China's Maritime Grand Strategy

Brigham Young University BYU ScholarsArchive

Undergraduate Honors Theses

2019-12

Sarah Quan

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CHINA’S MARITIME GRAND STRATEGY

By Sarah Quan

Submitted to Brigham Young University in partial fulfillment of graduation requirements for University Honors

Kennedy Center for International Studies Brigham Young University December 2019

Advisor: Eric Hyer

Thesis Readers: Jon Felt and Robert Griffiths

ABSTRACT

CHINA’S MARITIME GRAND STRATEGY

Sarah Quan

Kennedy Center for International Studies

Bachelor of Arts

INTRODUCTION

China’s goals in the South China Sea are twofold: to expand sovereignty while keeping the peace. I argue this is accomplished through rhetorical strategic ambiguity and military clarity, which have characterized China’s maritime grand strategy since 2010.

Using confusion and clarity—two seemingly opposite strategies—allows China to simultaneously expand sovereignty and maintain peace. This paper first introduces the literature and theory behind grand strategy and strategic ambiguity. It then demonstrates how China’s intentions are made clear through military actions, then shows that China’s rhetoric is ambiguous to members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by weighing evidence that China is unintentional in its ambiguity against evidence showing this is a deliberate strategy.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Marcos, Emily and my parents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title…………………………...……………………………………………………………i Abstract……………………………………..………………………………………..……ii Acknowledgments…………………………...…………………………………………...iii Table of Contents……………………………………..………………………………..…iv

I. Introduction…………………….………………………………….……………………1

II. China’s Grand Strategy…………………….……………………………….………….3

III. Military Actions………….…………….………………………………….…………..5

VI. Strategic Ambiguity…………………….……………………………………………12

V. Rhetorical Ambiguity…………………….………………………………….………..15

VI. Intentional or Incidental?……………..……….……………..………………….…...19

Vii. A Deliberate Tactic….…………………………………..….….……………………26

VIII. Conclusions…………………….…….……………………………….……………30

Works Cited………………………………………………………………………...……32

INTRODUCTION

What is China’s “grand strategy”? The search for this “grand strategy” incites heated debate among Chinese and Western academics and policymakers alike. Within the study of international relations, this search for an overarching strategy is nuanced and inconclusive partly because of the multifaceted nature of Chinese foreign policy. Each aspect of Chinese foreign policy has a specific doctrine. Foreign policy components are intertwined with domestic policy and range from evolving nuclear principles to Xi

Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (Rolland 2017). Among these tenants of foreign policy, the maritime domain is most relevant to the current security environment. Within the

People’s Liberation Army (PLA), many recognize that the “main threat of war has already shifted…to the ocean direction” because of territorial disputes in the South China

Sea (McCaslin and Erickson 2019). In the West, media is rife with fears of an increasingly belligerent and overconfident China.1 Clarifying China’s tactics and intentions in the South China Sea is crucial to maintaining regional stability and friendly

US-China relations.

Using confusion and clarity—two seemingly opposite strategies—allows China to simultaneously expand sovereignty and maintain peace. This paper first introduces the

1For examples, see Michael Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China” or the 2019 U.S. Department of Defense China Military Report. In 2013, Alastair Johnston argued the academic trend of pointing out China’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric underestimates the amount of aggressive rhetoric present before the 2010 era. He argues that there has not been an increase in aggressive rhetoric. However, this analysis predates Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power, China’s dismissal of the 2016 UNCLOS arbitration in favor of the Philippines, and increasingly aggressive acts in the South China Sea.

1 literature and theory behind grand strategy and strategic ambiguity. It then demonstrates how China’s intentions are made clear through military actions, then shows that China’s rhetoric is ambiguous to members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) by weighing evidence that China is unintentional in its ambiguity against evidence showing this is a deliberate strategy.

Many sources agree there is ambiguity in China’s approach to ASEAN countries in the South China Sea, yet there is surprising silence in academic research on whether

China’s ambiguity is intentional. A Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conference report on South China Sea issues describes “palpable tension as…Chinese experts attempted to defend Beijing’s positions…note the plural ‘positions’ because there was scant agreement as to what precisely the Chinese position is” (Poling 2012).

Strategists at reputable think tanks and universities discuss the impacts of China’s strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea on ASEAN countries without first clearly establishing whether it exists (for examples, see The Diplomat, “How China Maintains

Strategic Ambiguity in the South China Sea,” Nanyang University Richard A. Bitzinger’s speech on “The Challenge of Strategic Ambiguity in Asia”). This paper contributes to the current body of literature by systemically addressing the persistent assumption that

China’s ambiguity is strategic.

This paper is limited in scope in several ways. First, I do not argue strategic ambiguity is China’s overarching policy or that it defines China’s North Korea policy, nuclear policy, and military ambitions. There is already established literature exploring this possibility (Yu 2018; Shen CSIS; Mathiel and Schell 2013). Second, I focus solely on strategic ambiguity and exclude important models for understanding regional

2 attitudes, such as a reciprocity model of ASEAN’s reactions to China’s strategic ambiguity, as this paper intends to isolate strategic ambiguity to strengthen further research utilizing these other models.

I assume throughout this paper that China’s objective in the South China Sea is to avoid military conflict while expanding influence. China is not looking for a military provocation as the costs outweigh the benefits (Fravel 2010; Fravel, Roy, Swaine, et al.,

2019; Godwin and Miller 2013, 17). China’s security strategy goes beyond diplomacy— political, economic, and defense components factor into Beijing’s calculations (Howard

2001). Indeed, China is fully integrated into global and regional institutions of trade, commerce, and security, and depends on a globalized economy and active membership in

Asia’s multilateral security organizations. Furthermore, many argue China’s military lags behind world class militaries and has not yet completed its military modernization process and thus provoking conflict would be premature (China’s National Defense 2019,

6). Indeed, one ASEAN member seems to dismiss the idea of a violent China. In response to a provocation in 2013, Malaysia’s Defense Minister stated, “just because you have enemies, doesn’t mean your enemies are my enemies …the Chinese can patrol every day, but if their intention is not to go to war it is of less concern” (Lai 2017).2

WHAT IS CHINA’S GRAND STRATEGY?

What is a grand strategy? The definition of a grand strategy has expanded and diminished over time. A lack of consensus on the definition of a grand strategy complicates finding China’s grand strategy. Scholars and statesmen alike agree articulating China’s grand strategy is necessary but disagree whether China has an overall

2 Some would argue a lack of Malaysian response to this provocation was more inability more than unwillingness (Lai 2017).

3 grand strategy and how this would apply to the maritime domain (Stenstile 2014). For instance, Eric Hyer argues pragmaticism is a key characteristic of its grand strategy while others characterize the same observation and evidence as a lack of a grand strategy (Hyer

2015; Stenslie 2014).

Opinions can roughly be divided into several schools. Some argue a grand strategy does not exist. Wang Jisi of Peking University influentially argued in 2011 that

China’s grand strategy is a “field still to be plowed.” Others see Xi Jinping thought as revealing broad strategic direction but not as a grand strategy because China might have

“too many strategies to be strategic” (for examples of those in this school see: Stanzel,

Rolland, Jacob and Hart 2017; Yi, Levine and Liu 2011; Wang Jisi 2011; Stenslie 2014;

Jackobson 2014).

Others argue China has a bolder grand strategy than any other country because of the consistency of China’s defense and foreign policy (Erickson 2019, 73; Friedberg

2012). A school of Chinese scholars emphasizes China’s return to power as opposed to its rise to power as its “grand strategy” (Yan Xuetong’s book Ancient Chinese Thought reviews this school). Other Western theorists view China’s “prudence and patience” as the defining characteristic of China’s grand strategy and use Xi Jinping’s departure from

Deng Xiaoping’s admonition to “hide your strength and bid your time” to show China is preparing to reap the benefits of its patience (examples include Jacques 2009; Brzezinski

2012). When Hu Jintao was in office, some argued that China’s strategy was one of

“reassurance.” This strategy aimed to cement China’s place in the international economic order and prevent other countries from hedging against China (Golstein 2005;

Fravel 2010, 510). Still others argue China’s national security priorities are something

4 akin to a Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs, with larger goals such as protecting party leadership, dwarfing smaller objectives, such as addressing far seas interests (Erickson

2019, 73). The prolific literature and lack of consensus among Western and Chinese scholars alike illustrates the centrality of finding China’s grand strategy to understanding

“how Beijing will flex its muscles” in the 21st century (Shambaugh and Xiao 2012, 36).

I use the realist definition posed by Posen and Walt in the 1980s. These realists narrowly define a grand strategy as a “set of hypotheses or predictions that can explain how a country can ‘cause’ security for itself. If a country does A, B or C, then X, Y and Z will follow.” I use this definition as it creates a succinct and simple hypothesis. This definition leads to the following hypothetical statement: If China adopts strategic ambiguity towards in the South China Sea, then China will be able to maintain its maritime territory and expand in the South China Sea while maintaining peace.

Furthermore, much contemporary literature on China’s boundary strategies is rooted in realist strategy.3 Using a definition consistent with the dominant theory helps frame this discussion in the context of much other Western literature.

MILITARY ACTIONS

This section argues China is transparent about its intentions through its actions. It is particularly clear about how it expects ASEAN countries to act but muddies its own ground rules and intentions.

Beijing continuously emphasizes the importance of sovereignty in the South

China Sea in its national agenda. During the 19th Communist Party of China’s (CPC)

Party Congress, Xi Jinping highlighted the construction on South China Sea islands and

3 See the introduction of Eric Hyer’s book The Pragmatic Dragon: China’s Grand Strategy for a comprehensive review of the realist approaches to China’s boundary disputes.

5 reefs and urged greater efforts to “protect China’s sovereignty” (Full Text 2017).

Policymakers in Beijing have clearly signaled to the international community that asserting sovereignty in the South China Sea is a high priority. This is evident in the July

2019 China’s National Defense in the New Era document intended to help the

“international community understand China’s national defense,” which places safeguarding China’s maritime rights on equal footing with policies such as cracking down on proponents of separatist movements and safeguarding national social stability

(China’s National Defense 2019, 4).

The “Three Nos”

When communicating with ASEAN (particularly with the Philippines and

Vietnam), China has made “Three Nos” very clear: no balancing, no international appeals and no drilling for oil without Beijing’s help. China has shown that it does not want

ASEAN countries balancing against it in two primary ways. First, China has aggressively indicated it will only engage in bilateral talks to solve country specific maritime disputes.

While China has engaged in multilateral talks with ASEAN countries to draft a Code of

Conduct (CoC) since 2002, the CoC provides general outlines of how to act in the South

China Sea and serves as an opportunity for China to assert the rules that it wants others to abide by and not boundary demarcations. China is more concerned over ASEAN countries working together without its participation.

One way of preventing ASEAN from working together is through using the security-economic nexus by using economic pressure to push a security agenda (National

Institute 2019; Friedberg 1991, 265).4 Perhaps the most widely cited instance of this is

4 Beijing also overtly points out this security-economic nexus. A May 2016 People’s Daily article directly tells Vietnam to “weight in the question of guns versus butter.”

6 the 2012 ASEAN summit held in Phenom Penh where, for the first time in 45 years, foreign ministers failed to issue a joint communiqué on issues of concern to ASEAN.

After looking at drafts submitted by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam,

Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong consulted with advisors outside the room and returned with edits rejecting language referring to the Scarborough Shoal (in dispute with the Philippines), commenting that these were bilateral issues and not appropriate for a joint statement. The suggested comments and opinion that these were bilateral issues suspiciously aligned with Chinese views on the issue, and reports by those present suggest that Hor Nam Hong was sharing the suggested document with Chinese interlocutors outside of the conference room. Incidentally, a few days later, China promised Cambodia U.S. $500 million in aid and loans. China used its economic clout to

“press Cambodia into the awkward position of standing up to its ASEAN neighbors on one of the most important security concerns for the grouping and its members” (Bower

2012).5 Also adopting a more direct approach, language in CCP sanctioned press reports on the Philippines and Vietnam clearly highlights Beijing’s preference for bilateral talks.

People’s Daily articles repeatedly reinforce a variation of the statement that the “right track of negotiations” is “bilateral agreements” (China Lashes 2015).6 According to this logic, China has separate disputes with each country and there should therefore be settled independent of other influences.

Appeals for international support

5 This factors into the Chinese cultural idea of dealing with intermediaries instead of directly with the disputing party. It is typical in Chinese culture to deal indirectly with the opponent (Gao 1995). 6 This preference for bilateral negotiations is not unique to the post 2010 time period. In 2004 during negotiations to create specific measures to be included in the DOC, Beijing rejected the ASEAN policy of ASEAN countries meeting before consulting with China (Hyer 2015, 256).

7 Second, Beijing has made it clear countries should not appeal for international help—particularly from the U.S. Xi Jinping’s 2014 call for “Asian people to uphold

Asia’s security” is seen as a thinly veiled warning to the U.S. to refrain from building military alliances with Southeast Asian countries (Ng 2019).7 China’s diplomatic actions have supported this assertion. This is part of China’s greater objective of increasing its soft and hard power globally, and not specific to South China Sea disputes. Since 2014,

Beijing has held numerous summits and created infrastructure to increase regional influence. While such efforts are prolific, notable initiatives include the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI), Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and Forum on Chinese

African Cooperation. More specifically in the South China Sea, the official stance is that since the South China Sea is sovereign territory, the U.S. is meddling in China’s domestic affairs. People’s Daily articles repeatedly condemn efforts to seek help from the U.S., using the idiom “fox seeking power by riding the back of a tiger” (Hu Jia Hu Wei, 狐假

虎威) to criticize the Philippines for drawing support from the U.S (Xinhua 2015).8

7 Some see this call as an echo of early 20th century Japan’s call for an “Asia for Asians” (Chin 2014). 8 This is the exact translation of the idiom from the English version of the People’s Daily article. In my opinion, the Baidu dictionary captures the essence of the idiom more accurately as “borrowing power to do evil.”

8 Beijing also condemns involvement from the wider international community. This is best illustrated through Frequency of threatening the Beijing’s reaction to the widely potential use of force against the 8 Philippines in People's Daily articles publicized 2016 UNCLOS ruling 7 6 5 in favor of the Philippines. In a 4 3 Frequency Frequency 2 survey of over 300 People’s 1 0 Daily articles, dates Spring 2014 Summer 2015 Spring 2016 corresponding with events related to the UNCLOS arbitration (when it was announced, submitted and the decision made) incurred harsh responses from Beijing. Statements included strong warnings such as “China reserves the right to further [military] actions,” “attempts…are doomed to failure,” “no choice but to respond,” and “unlikely to walk away with impunity” (Xinhua

2014, 2016). By discouraging ASEAN from both working together and with non-ASEAN countries, China “lets the enemy’s spy sow discord in the enemy’s camp,” or undermines the enemy’s ability to fight by disunifying the opposition (Fan Jian Ji, 反间计).

Drilling for oil independently

Separately, Beijing has also clearly signaled that ASEAN countries should not drill for oil independent of China’s help. Russia’s oil giant Rostnef, India’s Oil and

Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh, and Japan Drilling Co. have all been rebuked by China for drilling, or considering drilling, in disputed Vietnamese territory (Trickett

2018). Beijing has made itself clear through both rhetorical and military actions. Every joint statement between Vietnam and China between 2011-2017 has included text about

“steady…and joint development” in exploring disputed territory in the South China Sea

9 (Chubb 2017). In 2018, Manila and Beijing signed the Memorandum of Understanding of

Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development, an agreement that the Philippines should not drill for oil without Chinese cooperation (Ng 2018). However, these statements were simply rhetorical affirmations of what had already been militarily asserted. Vietnam has halted drilling in offshore oil and gas projects in 2017, 2018 and 2019 because of military actions by China—most recently, Beijing sent a geological survey vessel and armed escort vessels into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone which the US State Department argues was intended to intimidate and send a message of deterrence to Hanoi (Reed

2019).

Clarity in Military Tactics

In the military sphere, Beijing’s “salami” and “cabbage” strategies of gaining and maintaining territory signal clear intentions. In general literature about manipulative decision making, the “salami” tactic is a type of policy entrapment characterized by

“breaking down the novel course of action into a series of gradual policy options” (Maoz

1990, 90). It is a way to make a “policy group…accept a commitment which would have been rejected out of hand had the full implications and full extent of the project been revealed from the start” (Stern 2003, 68). In the military sphere, a variation of this salami tactic is employed in the South China Sea by, instead of a blitzkrieg or sudden warfare move, China patiently uses small actions that add up to a major strategic shift. This establishes the “impression” of sovereignty and traditional indicators of state authority, such as the establishment of military bases and bureaucratic regulations and makes U.S.

10 allied operations more costly, creating the appearance of a decreased presence (Haddick

2014).9

Similarly, the “cabbage” strategy, or what a paper published by the National

Defense University calls “leading from behind,” characterizes a non-dualistic approach.

The controversial yet popular PLA rear admiral Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠) summarized this tactic in a 2013 TV interview with Chinese State media:

…we have begun to take measures to seal and control the areas around the Huangyan Island [Scarborough Shoal], seal and control continuously up till now. In the year period since then, there have been fishermen in the inside…The fishermen conduct normal production there. In the area around the island, fishing administration ships and marine surveillance ships are conducting normal patrols while in the outer ring there are navy warships. The island is thus wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage. As a result, a cabbage strategy has taken shape. If the Philippines wants to go in, in the outermost area, it has first to ask whether our navy will allow it. Then it has to ask whether our fishery administration and marine surveillance ships will allow it. Therefore, our fishermen can carry out their production safely while our country’s marine rights and interests as well as sovereignty are safeguarded. Is that not satisfactory? (Hill 2013).

Not directly declaring red lines should not be confused with strategic ambiguity as

China’s intentions and presence in the South China Sea are overt. While these strategies may seem to employ a measure of ambiguity because they refrain from directly declaring boundaries, these strategies do not shroud intentions. These tactics are a roundabout way of acquiring territory which complements rhetorical strategic ambiguity as it distinctly signals to ASEAN countries that it intends to expand sovereignty.

9 This tactic of delaying enforcement is one of three strategies a state can adopt to manage territorial claims. First, a state can adopt a policy of cooperation, such as Duterte’s Philippines and a traditionally reticent and quiet Malaysia. Second, a state can escalate the situation, either engaging in coercive diplomacy or forcibly seizing contested land. Escalation can be deliberate, inadvertent, or accidental (Kahn 1965, 96). Third, a state can engage a delaying strategy by maintaining a state’s claim without offering concessions or force (Fravel 2011, 297).

11 STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY

Strategic ambiguity is a deliberate lack of clarity in rhetoric and actions with the intention to gain a relative advantage over another state and avoid conflict. To illustrate the advantages and drawbacks of such a strategy, it is useful to examine U.S. strategic ambiguity toward the Taiwan strait issue. On one hand, strategic ambiguity towards

Taiwan acts as a “dual deterrence” policy or “deterrence by uncertainty.” Since Taiwan is uncertain about potential U.S. engagement should conflict occur, Taiwan is more hesitant to engage in aggressive behavior as the U.S. could potentially not offer sufficient support

(Pan 2003, 291). At the same time, ambiguity also deters China from acting aggressively for fear of the U.S. backing Taiwan. In contrast to Taiwan’s less aggressive behavior, clear rhetoric indicating the U.S. would back Japan in the case of conflict has ennobled

Japan to act more aggressively (Koda 2016; 34). On the other hand, some argue strategic ambiguity fosters a negative feedback cycle of an arms race fueled by insecurity, leading to policy failures evident in the 1995-1996 crisis where China held military exercises within 35 miles from ports in Taiwan, causing panic in Taiwan and US intervention (Pan

2003). On the whole, strategic ambiguity is not a solution to the Taiwan issue but a temporary tactic that has successfully kept peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait

(Benson and Niou 2001).10 China seeks these benefits of deterrence and maintaining the status quo of peace from adopting this policy in the South China Sea.

10 The U.S. has traditionally also employed ambiguity towards the Philippines in the South China Sea. China pointed this out through a 2012 China Daily article: “Without doubt, if the Philippines gets support from the US and other countries it will take an even tougher approach in the future. The Philippines has a very good plan, with only one drawback: neither the US nor any of its other allies are its puppets. Actually, the alliance between the US and the Philippines is typical of an alliance between a big power and a small country, in which the big power fears being dragged into a conflict not of its choosing, while the small country fears being sacrificed in the interests of its powerful ally. The US wants to make use of China's disputes with its neighbors to contain and balance China, but it does not want to become involved in any direct military conflict with China. Its recent promise of not "taking sides" bears testimony to this policy.”

12 Studying strategic ambiguity adds to the discussion of China’s behavior because it directly addresses the weaknesses of exclusively relying on realist theory.11 Realism explains the world in terms of power instead of the multi-dimensionality of how the world actually is (Goldstein 2011, 43). This precludes factors such as area knowledge, cost-benefit analysis, power transition theory and economic interdependence—all considerations which heavily influence China’s decisions (Fravel 2010, Johnston 2003).12

In attempting to address this weakness, realism has resulted in dozens of schools which fail to agree on the extent to which a state should engage in power seeking behavior. Take structural or neo-realists. Within this school alone, strict defensive realists argue states should only seek the minimum amount of power needed to ensure survival; modified defensive realists argue states expand because of domestic influences; and offensive realists claim the greatest guarantor of security is hegemony (Freyberg-Inan,

Harrison and James 2009, 109-112). Institutionalists, constructivist, and skeptics within realism itself criticize neo-realism by contending it ignores human nature and foreign policymaking independent of structural considerations. Post-modern realists are moving towards forms of realism that introduce greater structural complexity to provide a systemic account of domestic and international relationships to explain anomalies (James

2002, 195). Post-modern realism begins by recognizing the complex and imprecise relationship between language and action. Indeed, some would even argue that post-

11 Studying strategic ambiguity supplements—not supplants—the role of realist theory in analyzing China’s strategy. After all, strategic ambiguity is a strategy, not a theory. Furthermore, traditional Chinese thought—which has helped guide current Chinese governance—finds its roots in the deeply realist philosophies of legalism. Clearly, significant portions of realist theory are of value. Realism has provided the most reliable guidance for statecraft and has consistently offered the most compelling explanations of state behavior (Frankel 1996, 63). 12 Indeed, there is “little evidence of vigorous balancing by China against the U.S., vigorous balancing against China by weaker states, a vigorous Chinese effort to replace U.S, hegemony, or vigorous U.S. efforts to contain China’s rise” (Johnston 2012, 59).

13 modern realism is simply neo-classical realism as it analyzes political rhetoric “as a persuasive discourse rather than as a positive theory” (Beer and Hariman 2009, 10).

Despite this plethora of ideas, they all fail to account for cultural behavior and holistically explain China’s behavior. Even proponents of realism argue that realist international theory needs to be studied in conjunction with domestic politics and through a reciprocity model of how states respond to other states’ actions (Frankel 1996, 63; 248).

Strategic ambiguity addresses both of these concerns as it is employed both on domestic and international levels and often in response to other states’ actions (Chubb 2017). It can be seen as a facet of area knowledge which can supplement realist explanations as it provides a link between China’s domestic culture with its foreign policy. Drawing upon

George Friedman’s elaboration of a grand strategy as something “embedded in a nation’s

DNA…and appear[ing] so natural and obvious that politicians and generals are not always aware of it,” ambiguity and implicit communication (Han Xu, 含蓄) play into

China’s cultural idea of “maintaining face” (Friedman 2009, 39). It is generally accepted that it is a traditional Chinese tenant of communication that meaning lies beyond the words and in the unspoken ideas (Yi Zai Yan Wai, 意在言外). From a cultural perspective then, ambiguity could be seen less as an intentional tactic and more a cultural product that can contribute to our understanding of China’s motivations.13

13 Just as realism is insufficient in examining China’s behavior towards ASEAN, it is also insufficient in examining ASEAN’s behavior towards China. Scholars argue the response of ASEAN countries to Chinese behavior has progressed past the structural realist ideas of either bandwagoning with or balancing against China. Instead, these countries practice hedging, or engage in a “flexible strategy involving soft balancing, economic engagement, and limited bandwagoning” (Ross 2006; Goh 2008; Wu 2019).

14 BEIJING EXERCISES RHETORICAL AMBIGUITY

While China is clear about its expectations for its neighbors, China has made its own claims and intentions blurry through conflicting messages, unclear rhetorical and incremental military gains. Beijing clouds its intentions through the incongruity between diplomatic and official rhetoric with actions on the ground.

Three examples—among many—serve to illustrate this point. First, in 2015

President Xi publicly asserted to President Obama he would “not militarize artificial islands that Beijing has been building in the disputed South China Sea” (Page 2015).

Within two years of this reassurance, Beijing had placed military aircraft on all three of

China’s airstrips in the Spratly island (AMTI 2018). Second, there is disconnect between what Filipino President Duterte reports President Xi tells him and official People’s Daily rhetoric. In 2017, Duterte claimed that Xi Jinping directly threatened war if the

Philippines drilled for oil in disputed territory (Mogato 2017). This seemed to directly contradict government sanctioned PRC statements in People’s Daily. The language in

People’s Daily official statements on the state of relations between China and the

Philippines from 2016-2019 (including the period of time Duterte was complaining about threats of war from China) was entirely positive, consistently referring to their

“inspiring…friendship.”14

The third example of how official rhetoric does not always match evidence from the ground is the overwhelmingly positive official rhetoric directed towards Vietnam. A survey of over 300 People’s Daily articles found that language directed towards Vietnam

14 People’s Daily articles are useful measures of CCP opinion as they reflect Beijing’s direct opinion as Southeast Asian countries do not ignore China’s rhetoric and are careful to examine Beijing’s statements (Lai 2017).

15 between 2010 and 2019 focused on praising positive and close relations, with the exception of the year 2015. This was despite obvious conflicts, such as Chinese vessels firing water cannons at a Vietnamese fleet in 2014, Vietnam shipping mobile rocket launchers to the Spratly Islands in 201615 and allowing an Indian oil company to explore an oil block in 2018 (Gady 2016; Holmes 2016; Jennings 2019; Trickett 2018). This was most likely attributable to the commitment of “Sino-Vietnamese friendship propaganda” found in the 2011, 2013 and 2015 communiques between Beijing and Hanoi (Chubb

2017). While China has been clear about some issues—such as its displeasure with the

Philippines after the 2016 UNCLOS ruling through official channels—its rhetoric and actions have been incongruous when dealing with other issues such as conveying its opinion and intentions towards Vietnam.

15 Vietnam likely has shipped the rocket launchers, according to Reuters and Western officials. However, the Vietnamese foreign ministry officially disputes this claim.

Average intensity level of rhetoric in People's Daily articles: 2010-2019 4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

Jul-Aug '11 Jul-Aug Jul-Aug'10 Jul-Aug'12 Jul-Aug'13 Jul-Aug'14 Jul-Aug'15 Jul-Aug'16 Jul-Aug'17 Jul-Aug'18 Jul-Aug'19

Mar-Ap'11 Mar-Ap'12 Mar-Ap'13 Mar-Ap'14 Mar-Ap'15 Mar-Ap'16 Mar-Ap'17 Mar-Ap'18 Mar-Ap'19

Nov-Dec '15 Nov-Dec Nov-Dec '10 Nov-Dec '11 Nov-Dec '12 Nov-Dec '13 Nov-Dec '14 Nov-Dec '16 Nov-Dec '17 Nov-Dec '18 Nov-Dec

Philippines Vietnam

Chart 1: Over 320 official statements found in People’s Daily articles (not editorials) between 2010-2019 were arranged into four categories and the values averaged. Level 1 included phrases indicating warm relations such as “positive and productive,” “willing to work,” “golden opportunity.” Level 2 included “urge,” “hamper regional peace,” “deterrence.” Level 3 included “warn,” “repeatedly and sternly demand,” and “stop.” Level 4 included “doomed,” “beware,” “attempts will backfire,” “unlikely to walk away with impunity.” Shifting Claims

While China is clear that issues of sovereignty in the South China Sea are of the utmost importance, the claims themselves have shifted and not always been clearly articulated.

While China’s original claims were to the Spratlys (Nansha) and Paracels (Xisha), these claims have shifted to include Macclesfield Bank, then incorporated the Scarborough

17 Shoal as well even though it lies hundreds of miles from Macclesfield Bank (Poling

2012).16

Unclear physical map boundaries are yet another illustration of ambiguity in China’s claims. In 2012, the

People’s Daily announced the first

“complete and correct map” had been published by the PLA

General Staff Map 1: The SinoMap official map of China, which includes a tenth dash to incorporate Taiwan. Department. A few months later, SinoMaps, under the jurisdiction of State Bureau of Surveying and

Mapping, released another “official” map. This map detailed a ten-dash line with different borders, much to the ire of the Philippines and Vietnam (Jakobson 2014; Callar

2016). Clearly, publishing conflicting maps does not automatically signal a shift in policy. Inconsistency in maps was informally explained in a Time article by a Chinese

16 These changes also undermine the historical claims China has to these islands--many of the newer claims are not present on historical maps of China that Beijing claims legitimize their moves. 16 The Republic of China (Taiwan) also makes historical claims to the islands. A fascinating chronology of these historical claims can be found at: Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2016. Peace in the south china sea, national territory secure forever. Policy paper on ROC south china sea policy. Taipei, Taiwan: David Y. L. L

18 scientist as a mistake by cartographers who were “not working that rigorously” and were

“not that strict” (Beech 2016). Regardless, the lack of clarity caused confusion for the

Philippines and Vietnam, particularly when claims have historically changed.

INTENTIONAL OR INCIDENTAL?

To what extent is this ambiguity intentional? Perhaps ambiguity is the net effect of the unintentionally unwieldy arms of decision making working independently and cultural norms which send an unclear picture of China’s intentions to other countries.

Some could argue insufficient clarity of vision on the domestic front leads to a lack of clear messaging in the international arena. China’s overarching goals of a peaceful rise and a multipolar world are well advertised, but the path to these objectives is muddy.

Structural defects that lead to an inflated bureaucracy and competing interest groups in the Chinese government suggest this ambiguity is non-strategic and that authority over foreign policy is increasingly fractured (Jakobson and Knox 2010, vii). Even with Xi

Jinping’s swift consolidation of power, no Chinese leader can condemn actions officially taken to “safeguard China’s sovereignty” as publicly denouncing such an act would display weakness (Jakobson 2014, 32). Actions taken from lower levels of government conflict when there are inadequate active measures to unify disparate groups. However,

Beijing is aware of these issues and is actively attempting to rectify these structural issues with reforms.17

17 There is frustratingly sparse available academic information on the process of China’s military decision- making process, particularly informal processes. While researches such as Linda Jakobson research China’s maritime actors and general informal decision making and Michael Swaine general PLA processes, both heavily rely on inferences from policy processes in retrospect and personal interviews. Such researchers also point out the difficulty of verifying what we know about these policy processes.

19 Instructions given by the upper echelons of leadership are sweeping and avoid specifics, which leads to a variety of interpretations. Broad guidance is given from the

Central Military Commission (CMC), or the top leadership of the PLA, chaired by Xi

Jinping. This guidance gives the “general direction,” while implementation and policy formation is left to lower levels of government. One senior Chinese researcher commented that “anything can be explained, either way” and that given the ephemeral language of guiding Chinese foreign policy principles, guidelines can be used to justify sometimes competing policy objectives. A clear example is illustrated through Xi’s comments in 2012 to senior leadership in charge of maritime issues that he favored a

“determined response” to provocations of China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea while stressing that this could not endanger stability (Jakobson 2014, 25-30). One could see how such a statement could be used to back up a wide range of seemingly opposing actions because of its lack of clarity.

Competing interest groups in the government and military

Contradicting directives leave much room for other parties and many layers of bureaucracy between the decision makers and implementors to offer different interpretations the broad foreign policy strokes painted by the top leaders. Before the

2014 PLA military reforms, the interest groups pushing for their own agendas in maritime issues were referred to as the “nine dragons stirring up the sea” (Jiu Long Nao

Hai, 九龙闹海) by the Chinese media, in reference to a folk legend of the dragon king’s nine sons stirring up the sea (International Crisis Group 2012, 8). In fact, the messy tangle of government agencies each with overlapping interests in the SCS before the

2014 PLA reforms totaled more than nine, and included interests such as state-owned oil

20 enterprises, senior military leaders, provincial leaders, the Chinese Coast Guard, foreign ministry, PLAN, and the maritime militia (International Crisis Group 2012; Jakobson

2014).

Even within the military, there are competing facets which leads to redundancy and competition. Typical to most militaries, each arm lacks clear direction in peace time, leading the roles of each service to be only “relatively independent” (Zhang 2017, 4). The

Air Force (PLAAF), for instance, has been competing with the Naval Aviation, Army

Aviation, Navy Marine Corps and Strategic Support Force to increase operational relevance by expanding into the maritime domain. Surprisingly, from 2013-2017, 17 of

22 overwater bomber flights were from PLAAF bombers while the rest were from Naval

Aviation showing that the PLAAF has, at least in part, succeeded in expanding their range of capabilities at the expense of a different arm of the military (Cozad and

Beauchamp-Mustafaga 2017; McCaslin and Erickson 2019). This competition leads to greater ambiguity because as uncertainty of the responsibilities and roles of each military arm increases, it becomes increasingly more likely that this uncertainty could also lead to ambiguous signaling outside of the military.

Bureaucratic muddling

Aside from the dozens of competing interest groups, there is also bureaucratic inflation. Prior to the 2014 military reforms and consolidation of the PLAN and Coast

Guard, there were five civilian law enforcement agencies: the China Maritime Police,

China Maritime Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, Maritime Anti-

Smuggling Bureau and Maritime Safety Administration. These agencies were plagued by bureaucratic inefficiency and overlapping responsibilities, many of which were also

21 addressed in the sweeping 2014 military reforms (National Institute 2019). The expansive bureaucracy fosters uncertainty because different parties are uncoordinated. Thus, overlapping and conflicting messages, illustrated in the example in the previous section of the different map agencies publishing “official” maps with differing boundaries. This applies not only to differing ideas of what should be pursued, but also to uncoordinated technology. For instance, the Shanghai’s Rescue Coordination Center conceded in 2007 they could see local Maritime Safety Administration vehicles through their CCTV system on the Huangpu River but could not readily display the location of coast guard vessels in the same area (Goldstein 2010, 10). While this is a dated example, it illustrates that as little as 12 years ago, the systems lacked centrality and coordination.

Beijing is addressing these concerns

However, Beijing is addressing the aforementioned deficiencies in governmental structure that generate ambiguity. The 2014 military reforms were intended to solidify a hierarchical decision-making structure. Take the Chinese Coast Guard assimilation into the PLAN. As part of this reorganization, the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), one of the main forces that would engage in conflict, switched from reporting to civilian agencies to reporting to working with the military administered People’s Armed Police (PAP) in

2018. This allowed the military to streamline its maritime management resources, and placed the CCG under military control, suggesting a closer relationship with PLAN, making it easier for CCG to obtain PLAN vessels to conduct their patrols, and decrease competition between the two arms (Lin 2019). Indeed, in a Ningbo Academy study, scholars expressed that “internally, many scholars believe that maritime power means maritime military power, and maritime military power means the navy” (Lyle 2010, 23).

22 By streamlining these organizations, the CCP decreases the likelihood of independent actors functioning by themselves.

Subordination of the PLA to the CCP

Some point out that structure is not strategy: just because the military is reforming to create greater command and control does not mean the overall strategy is less ambiguous. However, establishing the PLA is firmly situated under the CCP eliminates the possibility that China’s ambiguity is a primary consequence of structural deficiencies.

The military is a subordinate of the CMC, which guarantees the “Communist Party’s absolute leadership of the military.” A senior PLA officer in 2007 commented that “the

PLA made great sacrifices for Chinese economic modernization for two decades. It was asked to have patience, and it obeyed without complaints,” emphasizing the distinctly subordinate position of the PLA to the CCP. PLA officers in leading small groups are typically primarily present to relay information, not to form policy, and there are dozens of competing bodies feeding into the decision-making process, only one of which is the

PLA (Jakobson and Manuel 2016, 104).18 Since the PLA naturally tends to have a more hawkish perspective of issues of sovereignty, this helps override hard lined emotionally driven factions within the army with more moderate voices in Party leadership for decisions deemed important enough to require top level decision making (Zhou 2008,

111-114; Shirk 2007, 9). Furthermore, there have traditionally been few military representatives on the politburo standing committee. There was not a single military officer on the Politburo standing committee during Hu Jintao’s first term. Factions within

18 “Leading small groups . . . are sometimes referred to by the leadership as ‘advisory bodies’ for the PB or Party Secretariat, and their decisions are often issued in the name of those bodies. However, they can also bring finished policy packages to the party leading organs at times and can sometimes issue orders and instructions directly to line departments and units” (Swaine 1998).

23 top level leadership has been frowned upon. For instance, Yang Shangkun and Yang

Baibing, a former vice chairman of the CMC and secretary general of the CMC, were dismissed in 1992 allegedly for organizing a clique (Zhou 2008, 113).19 Thus, the CCP has been attempting to lessen the muddling effects that come with large bureaucratic organizations and competing interests.

Ambiguity as a Cultural Byproduct

An alternative argument is that China is unintentionally ambiguous because it is the outward expression of a cultural standard. As the classic idiom expresses it, one must muddy the water to catch the fish (Hun Shui Mo Yu, 浑水摸鱼). Opportunity for flexibility, and ambiguity by extension, is a tenant of good governance in Chinese philosophical thought. Thus, ambiguity in Chinese foreign affairs stems from traditional philosophies of governance and Chinese interpersonal practices and is more a cultural norm than an intentional tactic.

Good governance in Chinese philosophical thought includes vagueness to accommodate for changing needs. Take Xunzi and Legalism as examples. Xunzi, a

Confucian philosopher during the Warring States period, argued that explicit standards should be vague so that the manner in which they should be implemented is open to interpretation (Angle 2017). According to Xunzi, “there are people who create order; there are no standards creating order of themselves.” Xunzi shows how vagueness leads to greater flexibility in governance through an analogy of trying to cross a river in a boat:

The rules are like the boat and the people [i.e. the ruler and his officials] are like the steersman. If the boat is damaged and the rudder is broken…everyone…understands that the boat cannot get across. So…it is

19 While these examples are dated, they show the traditional attitude towards having military leaders in policy making positions and the negative sentiment towards organizing cliques reminiscent of a post-Mao order.

24 necessary to reform the rules. There has never been a case where one could successfully restore order without reforming the rules (HHJ pp. 23–24).

The Legalist Han Feizi agrees that a good ruler must adapt to the times and not be stuck in tradition. While the “underlying patterns” may remain, their specific applications should evolve with the times (Angle 2017). Indeed, the Legalist text advocates pragmaticism for “… if one finds gains will exceed losses, one goes ahead with them”

(HFZ ch. 47).20 Thus, in both Xunzi’s pessimistic view of humankind and the legalist’s political realist perspective, vagueness is necessary for effective governance.

A classic contemporary political example of this is Deng Xiaoping’s evaluation of

Mao Zedong. Following Mao’s death, there was implicit but not overt criticism of his governing tactics. Deng declared that Mao’s legacy, which included the disastrous Great

Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, was “seventy percent right and thirty percent wrong” (Qi San Kai, 七三开). While radically assertive for the political climate of the time, instead of directly pointing out Mao’s mistakes, Deng showed restraint and gave a general assessment that could be interpreted many ways.

Aside from philosophical thought, vagueness is a quality of Chinese interpersonal communications. Handbooks on Chinese culture advise Westerners not to directly express intentions and instead employ indirect communication tactics (Gao 1995;

Hofstede 2016). Of course, Chinese culture is constantly evolving, but according to traditional thinking the concept of implicit communication (Han Xu, 含蓄) is considered a “social rule” in Chinese culture and involves leaving the “unspoken” to the listeners

(Yu and Gu 1990; Gao 1998). Indeed, “assertiveness does not have the positive

20 Of course, legalism also advocates for clear laws and punishments, but this is separate from vague overarching principles and doctrines.

25 connotations found in other cultures. Being assertive reflects the ill character of an individual and threatens the harmony and cohesion of interpersonal relationships” (Gao

1998).21

Therefore, it logically follows that the Chinese would adopt their interpersonal tactics when communicating with the regional community. Neither is this unique to

Chinese culture. Perhaps in reaction to China’s ambiguity or because of a general Asian tendency towards vagueness in communication, ASEAN countries themselves adopt similar communication methods—the “ASEAN way” involves dealing with Southeast

Asian customs of conflict resolution which include aversion and ambiguity (Acharya

2009; Kivimaki 2011). ASEAN responds to China’s aggressive signals by “send[ing] ambiguous signals related to similar security interests” to great powers (Lim and Cooper

2015; Wu 2019). Since the parties involved adopt this method of communication, it raises the possibility that ambiguity is the modus operandi and not a tactic that has been specifically sought out.22

AMBIGUITY: A DELIBERATE TACTIC DESIGNED TO MEET SPECIFIC GOALS

China’s ambiguity is not uniform. As discussed earlier, China has clearly articulated what it expects ASEAN countries to do and the importance of sovereignty issues to its national agenda. Rather, ambiguity is employed in situations when it furthers

China’s goal of peacefully expanding in the South China Sea by fostering anxiety which destabilizes the opposition and increases flexibility. While positive consequences do not

21 Being assertive in actions, I might add, differs from assertiveness in rhetoric. I am not attempting to downplay the level of assertiveness Beijing has displayed in its military incidents with its Southeast Asian neighbors, but rather point out how interconnected culture and politics are. 22 This does not mean ASEAN countries appreciate ambiguity from China. A CSIS report on an ASEAN meeting in 2012 reports there was “little appetite for vague pronouncements of Chinese policy and justifications…and [ASEAN] is frustration with the perpetual uncertainty created by a Chinese policy that amounts to avoiding taking a position at all costs” (Poling 2012).

26 prove intentionality, the benefits that come from ambiguity provide evidence that ambiguity could be intentional.

Anxiety

Anxiety is a form of manipulation designed to destabilize the opposition and give the aggressor greater flexibility. Indeed, ontological international relations commonly differentiates between fear and anxiety. Whereas fear has “a definite object of focus, anxiety is a more ambiguous state of unease, an affect that arises when identity is challenged or in flux” (Steele 2008, 51; Rumelili 2015, 12).

Ambiguity fosters anxiety on both the domestic and international level.

Refraining from using dualistic thinking is an integral part of conducting “political opinion warfare” (Xin Li Zhan, 心理战) and “psychological warfare” (Yu Lun Zhan, 舆论

战) in domestic propaganda (Walton 2012). Rhetorical contradictions between public statements made by “military hawks” and peace promoting MFA personnel in Chinese propaganda create a “push pull” effect between hardline and conciliatory rhetoric.

Indeed, Major-General Luo has used a Peking opera analogy in an online QQ forum to explain:

some [PLA figures] sing the white mask [villain role] and others sing the red mask [honest minister]. It can even be a mixture of truth and deceit, real and fake, transparent when transparency is called for, secret when transparency is not called for, all with the core strategic interests of the state as the highest consideration…engendering a sense of anxiety is one of our aims.

Why engender a sense of anxiety? Ambiguity allows the PLA to exchange red lines for blurry ones. As Andrew Chubb writes, “Rather than…establishing a red line of resolve to fight in a specific scenario, channeling and risk management of nationalist sentiment deters opposition by raising a remote but plausible chance of uncontrollable escalation

27 across an unspecified set of circumstances” (Chubb 2017, 275; emphasis in original). This allows the CCP to increase the public’s “maritime consciousness”（Hai Yang Yi Shi, 海洋

意识）and tightly control nationalistic sentiment (Bradshaw and Howard 2019; Luo

General 2013).

More anxiety means less accountability

Ambiguity gives China greater flexibility, which provides room to improvise or wiggle out of potentially provocative statements and movements, consequently avoiding conflict. Two points illustrate this idea. First, China has not historically stated specific claims. Specifically, as of 2015 it had not explicitly stated which reefs it considered to be surrounded by 12 nautical mile territorial seas (Chubb 2015). In the ensuing years, China has overtly delineated its claims by militarizing specific reefs. By not publishing these exact claims beforehand, China could adopt to the shifting attitudes and gauge the reactions of other players before acting. The constant evolution of opinions and policies allows

Beijing to use its strategy of ambiguity to outlast frequent turnovers of power. In the

Philippines for instance, even if Benigno Aquino’s government (2010-2016) was strongly anti-China, Beijing had only to wait for the Duterte government’s pro-China policies to realize the benefits of its “salami” strategy.23 Ambiguity then, is a useful component of a long term vision and end goals characteristic of Chinese foreign policy objectives.

Second, ambiguity creates a safety net for potentially provocative actions and allows China to “test the waters” and send messages to other countries. A 1978 fishing boat incident with Japan provides a useful illustration. In the midst of friendship

23 One could also make a strong case here that Aquino’s anti-China rhetoric was futile. Regardless of Filipino policy, China’s salami strategy was active during Aquino’s government, such as with the Filipino coast guard standoff at the Second Thomas Shoal. If anything, the UNCLOS arbitration (initiated by Aquino’s government) embarrassed China and did nothing but harden their stance.

28 negotiations between Tokyo and Beijing, approximately forty boats with signs reading

“The Diaoyu Islands are the territory of the People’s Republic of China” entered disputed waters. The same day, China withdrew the fishing boats in response to Japan’s demands.

Later, the Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao dismissed the incident by asserting the boats were “chasing fish around the island” and that it was an “accident.” Here, ambiguous statements messaged to Japan that China was willing to set aside issues to achieve the larger foreign policy goal of counterbalancing the Soviet threat by normalizing relations with Japan (Hyer 2015, 185-189). While the example is outdated, it clearly shows how flexibility was pragmatic on a microlevel—by allowing them to message to Japan their willingness to shelve the issue, and on a macrolevel—by showing they could put aside differences to help achieve the larger goal of normalization.

Ambiguity also forces the burden of decision making upon other claimants. Since the Chinese are already operating in violation of the designated 200-mile exclusive economic zone in countries such as the Philippines, at what point should strong action be taken? Because China’s gains are incremental, other countries have to decide what would be considered the first provocation that triggers a strong response action. Of course,

ASEAN countries are painfully aware of the asymmetric relationship and economic costs when considering whether to take action against China, but the gradual nature of China’s gains with blurry ends makes its actions appear modest instead of flagrant (Womack

2006).

Furthermore, ambiguity gives the PLAN greater freedom to perform controversial tasks such as enforcing maritime claims without soiling the PLA’s reputation (Kennedy and Erickson 2017, 4). This is illustrated through the 2019 Reed Bank Incident. In June, a

29 Chinese fishing vessel collided with a Filipino fishing vessel riding an anchor in disputed waters.24 The Chinese fishing vessel promptly left after the collision and had no traceable signal, leaving 22 Filipino fishermen in a drowning vessel. The fishermen were later rescued by a passing Vietnamese boat. This event provoked intense reactions from the

Filipino population (Castro 2019; Seeking Clues 2019). Was this collision from a Chinese vessel deliberate signaling from the maritime militia or a misguided fishing vessel? 25 On one hand, it was possible it was a maritime militia vessel since maritime militia vessels are often refurbished fishing vessels and are manned by civilians available for mobilization, which disguises the affiliation of the boats (Secretary of Defense 2019, 18-54). The dual nature of the ship would explain why their signal was turned off after the event. On the other hand, it could have been an inexperienced crew of illegally fishing fishermen whose signal went dark after the event because of the illicit nature of their activities. In the absence of clear and direct evidence that it was a premeditated attack from the Chinese, complaints from the Philippines to China could be downplayed as an “ordinary maritime accident”

(Reuters 2019). Ambiguity then, is a screen that China can hide behind as it tests reactions and asserts itself.

CONCLUSION

The principle question remaining is how the United States and other claimants should respond to China’s strategic ambiguity. ASEAN claimants are currently countering China’s claims with both reluctant acceptance and strategic ambiguity of their

24 This Filipino investigation into the incident also does not paint the fishermen in the best light. The report indicates the fishing license was expired, the engine officer was unlicensed, and there was no light on the boat and no lookout as the crew was asleep—except for the cook who was making rice (Galvez 2019). 25 An October 2019 AMTI report concludes that the Chinese vessel was likely an illegal fishing vessel (see Seeking Clues in the Case of Yuemaobinyu 42212).

30 own. While this has resulted in a diplomatic rhetorical dance that has maintained relative stability, it has not resolved the disputes. How can ASEAN both help maintain the peace while asserting sovereignty of their own? What role can and should the United States play in this struggle for sovereignty?

China arguably currently has the most articulately defined goals and grand strategy of any nation (Erickson 2019, 73). Its military actions clearly indicate China intends to continue expanding sovereignty, but precise intentions and the intended extent of expanding sovereignty is unclear. What is certain is that strategic ambiguity in maritime disputes is not a new idea—a policy of rhetorical strategic ambiguity is a strategy of pragmaticism and flexibility. These are tenants of traditional Chinese thought and have been the principle driving force behind Chinese foreign policy since the 1980s.

Indeed, strategic ambiguity is the expression of a pragmatic mindset. China’s strategic ambiguity has successfully allowed China to accomplish two seemingly opposing goals: expansion and peace. In other words, this ambiguity allows China to increase its control over the South China Sea without provoking a military response from other claimants.

While critics may point out the gathering challenges China faces in realizing their ambitious maritime aims, China is still more coordinated and unified than its smaller neighbors. China’s relative strategic clarity strongly suggests China does not plan to

“rejuvenate” in a disorganized or discombobulated manner, for China’s ambiguity is calculated, deliberate and strategic.

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