitive practices The Competition Commission of India ("CCI") vide its order dated 05.10.2017 has found Aditya Birla Chemicals (India) Limited (ABCIL), Grasim Industries Limited (GIL) and Gujarat Alkalis and Chemicals Limited (GACL) (collectively called as "opposite parties') guilty of bid rigging/ collusive bidding in terms of provisions contained in Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act, 2002 ("The Act") and has imposed penalty totaling INR 6.27 Crores. The brief facts are as under. For production of potable water three chemicals, namely, Poly Aluminum Chloride (PAC), Alum (coagulant) and Liquid Chlorine (LC) (disinfectant) are widely used, but PAC is mostly used as it is easy to handle. Delhi Jal Board (the Informant) has been procuring PAC and LC from the Opposite Parties for purification of water through tendering process. The Informant alleged that in case of negotiations over the bid price of PAC/LC, the Opposite Parties used to negotiate/ decrease the prices, to an equal extent. The Informant has further alleged that in negotiation over the bid price all the Opposite Parties used to decide as to how much amount is to be decreased or negotiated from bid/ quoted price.
    [Show full text]
  • BID RIGGING – a Long Time and Persistent Threat to Municipalities
    BID RIGGING – A Long Time and Persistent Threat to Municipalities By: James A. Donahue, III1 Executive Deputy Attorney General Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General Tracy W. Wertz Chief Deputy Attorney General Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General 1 James A. Donahue, III is the Executive Deputy Attorney General for the Public Protection Division and Tracy W. Wertz is the Chief Deputy Attorney General for the Antitrust Section of the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General. The views expressed in this article are their own and not those of the Office of Attorney General. On December 28, 1894, the Addyston Pipe & Steel Company, of Cincinnati, Ohio; Dennis Long & Company, of Louisville, Kentucky; the Howard-Harrison Iron Company, of Bessemer, Alabama; the Anniston Pipe & Foundry Company, of Anniston, Alabama; The South Pittsburg Pipe Works, of South Pittsburg, Tennessee; and The Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, of Chattanooga, Tennessee met to allocate pipe production among themselves covering all pipe sales in 36 of the 44 United States at the time. The agreement awarded specific tonnage of pipe to be produced by each of the companies. The companies’ production and sales were audited to insure that no one cheated on the agreement. The agreement further provided that: ‘Third. The Addyston Pipe & Steel Company shall handle the business of the gas and water companies of Cincinnati, Ohio, Covington and Newport, Ky., and pay the bonus hereafter mentioned, and the balance of the parties to this agreement shall bid on such work such reasonable prices as they shall dictate. ‘Fourth. Dennis Long & Company, of Louisville, Ky., shall handle Louisville, Ky., Jeffersonville, Ind., and New Albany, Ind., furnishing all the pipe for gas and water works in above-named cities.
    [Show full text]
  • Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation: Relevant Environmental Auctions
    PILOT AUCTION FACILITY FOR METHANE AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION: RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL AUCTIONS Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Christina Aperjis and Daniel N. Hauser 14 July 2014 Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate Change Mitigation Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 2. Carbon Auctions ...................................................................................................................... 2 2.1 UK Emission Trading Scheme Auction ............................................................................ 2 2.2 Carbon Markets .............................................................................................................. 2 2.3 Auction Format ............................................................................................................... 4 2.4 Experimental Work ......................................................................................................... 4 2.5 Auction Results ............................................................................................................... 5 2.6 Carbon Trading ................................................................................................................ 7 2.7 Lessons Learned .............................................................................................................. 7 3. Other Auctions ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Simple Statistical Screens to Detect Bid Rigging
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by RERO DOC Digital Library WORKING PAPERS SES Simple Statistical Screens to Detect Bid Rigging David Imhof N. 484 VII.2017 Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät Simple Statistical Screens to Detect Bid Rigging David Imhof July 9, 2017 Abstract The paper applies simple statistical screens to a bid-rigging cartel in Switzerland, and shows how well the screens detect it by capturing the impact of collusion on the discrete distribution of the bids. In case of bid rigging, the support for the distribution of the bids decreases involving a lower variance, illustrated by the coefficient of variance and the kurtosis statistic. Furthermore, when firms rig bids without side-payment, the di↵erence between the first and the second lowest bids increases whereas the di↵erence between the losing bids decreases, involving a negatively skewed distribution of the bids, highlighted by the relative distance and the skewness statistic. Finally, the collusive interaction screen shows that the behaviour of firms changed radically between the cartel and post-cartel periods. Therefore, the simple statistical screens proposed in this paper purpose to screen large dataset and to detect bid- rigging cartels by using only information on bids. JEL-Classification C00, C40, D22, D40, K40, L40, L41 Keywords Bid rigging detection, screening methods, variance screen, cover bidding screen, structural and be- havioural screens. Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Christian At, Marc Blatter, Karine Brisset, Stefan Buhler,¨ Alain Egli, Yavuz Karagok,¨ Thierry Madies,` Armin Schmutzler and Markus Wyssling for support and helpful comments.
    [Show full text]