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The Mythical Shia Crescent

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The Mythical Shia Crescent The Mythical Shia Crescent PAT PROCTOR © 2008 Pat Proctor ometime in late 2006, America awoke to the realization that, by deposing SSaddam Hussein and toppling his Ba’athist regime, it had inadvertently re- moved a major obstacle to Iranian dominance in the Middle East. Assessments of the associated events reached hyperbolic levels. Dire warnings of a growing Iranian hegemony began to surface. Sunni leaders such as Jordan’s King Abdullah II began to warn the West ofan emerging “Shia Crescent,”led by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.1 The idea caught fire in American media and became the dominant narrative in discourse on Middle East policy. But how realistic is this amalgamation? Is a Shia Crescent really emerging that is capable of challenging more than a millennium of Sunni domination in the Islamic world? Will Iran lead it? On the surface, the idea appears plausible. Yet, a more in-depth examination of the prospective mem- bers of this geopolitical realignment raises numerous questions. This intel- lectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism. Conceptual Objections The most frequent objection to the idea of an emerging Shia Crescent with Iran as its dominant power is the fact that Iran is Persian, while the other states in the proposed crescent are predominantly Arab. Critics of the Shia Crescent model rightly point to the continuing animosity between the Arabs and Persians that harkens back to a time before Islam, when the former were Bedouinnomads and the latter were rulers of an earlyempire.2 It isunfortunate thatthisargument hasdominated thedebate regardingtheriseoftheShiaCres- cent because it is the most easily dispatched; today’s Iran is actively cooperat- ing withvariousArabgovernmentsand organizationsthroughouttheregion. 30 Parameters To counter this argument, Shia Crescent-adherentspoint to Iran’s al- liance with Shia Arab Hezbollah—a hybrid insurgency, social service organi- zation, and political party, primarily funded and trained by Iran. Hezbollah seems wellon its wayto establishinga Shia theocracy in Lebanon.The Israe- lis were unable to dislodge it in a three-week conflict in 2006 and the Leba- nese government, infiltrated by Hezbollah, seems unwilling to confront the organization with military force. Shia Crescent-advocates say that sectarian- ism appears to have trumped ethnicity in this emerging partnership. Iran hasalso established relations with groups of Shia Arabs in Iraq, supporting militiassuch asJayshal-Mahdiandpolarizingfiguresthat include the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly known as SCIRI), the most powerful Shia political party in Iraq, was formed in the 1980s in Iran, where its leadership had taken refuge during the reign of Saddam Hussein.3 Those who warnof an emerging Shia Crescent point to these relationships as additional evidence that religious affiliation overcomes ethnic identity in modern Middle Eastern politics. Another relationship that refutes the Persian/Arab argument is that between Syria and Iran. The Syrian-Iranian alliance began when the former supported the latter in its decade-long war with Iraq. Since then, the alliance has proved surprisingly resilient.4 Shia Crescent-advocates contend the shared religious identity of the governments in Iran and Syria has made this relation- ship extremely durable. Supporters of an emerging Shia Crescent cite these instances as proof that religion is overcoming ethnicity in the realignment of the Middle East. One can legitimately concede that Persian Iran is working with Arab governments and organizations to further its strategic aims. When one exam- ines each member state in the supposed crescent, however, the model begins to break down. In Lebanon, for example, the power of Hezbollah is by no means absolute, and Shia do not dominate the government. In Iraq, cultural enmityandthescarsofeightyearsofwarwithIranmakeanIran-Iraqalliance unlikely.AndinSyria,thegovernmentisnotnearlyasShiaasitmightappear. Lebanon Hezbollah emerged in 1982, during the Lebanese civil war, in re- sponse to the Israeli invasion. It emerged from the coalition of a number of Major Pat Proctor participated as a joint operational planner in the 2007 campaign redesign for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a master’s in Military Arts from the US Army Command and General Staff College and is a student at the School for Advanced Military Studies. Spring 2008 31 smaller organizations, most significantly Islamic Jihad. Its “coming out party” was the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, killing more than 200 Marines.5 Hezbollah has beenclose toIraneversince its inception;this was es- peciallytrue during theperiod when ittrained in theBekaa Valley with theIra- nian Revolutionary Guards.6 There islittle doubtthatIranian-backed Hezbollahisa powerfulforce in Lebanon. It ably demonstrated its military capability in the three-week con- flict with Israel in 2006. Hezbollah isalso a politicalparty, controlling 14 seats in the Lebanese Parliament (11 percent of thetotal 128 seats) and 21percent of the municipalities across Lebanon.7 During reconstruction following the 2006 conflict, Hezbollah frequently co-opted aid from the West and distributed it through a network of hospitals, schools, and social organizations. The organi- zation is firmly woven into the fabric of Lebanese society.8 Hezbollahisnot,however,the mostpowerfulmilitaryforce inLeba- non.TheLebanesearmyconsistsof20mechanized,airborne,andcommando brigades and regiments, equipped with Russian, French, and British equip- ment. All told, it can field some 70,000 soldiers. The Lebanese military also hasanavy with27boats, mainly of BritishandFrench origin,and an airforce that has five British fighters and about 40 helicopters of French, British, and American manufacture.9 This military is capable of independent operations within Lebanon.For example, in 2007, the Lebanesemilitary dealta series of crushingblowstoal Qaeda-linkedFatah al-Islamnear thePalestinian refugee camp, Nahr el-Bared.10 Bycomparison, Hezbollah’s full-timestrength is only 1,000 guerilla fighters equipped with long-range rockets and antitank, antiship, and antiair- craft missiles.Inemergencies,between 5,000and 10,000reserve fighters can be mobilized.11 Hezbollah has nonavyor air force.While Hezbollahwas able to launch katyusha rockets into Israel until the last day of the 2006war, there isreasontobelieve thatitlost muchofitsmilitarycapability.Israeliandinde- pendent observers claim that as many as 500 to 600 Hezbollah fighters may have been killed.12 Attesting even more to the weakness of the organization, aspartofthepeaceaccords,HezbollahpermittedtheLebanesemilitarytoen- ter the south of Lebanon, a move it had consistentlyopposed sincethe end of the Lebanese civil war.13 Nor is Hezbollah the most powerful political force in Lebanon. Fol- lowing the June 2005 elections, the anti-Syrian coalition Tayyar al-Mustaqbal (Future Tide) gained control of the government with 72 parliamentary seats.14 This coalition was instrumental in the so-called Cedar Revolution of March 2005, which eventually forced the Syrian military to withdraw from Lebanon, ending 30 years of occupation. The protest the group organized was able to bring as many as a million people from across Lebanese society into the 32 Parameters streets.15 Hezbollah’s counterprotests only mustered approximately 200,000 individuals.16 Probably the most compelling argument against Lebanese member- ship in the Shia Crescent is demographic. Only between 30 and 40percent of theLebanesepopulation isShia.Lebanon is 39 percentChristian;the remain- ing population consists of Sunnis, Alawi, Druze, and other minority sects. Ninety-five percent of the population is Arab, with many identifying them- selves not as Arab but Phoenician.17 More importantly, the Shia population does not act as a single, monolithic block in Lebanese politics. While the Iranian-backed Hezbollahis a powerful force in Lebanese society,it isnot the dominant force. With the departure of Syria in2005 com- bined with the manpower and materiel losses sustained during the conflict with Israel in 2006, thegroup’s powerhas noticeablyreceded. It isextremely doubtful that Iran will be able to exert anything approaching hegemonic con- trol over Lebanon anytime in the near future. Iraq SCIRI and its armed wing, the Badr Corps, did hide in Iran during the reign of Saddam Hussein.18 It is also true that Muqtada al-Sadr and ele- ments of his militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi, are backed by Iran.19 The fact that all of these players in Iraqi politics try to downplay this connection, however, speaks volumes about the average Iraqi’s perception of Iran. Iran and Iraq fought a brutal war from 1980 to 1988. The war esca- lated dramatically because it was a proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union and due to the fact it was fought with tactics reminiscent of World War I. Ahalf million or more Iranians and at least 200,000 Iraqis died. At least 1.5 million Iraqis were injured.20 These years of hardship, death, and anti-Iranianpropaganda didmuchtoshapethe attitude ofIraqis,regardlessof sect, toward their neighbors. One need only tour the historic sites of Iraq to be reminded of the residual enmity Iraqis harbor for Iranians. The Swords of Qadisiyyah monu- ment in the center of Baghdad, until recently featured 50-foot replicas of Saddam’s
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