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Zaza D.Sc. (History), Professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy ALEKSIDZE of Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has University (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) EYVAZOV Rauf Ph.D. (Psychology), Leading research associate of the Center for Strategic Studies GARAGOZOV under the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) Archil Ph.D. (Geography), Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and GEGESHIDZE International Studies (Georgia) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture, Institute of Strategic Studies of the GULIEV Caucasus (Azerbaijan) Shamsaddin D.Sc.(Economy), Professor, Rector of the Azerbaijan State Economic University HAJIEV (Azerbaijan) Jamil HASANLI D.Sc. (History), Professor at (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury; Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.K.) Roin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Academician of the Georgian National Academy of METREVELI Sciences, President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians (Georgia) Fuad Ph.D. (Economy), Counselor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the MURSHUDLI International Bank of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan) Michael Associate professor, Near Eastern Studies Department, Princeton University (U.S.A.) A. REYNOLDS Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Mehdi SANAIE Professor, Tehran University, Director, Center for Russian Studies () Avtandil D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Tbilisi University of International Relations, Corresponding SILAGADZE member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla D.Sc. (History), Professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

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Editorial Office: THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION © The Caucasus & Globalization, 2012 98 Alovsat Guliyev, AZ1009 © CA&CC Press®, 2012 Baku, Azerbaijan © Institute of Strategic Studies of WEB: www.ca-c.org the Caucasus, 2012 4 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 6 Issue 3 2012

Conflicts in the Caucasus: History, Present, and Prospects for Resolution Special Issue

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

RUSSIA AND THE CONFLICTS Martin IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS HOREMUŽ 7

GEORGIA’S FLIRTATION WITH IRAN AND Dmitry ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS SHLAPENTOKH 15

KAZAKHSTAN AS A PLATFORM FOR HOLDING TALKS ON SETTLEMENT OF THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN Andrei NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT GALIEV 28

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE ATROCITIES IN SYRIA AND Kamal THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT MAKILI-ALIYEV 35

ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT AND Khazar EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY IBRAHIM 42 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

INSTABILITY IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: Marat REASONS, FACTORS, AND IMPLICATIONS ILIYASOV 48

THE CONFLICT IN THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT AND THE CITY OF VLADIKAVKAZ: THE CRUX OF THE MATTER, THE STATE’S ROLE, Israpil AND WAYS TO RESOLVE IT SAMPIEV 58

THE FIRST RUSSO-CHECHEN CAMPAIGN (1994-1996): CAUSES AND FACTORS OF Sofia ETHNIC MOBILIZATION MELIKOVA 72

GEO-ECONOMICS

REGIONAL ENERGY PROJECTS Zurab FOR GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS GARAKANIDZE 80

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS Abdurakhman (A NORTH CAUCASIAN CASE STUDY) HUSEYNOV 88

GEOCULTURE

ISLAM AND THE CONFLICT Ahmet IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS YARLYKAPOV 97

EAST-WEST: AN INTERCULTURAL DIALOG. FROM MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING Rasim TO INTEGRATION ABDULLA 108

PROLIFERATION OF RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN DAGHESTAN: Davud INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS KAKHRIMANOV 116

GEOHISTORY

THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CONFLICTS, IDENTITY, AND INTEGRATION Irada IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS BAGIROVA 127 6 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

THE CONFLICT-PRONE POTENTIAL OF THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF EMPIRES: POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC APPROACH (A CASE STUDY OF Revaz THE RUSSIAN , 1917-1923) GACHECHILADZE 134

GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR AND THE SETTLEMENT POLICY OF CZARIST RUSSIA IN THE CAUCASUS IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY Ikram (A GERMAN COLONIZATION CASE STUDY) AGASIEV 146 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Martin HOREMUŽ

Ph.D. (International Relations), Department of Political Science, Catholic University in Ružomberok (Bratislava, Slovakia).

RUSSIA AND THE CONFLICTS IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS

Abstract

he aim of this article is to take a clos- resolution of these conflicts. Since 1991, T er look at Russia’s role in the frozen Russia, within the framework of its own lim- conflicts in the Central Caucasus: Ab- its and available means, has been protect- khazia, , and Nagorno-Kara- ing its interests in accordance with its for- bakh. eign policy concept, the so-called Near The collapse of the U.S.S.R. meant Abroad. According to this concept, Russia the reopening of several conflicts that had demands a dominant position in the post- been artificially conserved. In the new gov- Soviet space. Therefore, Moscow has also ernment-conditioned and geopolitical con- been striving to assume the position of figuration, the Caucasus collided with sev- manager in each conflict and guiding it to eral of the parties involved, as well as with its own benefit. This can be described as the superpowers, which complicated the maintaining the status quo.

Introduction

The disintegration of the led, within the large geopolitical space of this former totalitarian state, to the launching of democratic processes and transformations that affected the cru- cial areas in a significant way and later conditioned further regional, political, economic, security, 8 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION cultural, ethnic, religious, and social development. With the formation of 15 newly independent coun- tries, which were part of one state until 1991, new quantitative and qualitative preconditions and per- spectives began taking shape in order to determine the relations among them. Along with this process came key changes in the local, regional, and global security environment, where new challenges, threats, and risks in the form of regional military conflicts, ethnic and religious , organized crime, political extremism, and international terrorism started to occur more intensively. However, several of these security threats and risks were not exclusively the consequence of the collapse of Communism, most of them were basically put on hold, i.e. “frozen,” as a result of the en- throning of totalitarian power and the Communist ideology. J. Rupnik, a well-known French political scientist, expresses it in a succinct way when he, in the context of the collapse of the Communist re- gime in Central and Eastern Europe, talks about the effect of “a defrosted fridge.” One of the prob- lems that resulted directly from this effect was the sudden rise in nationalism and the expansion of nationalist rage that had long been repressed by Communist nationalities policy. The totalitarian Communist regime mostly froze the nationalities issue in the context of attempting “a solution,” be- cause no solution was possible within a non-democratic political system. The collapse of the Commu- nist system, together with the failure of multinational empires, opened the question of searching for a national identity and forming nation-states, and not only in some of the Central European countries (the Czech Republic and Yugoslavia), but mainly directly within the Russian Federation, as well as in most of the of the former U.S.S.R. In particular, the unrestrained and politically minimally regulated development of events at the turn of the 1990s, on the part of the center (Mos- cow), led to an explosion of long-repressed and subdued national and ethnic demands in the periph- ery—in the Caucasus and Central Asia in particular.1

Russia and the Caucasus from a Historical Perspective

The Caucasus remains the most troubled of Russia’s peripheries. Both the Northern Caucasus (the republics of the Russian Federation) and the Central Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) are beset by a plethora of tribal, religious, and ethnic conflicts. Instability in the independent Central Cau- casian states has had a direct impact on the security of the Russian Federation, and vice versa.2 For Russia, the Caucasus is historically a key area that formed a natural geographic barrier in the past, separating its Empire from the Ottoman Empire and Persia. From a historical perspective, the forming and building of the czarist regime was completed in the 19th century, when it became grad- ually consolidated and Russia’s governmental-political and military position was strengthened as a consequence of easing the military pressure in the Caucasian and Central Asian geopolitical vector. The collapse of the czarist regime meant that the Caucasian countries acquired independence, however, with a chaotic and total governmental configuration of power, which lasted for a relatively short time. From 1922 to 1936, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia became part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Soviet era, or so-called Sovietization, afforded the states of the Central Caucasus very little opportunity to influence any of the processes going on in the region, even though the federation republics enjoyed formal autonomy. This had a serious impact on the sit-

1 See: S. Cornell, “Autonomy and Conflict: Ethnoterritoriality and Separatism,” in: The South Caucasus—Cases in Georgia, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2002. 2 See: J. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION uation inside the individual republics, while also caused deep changes in the social structure, as well as within the economic, cultural, and religious-ethnic segments. These changes were the direct result of rapid industrialization and irrational and forced collectivization in agriculture, but were mainly caused by intensive secularism and ideological indoctrination. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika, which attempted to democratize the Soviet system, resulted in certain national and ethnic demands that led to state-legal determination, while also opening up historical resentments and paving the way to disputes. In the Caucasus, this explosive mixture result- ed in the outbreak of several conflicts: Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the military conflict in the separatist regions of Georgia—South Ossetia and Abkhazia—that acquired the character of a civil war being just a couple of them. Since, after a colonial empire or multinational state collapses, it is always difficult for the former center to accept the independence of the periph- ery,3 the problem of conflicts in the Caucasus qualitatively reached a new dimension after 1991.

The Development of Russian Foreign Policy toward the Caucasian Region after 1991

The Period between 1991-2000

In the broader sense of the word, Russian policy regarding the Caucasus is part of the concept of the so-called Near Abroad. However, until this concept came to fruition, the issue of the so-called Near Abroad was on the periphery of Moscow’s interests, and this region was essentially left to “its own devices.” The government did not show any keen interest in the countries of the Near Abroad until the beginning of 1993, which was expressed in a number of statements by President and the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev. They supported the idea that Russia held special responsibility for security and stability in the former Soviet space, where international and regional organizations (the U.N. and OSCE) must inevitably provide Moscow with an adequate mandate for ensuring this security. This way of thinking was immediately labeled “the Monroe Doc- trine.” After resolution of the internal political crisis at the end of 1993, this alleged approach became Moscow’s official policy. The Russian Federation’s new military doctrine was adopted at the same time (in the fall of 1993), being the first official document to pay comprehensive and special attention to the stability of the regions in direct proximity to Russia’s borders. So, along with the Russia’s for- eign policy conception, which appeared in December 1992, the country’s first military doctrine was labeled “the Kozyrev Doctrine,” which was also considered to be a variant of “the Monroe Doctrine.” The subject-matter of both documents indirectly envisaged that, from Russia’s geopolitical perspec- tive, the post-Soviet space represents the highest priority and is an exclusive area of Russia’s national and security interests. Should Russia feel itself threatened, it had the right to undertake the necessary steps to defend itself. The matter of local regional conflicts was also reflected from the national security viewpoint in the doctrinal documents adopted by the Russian Federation after 1996 (the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation of 1997 and 2000 and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2000). In particular, Russia’s National Security Strategy of 1997 warns that the greatest threat in the security sphere is posed by the existing and potential hotbeds of local wars and military conflicts near

3 See: S. Cornell, The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Department of East European Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1999. 10 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russia’s state borders, which Russia will try to resolve peacefully. According to the Strategy, one of the tools for resolving them was to have been strengthening and enhancing relations with the CIS states, which is an important factor in helping to settle ethnopolitical and international conflicts and ensuring sociopolitical stability on Russia’s borders.4 The Strategy of 2000 also considered the rise and escalation of conflicts near Russia’s state border and the peripheral borders of the CIS member states to be an imminent threat, as well as the existence of seats of military conflict mainly near the Russian borders and the borders of its allies.5 Russia’s responsibility for development in the post-Soviet space as a whole was also supported by the increased attention focused on the CIS after 1993. Even though one of the aims of its establish- ment was to make use of the economic potential at that time and to retain the existing economic ties, Moscow gained the opportunity to enforce a different agenda on the CIS platform, including in the security sphere. In the context of the local military conflicts taking place in the post-Soviet space (in- cluding the Caucasus), the CIS strove to become the exclusive guarantor of the peacemaking system. What is more, the CIS enabled Russia to take on the role of a security moderator (manager) regarding these conflicts and at the same time hinder their excessive globalization by means of peaceful in- volvement of other players.

The Period between 2000-2010

After took office in 2000, the CIS strategy underwent radical reassessment. Foreign policy and multi-vector diplomacy concentrated on strengthening the bilateral dimension of political, security, and economic relations. The changed approach considerably influenced the Color Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), and also affected the geopo- litical rivalry in the Central Caucasus and Central Asia. The changes in foreign policy after 2000 also acknowledged adoption of a document called “Priority Tasks in the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” (2003). This document directly reflected the dynamics and changes in the security environment in international relations after 11 September, 2001, and at the same time meant a change in understanding the term “defense”—from territorial defense to defense of interests. What is more, the document signals that the Russian Federation is reserving itself the right to carry out preventive military strikes in the future if other states continue to apply forceful solutions in international relations. What is more, the then Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov mentioned the possibility of preventive strikes at the beginning of 2004 in an article written for the journal Russia in Global Affairs: “External threats require that the perform different kinds of tasks in various regions of the world. One should not absolutely rule out the preventive use of force, if this is required by Russia’s interests or its allied commitments.”6 The stated words assumed practical form in August 2008 during the military conflict in Georgia, when Russia, for the first time in its most recent history, used military force outside of its own territory. After 2003, the energy factor became an integral part of Russian foreign policy in connection with the gradual increase in oil and gas prices. During Putin’s second term, energy was introduced as a doctrinal factor in the statements made in 2007 and 2008. In 2009, excerpts from the upcoming

4 See: “Kontseptsia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1997 g.,” in: Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost sovremennoi Rossii, 1991-2002, ed. by T.A. Shakleina, MGIMO, Moscow, 2002, pp. 51-76. 5 See: “Kontseptsia natsionalnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 2000 g.,” in: Vneshniaia politika i bezopasnost sovremennoi Rossii, 1991-2002. 6 S. Ivanov, “Russia’s Geopolitical Priorities and Armed Forces,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 4, 2004, pp. 38-51. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION doctrine placed an even stronger emphasis on energy.7 For obvious reasons, greater attention was also focused on the Caucasus and the Caspian region, the latter drawing additional attention with respect to export routes of so-called Caspian oil. The importance of oil and gas sites in the Caucasus and the skyrocketed, especially after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and particularly after unclear ideas about the possibilities of several sites developed into practical extraction and business within the span of a few years. The energy aspect became an integral part of the conflict issue in the Caucasus and at the same time confirmed that Russia will make greater use of so-called soft power—economic power—to realize its interests. On the basis of the above, Russia’s strategy in the Central Caucasus can be divided into the fol- lowing key points: (1) Formation of a zone of Russia-friendly states; (2) Extraction regulation of mineral resources, supervision of their transportation, and preser- vation of the resulting economic effect; (3) Moderation of military conflicts in the area; (4) Exertion of political, economic, and military pressure on Azerbaijan, but mainly on Georgia; (5) Reduction of the influence of other states and super powers (the U.S., EU, Turkey) in the region and the ensuing repression of the Caucasian states’ (especially Georgia’s and Azer- baijan’s) attempts to carry out Euro-Atlantic integration; (6) Regulation of migration and the fight against drugs; (7) Preservation of the military presence in the region.8

Russia and Individual Conflicts in the Central Caucasus

In terms of Russia’s security conception, the greatest threat to its national security comes from the historically unstable southern regions of the former U.S.S.R.—zones of traditional Islamic dom- inance. According to the data of Russia’s ethnopolitical research center, more than 150 conflicts oc- curred in the former U.S.S.R. between 1988 and 1991, around 20 of which took human lives. The ethnic and interstate conflicts in the post-Soviet space posed the Russian Federation, as the largest and strongest CIS state, the problem of making an adequate response, despite the fact that at first some Russian experts (i.e. V. Alexandrov) evaluated the conflict level in the territory of the former Soviet Union as relatively low, as well as the level of Russia’s imminent military involvement in solving the existing conflicts.9 In 1992, and especially in 1993, Russia was clearly trying to abandon the position of passive bystander in conflict situations, which was also evidenced by its increased focus on augmenting its influence in the military conflicts going on in the Near Abroad.10 Even so, Russian diplomacy re- quired the U.N. to grant Russian forces the status of peacekeeping forces in individual conflict zones.

7 See: M. de Haas, “Russia’s Military Doctrine Development (2000-2010),” in: Russian Military Politics and Rus- sia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine, ed. by S.J. Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle (PA), 2011. 8 See: T. Šmíd, “Jižní Kavkaz,” in: Rusko jako geopolitický aktér v postsovìtském prostoru, ed. by P. Kuchyòková, T. Šmíd, Mezinárodní politologický ústav, Brno, 2006. 9 See: V. Alexandrov, “Diskussia: ‘Duga konfliktov’ i Rossia,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, Vol. 7, 1993, pp. 88-95. 10 See: B. Bekmurzaev, “Mirotvorcheskaia ro¾ Rossii v uregulirovanii vooruzhenykh konfliktov v SNG,” Pravo i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, Vol. 12, 1994, pp. 3-11. 12 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

For example, at a Civil Union forum in September 1992, President Boris Yeltsin gave a speech in which he said: “the moment has come for responsible international organizations to provide Russia with special competences as a guarantor of peace and stability in the territory of the former Soviet Union.”11 Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev claimed that Russia did not need the consent of international organizations for its peacekeeping operations, because it acts within the CIS and at the request of its concerned parties. The fact that the international community did not agree with this led Moscow to feel that the Western countries were ignoring its position concerning many important security issues. 12

Nagorno-Karabakh

The historically rooted ethnic tension between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorno- Karabakh began escalating in the final years of the Soviet Union’s existence. In 1988, the members of the Regional Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh declared the breakaway of the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, which neither Baku nor the Moscow center recognized. They tried to resolve the situation by transferring Nagorno-Karabakh under their direct administration (1989). However, at the end of the Soviet era, Moscow was on the side of Azerbaijan as its attitude represented preservation of the status quo. What is more, Baku did not show any inclination to pursue an independent policy, in contrast to Armenia, where it came to a quick awakening of nationalism and revisionism.13 The situation changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and the accession to power of President Abulfaz Elchibey, who introduced a strong anti-Russian bent in Baku’s foreign policy, which was also expressed, inter alia, by Azerbaijan’s refusal to join the CIS. This approach led Mos- cow to carry out a thorough reassessment of the situation and move toward a pro-Armenia position. Apart from that, Armenia alone began to realize after 1991 that, with regard to its foreign-policy orientation and geographical positioning, it must sustain good relations with Moscow. Since the first years of its independence, Erevan has had strong economic relations with Russia, which was also shown by the fact that the Armenian budget and its stability largely depend on loans from the Russian Central Bank.14 Therefore, Armenia is a traditional political and military ally of Russia in the Central Caucasus, which is the result not only of historical ties, but mainly of the country’s geopolitical posi- tion. Armenia was considered one of the most loyal Soviet nations in the Soviet era.15 The non-involvement of the Soviet units, in particular the Soviet Army’s 366th regiment inher- ited by the CIS forces, led to the conflict’s gradual intensification (from the military perspective) in 1992-1993. In February 1992, Armenian units invaded several Azerbaijan villages and occupied the strategic village of Khodzhali, which became a victim of terror by the Armenian forces. Armenians achieved further important military accomplishments by repressing the town of Shusha and the La- chin corridor connecting Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh. These were also the result of indirect military support from Moscow implemented in the form of illegal shipment of arms. Russia, however, greatly damaged its reputation with Azerbaijan by taking this step and de facto lost its position of a disinterested side. Under the influence of the military defeats, Baku attempted to overthrow Elchibey,

11 D. Malysheva, “Etnicheskie konflikty na iuge SNG i natsionalnaia bezopasnos• Rossii,” MEMO, No. 3, 1994, p. 30. 12 See: A. Sergunin, International Relations in Post-Soviet Russia: Trends and Problems, Nizhny Novgorod Lin- guistic University, Nizhny Novgorod, 2007. 13 See: S. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus, Curzon Press, Richmond, 2001. 14 See: E. Herzing, The New Caucasus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, The Royal Institute of International af- fairs, London, 1999. 15 See: R. Suny, Looking Toward Ararat. Armenia in Modern History, Indiana University Press, Indianapolis, 1993. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION who fled to Nakhchivan. Heydar Aliev came to power, the former chief of Azerbaijan’s Communist Party. Both externally and internally weak, Azerbaijan was not only compelled to join the CIS, but also to sign the Collective Security Treaty (1993). Baku, however, entered the so-called Tashkent Agreement, although it refused to adopt the security strategy approved at the CIS summit in February 1995. In particular, the Strategy con- firmed that the signatories would coordinate their security policy to prevent reoccurrence of the military conflicts and at the same time secure protection of the interests, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the concerned states. Azerbaijan did not adopt this Strategy, mainly because it was concerned about possible aggressors “from the outside,” i.e. outside the CIS, and not aggression from the inside, hinting at the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this respect, as early as June 1992, Armenia appealed for the mutual security pact to be used against Azerbaijan, which was not a sig- natory at that time. After depletion of both fighting sides, the conflict itself was quenched and frozen with Russia’s assistance during 1994 by the signing of a truce. However, Moscow did not succeed in deploying peacekeeping forces in the area, as it did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and could not even enforce a monopoly to resolve the conflict. Despite this, it retained a strong influence on the conflict’s reso- lution. During the peace process, the so-called OSCE Minsk Group tried to establish a long-term peace treaty and resolve the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and is still engaged in this process today. However, it has been unable to reach an agreement so far not only due to the non-compliance of the conflicting sides, but also because of Russia’s attempts to preserve the status quo.16

Georgia

Georgia’s importance stems from its geopolitical position, as it borders on all of the states in this geographic area, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and also Russia itself. What is more, Georgia has direct access to the Black Sea and, in the context of the tense Armenian-Azerbaijan relations resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, seems to be a crucial state from the perspective of laying existing and future oil and gas pipelines. The situation in Georgia was the most complicated of all of the states of the Central Caucasus after the U.S.S.R.’s disintegration. At the beginning of the 1990s, the political events developed rath- er unfavorably for the central government in Tbilisi with regard to its autonomous republics. The at- tempts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to develop politically outside of Georgia’s institutional struc- tures resulted in a military conflict. What is more, the entire situation was further complicated by the power dualism and disunity inside the state of Georgia (the political ambitions of Zviad Gamsakhur- dia). Even though it was unable to subdue the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia during 1992 and 1993, Tbilisi de facto lost all control over both of these territorial parts and also, due to Ajaria’s autarkic position, had to realistically face up to a state of disintegration. Russia used the extensive internal political weakening of the power center to force Tbilisi to join the CIS (1993) and accede to the Collective Security Treaty and an agreement on the deployment of peacemaking units in Abkhazia and South Ossetia officially operating under the CIS. The strength- ening of Russia’s position in the region was confirmed in 1995 by the drawing up of Russia-Georgia and Russia-Armenia agreements concerning the establishment of a total of six Russian military bases, four of which were in Georgia. In addition, both agreements contained a provision on border protec- tion. Eduard Shevardnadze tried to weaken Moscow’s influence by globalizing the conflict, i.e. by involving the U.N., the OSCE, and the U.S. when mediating discussions regarding the future status of

16 See: E. Souleimanov, “The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh,” in: OSCE Yearbook 2004, Institute for Peace Re- search and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp. 203-220. 14 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION both separatist republics; however, he did not manage to achieve this goal to its full extent. On the other hand, he was able to draw greater international attention to this issue since the economic and raw material factor (oil and natural gas) gained momentum as a result of this. Another indisputable achievement was gaining Russia’s consent to carry out a two- fold reduc- tion in Russian military bases in the territory of Georgia at the Istanbul OSCE summit (1999). In the foreign policy area, Tbilisi actively participated in establishing the so- called GUAM alignment (1997), a clear-cut political, economic, and strategic alliance, the aim of which was to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of its member states. In the energy sphere, the GUAM states estab- lished the Eurasian Trans-Caucasian corridor and began to cooperate on developing an energy net- work and building the Eurasian Trans-Caucasian corridor for oil transportation. Tbilisi’s foreign policy demarche against Moscow continued in 1999, when Georgia, together with Azerbaijan, did not extend the Collective Security Treaty (the so-called Tashkent Agreement). Even the alleged support of Chechen rebels, of which Moscow accused Tbilisi, did not help the over- all development of relations between Russia and Georgia during this period. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, the new leadership under President Mikhail Saakashvili made restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity a priority. Despite the withdrawal of Russian troops from Batumi and Akhalkalaki, relations between Russia and Georgia did not improve. From Russia’s view- point, Georgia’s aspirations for NATO membership became the most contentious issue in Russian- Georgian relations.17 The tension between Moscow and Tbilisi continuously intensified after 2006 as a consequence of a series of incidents and provocations (invasion of the air space by Russian planes, shooting down of a non-piloted Georgian plane, explosions on the transit gas pipeline from Russia to Georgia, espionage, and more). On the other hand, Russia, in an attempt to intensify the pressure on Georgia, did not hesitate to use not only economic sanctions in the form of wine and mineral water import bans, but also cut off postal and supply line communications, as well as apply labor migration measures. Even the remittances sent home by Georgians working in Russia alone were an important source of income for those who stayed behind. The Russian sanctions led to the expulsion of Geor- gians from Russia and created difficulties in transferring funds.18 For Georgia, international recognition of Kosovo in February 2008 had fatal implications, as did the failure to invite Tbilisi to participate in the NATO Membership Action Plan in April of the same year. Saakashvili, encouraged by the earlier successful re-integration of Ajaria and by interna- tional support, mainly from the U.S., carried out an unexpected military attack on South Ossetia in August 2008, which evoked a response from Moscow. Russia’s military response, which Georgia was unable to rebuff, expressly confirmed the conclusions of several experts that Moscow will con- tinue to intensively reinforce its influence in the future and not allow anyone to doubt its economic, political, and military-security interests in any key point of the post-Soviet geopolitical space. The aforementioned evaluation also applies to Moscow’s unchanged policy regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Conclusion

For Moscow, the Caucasian region has dual importance: on the one hand, as a source of instabil- ity related above all to the simmering conflict in Chechnia, and on the other, as a result of the compet-

17 See: L. Kuzmicheva, “Unresolved Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space: Russia’s Engagement in Conflict Manage- ment before and after Caucasus Crisis of 2008,” in: Panorama of Global Security Environment 2011, ed. by M. Majer, R. Ondrejcsák, V. Tarasoviè, T. Valáštek, CENAA, Bratislava, 2010. 18 See: O. Oiker, K. Crane, L. Schwartz, C. Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy. Sources and Implications, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ing geopolitical ambitions of the Central Caucasian states. The countries of the Central Caucasus not only represent an important buffer zone for Russia between the Russian Northern Caucasus and the Islamic world, especially its main rival Turkey, but also an area in which Russia feels threatened by the possible growth in influence of other players. In a certain sense, the Central Caucasus forms a gate for Russia’s influence on the Middle East and Central Asia. And last but not least, to retain its influ- ence in the geopolitical space of the Caucasus, Russia also needs to maintain control over the trans- portation routes of energy resources.19 Russian foreign and security policy in the Caucasus has undergone many changes during the twenty-year period since the fall of the Soviet Union, a significant number of which were imposed by outside circumstances and factors. The concept of the so-called Near Abroad adopted at the turning point of 1992/1993 introduced a thesis regarding Russia’s right to hold a dominant position in the post-Soviet space. Practical fulfillment of this goal, however, was significantly limited by internal, as well as external, power-political skills and possibilities. Also, for this reason, the status of “neither war, nor peace” of the local military conflicts in the Caucasus is more than convenient for Moscow, because it can “reactivate” these conflicts at any moment and skillfully use them to its own benefit. As for peacekeeping, Russia’s long-term goal is to eliminate existing or potential players (states and international organizations) that are politically, security-wise, or economically involved in the process of conflict resolution. Several provisions set forth in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation adopted in May 2009 also confirm this, which states, among other things, that “there is an increasing tendency to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regional basis, without the participation of non-regional powers.”20

19 See: S.M. Birgerson, After the Breakup of a Multi-Ethnic Empire: Russia, Successor States & Eurasian Security, Greenwood Press, 2001 20 See English text of Russia’s National Security Strategy, available at [http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-nation- al-security-strategy-to-2020].

Dmitry SHLAPENTOKH

Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor, Indiana University (Indiana, South Bend, the U.S.).

GEORGIA’S FLIRTATION WITH IRAN AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Abstract

ith the decline of both the U.S. and states of Eurasia have been engaging in ge- W Russia and with no visible single opolitical flirtation with several stronger pow- center of power in Eurasia, the small ers, even when these stronger powers are 16 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION at loggerheads with each other. The desire Georgian War when Washington did not to switch geopolitical loyalty, or at least dis- provide Tbilisi with the anticipated backing. tribute it among other states, is especially At that point, Georgia engaged in extensive tempting when the leaders of these small flirtation with Iran. Following the policy of the states think they have been betrayed. This pragmatic geopolitical game, Tbilisi tried to has been the case with the Georgian elite. maintain relations with both Tehran and Originally strongly pro-American, it was frus- Washington despite the bitter conflict be- trated in its expectations after the Russo- tween the U.S. and Iran.

Introduction

Since the Rose Revolution (2003), Georgia has been the staunchest supporter of the U.S. It was assumed that Georgia would be hostile toward any regime that was hostile to the U.S. However, a few years ago, Georgia started to flirt with the regimes and countries that could hardly be seen as allies of the U.S. Mikhail Saakashvili had an amicable meeting with Alexander Lukashenko, the Belarusian president, who is known in the West as the “last dictator in Europe,” and dramatically improved Geor- gia’s relations with Iran, the archenemy of the U.S. This indicates not just Iran’s increasing role in the geopolitical game, but is also a sign of how quickly alliances change. It also initiated the emerging multipolar world. It differs not only from the unipolar world that emerged after the collapse of the U.S.S.R., but also from that of the Cold War. Indeed, during the Cold War era, the global power/in- fluence was distributed between two major global powers—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Under the new arrangements, power became increasingly diffused among several regional power centers. Iran is emerging as one of them and is increasing its influence in various parts of the globe, including the former U.S.S.R. And it does this at the expense of global powers such as the U.S.

Georgia as an Ally of the U.S.

Georgia is one of the unstable states in the post-Soviet space with a tradition of violence that goes back to the end of Soviet era. It was then, in 1989, that Soviet troops used violence to suppress the demonstrations. When the U.S.S.R. collapsed, the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in- stalled. It did not survive very long, and Georgia lapsed into a bitter civil war. Later, the govern- ment of Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, emerged. However, Shevardnadze was neither able to improve the economic conditions of the country, nor overcome the rampant corruption, and was overthrown during the revolution of 2003. The new government of Mikhail Saakashvili was conspicuously pro-Western, to be more exact, pro-American. His policy was to make Georgia not just Western but, in a way, more Western than the West itself. The gov- ernment completely deregulated the economy, and some members of the government even accused the West of betraying its own free market principles. Saakashvili was also engaged in an ambitious plan to eradicate corruption. This was, indeed, a most ambitious enterprise if we recall that Georgia had the reputation of one of the most corrupt republics of the U.S.S.R., corruption that increased even more when Georgia became an independent state. Many observers asserted that no one could deal with the corruption. According to them, it was part of the national tradition and could only be eradicated through a blood bath. Despite the assertions of the skeptics, Saakashvili achieved im- pressive results in dealing with corruption, which is acknowledged even by those who are quite critical of his regime. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The fight against corruption has been interwoven with a sort of egalitarianism. I was told during my recent trip to Georgia that Saakashvili wanted to travel in the same airplane as ordinary citizens and that he only abandoned his plans when he was advised that this would create a serious problem for the other passengers. The regime also engaged in an unpresidential reinterpretation of Georgian his- tory. The new leadership’s approach to Stalin could be quite telling. The Georgians were very at- tached to Stalin, not because they approved of his policies, but plainly because he was the most fa- mous Georgian in history. This approach is not unique and has become especially pronounced among many nations that were part of either the Warsaw Treaty or the U.S.S.R. National pride has led many of them to choose the most unsavory characters as national heroes. For example, this is the case with the part of Ukraine where some Ukrainians made Symon Petliura, a nationalist and fascist anti- Semite, their national hero. Some segments of Georgian society clearly disapprove of such an ap- proach to the past. Stalin’s statue was finally removed from its place in Gori—his birthplace—and erected on the grounds of the Russian Occupation Museum. This notion of “Russian Occupation” also implied a post-Soviet interpretation of history and revising it to suit new post-Soviet Georgia. It im- plied that not just the era of the czar, but also of the U.S.S.R., was the time of the when ethnic Russians dominated and abused all the non-Russian minorities, the Georgians among them. While this notion of Georgian suffering from Russian domination is highly questionable, it can be noted that quite a few Russian nationalists regarded the U.S.S.R. as a state of minorities where they lorded over helpless ethnic Russians—it was still a revolutionary move in way. Indeed, Georgia was possibly the only post-Soviet state that made a bloody tyrant out of its most famous son and discarded the notion that he should be seen as a role model in any way. The notion is accepted by young Geor- gians. When I raised the question of Stalin’s legacy in a conversation with a young Georgian, asking how Georgians could treat Stalin in such a disgraceful way when he was the most famous of the Geor- gians, my acquaintance noted that the fact that Stalin was the most famous Georgian meant nothing. Indeed, he stated, the fact that Hitler was the most famous German does not mean that present-day Germans should keep his statue in German cities. This pro-Western approach is deeply connected with strong pro-American feelings and poli- cies. Georgians fully supported the American war in Afghanistan and sent Georgian soldiers to fight there. This rapprochement with Washington went along with the increasing tension with Moscow, which actually preceded Saakashvili victory. Indeed, as early as 2002, Moscow accused Tbilisi of implicit support of the Chechen rebels. Moscow stated that Chechens and other fighters had found refuge in some regions of Georgia1 and implicitly accused Tbilisi of doing nothing to prevent this. While the tension between Moscow and Tbilisi rose early on, it became even stronger after Saakashvili’s victory and his increasing gravitation toward Washington. Taking a strong anti- Russian stand, he clearly wanted to separate Georgia from Moscow. Saakashvili demanded that Moscow remove Russia’s military bases from Georgia and increasingly demonstrated his intention to take South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force if needed. Both ethnic enclaves were formally a part of Georgia, but actually became independent states, if not de jure, at least de facto, after the bloody wars that followed the collapse of the U.S.S.R. Their independence was supported by the presence of the Russian peacekeeper. The friction between Moscow and Washington, which seemed to be ready to support Georgia in the event of a possible collision with Russia, encouraged Tbilisi to regard Washington as its major geopolitical patron even more. When George Bush came to Georgia in 2005 he became an “instant national hero.”2 Saakashvili’s pro-American policy became so strong that one of the streets in Tbilisi, the Georgian capital, was named after George Bush, possi- bly the only street with such a name in the world. This Georgian gravitation toward the U.S. fit in

1 See: P.E. Tyler, “In Caucasus Gorge a Haven for Muslim Militants,” The New York Times, 28 February, 2002. 2 J. Traub, “The Georgia Syndrome,” Foreign Policy, 13 August, 2010. The article was republished in The Geor- gian Daily, 13 July, 2010. 18 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION well with the post-Soviet era when the U.S. quickly spread its influence in what was so recently the Soviet empire. At the beginning of the post-Soviet era, all or at least most of these post-Soviet re- publics and East European countries were convinced of Washington’s practically unlimited eco- nomic and military resources. Consequently, not only were many of those ex-Soviet states and East European countries—so recently part of Warsaw Treaty—ready to accept Washington’s patronage, they also became Washington’s most faithful allies. And this trend had increased dramatically by the beginning of Bush era.3 Georgia emerged not just as one of the most faithful allies, but also as a potential force that could well punish Russia when relations between Moscow and Washington soured by the end of what was, as can be assumed, Putin’s first term. Here the interests of both Washington and Tbilisi fairly well complemented each other. Consequently, Washington decided to deploy about 200 military special- ists to train and equip the Georgian armed forces.4 Indeed, it was assumed, and apparently not without grounds, that Georgia’s attack against South Ossetia in August 2008 was implicitly encouraged by the U.S. as a way to prod Russia. It was also assumed by Washington that Russia would follow the same model it has been exhibiting since the late Gorbachev era, which was nothing but ongoing geopolit- ical retreats. It was this feeling that stimulated Washington to give Tbilisi a nod of approval to retake breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which were formally still part of Georgia. It was assumed that the Russian peacekeeper would not put up much resistance and Moscow would acquiesce after, of course, some angry diplomatic barrages. However, the events did not follow the expected scenario. Moscow’s response was robust; it was clearly feared that Russian troops could well enter Tbilisi and there was a plan to capture or even kill Saakashvili.5 Soon enough Moscow recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Still for some Russian imperi- alists, the war was not directed as it should have been. Mikhail Deliagin, a well-known Russian pub- licist and scholar, noted in his op-ed in nationalistic Zavtra—one of the most well-known nationalis- tic publications in post-Soviet Russia—that the very fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were rec- ognized as independent states was of course quite a positive step. Still, this step was not enough to liberate Russia from being just a geopolitical appendix of the West.6 He and, of course, many other Russian imperialist nationalists assumed that the Medvedev/Putin tandem had reached its limits in its drive to “lift Russia from her knees.” However, Washington had also reached its limits. By that time, the “neo-con” doctrine, an ideological inspiration of the Bush Administration, had become increas- ingly unworkable. The projected blitzkrieg in Afghanistan and Iraq became a protracted war of attri- tion, and Washington had no desire to create additional problems for itself in the Caucasus. This had immediate repercussions for Washington’s relations with Tbilisi. Tbilisi’s request to be supplied with modern weapons was denied, and the Georgians bitterly complained about what they saw as a sign of betrayal. Indeed as a contributor to Wall Street Jour- nal noted in 2010, “Two years ago Georgian officials complained that the Bush administration re- fused to sell them anti-tank and air defense weapons.”7 The Georgians were also quite disappointed about the absence of direct U.S. support when Russian troops were near the gates of Tbilisi. More- over, “Washington has made it clear that Georgia made a mistake by attacking the breakaway prov- inces of South Ossetia on 7 August.”8 No one but Bin Laden grasped the Georgians’ sense of dis- appointment and bitterness. Soon after the end of Georgian/Russian War, he noted that those who believed the U.S. would protect them were wrong. And Georgia was a good case in point. Washing-

3 See: M. Dowd, “Bush’s Warsaw War Pact,” The New York Times, 26 February, 2003. 4 See: P.E. Tyler, “Moscow Fears G.I.s’ Role Could Deepen Conflicts,” The New York Times, 28 February, 2006. 5 See: “Polkovnik Kvachkov: ‘Byla postavlena zadacha zakhvatit’ Tbilisi i ubit’ Saakashvili,’” , 8 Sep- tember, 2008. 6 See: M. Deliagin, “Novye vlasovtsy,” Zavtra, No. 37 (773), 10 September, 2008. 7 M. Kaylan, “Georgia and the Limits of Russian Power,” The Wall Street Journal, 13 August, 2010. 8 N. Kralev, “Luring Belarus out of Russia’s Shadow,” The Washington Times, 7 October, 2008. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ton, Bin Laden noted, provided Georgia with the assurance that it would always protect it in the event of a conflict with Russia. However, Washington’s promises were worthless. The U.S. did not defend Georgia against Russia, and those who relied on Washington’s help would be rather disap- pointed.9 One of course had to wonder whether the Georgians were aware of this pronouncement by Bin Laden. Still, it is clear that quite a few of them were extremely disappointed. In any case, by the end of the Bush era, the U.S. had increasingly distanced itself from Georgia,10 and after the beginning of the Obama administration, relations between Tbilisi and Washington started to sour even more. The reason was the change in Washington. Obama clearly moved toward improving the U.S.’s relationship with Russia, increasingly leaving Georgia out in the cold. This part of the U.S.’s general strategy implied that the country understood the limits of its resources. Moreover, the changes in the foreign policy posture were implicitly related to the understanding that resources were rapidly dwindling.

Change in American Policy

For some of neo-conservatives, Obama’s reluctance to stand behind Georgia, his plans to with- draw from Iraq and from Afghanistan as well, in addition to other similar foreign policy steps, dem- onstrated that the Obama administration had made some horrible blunders and exhibited naivety, if not betrayal. Robert Kagan, one of the most influential neo-conservative ideologists, elaborated on what he regarded as a mixture of naiveté and treason in Obama’s foreign policy succulently enough.11 According to Kagan, Obama implicitly followed the European elite’s myopic vision of the world, which implied that national interests could be peacefully reconciled and problems could be solved through negotiation instead of a display of force. As a result of this mixture of short-sightedness and naiveté, according to Kagan, “Administration officials play down the idea that the great powers have clashing interests that might hamper cooperation.”12 Consequently, Obama tried to accommodate China and Russia “rather than attempting to contain the ambitions of those powers.”13 The same blun- der/treason could be seen in Obama’s treatment of allies and implicitly Georgia. Indeed, according to Kagan, “The Obama administration’s new approach raises the question of whether the will continue to favor democracies, including allied democracies, in their disputes with the great pow- er autocracies…”14 And this was surely the road to geopolitical disaster. “In this new mode, the Unit- ed States may be unhinging itself from the alliance structure it had erected in the post-World War Two strategy.”15 There is no doubt that quite a few Georgians, especially members of the Georgian elite, share this rather negative view of Washington and believe that the U.S. had actually betrayed them. Isra- el, a close U.S. ally, all recent friction notwithstanding, gave Georgia an additional bitter pill. Georgia has always been a nation with an extremely friendly approach toward Jews. The tradition goes back to the late Soviet era when Georgia experienced no anti-Semitism, which was not only

9 See: “Bin Laden napomnil evropeitsam o sud’be Gruzii,” Kavkaz Center, 26 September, 2009. 10 See: “Saakashvili bol’she ne v favore,” Kavkaz Monitor, 4 August, 2009. 11 It should be noted here that while quite critical in regard to Obama’s foreign policy at the beginning of his ad- ministration, Kagan changed his view later and noted with approval that Obama accepted some of the crucial aspects of his philosophy. Kagan believed that the assumption about the U.S. decline was wrong. 12 R. Kagan, “Obama’s Post-American World,” IWMPost, No. 103, March 2010, p. 14. 13 Ibidem. 14 Ibid., p. 151. 15 Ibid., p. 15. 20 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION encouraged by the authorities, but also had a grassroots appeal among the populace in many parts of the former U.S.S.R. It was not accidental that independent Georgia soon established the most friendly relations with Israel which, of course, received the U.S.’s blessings. It was not surprising that Georgia expected substantial military backing from both the U.S. and Israel. At the same time, the Georgians were quite disappointed, and not only with the U.S., but also with Israel. Israel had been delivering a lot of modern weapons to Georgia. However, Israel soon ended its weapons de- livery as the result of Russia’s pressure.16 At the same time, relations with the Obama administra- tion continued to deteriorate. Indeed, the news was even more disappointing regarding the U.S. under Obama, which should have been Georgia’s major geopolitical patron at a time when Georgia was still in great danger. Indeed, even after the Russo-Georgian War, if we are to believe some observers, Russian troops were “within 20 miles of Tbilisi,”17 and Moscow seemed to have achieved its goal. Indeed, according to François Heisbourg, special adviser to the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, Russia “has incapacitated the Georgian military, denied Tbilisi its much-hoped-for NATO status, and put the Georgian leader it despises—Mikheil Saakashvili—in a tough position.”18 Not only does Moscow seem to have achieved most of its strategic goals, it is also doing its best to humiliate Saakashvili personally. Moscow propagandists are very aware that a machismo self-im- age is essential for self-respect in the mind of a Georgian man, and Saakashvili is no exception in the view of these Moscow ideologists. For this very reason, they assigned Tina Kandelaki to denigrate Saakashvili. Tina Kandelaki, one of the leading Russian TV anchors, proclaimed that in the past Georgian men were sex symbols. Saakashvili, however, is not sexy and clearly a man with a derailed psyche.19 The very fact that Kandelaki is an ethnic Georgian and a woman should have made her statement especially humiliating for Saakashvili. It seems that Saakashvili was besieged from all sides and thus expected strong support from Washington. It would be wrong to assume that Georgia had no friends in Washington. Quite a few of them were Republicans. Some of them, such as Senator and Republican presidential candidate John McCain, see Putin’s/Medvedev’s Russia as an aggressive authoritarian power driven by neo-imperial ambitions and bound to regain absolute control over the post-Soviet space. McCain also implicitly sees the Russian elite as being solidly “Eurasianist” in its geopolitical posture and, thus, regards Iran as Rus- sia’s foremost ally. Consequently, the U.S. should stand behind Georgia.20 McCain assumed that “Georgians feel that Washington is selling them out to Moscow at the price of our ‘hitting the reset button’.”21 It is not just Republicans who were disappointed with Washington’s treatment of Tbilisi. For example, Michael McFaul, the National Security Council official “responsible for Russia and Eurasia” and later ambassador to Russia, had the same views.22 Still, these views do not shape Obama’s policy. There are clear feelings of “imperial overstretch”—the popular theory put into circu- lation by British historian and international relations specialist Paul Kennedy almost two generations ago—and these feelings even influence some members of the Bush cabinet where “neo-conserva- tives” rule supreme. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, whom Obama inherited from the previous ad- ministration, was originally on the side of Georgia, but understands that the U.S.’s resources are shrinking—the reason why he engaged in spectacular budget cuts, not as a result of “peace divi- dends,” but because of the increasing shortage of resources, which became evident even before the budget crunch and fear of a U.S. default later on. In general, financial restraints became increasingly

16 See: “Repots: Israel Halts Arms Sale to Georgia,” Civil.ge, 5 August, 2008. 17 M. Kaylan, op. cit. 18 Quoted from: R. Marquand, “Russia’s Big Caucasus Win,” Christian Science Monitor, 14 August, 2008. 19 See: “Kandelaki: ‘Saakashvili—nesportivnyi i neseksual’nyi,’” Rosbalt, 13 August, 2010. 20 See: “Makkeina razdrazhaet Rossia,” Rosbalt, 12 August, 2010. 21 Saudi Gazette, 28 May, 2010. 22 J. Traub, op. cit. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the force that shaped the U.S.’s foreign policy posture. Consequently, “the Obama administration is embracing austerity when it comes to providing economic assistance to the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus.”23 The financial restraints also shaped a much broader geopolitical agenda and not just the way foreign aid was distributed or the military posture maintained. Obama tried not to irritate Moscow much—at least this was the initial design—in order to be able to concentrate remaining American power where its presence was most crucial, that is, in the Middle East. In addition, Washington hoped to induce Moscow to participate in the war in Afghanistan and scored some success here. For example, Russian and U.S. troops are engaged in a joint operation to destroy drugs in Afghani- stan.24 All of this has changed Washington’s approach to the East European countries and some of the republics of the former U.S.S.R. The U.S. lost interest in Ukraine and Georgia plainly because the U.S. elite understood that Washington did not have enough forces to dominate all over the world. And Georgia and Ukraine are not one of Washington’s priorities.25 It was assumed that with all problems created by Moscow, the U.S. should focus on Iran rather than on Russia, which is implicitly seen as a more opportunistic power that tries to flirt with both Iran and the West. The Obama administration implicitly sees Russia as a pragmatic, if not consistent, “fox,” to employ Vilfredo Pareto’s definition; and members of the Obama administration definitely see no inherited “Eurasian” imperialism in present-day Russia’s political culture. Consequently, Denis Mc- Donough, National Security Council Chief of Staff, thinks Georgia is hardly a U.S. priority, and even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to Georgia led to no visible results for Georgia. Despite verbal condemnation of Russia’s policies, she did not “offer the Georgians any deterrent hardware.”26 Predictably, the result was quite pleasing for Moscow27 and disappointing for Tbilisi. “A senior U.S. diplomat has strongly denied any assumption that Washington has placed an arms embargo on Georgia, but also said on 29 June that arms sale was not a solution to Georgia’s prob- lems.”28 The last part of the sentence undoubtedly reaffirmed the suspicions in the minds of the Georgians that Washington was indeed trying to prevent selling advanced weapons to Georgia,29 and this had the most negative implication for the Georgian army, which lost much of its equipment after Russo-Georgian War. It was actually the end of rearmament of the Georgian army, regardless of Tbilisi’s continuous tense relations with Russia. The sense of betrayal became especially strong when Russia deployed S-300 antiaircraft missiles in Abkhazia. Tbilisi proclaimed that this would create a serious danger for European security.30 Despite Georgia’s protest and appeal to the U.S. to defend Georgia, Washington was calm and indicated that it saw no reason to change its approach to Moscow.31 The Europeans were equally undisturbed, and the EU expressed its displeasure with Tbilisi by proclaiming that it was Georgia that was responsible for the war.32

23 J. Kucera, “Central Asia & Caucasus: Obama Administration Adopts Moderate Assistance Stance,” Eurasianet.org, 10 February, 2010. 24 See: “Rossia i SShA proveli sovmestnuiu silovuiu operatsiiu na territorii Afganistana,” Komsomolskaia pravda, 30 October, 2010; “V nachale byl geroin,” Lenta.ru, 30 October, 2010. 25 See: V. Dabovyk, “Kyiv and Tbilisi: No Longer Washington’s Favorites?” PONARS Eurasia Policy Perspec- tives, July 2010; M. Corso, “Georgia: Tbilisi to Trumpet Security Success. NATO, OSCE Summits,” EurasiaNet.org, 10 November, 2010. 26 M. Kaylan, op. cit. 27 See: “Vladislav Vorob’ev: ‘Gruzia bol’she ne Dzhordzhiia,’” Rossiiskaia gazeta, 7 July, 2010. 28 “U.S. Official: We have No Arms Embargo on Georgia,” Civil.ge, 30 June, 2010. 29 See: K. Belianinov, G. Dvali, “Mikhail Saakashvili vernulsia iz Ameriki bez oruzhiia,” Kommersant, 17 January, 2011. 30 See: “ROAR: “Enemies had Better Not Fly to Abkhazia,” available at [www.russiatoday.com], 13 August, 2010. 31 See: “Rossia-Gruzia: raketami po vorob’iam,” Rosbalt, 13 August, 2010; “SShA ne vidiat novosti v fakte razver- tyvaniia Rossiei S-300 v Abkhazii,” RIA Novosti, 13 August, 2010. 32 See: D. Panovkin, “Tbilisi proignoriroval PASE,” Rosbalt, 17 January, 2011. 22 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The sense of ungratefulness was amplified by the fact that Saakashvili tried to convey the mes- sage that despite of all of the problems with the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, he not only still regarded Georgia as a true democratic and pro-Western country in the post-Soviet space, but also firmly believed that finally all of its problems with the West and the U.S. would be solved. Conse- quently, Saakashvili believed that Georgia would join NATO anyway33 and insisted that English be taught all over the country.34 However, despite of all of these manifestations of goodwill by the Geor- gian elite, the Obama administration continued to demonstrate a rather cold approach toward Tbilisi. Not only the Obama administration, but also members of the Bush team continued to send negative messages to Tbilisi. The situation involving Condoleezza Rice—Secretary of State during the Bush era—is a good case in point. It was Rice and Bush who actually encouraged the Tbilisi conflict with Moscow.35 While having a grudge against them, Tbilisi still regarded them as more understanding, and Saakashvili was anxious to restore the old ties whenever Condoleezza Rice visited Georgia. Still she tried to avoid meeting with Saakashvili.36 This was a sign both of political or even personal hu- miliation for Saakashvili. And the problem was not just Saakashvili. It was clear that the Georgian elite was not happy with the U.S.’s approach to the problems in the region37 and believed that the U.S. was selling it out for the sake of better relations with Russia.38 All of this led to feelings accumulating among the Georgian elite that it had been double crossed and that Georgia could well find itself alone in the event of a possible new open conflict with Russia. The sense of isolation was of course an im- portant reason why Tbilisi started to reevaluate its relations with Washington and take steps that could not please the U.S. There were, of course, many reasons for this abrupt and quite risky turn. There is a geopolitical consideration, which could be framed in the context of more or less traditional geopo- litical thinking: Georgia starting looking for a possible alternative to the U.S. Traditional geopolitics, of course, played quite an important role here. However, Georgia’s behavior could not be reduced to just calculating, cold, real politics. These considerations and the sense of deep disappointment with the U.S. are very much relat- ed to cultural traditions and expectations of what relations between powers and states should entail. More than perhaps most European nations, the Georgians have preserved their traditional dedica- tion to friends and guests found in the distant European past or still alive today in some parts of Asia. Georgian hospitality is legendary, and guests are expected to reciprocate. The fact that the U.S. did not do this after the Georgians did their best to demonstrate their loyalty was deeply offen- sive. Last but not least, Georgian foreign policy cannot be understood without taking into account President Saakashvili’s personality. Even those sympathetic to him assume that he is a “tempestu- ous and reckless figure.”39 While those who are hostile to him see him as almost insane.40 Moreo- ver, some of those close to him share the same temperament. For these reasons, it can be assumed that, contrary to the U.S., there is no clear division in the Georgian elite with respect to foreign policy, so Saakashvili could be pro-American today, anti-American tomorrow, and change direc- tions once again in the future. Whatever the reason/reasons for Tbilisi to be upset with Washington, and with the West in general, it/they did in fact exist and Tbilisi was in search of a new geopolitical patron, whereby Iran emerged as one of the important alternatives to the West. Georgia not only turned to Tehran because it wished to punish Washington/Brussels, it was not just a form of pecu-

33 See: “Gruzia ozhidaet priema v NATO,” News, 26 August, 2010. 34 See: “Saakashvili nashel sebe russkogo preemnika,” Utro.ru, 28 August, 2010. 35 See: “Snachala byli bol’shie nadezhdy a teper’ bol’shoe razocharovanie,” Nakanune.ru, 3 September, 2010. 36 See: “Kondoliza Rais: strannyi visit v Gruziiu,” Vesti.ru, 7 September, 2010; “Kondoliza Rais udrala ot Mishiko v Irlandiiu,” Kaliningrad.kp.ru, 6 September, 2010. 37 See: “Amerikanskie senatory prosiat B. Obamu razmestit’ v Gruzii radar PRO SShA napravlennyi na Iran,” Iran News, 11 February, 2011. 38 See: “Obespokoennaia Gruzia sblizhaetsia s Iranom i Turtsiei,” inoSMI.Ru, 28 May, 2010. 39 J. Traub, op. cit. 40 See: “Kandelaki: ‘Saakashvili—nesportivnyi i neseksual’nyi.’” Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION liar diplomatic revenge, but also because of the sense that there was a new turn in global order. Tbilisi understands, or at least feels, that now global affairs are not only run from Washington, or Washington and Moscow, as in the past, but from different places. Consequently, backing from Tehran might be as good or, in some cases, even better than from Washington, Moscow, or Beijing. While continuing its attempts to find solutions to the problems with Moscow, Tbilisi started its unexpected flirtation with Tehran, giving very little thought to what bad feelings this might arouse in Washington.

Georgian/Iranian Economic Ties

Building economic ties between Tehran and Tbilisi was the safest endeavor, at least from Tbi- lisi’s perspective. The people in Tbilisi could always tell Washington that they were driven by purely pragmatic considerations but that their geopolitical heart still belonged to the U.S. Moreover, they could claim that strengthening economic ties with Tehran was merely a response to Moscow’s bully- ing. And here Tbilisi would not be totally off the mark. Indeed, even before the 2008 war, relations between Tbilisi and Moscow had taken a sharp turn for the worse, and Moscow immediately made use of the economy to show Tbilisi its displeasure. Georgia was heavily dependent on gas supplies from Russia, which it inherited from the Soviet era, so in 2006, Moscow created serious problems for Tbi- lisi by blocking gas deliveries. At the same time, in 2006, Iran provided Georgia with gas.41 By 2010, the initial and rather sporadic economic ties had dramatically expanded. In the summer of 2010, Geor- gia and Iran discussed plans for economic cooperation in energy production and distribution.42 Te- hran continued to imply that it was ready to provide Georgia with gas/oil. At the same time, Iran also wanted to benefit from access to the broad market via Georgia.43 While Iran’s plan to sell gas on the broad market via Georgia was just an abstract plan, this was not the case with the Georgian electricity exported to Iran.44 While cooperation in energy was indeed a major aspect of Georgian/Iranian coop- eration, it was not the only one. Agriculture, transportation, and other aspects of economic coopera- tion continued to be discussed by both the Iranian and Georgian sides throughout 2010/2011.45 Eco- nomic relations were reinforced by increasing cultural ties and contacts between the citizens of the two countries. By 2011, visa requirements for citizens of Iran and Georgia who decided to visit either country for short time were abolished.46 Direct flights were also established between Georgia and Iran.47 As a result, the number of tourists from Iran who visited Georgia increased dramatically.48

41 See: “Iran aktiviziruetsia na Kavkaze,” Iran News, 14 January, 2011. 42 See: “Georgii Lomsadze: ‘Tbilisi pytaetsia raspolozhit’ k sebe Iran, Vashington nabliudaet za proiskhodiash- chim,” RT.KORR Rossia, 2 June, 2010. 43 See: “Iranskuiu neft’ i gaz v perspektive mogut nachat’ postavliat’ na Ukrainu,” Iran News, 11 November, 2010. 44 See: “Gruzia v nachale 2014 g. zavershit stroitel’stvo VL-400 KB,” Energon’ius, 11 July, 2011; “Gruzia budet eksportirovat’ elektroenergiiu v Iran,” Iran News, 8 July, 2011. 45 See: “Iran, Georgia Discuss Cooperation in Agriculture,” Civil.ge, 2 June, 2010; “Iranskim predprinimateliam budet okazano sodeistvie,” Iran News, 24 April, 2001; “Iran i Gruzia podpisali dogovor po sotrudnichestvu v oblasti transporta,” Iran News, 14 March, 2011. 46 See: “Bezvizovyi rezhim mezhdu Gruziei i Iranom vstupit v silu s 26 ianvaria,” Iran News, 13 January, 2011. 47 See: “Aviakompaniia ‘Airzena’ osushchestvila pervyi reis iz Tigerana v Batumi,” Iran News, 8 July, 2011; “Priamoe aviasoobshchenie Tbilisi-Tegeran zaderzhivaetsia na dve nideli,” Iran News, 2 October, 2010; “Mezhdu Iranom i Gruziei s oktiabria otkroetsia priamoe vozdushnoe soobshchenie,” Iran News, 22 September, 2010. 48 See: “Bezvizovyi rezhim mezhdu Gruziei i Iranom ekonomicheski vygoden—posol,” Iran News, 14 January, 2011; “Bisnesmeny iz Irana profinansiruiut stroitel’stvo riada GES v Gruzii,” Robalt, 5 November, 2010; “Gruzino-iran- skaia turisticheskaia kompaniia predstavit novyi proekt,” Iran News, 29 November, 2011. 24 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

There was increasing emphasis on the extensive historical/cultural ties between the two countries. Consequently, Tbilisi organized conferences and exhibitions related to Iran. Tehran reciprocated and organized conferences focused on Georgia.49 While Tbilisi could have convinced Washington that its economic relations with Tehran were purely pragmatic and had no geopolitical implica- tions, the increasing cultural and diplomatic ties with Tehran could not be explained in the context of pure economic pragmatism and could well have irritated Washington. Indeed, a Georgian ob- server expressed doubt that abolishment of the visa requirements between Georgia and Iran had been discussed with Washington.50 Moreover, Washington was sending an unmistakable signal to Tbilisi that it was displeased by Tbilisi’s much improved relations with Tehran and that even cul- tural/economic relations between Tbilisi and Tehran were not something Washington encouraged. The message was sent in an indirect way. It was stated that the U.S. regarded Iran as responsible for spreading drugs. Iran’s improving relations with Georgia helped drug pushers from Iran to send drugs to the wider community. Thus, the U.S. accused Georgia of being a channel for wider drug circulation.51 Georgia disagreed.52 Curiously enough, the way Washington expressed its displeas- ure with Tbilisi’s behavior was quite similar to the way Moscow conveyed its displeasure with Tbilisi. Indeed, as soon as relations between Moscow and Tbilisi soured, Russia immediately found problems with Georgian wines and mineral water. While lately the relations between Washington and Tbilisi have improved somewhat, Tbilisi is continuing to maintain cordial relations with Te- hran and engage in cultural exchanges with Iran.53 It should also be said that Georgia’s desire to improve relations with Iran was welcomed by Tehran, which has always been anxious to avoid diplomatic isolation. The increasing diplomatic ties, tourism, and cultural exchanges were not the only signs of a deep freeze in Georgian-U.S. relations at the beginning of Obama’s term. The rela- tions between Georgia and Iran also acquired clear geopolitical overtures.

Georgian/Iranian Political Rapprochement

Iran has a historically strong influence in the Caucasus, including Georgia.54 However, this long history of Iranian domination/influence in Georgia was not only of little significance throughout the czarist and Soviet eras, but also at the beginning of post-Soviet era when a thaw in relations could well be followed by a deep freeze. It was not Iran but Russia and lately the U.S. that were seen as Georgia’s major geopolitical patrons. Nevertheless, diplomatic and geopolitical relations between Tehran and Tbilisi began early on. Georgia and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1992, and since 1994 a Georgian embassy has been functioning in Tehran. In 1995, Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) visited Georgia. In 2004, Saakashvili visited Iran and met Mohammad Khatami, the Iranian president in 1997-2005. Still at that time, the contacts with Iran were not seen as damaging U.S./Georgian relations. Indeed, Washington had quite a positive attitude toward Khatami and regarded him as a sort of Iranian Gorbachev who would improve Iran’s relations with the West. Even Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s advent to power was quite likely not seen as being absolutely threat-

49 See: “V Irane proidet mezhdunarodnyi seminar posviashchennyi Gruzii,” Gruzia, 22 September, 2010. 50 See: “Gruziia-Iran: vizy otmeneny,” Iran News, 31 January, 2011. 51 See: “Levan Vepkhvadze: “Nel’zia sviazyvat’ otmenu viz mezhdu Gruziei i Iranom s narkotrafikom,’” Iran News, 6 March, 2011. 52 See: “Mid Gruzii ne vidit ugroz narkotrafika so storony Irana,” Iran News, 6 March, 2011. 53 See: “V Tbilisi otkroetsia fotovystavka rabot iranskogo fotografa,” Iran News, 31 January, 2011. 54 See: V. Evseev, “Iranskie lokti na iuzhnom Kavkaze,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 November, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ening to Washington in the first year of his rule. It can be assumed that Washington regarded his anti- Western and anti-Israel escapades as a temporary phenomenon. Tbilisi could also well have assumed that close relations with Tehran would not damage Tbilisi’s relations with Washington. Moreover, Tbilisi might have assumed that Washington would actually be pleased with Georgia’s contacts with Iran, since this meant Tbilisi could play the role of intermediary between Washington and Tehran. Consequently, in 2006, Deputy Foreign Secretary of Iran visited Georgia and Saakashvili told him that he was inviting Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to visit Georgia.55 Despite all of Tbilisi’s flirting with Tehran, Tbilisi still regarded Washington as a major patron. The very fact that relations between Washington and Tehran became extremely tense was definitely noted by both Tbilisi and Tehran and “in 2008, Iranian-Georgian relations were put on ice—really cold ice—for almost a year after Geor- gia agreed to extradite an Iranian citizen to the U.S. on charges of smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy.”56 By the beginning of Obama’s presidency, Iranian/Georgian relations had become quite warm again. However by 2010, the context of Georgian/Iranian relations was very different, since by that time Tehran had emerged as a mortal enemy of Washington and, in a way, the entire West. Moreover, Iran emerged as isolated from most of the other major centers of power. Relations with Moscow can serve as good example here. Tehran’s flirtation with Moscow has a long history. Some members of the Russian elite even had serious thoughts about building a full-fledged military/geopolitical alli- ance with Tehran in the 1990s. This was a lynchpin of Eurasianism, a philosophical and quasi-polit- ical doctrine that emphasized Russia’s Asian heritage and geopolitical gravitation. However, by the end of what can now be regarded as Putin’s first term, relations between Tehran and Moscow had become increasingly tense and, by 2010, Moscow had joined the West in imposing tough sanctions on Tehran. Admittedly, Moscow proclaimed that it was against attacks on Iran, which the West accused of developing a nuclear program. Still, Moscow began dragging its feet with respect to supplying Tehran with advanced weapons and finally, by 2010, had joined Western sanctions.57 Consequently, Iran became increasingly dissatisfied with Russia, which Tbilisi still regarded as a mortal threat to Georgia.58 The very fact that Iran’s relations with Russia lost the degree of trust they enjoyed in the late 1990s/early 2000s—the era of “Eurasianism” popularity among the Russian elite—provided Tbili- si with additional incentives to look at Tehran as a potential ally/geopolitical prop. However, it was not just Tehran’s defiance of both Moscow and Washington that made Iran attractive in the eyes of the Georgian elite. The most important thing here was Iran’s political culture—its faithfulness to allies and its readiness to defend them regardless of everything, including in a direct confrontation with the U.S.—a superpower. Iran’s approach to the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006 is a good case in point. Indeed in 2006, Israel engaged in war with Lebanon and was ready to strike Syria, which supported the anti-Israeli forces in Lebanon. Tehran made it clear that in the event of an attack against Syria, it would strike against Israel, regardless of the fact that Israel was strongly supported by the U.S. As a matter of fact, Bush’s Washington, in contrast to Obama’s Washington, was quite ready to engage in war with Iran. By the act of supporting Syria, Iran demonstrated that it was not only not afraid of direct confrontation with the U.S., a superpower, but was faithful to its allies. All of this was certainly noted by Tbilisi. It is true that Tbilisi had no desire to burn its bridges and most of the avenues of rapprochement with Tehran were in the economic and cultural realm. However, as Tbilisi’s frustration with Washington grew, it took a step clearly intended to show Washington that Georgia had a choice, and an alliance with Iran could well substitute its relations with the U.S.

55 See: “Glava MID Irana oformit s Gruziei bezvizovyi rezhim,” Iran News, 1 November, 2010. 56 H.S. Edwards, “Babylon & Beyond,” Los Angeles Times, 5 November, 2010. 57 See: “Novaia provokatsiia protiv Irana,” Iran News, 31 October, 2010. 58 See: “Posol Irana shantazhiruet Moskvu grozia terrorizmom, narkotrafikom i razvalom Rossii,” NEWSru.com, 27 October, 2010. 26 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Consequently, in May 2010, Ahmadinejad was invited to visit Georgia59 and Foreign Minister of Iran, Manouchehr Mottaki, was tentatively expected to visit Georgia in June 2010.60 In late May, it was reported that “Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze last week hailed a ‘new stage’ in relations with Iran as she hosted the Islamic Republic’s foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparasat.”61 Both sides expressed the desire to expand relations in the future. “Bilateral rela- tions between Iran and Georgia are entering a ‘new stage’ and Tbilisi hopes ties will further deepen,” Nino Kalandadze, Georgian deputy foreign minister, said on 22 May, 2010.62 Georgian/Iranian con- tacts continued through the fall.63 In November 2010, Saakashvili had a conversation with Mottaki and thanked Iran for its support of Georgia’s territorial integrity.64 Here Iran implicitly emerged as the geopolitical patron that defended Georgia against Russia, which had transformed South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Russian protectorates. Tbilisi/Tehran relations did indeed become quite close, and there were rumors that Georgia was selling Iran weapons it received from Ukraine. Iran was certainly ready to move closer to Georgia. Indeed, it is not religion but national interests that are the driving force behind Iran’s foreign affairs, and Tehran’s rapprochement with Tbilisi indicates this, along with other actions.65 It can also be stated that Iran’s improved relations with Georgia were designed to create a broader strategy. Indeed, Iran has been developing relations with many countries of the former U.S.S.R. It can also be added that Iran was not the only country in the Middle East with which Georgia tried to forge relations. Turkey was the other country.66

New Georgia/U.S. Rapprochement

By 2011, the Obama administration discovered that rapprochement with Moscow was not working, or at least not much was expected there, and the approach to Tbilisi changed once again. By 2011/2012, the U.S. planned to provide Georgia with some weapons,67 despite Moscow’s strong pro- tests. In addition, Washington assumed that Tbilisi would make a positive move with respect to “hu- man rights,”68 while before, as it was implied, it was sliding in an authoritarian direction. In response, Tbilisi immediately proclaimed that its relations with the U.S. were the most important for Georgia and, as some observers implied, Georgia was ready to support all of the U.S.’s endeavors, including a strike against Iran. Moreover, there were rumors that, in preparation for the war with Iran, the U.S. was building hospitals and airports in Georgia,69 and Georgia actually encouraged the U.S. to strike against Iran.70 However, there was no return to the previous trust, and both sides continued to view each other with considerable skepticism. It was also quite unlikely that Tbilisi would abandon its

59 See: “Obespokoennaia Gruzia sblizhaetsia s Iranom i Turtsiei.” 60 See: “Iranian FM Expected to Visit Georgia in June,” Civil.ge, 21 May, 2010. 61 Saudi Gazette, 28 May, 2010. 62 See: “Georgian Deputy FM: ‘New Stage in Georgia-Iran Relations,’” Civil.ge, 22 May, 2010. 63 See: “Gruzia i Iran rassmatrivaiut perspektivy razvitiia sotrudnichestva —MID,” Iran News, 18 September, 2010. 64 See: “Mikhail Saakashvili prinial glavu MID Irana,” Regnum, 5 November, 2010. 65 See: “Iran: mezhdu ideologicheskoi dogmoi i pragmatizmom,” Iran News, 17 April, 2010; On economic and po- litical collaboration between Iran and Georgia, see also: “Ekspert: Sblizhenie Gruzii i Irana opasno bez soglasiia Zapada,” Rosbalt, 3 November, 2010. 66 See: “Saakashvili Hails Georgia-Turkish Ties as Exemplary,” Civil.ge, 17 May, 2010. 67 See: “U.S. Senior Diplomat on Defense Cooperation with Georgia,” Civil.ge, 10 January, 2012. 68 “SShA: v Gruzii imeet mesto ogranichenie svobody slova,” Komsomolskaia pravda, 9 April, 2011. 69 See: “Vzorvet li Iran Rossiiu i Kavkaz?” Iran News, 24 January, 2012. 70 See: “Gruzia provotsiruet amerikano-iranskuiu voinu?” Iran News, 24 August, 2010. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION rapprochement with Tehran completely just to please Washington. It was even less likely that Geor- gia would be happy to see conflict between Iran and the U.S., in which it would be directly involved on the side of the U.S. After all of its experience with Washington—with both the Republican and Democratic administrations—Tbilisi clearly became suspicious about Washington’s intentions to be fully on the side of its allies, despite all the rhetoric, and Washington’s subsequent foreign policy moves did not inspire much trust in Washington’s commitments. Tbilisi, of course, was watching the U.S.’s treatment of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak was a faithful American ally for generations and was praised by both the Republicans and Democrats. However, when the going got tough, Washington demanded that he step down and made no attempt to save him personally. These actions by Washington made quite a bad impression on the U.S.’s allies in the Middle East and cer- tainly reinforced Israeli suspicions that Washington could easily sell them out, regardless of the end- less public assurances of the U.S.’s support of Israel. Tbilisi undoubtedly noted this and took Wash- ington’s new assurances with a pinch of salt. This includes the Obama administration’s assurance that Georgia would receive the requested weapons. The Georgian side still doubted that the U.S. would indeed fulfill its promises.71 Consequently, Tbilisi was in search of alternative source of weapon sup- plies. Indeed, Georgia and Azerbaijan planned to receive weapons from Poland.72 In addition, Tbilisi planned to develop its own weapons industry in order to be fully self-sufficient and made no secret of why it had decided to engage in this. Observing the newly manufactured Georgian weapons, Saakash- vili noted that Georgia has already experienced problems with supposedly friendly countries on which Georgia relied in the past. Some of these countries, Saakashvili noted, shared sensitive infor- mation with Georgian enemies. This was a barb against Israel. At the same time, Saakashvili noted that some other potential seller of weapons was providing Georgia with what it promised.73 Here Saakashvili was making a clear reference to the U.S. It is obvious that while continuing to deal with the U.S. and possibly expressing its full support of a possible U.S. strike against Tehran, Tbilisi was also continuing to maintain its relations with Iran.74 Moreover, relations with Iran were not broken even when there were attacks against Israeli diplomats, in which Iran was possibly implicated. This could well have been seen as retaliation for the of Iranian nuclear scientists. Tehran insisted that Israel had done this in retaliation to Iran, regardless of the objections from Washington.

Conclusion

While being quite unstable since the late Gorbachev era, Georgia seems to have fallen fully into the American orbit after the 2003 revolution that brought Mikhail Saakashvili to power. However, disappointment with its American patron and the still tense relations with Russia have led to quite an unexpected flirtation with Iran, which has become increasingly alienated from Russia and, needless to say, continues to be the archenemy of the U.S. There are several implications of these events. One––and the most evident––is that geopolitical alliances can change in the twinkling of an eye. Tbilisi, for example, as well as other countries, can move from Washington to Iran and back as easy as that. Even more important, it demonstrates the end of unipolarity, which is not just due to the limits of American power, but also to the changes in the U.S.’s political and, one might assume, foreign policy culture. Almost two centuries ago, Carl von Clausewitz made his famous statement in which he emphasized the direct connection between foreign

71 See: “Obama mozhet poschitat’ ‘neobiazatel’nym’ vypolnenie polozhenii o Gruzii v biudzhete oborony SShA,” Civil.ge, 3 January, 2012. 72 See: “Stratfor: Prezident Pol’shi otpravilsia v Zakavkazie oslabliat’ ob’iatiia Rossii,” Regnum, 26 July, 2011. 73 See: “Gruziia khochet proizvodit’ sobstvennoe oruzhie,” VOA News.com, 7 March, 2012. 74 See: “Vashadze obsudil s poslom Irana sotrudnichestvo mezhdu stranami—MID,” Iran News, 18 January, 2011. 28 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and domestic policy. It can also be noted that business culture and foreign policy have become quite related. Reckless and irresponsible speculation, which is an essential aspect of the U.S.’s economic life, has had a direct impact on U.S. foreign policy. While in the past the U.S. was a reliable ally, this is increasingly not the case now. At the same time, Iran has demonstrated that it is a reliable and strong partner that could well stand up to the U.S.—the only superpower. In 2006, Israel engaged in a war in South Lebanon against Hezbollah. It was also actually at war with Lebanon and threatened to strike Syria. Israel was supported by the U.S., whereas Syria was backed by Iran. The Iranians stated that if Israel attacked Syria, Iran would engage on the side of Syria, even if this led to a confrontation with the U.S. As a matter of fact, Iran, by supporting Syria, assumed the role of the U.S.S.R. of the past. This was noted by the countries of the region. Iran’s increasing assertiveness and apparent intention to improve its relations with Georgia have evidently increased its influence in Armenia and Azer- baijan.75 Indeed, Iran’s ability to carve out a sphere of influence at the expense of the major powers—the U.S. and Russia—demonstrates the emergence of a new multipolar world. However, this multipolar world is quite different from what has been envisaged by the majority of pundits. Most of them be- lieve that one of the larger states—China, Russia, or India—will take the lead. Still, the geopolitical landscape could be much more complicated; and many other regional powers, such as Iran, could increasingly play the role of a regional power center, paying little attention to much stronger states such as the U.S. and/or Russia.

75 See: “Georgii Lomsadze: ‘Tbilisi pytaetsia raspolozhit’ k sebe Iran, Vashington nabliudaet za proiskhodiash- chim.”

Andrei GALIEV

Ph.D. (Political Science), Co-Worker at the Abylay Khan Kazakh University of International Relations and World Languages (Almaty, Kazakhstan).

KAZAKHSTAN AS A PLATFORM FOR HOLDING TALKS ON SETTLEMENT OF THE ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Abstract

his article examines one of the ways to and laborious controversy in the Caucasus. T resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno- The author looks at the attempts of many Karabakh conflict—the most protracted countries, international organizations, and Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION prominent politicians to settle the disputes ful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh con- and contradictions between Azerbaijan and flict. It suggests creating a negotiation plat- Armenia. The paper points out that Kaza- form (in Almaty or Astana) and establishing khstan, as a prestigious state with sustain- a special Assistance Fund for improving the able economic development, could assume socioeconomic situation in Nagorno-Kara- the mission of guiding the talks on peace- bakh as a way to reach such settlement.

Introduction

When the bipolar system collapsed, participation in regional conflicts and their settlement be- came a key problem for the largest international organizations and one of the most important vectors in the foreign policy of the leading world nations. The dimensions of international peacekeeping op- erations abruptly increased, while these operations themselves are mainly militarized and aimed at so- called peace enforcement between the conflicting sides. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the republics that acquired their independence created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), hoping for mutual support, assistance, and develop- ment of close political, economic, and cultural relations. However, between 1988 and 1991 alone, more than 150 ethnic conflicts broke out in the former Soviet republics, about 20 of which claimed human lives. The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has at least three core elements (ethnona- tional, geopolitical, and state legal) and is essentially defined by methods (including armed) to gain power chosen by the political and national elites depending on the dominating interpretation of the two fundamental principles of international law that legalize ethnonational interests—the right to a state’s self-determination and territorial integrity. The conflict is caused by the following geopolitical and ethno-legal factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union; the influence of the U.S. and Turkey in the Caucasian region; Armenia’s aggres- sive actions; socioeconomic disproportions; and mutual mistrust between the Azeri and Armenian ethnicities. The numerous armed conflicts in different regions of the post-Soviet expanse largely serve as a reminder that force is all but the last argument used by many states when carrying out their domestic and foreign policy tasks.

I

The danger of armed conflicts in contemporary history lies, as before, in the fact that the world community has practically no mechanisms for preventing or rapidly settling them. In the conditions that have developed after the fall of the bipolar world order, the U.N.’s mechanisms have proven entirely ineffective. And even if the Security Council either does or does not adopt some decision or another in a crisis situation, it more often than not meets the interests of the initiators of the armed conflict rather than its victims. This causes local or regional armed conflicts to become extremely drawn out and tend toward escalation. The Central Caucasian region continues to pose several military and military-political threats that directly or indirectly affect the national security interests of Kazakhstan and its allies in the Cau- casus and the CIS as a whole. For this reason, the situation involving Nagorno-Karabakh, which still hangs in the balance, cannot help but concern Kazakhstan too. 30 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The conflict between the Central Caucasian countries arose in 1988 owing to Armenia’s territo- rial claims against Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh and seven of the regions adjacent to it—20 percent of Azerbaijani territory—are occupied by Armenian armed forces. The cease fire agreement signed in 1994 in the zone of the Karabakh conflict only effected a temporary halt in the military opposition, and for several years now both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been living in a situation that can be described as “neither war nor peace.” And even though the OSCE Minsk Group has managed to preserve the truce regime in the con- flict zone for almost 20 years now, it has been unable to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. During its 20 years of independence, Kazakhstan has made immense strides in socioeconomic development and reform of the political system, while also achieving high prestige on the internation- al arena. Kazakhstan is perceived by the European and world community as the clear leader and key partner in the Central Asian region and as an influential participant in the geopolitical processes in the post-Soviet expanse. Acting on the world political arena as a unique international mediator and reliable, long-term partner, Kazakhstan has acquired a new global platform for establishing a dialog and advancing its initiatives. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev said at a meeting with President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev in the fall of 2011: “We are grateful for Kazakhstan’s position with respect to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. President of Kazakhstan Nur- sultan Nazarbaev constantly keeps this topic in his field of vision and brings it up at important meet- ings with world leaders... “An end must be put to this conflict and occupation of our territory. The resolutions of the U.N. Security Council, the highest international authority, must be implemented. The U.N. Securi- ty Council has adopted four resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian occupational forces from the territory of Azerbai- jan. But, unfortunately, they are not being executed. Our territorial integrity has been violated. During its years of independence, Azerbaijan could have achieved immense success were it not for this grievous problem. We are determined to resolve this issue within the framework of internation- al law and the Helsinki Final Act, which clearly sets forth the principles and priority of a state’s territorial integrity.”1 A year ago, as the OSCE chairing country, Kazakhstan offered Azerbaijan and Armenia a dialog platform for peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh. Some observers expected that the summit in Astana would bring about a shift in peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. But no breakthrough was forthcoming. And there is little hope that the situation will change in the near future. In my opinion, it is not advantageous for Armenia to take any real steps toward peaceful settle- ment of the conflict, since it is obvious that international opinion far from favors Erevan. Moreo- ver, the breakdown in geopolitical forces in the region benefits Azerbaijan, keeping in mind the West’s interests in the country’s energy resources. Understanding this, it is more advantageous for Erevan to preserve the status quo as long as possible by drawing out the settlement process for an indefinite amount of time. And all of this makes the attempts of the world community to settle this crisis fruitless. As Thomas de Waal, Coordinator of the Caucasian Project of the Research Institute for War and Peace, noted, “no one has yet to talk about the need for building a common future for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union, which brought all the republics of the region together, no longer exists. While Europe and America are far away.”2

1 [http://www.zakon.kz/4454296-my-blagodatny-pozicii-kazakhstana-v.html]. 2 Quoted from: “Kak razreshit konflikty na Kavkaze? Politika SShA na Kavkaze,” available at [http://www. moldova.ru/index.php?tabName=article&owner=39&id=554]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

In keeping with the 20-year-old official request to mediate in the settlement of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict, the foreign ministers of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries called on the sides in the conflict to manifest the political will needed to reach secure and peaceful settlement. This is mentioned in the joint statement of the foreign ministers of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair coun- tries, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation , Secretary of State of the United States Hillary Rodham Clinton, and Foreign Minister of France Alain Juppé: “We urge the leaders of the sides to complete work as soon as possible on the framework agreement and subsequent final set- tlement—based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of non-use or threat of force, territorial integrity, and self-determination and equal rights of peoples; the United Nations Charter; and norms and prin- ciples of international law—which will allow the entire region to move beyond the status quo toward a more secure and prosperous future.”3 According to this statement, the peoples of the region have suffered the most from the consequences of the war, and any delay in reaching settlement will only prolong their suffering. During the years of the conflict, dozens, if not hundreds, of different statements have been made at various meetings, conferences, and so on. But there is no solution to the problem in sight. In 2008-2012 alone, for example, Russian President held more than ten meet- ings with his colleagues, the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As we know, no groundbreak- ing result was achieved. For example, the failure of the Kazan meeting in June 2011 could have direct consequences for Dmitry Medvedev’s peacekeeping initiative. Many experts say that Dmitry Medvedev was so disappointed by the meeting in Kazan that he was ready to stop his mediating efforts in the Karabakh vector. Medvedev essentially issued the participants in the conflict an ulti- matum that the next trilateral summit would only be possible if a plan on Karabakh had been pre- pared for signing at it.4 So, the same gloomy and ruthless picture is seen on the line of contact between the hostile sides in Karabakh: exchanges of machinegun fire and death from snipers. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are using drones on the contact line today, which means that the conflict will most likely acquire a new above-ground dimension (we have already seen the first signs of this). There will be more clanking of weapons, military exercises, and a hike in defense budgets. Under certain circumstances, Azerbaijan might be compelled to shift to forceful settlement of the Karabakh problem. This was stated by Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiev during a meet- ing with his Iranian colleague Ahmed Vahidi. “We are willing to liberate our land by military means, and no one should have any doubt that Azerbaijan will liberate its territory from occupation. Today, the fate of more than one million refugees, villages, settlements, and towns destroyed by the aggres- sor, as well as material and spiritual monuments, has fallen victim to double standards.”5 Department Head at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis (Russia) Sergey Markedo- nov says: “In my opinion, we cannot talk about any resolution of the conflict while we have no common terminology. The Azeris say that they are for resolution of the conflict. The question is what do they understand by this? Of course, the flag in Stepanakert is Azerbaijani. To be more exact, not in Stepanakert, but in Khankendi, as official Azerbaijani historiography and propaganda call it. What does settlement of the conflict mean for the Armenians? They say: we are for reso- lution of the conflict. But they understand this as self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh. The basic terms and concepts for settlement of the conflict are not the same for both sides. And so throughout.”6

3 Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries, available at [http://www. osce.org/mg/89076]. 4 [http://www.nr2.ru/moskow/337058.html]. 5 “Armianskoe mnenie,” Den, 5 May, 2009. 6 “Pravila igry,” July 2008, available at [http://www.presidentfoundation.kz/ru/activity/smi/700/]. 32 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Minsk Group is the target of much criticism. Kazakhstan supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and the of Azerbaijan and Armenia in their attempts to find some kind of peaceful solution to Nagorno-Karabakh. And this is absolutely correct. During a meeting in Seoul on 26 March, 2012, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan told U.S. President Barack Obama how dissatisfied he was with the activity of the OSCE Minsk Group. He said: “During the past two decades the OSCE Minsk Group has not succeeded in settling the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And since the issue has reached a deadlock, I suggested that we talk to Azeris and Minsk Group co-chairing France, Russia and the United States try to persuade Armenia, so that they can solve the issue.”7 Most Kazakhstan politicians think that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory, while offi- cial Astana is trying not to express any particular likes or dislikes, saying that it is against any blood- shed. So President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev offered Azerbaijan and Armenia the Kazakh course of peaceful settlement, which is currently being processed by the sides as the most suitable compromise.

II

Kazakhstan is in favor of a well-balanced and responsible search for peaceful ways to resolve this matter. Kazakhstan believes that not one ethnic conflict today can be resolved by military means alone. Given that the bone of contention between the two fundamental principles is the right to territorial integrity and inviolability of territory, on the one hand, and the right of nations to self- determination, on the other, this problem should be resolved gradually, within the framework of international law.8 At the first stage, the question of the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic must be resolved based on Paragraph 1(III-IV) of the Final Act of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki). It emphasizes: “The participating States regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from as- saulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State. …The participating States will re- spect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.”9 After the territory of the Lachin, Agdam, and other Azerbaijani districts alienated as a result of the hostilities has been returned to Azerbaijan, we can move on to deciding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. This approach will make it possible to resolve a very important humanitarian aspect—how to return hundreds of thousands of refugees and forced migrants to their homes as quickly as possible. If we think about it, we will recall that various solutions have already been offered for resolving the conflicts in this region. For example, as early as 1992, the model of a protectorate over the conflict territory was offered that suggested temporary joint administrative and judicial governance carried out by representatives of international bodies and the local administration. As for a permanent admin- istration regime, the model proposed by Italian lawyers from the University of Padua appears very

7 “Obama, Erdoðan Discuss Karabakh, Armenian Genocide Bills at Seoul Talks,” 26 March, 2010, available at [http://theorthodoxchurch.info/blog/news/2012/03/obama-erdogan-discuss-karabakh-armenian-genocide-bills-at-seoul- talks/]. 8 See: B. Sultanov, “Vystuplenie na kruglom stole na temu: ‘Azerbaidzhan i Kazakhstan: dvustoronnie otnosheniia i reguliarnye vzaimosviazi,’” 13 September, 2010, available at [http://sam.gov.az/uploads/files/SAM%20%26%20KISI. pdf]. 9 [http://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION attractive here. It introduces the concept of transnational territory, the legal status of which is deter- mined by the following elements: (1) an agreement among the ethnic groups residing in this territory; (2) an agreement between the state of which it is a part and its neighboring states; (3) a decision of international bodies to guarantee the transnational character and special form of autonomy of this territory; (4) the presence in this territory of a special international body responsible for its protection and development; (5) membership in international structures and bodies. It must be confessed that all the regional players in the Caucasus are only playing their own games. This is what Fiona Hill, senior researcher at the Brookings Institution, believes. In her opin- ion, it is very interesting to compare the Caucasus with the Baltic countries, where the same discus- sions as in the Caucasus have been held or are still being held—on integration into Europe, coop- eration with NATO, and so on. The Baltic countries have successfully resolved these issues be- cause they acted jointly. They have been able to formulate common goals, although this was not always easy. These countries differ greatly from each other, each of them has its own unique histo- ry, although several aspects of their past are very similar. The Baltic republics share the concept of Russia as a threat, which has made it possible for Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to form a consol- idated platform. In the Caucasus, the situation is very different. There is no common agenda that could promote the joint development of the Central Caucasian republics. Nowadays we are seeing rivalry among the three Central Caucasian republics, whereby this rivalry is not only going on within the region, but also in Paris, London, Moscow, and Washington.10 It must be stated that Kazakhstan has very good relations with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. Since the time Kazakhstan and Armenia acquired their independence, bilateral relations between the two countries have been developing in the spirit of partnership and mutually advantageous coopera- tion. A trust-based dialog has been established that relies on alliance relations developed within the CSTO. There are no contradictions between the two states. A constructive political dialog has been established between Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Ka- zakhstan and Azerbaijan are distinguished by close positions on pertinent regional and international issues. Kazakh-Azerbaijani relations are developing in accordance with the precepts and provisions of the Treaty on Strategic Partnership and Alliance Relations signed after Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s official visit to Baku in May 2005. In the multilateral format, the sides are actively cooperating within the framework of international and regional organizations (the U.N., OSCE, CICMA, CIS, TURKSOI, and others). By reinforcing traditionally friendly, good-neighborly, and partnership relations, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are upholding a course toward expanding political and economic cooperation and are equally interested in strengthening the regional security, international stability, and prosperity of their countries. At the current stage, Azerbaijani-Kazakh cooperation is developing successfully and intensively. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are two fraternal states, strategic partners working together to build bilateral cooperation and ensure security in the Caspian Sea. So Kazakhstan has very good, friendly relations with both these CIS countries that have very complicated and conflictive relations. Russia, in my view, is not the country that could be a mediator in resolving the current difficult contradictions. There are many people in Azerbaijan who believe

10 See: B. Sultanov, op. cit. 34 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION that it is not Armenia, which is essentially a part of Russia today (although I do not share that view- point), that is a side in the conflict. However Azerbaijan does not have the capacity to fight against Russia. On the other hand, Azerbaijan also has its reasons for cooperating with Russia. Its relations with the U.S. cannot be called trouble-free either. In addition to everything else, there is a large and influ- ential Armenian lobby in the U.S., which is able from time to time to force Washington to act in the interests of Armenia, ignoring the interests of Azerbaijan (as, for example, in the case of the American embargo still in effect on deliveries of weapons to Azerbaijan). While it was chairing the OSCE, Kazakhstan offered Azerbaijan and Armenia a dialog platform for peace talks on Nagorno-Karabakh. Kazakhstan has everything necessary for taking successful steps to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. It should be confessed that this peacekeeping mission is also advantageous to Kazakhstan itself for raising its prestige on the international arena. Kazakhstan is precisely that country where a center for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh con- flict can and should be set up (in Almaty or Astana). Attention should be focused on an economic approach. After all, Nagorno-Karabakh is essentially unable to develop normally, while Azerbaijan has certain resources for development and may be able to resolve many socioeconomic problems by investing in Karabakh. Other countries and primarily economically developed ones should also join this vector. This is in the interests of many.

Conclusion

This article has analyzed the difficult situation that has developed around Nagorno-Karabakh. This situation is very tense, but I am convinced that it is potentially resolvable. For more than 20 years, dozens of attempts have been made to settle this problem. However, all of them have been unproductive. The Minsk Group has also been unable to reach a positive result for the conflicting sides. But a solution must be sought, otherwise a war may breakout with all its unpredictable and extremely tough consequences, whereby not only for Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also for the entire Caucasian region. There is no question that the other CIS countries, as well as Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. will be caught in the fray too. One of the possible solutions to the impasse that has developed is to create a special platform in Kazakhstan (in Almaty or Astana) for holding talks on resolving the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, particularly since President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev has already made this suggestion. Nursultan Nazarbaev is perhaps the most authoritative politician in the CIS at the moment, and I think that in hospitable Kazakhstan territory and with his direct arbitration, such talks are possible and even expedient. A special Fund (Bank) of Development of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region could also be created in Kazakhstan. The resources going into this Fund (Bank) from different sources could be used to finance industrial facilities, assist housing construction, create infrastructure, and develop medicine and education in Nagorno-Karabakh with the aim of promoting sustainable high socioeconomic de- velopment of this area. So we believe that it would be expedient for the expert community to study this idea. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Kamal MAKILI-ALIYEV

Ph.D. (Law), Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Editor of Caucasus International (Baku, Azerbaijan).

COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE ATROCITIES IN SYRIA AND THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

Abstract

his article presents a comparative study author tackles both actus reus and mens T of International Humanitarian Law in rea of international crimes to provide a bet- the cases of the Nagorno-Karabakh ter understanding of the differences in ap- conflict and the recent atrocities in Syria. proach of international law in each case. In The article focuses on the similarities, as the end, the article concludes that while well as the differences in the crimes com- there are many similarities in the criminal mitted in both cases. While analyzing the patterns in both cases, in one case Interna- nature of such crimes, the article provides tional Humanitarian Law applies in full and legal insight into each case separately. The in the other it is not applicable at all.

Introduction

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh that broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan is still one of the greatest obstacles to security, peace, and regional development in the entire Caucasus. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh who made up the majority of the population of the Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region originally sought to be unified with Armenia in 1988 before the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., but both Azerbaijan and the leadership of the U.S.S.R. rejected these territorial claims. However, after Azerbaijan and Armenia regained their independence in 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians changed their policy, demanding secession from Azerbaijan. As a re- sult of the undeclared war, between 1992 and 1994 the Armenian military forces seized almost one- fifth of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territory, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven adjacent Azerbaijani populated districts. Nearly one million people were displaced from these occupied territories, along with the ethnic Azerbaijanis expelled from Armenia in 1988-1989 due to ethnic tension. Despite the ceasefire that has been maintained since 1994 and the ongoing negotiation process mediated by the OSCE Minsk Group (it was created to find a political solution to the Nagorno-Kara- bakh conflict by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1992), no tangible results have been achieved in the conflict resolution process so far. 36 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The situation in Syria has been grave since the spring of 2011. Estimates of the tragic events in Syria put the toll at 30 to 100 civilian deaths every day with some intermissions and pauses. The total number of victims is now estimated at more than 9,0001; the international community has yet to decide how to react to the situation. Syria’s major opposition group has repeatedly condemned the government for its “brutal massacres” and called on the United Nations to protect civilians against “acts of genocide.” As of 12 April, 2012, the situation achieved a U.N.-negotiated cease- fire, which maintains a fragile peace between the government forces and the opposition. Despite the intermission in active hostilities, the situation in Syria remains grave and on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe. One thing that brings together these two different situations is the uncertainty among interna- tional scholars over which regulations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) should apply to them. There are skeptics on both sides and in both cases. For example, although it seems quite clear that the situation in Syria cannot be considered a crime of genocide, widespread facts of crimes against humanity are quite evident in this particularly atrocious case. Still there are experts that argue that IHL should apply on a full scale in Syria as the tragic events should be considered war with all the ensuing consequences.2 This article will attempt to analyze how IHL, as well as International Criminal Law (ICL), ap- plies in both of the aforementioned cases and compare them to draw a clear distinction between war crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the crimes against humanity in the case of the recent atroc- ities in Syria. In addition, this article will focus on the similarities and differences in the approaches of the international community toward both situations.

War Crimes in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

To understand the specifics of the war crimes committed during the active phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, we should first establish the law appli- cable to the situation. Since it is widely known and accepted that this conflict is international in na- ture, the rules of IHL applicable to international armed hostilities apply on a full scale. This means both the Law of Geneva and the Law of The Hague.3 As the hostilities in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were landlocked, it is clear that out of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 only I, III, and IV apply, as well as the provisions of Additional Protocols I and III to the conventions in the parts that relate to international conflicts.4 The Law of The Hague applies in regard to the means of warfare. There is a basic provision set forth in Art 22 of the Hague Regulations that reads: “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injur-

1 See: AFP, 27 March, 2012, available at [http://bit.ly/HTSg8D]. 2 See: L. Blank and G. Corn, “Syria Must Be Held to the Law of War,” CNN, 4 April, 2012, available at [http:// bit.ly/Id2guf]. 3 The Law of Geneva provides protection for those who as a consequence of war have fallen into the hands of the enemy. The main purpose of protection here is not against the violence of war itself, but from the power that one side acquires over those persons of the party that have fallen into its hands. There are four Geneva Conventions of 1949 that create the basis of the Geneva Law. The Law of The Hague is one of the current laws of IHL. It is a set of regulations regarding some aspects of IHL where a distinction should be made between smaller groups of norms ad- dressing issues like: combatants and their qualifications, means and methods of warfare, civilian protection, cultural property, etc. 4 See: The Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, ICRC, Geneva, pp. 76, 155; Protocols Additional to the Gene- va Conventions of 12 August, 1949, ICRC, Geneva, 1977, p. 3; Third Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 2005 [http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/emblem-keyfacts-140107.htm]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ing the enemy is not unlimited.” Several principles were subtracted from this general one, such as prohibition of use of arms that cause “unnecessary suffering” (Art 23(e)), prohibition of treachery toward the enemy in Art 23(b).5 These rules are applicable due to the number of crimes committed in violation of these provisions in the course of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as will be demonstrated further. All such regulations form the basic principles of IHL that have long become a part of customary international law and some of them even jus cogens. The basic principles of IHL include: n Persons hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and physical and moral integrity. They shall in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction. n It is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or who is hors de combat. n The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to the conflict which has them in its power. Protection also covers medical personnel, establishments, transports and materiel. The emblem of Red Cross (Red Crescent) is the sign of such protection and must be respected. n Captured combatants and civilians under the authority of an adverse party are entitled to re- spect for their lives, dignity, personal rights and convictions. They shall be protected against all acts of violence and reprisals. They shall have their right to correspond with their families and to receive the relief. n Everyone shall be entitled to benefit from fundamental judicial guarantees. No one shall be held responsible for an act he/she has not committed. No one shall be subjected to physical or mental , corporal punishment or cruel or degrading treatment. n Parties to a conflict and members of their armed forces do not have an unlimited choice of methods and means of warfare. It is prohibited to employ weapons or methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering. n Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combat- ants in order to spare the civilian population and property. Neither the civilian population nor civilian persons shall be object of attack. Attacks shall be directed solely against military objectives.6 Such principles underline the IHL regulations to be followed during a conflict. However, not following the regulations of IHL to the book does not yet make them crimes. Not every crime commit- ted in an armed conflict is a war crime. A war crime must be sufficiently linked to an armed conflict itself and does not need to be a part of the policy or of practice officially sanctioned or tolerated by one of the parties to a conflict.7 War crimes in international armed conflicts are dealt with by Art 8(2)(a) of Statute of International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), which penalizes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and by Art 8(2)(b), which penalizes other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflicts, within the established framework of interna- tional law.8 Thus, grave breaches of IHL are war crimes. Numerous such crimes were committed during the active phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and some of them are continuing to be perpetrated today.

5 See: International Law Concerning the Conduct of Hostilities. Collection of Hague Conventions and some other International Instruments, ICRC, Geneva, 1996, pp. 17-22. 6 See: International Review of the Red Cross, ICRC, Geneva, 1978, pp. 248-249. 7 See: Tadiæ Case (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadiæ), 10 August, 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision of the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, para. 70. 8 See: Rome Statute, Art 8(2), available at [www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm]. 38 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

During the course of the conflict, Armenian forces attacked while Azerbaijani forces were in defensive positions. Armenian armed forces continue to this day to occupy territories of Azerbaijan. Throughout the occupation, Armenian armed forces have committed willful killings in a large number of cases.9 Willful killing is considered a grave violation of IHL and a war crime according to ICL.10 Such acts of murder include killing the civilian population, as well as prisoners-of-war. Both of these instances have been recorded in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such crimes occurred during attacks on Kelbajar, Agdam, Qubatli, Djabrail, Fizuli, Zangelan, and other parts of Azerbaijani territory.11 They continue to be committed at the present time. For example, there was a recent event when a civilian, a 9-year-old boy, was killed by an Armenian sniper.12 Another crime widespread during the conflict and punishable according to the Rome Statute was hostage-taking. The Armenians used that prohibited method of warfare many times and later traded the hostages for POWs. Numerous reports suggest that this was a policy on the part of the Armenian armed forces.13 Taking hostages is punishable by ICL due to mens rea of the crime—dem- onstration of intention on the part of the accused to deprive the victims of freedom in the interests of the accused to gain an advantage during the hostilities. During their offensive, the Armenian armed forces also used such methods of warfare as indis- criminate fire, causing intentional damage to civilians.14 Indiscriminate fire is considered to be a type of war crime that breaches the rule of IHL and prohibits intentional launch of an attack in the knowl- edge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian ob- jects. Such crime is very common in armed conflict, which makes it even graver considering the con- sequences of such actions. Art 49 of Geneva Convention IV prohibits individual or mass deportations or transfers of all or parts of protected persons from occupied territories to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, regardless of motive. At the same time Art 85(4)(a) of Protocol I makes a grave breach the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or parts of the population of the oc- cupied territory within or outside this territory, in violation of Art 49 of aforementioned convention. Any actions in breach of these rules of IHL constitute a war crime under ICL.15 However, this is ex- actly what Armenia as an occupying power has been doing. The pain and suffering caused to civilians by that crime is unimaginable. Not only were the Armenian armed forces able to displace more than 0.6 million of the Azerbaijani population, they have transferred parts of their own population to the occupied territories.16 One more very common war crime committed by the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh was pillaging. Many Azerbaijani towns and villages were plundered and looted during the active stage of the conflict. Civilian property lost by Azerbaijanis in pillaging is estimated at up to several hundred thousands of U.S. dollars.17 Pillaging constitutes a grave breach of IHL and has been properly defined in the Èelebiæi case (ICTY), which later paved the way for its inclusion in the Rome Statute.18

9 See: Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki, 1994, p. xiii. 10 See: Rome Statute, Art 8(2)(a)(i). 11 See: Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, pp. 8-34. 12 See: “Armenian Sniper Kills Azerbaijani Child,” Reuters, Washington, 10 March, 2011, available at [http://reut. rs/J1bqJk]. 13 See: Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, pp. 51-58. 14 See: Ibid., pp. 8-34. 15 See: Rome Statute, Art 8(2)(b)(viii). 16 See: K. Makili-Aliyev, Enforcement of International Law in Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, UNIVERSAL, Tbilisi, 2008, p. 72. 17 See: Azerbaijan. Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, pp. 8-34. 18 See: Èelebiæi case (Prosecutor v. Delaliæ, Muciæ, Deliæ & Landžo), 16 November, 1998, Case No. IT-96-21-T, para. 591. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

As can be seen from the above, these crimes are related to the armed conflict and have been carried out in close relation to the hostilities. All of these instances are easily definable and clearly reflected in international law. War crimes are applicable only when IHL is active—in other words jus in bello. However, a distinction should always be made between international and non-international armed conflicts; the proper identification, if the crime falls under the definition of a “war crime,” al- ways depends on the notion of “armed conflict” itself. Since IHL applies only to armed conflicts (wars), war crimes can only be committed while there are hostilities defined as such. War crimes should not be confused with the crime of genocide.19 One such instance is the infa- mous genocide in Khojali, something that also took place during the active stage of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. In the early hours of 26 February, 1992, the armed forces of Armenia, the armed Armenian militants of Nagorno-Karabakh, and Motor-Infantry Regiment No. 366 of the former Sovi- et Union dislocated between Askaran and Khankendi occupied the town and committed genocide against the Azerbaijanis.20 During the offensive, full-scale atrocities were committed, however the crimes committed in that particular case were neither crimes against humanity, nor were they war crimes, thus beyond the scope of this article. On the other hand, when it comes to Syria, the situation is not as definite. There are different views that argue the inapplicability of IHL to Syria, on the one hand, and that the situation in Syria clearly amounts to a non-international (internal) armed conflict, on the other.

Crimes against Humanity in Syria

Recently, the United Nations Human Rights Council (U.N. HRC) adopted a Report of the Inde- pendent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.21 This report provides a valuable base for the facts and materials on the human rights situation in Syria. However, to understand the humanitarian situation in Syria, we need to be clear about what crimes against humanity are. As defined by Art 7 of the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity are the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civil- ian population, with knowledge of the attack: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in viola- tion of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under interna- tional law, in connection with any act referred to in Art 7(1), or any other crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction; enforced disappearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a sim- ilar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or mental or physical health.22 An important specific feature of such crimes is that commission of an attack that is inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health, must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against members of the civilian pop- ulation.23 Thus forming the actus reus of crimes against humanity.

19 The Rome Statute, which came into effect on 1 July, 2002 and established the International Criminal Court, at- tributes to the Court’s jurisdiction four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, aggression, and crimes against humanity. 20 See: K. Makili-Aliyev, op. cit., pp. 57-59. 21 See: U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69, available at [http://bit.ly/zBpeYa], 20 April, 2012. 22 See: Rome Statute, Art 7. 23 See: Akayesu case (Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu), 2 September, 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 497; Kambanda case (Prosecutor v. Jean Kambanda), 4 September, 1998, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, para. 578. 40 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

When it comes to mens rea of the aforementioned crimes, if we depart from the specific ele- ments of each individual crime against humanity, the perpetrator in each case must knowingly com- mit the crime in the sense that he must understand the overall broader context in which his act occurs. A person who commits such a crime must know that his actions (or acts) are part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, forming the context of mass crimes and pursuant to the policy or plan.24 Without such knowledge, the perpetrator would have mens rea of an ordinary crime. As can be seen from the above-mentioned facts, international law is quite clear on what crimes against humanity are and what is required for the crime to be prosecuted as such. In Syria, the government was not able to uphold its duty to protect its people. The government forces committed acts of violence against the people of Syria, including widespread, systematic, and gross human rights violations. Anti-Government groups have also committed abuses, although not comparable in scale and organization to those carried out by the State.25 The violence recorded by the U.N. provides evidence of the crimes committed. Specifically it is reported that Syrian army snipers and gunmen posted at strategic points terrorized the population, tar- geting and killing small children, women, and other unarmed civilians. Densely populated neighbor- hoods were fired at with fragmentation mortar bombs. When League of Arab States observers with- drew in late January 2012, the army intensified its bombardment with heavy weapons. The population was given no warning and unarmed civilians were given no chance to evacuate. As a result, large numbers of people, including many children, were killed. Several areas were bombarded and then stormed by State forces, which arrested, tortured, and summarily executed suspected defectors and opposition activists. In the Idlib governorate, the army shelled the villages of Ihsim, Ibleen, Ibdita, Kasanfra, and Kafar Awid in mid-December. When State forces took control of the villages, security agents pillaged houses and loaded their loot into trucks brought along to transport detainees.26 From these reports it is clear that the government forces committed crimes that included , exterminations, persecutions, torture, etc. All of these crimes can be found in Art 7 of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, the U.N. HRC report mentions: “On 24 January, tanks and snipers surrounded and shelled Bab Qebli neighborhood in Hama, where an FSA group had been present. FSA members had apparently withdrawn upon the approach of the army, but many opposition activists remained in the neighborhood. The next day, soldiers raided the neighborhood, arresting many and looting homes. On 26 and 27 January, State forces conducted a similar operation in the Al Hamidieh neighborhood in Hama. After the operations in Bab Qebli and Al Hamidieh, the handcuffed bodies of persons who had apparently been executed were dumped in Hama.”27 These events provide evidence of deprivation of physical liberty in violation of the fundamental rules of international law, as well as executions with the aim of extermination. These categories of crimes can serve themselves as evidence of the widespread character of the attacks as they are usually conducted summarily. Moreover, there are reports that there have been widespread and systematic cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, abductions, and forced disappearances. There are many examples of arbitrary arrests and detention of suspected protesters, opposition activists, human rights defenders, and deserters. Arbitrary arrests typically were not formally acknowledged and suspects were often held incommuni- cado without their families being notified about their arrest or whereabouts.28 There are reports that arbitrary arrests were conducted across the country and followed similar patterns. During protests, military and security forces would often encircle the protesters. Those ar- rested, including the wounded among them, would be transported in government buses and trucks to

24 See: Tadiæ case (Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadiæ), 10 August, 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision of the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, paras. 626, 638, 656, 657. 25 See: U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69, p. 1. 26 See: Ibid., paras. 39-42. 27 See: Ibid., para. 45. 28 See: Ibid., para. 58. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION detention centers operated by security agencies, sometimes after being temporarily held in facilities such as sports stadiums or schools. More large-scale raids were conducted, especially in areas where defectors are presumed to be hiding or in areas perceived as being sympathetic to the protesters. The regular army normally cordoned off the area before security forces or elite army units, sometimes accompanied by Shabbiha,29 carried out house-to-house searches. In such raids, women were target- ed for arbitrary arrest and detention, in many cases also to force male relatives to turn themselves in. Many women also emphasized the traumatic invasion of their privacy when security forces raided their houses, typically at night, and vandalized or looted their personal possessions. Torture took place predominantly in detention centers. According to U.N. HRC, victims and witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts of places and methods of torture.30 These actions of the government forces can also be added to the list of crimes. Although they constitute a separate group of violations of international law as defined by Art 7 of the Rome Statute, they nonetheless were committed on a systematic basis and thus can be identified as part of the gov- ernment’s plan of attack on civilians. If we add to this that prohibition of all forms of torture itself is part of jus cogens, we have the entire picture of actus reus and mens rea of the crimes. However, the most horrible of crimes against humanity were those that targeted children. Snip- ers and other Syrian state forces reportedly killed or wounded children, even those aged 10 years and younger. Many children were killed when the government forces shelled residential areas in Homs and other cities in January and February 2012. There are many reports that children are arbitrarily arrested and tortured while in detention. In some cases, children, in total disregard of their age, were treated in the same way as adults. They were kept in the same cells and subject to the same methods of torture as adults. Moreover, injured children did not benefit from adequate medical treatment, not least because hospitals and health clinics were not safely accessible and due to the fact that the adults accompanying them risked arrest.31 Targeting children in mass military operations is usually a clear sign of the indiscriminate char- acter of the attacks. And due to the fact that the casualties among children in Syria right now exceed 500 victims, it is clear that they have been the result of a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population. Such attack is a main prerequisite for considering these crimes to be crimes against humanity.

Conclusion

Since we have been able to establish clear indications that the government planned to carry out widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population, the violence in Syria has all the characteristics of a crime against humanity. So the question arises of what is the difference between the war crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh and the crimes against humanity in Syria? Most of these crimes are of the same character: they include murder, extermination, indiscriminate attacks, torture, etc.; they both target the civilian population… So what is so different? First of all, war crimes are acts that are committed aside from government policy and planning. They can be related to the military forces and their own mens rea in each and every case. In addition, war crimes target civilians, as well as combatants and prisoners of war, while crimes against humanity can target only civilian populations. Engagement of troops in the territory of Azerbaijan during the hostilities clearly indicates that combatants were present in the conflict, making the injustice toward them a war crime. At the same time, the only organized military presence in Syria was the government

29 The word gained international notoriety at the beginning of the 2011 Syrian uprising due to its use to describe armed men in civilian clothing who assault protesters against the regime of Bashar Al-Assad. It is widely believed that the shabbiha are hired goons of the regime, including some members of the security forces. 30 See: U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69, paras. 60, 62. 31 See: Ibid., paras. 78-80. 42 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION forces and security agencies linked to the government, rendering the notion of combatants void dur- ing the atrocities in Syria. However, most importantly war crimes can be committed only during a war—an armed conflict. With that in mind, there is no proof that the situation in Syria amounts to an armed conflict. Such a position is widely supported by the U.N. HRC. The commission that prepared the report for the Hu- man Rights Council stated that International Humanitarian Law did not apply because it is only appli- cable in armed conflicts that depend on the intensity of the violence and the level of organization of the parties participating in the conflict. And although it is clear that the violence in certain areas may have reached the requisite level of intensity, the Commission was not able to verify that the Free Syrian Army, local groups identifying themselves as such, or other anti-government armed groups had reached the necessary level of organization.32 Conclusively we have the situation where: 1. The atrocities in Syria are linked to government policy and planning, whereas the atrocities in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were an integral part of the armed conflict; 2. Only civilians were targeted during the breakdown in Syria, while victims of the crimes in Nagorno-Karabakh included combatants and POWs; 3. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a widely-recognized international armed conflict, where- as the U.N. failed to identify the Syrian situation as an armed conflict. Thus, the crimes committed during the violence in Syria can be identified only as crimes against humanity and should be distinguished from the war crimes committed in actual armed conflicts. If nothing else, there is a difference in who will be held responsible for these crimes.

32 See: U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69, para. 13.

Khazar IBRAHIM

Ambassador, Head of the Mission of the Azerbaijan Republic to NATO (Baku, Azerbaijan).

ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT AND EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

Abstract

redibility, Commodities (mostly hydro- Atlantic security if the Armenia-Azerbaijan C carbon), and Communications are three Nagorno-Karabakh conflict continues to sim- major elements that can affect Euro- mer.

The views in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Az- erbaijan. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Euro-Atlantic security is best ensured are increasingly reliant on the vital com- through a combination of NATO’s military munication, transport and transit routes on might and the Euro-Atlantic community’s which international trade, energy security value- and principles-based policies. The and prosperity depend.” The Armenia-Azer- latter applies to NATO’s approach to the baijan conflict has the potential to disrupt conflict, thus enhancing its credibility. Any the flow of strategic hydrocarbon commod- deviations from this principled position by ities from the Caspian Sea to Europe and NATO would seriously affect its interests halt future energy projects. It could also cut in the Greater Caspian Region. NATO’s off a crucial transportation route to and from latest strategic concept says, “All countries Central Asia.

Introduction

Acronyms overload the Euro-Atlantic1 glossary. Widespread in the 1990s, C3 (command, con- trol, communications) later evolved to incorporate new components. C3 is also a key acronym for the impact of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict on Euro-Atlantic security. Here it stands for Credibility (real, not perceived), Commodities (mostly hydrocarbon), and Communications (of a different type), with the potential to embrace new elements if the conflict continues to simmer. Euro-Atlantic security is best ensured through a combination of NATO’s military might and the Euro-Atlantic community’s value- and principles-based policies. The latter applies to NATO’s ap- proach to the conflict, thus enhancing its credibility. Any deviations from this principled position by NATO would seriously affect its interests in the Greater Caspian Region.2 NATO’s latest strategic concept says, “All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital com- munication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend.”3 The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict has the potential to disrupt the flow of strategic hydro- carbon commodities from the Caspian Sea to Europe and halt future energy projects. It could also cut off a crucial transportation route to and from Central Asia.

Credibility

Since gaining their independence, the countries of the former Soviet Union have been looking to the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions as powerhouses of justice. And Azerbaijan is no ex- ception. However, reality has proven to be somewhat different. Even though the OSCE has been the organization providing a framework for the conflict resolution, as a consensus institution (in which both Azerbaijan and Armenia are members) with no legally binding decisions or practical tools, it was unable to deliver results. The OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs have also failed to find a solution to the conflict so far, despite their almost two decades of work. The has not been a framework, and some of its decisions have had no direct implementation mechanisms.

1 In this paper, “Euro-Atlantic” predominantly embraces NATO and to some extent the European Union. When “community” is added, it means the members only. 2 Here the term “Greater Caspian Region” includes all the former Soviet Central Asian republics, plus Afghanistan, as well as the countries of the Southern Caucasus, plus Turkey, Russia, and Iran. 3 “Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” Para 13, Lisbon 2010, available at [http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf]. 44 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The European Union and NATO possess more tools to assist conflict resolution,4 but the South- ern Caucasus remains outside the targeted actions to this end. True, both the EU and NATO have decisions and documents clearly stating the principles to be applied in resolution of the Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict. The 2012 NATO Chicago summit declaration reads: “With our vision of a Euro-Atlantic area at peace, the persistence of protracted regional con- flicts in the South Caucasus and the Republic of Moldova continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance. We welcome the constructive approach in the renewed dialogue on Transnistria in the 5+2 format, and encourage further efforts by all actors involved. With respect to all these con- flicts, we urge all parties to engage constructively and with reinforced political will in peaceful conflict resolution, and to respect the current negotiation formats. We call on them all to avoid steps that undermine regional security and stability. We remain committed in our support of the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Re- public of Moldova, and will also continue to support efforts towards a peaceful settlement of these regional conflicts, based upon these principles and the norms of international law, the United Na- tions Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act.”5 The European Parliament’s May 2010 resolution states: “The European Parliament is seriously concerned that hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return, property rights and the right to personal security; calls on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognize these rights, the need for their prompt realization and for a prompt solution to this problem that respects the principles of interna- tional law; demands, in this regard, the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, accompanied by deployment of international forces to be organized with respect of the U.N. Charter in order to provide the necessary security guarantees in a period of transition, which will ensure the security of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and allow the displaced persons to return to their homes and further conflicts caused by homelessness to be prevented.”6 But no tangible steps have been taken to translate the positions into tools that promote resolu- tion of the conflict. Instead, some members of the Euro-Atlantic community made efforts to erode the principled position of both entities. In this paper I am not searching for a rationale behind these efforts, what I intend to argue is that without more consistency and assertive pursuit of the principles enshrined in the charters and docu- ments of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, credibility will be at stake. The documents are also straight- forward. The PFP framework document states: “They [the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document] reaffirm their commitment to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to re- frain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means.”7 The EAPC Basic Document says:

4 Without undermining existing negotiation frameworks. 5 “CHICAGO SUMMIT DECLARATION,” issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Chicago on 20 May, 2012, Para 47, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ SID-0D712E71-4E5BF186/natolive/official_texts_87593.htm]. 6 The Need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus, European Parliament Resolution of 20 May 2010 (2009/ 2216(INI)), Para 8, available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010- 0193&language=EN]. 7 PFP Framework Document, 10-11 January, 1994, Para 2, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/ c940110b.htm]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“They [the member countries of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and participating countries of the Partnership for Peace] reaffirm their joint commitment to strengthen and extend peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, on the basis of the shared values and principles which underlie their cooperation, notably those set out in the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace.”8 Damaged credibility would definitely have geopolitical consequences. In this case, I am not presenting geopolitical considerations in a zero-sum context (even though it might be perceived as so). I am also far from implying the infamous Great Game rivalry here. I am talking about interests.9 Most of the global players have stakes in the region. Some interests are in hydrocarbon resources, some in transportation routes, while others are in pure business. Azerba- ijan is critical to that end. It links the region to Central Asia, possesses energy resources, and dominates regional business. President Ilham Aliev stated last year: “Azerbaijan is a leading state in regional af- fairs, a leading state in the South Caucasus. The Azerbaijani economy accounts for 83 percent of the South Caucasus economy. Our political initiatives play an important part in deepening the regional cooperation. Our standing in the world is strengthening.”10 If credibility becomes an issue, other players will definitely have the upper hand. For the Euro-Atlantic community (and for any other player too), it is important to have a realistic assess- ment. “Dogma kills,” was a saying of one of my favorite professors. “Perceptions mislead,” I would add. The Euro-Atlantic community might perceive that given its strong international stance, demo- cratic societies, and economic power, it has the luxury of downgrading the risk. Historically, this is a commonplace practice for global players. But trends are different today, which can seriously aggra- vate the consequences. The international arena is becoming more crowded, democratic practices at home are not converted into democratic policies in foreign affairs, and economic powerhouses are emerging in Asia and Latin America at a time of serious financial crisis in Europe. This situation can create fertile ground for a change in Azerbaijani public opinion vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic institutions, if perceptions trump realism on the part of the latter.

Commodities

Caspian energy resources significantly diversify European energy supplies. First came oil. Con- struction of the BTC pipeline11 was a milestone in the region’s development and specifically in con- necting it, both factually and psychologically, with Europe’s economy and security. In an environ- ment of increasing demand for energy with decreasing growth in oil production, the BTC pipeline brings much-needed energy resources to Europe at a critical time.12 This was followed by natural gas. The Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline delivers Caspian gas to Turkey, but even more of it is about to enter the European market. The committed volume comes

8 EAPC Basic Document, 30 May, 1997, Para 1, available at [http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-066e.htm]. 9 In the case of NATO or the EU, interests are both national (for bigger members and those with clear-cut involve- ment in the region) and institutional. 10 Speech by President Ilham Aliev at the Opening of the Heydar Aliev Center in Ujar, 30 October, 2011, available at [http://en.president.az/articles/3516/print]. 11 The 1768-km-long Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has been built to address export solutions for Azerbai- jan. The pipeline crosses the territories of three countries—Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, starting from the Sangachal terminal in the Caspian Sea and ending at the Ceyhan terminal on the Turkish coast of the Mediterranean, from where ACG oil is delivered to the international markets (BP-Azerbaijan website). 12 See: S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2006, p. 20. 46 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz reserves stage 2,13 but potentially, the Eastern shore can also add its very significant resources. Caspian gas is a game changer for the European Union, and one by one the barriers to its passage to the heart of Europe are coming down. But if Europe is to reap the full rewards of access to gas from the Caspian’s eastern shores—from Turkmenistan and perhaps from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan too—then a sustained effort to translate concepts and proposals into physical transmission systems is needed. That is the challenge facing Günther Oettinger, the EU’s new Energy Commissioner.14 Along with political efforts, as suggested, conflict resolution steps need to be taken too. The Arme- nia-Azerbaijan conflict has the potential both to impede or sabotage them. Geography defines the problem. Azerbaijan is the “cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.”15 The existing pipelines actually run a few kilometers away from Nagorno-Karabakh’s [adminis- trative] border—a comfortable shell distance from those interested in causing trouble.16 Even without eruption of a full-scale war, the status quo endangers the BTC significantly. Any “misfire” by Armenian troops from the occupied Azerbaijani territories could disrupt energy flow to the European market. Moreover, modern warfare has many new non-lethal components, one of which is a cyberattack. Ironically, one of the major tasks for the contemporary critical energy infrastructure is cyberdefense, or cybersecurity, if taken in the larger context. Cybersecurity is a serious and ongoing challenge for the energy sector. Cyber threats to energy delivery systems can impact national security, public safety, and the national economy.17 I would also add here that they can have a significant impact on the global or regional energy landscape, depending on the importance of the energy supply routes and demand in critical markets.

Communications

“Sitting in the middle of the Caucasus, on the shores of the landlocked Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is a nexus of trade routes from Asia to Europe,” says a recent CNN report.18 The building of a railroad connecting Kars in Turkey to Akhalkalaki in Georgia and the rehabil- itation of the Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi rail line will connect Istanbul to the Caspian sea by rail. Together with the building of rail lines linking Kazakhstan to China, this creates a rail connection from Istanbul to China, making it possible to ship goods quickly and relatively inexpensively across Asia.19 Im-

13 The Shah Deniz field was discovered in 1999. It is one of the world’s largest gas-condensate fields, with over 30 trillion cubic feet—1 trillion cubic meters—of gas in place. Shah Deniz Stage 2, or Full Field Development (FFD), is a giant project that will bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe and Turkey. This will increase gas supply and energy security to European markets through the opening of the new southern gas corridor. The project is expected to add a further 16 bil- lion cubic meters per year (bcm/yr) of gas production to the approximately 9 bcm/yr from Shah Deniz Stage 1. It is one of the largest gas development projects anywhere in the world (BP-Azerbaijan website). 14 See: J. Roberts, “Europe’s Caspian Gas Policy to Be a Key for Energy Security,” 2010, available at [http:// www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21667/language/en- US/EuropesCaspiangaspolicytobekeytoenergysecurity.aspx]. 15 Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 46. 16 See: F. Guarascio, “Caucasian ‘Great Game’ over Gas and Oil Remains Unresolved,” 7 March, 2012, available at [http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1609/caucasian-great-game-over-gas-and-oil-remains-unresolved]. 17 See: “Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems Cybersecurity,” September 2011, p. 1, available at [http:// www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Energy_Roadmap.pdf]. 18 “Azerbaijan’s Oil Gateway,” CNN, 13 October, 2011, available at [http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/busi- ness/2011/10/04/gateway-anderson-baku-oil.cnn?iref=allsearch]. 19 See: T. Ziyadov, “The Kars-Akhalkalaki Railroad: A Missing Link Between Europe and Asia,” Central Asia- Caucasus Analyst, 19 April, 2006, pp. 5-6; S.E. Cornell, S.F. Starr, op. cit. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION plementation of an international project to build the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway line and con- struct a railway line tunnel in the Bosporus, along with providing connection of the Trans-Europe and Trans-Asia railway networks and carrying freight and passengers directly through Azerbaijan, Geor- gia, and Turkey, will serve to increase the transit potential of the regional countries.20 In fact, this railroad’s importance goes well beyond trade and business activities. The ISAF21 countries have started to pull out of Afghanistan, so reverse transit is becoming a “hot” issue. Contin- uing supply of the remaining troops in Afghanistan also remains an important issue. Given the current closure of the Pakistani route, the only tangible alternative remains the northern direction, the so- called Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The NDN itself comprises a southern route—starting at the Georgian port of Poti, going over- land to the , Azerbaijan, then by ferry to Aqtau, Kazakhstan, and on through Uzbekistan to Afghanistan—and a more heavily used northern route, traversing Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.22 Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan reportedly are the main overflight, refueling, and landing routes for the U.S. and coalition troops bound for Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan also is a major land transport route for military fuel, food, and construction supplies. According to U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Matthew Bryza, “virtually every U.S. soldier deployed to Afghanistan has flown over Azerbaijan. Moreover ... approximately half of all supplies that reach Afghanistan by routes other than Pakistan now transit Azerbaijan.”23 The functioning BTK is likely to make the role of the NDN’s southern direction even greater. If it (the U.S.) were to secure a transit agreement with Turkmenistan, the port of Turkmenbashi could be an additional destination for goods leaving Baku by ferry.24 After construction of a new seaport in Alat (Azerbaijan), the transit capacity (11.6 million tons per year) will be even higher. “Baku’s new seaport will be of regional importance and a very large logistics center established there. Cargo transportation from China and Central Asia to Europe will grow significantly,” Akif Mustafaev said about the international transport program TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe- Caucasus-Asia).25 The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict can affect strategic transportation routes in two ways. n First, as in the case of energy infrastructure, it can be disrupted by a direct hit, given its prox- imity to the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops. n Second, the countries involved in transportation could avoid it for security reasons if a war breaks out.

Conclusion

Thus, for the sake of its strategic security interests, the Euro-Atlantic community should do more than just be a part of energy projects that have access to the transportation routes and are perceived as credible. It should step up every effort to solve a major obstacle—the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

20 See: “Baku-Tbilisi-Kars New Railway,” State Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan, available at [http://www. oilfund.az/en_US/layiheler/baki-tbilisi-qars-demir-yolu.asp]. 21 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan established by the U.N. Security Council on 20 December, 2001 by Resolution 1386 as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. 22 See: “Northern Route Eases Supply to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” IISS, available at [http://www.iiss.org/ EasySiteWeb/getresource.axd?AssetID=45813&type=full&servic]. 23 Quoted from: J. Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” CRS, 27 October, 2011, p. 5, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf]. 24 See: “Northern Route Eases Supply to U.S. Forces in Afghanistan.” 25 “New Port could Open Gateway to a World,” CNN, 2 February, 2012, available at [http://business.blogs. cnn.com/2012/02/02/azerbaijan-port-gateway]. 48 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Two major tools NATO has in this regard are: political influence and peacekeeping capabilities. Two (the U.S. and France) out of the three OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs mediating the conflict are NATO members. Their principled position on resolution of the conflict within the organization is a clear signal that they support the unanimous position of the international community, which is reflected in relevant documents of the United Nations and other organizations. Also, NATO has expertise in peace- keeping and some NATO members could commit themselves to a potential peacekeeping mission. In short, the recipe is simple: the Euro-Atlantic community should be consistent in pushing for the values and principles enshrined in its own documents and act within its capabilities.

Marat ILIYASOV

Master’s Degree in Political Science from Vilnius State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

INSTABILITY IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS: REASONS, FACTORS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Abstract

he Northern Caucasus is the most conflict in the region, but they cannot be T unstable area of the Russian Federa- reasons themselves. The volatility in the tion. Violence broke out there almost Northern Caucasus originates in the as soon as the U.S.S.R. collapsed and con- Chechen nationalist movement for libera- tinues until this day. tion. However, Moscow put a lot of effort The explosiveness of the Northern into depicting it as a terrorist movement. Caucasus, according to scholars, is deter- Refusing to recognize any other point of mined by such factors as ethnic and reli- view, the Kremlin created a vicious circle, gious diversity. However, deeper analysis which cannot be broken until the real tar- shows that they can only be supplementa- get is addressed. Thus the violence in the ry stimuli for the instability. The same ap- region is likely to reemerge even after suc- plies to economic issues. They may fuel cessful quelling of the current insurgency.

Introduction

No one is likely to argue with the statement that “…since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Northern Caucasus has emerged as the most volatile area of the Russian Federation.”1 Moreover,

1 A. Matveeva, The North Caucasus: Russia’s Fragile Borderland, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Research Paper, 1999, p. 1. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION it is still in a situation of stable instability. To be more precise, violence in the region is mainly asso- ciated with the national republics, especially three of them: Daghestan, Chechnia, and . This eastern part of the Northern Caucasus, particularly Chechnia, is considered the hub of the anti- Moscow activity that has been going on since the beginning of the in 1994. The situation in the western part of the Northern Caucasus is different. Most experts agree that “in the ‘Olympic’ territories, the sociopolitical situation is relatively calm.”2 This part of the region is also considered to be more integrated with Russia than the traditionally unstable East, which in Rus- sia’s National Security Strategy until 2020 is officially identified as a place for fighting international terrorism.3 The revival of the Circassian nationalist movement might become another threat to Russian domestic security. It could undermine not only Kabardino-Balkaria, but also the western republics of Karachay-Circassia and Adigey,4 which are officially excluded from the North Caucasian Federal District.5 However, it seems that the Kremlin does not evaluate such a scenario as real trouble, paying more attention to the militant Islamist movement that appeared in Kabardino-Balkaria under the influence of the Chechen war. Other North Caucasian republics suffered from the spillover effect even earlier than Kabarda, which is separated from the eastern part of the region by the only Chris- tian republic, North Ossetia-Alania. The latter appears in the news tabs mostly as a target of guer- rilla action. Since all processes in the eastern and central part of the Northern Caucasus somehow relate to Chechnia, the main focus of the analysis spins around this republic. Nonetheless, the level of explo- siveness and reasons for instability in other republics are also analyzed.

Ethnic Diversity as a Potential Cause of Tension

There is a whole set of problems in the Northern Caucasus that relates to the domestic and na- tional security of the Russian Federation. Researchers designate: n ethnic-based tension between neighboring peoples; n territorial claims against one another; n historical grievances and injustice of the federal center; n Islamization or radicalization of local Muslim communities; n economic-based unfairness and arbitrariness of local authorities; n nationalist movements or struggle for independence.

2 W. Górecki, Managers Instead of Governors-Generals? Moscow’s New Tactics in the North Caucasus, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, 2010, p. 1. 3 See: R. McDermott, Russia’s National Security Strategy, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 May, 2009, available at [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35010]. 4 Adighes, Kabardins, and Cherkess regard themselves as Circassians (see: M. Light, “Migration, ‘Globalised’ Is- lam and the Russian State: A Case Study of Muslim Communities in Belgorod and Adygea Regions,” in: Europe-Asia Studies (University of Toronto), Vol. 64, Issue 2, pp. 195-226). 5 The North Caucasian Federal District includes 6 national republics and the Stavropol Territory, but in this re- search it makes more sense to exclude Stavropol and include Adigey. In this case, the territory of the Northern Cauca- sus would constitute almost 119 000 square kilometers with approximately 7 million people, most of whom confess Islam. 50 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The latter was a core factor that undermined stability in the region after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. However, this analysis also examines all the other aspects mentioned. The first of them is ethnic diversity, which experts usually consider to be a factor promoting instability. That is why some analysts refer to the region as the Caucasian Balkans. This category was formulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The former advisor of President Jimmy Carter considered the Caucasus to be part of a wider area that he called the Eurasian Balkans, a region which is specifically known for the large concentration of energetic resources, instability, and inclination toward fragmen- tation.6 Technically, this category can also be applied to the eastern Northern Caucasus. Daghestan is known for its ethnic diversity (over 40 ethnic groups), Chechnia and Ingushetia for hydrocarbon en- ergy resources, and all three republics for instability. However a closer analysis reveals the flaws in this approach. The mountain-dwellers, as we know, used to live together for a very long time sharing joy and sorrow. They established their own state several times, but never succeeded in creating a melting pot or one nation for the whole region and eventually remained fragmented, although not because of dis- sention or bickers.7 In other words, the local inhabitants have learnt how to coexist peacefully without assimilating one another. All of their efforts to achieve statehood were mainly determined by the common threat, but they failed basically because of military debacles. Another noteworthy and contradictory fact is that the North Caucasians never fought one anoth- er in large-scale wars. Local skirmishes among neighbors occurred quite frequently, but they never led to ethnic confrontation until the Soviet period. Moreover, it was even hard for the Soviets to insti- gate hatred between people, a feeling that is totally alien to the Caucasians. A very eloquent example is the relations between local inhabitants and newcomers like the Cossacks (in the 15th-16th centu- ries) or the Alans (in the 8th-9th centuries). These people settled alongside the North Caucasians, established friendly relations, and eventually adopted not only their style of clothing, but also modus vivendi, modus operandi, and many traditions. Later examples show that representatives of some nationalities were accepted as a part of Chechen society. They established their own teips (clans) in Chechnia.8 Historians agree that the free lifestyle attracted many people of different nationalities to Chechnia, especially from suppressed Russia.9 The Soviet Union’s policy toward minorities can be blamed for the later ethnic tension in the region. Changed by Moscow, the borders became a real time bomb in the region. Some other seeds of instability were also sown. An interesting and at the first glance effective formula of coexistence for the North Caucasians was invented at that time. Uwe Halbach’s study provides a good example of how it works nowadays in Karachay-Circassia. It says that the main post in the republic (the presi- dent’s) is reserved for Karachays, who constitute 40% of the republic’s population. Russians (34% of

6 See: Zb. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997. 7 Historians refer to medieval Daghestan as a mainly mountainous common territory of the Vainakhs (Chechen and Ingush people) and Daghestanis. The modern state (as people perceive it today) in this territory appeared in the late 18th century. Chechen Sheikh Mansur Ushurma managed to unite the majority of North Caucasians in order to re- pulse Russian aggression. One morg partly successful attempt to unite the Northern Caucasus was made in the middle of the 19th century. Daghestani-born Imam Shamil was the head of the theocratic state Imamate, which included the mountain territories of Chechnia and Daghestan. At the dawn of the 20th century, the northern part of the Caucasus was united into one confederative state again. The Mountain Republic under the presidency of Chechen Tapa Chermo- ev existed for almost year. The last attempt to create a state for all the North Caucasians was declared by Islamist lead- er Doku Umarov in 2007. 8 Chechen historian Mairbek Vachagaev distinguishes teips that originate from Russians, Tatars, Turks, Jewish, Circassians, etc. (see: M. Vachagaev, “Chechensky teip: vchera i segodnia,” 2008, available at [http://www.chechen.org/ cheteip/13-chechenskijj-tejjpvchera-i-segodnja.html]). 9 As scholar Moshe Gammer emphasized, people of all religions felt really free in the Imamate (see: M. Gammer, Shamil. Musulmanskoe soprotivlentie tsarizmu: Zavoevanie Chechni i Dagestana, KRON-PRESS, Moscow, 1998). Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION population) usually delegate the head of parliament, and Circassians (19%)—the head of govern- ment.10 Unfortunately, this formula became a tool for helping the Kremlin to implement the divide et impera policy. The level of ethnic tension increased dramatically when competition over major posts started. For example, the Balkars started to blame the Kabardins for occupying all of them in Ka- bardino-Balkaria. Nor are the other republics, apart from homogeneous Chechnia, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia, free from an ethnically based struggle for power either. However, this does not mean, as some authors claim, that clashes will necessarily happen if Russia withdraws from the Northern Caucasus. As historical examples show, the North Caucasians are able to regulate their affairs by themselves. The ethnic hatred in the Northern Caucasus that analysts point to is nothing more than a deriva- tion of conflicts started because of other reasons. One of them is the conflict over territory. This source of current violence, as well as many other problems in the Northern Caucasus, can be traced back to the Soviet period.

Clashes over Territory and Wealth Division

Since 1991 at least one territorial dispute11 that turned into an armed conflict occurred in the Northern Caucasus. The Ingushes and Ossetians clashed over the Prigorodnyi District in 1992. Six days of continued fighting over Ingush lands transferred to the Ossetians in 1944 resulted in several hundred deaths and several dozen thousands of internally displaced people (mostly Ingush). Osse- tians death and other tolls were several times lower.12 It should be emphasized that the question of regaining the Prigorodnyi District was vitally im- portant to the Ingush people. They even decided to break away from the independence Chechnia de- clared and remain a part of the Russian Federation. The Ingush never succeeded in fulfilling their dream though. After the violence broke out on 31 October, 1992 and Russia demonstrated its support of the Ossetians, the Ingush lost all hope of returning to their lands by lobbying this question in Moscow, unless the situation changed in Russia. Moreover, they realized their role in that conflict. As later confirmed by former president of Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev, the violence was triggered targeting Chechnia. Foreseeable Chechen participation in the conflict would be justification to attack de facto independent Chechnia.13 Official cunningly refused to interfere in the conflict and the ques- tion of the Prigorodnyi District remains unresolved.

10 See: U. Halbach, Russia’s Internal Abroad, the North Caucasus as an Emergency Zone at the Edge of Europe, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Research Paper, Berlin, 2010, p. 23. 11 Ethnic stability in the region was undermined during Soviet rule when the borders of the republics were rehashed after the deportation of 4 nations. In November 1943, Karachays and, in February-March 1944, Balkars, Chechens, and Ingush were deported to Central Asia and Siberia. After returning to their homeland in 1957, they found the land of their ancestors occupied by others, which provoked ethnic tension and clashes. Since that time, Chechnia has disputable territo- ries with Daghestan and Ingushetia, while the Balkars are reclaiming a district that was transferred to the Kabardins. There is also a divided nation problem in Daghestan. Lezghian irredentism became a potential source of conflict after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Current initiatives of the federal government that consider a possible unification of repub- lics, for instance Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory, are also leading to ethnic tension (see: N.J. Melvin, “Building Sta- bility in the North Caucasus. Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union,” SIPRI Policy Paper (Bromma), No. 16, 2007, p. 26). 12 See: Russia: The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict in the Prigorodnyi Region, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki, 1996, p. 1. 13 See: R. Aushev’s Interview on Radio Liberty, available at [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7EvAayw7_g0]. 52 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Having neither borders nor blood relations with Chechnia, the Karachay and Balkar people avoided such a dramatic scenario. Nevertheless, ethnic war is looming in both Karachay-Circassia and Kabardino-Balkaria. The reasons for this are slightly different than for the conflict between the Ingush and the Ossetians, but they are also related to territorial arguments. Dr. Zeinel A. Besleney put it this way: “The Soviet policy of dividing nations and then forcing them to live within the same ad- ministrative unit with ethnically unrelated national groups is the most important factor for the pres- ence of deep ethno-political divisions and social unrest in the Northwest Caucasus.”14 The same can be said not only about the Karachay and Balkars who have kinship relations, speak the same language, and want to live in one administrative unit, but about the Circassians too. The latter nation is separated by the administrative borders of three republics and is not willing to share political power with the Karachays and Balkars. Tension among nationalities within the borders of one republic has not only a territorial, but also an economic background. The Balkars15 , as well as others, are striving to have representatives at least at the republican level in order to gain access to federal funding, which is considered to be the main source of revenue throughout the entire region. The Northern Caucasus is notorious for its dependence on money transfers from the center. Official numbers say that the national republics are subsidized by more than 50% and, as some re- searchers claim, this helps to calm the situation. Alexey Malashenko, an expert on Caucasian issues, estimates that “…almost 90% of the revenues of Ingushetia and Chechnia’s budgets come from direct subsidies from Moscow; 78% in the case of Daghestan; 76% in the case of Karachay and Circassia, and 60% in the case of North Ossetia.”16 Unemployment figures, which also soar very high, show the importance of support from the center. All the aforementioned figures also demonstrate how much different clans and ethnic groups are interested in power, which has become a bone of contention. According to Russian official statistics, unemployment rates reach 50.3% in Ingushetia and 33.9% in Chechnia, while the average rate in Russia is approximately 10%.17 Unofficial numbers are much higher, about 70% in Chechnia, according to J.B. Dunlop and R. Menon.18 About half of all compa- nies in Chechnia and Ingushetia are on the brink of bankruptcy, while the average wage in the state service (about 20% of employed) is lower than anywhere else in Russia (about 10 000 rubles a month). Thus, in the ranking of Russia’s 88 regions, as estimated by J. B. Dunlop and R. Menon, “…in terms of the standard of living the Northern Caucasus would be at the very bottom.”19 The situation is exacerbated by the large number of young people in the region (youth bulge) and the gap between the demand for jobs and their availability. The average age of unemployed people in these republics is 22-25 years, while in Russia, it is 34-35. Everything mentioned above also corresponds to the Human Needs Theory. According to this theory, in order to live and attain well-being, certain basic human needs must be met. Violence occurs if certain individuals or groups do not see any other way to meet their needs.20 “People tend to be-

14 Z.A. Besleney, “Ethnic Unrest in the Northwest Caucasus,” 2002, available at [http://www.kafkas.org.tr/english/ tarih/circassian_karachai_essay_.html]. 15 Unification with the Karachays, as they imagine it, might provide them with more opportunities. 16 “Kavkaz ustal ot khaosa,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 17 November, 2009, available at [http://www.ng.ru/ng_politics/ 2009-11-17/11_kavkaz.html. 17 [www.gks.ru]. There are similar numbers for the other North Caucasian republics too. 18 See: J.B. Dunlop, R. Menon, “Chaos in the Northern Caucasus and Russia’s Future,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 101. 19 Ibid., p. 105. 20 See: H. Kok, “Reducing Violence: Applying the Human Needs Theory to the Conflict in Chechnia,” The Journal of Turkish Weekly, 2007, available at [http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/308/reducing-violence-applying-the-human- needs-theory-to-the-conflict-in-Chechnia.html]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION come resentful and disposed to violent political action when they share a sense that they have been deprived of economic opportunities or political advantages enjoyed by other groups.”21 However, the traditionally strong support within families in the Northern Caucasus diminishes this factor. As Arbakhan Magomedov, a professor from Ulyanovsk State University, said, official statistics do not reflect the real situation. “The highly developed shadow economy occupies an enor- mous space in the republic’s life and the income generated there is almost never included in official accounts.”22 In other words, poverty in the Caucasus would not force people to take up arms, but it is fair to say that economic factors sometimes can become decisive for some hesitant people. It is also clear that most North Caucasian people no longer see Russia as a mediating and supervising arbiter. The political establishment (especially of smaller nations) does not believe that Moscow can ensure a fair mechanism of power-sharing. Nor do the ordinary people trust the juridical system and prefer to re- solve their problems by other means, the most desperate of which is to take up arms. This option is especially attractive for the youth.

Islamization and Radicalization of the Northern Caucasus

It is impossible to analyze the last bout of radicalization in the Northern Caucasus without putting it into the context of both Chechen wars. In 1991, the breakaway republic decided to go its own way after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Chechen politicians claimed that it was the only way to forget historical grievances and establish new relations with Russia. The war broke out in 1994 after three years of Chechnia’s de facto independence.23 Since that time this suffocated but unresolved armed conflict has been the main stimulator of unrest in the re- gion. This protracted war with a three-year hiatus24 underwent many changes. The situation in which neither side was able to take over forced them both to change tactics. Russia tried to transform the armed conflict into an internal Chechen confrontation and shift responsibility for the war onto pro- Russian Chechen forces—the policy was later called Chechenization. This policy did not help to sup- press the rebellion, but it defocused the attention of the international community. Moscow stopped being a target of constant criticism of the atrocities in Chechnia. The other side also started restructuring. Chechen fighters decided to extend the frontline into neighboring republics. Trying to attract more supporters they transformed the Chechen struggle for independence into an Islamist movement based on the most radical ideology of Salafi jihadism.25 The

21 T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1970 (quoted from: D. Sagramoso, “Vio- lence and Conflict in the Russian Northern Caucasus,” International Affairs, No. 4, 2007, p. 690). 22 A. Magomedov, “Daghestan and the Russian State: ‘Stable Instability’ Forever?” The Northern Caucasus Crisis, Russian Analytical Digest, No. 70, 21 December 2009, pp. 9-14. 23 The 1994-1996 war, which was called an Operation for Reinstating Constitutional Order, resulted in withdrawal of the Russian troops from the republic. The sides signed the Khasaviurt agreements (1996) and a Peace Treaty (1997), documents that are considered actual recognition of the independence of Ichkeria. The issue of Russia’s official recogni- tion had to be decided by a referendum in Chechnia before 2002. 24 The second war started in 1999, neglecting the Peace Treaty signed two years earlier by the Russian and Chechen presidents. It was called a counter-terrorist operation. Officially the war ended in March 2009. However, resist- ance is not over and, moreover, the guerrillas’ activities have spilled into neighboring republics, the territories of which have also becooe a stage for warfare. The situation has remained unchanged since that time. 25 The media usually refers to the representatives of Salafi jihadism as Wahhabis. The term Salafi jihadism was coined by French political scientist Gilles Kepel. According to him, it combines “…respect for the sacred texts in the most literal form … with an absolute commitment to jihad” (G. Kepel, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris&Co, London, 2006). 54 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION newly declared goal was liberation of the whole region and establishment of an Islamic state named “The Imarat of the Caucasus” between the Black and the Caspian seas.26 International recognition was not on the guerillas’ agenda any more. Moreover, following the Salafi approach, they identified all non-Muslim communities as potential or real enemies. The logic was simple—Ingush, Daghestanis, Circassians, and other peoples will not fight for Chechen independence. The common platform and objective for unification were obvious. For centu- ries resistance to the Russian invaders in the Northern Caucasus was endorsed by religion, and it showed up again. However, at first glance, the logical step was in fact neither necessary nor politically useful for the Chechen side. The number of young people willing to participate in the struggle against injustice actually did not change after declaration of the Imarat. As can be judged from the official Russian data provided by the Federal Intelligence Service (FSB—Russian abbreviation), the number of rebels has been fluctuating at about the same level since 2006. Every year the head of the FSB re- ports about more or less 250-300 “exterminated rebels.”27 The period before is considered a full- fledged war in Chechnia when the success of the FSB and military operations was estimated at thou- sands of eliminated fighters.28 Therefore, it seems that support of the resistance corresponds more to other factors. As M. Falkowski noted: “The anti-terror methods used by siloviks (a common term used to describe the Russian defense and security structures, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of De- fense, the military, the FSB.—M.I.) injure civilians more than anyone else, which adds to the instabil- ity instead of eliminating it.”29 Furthermore, residents of the Northern Caucasus feel as if they are second or even third class citizens in Russia. Everywhere in the Russian Federation, apart from the homeland, they face the risk of racist attacks and harassment from the police. Moreover, the number of hate-related crimes in Russia is soaring. “The Moscow Human Rights Bureau estimated that about 170 xenophobic attacks occurred in Russia in 2010, leaving 39 people dead and about 213 injured.”30 The negative attitude of the Russian nationalists is shared by the ordinary people. The research completed by the Levada Cent- er in 2006 shows that 58% support the “Russia-for-the Russians” slogan.31 Basically, Russian policy itself is to be blamed for aggravating the situation and for the ever- lasting turmoil. Trying to conceal war crimes, Russia restricted access of Western NGOs to the conflict zone, thus limiting opportunities for the self-realization of young people. Moreover, the authorities promote the perception of Western culture as cheap mass production, especially in the Northern Caucasus. Bearing in mind the very difficult economic situation, massive unemployment, overpopulation, nepotism, corruption, and poverty, the youth has two main paths to follow. Search- ing for appeasement on the Internet, in online games, sports, etc. does not always lead to self-ful-

26 The changes started under successor of President of Chechnia . Although Sheikh Abdul-Kha- lim Sadulaev included other North Caucasian republics as part of the newly formed frontline, he did not change the main objective of the Chechen fighters. The independence of Chechnia as an objective was neglected the year after his demise in 2006. Nonetheless, Doku Umarov’s declared transformations that were not accepted by the Chechen politicians who are seeking for recognition of Chechen Republic internationally. 27 See: FSB annual reports at [http://www.agentura.ru/dossier/russia/fsb/]. 28 There is no reliable data about the death tolls in Chechnia in the first years of the second war. Russian sources tend to diminish civilian losses and exaggerate their military success. However, it can be definitely inferred that the size of resistance has been steadily declining. Analysts also point to Daghestan which, judging from the numbers of killed guerrillas and terrorist attacks, became a leader of “terrorist activity” after 2010 in the Northern Caucasus. However, for different reasons (e.g. Chechnia ought to act as an example of stability for other republics), the real numbers can be dis- torted. Therefore, these trends are not examined. 29 M. Falkowski, “: Between a Caucasian Jihad and ‘hidden’ Separatism,” Policy Briefs, CES, January 2007. p. 44. 30 J. Nichol, “Stability in Russia’s Chechnia and Other Regions of the Northern Caucasus: Recent Developments,” Congressional Research Service, 13 December, 2010, p. 18, available at [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34613.pdf]. 31 J.B. Dunlop, R. Menon, op. cit., p. 102. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION fillment, therefore joining the armed resistance seems a right option. Many youngsters prefer the latter because sacrificing themselves in jihad makes much more sense than living such a miserable life without any real goal.32 The arbitrariness of the local authorities also provokes young people to choose this path. Maciej Falkowski writes, “…people are deprived of a dignified life… by the current Chechen regime, doomed to living in poverty and marginalized.”33 Moreover, ’s (Moscow-appointed head of the Chechen Republic) soldiers “…terrorize people … by methods such as execution without a court verdict, hostage-taking, kidnapping, torture, and imprisonment in illegal jails.”34 Islamic ideology, which rejects this kind of attitude and behavior and proposes returning to the “golden age of the Caliphate,” seems attractive to young people. Growing up under the influ- ence of the two Chechen wars, they are deprived of any other way of dealing with injustice apart from armed resurgence. Since Russia is blocking access to any democratic alternative and has failed to offer its own,35 Islamization seems to be the only option for the North Caucasian youth for the time being.

The Perspective of Nationalism

The partial Islamization and radicalization of society does not mean the end of the nationalist movement leaders, which the Chechens are in the Northern Caucasus. Apart from them, no na- tionality in the region has clearly stated the aim of forming an independent state. Nevertheless, as D. Sagramoso pointed out, “…most of the North Caucasian national groups remain eager to run their own affairs, thus creating a problem for Russia’s internal political and administrative organ- ization.”36 As for the Chechens, they were ready to sacrifice themselves defending this idea and proved it. The cost of the two wars is just incomparable in socioeconomic terms (up to 250 thousand killed). Of course, the Chechen nationalistic movement suffered a huge blow after Doku Umarov denounced Ichkeria37 in favor of the Imarat in 2007. After that step, it could be said that compared to other na- tionalist movements that managed to build their political wings from the military (Palestine Libera- tion Organization, Irish Republican Army), the Chechens regressed. Nonetheless, as Maciej Falkowski pointed out, “the ethos of national liberation is strongly rooted in Chechen society.”38 The decision to transform the ultimate goal of the resistance corresponded to Russia’s efforts to demonstrate it as a terrorist movement. The Russian media used to trumpet that it had “…found in- structions for piloting Boeings in rebels’ shelters,” “Osama bin Laden’s Chechen bodyguards,”

32 Most researchers suggest that the main source of recruits for resistance is the large army of unemployed youth. However, the whole picture is more complicated. After the attack on the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria Nalchik in October 2005, the Ministry of Internal Affairs presented a social portrait of the 166 assailants. 87% of them were young men of about 30 years old, 20% had advanced schooling or a university education, and only 1.2% had failed to complete basic education (see: U. Halbach, op. cit., p. 18). 33 M. Falkowski, op. cit., p. 52. 34 Ibid., p. 56. 35 Gennady Gudkov, the then deputy chairman of the Russian ’s Committee on Security and a retired colonel of the FSB, has predicted that Russia could lose the Northern Caucasus not because of Islamic fundamentalism, but because of the central government’s inability to forge a coherent policy (see: J.B. Dunlop, R. Menon, op. cit., p. 107). 36 D. Sagramoso, op. cit., pp. 681-705. . 37 The official names of the republic are Noxçiyn Paçxalq Noxçiyçö (Chechen language) and The Chechen Repub- lic of Ichkeria (English). 38 M. Falkowski, op. cit., p. 61. 56 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

“Chechen fighters in Afghanistan” etc.39 Thus, it became grounds for accusing Doku Umarov of col- laborating with the FSB.40 In 2011, the Imarat Caucasus was entered on the U.S. list of terrorist or- ganizations, but it was already separated from the Chechen government in exile, which continued to condemn terrorist methods of warfare and seek recognition of Ichkeria. Thus, Moscow has not suc- ceeded in delegitimizing the Chechen fight for independence. There are several more aspects that determine the recurrent transformation of Islamists or re- birth of nationalism. As Norwegian researcher Julie Wilhelmsen pointed out, Islam initially did not play a significant role in the ideology of Chechen separatism and it is doubtful that religion plays a dominant role now. “On a general level, the strengthening of religious faith during a war is effected by a well-known mechanism: when in trouble people turn to God. In the Chechen case it also served as a means of organizing and politicizing.”41 However, Adat norms42 used to be and still are more important for the Chechens than Shari‘a law. The ideas of radical Islam actually are quite alien to them. This became obvious when the Chechens rejected the path of Salafism in the period between the two wars (1996-1999). For most people it was unacceptable to change the nation’s long-living traditions. As N.J. Mervin noted, “The Salafi movement’s intolerance of national cultural traditions limited the scope of its expan- sion.”43 The national factor plays a significant role even among the North Caucasian militants them- selves. Propagandistic talk about one Islamic nation loses its viability when radicals come down to the operational level. Jamaats44 in the region are formed mainly on a national basis and usually function within the territory of the national republics. This approach was determined by an aware- ness of the local landscape and the attitude of the local people. Even those who support the rebels are not willing to be “liberated” by another nation, only by their own. In other words, only Circas- sians are allowed to kill Circassians (Nalchik, 2005) and Daghestanis to execute Daghestanis. As N.J. Melvin put it, insurgency in the Northern Caucasus is now divided into local, largely autono- mous groups.45 Despite all the efforts of the Russian authorities to eradicate nationalism in Chechnia (and to some extent in the whole region), it is really doubtful they will achieve this. There are two factors that will not allow it. n The first is the national character, which can be explained by famous Russian scientist Lev Gumilev’s theory of ethnogenesis.46 Gumilev’s theory corresponds with the youth bulge

39 “Amerikanskie terakty pridumany v Chechne,” 2001, available at [http://www.utro.ru/articles/200109241413303 7162.shtml]; V. Abarinov, “Bylo li zakonnym ubiistvo Usamy bin Ladena?” 2011, available at [http://www.svobodanews. ru/content/transcript/24107828.html]; “V Afghanistane ubity arabskie i chechenskie boeviki,” available at [http:// voinenet.ru/novosti/operativnaya-informatsiya/25373.html]. 40 Islamist movements used to be established and utilized by the Russian special services in order to divide Chechen society. The first one was set up by Beslan Gantemirov (Russian FSB colonel) in 1991. In 1998, the Salafi movement provoked fights with Chechen governmental forces. Later Islamist movements allowed Russia to accuse Chechens of being terrorists, which was especially effective after the 9/11 attacks. The myth was dispelled by the Chechen refugees in Western countries. Not one terrorist attack was organized by Chechens, whereas the Salafis were supposed to be fighting all the Western governments too. 41 J. Wilhelmsen, “Between Rock and Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement,” Europe- Asia Studies (Carfax Publishing), Vol. 57, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 35-38. 42 The word “Adat” means a rule. Researchers usually refer to it as a set of cultural norms, values, and customs ob- ligatory for all members of a particular community, in other words, a kind of unwritten . 43 N.J. Melvin, op. cit., p. 19. 44 The term jamaat means religious community in peace time and a group of fighters in war. 45 See: N.J. Melvin, op. cit., p. 4. 46 In a few words, the theory of ethnogenesis describes the history of nations encompassing biology, geography, and some other sciences. Each and every nation, according to this theory, goes through a certain cycle that lasts about 1,500 years and can be divided into 5 stages of about 300 years each if no force-majeure situation occurs. Ethnicities are Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

theory; the focal point of both is what he called passionarity, which can be described as the level of vital energy characteristic of any ethnic group and is mainly a feature of youth. Endorsed by demographic changes and the center’s weakness, it makes possible even the uprising of local elites. They may lose their allegiance and start supporting national liber- ation ideas. n The second aspect that influences survival of the nationalist movement is the large (at least 150 thousand) Chechen diaspora in Europe. Expelled from the home country by unbearable war atrocities and repressions, these people mainly remain adepts of the idea of an independ- ent Chechen state. Not surprising. The Russian government, as Andrey Piontkovsky pointed out, “proved” to the Chechens that they are Russian citizens by attacking and destroying their cities, and abducting and torturing their relatives.47 In other words, “Russia was engaged in total warfare against citizens it claims as its own.”48 Resistance has been seen as the only way to preserve national identity, culture, and language in the homeland. Moreover, the Chechen population does not exclude the fact, and this opinion was securitized by Ichkeria’s politi- cians, that if resistance fails, they face mass deportation as they did in 1944, or something even worse.49 Thus independence and recognition of the state for Chechens is the only way to avoid recursion of the tragedies that happened in 1944, 1994-1996, and 1999-… “In par- ticular, the vital lesson that Chechens have learnt is that being a part of Russia makes them vulnerable to arbitrary rule and oppression.”50 To sum up, the main issue in the Northern Caucasus for Moscow is that it should still be asso- ciated with the Chechen nationalist movement. Its potential has not been destroyed or even critically diminished, thus a new round in the conflict requiring recognition of the independent Chechen state is likely to occur in the near future.

Conclusion

An analysis of the security situation in the Northern Caucasus shows that violence in the region is associated with the eastern part of the region. However, under the influence of the Chechen war and the spillover effect, which has already undermined stability in Kabardino-Balkaria, the western re- publics related to it are also hanging in the balance. born, grow, mature, decay, and fade away to be reborn again. The stage of history or development of an ethnicity strongly correlates with the number of people devoted to an idea (passionarity). In other words, they are people whose biochemical energy is overwhelming and allows them to sacrifice themselves for the sake of an idea. Passionarity, as Lev Gumilev stated in his seminal book Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere of the Earth, works against the basic instinct of self-preserva- tion. Although passionarity can be judged as a scientifically unfounded concept, for Gumilev, it is a force of nature which drives history. The level of passionarity changes along with the development of a nation. 47 See: A. Piontkovsky, “North Caucasus: One War Lost, Another One Begins,” March 2011, available at [http:// www.opendemocracy.net/print/58533]. 48 B.G. Williams, “Commemorating the Deportation in Post-Soviet Chechnia,” History and Memory (Indian Uni- versity Press), Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring-Summer 2000, pp. 101-134. 49 Actually, it is hard for the Chechens to imagine something worse than deportation, which was recognized by the European Parliament as an act of genocide in 2004. As B.G. Williams stated, deportation has had the most lasting impact on the Chechens’ collective memory. “It became a part of national identity. Forgetting the evocative trauma becomes an act of betrayal to the community.” Russia is identified as a successor of the Soviet Union, the state regarded by Chechens as a real enemy (B.G. Williams, op. cit., pp. 101-134). 50 I. Akhmadov, “The Russian-Chechen Tragedy: The Way to Peace and Democracy. Conditional Independence under an International Administration,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, 2004, Cen- tral Asian Survey, 2003, Vol. 22, Issue 4, p. 27. 58 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The history of the Caucasus confirms that the ethnic diversity of the region does not relate to the level of its explosiveness. People used to live together in peace and harmony for centuries here. As the analysis shows, ethnic hatred is supposedly associated with Soviet rule. Basically, it is based on ter- ritorial arguments between peoples. Stability was undermined by the Kremlin, which changed the existing borders of the republics in order to divide and rule. The situation has changed now. Russia’s rule is mainly based on regular money transfers and military force, but Moscow has already lost its credit and role of arbiter for most of the North Cauca- sian people in terms of peacekeeping and just division of wealth and revenue. Frequent reference to the armed forces has created a vicious circle. The arbitrariness of the local and federal government (siloviks) fuels resistance, while Moscow’s efforts to justify its military activity and atrocities in the Northern Caucasus have led to radicalization and self-deception. The Chechen national liberation movement continues to be the main engine of resistance in the Northern Caucasus. Even radicalized, it still determines the possibilities of conflict resolution and appeasement of the region. Thus resurgence is likely to continue until the real target is addressed. Even if Russia succeeds in slowing it down, there is a great chance that violence will reemerge in the Northern Caucasus sooner or later, unless the real reasons for conflict are finally recognized and ad- dressed.

Israpil SAMPIEV

D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor, Head of the Chair of Sociology and Political Science at Ingush State University (Nazran, the Russian Federation).

THE CONFLICT IN THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT AND THE CITY OF VLADIKAVKAZ: THE CRUX OF THE MATTER, THE STATE’S ROLE, AND WAYS TO RESOLVE IT

Abstract

n analysis of the documentary sourc- the October-November 1992 conflict can- A es, including of the information not be called ethnic, but must be defined gleaned by a joint investigatory team as ethnic cleansing sanctioned by the of the Russian Federation Prosecutor Gen- state. The Russian government bodies, as eral’s Office, shows that based on the en- one of the parties concerned, were not ob- tities involved and the main determinant, jective peacekeepers and mediators in the Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict, which the region is to ensure immediate and un- is proven by the 20-year settlement expe- conditional execution of the Federal Law rience predominated by coercion. The only on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peo- legal and moral way to restore order in ples.

Introduction

The fair resolution of any conflict presupposes taking comprehensive account of the legal inter- ests of the sides, being objective, and excluding actors as mediators who are directly or indirectly party to the conflict. This is a necessary prerequisite for civilized conflict settlement, and this is what determines the prospects for its resolution. Applying this precept in the case-study of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict appears to be heuristic both with respect to understanding and resolving it, since practice has shown the ineptitude of the existing approaches. It has been almost twenty years since the events officially called the Ossetian-Ingush conflict came to pass, but the level of tension is still high. In short, the conflict has been frozen by the armed forces of the Federal Center1 and continues to play a significant role in the ethnopolitical situation in the Caucasus.2 After the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008 and Russia’s recognition of the “independence” of South Ossetia, it stands to reason that the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict will continue to be a key bone of contention in the region in the future.3 In this respect, new approach- es must be found to the crux of the matter and ways to resolve it.

Origin of the Conflict and Its Basic Determinant: Common Sense versus Vicious Perpetuity

The official version calls this conflict a dispute between two ethnic groups over who has rightful claim to the Prigorodny District, the city of Vladikavkaz, and part of the Mozdok District, that is, an ethnoterritorial conflict. However, we think that the Ossetian-Ingush dispute is a separate independ- ent topic, although it derives from the state national policy pursued by all the regimes in the Caucasus. Essentially the open conflict that erupted in the fall of 1992 was not simply a squabble over territory between two ethnicities, but over the territory of a national-state formation, the boundaries of which could not be changed without their consent (a national referendum) either under the of the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., and Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. in effect in 1944 or under the current Consti- tutions of the Russian Federation and Republic of Ingushetia. All of the anti-constitutional repressive acts of the Stalinist regime to eliminate the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and transfer its territory have been cancelled and North Ossetia has no legal grounds for jurisdiction over this territory.4 Conse- quently, the conflict is based on a political dispute, i.e. the contradiction between the national-state

1 See: I.M. Sampiev, “Repressirovannye narody: sostoianie reabilitatsii,” Kavkazsky ekspert, No. 4 (8), 2006. 2 See: S.M. Markedonov, “Osetino-ingushsky dialog,” Politkom.ru, 4 May, 2007. 3 This is shown by the fact that 300 Ingush policemen dutifully resigned in August 2008 (see: “Ponuzhdenie vayna- khov,” Novaia gazeta, No. 62 (1380), 25 June-27 August, 2008). 4 See: A.I. Kovalenko, Pravovaia ekspertiza documentalnykh materialov, otnosiashchikhsia k territorialno-po- liticheskomu razvitiiu ingushskogo naroda, Nazran, 2001. 60 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION status of this territory as a constituent part of the Republic of Ingushetia and its possession de facto by another entity. By defining the entities in the conflict as ethnicities, the sides, in their striving to justify the ethnic affiliation of the Prigorodny District, go back to historical times5 that are not directly related to the conflict. In fact, the 1992 armed conflict goes back to the 1920s, that is, to the time the national- territorial formations and their boundaries emerged. The Ossetians had little to do with the confron- tation between the ethnic Ingush and the Russian Empire over the territory of the Prigorodny District in the 19th century—the czarist authorities recruited Russians and Cossacks to carry out expansion. The Ingush, like several other mountain peoples, found themselves victims of the colonial policy that was expressed by territorial rearrangement, the expulsion of entire groups of the population to the Ottoman Empire, confiscation of the mountain peoples’ lands, and their resettlement by the Cossacks. As A. Zdravomyslov notes, “in the 1930s, a new line of fortifications began to be erected—fortresses and Cossack settlements—called the Sunzha Line. This line passed through the territory traditionally occupied by ethnic Ingush… Consequently, at the very initial stage of colonization of this region, the interests of the Ingush were infringed upon.”6 The Soviet Union, already on a new ideological platform, revived the imperial principles of its national and geopolitical strategy (and these principles were always indivisible, since the empire was totally comprised of conquered peoples and territories). This policy culminated during Stalin’s rule, but after the 1917 revolution it could no longer rely on the Cossacks as a privileged class. The Soviets put the stakes in the region on the Ossetians—an important role in this being played by Stalin’s Osse- tian origin.7 The repression and deportation of 13 “untrustworthy,” from the Stalinist regime’s per- spective, peoples from their historical territory was chosen as way to resolve the geopolitical prob- lems. The Ingush were among them: on 23 February, 1944, Stalin deported each and every Ingush and Chechen to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, including 710 officers, 1,696 sergeants, and 6,488 rank-and- file soldiers who had been recalled from the front in 1944. The conditions the repressed peoples found themselves in were intolerable. In Kazakhstan alone, 125,564 people died of starvation between April 1944 and July 1949.8 In the wake of this deportation, the territory of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. was divided among Georgia, North Ossetia, Daghestan, and the Grozny Region. The Prigorodny, Nazran, and Achaluki districts of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and the city of Malgobek were joined to the North Ossetian A.S.S.R. on 7 March, 1944 and settled with Ossetians. The report of First Secretary of the North Ossetian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(Bolsheviks) K.D. Kulov at the 13th regional party conference noted that “thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party and Comrade Stalin personally, in February 1944, new districts were joined to North Ossetia, among them Malgobek, the city of oil workers, and the Mozdok and Kurp districts. These measures enlarged the territory of our republic by 50%, and its population also increased.”9 The Ossetians were not the only ones to assimilate other people’s land, but in contrast to the Georgians and Daghestanis, they did not return the time-honored land to their neighbors and thus paved the way to ethnic discord. After the personality cult was exposed at the 20th congress of the Communist Party in 1956, the decades-long rehabilitation of the repressed peoples began and has still not been completed.10 All of

5 For a review of the approaches, see: V.A. Shnirelman, Byt alanami. Intelledtualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze v XX veke, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moscow, 2006, Part 2, Chap. 8, 9; Part 3, Chap. 9. 6 A.G. Zdravomyslov, Osetino-ingushsky konflikt: perspektivy vykhoda iz tupikovoy situatsii, Moscow, 1998, p. 30. 7 [http://stalinism.ru/zhivoy-stalin/dzhugashvili-proishozhdenie-familii.html; http://www.rso-kprf.ru/index.php/ info-otdel/2230-2011-03-10-12-16-08.html]. 8 Central State Archive of the October Revolution, rec. gr. 9479, inv. 1, f. 182, sheet 5. 9 K.D. Kulov, “Doklad na 13-y oblastnoy partiynoy konferentsii VKP(b) SOASSR,” Sotsialisticheskaia Osetia, No. 30, 12 February, 1949. 10 For more detail, see: Problemy reabilitatsii repressirovannykh narodov v sovremennoy Rossii, Collection of arti- cles, ed. by I. M. Sampiev, Piligrim, Nazran, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION this occurred on the basis of by-laws in violation of the Constitutions of the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., and Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., thus tilling the ground for an ethnic dispute over the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz. It was the discriminatory policy of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. leadership pandering to the territorial claims of North Ossetia that set the slow-action bomb in this part of the Caucasus. The government bodies of the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., and North Ossetian A.S.S.R. adopted anti-constitu- tional acts that restricted the rights of ethnic Ingush to choice of place to stay, residence, and free- dom of movement,11 repressing all those who protested against the tyranny.12 At the same time, people from the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the Georgian S.S.R. were settled in the Prigorodny District. “Assuming mass proportions, migration from the villages of the region be- tween 1956 and 1959 reduced the population by 22,000 people. The main flow of migrants went to North Ossetia, where they settled in the suburbs of the republic’s capital, on land they were given by collective and state-owned farms.”13 Before 1944, more than 34,000 people lived in the Prigor- odny District of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., 31,000 of whom were Ingush. By 1990, a total of 40,000 people lived in the same territory, 17,500 of whom were Ingush.14 The most backward dis- tricts in Chechen-Ingushetia were Ingush areas—Nazran, Sunzha, and Malgobek districts, as well as the Prigorodny District in North Ossetia.15 This kind of “equality” could not suit the Ingush, and even in the most difficult years, the Ingush people fought actively for their rights.16 The demands the Ingush made on Moscow were set forth in the address of the Second Congress of the Ingush Peoples (held on 9-10 September, 1989 in Grozny) to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and U.S.S.R. : to adopt a Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples with Resto- ration of Territorial Integrity, as well as resolve the question of restoring the autonomy of the In- gush peoples in their time-honored historical boundaries.17 On 19 November, 1989, under pressure from the repressed peoples, the U.S.S.R. Supreme So- viet adopted the Declaration on Recognizing the Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Depor- tation Illegal and Criminal and Guaranteeing Their Rights, which deemed deportation an extremely grave crime contradicting the fundamental principles of international law. In furtherance of this Declaration, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet cancelled the repressive legislative acts with its Resolu- tion No. 2013-1 of 7 March, 1991, while on 6 June, 1991 the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers adopted Resolution No. 336 On Cancellation of the Resolutions of the Former State Defense Committee of the U.S.S.R. and Decisions of the U.S.S.R. Government Regarding Soviet Peoples Subjected to Repres- sion and Deportation.18 On 26 April, 1991, in a tough political struggle, U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. deputies for the re- pressed peoples succeeded in pushing through the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples, in spite of opposition to its adoption by the authorities of North Ossetia and their support by

11 See: Confidential letter of the Council of Ministers of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R. No. 063 of 17 October, 1956, Resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers No. 183 of 5 March, 1982 On Restricting Registration of Citizens in the Prigorodny District of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R., and so on, which directly violated Art 123 of the U.S.S.R. Constitu- tion and Art 127 of the R.S.F.S.R. Constitution. 12 See, for example: A. Nekrich, Nakazannye narody, Khronika, New York, 1978, pp. 131-132 (A. Nekrich, The Punished Peoples. The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, Norton and Com- pany, New York, 1978); Resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. of 13 March, 1973 on Antisocial and Na- tionalist Manifestations in Grozny. 13 D.G. Kabisov, Rost blagosostoianiia i demograficheskie protsessy v Iuzhnoy Osetii, Tskhinvali, 1987. 14 See: T.Kh. Mutaliev, Kh.A. Fargiev, A.A. Pliev, Ternistyy put naroda, Moscow, 1992, p. 52. 15 See: Ibid., p. 53. 16 See: “Politicheskoe samoopredelenie ingushskogo naroda v postsovetsky period: istoricheskie, politicheskie i sotsialno-ekonomicheskie faktory,” in: Aktualnye sotsialno-politicheskie i etnokulturnye problemy Ingushetii, Collection of Scientific Articles, ISI IngGU, Magas, 2007, pp. 4-37. 17 See: Vtoroy s’ezd ingushskogo naroda, Kniga, Grozny, 1989, pp. 209, 213. 18 [http://www.bestpravo.ru/sssr/gn-instrukcii/q0g.htm]. 62 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the Ossetian lobby, still powerful since Stalin’s time, in the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.19 Unable to achieve its goals, the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. adopted a Resolution on 17 May, 1991 On the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples, which reserved itself the right to suspend Arts 3, 4, and 6 of the indicated Law in the territory of the North Ossetian S.S.R. The central authorities and Prosecutor General’s office, which could have prevented further escalation of violence in the region, failed to respond in the appropriate way. The Ossetian authorities were left with one alternative—preventing the territorial rehabilitation of the Ingush people by force. On 14 April, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. entrusted itself with the right to introduce a state of emergency, which was a gross violation of the Union Law on a State of Emergency. The same day, a state of emergency was introduced in the Prig- orodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz, the motivation for which was a family fight provoked by the authorities in the village of Kurtat. In their repeated appeals to all the government bodies of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R., representatives of the Ingush population expressed their indignation over the tyranny of the Ossetian defense and security employees performing acts of terror under the sem- blance of a state of emergency, and demanded that measures be taken. Overt arming of the guards, , and other illegal armed formations,20 attacks on military warehouses, and theft of firearms became customary practice in North Ossetia.21 However, the Center encouraged the illegal actions of the leadership of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R.: under the pretext of rendering military aid to South Ossetia, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense supplied North Ossetia with a large amount of weapons.22 At the same time, at talks with members of the Organizing Committee for Restoration of the Autonomy of Ingushetia, the Ossetian leaders made a statement characteristic of the Ossetian side: “We did not deprive the Ingush of their Homeland—the Prigorodny District and part of the Malgo- bek District. Russia gave them to us, and if Russia adopts the Law on Rehabilitation of the Ingush Peoples, the Ossetians will do their part in a dignified fashion—we will return your land. It should have been returned back in 1957. Then we would not be having such a hard time today.”23 Howev- er, this was no more than maneuvers aimed at postponing execution of the Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples, since the leadership of North Ossetia, which was closely associated with reactionary circles in the party upper crust, army, and special services, had information that prep- arations were being made for the August coup, and so delayed the talks while intensively arming themselves. Professor V. Shnirelman comes to the same conclusion: “The attempted coup that oc- curred in the next few days threw a spanner in the works, and the radically changed situation in the country allowed the North Ossetian leaders to delay resolution of the issue.”24 Participants in the talks also testify to this.25

19 See: V.A. Shnirelman, op. cit., p. 309. 20 See: The Tenth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. (twelfth convocation), Verbatim re- port, Vladikavkaz, 1992, pp. 282-287. 21 See, for example: the newspaper Severnaia Osetia of 21 December, 1991: “The day before yesterday, a meeting was held at the headquarters of the national militia between representatives of the media and leaders of the self-defense forces;” the newspaper Severnyy Kavkaz of 16 May, 1991: “In many districts of Vladikavkaz, funds were collected from residents for purchasing weapons for the self-defense contingents. A sum of between 200 and 1,000 rubles;” the newspa- per Severnaia Osetia of 12 October, 1992: “…over the past two years, 1,655 guns have been stolen from military units of North Ossetia, including 735 machineguns, 720 pistols, 236 missiles, and 10,000 pieces of ammunition,” to quote just a few of dozens of similar publications. 22 See: “Spravka ob obstoiatelstvakh vozniknoveniia osetino-ingushskogo vooruzhennogo konflikta, ego razvitiia i roli v nem federalnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” in: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy nationalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 godakh, Moscow, Nazran, 1996, pp. 376-377; “Istoriia odnoy ot- stavki,” Dosh, Special Issue, No. 4 (12), 2006. 23 B.U. Kostoev, Kavkazsky meridian. K voprosu russko-osetino-ingushskikh otnosheny i chechenskogo uregulirov- aniia, Humanitarian Foundation of Ingushetia, Moscow, 2003, p. 73. 24 V.A. Shnirelman, op. cit., p. 311. 25 See: F.P. Bokov, Iad kriminala, Insan, Moscow, 1994, pp. 22-23. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

After failure of the August coup, on 6 September, 1991, the militants of the All-National Con- gress of the Chechen People (NCChP) dispersed the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingushetian Republic and power went to the Executive Committee of the NCChP. Execution of the Declaration on Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic demanded legitimization of power in the Ingush districts. The referendum held on 30 November, 1991 among the Ingush population became that legitimate act of declaration of the people’s will. The referendum asked one question: “Are you in favor of establishing the Ingush Republic within the R.S.F.S.R. with return of the illegally confiscated Ingush land and with its capital in the city of Vladikavkaz?” Ninety-seven percent of the electorate of the Ingush dis- tricts took part in the voting, 92.5% of whom answered “Yes.”26 Despite all the hindrances and provocations both from North Ossetia and from self-proclaimed Ichkeria, the Ingush leaders were able to pass the Law 0n the Formation of the Ingush Republic within the Russian Federation on 4 June, 1992. Adoption of the Law required that the Federal Center create temporary bodies of power. To this end, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. appointed deputy V. Ermakov as its rep- resentative in the Ingush Republic and I. Kostoev was appointed as representative of the Russian President for Ingushetia. Noting their role in the social life of the republic being established, Profes- sor V. Tishkov wrote the following: “Some circumstances have been limiting their activity and pre- venting them from fulfilling the mission of representatives of the supreme power. First, the Center has not been effectively supporting Ermakov and Kostoev: they do not have real financial resources at their disposal and there has been no assistance from the federal ministries…”27 It is obvious that the Center was stalling for time in the hope of restoring Chechen-Ingushetia, so one candidate after an- other for head of administration of the republic was nominated for approval of the Russian President and rejected by him, which aggravated the struggle among the political parties. The leaders of North Ossetia made successful use of this.28 As V. Tishkov notes, “North Ossetia could not help but be aware of the position and action of the Ingush side. In response to them, a strategy of rejecting any compromises and of building up force positions was chosen, accompanied by anti-Ingush propagan- da… The North Ossetian leaders felt fairly confident, enjoying their financial and force advantages, as well as close contacts with the Center…”29

The Crux of the Conflict: Official Version and Facts

Due to its policy on the eve of the open phase of the conflict, the Kremlin essentially provoked the Ingush to engage in an unorganized uprising against the repressions in the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz in order, in this way, to resolve the problem of sovereign Chechnia which many powers in the Center wanted to return by force to Russia by playing the Ingush card.30 Resolu- tion of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office on Termination of Criminal Case No. 18192642-9231 contains a large number of factual documents (an analysis of dozens of volumes) that reveal the role of the Federal Center in planning and preparing the conflict. However, for political reasons, these

26 T. Muzaev, Etnichesky separatizm v Rossii, Panorama, Moscow, 1999, p. 100. 27 V. Tishkov, “Osetino-ingushsky konflikt,” Serdalo, No. 35, 21 August, 1996. 28 See: I.M. Sampiev, Institutsializatsiia samoopredeleniia narodov v politicheskikh protsessakh na postsovetskom Severnom Kavkaze, Piligrim, Nazran, 2010, pp. 230-231. 29 V. Tishkov, op. cit. 30 For more on this process, see: I. Dementieva, “Ingushskaia tragediia,” Izvestia, 30 November, 1992; I. Kostoev, “Eta tragediia byla sprovotsirovana umyshlenno,” Dosh, Special Issue, No. 4 (12), 2006, pp. 20-21. 31 See: Resolution on Termination of Criminal Case No. 18192642-92 of Assistant of the Russian Prosecutor Gen- eral G. E. Chuglazov, Moscow, 8 February, 1995. 64 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION documents are ignored when evaluating the events of the fall of 1992 in the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz, which had a direct effect on settlement of the conflict. The resolution shows that the federal structures, represented by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Se- curity, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, helped to establish and arm illegal armed formations of the North Ossetian S.S.R.—national militia and guards (from mid-1991)—and notes Moscow’s target- ed efforts to militarize North Ossetia, as well as numerous imaginary “seizures” of armaments, in- cluding heavy, by Ossetian armed gangs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense transferred weapons and armored vehicles under the pretext of supporting the so-called peacekeep- ing battalion in South Ossetia and the patrol-guard service regiments in the North Ossetian S.S.R.32 that took active part in the genocide. It is no accident that the first to show up in the conflict zone were former commander of this battalion Major General Sergey Shoygu and his deputy Gennady Filatov. An analysis of the numerous testimonies of high-ranking Russian officials makes it possible to conclude that the Federal Center, represented by the defense and security structures, drew up the plan for the armed act in the Prigorodny District intended to resolve the problem of independent Chechnia. The Ossetian leadership had already taken advantage of the situation to hinder territorial rehabilita- tion of the Ingush by means of an act of force, since it had undergone a fiasco in the political and legal sphere. President Boris Yeltsin and the defense and security ministers were well informed about the situation in the region, including from their representatives there.33 On 31 October, armed clashes began, and as early as 2 November an extensive army operation began with the use of armored vehi- cles, helicopters, and heavy artillery to drive the Ingush from their villages in the Prigorodny District. During the conflict itself, the Russian government vice premiers who came to execute the state of emergency, Georgy Khizha and Sergey Shoygu, issued an order with the consent of First Vice Pre- mier Egor Gaidar and Defense Minister on supplying the Ossetian armed gangs with 642 automatic weapons, 18 BMP-2 (infantry combat vehicles), and 57 T-72 tanks.34 According to independent military experts from the Shchit and Soiuz ofitserov servicemen or- ganizations, “the steps taken by the leadership led to aggravation of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and, as a result, to deterioration of the situation in the North Caucasian Region since a method was chosen not for separating the sides (as happened in South Ossetia and Transnistria), but for suppressing one of the sides.”35 It is characteristic that the draft of “The Political Evaluation of the Russian Security Council of the Armed Conflict in the North Ossetian S.S.R. and Ingush Republic in October-November 1992,” which was never approved, did not say a word about the role of the Union and Federal Center, the army, or the internal troops in the armed conflict among the factors and reasons for the conflict.36 However, the information gleaned by the joint investigatory team gives direct indication of their spe- cial role. The fact sheet provided on 14 June, 1993 by senior investigator for particularly important cases of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office V.E. Kostyrev indicated that “… the nature of and way the state of emergency was instituted at the beginning of the armed conflict did not meet the in- tended purposes and tasks. Independent armed formations continued to operate in the state of emer- gency zone, including those from another state—Georgia.”37

32 See: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy natsionalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 godakh, Moscow, Nazran, 1996, p. 343. 33 See: R. Albagachiev, A. Gazgireev, Genotsid, Nazran, 1994, p. 9. 34 See: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav cheloveka lits ingushskoy natsionalnosti v 1992-1995 godakh, Me- morial, Moscow, 1995, pp. 260-261. 35 Ibid., p. 343. 36 See: Nezavisimaia gazeta, No. 54 (730), 23 March, 1994. 37 “Spravka ob obstoiatelstvakh vozniknoveniia osetino-ingushskogo vooruzhennogo konflikta, ego razvitiia i roli v nem federalnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” in: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy nat- sionalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 godakh, 1996, pp. 378-379. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 65 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

As a result of the “peacekeeping” intervention of the Armed Forces and internal troops, ethnic Ingush were forced to leave their homes when their peaceful villages were subjected to artillery and helicopter fire, while the rest were killed or taken hostage by the Ossetian armed gangs that arrived in the wake of the paratroopers. Around 3,200 Ingush households were plundered and razed to the ground. Thirteen of the sixteen population settlements of compact Ingush residence were destroyed to one extent or another.38 In November, the Ingush were given the opportunity to bury their dead. It turned out that many were missing their hearts, kidneys, and other organs, possibly the result of the Agreement between France and Ossetia on the Procurement of Organs entered in October 1992, re- vealed by English journalist Armora Zeynon,39 which shows the major preparations made for the planned conflict. Furthermore, the Federal Center did not restrict itself to connivance, but took direct part in the conflict. Ethnic cleansing of the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz from the Ingush population, which was cynically called “the expulsion of armed gangs,” would essentially have been impossible without the help of army artillery, helicopters, and tanks. As Akhsarbek Galazov stated in the Report on Perfidious Aggression of the Ingush National Extremists and Measures to Ensure Security, Legality, and Law and Order in the Republic, “…we had no doubt that Russia would assist the republic at this difficult time. And this assistance was forthcoming. At our request, the Russian President introduced a state of emergency throughout North Ossetia … today I have no reservations in expressing my gratitude to the Russian generals, officers, and soldiers for their help. I want to draw special attention to our old and true friends who have brought peace to South Osse- tia: Chairman of the State Committee Sergey Shoygu, his deputy, Colonel General Gennady Fila- tov, and Deputy Minister of Security Alexander Safonov.”40 Only later was it realized that the ac- tivity of the joint group of internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense should have been described as peacekeeping, whereas at the time the press made no bones about it: “The teams of joint armed forces of Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, OMON, national militia, republic guards, paratroopers, and Russian internal troops are augmenting the force grouping in the conflict zone for the purpose of destroying hotbeds of resistance and stabiliz- ing the situation as a whole.”41 As follows from the testimony of Minister of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia Georgy Kantemirov, “the entire guards and some of the militia have joined the ranks of the peacekeeping forces.”42 Valery Tishkov has the following to say about the role of the Federal Center in the events of the fall of 1992: “Here we concede to a scenario which nevertheless needs confirming—to provoke Chechnia by means of an ‘armed act’ in this region and in so doing resolve the ‘problem of Dudaev…’ I. Dementieva’s journalistic investigation has shown essentially beyond a doubt that the federal au- thorities, including President Boris Yeltsin himself, were motivated by the Chechen question, which is confirmed by the subsequent course of events. Later Egor Gaidar also admitted this.”43 In addition to active participation in the ethnic cleansing, the Federal Center created advantages for one of the sides with its law-making. The state of emergency introduced on 2 November by law required subor- dination of all the government and administrative bodies of both republics to the Interim Administra- tion established, but President Yeltsin’s subsequent decree of 4 November, 1992 determined that only

38 See: R.Sh. Albagachiev, M.A. Akhilgov, Znat i pomnit, Moscow, 1997. 39 See: S. Bartnikas, L. Krutakov, “Khochesh pochku? Tolko cherez moi trup. Na voyne, kak na voyne,” Komso- molskaia pravda, 3 November, 1993. 40 Documents of the 5th Sitting of the 18th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. of the 12th Convocation (10 November, 1992), Vladikavkaz, 1992. 41 Severnaia Osetia, 4 November, 1992. 42 “Spravka ob obstoiatelstvakh vozniknoveniia osetino-ingushskogo vooruzhennogo konflikta, ego razvitiia i roli v nem federalnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” p. 15. 43 V.A. Tishkov, “Osetino-ingushsky konflikt (Antropologiia etnicheskoy chistki),” in: Ocherki teorii i politiki et- nichnosti v Rossii, Russky Mir, Moscow, 1997, p. 388. 66 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the executive power bodies were subordinate to the Interim Administration in North Ossetia, which in fact subordinated the Interim Administration in the conflict zone to the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. As was mentioned above, the investigation notes that “independent armed formations contin- ued to operate in the state of emergency zone, including those from another state—Georgia (mean- ing the South Ossetian battalion armed by the Russian Ministry of Defense—I.S.).” “The joint forc- es of the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs,” senior investigator for particularly important cases of the Russian Prosecutor General’s office V.E. Kostyrev continues, “did not separate the opposing sides, did not ensure eradication or localization of the armed forma- tions, and did not destroy them, nor was the task solved of ensuring the vital activity and security of the district’s population and releasing hostages. In some cases, with the direct involvement of the joint armed forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the North Ossetian Ministry of Internal Affairs, armed formations carried out violence against citizens, plundering, looting, setting fire to and bombing homes, and taking up illegal residence in the houses and apartments abandoned by the refugees.”44 The conclusion of the National Assembly, the Parliament of the Republic of Ingushetia, On the Political and Legal Assessment of the Events of October-November 1992 in the Prigorodny District and the City of Vladikavkaz of the Republic of North Ossetia of 21 September, 1994 on the basis of the investigation documents of the parliamentary commission states: “The events of October-Novem- ber 1992 cannot be called an ‘Ossetian-Ingush conflict’ since violence was exercised by well-armed Ossetian formations and Russian troops against the peaceful, unarmed, and unprotected Ingush pop- ulation of the Prigorodny District.”45 In this way, the Russian leadership not only acted as an initiator, but also as a direct participant in the conflict. As Professor Tishkov notes, “from that moment (the transfer of weapons and armored vehicles.—I.S.), the Center unequivocally identified itself with one of the conflicting sides and effectively sanctioned and financially supported the armed acts and mass violence against the civilian Ingush population… I am increasingly inclined to think that the final tragic stage of the conflict was made possible when the Russian supreme leadership exchanged in- dulging in ethnic cleansing for the opportunity to use the situation to resolve the problem of restoring power over Chechnia.”46

Post-Conflict Settlement

The further steps taken by the Federal Center and its Interim Administration exposed the organ- izers’ intention of genocide: the state of emergency was executed in Ossetia by the Ossetian author- ities and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in Ingushetia by the commandants of the Russian Min- istry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Interim Administration began taking steps to block the formation of legitimate government bodies of the Ingush Republic, replacing them with the appointed and powerless Interim Administration of the Ingush Republic. In these difficult conditions in Ingushetia, an Emergency Congress of the Ingush People gathered on 20 December, 1992, which contrary to the Kremlin’s will, instituted the post of President of the Ingush Republic, approved the

44 “Spravka po resultatam izucheniia ugolovnogo dela o massovykh bezporiadkakh v Respublike Severnaia Osetia k zasedaniiu Kollegii Generalnoy prokuratury Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 01.09.04 g.,” in: Doklad o massovykh narusheni- iakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy natsionalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 gg. 45 Conclusion on the Political and Legal Assessment of the Events of October-November 1992 in the Prigorodny District and the City of Vladikavkaz of the Republic of North Ossetia; Resolution of the National Assembly, the Parlia- ment of the Republic of Ingushetia, Ingushetia, No. 47, 21 September, 1994. 46 V.A. Tishkov, “Osetino-ingushsky konflikt (Antropologiia etnicheskoy chistki),” pp. 392-394. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Provisions on the President and on the Central Elections Committee, as well as Temporary Provisions on the Election of the President of the Ingush Republic, and scheduled a . It also nominated on its behalf Major General Ruslan Aushev as candidate for president of the Ingush Re- public.47 Under public pressure, the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on 20 January, 1992 On Election of the President—Head of Executive Power of the Ingush Republic in accordance with the Russian Law of 4 June, 1992 On the Formation of the Ingush Repub- lic within the Russian Federation and with the resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation of 10 December, 1992 On the Russian Federation Law on the Formation of the Ingush Republic within the Russian Federation, as well as taking into account the declaration of will of the Ingush people. The Federal Center continued to pursue a unilateral policy in the following years. Beginning in November 1992, 131 regulatory legal acts were issued by the federal state power bodies aimed at eliminating the consequences of the events that occurred in Vladikavkaz and the Prigorodny Dis- trict. They included 47 decrees and orders of the Russian President, 10 assignments and addresses of the Russian President, 49 resolutions and orders of the Russian Government, 23 resolutions of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, and 2 rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The presidents and governments of the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia signed more than 20 treaties, agreements, and work plans and programs aimed at resolving the problem.48 However, these regulatory acts bore no fruit; on the contrary, they hindered refugees from returning to their homes. Even the Russian Federation Security Coun- cil stated as early as January 1999 that not one of the regulatory legal acts designed to return the forced migrants to their places of former residence had been executed.49 And not until thirteen years later did the Federal Center admit that this way was ineffective and led to endless delays in dealing with the consequences of the conflict.50 The strategy of the Federal Center, which ensured a forceful and political cover for not allowing the Ingush into the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz both by means of coercive acts and by adopting anti-constitutional regulatory acts, consisted of replacing the question of territorial reha- bilitation with the problem of returning the Ingush to the Prigorodny District. But this process is also being deliberately delayed and return of the internally displaced persons to their former places of res- idence is not taking place.51 Well aware of the Kremlin’s true intentions, the Ossetian side noted with satisfaction that “the problems of returning the internally displaced Ingush and setting them up in their former places of residence in North Ossetia, in spite of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s in- structions to the leaders of North Ossetia and Ingushetia and authorized representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak to complete this process in 2007, will not be resolved this year either.”52 In the so-called post-conflict period between 1992 and 2011 alone, more than 150 ethnic Ingush were killed, more than 90 injured, 39 taken hostage, 450 Ingush households destroyed, and 238 units of temporary housing burned down during the state of emergency in the region carried out by subdi- visions of the army, internal troops, and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and North Ossetia forces. Carrying out the counterterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus gave the Ossetian author- ities the opportunity to correlate execution of the Federal Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed

47 See: Documents from the Emergency Congress of the Ingush People. The author’s archives. 48 See: Informatsionnyy vestnik, No. 2, January 2002. 49 See: Ibidem. 50 See: M. Targimov, “U ingushskikh bezhentsev poiavilas nadezhda,” Iuzhnyy Federalnyy, No. 14 (237), 19-25 April, 2006. 51 See: Fantazii i realnost, Vladikavaz, 2001, p. 16. 52 A. Dzadziev, “Itogi pervogo polugodiia,” Biulleten Seti etnologicheskogo monitoringa i rannego preduprezhde- niia konfliktov, No. 74, July-August 2007, p. 61. 68 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Peoples with the notorious struggle with extremism. This became particularly noticeable after seizure of the school in Beslan in 2004.53 The Authorized Representation Office of the Russian President in the Southern Federal District was compelled to admit this: “The law-enforcement agencies do not exclude the existence in the region of an organized group that has been kidnapping Ingush people and in so doing supposedly taking revenge for the deaths of the children in Beslan.”54 The protests regard- ing the numerous kidnappings, attacks, and nationalist escapades55 were simply ignored. During the investigation, it transpired that between the summer of 2005 and July 2007, 21 people were kid- napped in North Ossetia, whereby in most cases witnesses pointed to police employees. According to Kommersant, the investigators came to the following conclusion: groups operate in North Ossetia that are helped by police employees. The presumed motives vary: revenge for Beslan and efforts to pre- vent the Ingush from returning to the Prigorodny District.56 The repeated addresses of the parlia- ment,57 public organizations, and citizens of the Republic of Ingushetia to the Federal Center—“the desperate appeal to the Kremlin to stop sticking its head in the sand and begin performing its direct obligations”58 —are simply ignored or the local authorities are turned loose on the authors of the ad- dresses. On the other hand, the federal and district bodies have rendered substantial support to the authorities of North Ossetia in creating a new population settlement for internally displaced persons directly on the border with the Republic of Ingushetia where a ghetto was essentially set up in order to stop them from reaching their homes. For all intents and purposes, the Federal Center has as good as blocked all attempts to resolve the conflict using legal methods, relying on violence. And even the rulings of the judicial bodies are either ignored or illegally cancelled. For example, the Federal Judge for the Nazran District issued a decision on 14 December, 2004 on an appeal from the Akhki-Yurt public movement, deeming the actions of officials of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. to co- ordinate the borders of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and North Ossetian A.S.S.R. to be drawn on maps illegal. The Parliament of the Republic of North Ossetia did not lodge a complaint against this judicial decision in accordance with legal procedure and so the decision came into legal force. However, six months later it was cancelled … by the federal city court (that is, of the same level!) of Rostov (?!). The approaches to settlement of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict by the Federal Center as its main organizer and actor are also clearly illustrated by the so-called Kozak Plan drawn up on the instructions of Vladimir Putin with the aim of ultimately resolving the conflict before the beginning of 2007.59 This plan was set forth in the Minutes of the Meeting between Authorized Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak and Leaders of the Federal Executive Power Bodies and Executive Power Bodies of the Constituents of the Repub- lic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia on Settlement of the Consequences of the Osse- tian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992 of 8 February, 2006.60 The reaction of the Ossetian side to the decisions made was in general positive, since the objective content of the Minutes as a whole and their individual provisions correspond to the official position of North Ossetia, which has not changed since November 1992. Its basic principles were set forth on 10 November, 1992 in Akhsarbek Galazov’s Report on the Perfidious Aggression of the Ingush National Extremists against

53 See: V. Salugardanov, “Ostenisky kukluksklan,” available at [www/gazet.gzt/ru], 12 October, 2004. 54 Severnaia Osetiia, No. 128 (24929), 19 July, 2007, p. 1. 55 See: “Ingushi v Severnoy Osetii vyshli na miting s trebovaniem prekratit pokhishcheniia liudey,” Regnum.ru, 29 March, 2006. 56 [kavkaz.memo.ru], 24 September, 2007. 57 See, for example: “Parlament Ingushetii schitaet situatsiiu v zone osetino-ingushskogo konflikta kriticheskoy,” available at [www.regnum.ru], 27 March, 2006. 58 S. Markedonov, op. cit. 59 See: Assignment of the President of the Russian Federation of 14 November, 2003, No. MK-1871. 60 [http://www.magas.ru/news_detail.php?id=638]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

North Ossetia at the 5th sitting of the 18th session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R.,61 as well as in the Kislovodsk agreements signed by Akhsarbek Galazov and Ruslan Aushev in March 1993, where provisions that violate the rights of citizens on ethnic grounds were registered and included in all the subsequent agreements and documents. The inherent integrity of these documents is shown by provisions of the Kislovodsk agreement of 1993 and the Minutes which are identical in meaning. 1. “Comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem” in the Kislovodsk agreements, which implied correlating the problem of accommodating the South Ossetian refugees in the Prig- orodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz with the problem of returning the Ingush depor- tees, and “housing accommodation of other categories of refugees and forced migrants” (Para 5.8 of the Report), where refugees means South Ossetians (for North Ossetia), and oth- er categories of forced migrants means those from the Chechen Republic (for the Republic of Ingushetia). 2. “On the impossibility of coexistence”—a thesis from Resolution No. 84 of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. of 6 March, 1993, which essentially “legitimized” the policy of apartheid and discrimination on ethnic grounds62 and which was recognized by Resolution No. 17-P of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of 17 September, 1993 as not complying with the Russian Federation Constitution63; whereby parts of it were dis- owned in 1998. However, it continues to be implemented to this day, cloaked verbally in less extremist formulations. One such formulation can be considered the thesis “on com- pact living accommodation” (paragraphs 3.4. and 3.5. and similar formulations in para- graphs 5.1. and 5.5.). 3. “On the perfidious aggression of the Ingush national extremists.” Although there was no po- litical or legal evaluation of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict by the federal authorities, Moscow de facto proceeds in the documents adopted and measures carried out from the Os- setian thesis on “the Ingush being to blame.” This was precisely why the Interregional De- partment of the Russian Federal Immigration Service was instructed “…to send the docu- ments on 581 records of forced migrants to the Commission of the Government of the Repub- lic of North Ossetia-Alania created by order No. 8-rg of the Head of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania of 1 February, 2006 in order for written motivated conclusions to be drawn up by the local administration heads of the corresponding population settlements on the possi- bility of or hindrance to providing specified families of forced migrants with housing accom- modation in their chosen places of residence” (Para. 4.2.). The indicated provisions show the attitude of the plan’s authors toward the Ingush formed by Galazov’s ideologeme on the “Ingush aggressors,” which it is difficult to describe as anything other than illegal and insulting, since the federal authorities, the main culprit of the ethnic cleansing, places the question of restoring the Ingush constitutional rights at the discretion of those who directly violat- ed these rights. In our view, such an ambiguous document as the Minutes of the Meeting … on Settlement of the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992 appeared as the re- sult of the following circumstances: pressure from the Ossetian leadership and nationalist public on

61 “On the Perfidious Aggression of the Ingush National Extremists against North Ossetia,” in: Documents of the 5th Sitting of the 18th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. of the 12th Convocation (10 November, 1992), p. 20. 62 See: Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. on the Program for Comprehensive Resolu- tion of the Problem of Refugees, Forced Migrants, and Persons Who Have Left North Ossetia No. 84 of 6 March, 1993. 63 See: Resolution No. 17-P of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of 17 September, 1993, available at [http://www.eurolawco.ru/publ/ccrf12.html]. 70 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Moscow after the Beslan events; Dmitry Kozak’s striving at all costs to “close” the Ossetian-In- gush conflict before the end of 2006 as instructed by the Russian President; and another failure by the Ossetian side to juridically cancel Arts 3 and 6 of the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples.64

The Crux and Prime Cause of the Conflict: Several Conclusions

The above makes it possible to confirm that the conflict being analyzed cannot be classified as ethnic (ethnoterritorial). Its interpretation as the Ossetian-Ingush conflict is incorrect in the purely ethnic respect. Although the ethnic factor is clearly manifested in the conflict, and as such it is active- ly hypostatized, in actual fact ethnicity is a secondary factor. All the clashes occurred only in settle- ments of the Prigorodny District where Ingush lived. There were no clashes in any villages beyond the district or in villages of the district where only Ossetians lived, so there can be no talk of an ethnic war. Moreover, identifying one of the sides in ethnic categories implies that all the other sides in the conflict should be identified in the same way. If the conflict or its open phase is evaluated in ethnic categories, it should be described as Russian-Ossetian-Ingush. This follows at least from the fact that Russian servicemen participated en masse in the conflict, whereby their participation determined the course and nature of the conflict. Nor can we ignore the participation of armed Cossack contingents who were later rewarded with Ingush homes in Terk and the Popov hamlet. The entities and initiators of the conflict are the Federal Center and the government and admin- istrative bodies of the North Ossetian S.S.R. Government bodies did not participate in the conflict on the Ingush side, since they simply did not exist, but if they had, they would have been the entities of the events. The deciding participation of the Federal Center, represented by its power bodies, army, and other defense and security structures, defies describing the conflict as ethnic. The dominating reason for the conflict, like its genesis, lies in the state’s national policy—first the Russian Empire’s, then the Soviet Union’s and the Russian Federation’s. So the ethnic standoff is only a consequence and not the main reason for the conflict, which is the state’s national policy applied to various ethnic entities. It is precisely the state, represented by the Federal Center, that was the main actor in the events of 1944, 1957, 1973, 1981, and 1992. So Professor Iu. Karpov is right when he says that “…in today’s reality, it (the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.—I.S.) is exacerbated by the presence of a third entity that at one time created grounds for the conflict and now is trying to perform the function of an arbi- trator. Whereby the third entity, having its own interests, has the greatest power, which defines its active position as well as the striving of each of the sides to secure its support. The Ossetian side, looking for support from the federal authorities, refers, among other things, to the fact that the Osse- tian people are carrying out a special mission in the region.”65 Another important aspect of the problem is international. By describing the conflict in the fall of 1992 as ethnic “Ossetian-Ingush,” Moscow deliberately presented it as a conflict of values and con- sequently as essentially irresolvable.66 Designating it as purely ethnic or even civilizational was prompted by the latent desire to convince the West, which is always very wary about any kind of eth-

64 See: Definition of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 365 of 1 December, 2005 on the in- quiry of the Parliament of North Ossetia “On Checking Compliance of the Provisions of Arts 3 and 6 of the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.” 65 Iu. Karpov, “Obrazy nasiliia v novoy i noveyshey istorii Severnogo Kavkaza,” in: Antropologiia nasiliia, St. Pe- tersburg, 2001, p. 244. 66 For more on the conflict of values, see: V.A. Avksentiev, Etnicheskaia konfliktologiia, Stavropol, 1997, pp. 52-58. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION nic conflict, of the need for tough measures in the Caucasus where “wild tribes have the tendency to slaughter each other.” However, the definition of the entities of the conflict and their role in it, as discussed above, gives no grounds for concluding that it is an ethnic conflict. Moreover, this follows from an analysis of the crux of the conflict being examined. The prime cause of the conflict is the Kremlin’s recidivist policy aimed at divestiture of Ingush national territory in favor of ethnic groups which in the Kremlin’s opinion correspond more to the great power’s ethnic geopolitics. All other manifestations of the conflict in the form of ethnic incom- patibility and fighting barbarism, banditry, and extremism are consequences of this policy. If this fact is not taken into account, the model of the conflict turns out to be a priori ineffective in terms of its political and practical resolution. The state’s coercive resources make it possible to replace fair reso- lution of the conflict with its “regulation,” which is effectively nothing other than illegal group vio- lence. The incidental products of this policy are mass discrimination on national and religious grounds, stirring up ethnic discord, segregation, and other negative phenomena. The subject of the conflict is clearer—the territory the Stalinist regime illegally took from the Ingush people in 1944 and gave to North Ossetia. But if the question is asked, who took away this territory, gave it to another ethnicity, held onto it by force, and for what purpose, the problem appears in an entirely different light. Of course, the ethnic tension between the Ossetians and Ingush is related to the subject of the conflict, but this tension is a consequence of the state’s political actions, and not the reason for them. All the arguments about the eternal antagonism or civilizational incompatibility between the Ingush and the Ossetians are trivial and smack of fascism. To be fair, it must be confessed that the Ingush authorities too have taken the position of “political pragmatism” imposed on them. In other words, an evaluation of the conflict and attempts to settle it proceed from only one factor— force. The theoretical weakness of this position lies in the fact that force is not a constant argument, but transitional in the historical respect. This is why this conflict and others like it cannot essentially be resolved given the existing approaches.

Conclusion

The conflict around the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz is acquiring new devel- opment in the light of South Ossetian “independence.” The twenty-year epic of its “settlement,” first by the Interim Administration in part of the territory of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic (1992- 1995) and the Russian Federation State Committee (1995-1996), then by the authorized representa- tive of the Russian President in the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia (1996- 2000), the special representative of the Russian President for settlement of the Ossetian-Ingush con- flict (2000-2002) and, finally, the authorized representative of the Russian President in the Southern Federal District (since 2002), has effectively brought the situation to an impasse. We need to rid our- selves of approaches to the conflict and to resolution of the problems it has created that have discredit- ed themselves, critically re-examine the principles and practice of national policy on which they are based, and draw up new approaches to a systemic resolution of the problems of ethnic interaction in the region. Resolving the problem of the return of the Ingush deportees to their homes is a secondary problem that can be resolved by executing Arts 3 and 6 of the Federal Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples. In fact the problem itself was created to distract attention away from territorial rehabilitation, whereas execution of the law will automatically remove the problem of returning the deportees to their homes and restore equality and peace in ethnic relations. To sum up, the entities of the conflict of October-November 1992 are the Federal Center, the power bodies of North Ossetia, and the ethnic Ingush population of the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz. Based on the main reason for its emergence and its entity-initiators, the conflict cannot be described as ethnic Ossetian-Ingush, but is defined as an ethnic geopolitical act of the Fed- 72 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION eral Center in the form of ethnic cleansing sanctioned by the state, responsibility for which is held by the leadership of the Russian Federation and North Ossetia. In this respect, the power bodies of the Russian Federation cannot from either the moral or legal viewpoint claim the role of peacekeeper and mediator in settlement of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict. Force and the threat of force should be excluded as a factor of settlement; otherwise the decisions being made cannot be recognized as legitimate and binding when changing the balance and breakdown in forces of the sides. The only legal and moral way to restore order in the region is to ensure immediate and unconditional execution of the Federal Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples. Precisely how realistic this is in con- ditions of sovereign democracy and how settlement can be carried out in practice is another matter, but it is just as idealistic to think that the conflict can be resolved in any other way.

Sofia MELIKOVA

Licentiate in International Relations, North-West Academy of Public Administration (St. Petersburg, Russia), M.A. in European Studies (Flensburg, Germany).

THE FIRST RUSSO-CHECHEN CAMPAIGN (1994-1996): CAUSES AND FACTORS OF ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

Abstract

his article attempts to examine the deep ern Caucasus. Furthermore, the author an- T historical roots and causes of the first alyzes the link with Islam as an instrument Russo-Chechen conflict (1994-1996) of political mobilization. The level of involve- and the role it has played in influencing ment of international actors in the first Rus- overall Russian policy-making in the North- so-Chechen campaign is also analyzed.

Introduction

The first Russo-Chechen war, which lasted from 1994 until 1996, is believed to be one of the most severe conflicts in the Northern Caucasus in terms of the number of deaths and scope of material devastation. On the one hand, it involved one of world’s greatest military powers—the Russian Fed- eration, while on the other, like no other conflict, it displayed the rebelling minority’s fight for life or death. In addition, the war was fueled by international actors, which made the discord relevant in re- Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION gional and international context. The conflict transformed slightly over time from a war against rebels to a war against terrorists. The aim of this study is to investigate the specific features and causes of the conflict, the role of religion, and the engagement of the international community. The article examines how certain theoretical approaches in the field of nationalism apply to the case of the Chechen separatist move- ment. The initial hypothesis of this study is that the Chechen experience of mass deportation and sub- sequent resettlement during the de-Stalinization campaign served as a keystone for the idea of estab- lishing a separate Chechen state based on Shari‘a values. In order to present particular and detailed information and provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic, the author will take an in-depth look at the historical tension between the ethnic Russians and North-Caucasian mountain ethnic groups and outline the main ethno-cultural features of the Chechen (Vainakh) identity. Furthermore, the cru- cial theoretical approaches to the problem will be summarized. So, before proceeding to the dynamics of the first Russo-Chechen war, the historical back- ground and possible reasons for its emergence should be underlined.

Historical Preconditions and Causes of the Conflict

First, the three main categories of historical factors constituting the formation of the overall Chechen identity and attitude toward the Russian state listed by Ekaterina Sokirianskaia must be un- derlined. Namely, the author distinguishes three types of memories, which are defined as “memories of grievance”, “memories of success” and “memories of multicultural existence.”1 It is clear that the first category of memories has contributed most negatively to the emergence of secessionist ideas in the Chechen republic. Therefore, the events contributing to this cluster will be scrutinized first and in more detail. So, “memories of grievance” include mainly collective remembrance of violent resistance to the Russian and Ottoman authorities during the Caucasian wars, followed later by the forced collectiviza- tion and mass deportation during the Soviet period. It is crucial to point out that the North Caucasian region as such has always had a bloody history of engagement in wars with the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and with the Russian Empire, on the other. In the aftermath of the in 1917 due to the anarchy in the country there was an attempt to create the North-Caucasian autonomy in Daghestan and the Terek region. The provi- sional North-Caucasian government declared its independence on 21 December, 1917, the movement that was later followed by its other Caucasian neighbors. The autonomy existed only for a few years and in 1921, after the victory of the in the , was incorporated again into the territory of the Soviet Russia. By the mid-1920s, the North Caucasian region was divided into admin- istrative units depending on the ethnicity prevailing in the respective territory. This new political map based on the principles of ethno-feudalism further intensified the discrepancies between the regions and bred even more misunderstanding and hatred among the local ethnic groups. Furthermore, unlike the Union republics, the autonomous republics and autonomous regions did not have a full set of at- tributes of sovereignty. According to the Soviet Constitution, the autonomous republics were “na- tional states” and not “sovereign states,” like the Union republics. “The cultural rights of an A.S.S.R. were far more restricted than those of a Union republic. In an A.S.S.R., as a rule, school and university

1 E. Sokirianskaia, “Ideology and Conflict: Chechen Political Nationalism prior to, and during, Ten Years of War,” in: Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet Disorder, ed. by M. Gammer, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 104. 74 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION education was only available in Russian.”2 The same practice also applied to the Chechen and Ingush ethnicity by creating a new consolidated Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region in 1934 that was later (in 1936) transformed into the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. Interestingly, the principle of “divide and rule” prevailing in heterogeneous societies, including in the Soviet Union along with the Soviet “nomenklatura,” contributed to some extent to the ethnicization of bureaucracy. In the case of Chechnia, the local elites mainly comprised the educated middle classes, which subsequently contrib- uted to the political ethnic mobilization. In addition, the main reason for the rise in rebellious attitudes, which the Chechen people are also referring to, is their mass deportation initiated by Joseph Stalin. Accused of collaborating with the Nazi invaders, the Chechen people were deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan. The deportation started on 23 February, 1944 and lasted till 9 March of the same year. The entire Chechen-Ingush republic was disbanded. It should be mentioned that some other ethnicities, such as Koreans, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, Karachay, Balkars, and Kalmyks, were also the victims of Stalin’s depor- tations. There is no clear and exact data regarding the total number of people killed and deported. However, according to the official Soviet statistics, in July 1944, Lavrenty Beria reported to the Kremlin that “in February and March 1944, 602,193 residents of the Northern Caucasus were moved to the Kazakh and Kirghiz S.S.Rs, including 496,460 Chechens and Ingush, 68,327 Karachai, and 37,406 Balkars.”3 During transportation, the conditions were so poor and the people were so tightly packed into the vehicles that a large number of the deportees died of epidemics, starvation, or cold, since deportation occurred in the month of February. Estimates of the number of Chechens who died range from about 170,000 to 200,000, which at that constituted almost 1/3 of the total Chechen pop- ulation. It was not until after Stalin’s death and the subsequent de-Stalinization process initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1957 that the deported ethnicities had the opportunity to return to their homes. At the international level, the European Parliament first recognized the 1944 deportation of Chechens as an act of genocide in 2004. Furthermore, it might be of interest to underline the psychological concept of “marsho” or “freedom,” described by Moshe Gammer as “a central concept in both Chechen culture and the Chechen psyche.” Although Chechen nationalists attach to it modern political connotations, tradi- tionally its meaning went far beyond that of either the Western or Islamic connotations of the word. In the Chechen language the word also contained the connotations of “peace” and “well-being.” The author also admits that for the Chechens the acceptance of Russian rules meant “more than losing freedom in the Western sense of the word: it was losing one’s manhood and more impor- tant—one’s soul.”4 This could also probably serve as one of the explanations for the desperate and enduring history of the Chechen resistance. What is more, it was hard for Cossacks to understand during czarist times why the Chechen rebels, women, and even children were committing suicide instead of being imprisoned. So in conclusion it should be underlined that the above-mentioned historical facts and events contributed to the emergence of discontent among the Chechens over Russian rule. These facts also set a certain precedent in understanding the causes and roots of the otherwise irrational civil wars between the Russian federal forces and the Chechen rebels. In addition, the sequence of these tragic events enhanced even more the consolidation of the Chechen nation. The Chechen identity is a clear example of “multifaceted self-determination.” One of these identities is the common shared territorial identity together with the specific Sufi-Islam beliefs that will be examined later. Furthermore, being part of the North Caucasian and, in particular, Checheno-Ingush linguistic (or Vainakh) community

2 C. Zürcher, “The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood,” New York University Press, New York, 2007, p. 26. 3 V.A. Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society, University of California Press, London, 2004, p. 25. 4 M. Gammer, The Lone Wolf and the Bear: Three Centuries of Chechen Defiance of Russian Rule, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., London, 2006, pp. 6-7. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION favored the emergence of the radical expansionist ideas of establishing an Islamic state in the North- ern Caucasus during escalation of the conflict.

Theoretical Analysis of the First Chechen War (1994-1996)

First, it should be noted that the Chechen case is a clear example of a nationalist movement. The term “nationalism” is well-defined by Michael Hechter as “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its government unit.”5 In order to be considered a nation, a certain social group should have a common history along with claims on territory. These two features are the basic criteria for a group of genetically unrelated people with high solidarity to be distinguished as a nation. In the present case, the Chechen separatist movement adheres to the intr- astate secessionist or irredentist type of nationalism, when a culturally distinctive territory resists in- corporation into an expanding state or attempts to secede and set up its own government. Furthermore, in terms of the primordial approach, the Chechen conflict can be explained as a security dilemma situation, where the uncertain political situation in a country (in our case, the col- lapse of the Soviet Union) creates an anarchic situation: mistrust, misperceptions, and lack of credible commitments among citizens leading subsequently to ethnic violence. These circumstances of the democratic transition experienced by a number of post-Soviet countries at the beginning of 1990s were followed to a certain extent by the emergence of local armed ethnic conflict areas. In addition, the Chechen resistance can be considered an “ethnopolitical conflict,” where an ethnic group “organizes around their shared identity and seeks gains for members of their group.”6 According to this theoretical approach, such groups can be further divided into either “national peo- ples” who want to separate, or “minority peoples” who seek equal rights. In our case, the Chechen ethnic group can be referred to both of these categories depending on the time and stage of the con- flict. However, taking into consideration the period at the beginning of 1990s, it is clear that the Chechens constituted the “national peoples” group. According to the same theory, there are basically several crucial factors that determine the emergence of ethnopolitical action, namely: n the salience of ethnocultural identity for members of the group based on a common decent and shared past; n the extent of the group’s capacities for collective action; n the availability of opportunities in the group’s political environment that increase its chances of attaining group objectives through political action.7 As regards the Chechen case, the first section on the historical background of the conflict al- ready proved the fact of the salience of ethnocultural identity that has formed over the past several centuries and has greatly consolidated the Chechen people. Also, the economic inequalities between the center and the regions, especially in ethnically diverse states, often lead to ethnic tension. In the present case, the consistently high birth rates among the Chechens, together with about 340,000 re- turnees from exile, outpaced Moscow’s modest investments in Chechnia-Ingushetia (which was re-

5 M. Hechter, Containing Nationalism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, p. 3. 6 T.R. Gurr, “Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conflict in a New Century / Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict,” ed. by A. Chester, F.O. Hampson, P. Aall, United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp. 163-164. 7 See: Ibid., p. 167. 76 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION instated in 1957 and survived until 1992), leading to endemic unemployment and other social prob- lems. In addition, the Soviet authorities “refused to give any moral or financial compensation for de- portation, indeed it did not acknowledge the fact of genocide.”8 So, on the one hand, due to the ab- sence of sufficient economic conditions, the Chechen people, feeling their unequal treatment, sought to separate from the rest of Russia and establish their own state. However, on the other hand, this so- cioeconomic approach toward the conflict does not fully explain the incentives of the rebels for sep- aration. Other ethnic republics neighboring on Chechnia, such as Ingushetia or Daghestan, for in- stance, have not expressed their desire for secession. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, proceeding from the examples of secession of other Union republics, the Chechen leaders felt it possible to use the weakness of the newly formed Russian Federation to create their separate country. Regarding this, David Laitin point- ed out in his book that a weak state can be a source of civil war in a country. By “weak states” he implies “newly independent or newly democratizing” countries.9 In addition, the author also under- lines environmental conditions as a possible source of civil war. For instance, in our case, mountain- ous terrains have mainly favored the local rebels who are used to such harsh conditions and, in the event of conflict, have simply hidden there. The nationalist movement in Chechnia intensified when former general of the Soviet Army Dzhokhar Dudaev was invited to become its leader. After creating a new National Congress of the Chechen people, Dudaev started to act more independently of the Russian government. Between 1991 and1994, de facto independent, Chechnia became a working anarchy ruled by an unsuccessful dicta- torship. After first Russian president Boris Yeltsin refused to grant the Chechen people independence, the tension between the central and local governments intensified, with subsequent Russian invasion of the republic in 1994. Initially, this military campaign was planned to be short and directed against the separatist movements in Chechnia. In reality, it lasted for almost 13 months and claimed the lives of approximately “4,000 Chechen fighters and 7,500 Russian soldiers (…); as many as 35,000 civil- ians [were] killed during the course of the two-year conflict”10 (the data differs considerably accord- ing to the source). The capital of the republic was completely destroyed. Almost 500,000 refugees were forced to abandon their homes. Also, Dudaev, the main leader of the Chechen separatist movement, was killed in 1995 by the Russian army. After that, Aslan Maskhadov was elected president of the Chechen Republic. After withdrawal of the Russian troops and signing a ceasefire with the Chechen separatists, the republic remained de facto independent. Aslan Maskhadov, who commanded the secessionist movement after the death of Dzhokhar Dudaev, was elected as a president in 1997. Many experts, including Alexei Malashenko and Dmitry Trenin, defined this conflict as a “commercial war” seeking control over the flow of Chechen oil and money.11 In general, for Russia, secession in the strategically important region of the Caucasus posed a particular challenge. Loss by the parent state of territory and population would have caused another chain of separatist movements in other national republics of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, as Mike Bowker argues, “independence would not have led to peace and stability for Chechnia, and it was also likely to further destabilize the Caucasus region. There is no doubt, however, that Moscow’s policies toward Chechnia have exacerbated a difficult situation, and … its conduct in the war has made peaceful settlement more difficult to achieve.”12

8 G.M. Derluguian, “Ethnofederalism and Ethnonationalism in the Separatist Politics of Chechnya and Tatarstan: Sources or Resources?” International Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 22, No. 9-10, 1999, p. 1412. 9 D.D. Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007, p. 21. 10 B.G. Williams, “The Russo-Chechen War: A Threat to Stability in the Middle East and Eurasia?” Middle East Policy, Vol. 8, 2001, p. 131. 11 See: A. Malashenko, D. Trenin, Russia’s Restless Frontier: the Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., 2004, p. 16. 12 M. Bowker, “Russia and Chechnya: The Issue of Secession,” Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10, Issue 4, 2004, p. 462. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Islam as an Instrument of Political Mobilization

First, it is crucial to point out that Islam came rather late to the Northern Caucasus. Moreover, Chechnia was actually Islamized in the late 18th century, that is, much later than Azerbaijan, Central Asia, or Tatarstan, for instance. It can already be assumed that Islam was not the main factor in forma- tion of the Chechen identity. The Chechen language is considered to be one of the oldest on earth— “linguists date its origins to some four to six thousand years ago.”13 What is more, by adapting to the local traditions and customs, Islam in Chechnia appeared in a new form, so-called Sufi-Islam. It is considered to be a certain mystical branch of the more official Sunni-Islam, but with some crucial new elements. In particular, this form of Islam rejects Shari‘a law in favor of “adat” or customary codes, which also prevail in the neighboring North Caucasian republics. The system of Sufi brotherhoods (Naqshbandi and Qadiri) and the subordinate relationship between pupil (“murid”) and master (“sheikh,” “murshid”), known as “muridism,” were adopted as the structure for the resisting commu- nity and, in the Imamate of Shamil, this crystallized into an actual “Islamic state,” until its capitulation in 1859.14 This was actually one of several times in history when the local Islamic customs converted to a certain extent to their more fundamental form. Also of particular interest here is the fact that there have been clear differences among the different brotherhoods. For instance, in the 19th century the Naqshbandi branches supported jihad ideas, while the followers of Qadiri (in particular the Kunta- Hadji group) tended to oppose radical ideas and maintained peaceful relations with Russia. However, at the beginning of the 1990s their positions underwent considerable changes. The Naqshbandi branches, which were concentrated mainly in the northern parts of the republic, surprisingly “opposed the confrontation advocated by Dudaev, and in contrast both the Qadiri branches and the Kunta-Hadji orders supported the secessionist regime, which was increasingly looking for support in the moun- tainous southern region.”15 Furthermore, the Caucasian phenomenon of “ghazavat” was the turning point toward the “holy war” or “jihad” idea, which also came from fundamental Islam and Shari‘a and meant armed resist- ance against non-Muslims (so-called “kafirs”) in Chechen territory. For instance, green headbands with statements taken from the Koran that have been associated with Wahhabis and terrorists “were worn by many young Chechens who vowed to fight without regard to their own lives, as warriors of Islam.”16 At the same time, both concepts do not imply the same meaning: jihad represents the univer- sal concept about order, whereas “the North Caucasus’ tradition of ghazavat has served rather as an instrument of social mobilization against the external enemy.”17 It should be noted that after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian religious and nationalities policies have had to deal with a range of old and newly appeared religious communities that expe- rienced relief after years of enduring Soviet atheistic ideology. Such a “religious renaissance” was followed by politicization processes, especially in the newly emerged conflict areas. In the present case of Chechnia, according to Moshe Gammer, four major processes characterized this period, namely: n Islamic revival;

13 E. Walker, Islam in Chechnya, available at [http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/caucasus/articles/walker_1998- islam.pdf]. 14 U. Halbach, “Islam in the North Caucasus,” Archives de sciences des religions, 46e Annee, 115, Islam et Poli- tique dans ke Monde (Ex-Communiste), 2001, p. 97. 15 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 16 A. Kroupenov, “Radical Islam in Chechnya,” International Institute for Counter Terrorism, available at [http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333154]. 17 E. Souleimanov, O. Ditrych, The Internationalization of the Chechen Conflict: Myths and Reality,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 7, 2008, p. 1209. 78 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

n The use of Islam by both the authorities and many opposition groups; n The involvement, usually reluctant, of the Sufi leadership in politics; and n The appearance on the stage of the “Wahhabis.”18 The turn to Islam was essentially a political phenomenon based on the insecurities and traumas of past experience. As Edward W. Walker admitted, the Islamic revival there itself became “politi- cized, fundamentalist, anti-Russian, and probably anti-Western in orientation.”19 In order to under- stand why did the leaders of the secessionist movement turned to radical Islamic, anti-Russian, and anti-Western ideas, the policies of both Dzhokhar Dudaev and Aslan Maskhadov should be briefly analyzed. First, it should be emphasized that both leaders did not at first have any intention of consolidat- ing Chechen society on a religious basis. For instance, several scholars still regard Dzhokhar Dudaev as a controversial figure and sometimes inconsistent in decision-making. Working as a commander of the Soviet Army while also being married to an ethnic Russian woman, Dudaev spent most of his life far from Chechnia, namely in Kazakhstan. The leader even had poor command of the Chechen lan- guage and did not respectfully follow the Islamic traditions. The Chechen Constitution adopted under Dudaev’s regime established a secular state and provided for the freedom of religion in the republic. The leader even pointed out the following in an interview with Literaturnaia Gazeta: “I would like the Chechen Republic to be an institutional secular state.”20 The problem was that due to the absence of any other ideological substitution for the consolidation of society over state-building, Dudaev and later Maskhadov had to base the secessionist movement on radical Islamic ideas. As Edward Walker pointed out, after the death of communism, “western liberal democracy has been discredited by the refusal of the West to help Chechnia during the war.” Moreover, in the presence of certain local clan relations and customary codes, liberal ideas seem to be alien to the traditional Chechen culture. After understanding that the Western world was not going to support the secessionist movement, Dudaev visited Iran, after which he called for a jihad against the Russian state. During his inauguration as a Chechen president on 9 November, 1991, the leader swore with his hands on the Koran in front of numerous representatives of Islamic religious institutions. During the ceremony, the leader “prom- ised to abide by and to protect the Islamic faith.”21 However, at one of the press conferences at that time he repeatedly made the mistake of assuming that good Muslims should pray four instead of five times per day, which was outrageous for a leader insisting on the establishment of an Islamic republic. Still, Chechnia remained secular until the outbreak of the first Chechen war in 1994. This was the same year the Chechen political leaders established their first crucial ties with other Islamic coun- tries. The war “triggered the Islamization of politics in Chechnia and catapulted the Wahhabis and their ideology” into the center of attention, both in Chechnia and in neighboring republics.22 n One of the most prominent leaders of the Wahhabis at that time was , who established the “Islamic Umma Congress” in 1997 with the aim of creating one single Islamic nation. The second famous leader was Shamil Basaev, who also established the “Congress of the Peoples of Daghestan and Ichkeria” in 1998, pursuing the similar aim of uniting the Muslim peoples of those two republics into one state. Basaev also collaborated with another famous radical commander of the Arab volunteer fighters in Chechnia—Emir Khattab. The presence of Middle Eastern “Islamic charities” in the Chechen republic was first recorded in 1995. According to some sources, Wahhabi emissaries operated mainly according to the fol-

18 M. Gammer, “Between Mecca and Moscow: Islam, Politics and Political Islam in Chechnya and Daghestan,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 41, No. 6, 2005, p. 834. 19 E. Walker, op. cit. 20 E. Souleimanov, O. Ditrych, op. cit., p. 1209. 21 A. Kroupenov, op. cit. 22 See: M. Gammer, “Between Mecca and Moscow… p. 836. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

lowing scheme: “local Mullahs and Imams were offered one-time grants of $1-1,5 thousand plus a monthly salary of $100-150 in return for their consent to join the Wahhabi sect.”23 n Two of the most dramatic terrorist attacks during the first Chechen war were the Budyon- novsk hospital hostage crisis in 1995 led by Shamil Basaev and the Kizliar-Pervomayskoye hostage crisis conducted by Salman Raduev in 1996. Both of those terrorist attacks were in- itiated under the Islamic banner with the fighters wearing symbolic green Islamic headbands that clearly exhibited radical Islamist features. The main objective of the rebels was to de- mand that Russia withdraw from Chechnia. These two events are the main human rights vi- olations committed by the Chechen side in the first war. At the international level, Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president at that time, “faced heavy criticism for letting the rebels off so lightly.”24 To briefly sum up, it can be assumed that Islam was adopted quite late by the Chechens. More- over, as mentioned above, Islam in the North Caucasian region faced strong local customs and beliefs that consequently mixed with each other. During conflicts, warlords and politicians had to use radical Islam as a tool for consolidating the nation and furthering their own interests. Using the example of the first Chechen conflict, it clearly showed the transformation of the initial purely separatist and secessionist goals of the rebels toward the radical ideas of a holy war against Russians and later against the whole Western world. To a certain extent, they pursued such aims due to the external fund- ing coming from abroad and terrorist organizations. However, it is still important to bear in mind that the conflict in Chechnia was a separatist movement with the late appearance of Islamic features.

Conclusion

So the above discussion brings us to the conclusion that over the course of the first Chechen war and especially in its aftermath, Chechen nationalism was vividly reflected in Chechnia’s efforts to preserve and develop the ethnic culture, where Islam played an undisputedly important role. Howev- er, we should not neglect the fact that Islam in the Northern Caucasus is mixed with certain local tra- ditional customs and beliefs. The Soviet past considerably influenced the secularization processes in all the republics of the Soviet Union, including Chechnia, where Sufi-Islam local specifics also con- tributed to this. So it can be assumed that at the beginning of 1990s the Chechen people were consid- ered to have multiple political identities, the salience of which was triggered by certain dramatic sit- uations and events in the past. Although there was a religious revival in Chechnia at the time, Islam initially played a marginal role in the ideology of the Chechen separatists. Overall, it can be concluded that the initial hypothesis of the present study, which assumed that certain tragic experiences of the past wars and deportation served as a keystone for the idea of Chechen secession, turned out to be partially right. Even though this tragedy also applied to some other ethnicities accused of betraying the Soviet regime and supporting the Nazis, only the Chechens sought to use these historical events as the main reason for their independence struggle. The moment to secede seemed quite appropriate since Russia was still weak after the fall of the Soviet Union.

23 A. Kroupenov, op. cit. 24 “Chechen Rebels’ Hostage History,” BBC News, 2004, available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 2357109.stm]. 80 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Zurab GARAKANIDZE

Ph.D. (Econ.), Observer for the Turkish-English Language Magazine Political Reflection; Observer for the British e-magazine NewsBase (Tbilisi, Georgia).

REGIONAL ENERGY PROJECTS FOR GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Abstract

fter the August 2008 war, the Russian threats to the Turkish Straits, the author A government repeatedly announced suggests reviving the Novorossiysk-Supsa- that it would not talk to the Georgian Ceyhan oil pipeline project (along the Black government on any topic. This article at- Sea coast). tempts to prove that, by the end of 2012, Also, after introduction of the anti-Ira- after reconstruction of the Caspian Pipe- nian sanctions, the possibility of using the line Consortium (CPC), the probability of North-South Gas Pipeline (Russia-Georgia- reviving joint Russian-Georgian energy Armenia) in the reverse mode grew. This projects increased. Given the interests of situation is favorable for Russia, Iran, and the so-called Kremlin energy lobby in trans- Armenia, as well as for Georgia and its portation of the increasing flows of Central western allies, as long as sanctions do not Asian energy sources and the ecological extend to Iranian gas.

Introduction

Ankara has announced its intention to work with foreign oil companies and create a fund for protecting the Turkish Straits against accidents. The cost of this plan may exceed $30 billion by some Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION estimates. However, the Turkish government, pointing again to the massive spill in the Gulf of Mex- ico, says the proposed measures are well worth the price. Part of Turkey’s plan involves reorienting oil flows away from the Straits and into an overland pipeline—specifically, the Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, which is to be built by a Russian-Italian-Turkish consortium along the Samsun-Ceyhan route. But construction of the Samsun-Ceyhan and Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipelines has been halted and the increased volumes of Kazakh oil through the CPC need a new export route. This is why we propose reviving the Russian-Georgian-Turkish Novorossiysk-Supsa-Ceyhan oil pipeline project. On the one hand, this scheme is designed to establish a crude oil transportation route to by- pass the Bosporus and Dardanelles. While on the other, this project will help to open the deadlock in the tense Georgian-Russian relations. In July 2011, Turkey hosted an international conference to discuss navigation security issues in the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. The event was held in Istanbul and was attended by represent- atives of about 20 leading foreign oil companies, including international majors and companies based in Russia and Kazakhstan. Those attending the conference agreed on the importance of guarding against environmental accidents and keeping the Turkish Straits open. These waterways are among the busiest sea lanes in the world. According to official statistics, some 154 million tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products passed through the Turkish Straits in 2009. About 51,000 ships sail through the Bosporus and Dardanelles every year, five times more than in 1990. According to a report present- ed at the Istanbul conference by Turkey’s Energy Ministry, an average of 136 ships navigate the Straits every day. Twenty-seven of these are tankers, the report noted.

Emergency Measures for Black Sea Energy Routes

In his opening address at the conference, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz called for in- troducing emergency measures to protect the Straits in light of the swelling ship traffic. Over the last 15 years, he noted, some 115,000 tonnes of crude oil and petroleum products have been spilled in the Turkish Straits. He also noted that Istanbul, which is home to 15 million people, is located on the Bosporus. Any accident involving an oil tanker in the area would have grave environmental consequences for the city, he said. Despite this threat of an environmental catastrophe, Turkey does not have the option of closing or tightly restricting shipping traffic through the Straits. Under the 1936 Montreux Convention, which regulates navigation in these waters, the Bosporus and Darda- nelles must remain open. Yildiz said at the conference that Ankara was committed to upholding its obligations. He also commented, though, that attitudes had changed because of the disaster that followed the collapse of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform at BP’s Macondo field in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. This event highlights the need for new rules, he said. According to the Turkish press, Ankara has announced its intention to work with foreign oil companies to create a fund for protecting the Straits against accidents. The cost of this plan may exceed $30 bil- lion by some estimates. However, the Turkish government, pointing again to the massive spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, says the proposed measures are well worth the price. Part of Turkey’s plan involves reorienting oil flows away from the Straits and into an overland pipeline—specifical- ly, the Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, which will be built by a Russian-Italian-Turkish consortium along the Samsun-Ceyhan route. This scheme is designed to establish a crude oil transportation route to bypass the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits and link the Black Sea to the eastern Mediter- ranean. Turkish authorities assert that oil companies will not suffer losses if they switch from tank- ers to this route. 82 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Russian Support for Bypassing the Straits

For years, Ankara has been actively lobbying for the construction of a pipeline from Samsun to Ceyhan. It has achieved some success on this front with the recent signing of a deal with the Russian energy giant Rosneft, which will join Italy’s Eni and Turkey’s Calik Enerji to build the pipeline. Russia’s state oil pipeline operator Transneft will also be involved in the project. Its participation, and that of Rosneft, will ensure that the Samsun-Ceyhan link is filled and therefore profitable. Russia had long resisted the pipeline project, in part because of its own plans to build another bypass route through Greece and Bulgaria. In the face of Turkey’s plans to introduce new environmental protec- tion measures for the Bosporus and Dardanelles, however, it seems to have decided to embrace the Samsun-Ceyhan route. This logic is sound: if the pipe were built by other investors and the Straits somehow shut down, Russia would have a very difficult time finding an alternative route for oil ex- ports through the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Russia has not given up on the other bypass line, which would run from Burgas on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast to Alexandroupolis, a Greek port on the northern Aegean coast. If both of these pipelines were built, they would be able to accept most of the oil that is now transited through the Straits. However, Nikolay Tokarev, the president of Transneft, has said that the cost of pumping oil through the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline is likely to be nearly twice as high as the cost of tanker shipments through the Turkish Straits. He also estimated that the cost of using the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline would be nearly three times as high. Nevertheless, Eni, Transneft, and Ros- neft have agreed to cooperate with the Turkish government on this pipeline venture. Meanwhile, re- ports from the conference in Istanbul state that U.S. companies have suggested upgrading the Straits rather than establishing transportation routes. A Chevron representative, for example, said that his company was not considering any new routes for fuel oil shipments. (BP, for its part, has prepared a special document on methods of bypassing the Straits, according to an employee of the company’s Turkish office.) Turkey, however, has resisted the U.S. proposals. Turkish Environment Minister Veysel Eroðlu said: “Freedom of passage through [the Straits] should be controlled in the interests of ecology and for the people of Turkey.” However, there is no way to redirect oil flows immediately. Moreover, Turkey will probably have a difficult time convincing foreign energy giants to fork out the many billions of dollars needed to cover the costs of setting up the proposed environmental program and of constructing the pipeline to Ceyhan.

Necessity for CPC Expansion

At the same time, Central Asian energy is strategic, enabling Russia to expand its economic gains in the energy market. Russia’s gas and oil fields are aging and production is slowing. Bringing additional reserves online will take both significant time and investment.1 The threat to Russian energy dominance originates in the Caucasus. The Western energy corri- dor through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey offers the opportunity for the West to break Russia’s grip on Caspian and Central Asian energy. While the BTC and BTE already allow Caspian oil and gas to flow west along this corridor, it might be expanded by trans-Caspian pipelines to tap Central Asia’s large deposits. Though such a pipeline route would be a feat of both engineering and politics, it is possible that Russia will view it as a serious threat.2

1 See: B. Rumer, “The Search for Stability in Central Asia,” in: Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?, ed. by B. Rum- er, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2002, p. 56. 2 See: A.M. Ismail, “Is the West Losing the Energy Game in the Caspian?,” CA-CI Analyst, 6 May, 2009, available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5100], 12 May, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

To secure its future as a global energy superpower, Russia needs to reassert itself in the former Soviet regions of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Georgia creates a strategic chokepoint. If Geor- gia could be brought in line, Moscow could use its political dominance to cut off NATO’s air corridor, the Western energy corridor, into Central Asia and reduce the negative consequences of Russia’s declining economic importance for Georgia and the former Soviet countries. The problem for Mos- cow is that Tbilisi is anything but pro-Russian. This problem was highlighted by two developments in December 2010. On the one hand, Mos- cow struck an agreement with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) on the expansion of the Ten- giz-Novorossiysk oil export link. While on the other hand, Russia and Turkey signed documents per- mitting Rosneft and Transneft to join up with Eni and Turkey’s state pipeline operator Botaº on the Samsun-Ceyhan project. These events may be linked. The CPC expansion project will increase the volume of oil flowing into the Black Sea, not via the Central Caucasus, but through Russian territory. It will boost the capacity of the Tengiz-Novorossiysk link from its current level of about 36.5 million tonnes per year (733,000 bpd) to 67 million tonnes per year (1.34 million bpd). Most of the additional volumes will come from the massive Tengiz field in western Kazakhstan, which is operated by a Chev- ron-led consortium. However, some may come from Kashagan, an even larger field in the Caspian Sea. The cost of the expansion project is expected to reach $5.4 billion, a figure that some Russian observers have described as unreasonable. It is also important that the Russian government needs CPC expansion to block the possible transportation of “big Kashagan oil” via the South Caucasian routes. But Astana is of a slightly different opinion. As underlined by Professors V. Papava and M. Tokmazishvili, “...despite close relations with Russia, Kazakhstan is also very interested in the security of the transportation corridor passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia.”3

Burgas-Alexandroupolis Failure

Moscow resisted the plan for years, but agreed to approve it after Transneft managers, along with First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, struck a deal with Chevron that provided for crude oil from the Tengiz field to be transported by tanker from Novorossiysk to Burgas for loading into the Burgas-Alexandroupolis link. Then in 2010, Bulgarian Prime Minister Boiko Borisov, who was ap- pointed in July 2009, said he would rather not go ahead with the pipeline project. He said it posed an unacceptably high risk of pollution for the magnificent beaches of southern Bulgaria. This would endanger the tourist business, which is much more important for the country than the “pittance” of 36 million euros ($49 million) per year in transit fees from the pipeline, he said. There is an obvious and simple alternative to Burgas-Alexandroupolis—namely, continued use of the Bosporus and Darda- nelles Straits. However, Ankara is seeking to limit oil shipments through these channels. Initially, Moscow openly objected to the Turkish position and accused Ankara of violating the Montreux Con- vention, which guarantees freedom of passage for civil transport through the Turkish Straits. These protests failed to move Turkish officials, who remained unwilling to accept the risk of increased tank- er traffic. Signs of rapprochement appeared in 2009, when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoðan signed an agreement that gave Russia’s state-run natural gas monopoly Gazprom the right to build a section of the South Stream pipeline in Turkey’s section of the Black Sea. In exchange for this, Putin agreed to Ankara’s insistence on using the Sam- sun-Ceyhan pipeline for shipments of Russian oil. Sechin, who had long opposed the Turkish bypass route, publicly expressed his displeasure with the deal. However, Putin appears to have decided that

3 V. Papava, M. Tokmazishvili, “Russian Energy Politics and the EU: How to Change the Paradigm,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 4 (2), Spring 2010, p. 106, available at [http://www.cria-online.org/Journal/11/ Done_Russian_Energy_Politics_and_EU_How_to_Change_the_Paradigm_by_Vladimer_Papava_and_Michael_Tokmazishvili.pdf]. 84 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION it is more important to please Alexei Miller, the head of Gazprom. This is perhaps because South Stream is meant to serve the important strategic purposes of bypassing Ukrainian transit routes and of competing with EU’s Southern Gas Corridor, a pipeline projects designed to reduce European de- pendence on Russian gas.4 It appears that Russia has abandoned the Burgas-Alexandroupolis project in favor of the Sam- sun-Ceyhan pipeline and Turkey’s program for protecting the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits. In so doing, it has also made a point about its relationship with one of its main post-Soviet partners—Bul- garia. So it would be good if Georgia’s energy policy were transformed into a rational policy. In this regard, and according to the Georgian government’s “10-Point Strategic Plan,”5 in the coming years, the country should become as a regional energy and transport hub. For that purpose I will discuss two projects: (1) an alternative route for Kazakh oil in the Central Caucasus: the Novorossiysk-Supsa-Cey- han Oil Pipeline, and (2) the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor and the Russian-Armenian North-South Gas Pipeline In- terconnector project.

Alternative Route for Kazakh Energy Resources in the Central Caucasus: The Novorossiysk-Supsa-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline

The forgotten proposals for the Novorossiysk-Supsa-Ceyhan pipeline along Black Sea coast deserve a second look because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline threatens the ecology of the Turkish Straits. Along with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan is vitally interested in diversifying its options for oil and gas deliveries to world markets and in reducing its dependence on transit routes through Russia. To some extent, it has succeeded; it has, for example, been exporting oil to China via the Atasu- Alashankou pipeline since 2006. However, the growth of production at the Tengiz and Karachaganak fields, along with the promise of future output from Kashagan, has created a powerful incentive for the creation of an additional export route through the Central Caucasus. Since the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., Kazakhstan has exported most of its oil via Russian territory using two high-capacity pipelines. One of these is the Soviet-built Atyrau-Samara link. The other is the conduit from Tengiz to Novorossiysk built by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The CPC was meant to allow Kazakhstan to export more oil, especially production from the Tengiz field. Since the pipeline ends at the Black Sea coast, however, the oil must then be loaded onto tankers for transport through the Turkish Straits to the Mediterranean market. Recently, many ship- pers have favored continuing this arrangement. The CPC provides export of Kazakhstan and Russian oil. During its ten years’ of operation, more than 2,500 tankers have shipped almost 270 million tons of raw materials to consumers from the sea terminal near Novorossiysk, Russia. In July 2011, implementation of the project to expand

4 See: Z. Garakanidze, “Successful Visit of the EC High Level Officials to Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” English- language magazine Political Reflection (Turkey, Ankara), Vol. 2, No. 1, March, 2011, pp. 49-52. 5 See:“10 Point Strategic Plan of the Government of Georgia,” available at [http://www.government.gov.ge/ index.php?lang_id=geo&sec_id=234&info_id=33014]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the capacity of the petrowire system, which was expected to come to the end in September 2012, began. The CPC project is one of the most successful in the energy sphere in post-Soviet territory. Application of advanced organizational and administrative technologies, modern and reliable equip- ment, and highly professional and responsible personnel are its main advantages. For 10 years, the Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, with a total length of 1,511 kilometers, has been operating without uniform failure. The current CPC reconstruction project has been developing taking into account the prospect of a 2.5-fold increase in its initial throughput to 67 million tonnes of oil annually, and of oil with anti-friction additives to 76 million tonnes.6

Bosporus Bypass May Help in Conflict Resolution

At present, reconstruction at a number of the CPC pipeline facilities is two months ahead of schedule. In particular, around 20% of the work has already been completed at the Kropotkinsky pumping station. There are plans to complete modernization and launch operation in September 2012. The expansion project is being implemented without a halt in oil swapping. However, Ankara is wary, especially in light of the mentioned campaign to expand the CPC’s capacity. It would instead like to see Kazakhstan crude oil shipped across the Black Sea for loading into the planned Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline. Russia, meanwhile, has previously urged Kazakhstan to use the planned Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline. All of these options pose certain problems. Turkey opposes the first on the grounds that it would put too much strain on the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits,7 while Russia and Kazakhstan have yet to make specific throughput commitments to the Samsun-Ceyhan project. Bulgaria, for its part, has effectively blocked the Burgas-Alexandroupolis scheme. As such, Georgia, Russia, and Turkey ought to team up for talks on another alternative—an oil pipeline connecting Novorossiysk, Supsa, and Ceyhan along the Russian and Georgian Black Sea coasts. This one, which virtually no one remembers, calls for moving Kazakhstan oil along the Geor- gian Black Sea coast from southern Russia through Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia, to Turkey. The idea gained some popularity in the 1990s but was later abandoned. It is worth reviving though, now that work on the CPC expansion project has begun. The alternative pipeline would also be cost-effective. Russian experts have calculated its cost at $600 million, compared to $30 billion for the proposed Turkish Straits fund, $2 billion for Samsun- Ceyhan, or 1 billion euros ($1.44 billion) for Burgas-Alexandroupolis.8 Additionally, the pipeline would generate additional transit fees for both Moscow and Tbilisi. Russia could use these revenues to recoup its losses from the Azerbaijani pipelines, while Georgia could use its share to cover costs related to reunification with Abkhazia. It is worth noting, however, that unless the problem of Abkhazia’s status vis-à-vis Georgia is resolved, the Novorossiysk-Supsa-Ceyhan project will not be able to gain any momentum.

6 See: Z. Garakanidze, “Protecting the Turkish Straits,” NewsBase, Week 28, 21 July, 2010, p. 4. 7 See: E. Ismailov and V. Papava have underlined: “Practically from the very moment of the inception of the idea of transporting Caspian oil to the West and the construction of oil pipelines bypassing the territories of Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey appeared as one ‘team’...” (E. Ismailov, V. Papava, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2008, p. 293). 8 See: Z. Garakanidze, “Important Step Has Been Made in Supply and Transit of the Shah Deniz 2 Gas,” Political Reflection, Vol. 2, No. 4, December, 2011, pp. 24-27. 86 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The EU’s Southern Gas Corridor and the Russian-Armenian North-South Gas Pipeline Interconnector Project

In 2010, the Georgian parliament approved changes to the Law on Privatization of State Prop- erty. As a result, the Russia-Georgia-Armenia natural gas pipeline, or the so-called North-South Trunk Pipeline, was removed from the list of state-owned assets not eligible for sale. A number of experts have noted that privatization of the pipeline would serve no real fiscal purpose for Georgia. The sale would probably generate no more than $250-300 million in non-tax revenues for the Geor- gian budget, given that the initial price discussed in 2005, when Tbilisi first attempted to sell, was $200-250 million. What, then, would be the benefits to buyer and seller? From an economic point of view, privatization entails few risks. On the contrary, Tbilisi would probably opt to sell the pipe- line to a private investor willing to invest tens of millions of dollars in its rehabilitation. This would enhance the quality of gas flows, which would, in turn, improve Georgia’s standing as an energy transit state, as is indicated in the government’s 10-Point Plan. But in geopolitical terms, sale of the North-South Trunk Pipeline to an investor from Russia or any of its allies would pose certain chal- lenges for Georgia and its Western allies. For this reason, some analysts have speculated that the quick decision to prepare for privatization was a result of political pressure. How can we avoid such an influence?

A Possible Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia Interconnector Project

At present, the only place where Caspian and Russian gas transport network intersect is in Geor- gia. In that country, the North-South Trunk Pipeline, which runs from Russia to Armenia via Georgia, crosses the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), which is currently pumping gas from the first stage of Shah Deniz (SD1) and which will direct gas into Nabucco or the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline. The point of intersection is near the village of Jandara, near Gardabani. The North-South Trunk Pipeline begins in the southern Russian city of Mozdok in Russia and terminates at the Armenian-Georgian border. The 235-km conduit includes two pipes—one with a diameter of 1,200 mm and a second or spare tube with a diameter of 700 mm. Most of the gas transited through these pipes is now delivered to Armenia, as Georgia has been receiving SD1 gas since 2007. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the pipeline operated far below capacity. While the design capacity of both pipes comes to 18 bcm per year, the network pumped only 1.7-1.9 bcm per year in 2007-2010. (Even in Soviet times, the maximum annual transit volume was 9.5 bcm per year.) If it were connected to the SCP, this pipe- line could be used to channel some of the gas that Russia might have exported via South Stream into Nabucco or the Trans-Anatolian pipeline. Increasing gas transits would also be profitable for Geor- gia. The country already receives 10% of the gas pumped through the North-South Trunk Pipeline as a transit fee. In recent years, gas consumption in Georgia has averaged about 1.73 bcm per year, while Armenia has used about 1.93 bcm per year. This implies that the state-owned Georgia Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC) receives approximately 190-193 million cubic meters per year of free gas, equivalent to about 11.0-11.2% of the country’s gas consumption, which it then monetizes through sales to the local population. The volume of gas transited through Georgian territory is slated to rise in 2017, when SD2 be- gins production. At that time, the SCP link, which has only been pumping 4.7 bcm in 2011, will see its capacity increase dramatically to 20 bcm per year. An agreement signed between Turkey and Azer- Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION baijan on the transit and volume of SD2 gas in June 2010 provides for the pipeline to operate at full capacity. Linking the SCP to the North-South Trunk Pipeline would improve the latter’s prospects, while also giving Russia access to a new high-capacity export route and improving access of the Nabucco and Trans-Anatolian pipelines to gas supplies. Making the connection would be easy and would not restrict supplies to Armenia, especially since that country is now able to receive gas from another supplier—namely Iran. If this can be done, the competition between Southern Gas Corridor’s projects and South Stream would subside, and the two projects would instead complement each other. That is, rather than working against the Southern Gas Corridor, Gazprom would be able to use the EU’s pipelines to acquire a new export route to Europe. We fully agree with the idea, according to which “...harmonizing gas pipelines is even more important given that it is far from clear whether the Russian gas transport system will be sufficient to transport expanded volumes of Central Asian gas during the first part of the next decade.”9 Moreover, connecting the SCP to the North-South Trunk Pipeline would allow the creation of a wider network in which Iran could serve as a supplier, as long as western anti-Iranian sanctions are against the oil exports and do not extend to Iranian gas. Iranian gas pumped through the Tabriz- Meghri line to Armenia could then be pumped to the Georgian village of Jandara, near Gardabani, via the Armenian network and redirected into the SCP for loading into the Trans-Anatolian or any of the Southern Gas Corridor’s gas lines, just as gas from Russia could be pumped through the North-South line for transfer to the SCP. This would be cost-effective, as it would make use of existing pipes rather than require the construction of new lines.

Conclusion

Not only is energy a source of economic wealth, it also translates into political power. However, coercive energy diplomacy is not the only source of leverage that Russia has against Georgia. Having assumed responsibility for mediating Georgia’s separatist conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow has the ability to manipulate these internal disputes for political gain.10 Now Georgia has a chance to use its geographical location to promote the country’s reunifica- tion. Development of the Central Asian energy projects and growing shipments of Kazakh oil via the Turkish Straits give Tbilisi the chance to start a dialog with Russia on the topic of using Georgian territory, including the occupied regions, in which the West could be involved. For that purpose, the Novorossiysk-Supsa-Ceyhan oil pipeline project must be revived. Also, according to the Georgian government’s strategic plan, in the coming years the country should become a regional energy and transportation hub. To that end, the EU Southern Gas Corridor’s projects, via the SCP as an intercon- nector, must be linked up with the Russian-Armenian North-South Gas Pipeline, which can also be used as leverage for using Iranian and Armenian economic interests in future Georgian-Russian ener- gy cooperation.

9 V. Papava, M. Tokmazishvil, “Pipeline Harmonization Instead of Alternative Pipelines: Why the Pipeline ‘Cold War’ Needs to End,” available at [http://www.ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/150/20090327030535315.html]. 10 See: K. Preobrazhensky, “South Ossetia: KGB Backyard in the Caucasus,” CA-CI Analyst, Vol. 11, No. 5, 11 March, 2009, p. 3. 88 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Abdurakhman HUSEYNOV

Ph.D. (Econ.), Professor, Leading Research Fellow, Regional Center of Ethnopolitical Studies, Daghestan Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences (Republic of Daghestan, the Russian Federation).

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS (A NORTH CAUCASIAN CASE STUDY)

Abstract

he author investigates the methodo- ples of the neoinstitutional approach in so- T logical (institutional, systemic, and neo- ciology as applied to the regional institu- functional) aspects of the conflict po- tional specifics of the Northern Caucasus tential of social institutions in the Northern and the conflict potential of social institu- Caucasus and formulates the main princi- tions in a polyethnic region.

Introduction

The causes and mechanisms of conflicts in contemporary society cannot be correctly identified without a profound analysis of their institutional component. Indeed, today the specifics of all sorts of regional conflicts point to an easily identifiable institutional origin. Social institutions can be de- scribed as a “potential conflict testing ground” on which potential threats to social integrity and sta- bility are unfolding. Back in the early 1990s, the academic community realized that the entire range of conflict-prone problems had developed into a threat. This became especially obvious in the Northern Caucasus. On the one hand, the causes and mechanisms of social conflicts should be identified; while on the other, the role and place of social institutions in the emergence and settlement of conflicts and conflict- prone situations should be determined. This should be done to avoid subjective approaches to the analysis of conflict-prone factors; moreover, academic interest will intensify the possibility of gener- alizing the objective determinants of social conflicts during analysis. Indeed, studies in conflict po- tential are impossible without an in-depth investigation of the institutional structure of contemporary society. In the context of the neoinstitutional approach to social institutions as organized sociocultural entities that generate, reproduce, and lower transaction costs, the institutional complex of the whole of society and an individual region can be described as a conflict-prone and conflict-regulating factor of social development. The still inadequately studied institutional determination of social conflicts in social sciences calls for its sociological determination and interpretation. This will increase the volume of our theo- retical and empirical knowledge of contemporary social changes, including social conflicts. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Institutional, Systemic, and Neofunctional Approaches to Social Institutions

The conflict potential of social institutions in contemporary society cannot be properly studied without methodological delimitations and interpretations of the main descriptions of social changes as structure-action; for the same reason, the prerequisites and the gist of the discourse on correlations of predetermined macro and micro changes should be taken into account. Here I will dwell on a re- flexive analysis, interpretation, and verification of the main provisions of the neoinstitutional theory as part of a wide range of contemporary and reliable theories of social changes in sociology and adja- cent disciplines. The institutional, systemic, and neofunctional approaches in sociology are methodologically very close to the complementary neoinstitutional approach born within economics. The neoinstitu- tional approach obviously complements the systemic approach; the same is true of the particular na- ture of neoinstitutionalism and the generalized and holistic constructs of the systems theory ranging from the classical general theory of systems to cybernetics of the second order (H. Maturana, F. Vare- la, and N. Luhmann). The systemic approach and systemic analysis are two generally recognized and rapidly develop- ing scientific trends that go deep into the natural sciences, technology, and the humanities. Systemic comprehension of the investigated objects (social institutions), however, is methodologically speci- fied within the institutional and functional approaches in sociology and their contemporary revision in neoinstitutionalism and neofunctionalism. The specifics of the development of the neofunctional approach in sociology created its obvious advantages when studying the conflict potential of social institutions. In the political context, neo- functionalism, which was developed by a group of American academics headed by Ernst Haas, be- came one of the basic theories of European integration. It was generally recognized that the trend toward governable integration at the regional level is the strong side of neofunctionalism. According to Haas, the integration mechanisms of a polyethnic expanse rest on functional reducibility and func- tional supplementarity and in many respects are identical to the Monnet method of integration, that is, integration through economic relations leading to political integration. Jeffrey Alexander is convinced that today Western neofunctionalists (S. Eisenstadt, P. Colomy, J. Alexander, L. May, and N. Smelser) “move beyond purely systemic and evolutionary explanations of differentiation toward accounts that stress contingency, concrete groups, conflict, and social move- ments and collective behavior;”1 the very foundations of the paradigm of neofunctionalism, however, have not avoided a certain amount of ideologization, or “party bias” (to borrow a Soviet formula). The neofunctional approach bases the mechanisms of social integration on neoliberal interpretations hard- ly verifiable in different social realities of non-Western, a-typical societies. It seems that the neofunctional integration model of the West European Community can hardly be applied to Russia’s North Caucasian region: there is no more or less similar system of economic relations; the local economies depend on donations from the Center; the ethnocultural and ethnopo- litical landscape is much more varied; political institutions are highly vulnerable; the social and de- mographic structures are very different from Europe; traditional societies and traditional culture are much more persistent, etc. This means that the “economy first, politics later” integration pattern might become a disintegrating factor. Economic contacts at the regional and interregional level add to the integration potential; federal donations, on the other hand, “inflate” the regional economies by in-

1 J. Alexander, P. Colomy, “Neofunctionalism Today: Reconstructing a Theoretical Tradition,” in: Frontiers of So- cial Theory: The New Syntheses, ed. by G. Ritzer, Columbia University Press, New York, 1990, p. 53, available at [http:// ccs.research.yale.edu//alexander/articles/1990/alexcolomy_neof2dy.pdf]. 90 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION creasing corruption, transaction costs, and social inequality; they fan social discontent and tension and may, therefore, become a factor of disintegration. Integration in the Northern Caucasus cannot be achieved through economic mechanisms: there the neoinstitutionalist maxim “institutions matter” is more applicable than anywhere else. Neoinstitutionalism was born in the 1960s-1970s as an economic trend. The founding fathers who studied the institutional structure of production realized that their economic theory needed con- cepts such as transaction costs, property rights, contract relations, etc. Classical institutionalism in economic theory is associated with the names of Thorstein Veblen and John Commons; later it was supplemented with categories borrowed from the social sciences and humanities (particularly from sociology and psychology). Neoinstitutionalism is a natural product of expansion of the social and personalized to the mac- roeconomic (in their essence) constructs of institutional economics. The unfolding world economic crises caught the majority of economic theorists unawares; it cast doubt on the efficiency of legitimate economic methods and mechanisms of forecasting, simulation, and management of economic and social processes. It seems that the world economic crisis threw into bolder relief the relevance and advantages of the neoinstitutional approach. Neoinstitutionalism, on the other hand, is not free from methodological limitations caused by its close genetic ties to economic theory. It proceeds from two general premises: (1) Social institutions matter; (2) Social institutions can be analyzed with the help of concepts and methods created by eco- nomic science. While sociologists treat the former as an axiom and even banality, the latter is absolutely unac- ceptable: while applying the neoinstitutional approach to sociological studies we should forget the latter premise; this means that we should rely on certain sociological analogies and interpretations. The “methodological individualism” that dominates in neoinstitutionalism refuses to treat so- cial groups and social organizations as subjects. The behavior of collective communities is explained within purpose-oriented individual behavior. The frequently naïve (from the viewpoint of sociology) attempts of theoreticians of economics to join the discourse of those who represent the paradigms of social action inevitably orientates them toward the sociological theories of practical rationality and rational choice. Neoinstitutionalists have introduced the concepts of limited rationality (Herbert Simon) and opportunistic behavior (Oliver Williamson) to explain social action and economic behavior. As distinct from the neoclassical economic theory, which looks at man as an absolutely rational creature not alien to mechanistic systemic rationality, neoinstitutionalism points out that economic agents are rational within certain limits created by the far from complete information accessible to them and their intellectual narrowness. Opportunistic behavior is interpreted as “self-interest seeking with guile,” which includes the possibility and influence of all kinds of lies, swindle, and corruption interests. According to neoinstitutionalists, social institutions should minimize the negative effects of limited rationality and opportunistic behavior. This thesis has found its way into the main idea of neoinstitutionalism—institutions are social entities designed to lower the costs of transacting. It should be said that this idea is anything but novel and that it is obvious to sociologists and other social and humanitarian scholars. This thesis is not exhaustive and is, in fact, a product of the theory of social structure and social exchange that develop within sociological and socio-anthropo- logical knowledge. In sociology, classical political economy, social and, in particular, political and economic anthropology, as well as in the symbiotic branches of social-humanitarian knowledge and natural science, the discourse on the specifics of social structures and social exchange is of fundamen- tal importance. For example, the development of French ethnology and anthropology is genetically associated with the study of social exchange (started by Marcel Mauss in his Essai sur le don) and social structures (the structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss). Study of the social structures Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and systems of exchange in living systems—traditional societies and animal populations—allowed scholars to extrapolate the results to industrial and post-industrial societies as much more complicated community types. A comparative analysis of the above approaches and the neoinstitutionalist approach to eco- nomic theory suggests the following provisions of the neoinstitutionalist approach to sociology: (1) Social institutions matter irrespective of the methodological diversity of their interpretation ranging from extreme objectivist to extreme subjectivist. (2) An analysis of social institutions based on the concepts and methods elaborated exclusively by economic science is ineffective, while the complementary nature of the branches of sci- entific knowledge and the dominating paradigm is obvious in the case of their institutional analysis. (3) Social structure is a structure of production, distribution, and redistribution of resources within a social system. (4) Social institutions are the organizational mechanisms of production, distribution, and redis- tribution. (5) Production, distribution, and redistribution of resources in a social system are implicitly as- sociated with costs (“transaction costs” within neoinstitutionalism) of unequal consump- tion, social inequality, inefficiency of social institutions, redistributive nature of the econ- omy, etc. (6) Lowering transaction costs is not the only function of social institutions—they are respon- sible for their production and reproduction (even in the form of exclusive production of costs with convincing imitation of their functional activity and transaction inefficiency). Therefore, the neoinstitutionalist approach to an analysis of economic activity of the social institutions in the North Caucasian regions (as lowering the costs) will end in a methodo- logical and scientific-practical impasse. (7) We should contemplate not only the vertical non-equivalent systems and practices of social exchange, but also horizontal, reciprocal exchange. (8) Limited rationality and opportunistic behavior introduced to explain social action and eco- nomic behavior proved not to be exhaustive. They will inevitably be revised or replaced with much more complicated sociological theories of social action. According to the neoinstitutionalists, normative analysis should proceed in a comparative insti- tutional context—the functions of institutions should be compared not with imaginary constructs but with realizable alternatives. (In sociology this approach is represented by Robert Merton’s concep- tion of functional alternatives and functional replacement.) If accepted, this thesis will raise the ques- tion of the correlation and mutual influence of the “sustainability” and “effectiveness” of social in- stitutions. Scientific discussion waged within the neoinstitutional theory points to the complicated nature of interpretation of the efficiency of the institutions as applied to the interpretation of their sustainability. At first the amount of institutional costs served as the criterion of the efficiency of social insti- tutions in neoinstitutionalism. Thrainn Eggertsson formulated a general version of Coase’s Theorem: “The economic growth and development of a country are basically unaffected by the type of govern- ment it has, if the costs of transacting in both the political and economic spheres are zero.”2 Later Douglass North refuted this “optimistic” model of institutional efficiency and the idea that inefficient institutions will be inevitably replaced with efficient, which will lower the transaction costs. He dem-

2 T. Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 248. 92 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION onstrated that it was inapplicable to the situation of economic growth of West European civilization in the Modern and Recent times.3 Neoinstitutionalism treats the problem of the sources of social change and their sustainability in a very special way. According to North, there are two sources of institutional changes: A. Changes in the structure of relative prices. Social changes make some of the forms of organ- izational and institutional interaction unprofitable, which forces economic agents to try new forms. B. Ideology. By ideology North understands subjective models through which people perceive the world around them. From the viewpoint of the neoinstitutional approach, the absence of institutional changes means that none of the actors is ready to revise the functioning social institutions and institutional practices (because of the costs such changes would have incurred), therefore social deprivation, social discon- tent, and tension do not automatically generate social changes. Protest potential and protest activity are growing, but only accumulated protest potential leads to a revision of the conventional institutions and practices, that is, when the costs of their continued existence exceed the possible cost of the changes. Neoinstitutionalism treats the stability problem in a simplified mechanistic way. Everything known so far about the sources of extremism and terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and in other countries, for that matter, does not point to this simplified mechanistic pattern of social changes. This pattern ignores the socio-cultural dimension of social inequality and social discontent, such as the different social, economic, and political positions of communities, population groups and categories; this accounts for the different perceptions of the social situation and social changes, as well as for the different degrees of their desirability. According to Douglass North, the effects and interaction of the factors of prolongation and con- servation of inefficient social institutions stabilizes the institutional system irrespective of its effi- ciency. On the one hand, the institutional path-dependent development of any specific society deter- mined by a combination of efficient and inefficient institutions is responsible for the rigidity and pre- determined behavior of people amid social changes. While on the other, a set of efficient and ineffi- cient institutions and their correlations determine, in the final analysis, institutional path-dependent social development. The ideas formulated by Douglass North correlate in many respects with what Svetlana Kirdina writes about the rigid “institutional matrices” that predetermine the development of each specific society. An institutional matrix is a stable system of basic social institutions, a product of the past development that predetermined the first states and the development of all the following institutional structures, which, in turn, predetermine the reproduction of the primary model that has preserved its essence. There are two types of matrices—the western and the eastern, each with a specific set of basic and auxiliary institutions.4

The Concept of “Institution” as Treated by Neoinstitutional Theory

It seems that before going further we should look at how neoinstitutionalists interpret the con- cept “institution:” it is impossible to operate with similar concepts and arrive at common methodolog-

3 See: D. North, R. Thomas, The Rise of Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge University Press, 1973; D. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, 1990. 4 S.G. Kirdina, Institutsionalnye matritsy i razvitie Rossii, TEIS, Moscow, 2000, pp. 11, 23-24. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ical and interpretative ground without achieving a clear idea of how the neoinstitutionalists treat the institution concept in economic theory and sociology. The question is: Do neoinstitutionalists under- stand by “institution” a social unit analogous to the “social institutions” in sociology? Douglass North has identified the following components: (1) Informal constraints (traditions, customs, and social conventions), in short, everything which sociology describes as “informal norms” together with customs, traditions, etc. (2) Formal rules (constitutions, laws, judicial precedents, and administrative acts). Formal reg- ulations in sociology. (3) Enforcement mechanisms to ensure observance of rules (courts, the police, etc.). Social sanctions: positive and negative in sociology together with institutions and agents of social control. This means that there is a certain methodological and conceptual similarity in the interpretation of social institutions in sociology and North’s neoinstitutionalism. It should be said that interpretation of social institutions in neoinstitutionalism as a system of rules is similar to Anthony Giddens’ interpreta- tion of social structures, including institutions, which regulate all possible variants of social action.5

Transaction Costs as an Efficiency Criterion of Social Institutions

The transaction cost theory is a methodological innovation of neoinstitutionalism. It is an at- tempt to translate the reproduction costs of a social structure and social exchange (an axiom within sociological knowledge) into the language of economic theory. The level of transaction costs is a criterion of efficiency/inefficiency of a social institution at the macro level of the society’s institutional morphology and even path dependence. The level of cost minimization can be described as a criterion of an institution’s efficiency. In his monograph, Andrey Shastitko points out that transaction costs within the neoinstitutional approach are interpreted as “the cost of resources (money, time, etc.) needed to plan, adapt, and con- trol how the individuals fulfill the obligations assumed in the course of alienation and appropriation of the rights of ownership and freedoms recognized by society.”6 The neoinstitutionalists identify the following types of transaction costs: (1) costs of information search; (2) costs of measurement; (3) costs of talks and contract signing; (4) costs of specification and protection of the rights of ownership; (5) costs of opportunistic behavior. These types of costs are intercrossing and mutually complementary. Transaction costs are divid- ed into “pre-contract,” “contract,” and post-contract,” as well as into “real” (which interfere with certain types of interaction) and “virtual” (the cost of overcoming interference).

5 See: A. Giddens, “Structuration and the Practical Routines of Social Life,” in: A. Elliott, Contemporary Social Theory: An Introduction, Routledge, London, New York, 2009, pp. 124-140. 6 A.E. Shastitko, Neoinstitutsionalnaia ekonomicheskaia teoria, Moscow, 1999, p. 158. 94 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

From the viewpoint of social-humanitarian and, in particular, sociological knowledge, transac- tion costs are divided into the following types: (1) Costs of reproduction and changing the social structure as a whole and its individual social- structural components in any specific society. (2) Costs of reproduction of social institutions and institutional changes. (3) Costs of reproduction of social organizations and organizational changes. (4) Costs of reproduction of social groups and changes in group dynamics. (5) Costs of interpersonal social interaction. (6) Costs incurred by the actors’ personal specifics. The transaction cost theory in sociological, auxiliary interpretation makes it possible to analyze and assess the activities of social institutions within the regional context and to identify their efficien- cy. As applied to an analysis of the North Caucasian institutional agreements and institutional envi- ronment, the theory offers obvious heuristic possibilities. From the neoinstitutional position, the following institutional specifics can be identified in the North Caucasian region and the Republic of Daghestan as its part: (1) The great role and stability of informal rules and constraints. (2) The low authority of formal rules and constraints. (3) A negative attitude toward the formal enforcement mechanisms, formal sanctions, informal institutions, and agents of social control. (4) The higher authority of the informal enforcement mechanisms, informal sanctions, institu- tions, and agents of social control. (5) A much more informal nature of institutional agreements and institutional environment. (6) A relatively higher (sometimes high) inefficiency level of social institutions. (7) The inefficiency of social institutions is largely supported by various population groups and categories (part of the local ruling regional elites and ethnocratic national and family elite groups, etc.). (8) A relatively higher level of transaction costs.

The Neoinstitutional Approach to Conflict Potential in a Polyethnic Region

A comparative analysis of the neoinstitutional approach to the economic theory and the concep- tions of social structure, social exchange, and institutional analysis in other spheres of social-humanitar- ian and, in particular, sociological knowledge provided the following provisions of the neoinstitutional approach in sociology used to analyze the conflict potential of social structures in a polyethnic region: (1) Ineffective institutions can be much more stable than effective ones, which means that there are different types and models of social institutions ranged according to the stability/effi- ciency criteria: stable and inefficient; stable and efficient; unstable and inefficient; unstable yet efficient. Any level and any degree of stability and efficiency should be discussed both diachronically and synchronically, ad hoc and permanently. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(2) The inconsistency of the general version of Coase’s Theorem. Few historical analogues confirm the premise that in the course of institutional changes inefficient institutions are re- placed with efficient ones, that is, ensure low-cost transacting. (3) According to Douglass North, the main factors of prolongation and conservation of ineffi- cient social institutions and their functioning are the following: (a) The state might be interested in preserving inefficient institutions if they contribute to maximizing the gap between budget incomes and spending. In the post-Soviet period, inefficient social institutions were preserved to avoid costly modernization and trans- formation. This is true of the social sphere and the budget sphere in the economy: the state caught in the momentum of minimizing modernization costs accepted the huge transaction costs in the form of corruption and inefficient spending of budget money. On the other hand, when the balance between preservation of the vast and initially cheap set of social perks and state obligations (with a very limited budget) and their possible monetization shifted in favor of the latter, the state became resolved to mini- mize the cost. While fully aware that many of the social institutions in the Northern Caucasus are inefficient, the federal Center has to support them since the cost of their modernization and transformation might produce repercussions going far beyond the limits of the economy as such. (b) Various population groups and categories may be interested in inefficient social insti- tutions. The social structural diversity of post-Soviet Russia abounds in relevant exam- ples: there are elites with their own interests; recipients of social privileges to whom monetization should be explained; and representatives of various power structures who have grown accustomed to “transaction costs” in the form of bribes of all sorts. In post- Soviet states, as well as in the Northern Caucasus, the national and local elites generate transaction costs, which preserves the inefficiency of the social institutions. When an- alyzing, from the neoinstitutional position, the causes of extremism and terrorism in the Northern Caucasus, we should not ignore the activities of very specific “interest groups” determined to preserve inefficient social institutions and inefficient institu- tional methods for combating these phenomena. (c) The evolution of any society is directly related to the chosen institutional path depend- ence in which new and/or more or less efficient institutional “rules of the game” might remain ignored for the simple reason that their introduction calls for considerable ini- tial spending, while it is much cheaper to preserve the long established social institu- tions. (This means that to reduce the conflict potential of social institutions in the Northern Caucasus it is necessary to radically change their path dependence; within the present path dependence, the efficiency of the struggle against extremism and terrorism very often depends on inefficient social institutions and institutional methods which merely reproduce the negative social phenomena.) (4) Seen from the neoinstitutional position, the absence of institutional changes means that none of the actors is resolved to change the functioning social institutions and institutional practices in view of the costs this would incur. For this reason social deprivation, social dis- content, and tension do not automatically generate social changes. Despite the growing pro- test potential and protest activities, changes only begin when negative sentiments have ac- cumulated to the extent when it becomes cheaper to revise the conventional institutions and practices rather than prolong their existence. It should be said that neoinstitutionalism treats the stability problem in a much simpler mechanistic way. An analysis of the sources of ex- tremism and terrorism in the Northern Caucasus and elsewhere in the world does not con- firm this oversimplified mechanistic scheme of social changes. 96 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

(5) From the position of social-humanitarian and, in particular, sociological knowledge, trans- action costs can be divided into the following types: —Costs of reproduction and changing the social structure as a whole and its individual so- cial-structural components in any specific society; —Costs of reproduction of social institutions and institutional changes; —Costs of reproduction of social organizations and organizational changes; —Costs of reproduction of social groups and changes in group dynamics; —Costs of interpersonal social interaction; —Costs incurred by the actors’ personal specifics. The transaction costs theory in the sociological context makes it possible to analyze and assess the activities of social institutions in the regional aspect and identify the degree of their efficiency. As applied to the analysis of institutional agreements and institutional environment in the Northern Cau- casus, this theory offers obvious heuristic possibilities.

Conclusion

A comparative analysis of the neoinstitutional approach in economic theory and the conceptions of social structure, social exchange, and institutional analysis in other spheres of social-humanitarian and, in particular, sociological knowledge provided several provisions of a neoinstitutional approach in sociology used to analyze the conflict potential of social structures in a polyethnic region. The approaches to the study of conflict potential in the Northern Caucasus formulated above are conducive to an analysis and expert recommendations about the functioning of the social institutions in the region and reveal the degree of their efficiency related to conflict prevention and conflict settle- ment. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Ahmet YARLYKAPOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

ISLAM AND THE CONFLICT IN THE NORTHERN CAUCASUS

Abstract

he author’s analysis of field studies terpretations of Islam present in the region T (carried out in the last 14 years) of do not make it a source of conflict. Islam the role of the Islamic factor in the is drawn into regional conflicts by a com- North Caucasian conflicts brings him to the plex intertwining of spheres of influence, in- conclusion that the various forms and in- terests, and ambitions.

By Way of an Introduction: Current Trends

This article is best described as an attempt to survey the forms that Islam has assumed in the Northern Caucasus. The radical changes of the last two decades have created an absolutely new pic- ture of the region’s religious life. Throughout these years Islam has been rapidly gathering authority among the Caucasian peoples in different spheres of daily life, as well as gaining in political scope. On the other hand, extremism among the Muslims receives much more attention than it should, which explains why Islam in the Caucasus is studied in a fairly biased way. The real involvement of Islam in the region’s conflicts and the forms of this involvement may offer a highly interesting subject for scholarly studies. Are there “conflict-prone” and “peaceful” 98 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION forms of Islam, or are they nothing but myths? Is religious ideology the initial source of a conflict, or do the conflicting sides turn to it to justify what they do for different reasons? I will look for the an- swers to these and other questions in the field studies in the Northern Caucasus I have been involved in since 1998. The Caucasian history of Islam is rich and diverse; the first Muslims appeared there in the first century of Islamic history. Sunni Islam of the Shaf‘i madhhab and Shi‘a Islam of the Imami madhhab arrived in the Caucasus from the south (Mesopotamia and Iran). Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madhhab arrived from the north (from Central Asia via the Golden Horde). Both trends created a Sufi impact in the Caucasus where the practices of Sufi Tareqats—Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyyah and Shadhiliyya— became fairly widespread.1 The Islamic map of the Northern Caucasus is quite different: the followers of two of the Sunni madhhabs (Hanafi and Shafi‘i) communicate much more than before; the number of those who want to remove the barriers among the various madhhabs is growing. Muslims the world over are being gradually drawn into “Islamic globalization” without the ethnic and state borders that so far still sep- arate the madhhabs. The urban Muslim youth is the movement’s most active supporter. On the whole, “Islamic globalization” is trying to leave behind the division of the single religion into madhhabs. It relies on the idea of a single Islamic “nation.” In fact, before the era of “national- ism,” religious identity, if it did not predominate in the Islamic world, was accepted on an equal foot- ing with ethnic identity. Many of the Muslim peoples do not distinguish between Islamic community and nation and use the word millah to describe both. This suggested that ethnic identity came after religious. Those who side with this say: “First of all we are Muslims, and only after that are we Arabs, Persians, Chechens, etc.” In this system, civilian and political identity comes second; not infrequently the diversity of real Islam is ignored. Universal “ideal” Islam is needed to tie together the Muslim ummah. Second, this explains why Islam tends toward fundamentalism. According to the ideologists of Islamic globalism, universal Islam is very real; it should merely be freed of later additions. These people have opted for the simplest alternative—it is enough to rely on the Koran and the Sunnah, while the achievements of Islamic philosophy accumulated over the span of fourteen centuries should be ignored. Even if this heritage is recognized as a fact, many eminent authors of the past have been weeded out. This reassessment of the Islamic heritage is a very important process, the results of which will not be seen any earlier than in the mid-term perspective. Third, “Islamic globalization” functions as a network of organizations: it is spreading far and wide at a comparatively fast pace and has reached the least favorable of the milieus (Daghestan, Chechnia, and Ingushetia in the mid-2000s).2 The new type of Islamic activity promoted by youth leaders is absolutely alien to the Sufi (Tareqat, the local term) communities of these highly traditional republics. All attempts to stem these trends by punitive measures missed the point: the new network structures have become an inalienable part of the three republics’ Muslim landscape. Under the pressure of high-tech mobile and satellite tools of communication, the Internet, etc., certain groups of protest Muslim communities are becoming extraterritorial: their members no longer attend the same mosques every Friday; there is no need to know each other personally. Like-minded people can create real network communities with the help of virtual technologies. In Russia, some of the youth jamaats started moving in this direction when the attempt to set up a legal youth community in Nalchik failed.3

1 See: A.K. Aliev, Z.S. Arukhov, K.M. Khanbabaev, Religiozno-politicheskiy ekstremizm i etnokonfessionalnaia tolerantnost na Severnom Kavkaze, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2007, p. 112. 2 These developments are best illustrated by the local Jihad of Shari‘a jamaat in: R. Kurbanov, “The Information Jihad of “Shariat” Jamaat. Objectives, Methods, and Achievements,” in: Russia and Islam. State, Society and Radicalism, ed. by R. Dannreuther, L. March, Routledge, 2010, p. 156. 3 This form of youth activity draws youth jamaats into “Islamic globalization” at a much faster pace. Young people acquire access to fatwas and the opinions of “electronic” muftis who work in the global audience through the Internet. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Significantly, Russian, rather than Turkish, Persian, etc., is used in the ethnically diverse North- ern Caucasus as the main language of communication; it is used in some fairly strong jamaats, the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat can be cited as an example. This does not mean that the local languages are not used at the local level: in a Balkarian village, for example, the imam uses Balkarian, while at the republican level the prevails.

Toward “Global Islam”

These forms of globalizing activities, informal and initiated from below, are very strong; young Russian Muslims, especially in the cities, describe this new version of Islam in the Northern Caucasus as “new.” This creates the danger that the Muslim community might split under the pressure of a con- flict between the “new” and “old” Muslims. The quest for universal Islam, which has already tempted a large part of the Islamic youth, pre- vents its smooth integration into contemporary society: in Russia Muslims are obviously alienated; on the other hand, the Muslim community is disunited by disagreements on the way toward “genuine” Islam.

Disagreements over “Traditionality”

The disagreements over “traditional” and “nontraditional” Islam have moved to the fore: “tra- ditional” Islam should become the “official” and dominating religion. This is of great methodolog- ical importance—many Russian researchers have already been using this rhetoric—and is abso- lutely unproductive. Islam in the Northern Caucasus is represented by different directions, trends, and schools; so far, repeated attempts to insist on the only true Islam have failed. In Daghestan, the local form of Sufism was accepted as the only true type of Islam opposed to Wahhabism; all other forms were dismissed as “nontraditional.”4 In September 1999, in Daghestan, “Wahhabi activities” were banned by law.5 The Law on Banning Wahhabi and Other Extremist Activities passed in Daghestan6 did not offer a clear legal description of these activities. It, however, allowed support- ers of Sufi Sheikh Said-afandi al-Chirkavi,7 who dominated the religious scene, to remove their rivals. “Official” Islam is represented be the Spiritual Administrations of the Muslims in each of the North Caucasian republics. On the whole, in the Northern Caucasus, the Spiritual Administrations of the Muslims are losing the battle for new supporters to “unofficial” Islam. The Spiritual Administrations, the heirs to the imperial system of administering Islam, are conservative and clumsy. The state’s unconditional sup-

Quite often sermons and fatwas are translated into English, or are even written in English (which is assisted by numerous translation facilities found on the Internet), thus facilitating access for Russian-speaking Muslims (for more detail, see: G.R. Bunt, iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam (Islamic Civilization and Muslim Networks), The University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 4 It should be said that in Soviet times Sufism in the Northern Caucasus was treated as an “unofficial” and, there- fore, persecuted form of Islam. 5 See: A.K. Aliev, Z.S. Arukhov, K.M. Khanbabaev, op. cit., p. 370. 6 The changes that took place in Daghestan early in 2012, including the fairly successful meetings between Sufis and Salafis, at which the sides decided to move away from confrontation, stirred up the opinion that the republican law on the ban of Wahhabism should be abolished or, at least, seriously amended. 7 The law recognizes, in particular, the “administrative structure of the religious republican organization,” which is the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Daghestan (DUMD) controlled by scholars of Said-afandi. 100 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION port guarantees their continued monopoly on speaking on behalf of all Muslims at the state level; the opposition forces are ignored. Not infrequently, the Spiritual Administrations of the Muslims, as practically “official” organizations, demonstrate no real skills and rarely respond to the chal- lenges of our day, something young Muslims accuse them of.8 Parallel Muslim structures are often more active and more effective. In the mid-1990s-early half of the 2000s, for example, the Kab- ardino-Balkarian Islamic Center (later the Kabardino-Balkarian Institute of Islamic Studies), a le- gal structure of the Kabardino-Balkarian youth jamaat, a centralized hierarchical organization of young Muslims, successfully competed with the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kab- ardino-Balkaria. For a long time, both structures competed for the right to represent the Muslims of the repub- lic: the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria spoke about the members of the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaats as Wahhabis and relied on the republic’s defense and security structures for support. Repressions were often openly anti-Islamic. For example, early in the 2000s, all the mosques in the republic remained closed except for one hour on Fridays. Young men who performed prayers five times a day were persecuted; a girl in Muslim dress was immediately recog- nized as a terrorist. Many young Muslims were brought to police stations and beaten up.9 This rad- icalized the previously moderate jamaat leaders. In 2004, at a meeting with Shamil Basaev, amirs of the jamaat Musa Mukojev and decided to join the armed struggle against the Russian authorities.

Daghestan

The situation in Daghestan, the most religious of its North Caucasian neighbors, is worth exam- ining separately. The majority of its population follows Islam, one of the pillars of identity for 3 mil- lion Daghestanis; there are about 2 thousand mosques in the republic. From the very beginning, that is, from the early 1990s, religious development in Daghestan assumed a violent nature. The Muslim renaissance began here with the republic’s fairly scandalous divorce from the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus and developed in the form of further division into ethnic religious groups. Today, ethnic muftiyats are a thing of the past, but at least half of the Muslim communities refuse to accept, for different reasons, the legitimacy of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Daghestan, mainly because of the republican muft- iyat’s narrow Sufi orientation dominated by the murids of Sheikh Said-afandi al-Chirkavi. Islam in Daghestan is not limited to two of the madhhabs (Shafi‘i and Hanafi) of Sunni Islam, to Shi‘ism and Sufism. The republic’s Islamic field is much more diverse and includes radical Salafi groups—the so-called forest groups, Wahhabis, and the moderate Akhlyu Sunnah group. Different schools and traditions of Sufism are also represented, as well as small marginal groups of supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir and Fethullah Gülen, as well as a particular sect known as Krachkovtsy. The repub- lic is strongly affected: divided Islam cannot stabilize the situation; not infrequently, religion is used as a vehicle of protest. Protest sentiments, typical of the youth, take the form of a conflict between the older and young- er generations. Young people refuse to follow the traditions of their ancestors; they visualize their

8 See: Zh. Khamdokhova, “Kabardino-Balkaria: ‘spiashchuiu krasavitsu’ razbudili?” in: Severny Kavkaz: vzgliad iznutri. Vyzovy i problemy sotsialno-politicheskogo razvitia, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 2012, p. 62. 9 For more detail about the developments in Kabardino-Balkaria, see: A.A. Yarlykapov, “Novoe islamskoe dvizhenie na Severnom Kavkaze: vzgliad etnografa,” in: Rasy i narody: sovremennye etnicheskie i rasovye problemy, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 2006, Issue 31, pp. 205-229; M. Shterin, A. Yarlykapov, “Reconsidering Radicalisation and Terrorism: The New Muslims Movement in Kabardino-Balkaria and its Path to Violence,” Religion, State and Society (Routledge), Vol. 39, Nos. 2/3, 2011, pp. 303-325. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION new role in society and new position in it. It will be no exaggeration to say that the North Caucasian, and Daghestani for that matter, Islamic youth is facing an identity crisis. Today, Daghestan can be best described as a social patchwork. The republic’s population dem- onstrates a fairly high cultural level; its cities are rapidly assuming the Mid-Eastern makeup. This process, however, has nothing in common with the traditions and the traditional image of the repub- lic’s society. Traditions are still alive in the countryside, but young people are moving away from the traditional structures and the relationships within them. Their mechanism has been broken; in the past traditions were observed by the entire jamaat and kept the village community together; today, their sphere is limited to a family or a clan.10 Once outside them, young people feel free. An official com- plained that his nephew, who had diligently attended Friday services when at home in a mountain village where people kept close tabs on any digression, stopped praying as soon as he arrived in Makhachkala. Sociologists have already registered that the younger generation is harder hit by the identity crisis than other age groups. Daghestani sociologist Zaid Abdulagatov has detected a paradoxical duality in the way young people regard themselves: over half of them identify themselves with the Eastern culture based on Islam.11 The changes currently unfolding in Russia and the anti-Caucasian hysterics are pushing young Daghestanis away from the all-Russia community, thus adding an edge to the already acute identity crisis. The youth is responding to the total corruption and lack of prospects with a rising wave of pro- test sentiments. Even the best educated young people believe that the immediate introduction of Shari‘a is the only answer to the republic’s numerous problems (they are also talking about either a slightly or totally revised system or reform from above, from Moscow).12 A small, yet extremely ac- tive part of the youth is finding the answer in the forests among the fighters. The larger part is leaving the republic in search of jobs: unemployment is very high (which is not that important in the agrarian republic), while wages are very low (which is much more dangerous than job shortages). The surplus labor force creates an outflow of about 10 thousand every year.13 Post-Soviet mi- gration is very different from what went on in Soviet times. Today, confronted with a far from friendly or even hostile attitude, migrants are forming compact Daghestani communities in cities (Astrakhan is one example) and the countryside (the Rostov Region).14 On the one hand, circum- stances are driving labor migrants into compact groups, while on the other, this is preventing as- similation. More than that: in the mid-term perspective it will undermine the development of a sin- gle political nation in Russia and intensify fragmentation. Daghestanis, and members of other North Caucasian nationalities for that matter, live in ethnically uniform parts of Russian cities or in compact ethnic communities; they find jobs in certain limited niches that offer no chance of com- municating with the rest of society and, by the same token, breed alienation and an awareness that they should go different paths. Therefore, the outflow of young people to big cities and oil- and gas-producing regions in search of employment is inflating, rather than deflating, tension. In the new context, Islamic identity, which is “dormant” at home, “wakes up” and becomes actualized. Not infrequently, young men in unfamiliar and far from friendly (if not hostile) environments seek for and find moral support in their

10 Interview with Makhach Musaev, Head of the Department of Oriental Studies, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography, DNTs RAS, 15 September, 2011. 11 Interview with Zaid Abdulagatov, Head of the Department of Sociology, Institute of History, Archaeology and Ethnography, DNTs RAS, 14 September, 2011. 12 Ibidem. 13 Interview with Abas Akhmeduev, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Social-Economic Studies, DNTs RAS, 16 September, 2011. 14 For more detail, see: Yu.Yu. Karpov, E.L. Kapustina, Gortsy posle gor. Migratsionnye protsessy v Daghestane v XX—nachale XXI veka: ikh sotsialnye i etnokulturnye posledstviia i perspektivy, Peterburgskoe vostokovedenie, St. Pe- tersburg, 2011, pp. 163-211, 348-408. 102 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Islamic identity. The phenomenon of re-Islamization of migrants calls for special attention and anal- ysis. So far, it has become absolutely clear that it is not going on within so-called traditional Islam. Young people are tempted by radical interpretations of Islam; this is not readily accepted at home, which stirs up conflicts among the Muslim communities of Daghestan. Recently, President of the Republic of Daghestan Magomedsalam Magomedov initiated discus- sions among Islamic groups, in the course of which the moderate Akhlyu-Sunnah Salafis developed into a political force of sorts that represents the interests of oppositionist Muslims. The defense and security structures were instructed to stop using force against the peaceful Salafis; there are Salafi mosques in several settlements and Salafi groups in the republic’s capital. In Makhachkala, Salafi businesses (trade, services, and realty) have come into the open. There is a lot of skepticism in the expert community about the commission set up under the president of the republic and on his initia- tive to help those who abandoned terrorist and extremist activities and want to resume a peaceful life. This fact, however, says a lot: the authorities are obviously determined to start talking to the extreme opposition. While approving the initiatives and being cautiously involved in cooperation, the moder- ate Salafis will not be taken by surprise if the government and the official Islamic leaders decide, all of a sudden, to end the dialog: “We have come out into the open, but we are prepared to resume clan- destine activities because we do not believe that the new attitudes have arrived to stay.”15 The secular part of Daghestani society has its own reasons to be critical of the new policies: it is concerned about the fact that the government has been more and more frequently demonstrating its religiosity. The republic’s head openly attends Friday services in the main mosque.16 Has “official” Sufism preserved its position in the new conditions? Unlike the Sufis of Chechnia and Ingushetia, the Sufis of Daghestan are followers of living sheikhs, Said-afandi al-Chirkavi being the most popular among them. He is the sheikh of two Tareqats—Shadhiliyya and Naqshbandiyya— while half of the Sufis of Daghestan are his followers. His community is the strongest in the republic, while his network covers the republic and goes further: there is a strong group of his murids in Mos- cow, until recently it controlled Islam.ru, the most popular Internet portal in Russia.17 In Daghestan, his scholars have gone far; he or, rather, his entourage controls many of the municipalities in Northern Daghestan through his followers; quite a few of them are found in the republic’s power structures and among the members of parliament; his murids fill high posts in the republican government and econ- omy. It should be said that Said-afandi is not a mafia god father. He is a symbol with no real decision- making power, which belongs to his cronies. The Sufi community is not seeking political and strate- gic control in the republic. In other words, it is a spontaneous movement; however, the Sufis are not alien to exerting pressure through their men in the corridors of power. The Daghestani Sufis are using the instruments at their disposal to actively interfere in the re- public’s social and political life; they aspire to control book publishing through attacks on bookshops selling books banned by the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Daghestan. One such attack took place in March 2010 when followers of Said-afandi organized pogroms in several bookshops. Not infrequently Sufis rely on Islamic laws as their strongest arguments. Their hectic activities, sup- ported by the republican authorities, have added tension to the relations between the secular and reli- gious parts of society. It should be said that the Sufi part of the republic’s Islamic community reflects, in the strangest way, the ethnic factor. In the 1990s, it was good form to say that the Sufi communities were ethnically uniform, that is, that the murids and the sheikhs belonged to the same ethnic group. Sheikh Sirajuddin Khuriksky from the Tabasaran District was mainly the religious leader of Southern Daghestan where the population spoke the Lezghian language; Said-afandu al-Chirkavi was the sheikh of the Avars. In the 2000s, this trend seemed to be pushed aside, while communities became more ethnically diverse.

15 Interview with anonymous representative of the Salafi community of Makhachkala, 23 September, 2011. 16 Interview with Zaid Abdulagatov, 14 September, 2011. 17 Today this resource is controlled by a Daghestani group of murids. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

With the help of his scholar Arslanali-afandi Gamzatov, sheikh of the Shadhiliyya Tareqat and rector of the Buinaksk Islamic University, Said-afandi spread his influence to the Kumyks and linguistically kindred Nogays. Arslanali-afandi demonstrated no mean talent: in no time he moved close to claim- ing the title of the most influential sheikh of Daghestan among Said-afandi’s followers. They, howev- er (practically all of them being Avars) decided that this honor should not be bestowed on a Kumyk. His ijazah (license) as the sheikh of the Shadhiliyya Tareqat was withdrawn together with the post of rector.18 The ethnic factor, still very important in the Islamic field of Daghestan, betrays itself in many strange ways. The Daghestanis are very religious; this affects the republic’s social and political life. Fully aware of the whole-hearted support of the conservative religious part of society, the religious leaders do not hesitate to meddle in spheres far removed from religion. They actively interfere in scientific discussions and try to follow everything written and published in the republic to promote certain pref- erences among the republic’s population by banning some books and recommending others. The of- ficial Islamic figures interfered in the sphere of entertainment by closing the republic to the Russian pop stars.19 There is no agreement about the content of teaching religion in schools, about Islamic dress in state schools, co-education of boys and girls, etc. Too active supporters of secular education fall vic- tim to the passions. In September 2010, Patimat Magomedova, the director of a school in Shamkhal, was murdered because of her resolute objection to hijab in school and an equally determined resolu- tion to continue physical education lessons for girls.20 Two otherwise irreconcilable opponents—the Sufis and Salafis—present a united front to the secularly minded part of society. If, in their zeal, religious figures transcend the limits of the Constitution of the Republic of Dagh- estan, which describes Daghestan as a secular state, the secular part of society must remain firm. In some cases, however, criticism of the religious leaders is not absolutely justified. There is a lot of talk about Islamic education, which allegedly will replace secular. In fact, the number of communities that would prefer Islamic education for their children is shrinking. Back in the 1990s the threat was real; however, the trend has not developed. Today secular education is obviously preferred as prestigious; according to experts and even state officials, the Islamic higher educational establishments of Daghestan, another target of vehement criticism, play an important role by offering education to those who do not have the money to enroll at secular institutes. These young people are housed and fed; they are educated accord- ing to the Sufi moral principles, which prohibit armed struggle and extremism.21

Political Conceptions: Regional Angles

There is another very important trend: transformation of the separatist movement in the North- ern Caucasus. Today, ethnic separatism, which started as a struggle for Chechen independence, has

18 The expert community and the media paid practically no attention to these developments even though the Kumyk Internet forums were concerned (see, in particular: “Natsionalnaia okraska v religioznykh razborkakh,” web site Kumykskiy mir. Kultura, istoria, sovremennost, available at [http://kumukia.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?t=1200], 1 April, 2012). 19 In the 2000s, tours of several Russian pop stars, in particular Boris Moiseyev, were banned (see, for example: “Artista Borisa Moiseyeva ne pustili v Makhachkalu; obzor SMI Daghestana,” IS Regnum [http://www.regnum.ru/all- news/256041.html/], 5 November, 2011). 20 See: O. Ionov, “Direktor shkoly v Makhachkale stala zhertvoy naemnykh killerov…,” available at [http://www. kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/174704/], 24 September, 2010. 21 Interview with Murtazali Yakubov, Chief Specialist at the Department for Cooperation with Religious Educa- tional Establishments and Humanitarian Cooperation of the Administration for Relations between the State and Religion of the Ministry for National Policy, Religion and External Contacts of the Republic of Daghestan, 23 September, 2011. 104 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION been transformed into a movement for the liberation of Muslims from the power of the “state of the infidels.” Politicization of Islam is a complex and far from straightforward phenomenon; there is a multitude of methods by which Muslims are drawn into politics. Here is how the conception of the “Islamic state” affects the minds and practices of the Muslims of the Northern Caucasus. All the processes underway in the Islamic communities of Russia inevitably lead to their polit- icization. No other religious movement is as politicized as Islam. This process is going on both in the minds of the Muslims and in practice. This means that we should acquire a clear idea of the ways politicization is connected with the idea of the Caliphate (or whether they are connected at all). So far, this subject has been essentially neglected; little has been said about its impact on the minds and practices of the Russian Muslims; the Caliphate, on the other hand, is one of the pet sub- jects that regularly surfaces in official commentaries on extremist activities in the Northern Cauca- sus. It is alleged that terrorists are fighting for a Caliphate in the Northern Caucasus.22 This vague- ness stems from the fact that we know precious little about Muslims, both “traditional” and oppo- sitionist, and their aims. On the one hand, everything is clear: those who fight the Russian author- ities want to establish their own form of power (the Caliphate by a general tacit agreement). Spec- ifications defy logic: sometimes it is said that the fighters want to set up a worldwide Caliphate, sometimes it is asserted that they will be satisfied with the North Caucasian Caliphate. To some extent, this is rooted in an inadequate academic base. The number of works about politicization of the Russian Muslims, religious and political extremism among them, is vast; there are practically no works dealing with their political doctrine in correlation with the idea of the Caliphate. This extremely important and interesting subject is absent from the works of prominent Russian and foreign students of Islam in Russia: A. Malashenko, A. Ignatenko, D. Nechitaylo, I. Dobaev, E. Kis- riev, K. Khanbabaev, A. Knysh, G. Yemelianova and others.23 Most specialists and experts con- centrate on radicalization of the Muslims of Russia, by which they understand their politicization, which is a delusion. I must say that the processes of genuine politicization, not politicization/rad- icalization, are extremely interesting. The steadily increasing number of supporters of Shari‘a in Russia is closely associated with the discussion of politicization and the ideas of building an “Islamic state.” The idea of Shari‘a is popular in Daghestan, where it is openly discussed by the wide masses, especially among the youth. A lot of criticism of the ruling circles and the official religious figures can be heard at any of the youth forums. Much of the criticism is absolutely correct; anyone living in Daghestan can see the wide gap between ostentatious religiosity and the statements that Daghestan is a country of Islamic knowledge, on the one hand, and the chaos in the minds and actions of the ordinary people, on the other. Daghestani society is steeped in corruption, crime, and embezzlement, which is surprisingly widespread in a re- public that survives on subsidies from the center. The faithful youth, who cannot find a worthy place in this bacchanalia, protests, not necessarily with arms in hand; they do not hide in the forests, but try to identify the roots of this state of affairs. Shari‘a looks to be a solution. This should not be treated lightly: the intellectual elite of Daghestan have already started building an “Islamic state” in their minds. Many of the ideas are still half-baked, but we should realize that disenchantment with the gov- ernment, which has discredited the principles and values of Western democracy, suggests that Shari‘a is the best option. Today, Daghestan brings to mind the Soviet Union, where political reality was heatedly discussed in practically every other kitchen. All boys and girls hear the talk about high posts

22 These approaches have migrated from official commentaries to academic writings, one of the latest of them be- ing G. Yemelianova, “Divergent Trends of Islamic Radicalization in Muslim Russia,” in: Russia and Islam. State, Society and Radicalism, pp. 133-134. 23 See, for example: A.V. Malashenko, Islamskaia alternativa i islamistskiy proekt, Moscow, 2006; A.A. Ig- natenko, Islam i politika, IRP, Moscow, 2004; D.A. Nechitailo, Mezhdunarodny islamizm na Severnom Kavkaze, Mos- cow, 2006; I.P. Dobaev, Islamskiy radikalizm: genesis, evoliutsia, praktika, Rostov-on-Don, 2003. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION being sold and bought, huge bribes, and contacts, without which no successful career is possible. Young people know that money changes hands every time one of them enrolls at a higher educational establishment or graduates from it; technically free government-subsidized study at a college also costs money. Nor does finding a job after graduation come free; private business is divided among ethnic groups: there are “Avar,” “Dargin,” “Kumyk” etc. business groups patronized by correspond- ing ethnic communities. Shari‘a cannot be introduced without radical political changes: part of the Islamic youth is con- vinced of this. In fact, Shari‘a as a panacea for all social ills is another highly interesting delusion: the young people are too young to know that Shari‘a needs positive historical experience to take root. For them Shari‘a is an ideal law that can solve all problems by the very fact of its existence. This is what deeply religious people think; in this respect faith is intertwined with practice. Young people are be- ginning to introduce Shari‘a themselves: a large number of young Muslim Salafis in Daghestan are starting their own businesses in full conformity with the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, who endorsed trade. In this way they escape dependence on the omnipresent corrupt system. These eco- nomically independent groups, the jamaats, have created a comfortable and isolated expanse in which these people can practice the norms they take for Shari‘a or which are Shari‘a. Their personal life, fear of God, and what they called “halal” business practices allow these people to stand opposed to the order of things in their republic and inculcate Shari‘a as they understand it. Young Muslims are going beyond the limits of private life and business practices: they look at Shari‘a as a universal remedy and a universal legal system applicable to all spheres of life. Corruption should be punished by severing hands; administration should be entrusted to collegiate structures operating according to the Shura principle, which has nothing in common with liberal Western de- mocracy. Governance should be entrusted to one person elected by the faithful whose power is limit- ed by a council (Shura) of local leaders (amirs). Fairness is guaranteed by strict application of Shari‘a and no less strict public control realized through the Shura. Normally Shari‘a and the Caliphate are not interconnected. Today, the idea of an Islamic state is openly supported by two rivaling structures—the Wahhabis and the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Back in 2007, the radical wing of the former established the Caucasian Emirate on tiny scattered pieces of land as part of the Caliphate that was expected to appear sometime in the future. The leaders are build- ing a state apparatus complete with power structures and a taxation system. Hizb ut-Tahrir remains true to its traditional policy and is criticized by the Russian defense and security structures and the Wahhabis. Very much like the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in the early 20th century, Hizb ut-Tahrir and Salafi fail to agree on the methods rather than the aims. The Islamic Liberation Party suggests that an Islamic state (in the form of a Caliphate) should be established by peaceful means through gradual changes in the mind; the Salafis prefer more radical methods: the state of the “infidels” should be replaced with an Islamic state, not necessarily a Caliphate (at least at the initial stage). These radicals are convinced that in the Northern Caucasus jihad should be armed. Those who doubt that armed jihad is inevitable are treated as apostates, not as erring people or traitors. In the absence of adequate means, terror against the law enforcers and those who support what the radicals call the “kafir” state necessar- ily remains the main instrument of struggle. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects these methods; it places the stakes on gradual penetration into the so- cial structure in order to change society from inside. People must change before society can change. This means that members of Hizb ut-Tahrir should infiltrate all spheres of social and political life and entrench themselves in the key structures. These methodological disagreements between Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Salafis are of fundamental importance. In their joint leaflet, Kudaev and Astemirov, two ideologists of the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat, dismiss Hizb ut-Tahrir as an Islam- ic political party “that wants to restore the Islamic state in the form of a Caliphate and believes that brainwashing is the only ideological instrument that can launch an ideological and then political revolution.” They have arrived at the conclusion that “the ideology and methods of this party con- 106 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tradict the very foundations of the creed and methods of Akhlyu Sunnah Wal Jama’a,”24 that is, the Sunnis. While criticizing the organizational structure of this party, the Salafis pointed out: “They call the regions and districts in which the party operates ‘uilayyats’ (controlled territories).”25 In 2007, after establishing the Caucasian Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz), they called its regions and districts “vilay- yats.” Unconsciously, they were driving toward a global Islamic Caliphate, of which the Caucasian Emirate was part. Hizb ut-Tahrir never spread far and wide in the Northern Caucasus and Daghestan as its part; the Caucasian Emirate as a project proved much more successful. At the turn of the 20th century, the idea of a geographically limited imamate was fairly popular. Those who promoted the idea proceeded from the fact that at that time most Sunnis recognized the imamate of the Ottoman sultans who had assumed the title of caliph. The imams of Daghestan and Chechnia tried to keep these Islamic territo- ries within Darul Islam (the House of Islam) even if outside the Ottoman caliph’s direct rule. When the Islamic world fell apart politically with several caliphs ruling simultaneously and when the Caliphate, the symbol of Islamic unity, ceased to exist, Muslims resorted to various different types of political arrangement. Formally, all rulers who came to power when the Caliphate disappeared recognized the caliph as their sovereign: they demonstrated no zeal in practical terms and never assumed ambitious titles, being satisfied with the title of amir ruling an emirate. For the Mus- lims, emirates are bricks of sorts, parts of the Islamic world. Sometime in the future they will all join together to become a Caliphate, which will bring the Islamic umma together. In other words, the states with Muslim populations and Muslim rulers can be formally described as caliphates established in small territories. There were imams of Daghestan and Chechnia and the Imamate of Shamil established in the Caucasus that successfully opposed the pressure of the Russian Empire in 1829-1859. In the early 21st century, the Northern Caucasus, with its vast previous experience of building a local Caliphate, revived the idea; very much as before, in the 1990s-2000s it remained closely con- nected with the idea of jihad. Yasin Rasulov, an ideologist of the radical Salafis, wrote an outstanding book called Jihad na Severnom Kavkaze: storonniki i protivniki26 (Jihad in the Northern Caucasus: Supporters and Opponents), in which he proved that the Sufis had never been involved in North Cau- casian jihad, while Salafism was not a newcomer in the Northern Caucasus.27 The new Caucasian jihad started as Chechnia’s independence struggle; little by little Islamic agitators planted new interpretations of its aims and tasks in the minds of those who fought in the war. Shamil Basaev, a Chechen field commander, did more than the others to supply jihad with new di- mensions. As member of the government of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, he initiated and implemented a project that took jihad beyond the borders of one republic and drew other North Caucasian peoples into the struggle. He paid particular attention to the Nogays, the most downtrod- den group which lived in the east of the Stavropol Territory. After setting up a Nogay District in Chechnia and reserving several places for the Nogays in the Ichkerian parliament, he earned the eter- nal gratitude of young Nogays who proved to be excellent fighters during the military campaigns in Chechnia. Basaev tried to consolidate his success by moving in different directions and paying particular attention to Kabardino-Balkaria. By the mid-2000s, a close-knit Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat had al- ready appeared. Basaev was very specific and very efficient: he contacted the jamaat leaders and drew them into his orbit. In 2004, the leaders of the jamaat, finally discouraged by their futile attempts to legalize the jamaat and protect the republic and its Muslims against troubles, decided to join the

24 R. Kudaev, F. A. Astemirov, “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islamiy (Islamic Liberation Party),” available at [http:// www.salyaf.info/download/index.php?act=view&id=7440], 25 March, 2012, p. 11. 25 Ibidem. 26 See: Ya. Rasulov, Jihad na Severnom kavkaze: storonniki i protivniki, s.l., s.a., 78 pp. 27 See: Ibid., pp. 67-68. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION armed jihad. In the same year, Anzor Astemirov took part in a daring attack on the State Drug Control Administration to obtain weapons for those who were prepared to fight. Aware of their importance and numerical strength, the leaders of the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat rejected the “kid brother” role. This told the leaders of Ichkeria that an independence struggle limited to Chechnia had become an anachronism. Anzor Astemirov and Chechen leader Doku Umarov had been exchanging letters for a long time before the Chechen leader realized that the idea of Chechen independence should be replaced with the idea of independence for the Caucasus under Islamic slogans. Astemirov, who relied on the Koran and the Sunnah, was clear and convincing; nationalism was the Caucasus’ gravest problem. He argued that all peoples should be united as Muslims, which could be realized in a common Islamic state ruled by the Muslims and living according to Shari‘a. On 25 Ramadan 1428 (7 October, 2007), Amir Doku Umarov officially proclaimed the Cauca- sian Emirate, or Imarat Kavkaz. He was shown against the background of a black flag when he an- nounced that having abandoned the idea of independence for Chechnia he had set up the Caucasian Emirate and enumerated the vilayyats of the new state. It was a step toward unification of all Muslims: “We are an inalienable part of the Muslim umma.” As the first step the leaders of the new state—Umarov and his closest circle (Astemirov was one of the associates) created state structures and the Shari‘a Court of Justice (headed by Astemirov), which proved to be most effective. Its conviction of Zakaev, unrealized, but compiled according to the rules, was one of the most striking decisions. The Internet discussion about the state language of the newly established Emirate clarifies the idea of the Emirate as a stage on the long road to the Caliphate. Several languages were mentioned, including Russian (the de facto “state” language of the Emirate, since the announcement was in Rus- sian; numerous statements of warlords are also in Russian). Some people favored either Arabic or “Ottoman” (Turkish); those who supported the Turkish language argued that it had been used in the last Caliphate, a telltale argument. So far the discussions are going on in the virtual space of a virtual Emirate and are far removed from real life and the hopes of the absolute majority of the North Cauca- sian Muslims.

Conclusion

In the Northern Caucasus, Islam is not merely “official” and “unofficial” or “traditional” and “untraditional”—the black-and-white picture to which we have grown accustomed does not exist. It is better described as a patchwork of various trends, madhhabs, and interpretations. Today, Islam is moving to the fore in the social and political life of the North Caucasian republics and is gradually filling the ideological vacuum. There are active or suppressed conflicts into which Islam is wittingly or unwittingly drawn. We should become accustomed to the fact that in many cases Islam is being used as a banner designed to conceal the causes and real aims of the sides. The future of political Islam in the Northern Caucasus and in Daghestan as its part is vague. Even those who support the idea of Shari‘a and the Caucasian Emirate have no clear idea of what a Caliphate is. This means that the official statements about terrorists in the Northern Caucasus alleg- edly fighting for the Caliphate are wrong. 108 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Rasim ABDULLA

Ph.D. Candidate, Academician Z. Bunyadov Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

EAST-WEST: AN INTERCULTURAL DIALOG. FROM MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO INTEGRATION

Abstract

oday, the sociocultural situation shaped tions. Indeed, it has become abundantly T by global integration, mass migration, clear that global problems cannot be re- more active international contacts, and solved without an equal and constructive a wider information space calls for a dia- dialog between the West and the Muslim log between cultures and respect for their East, in which Azerbaijan, as a bridge be- diversity as cornerstones of civilized rela- tween them, plays a special role.

Introduction

Intercultural dialog is a priority of our times that is increasingly acquiring global dimensions. None of the cultural and political issues today is regarded as more urgent or attracts more attention than the dialog of civilizations. Numerous international and national organizations at different levels in different corners of the world are discussing its general parameters and political, religious, and scientific aspects; numerous conferences, symposiums, and meetings bring together clergy, officials of all ranks, writers, academics, cultural figures, and sociologists to discuss the focal points from dif- ferent points of view; and numerous academic papers and publicist writings deal with the same ques- tions: How can the rising tension between the West and the be defused? How can agreement and mutual understanding between the East and the West be achieved?

Factors that Interfere with Mutual Understanding between the West and the Muslim East

No matter how much has been done and is being done to promote intercultural dialog, recently it has become clear that these praiseworthy efforts have not yet brought the results expected by those who started the process. Hundreds of events have produced excellent resolutions and recommenda- tions, however, only a small fraction of them have been implemented so far. This is because the sem- Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION inars and colloquiums are of an academic rather than practical nature; they bring together those will- ing to vehemently denounce Samuel Huntington’s notorious theory of the “clash of civilizations” and to tell each other that cultures and religions should start a dialog. Today, there is a more or less widespread conviction in the Islamic world that the dialog of civ- ilizations is in crisis and that despite its fairly long history it has produced no positive results. They insist that the world needs a new dialog based on mutual respect, equality of all countries, and a com- mon platform of interests.1 People in the East are convinced that the West is using the dialog to impose its own concepts, symbols, and values under the banner of democracy or “scientifically substantiated” data. Having armed themselves with Bernard Lewis’ “Many Muslims deeply resent to the West”, because they had fallen hopelessly behind and the West allegedly has to educate them,2 Anglo-Saxons pose as such educators, while trying to revive the old formulas of “white man’s burden,” “civilizatory mission,” etc. Edward W. Said, a prominent American culturologist of Palestinian origin, offered the follow- ing comment: “Lewis proceeds by distorting the truth, by making false analogies, and by innuendo, methods to which he adds that veneer of omniscient tranquil authority which he supposes is the way scholars talk.”3 In his Orientalism, a book published in 1979 which made him world famous and in which he discussed the European approach to the non-European part of mankind, Edward Said was scathingly critical of academics who shared Lewis’ approaches, saying that Western interest in the Orient, in- cluding that of Western scholars, is nothing more and nothing less than evidence of racism and colo- nialism. He is out to prove than the West’s interest in the East, which created colonialism and which was further confirmed by imperialist expansion of the West to the East, gave birth to an intellectual and literary trend which regarded the peoples of the East and their culture as a certain static object to be interpreted (recreated) and dominated. This trend is known as Orientalism. Edward Said believes that racism is an inalienable part of Orientalism and the way the master nation treats subjugated peo- ples allegedly unable to express their interests themselves. As a prominent academic he relies on rich factual material to demonstrate that mental construc- tion of the East in the cultural (Orient) rather than geographic (East) sense was one of the inherent elements of intellectual and political self-construction of the West. The Orient is an absolute Other, something which substantially differs from the Western man who contemplates it. “Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient—dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”4 Edward Said traces the beginning of Orientalism to the Enlightenment when European mankind first devised a global project to teach “primitive” Eastern peoples the values of Western civilization. “Without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the enormously sys- tematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively.”5 There is a fairly widespread opinion in the Islamic academic community that the stumbling block is the West’s insistent desire to impose its own ideas about the problem’s roots, its own values, and its own assessments. Several American and European scientific centers pooled forces and put forward the thesis, under various guises, that confrontation between the West and the Muslim East

1 See: . p. 12 (Mahmoud Hamdy Zakzouk, Islam and Problems of Dialog, Al-Ahram Press, Cairo, 2002). 2 B. Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle East Response, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2002, p. 95; idem, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, pp. 47-60. 3 E.W. Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books Edition, 1979, p. 342. 4 Ibid., p. 3. 5 Ibidem. 110 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION was caused by Islam’s militant and extremist nature. The West, its political and intellectual elite, and the media look down on Islam as a religion of a lower level. Not infrequently, Islam is presented in the West as a black-and-white phenomenon deprived of philosophical depth; few people in the West are aware of the Islamic civilization’s rich cultural her- itage despite the fact that there is any number of excellent Western Orientalists well-versed in Islam and related subjects. Outside the West, on the other hand, it is commonly believed that, on the whole, the West knows pitifully little about Islam. The West remains practically ignorant of the fact that in recent years the Muslim world has acquired a new strong elite comparable (or even superior) to West- ern intellectuals. These people know how to address the problems of the Muslim states without out- side interference. These well-educated and enlightened people did not limit themselves to the spiritual wealth of the Islamic civilization; they have mastered the cultural heritage of the West and find it hard to accept, without indignation, that certain forces in the West are out to equate terrorism and Islam. They insist that this is the wrong way, leading nowhere, and they are absolutely right. Political terrorism has nothing to do with any religion, let alone with any of the monotheist religions. The commandments of the three Abrahamic religions are essentially the same: kindness, high morals, peace, and charity. Assured of its superiority, or for some other reason, the West has chosen to ignore the fact that the new generation of political leaders in the Muslim East has proven by deeds and not by words that they can ensure fast economic development and promptly resolve acute confessional and political crises. The processes underway in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, , and other Middle Eastern countries have shown one and all that Islam relies on the intellectual unity and mounting solidarity of the new social groups. Professor Govkhar Bakhshalieva, an Orientalist from Azerbaijan, has commented on the recent developments in the Middle East by saying that they have at least one thing in common: they were started and driven by young intellectuals. “A new generation has emerged on the political scene of the Muslim world. Fairly well-educated, these people do not need political leaders and polit- ical parties to become an organized political force. This is a new social-political phenomenon.”6 According to M.A. Muqtedar Khan, an American academic and Vice President of the Associa- tion of Muslim Social Scientists, the new Islamic intellectual elite can generate ideas to strengthen its potential and liberate itself from spiritual imprisonment in which secular intellectuals and the tradi- tional ulemas still linger. Convinced that Muslim problems can be resolved inside the Muslim world, the new leaders began thinking on a larger scale; they have finally disentangled themselves from the inferiority complex in which the Muslims were trapped in the colonialist era. This means that even before they were able to build up their potential, the Muslims became a much stronger community thanks to their educated elite and their determination to move forward. This explains the discursive balance of forces achieved despite the limited imbalance of material resources. Muqtedar Khan be- lieves that the West should become aware of the new side of the Islamic civilization; it should accept the Islamic sociopolitical movement as a legitimate force and learn to regard it as an expression of the desire of millions of Muslims to live according to their rules rather than as a crop-up of extremist feelings of a minority.7 In recent years, it has become abundantly clear that global problems will defy resolution as long as there is no equal and constructive dialog between the West and the Muslim East. The sides must achieve mutual understanding and learn not to impose their ideologies on their partner. In other words, the East is prepared to talk to the West if and when the latter abandons its neocolonialist ap-

6 K. Khamzaoglu, “Vliianie proiskhodiashchikh v arabskom mire volneniy na Azerbaidzhan nevozmozhno—Di- rektor Instituta Vostokovedenia NANA,” Information Agency 1 news.az, available at [http://www.1news.az/analytics/ 20110406092102814.html], 6 April, 2011. 7 See: M.A. Muqtedar Khan, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology,” Security Di- alog, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 1998 (see also: Z.H. Bukhari, S.S. Nyang, M. Ahmad, “Muslims’ Place in the American Public Square: Hope, Fears, and Aspirations,” AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2004, pp. 84-108). Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION proaches. In an effort to preserve its millennia-old culture and civilizational identity, the East stands opposed to all unificatory trends. Indeed, an equal dialog, mutually advantageous cooperation, and synthesis of values accumulated by the sides, as well as partnership of civilizations in the more distant future, are the prerequisites needed today to resolve the main contradictions.

The Role of Azerbaijan in Intercultural Dialog and Regional Integration

Azerbaijan, which has been actively developing its relations with the Muslim states since 1991 while also cooperating with the West, can play an important role in a constructive discussion between the West and the Muslim East. The country is a unique place where different cultures and civilizations meet at the crossroads between the North and the South and the East and the West. Azerbaijan, which belongs to several Islamic and European organizations, cherishes the values of both civilizations and can become a bridge for spanning them. It not merely understands both sides in the developing conflict, but can also help them better understand each other. The country, which has been known since hoary antiquity as the Gates to the Orient, also looks like the Gates to the West when seen from the opposite side. This explains why Azerbaijan has mas- tered the cultures of both civilizations and blended them into a single whole. This allows it to under- stand the West and the East and help them to unite. The statistics and geography of the recent international events show that Azerbaijan, known all over the world as a country in which different cultures live side by side, has initiated the largest number of events relating to the dialog between cultures and civilizations. No wonder it is seen as a “civilizational bridge” of sorts in this process, the importance of which for mankind cannot be over- estimated. In antiquity, Azerbaijan played this role as a stretch of the Great Silk Road, which tied together the East and the West; today it is resolved to support the projects designed to play the same role: TRACECA, the Nabucco gas pipeline, and the Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway Project. This means that the country’s strategic position between the East and the West and several interna- tional routes which cross its territory motivates it to contribute to regional and international cooper- ation, integration, and dialog on a scale that complies with its geographic location. Today, Azerbaijan is involved in and is coping successfully with international projects—the BTC oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. In the final analysis, this can be described as a solid foundation for intercultural dialog and a symbol of interna- tional and regional dialog. Azerbaijan’s role in regional integration cannot be properly appreciated outside the Caucasian context and without a clear picture of the stumbling blocks on the road to cooperation and full-scale economic development. Without this, it is impossible to appreciate the fairly complex problems en- countered in the region, an important meeting place between the West and East, which, therefore, calls for a special approach. Regrettably, in late-Soviet and post-Soviet history, the Caucasus and conflict have become in- separable concepts. In the late 1980s, the Caucasus became embroiled in very acute ethnopolitical conflicts and wars. Out of the eight armed ethnopolitical and civilian conflicts that flared up in the post-Soviet expanse, six occurred in the Caucasus.8 They are the Armenian-Azeri conflict over

8 See: S.M. Markedonov, “Separatizm na Bolshom Kavkaze v postsovetskiy period: predposylki, itogi, per- spektivy,” Aktualnye problemy Evropy, No. 3, 2009, p. 39. 112 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Nagorno-Karabakh; the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts; the civil war in Geor- gia; and two conflicts in Russia (the Ossetian-Ingush and Russian-Chechen). This has made the Cau- casus a breeding ground of separatist units. The academic literature offers several paradigms applicable to the conflicts in the Caucasus, Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations having the greatest impact on the academic and po- litical analysis of the Caucasian problems. Its author argued that civilizational identity rather than ideology or the economy is responsible for potential conflicts. By civilization he meant cultural unity and broad cultural identity, while he treated religion as a civilizational determinant. The bloodiest wars will unfold along the dividing lines of civilizations, the Caucasus, in his opinion, being one such line and a zone of contact doomed to become an area of civilizational clashes. As soon as the Soviet Union fell apart, the Caucasus became an arena of uncompromising conflicts. Samuel Huntington explained them by clashes of religious identities (Orthodoxy vs. Islam), which acquired special im- portance in the post-Soviet period. This accounted, according to Huntington, for the conflicts in Ka- rabakh and Chechnia.9 Other authorities in Caucasian developments disagree with the above. They are convinced that Huntington overestimates the role of the religious factor. Svante Cornell, for example, has dismissed this explanation as nothing more than a stereotype and an oversimplified analysis of these conflicts. Cornell, in turn, blames the conflicts on a combination of nationalism and national interests rather than on religious-civilizational contradictions.10 In actual fact, disintegration of the Soviet Union changed the geopolitical paradigm in the Cau- casus and plunged it back into the days it was searching for its identity. Before the Russian Empire established itself in the region, religious identity was the main determining feature, whereas in our times, ethnic affiliation has become the main identity factor. Decline of the Communist ideology left a moral and ideological vacuum which was filled in due time with nationalism; this was when ethnon- ationalism began to rise in the Caucasus. Ethnopolitical and nationalist biases led to conflicts between states and inside states across the Greater Caucasus (three independent republics of the Central Cau- casus and nine North Caucasian entities of the Russian Federation). In all cases, separatism was the main driving force; realization of separatist projects made it, if not entirely impossible, at least prob- lematic to carry out political integration of different ethnic communities within the same state. We all know that Armenia’s territorial claims on Azerbaijan violated stability in the Central Caucasus and sent up national tension. The aggressive ethnic separatist movement Armenia estab- lished in Nagorno-Karabakh, which spread far and wide to envelop the Caucasus, set the dangerous trend in motion. Today, ethnic extremism and separatism as its product is one of the gravest ills of the Caucasus. Not many countries can boast of a monoethnic population (comprising over 99 percent of peo- ple of the same ethnic group): they are mainly island countries which developed in natural isolation. Strange as it may seem, Armenia, with a population comprising 97.9 percent of Armenians, is the only monoethnic state in the multinational and polyconfessional Caucasus, where even neighboring villag- es might use different languages. It is not an island, but a landlocked country with multinational Az- erbaijan, Iran, Turkey, and Georgia as its closest neighbors. In the past, Armenia was not monoethnic; when the Armenian S.S.R. set up in the present borders of the Republic of Armenia with Goyca and Zangezur within it, the number of Azeris in Armenia, according to different sources, was either equal to the number of Armenians or even larger. “Armenization” was deliberately pursued through numer- ous deportations and ethnic cleansing during Soviet times and even earlier, in the 19th century, when Russia established itself in the Caucasus. In 1828, Alexander Griboedov, Russian envoy to Tehran

9 See: S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone Books, New York, 1998, p. 138. 10 See: S.E. Cornell, “Religion as a Factor in Caucasian Conflicts,” Civil Wars, Vol. 1, No. 3, November 1998, pp. 46-68. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and responsible for resettlement of the Armenians, repeatedly informed the czar that the Armenians had been indulging in ill-advised anti-Muslim propaganda, even though the Muslims had been uncer- emoniously pushed out.11 From that time on, Azeris became victims of consistent ethnic cleansing which extended into Soviet times. In 1948-1953, under Stalin’s decree, Azeris were deported from Armenia in huge numbers. While the Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and others were moved away from their homeland under the formal pretext of “cooperation with German occupants,” the Azeris were evicted just because they were Azeris. In 1988-1989, the region was engulfed by another wave of deportations and ethnic cleansing: Russians (Molokans), Kurds, and other nationalities also lost their homes. According to incomplete data, no fewer than 200 Azeris were killed in Armenia; several dozens died brutal deaths; and about 240 thousand had to leave their homes. Today, the Armenian side is using self-determination of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (meaning its detachment from Azerbaijan) to justify its territorial claims on Nagorno-Karabakh (which is part of Azerbaijan). However, it must be pointed out that the right of nations to self-determination does not mean the “right to separation” or separatism. The right to self-determination gained currency when the worldwide colonial system fell apart. On 14 December, 1960, the U.N. adopted a Declara- tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which envisages that only colonial peoples have the right to self-determination, even going as far as the establishment of an independent state. The Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh can hardly regard themselves as a colonial nation within the Azerbaijan Republic. The right of nations to self-determination should not be con- fused with the rights of minorities. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 speaks about the right to self-determination in terms of territo- rial integrity. If this is related to the problem of national minorities, we need to place the rights includ- ed in the Helsinki Final Act in the wider context of human rights. At the level of national minorities, we must discuss their cultural, language, religious rights, etc. As members of the Council of Europe, Azerbaijan and Armenia are equally duty bound to abide by its conventions, the framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities being one of them. Art 21 of the Convention says: “Nothing in the present framework Convention shall be inter- preted as implying any right to engage in any activity or perform any act contrary to the fundamental principles of international law and in particular of the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States.” This means that the Armenian minority of Azerbaijan may engage in self-determination within the bounds of this and similar other international legal instruments with- out infringing on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Regrettably, the international organizations and large states that have shouldered the burden of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are not determined enough to put pressure on Armenia to push it toward a constructive position in peace talks and stop misinterpreting the self-determination issue. This still unresolved conflict negatively affects all other conflicts across the Caucasus, since most of them are of a national and ethnic nature. To prevent or promptly resolve these conflicts, the Western countries and international organi- zations involved in the process need to learn much more about the region, its ethnic composition, its past, and its geopolitical present. There is no other way to success. The Caucasus is a unique melee of different ethnicities who speak different languages, profess different religions, and have different cultures. No wonder it is often called Babylon, or a museum of peoples. Today, it is home to around 50 nationalities, each of them with its own highly specific culture and language (some of them spoken by only a few hundred people), while large ethnic groups com- prise several million members. The Caucasus inherited this ethnic diversity from antiquity; in the 6th-

11 See: A.S. Griboedov, “Zapiska o pereselenii armian iz Persii v nashi oblasti,” in: Sochineniya, in two volumes, Vol. 2, Pravda Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 339-341. 114 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

5th centuries B.C., Aeschylus and Herodotus described it as a geographical region with a population that spoke different languages but had similar cultures and social order. At the dawn of our era, Strabo (64/63 B.C.-23/24 A.D.) wrote: “There assemble at Dioscurias 70 or, according to some writers who are careless in their statements, 300 nations. All speak different languages, from living dispersed in various places and without intercourse.”12 Thirty years later, Roman writer and scientist Pliny the Elder (c. 23-79 A.D.) wrote in his Natural History: “There were settled therein 300 Nations which used distinct Languages. And afterwards our Romans were forced to provide 130 Interpreters for the traffic with People.”13 In the Middle Ages, Oriental scholars, likewise, were struck by this diversity. Abu al-Hasan Ali ibn al-Husayn al-Mas’udi (d. 956), a famous Arab geographer and traveler, called the Caucasus “the mountain of languages” because of the multitude of peoples and multitude of languages. In his Book of Notification and Review, he wrote: “There is a vast number of kingdoms and tribes in the mountains of Kabk (Caucasus). There are 72 tribes living there, each with its own king and own language, which differs from other languages.”14 Somewhat later, in 977, Abdul Kasim ibn-Haukal, another Arab ge- ographer, wrote: “The Kabk (Caucasus) range is enormous; they say there are 360 languages. I had denied this until I saw with my own eyes numerous cities each with its own language in addition to Azeri and Persian.”15 Little has changed since that time: the Caucasus is still known for its ethnic diversity. In these conditions, those countries and organizations indulgent toward Armenia’s insistent demands that the self-determination principles should be absolutely applied would do well to think carefully about what will happen to the Caucasus if all nations and ethnicities were to follow in the Armenians’ footsteps. Naturally this approach would become a precedent for settling other ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus, from which neither the local countries nor the West would benefit. Some authors claim that since the Caucasus is a traditional area of Russia’s interests, Moscow only needs to preserve the status quo in the Central Caucasus to consolidate its position and that it needs “manageable instability” in the region. Those who say so are probably unaware that “manageable instability” is as dangerous as playing with fire. Instability and conflicts are like forest fires which spread much faster than they can be con- trolled. Recent developments show that Russia is not insured against the escalation of ethnic conflicts. Early in the 1990s, there were several ethnonational movements (not counting the Chechen uprising) which appealed to the idea of “self-determination up to and including secession.” The Caucasian peo- ples wanted to separate not only from Russia, but also from the republics in which they have formed distinct ethnic groups. In 1991, five republics were declared in Karachaevo-Cherkessia alone: the republics of Karachay, Cherkessia, Abaza, Batalpashinskaya Cossack, and Zelenchuk-Urup Cossack, to say nothing of the other North Caucasian entities of Russia. Experts, meanwhile, warn that the situation in the Northern Caucasus today is distressing. In recent years the number of conflicts, terrorist acts, and murders in the Northern Caucasus has risen. Political scientist Mubariz Akhmedoglu, for example, deems it necessary to ask: “Moscow wants peace in the Caucasus while the freedom-loving Caucasian peoples are stirred up by the example of Armenian separatism. What can convince the million-strong people of Ingushetia that they cannot be a free state if 100 thousand people in Nagorno-Karabakh get away with declaring themselves a state?”16 He is convinced that as long as Moscow continues flirting with the Armenian separatists, they will de facto remain a factor of ethnic and national clashes in the Caucasus.

12 Strabo’s Geography, Book XI, available at [http://rbedrosian.com/Classic/strabo11.htm]. 13 Pliny’s Natural History, in thirty-seven books, Books 1-3, Printed for the Club by G. Barclay, 1848, pp. 104-105. 14 I.A.Karaulov, “Svedenia arabskikh geografov IX-X vekov o Kavkaze, Armenii i Azerbaidzhane,” in: Sbornik materialov dlia opisaniia mestnostey i plemen Kavkaza, Issue 38, Tiflis, 1908, p. 40. 15 Ibid., p. 97. 16 M. Akhmedoglu, “Karabakhskiy separatizm podzhigaet Kavkaz,” Zerkalo, 7 January, 2011. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Indeed, Russia is much more than the Northern Caucasus, which means that a wave of separa- tism would cause havoc in such a great and multinational country; this looks even more real against the background of the radical geopolitical transformations in the Middle East, which are spreading far and wide to neighboring regions. The West should be interested in Karabakh settlement for the sake of regional security, peace, and stability. As a meeting place of energy, transport, and trade routes, the Caucasus is a vitally im- portant region; continued conflicts may interfere with the large West-supported projects. The Central Caucasus is one of the world’s strategically important geopolitical regions; today, it offers access to Central Asia that bypasses Russia and Iran. This means that the West will find it hard to deal with a host of tiny states in a relatively small unstable region while the rest of the world is globalizing and integrating. The unsettled regional conflicts not only damage economic and political interests, but also threaten the Western countries, since they could escalate at any moment into a large-scale war in direct proximity to Europe. The local countries should be interested more than any others in conflict settlement. Armed conflicts have already claimed numerous lives, caused material losses and economic disintegration, and turned hundreds of thousands into refugees and temporary migrants. The unresolved conflicts are adding to economic disorganization of the Caucasian countries; the conflicts interfere with the coun- tries’ unhampered development of global and regional contacts and do not allow them to fully tap their potential. The question is: What can serve as a common stimulus for the settlement of these conflicts? No matter how complicated, the question has an answer. By overcoming their internal conflicts, these countries can profit from closer economic ties and deeper integration partly because the TRACECA transport corridor and similar projects may prove critically important for the entire region. As the main transit link and a country rich in oil and gas, Azerbaijan is in the center of these complicated geopolitical processes in the Caucasus; this enables it to consolidate its leading role in ensuring energy security for Europe and helps it to diversify energy sources. On the other hand, Az- erbaijan is a rapidly developing country: the lion’s share of the region’s GDP is produced in Azerba- ijan. It accounts for 80% of the economy of the Central Caucasus. As an economic leader of the Cau- casus, Azerbaijan stands a good chance of becoming the region’s driving force and first foundation stone of regional integration.

Conclusion

The East and the West are two branches of human culture, two civilizations, and two life styles. They are different in certain cultural respects and have different material values; they follow different cultural, civilizational, social-economic, political, and spiritual roads. On the other hand, they form a common world culture in which different values and mentalities coexist without conflicts. This explains why intercultural dialog plays an important role in the worldwide sociocultural process; today, it has acquired additional importance for mankind. It should be said that intercultural dialog has been and remains vital in the development of mankind; for centuries, or even millennia, cultures have been mutually enriching each other to form a unique mosaic of human civilization. On the whole, the willingness to enter a dialog and reach mutual understanding has acquired special importance. In the past, the cultures of the East and the West had nothing in common; today, there are obvious points of contact and mutual understanding. Interaction between cultures and their dialog are far from consistent and far from unambiguous. Cultures not only interact, but also mutually complement and enrich each other. The idea of intercultural dialog is based on the idea of human values. This process leads to more profound cultural self-development and mutual enrichment stem- ming from the cultural experience of individual cultures and of world culture as a whole. 116 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Intercultural dialog presupposes comprehension and respect of the axiological system of other cultures; stereotypes should be pushed aside, while the original features of various cultures should lead to mutual enrichment and integration of cultures in the world cultural context. It is important to discern human values in the cultures involved in intercultural dialog; this dialog is absolutely indis- pensable for mankind’s continued existence. Azerbaijan as a bridge between the East and the West plays an important role in this dialog. The republic has many centuries of experience in this sphere, which it is willing to share with others. It synthesizes the Eastern and Western cultural traditions; the dual nature of the Azeri culture makes it an intermediary between the East and the West.

Davud KAKHRIMANOV

Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Coordinator of International Contacts at the Department for International Contacts, Russian State University of Trade and Economics (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

PROLIFERATION OF RELIGIOUS-POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN DAGHESTAN: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ASPECTS

Abstract

he author probes deep into the fac- geopolitical, socioeconomic, ethnopolitical, T tors conducive to religious-political ex- and sociocultural aspects of this phenom- tremism in Daghestan and looks at the enon.

Introduction

Many latent problems surfaced when the Soviet Union, a large ethno-federal power, fell apart; the new social and political reality across the post-Soviet expanse created even more problems. Dagh- estan has had its share of negative developments: the social and political crisis in the republic has not yet passed the point of no return, although today its scope has become unacceptable. This has made Daghestan one of the most troublesome regions in the South of Russia; together with its North Caucasian neighbors, it belongs to the zone from which direct threats to the state’s national security are spreading far and wide. The constitutional foundations of Russia’s statehood, its Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION territorial integrity, and the security of its population figure prominently on the agenda. The threats to the country’s national security are posed by terrorist groups driven into more frenzied activity by the ideology of religious-political extremism. At the turn of the 1990s, Daghestan became a seat of fundamentalist religious ideas that en- gulfed the Northern Caucasus; this was partly explained by the post-Communist Islamic renaissance in the republic and throughout the entire region. This process has been unfolding under a dual impact: external pressure from Islamist ideologi- cal centers and radicalization of social and political processes inside the republic. Combined, the two factors have produced a social outburst among a considerable part of the republic’s population. Here I intend to take a closer look at the factors which are accelerating the spread of radical Islamism in Daghestan.

The Geopolitical Aspect of Radical Islamism

Geopolitically, Daghestan is extremely vulnerable to external impacts: its geographic location at the crossroads of world civilizations can be described as one of the most important factors shaping the republic’s ethnoconfessional and sociocultural makeup; it is part of the fairly complicated system of spatial models in the Caucasus. Its borders are quite conventional and mobile: its administrative and even state borders do not coincide in all places with its ethnic, confessional, and cultural-civiliza- tional borders.1 Indeed, a large number of Lezghians and Avars live in the north of Azerbaijan, while in the south of Daghestan there is a fairly large Azeri community. There are Kumyks and Nogais living beyond the territorial-administrative limits of Daghestan; in Turkey there are considerable diasporas of the peoples of Daghestan.2 The ethnicities of Daghestan are traditionally related to the co-religionists in the Muslim East, while the republic belongs to the “religious geopolitical crescent” that stretches from North Africa to the Middle East and Southeast Asia and separates the Muslim South from the Christian North. The “gateway regions” conception formulated by American geographer Saul Cohen, who wrote that gateway regions “play a novel role in linking different parts of the world by facilitating the ex- change of peoples, goods and ideas,”3 perfectly fits the Daghestani context. The republic is frequently described as the “gates” of the Caucasus. This explains why the republic is very involved in the geopolitical processes now underway in the Caucasus, the Caspian area, and the Islamic world as a whole. Open to the geopolitical “winds” blowing in the Caucasus because of its geographic location, Daghestan is vulnerable to all more or less significant geopolitical perturbations in the Caucasus (which is closely involved in what is going on in the world).4

1 See: I.M. Hasanov, “Vliianie prirodnykh usloviy na rasselenie korennogo naseleniya (na primere Tatarstana,” in: Narody Evrazii. Istoria, kultura i problemy vzaimodeystvia. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konfer- entsii 5-6 aprelia 2011, Nauchno-izdatelskiy tsentr “Sotsiosfera,” Penza, Baku, 2011, pp. 20-21. 2 See: K.S. Hajiev, Kavkazskiy uzel v geopoliticheskikh prioritetakh Rossii, Logos, Moscow, 2010, pp. 31-35. 3 S.B. Cohen, Geopolitics of the World System, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Boston, 2003, p. 49. 4 See: Z.S. Arukhov, “Nekotorye parametry novogo geopoliticheskogo izmereniia Rossii i Daghestana v Kavka- zskom regione,” in: Severny Kavkaz i Daghestan: sovremennaia etnopoliticheskaia situatsia i puti ee stabilizatsii. Materi- aly nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, posvyashchennoy 10-letiyu RTsEI DNTs RAN (1-3 okryabria 2002 g.), DNTs RAN Press, Makhachkala, 2004, pp. 157-160. 118 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

We all know that in the past, too, the Caucasus was one of the hubs of international contradic- tions.5 Today, the confrontation that gained momentum in the late 1980s and has become much more complicated has brought together more sides. It is going on amid all sorts of international and regional processes and multisided political interests of great importance for the region’s countries. This is a place where the geopolitical interests of Russia, the new independent countries of the Central Caucasus, the Middle East, America, and Europe intertwine and clash. Transnational compa- nies are interested in the region’s natural resources and the strategic communication capabilities of the Caspian.6 It should be said that Daghestan is developing into a vitally important geo-economic and mili- tary-strategic area of Russia’s South and its “soft underbelly.”7 The geopolitical situation around Daghestan is strongly affected by all sorts of vectors and trends. They reflect the geopolitical dynam- ics in the Caucasus and the rivalry between countries over access to the republic’s strategic natural resources; in this way, Daghestan has already become the Caucasian geopolitical hub.8 It has been pointed out more than once in academic writings that the Islamic card played in the region to under- mine Russia’s position was the most logical of instruments.9 This factor is developing into a real force in the context of the current division of the spheres of influence in the Caspian-Caucasian region. It should be said that Islamism and its most radical forms have already arrived in Daghestan: because of its geopolitical specifics described above and with no “iron curtain” to isolate them from the Islamic world, the republic’s Muslims have been demonstrating a lot of interest in the Islamic trends formulating in other countries.10 The foreign ministries of the Muslim states and their religious circles, prominent religious figures, and theologians of the Muslim East have never let the develop- ments in the Islamic communities of Russia and elsewhere in the post-Soviet expanse out of their sight: they, too, wanted to spread their influence to the post-Soviet Muslim communities.11 Numerous international organizations (Al Igasa (Islamic Relief), Benevolence International Foundation, Jamiat Ihya ul Turath, Lashkar-e-Taiba, al Hayriyya, Al-Haramain Foundation, Qatar Foundation, Iqraa, etc.) have spared neither effort nor money to spread Islamist ideology across the Caucasus.12 They have been openly promoting the pan-Islamic idea of unification of the Caucasian Muslims into a single Islamic state in the Caucasus.13 It should be said that the interests of not only the Muslim states, but also some of the Western powers can be discerned in what foreign Islamist organizations and radical Islamic structures are doing in the Northern Caucasus. The special services of Muslim and Western states and NGOs are tilling the soil to pursue their political, economic, and religious interests in the region.14 Kaflan

5 See: V.V. Degoev, Bolshaia igra na Kavkaze: istoria i sovremennost, Moscow, 2003, pp. 72-79; Sovremennye problemy geopolitiki Kavkaza, Rostov-on-Don, 2001, pp. 32-36; K.S. Hajiev, Geopolitika Kavkaza, Moscow, 2001. 6 See: K.S. Hajiev, Bolshaia igra na Kavkaze: vchera, segodnia, zavtra, Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia Publishers, Moscow, 2010, pp. 45-50. 7 See: Z.S. Arukhov, “Respublika Daghestan v usloviiakh transformatsii geopoliticheskikh koalitsiy v Kavkazskom regione,” in: Vzaimodeystvie gosudarstv i religioznykh obyedineniy: sostoianie i perspektivy. Materialy Severokavkazskoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, Makhachkala, 2004. 8 See: Z.A. Makhulova, Daghestan v sovremennoy kavkazskoy geopolitike Rossii (na materialakh Respubliki Daghestan), ed. by I.P. Dobaev, YuNTs RAN Publishers, Rostov-on-Don, 2006, p. 105. 9 See: A.A. Magomedov, Evraziyskiy Daghestan k itogam XX veka, Makhachkala, 2000, pp. 45-56; Z.A. Makhulo- va, Daghestan v kavkazskoy geopolitike Rossii, Makhachkala, 2005, pp. 54-60. 10 See: K.M. Khanbabaev, “Islamskiy radikalizm na Severnom Kavkaze,” Svobodnaia mysl, No. 3, 2007, pp. 105- 116. 11 See: “Zarubezhnye sponsory islamskikh ekstremistov,” Problemy natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Series, Analit- icheskiy vestnik Soveta Federatsii FS RF, No. 11 (263), 2005, p. 36. 12 See: M.R. Aliev, “Vliianie zarubezhnykh religioznykh organizatsiy na radikalizatsiiu islama v Daghestane,” Go- sudarstvo i religia v Daghestane, Information-analytical Bulletin (Makhachkala), No. 3, 2002, p. 34. 13 See: K.M. Khanbabaev, M.G. Yakobov, Religiozno-politicheskiy ekstremizm i opyt protivodeystviia, Respub- likanskaya gazetno-zhurnalnaia tipografia, Makhachkala, 2008, pp. 7-12. 14 See: A. Litoy, “Malaia politika. Kto ukhodit v radikaly,” Novoe vremya, No. 25, 2006, pp. 23-25. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Khanbabaev, an expert in religious-political extremism in the Caucasus, is convinced that the reli- gious-political, extremist, and terrorist organizations in the Northern Caucasus live on the money they receive from abroad and earn inside Russia by setting up an infrastructure of financial sources. It has been established that about 60 international Islamist organizations, over 100 foreign companies, and dozens of bank groups fund Caucasian extremists and terrorists.15 It seems, however, that the phenomenon of religious-political extremism and terrorism in Dagh- estan and the republic’s Islamization cannot be completely explained by the geopolitical “games” in the Caucasus and the Caspian; other no less important factors should not be forgotten either. Indeed, it is hardly correct to heap the guilt on international Islamist organizations to account for the wide popularity of fundamentalism and religious-political extremism in the republic, especially in regions where there have been practically no extremist activities. Nor can the rising number of extremists be explained by the tightening of conditions relating to the activity of international religious organiza- tions in Russia (many of which have been closed down). Today subversive and terrorist groups can support themselves and are less dependent on fund- ing from abroad. According to S. Chenchik, Head of the Main Administration of the RF Ministry of the Interior for the North Caucasian Federal District, “the sums which arrive from abroad are several times lower than what bandit groups can get from local businesses.”16 It has become obvious that stemming money flows from abroad (from international terrorist structures and their cells in the post-Soviet expanse) is not enough. V. Galitsky and Ya. Starshinov have rightly pointed out that the present ideology of religious-political extremists in the Caucasus “is much more dangerous than the Wahhabi underground of the previous period. Today, extremists are driven by ideology rather than by money or fear.”17 At the same time, an analysis of the processes underway in Daghestan reveals that the phenomenon of religious-political extremism and terrorism is not homogenous and is fairly complicated, while the fact that extremist activity is spreading across the republic to different social groups shows that the internal political situation in Daghestan is far from simple. It is not enough to analyze the threat of the region’s Islamization and militarization created by international Islamist structures to explain the negative developments in the republic: we need to probe the social and political spheres in search of an answer. The Sub-Program for the South of Russia formulated by the Central Mathematical-Economic Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences, states the following: “Today, endogenous factors are more important in the Northern Caucasus than exog- enous factors: the latter merely invigorate the former. Politicization and radicalization of Islam, which turn it into what is called the ‘Islamic factor,’ are determined not so much by geopolitical but by socioeconomic and political circumstances.”18 This means that at the early stages external factors were instrumental in planting and encourag- ing radical Islamic ideas in the republic; however they first struck root in the crisis zones. There is no shortage of works saying that grave economic problems, protracted ethnopolitical conflicts, rapid social and cultural change, or all of the above create a breeding ground for widespread violence.19 Their frustrating impact cannot be overestimated—they interfere with satisfying people’s vital basic requirements. It is a commonly recognized fact that the threat of Islamic fundamentalism appears and comes to the fore mainly in the economically and socially vulnerable regions. Sergey Markedonov, a

15 See: K.M. Khanbabaev, op. cit. 16 “Zarubezhnye sponsory lishili finansirovaniia boevikov na Severnom Kavkaze,” 15 March, 2011, available at [http://www.rbcdaily.ru/2011/04/15/focus/562949980070751]. 17 V. Galistky, Ya. Starshinov, “Religiozny ekstremizm v molodezhnoy srede Rossii,” Obozrevatel, No. 6, 2010, p. 16. 18 “Podprogramma po Yugu Rossii. Analiz i modelirovanie geopoliticheskikh, sotsialnykh i ekonomicheskikh prot- sessov v polietnicheskom makroregione,” available at [http://adaptation.iea.ras.ru/reports/2006/subprogramme.pdf]. 19 V.V. Lunev, “Politicheskaia, sotsialnaia i ekonomicheskaia nespravedlivost v mire i terrorizm,” Obshchestven- nye nauki i sovremennost, No. 3, 2004, p. 81. 120 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russian expert in the Caucasus, has rightly pointed out the following: “Any penetration from the outside can be effective only if it strikes well-tilled soil.”20

Socioeconomic Factors of Extremist Activities

Religious-political extremism in Daghestan and the Northern Caucasus is spreading because Daghestani society is become more and more radically-minded under the pressure of the social and political crisis caused by the far from simple political situation in the republic, the still unresolved ethnic and national problems and unprecedented corruption, the clan system, and criminalization of social and political life.21 Confirmed by many experts,22 this means that social and economic factors should be carefully studied. The social and economic situation, the living standards of the absolute majority of the local people, and many other parameters place Daghestan among Russia’s depressed regions.23 Early in the 1990s, the republic, together with the rest of Russia, plunged into social, political, and economic re- forms in order to move ahead to a market economy. It soon became clear that the republic was not ready to adjust to the economic and political changes brought about by the ruined economic system of the R.S.F.S.R. and political reforms; this bared numerous contradictions responsible for the repub- lic’s inconsistent economic reality.24 According to official sources, Daghestan is trailing far behind the average Russian indices of social and economic development. Over 60% of the money handled by the republic’s lending struc- tures arrives as budget transfers, financial aid from federal non-budget funds, as well as from the amounts used to finance the territorial branches of federal structures.25 Today, industrial enterprises burdened with financial problems, persistent shortage of liquidity, inaccessible loans, and high and growing production costs are responsible for the low share of capacity utilization. Daghestan is a re- gion with a depressed agricultural sector and very weak industry.26 Hypertrophied corruption has criminalized the socioeconomic sphere and made the situation in the republic hardly tolerable. “It is impossible to find a job in a state structure without connections or a large bribe. Enrollment in higher educational establishments and official posts, including those in the law-enforcement structures, are openly sold and bought. In the last decade corruption and essen- tially shameless trade in official positions have become common or even ‘natural’ to an extent that exhausts popular indignation.”27 It can be said that this is not isolated manifestations of a phenome- non that can be surgically corrected, rather it is a systemic merging of state bureaucrats and even law enforcers with semi-legal criminal structures.28

20 S. Markedonov, Turbulentnaia Evrazia: mezhetnicheskie, grazhdanskie konflikty, ksenofobia v novykh ne- zavisimykh gosudarstvakh postsovetskogo prostranstva, Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, Academia, Moscow, 2010, p. 23. 21 See: R. Gereev, “Krizis profilaktiki ekstremizma v Daghestane,” Nastoiashchee vremia, 23 July, 2010. 22 See: V.V. Lunev, op. cit., pp. 79-85. 23 See: K.S. Hajiev, Kavkazskiy uzel…, p. 135. 24 See: D.M. Kakhrimanov, “Natsionalnaia bezopasnost Rossiiskoy Federatsii: sotsialno-ekonomicheskie aspekty,” Vetsnik RGTEU, No. 7-8 (56), 2011, pp. 180-187. 25 See: Severny Kavkaz: problemy ekonomiki i politiki, ed. by A.A. Yaz’kova, LKI Publishers, Moscow, 2008, p. 69. 26 See: A.Sh. Akhmeduev, Z.Z. Abdulaeva, “Uzlovye problemy i kontseptualnye osnovy sotsialno-ekonomichesko- go razvitiia Respubliki Daghestan,” Vestnik Daghestanskogo nauchnogo tsentra, No. 18, 2004, pp. 100-106. 27 K.S. Hajiev, Kavkazsky uzel…, p. 140. 28 See: A. Muraev, A. Savelyev, “Geopoliticheskiy status novoy Rossii,” Svobodnaia mysl, No. 12, 2009, pp. 5-16. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Corruption, which has criminalized society and caused its degradation, is itself a product of the flourishing shadow economy. As President of the Republic of Daghestan Mukhu Aliev wrote: “The share of our republic’s shadow economy is assessed at over 50% (the Russian average being 20-25%). About 40% of the republic’s population works in the non-formal sector; this means that the high level of the shadow economy produces large-scale money laundering, including criminal profits.”29 The republic’s ethnic clans are locked in a struggle for control over the money flows; this, and clan rivalry for control over power in the republic, has further criminalized a large part of society. Svetlana Lipina has rightly pointed out that “the clan and corporate communities now in power have monopolized all the political and economic resources and created non-formal mechanisms of political and administrative decision-making. Not infrequently, ethnic and clan conflicts are superimposed on the desire of these communities (represented by the local administrative structures) to maintain ‘man- ageable instability’ in order to preserve or even increase the volume of transfers from the Federal Center.”30 Macroeconomic disproportions, the most dangerous of them being the wide gap between the republic’s economic potential and its population size, can be described as a serious threat and a factor of social tension.31 Its economy is not self-sustainable, while its economic potential cannot catch up with the fast growing population, especially its gainfully occupied population. The capi- tal-labor ratio per able-bodied person in Daghestan is twice as low as Russia’s average. This is re- sponsible for a very serious disproportion between the number of jobs and the number of people of employable age.32 Unemployment and poverty of the greater part of population together with the high level of corruption in all spheres of life negatively affect social and political development. According to Sergey Ryazantsev, the group of hidden unemployed is more prone to conflicts than others and is responsible for a great share of the social tension; they account for 18% of the gainfully occupied population.33 The share of jobless is especially high in the countryside: as of 1 January, 2010, it ac- counted for 50-56% of the republic’s total population.34 This factor is best illustrated by the rates and deepness of social polarization which drives the bulk of the republic’s population to one side and the propertied groups and holders of lucrative posts to the other. The social stratification pattern has changed considerably in the post-Soviet period: over 70% of the population has found itself among the poor members of society.35 Property stratification, which has assumed large proportions in Daghestan, is another destructive factor, raising social and political tension in the republic, radicalizing its society, and escalating violence. In the absence of adequate responses from the federal structures these factors, together with the corrupt economy and politics and clan rivalry for control over power structures in the republic, have radicalized a large part of the republic’s population.

29 “Tenevaia ekonomika—bich Daghestanskoy ekonomiki,” Daghestanskaia pravda, 13 July, 2006. 30 Razvitie situatsii na Severnom Kavakaze, Interview given by S.A. Lipina, Scientific head of FORMIKA R&D to the editorial office of electronic edition of VIPERSON information-analytical portal, 27 November, 2008, available at [www.viperson.ru]. 31 See: Kh.G. Bashirov, “Ekonomicheskie problemy regionov i otraslevykh kompleksov,” Problemy sovremennoy ekonomiki, No. 3 (23), 2007, p. 61. 32 Ibid., p. 58. 33 See: S.V. Ryazantsev, “Sovremennye tendentsii razvitiia rynka truda Severnogo Kavkaza,” available at [http:// www.kavkaz—uzel.ru/articles/120828]. 34 See: “Sotsialno-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Severo-Kavkazskogo federalnogo okruga v ianvare-sentiabre 2010 goda,” in: Regiony Rossii. Sotsialno-ekonomicheskie pokazateli. Statisticheskiy sbornik, Moscow, 2010, p. 365. 35 See: G.I. Yusupova, “Globalizatsiia i etnopoliticheskaia bezopasnost Yuga Rossii,” Regional Center of Ethno- political Studies, Daghestani Scientific Center, Russian Academy of Sciences, Sobranie Publishers, Moscow, 2009, p. 255. 122 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Ethnopolitical Factors of Religious-Political Extremism

The far from simple ethnopolitical situation in Daghestan created by ethnocracy, ethnic clans in the corridors of power, and numerous ethnonational problems adds to the social and political tension and is leading to further radicalization and the spread of extremism. Daghestan has the largest number of ethnic groups in its territory compared with all the other regions of the Russian Federation; over 30 autochthonous groups have their specific social and polit- ical interests; not infrequently Daghestan is referred to as the “smaller Caucasus.” This means that cooperation among ethnic groups, just as power relations, are all-important when it comes to social and political stabilization. Much depends on how the problems of the repressed, deported, and divid- ed peoples are resolved. It should be said that the Soviet Union’s disintegration and transformations in the political and economic spheres in Russia went hand in hand with the awakening of national self-awareness of the ethnic minorities, while their ethnic self-identification became more or less clearly political.36 In Daghestan, these processes developed into so-called national movements. From the very beginning they were shaped and developed by the ethnic intelligentsia; its mem- bers fought bravely in the government for the interests of their respective ethnicities.37 Very soon, however, practically all the representatives of the ethnic elites were pushed aside by the government structures, including by sharing power and money with them. In this way, the ethnic elites were made to fit into a political system in which clan and ethnic affiliations dominated.38 This is also testified by the fact that throughout the post-Soviet period members of the three largest ethnoses (the Avars, Darghins, and Kumyks) appropriated the top three posts in the republic, those of the president, chairman of the Popular Assembly, and chairman of the Cabinet. It seems that those who believe that the lucrative posts in the lower echelons of power also go to members of the same ethnoses are right.39 Sergey Arutyunov has pointed out that throughout many centuries (prior to Russia’s conquest of the Northern Caucasus) there was no ethnocratic centralization or vertical or pyramidal power structures in these parts. Small feudal possessions were based on ethnic principles but never em- braced ethnicities as a whole. While part of the communities (jamaats) were vassals of the feudal lords (khans, shamkhals, emirs, and utsmies), the other, and fairly large, part of the communities were so-called free societies—small independent republics of the polis type ruled by elders on the basis of consensus.40 This means that the present clan-ethnocratic model of relations at the top has nothing in common with the traditional polyethnic model of Daghestan; it contradicts it in many respects, in the same way as it contradicts the very nature of polyethnic communities with their varied interests.

36 See: V.D. Dzidzoev, Kavkaz kontsa XX veka: tendentsii etnopoliticheskogo razvitiia (istoriko-politologicheskoe issledovanie), 2nd edition, Vladikavkaz, 2004, p. 25. 37 See: Kh.A. Kadiev, “Etnopoliticheskie protsessy v Daghestane v nachale 1990-kh godov,” in: Severny Kavkaz i Daghestan: sovremennaia etnopoliticheskaia situatsia i puti ee stabilizatsii. Materialy Regionalnoy nauchno-prak- ticheskoy konferentsii, posviashchennoy 10-letiyu RTsEI DNTs RAN (1-3 oktiabria 2002 g.), DNTs RAN Publishers, Ma- khachkala, 2004, pp. 503-505. 38 See: M. Falkowski, North Caucasus: The Russian Gordian Knot; J. Rogoza, Putin After Re-Election, Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, Poland, 2004, pp. 43-49. 39 See: A. Sadyki, Federalizm—vnutrennee kredo demokratii, Logos, Moscow, 2001, p. 115. 40 See: S.S. Arutyunov, “Etnokratiia ili demokratiia? Traditsii Severnogo Kavakaza,” in: Traditsii razreshenia kon- fliktov na Kavkaze i metody institutov grazhdanskogo obshchestva, Collection of articles (based on the papers presented at the conference “Traditsii narodnoy diplomatii i normy povedeniia vo vremia voyny i konfliktov na Kavkaze” organized by the Caucasian Forum of NGOs, Tsakhkadzor (Armenia), 31 May-2 June, 2001), available at [http://www.kavkaz- uzel.ru/system/attachments/0000/3106/]. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Having monopolized the top posts, members of the largest ethnicities acquired the necessary regulatory, administrative, and power resources to push aside many of the urgent ethnic and national problems. Arend Lijphart wrote that ethnocracy blocks the horizontal ties of consociational democra- cy both of grass-roots monoethnic and, especially, of polyethnic cells of plural societies.41 In Dagh- estan, the ethnocratic model made it much harder to achieve proportional representation of all the ethnic groups in the legislative and executive structures; not infrequently this pattern repeated itself at the municipal level.42 This made it next to impossible to legally change the course of the political processes in the republic. It should be said that the clan elites with a firm grip on power do nothing to promote the interests of their own clans and ethnicities. Academician Arutyunov pointed out that in the fall of 1999 the discrepancies between the political regime and the ethnopolitical and ethnosocial realities caused a spontaneous outburst of protests against the ethnocratic vertical of power in the Kadar zone. Signif- icantly, it was the Darghins (who were represented along with the Avars at the very top of the pyramid of power) that protested, or rather their “community core,” which was not merely excluded from priv- ileges but was also “vulnerable to the arbitrary rule of the powers that be. In these specific conditions their protest acquired a radical religious ‘Wahhabi’ form.”43 In these conditions, the social-state ideology frequently serves as an ideological-moral screen behind which narrow groups that monopolize power conceal their interests.44 Fully aware of this, the ethnic minorities cannot respect the republic’s leaders, while the majority does not regard the power structures as representative. Kaflan Khanbabaev has righty noted that “in Russian society protest sen- timents are fanned by the lack of institutional and consistent feedback between society and the gov- ernment. In the absence of a dialog, social protest spreads beyond the limits of the law.”45 The fact that the majority of the republic’s ethnic groups have no right of decision-making on vitally important issues pushes them to alternative means: in the last twenty years this has developed into an extremist threat. The gaps and defects of the present system of ethnocratic hierarchy and the fairly criminalized clan and patronage structure are responsible for the present scope and effects of the systemic crisis not only in the power structures, but also in Daghestani society as a whole. This eth- nocratic model does nothing to satisfy the numerous ethnonational interests and resolve the ethnic contradictions; this means that they are pushed out into the illegal sphere, where they acquire extrem- ist forms.

The Social and Cultural Factors of Religious-Political Extremism

The spiritual and civilizational deformities are also conducive to the spread of religious-politi- cal extremism in the republic. It comes as no surprise that all those who study extremism invariably point out that macro social factors responsible for people’s sentiments and for the transfer from a

41 See: A. Lijphart, “Mnogosostavnye obshchestva i demokraticheskie rezhimy,” Polis (Political Studies), No. 1, 1992, p. 34. 42 See: Kh.Kh. Vaykhanov, Natsionalnaia bezopasnost Rossii na regionalnom urovne, ed. by I.P. Dobaev, SKNTs VSh YuFU Publishers, Rostov-on-Don, 2010, p. 64. 43 S.S. Arutyunov, op. cit. 44 See: M.P. Khripkov, Vnutrennie ugrozy natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossii: sushchnost, struktura, sotsialnye pos- ledstvia (Sotsiologicheskiy analiz), Doctoral thesis, 22.00.08, Moscow, 2004, 406 pp. 45 K.M. Khanbabaev, Religiozno-politicheskiy ekstremizm v Rossii: sostoianie i problemy, Lotos Publishers, Ma- khachkala, 2010, p. 138. 124 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION traditional to a modern society (the sum-total of these processes is described as modernization) play an important role.46 An analysis of the processes underway in the Republic of Daghestan shows that radical fundamentalism is largely a response to the moral and axiological deformations caused by cultural globalization. Prof. Sergey Murtazaliev has pointed out that in the sociocultural context globalization affects inter-cultural communication, interaction, and mutual influence of cultures, which leads to moderni- zation of the local societies, ethnopolitical integration, the ever increasing impact of mass culture, and standardization, which dilutes national traditions and ethnic identity.47 It should be said that today the ideological and axiological paradigm of liberal West European civilization (cultural values, way of life, and behavior which fit Europeanism in its contemporary interpretation) has been accepted as the only “correct” model of modernization and integration into the “developed world.” This means that ultraliberalism, viz. individualism, pragmatism, purposeful behavior and thinking, leisure time, atti- tude toward the family, and the individual’s place in society are accepted as preferential. More often than not traditional societies regard this as ideological-civilizational expansion.48 In Daghestan, the cultural-globalizational processes proceeded in several directions. On the one hand, they destroyed the traditional values, which sent the traditional social institutions into a deep crisis and caused an outburst of individualism, egoism, and the primacy of the material over the spir- itual and personal over the communal (phenomena unheard of in these parts and absolutely alien to the local people) and stirred up all sorts of social pathologies and massive degradation of the younger generation.49 A crisis of the traditional spiritual and philosophical landmarks of Daghestani society could not be avoided. On the other hand, part of the local society turned to Islamic values, which caused a large-scale Islamic revival; in a very short period of time the republic acquired thousands of mosques, religious educational establishments, and social religious organizations.50 These mutually contradictory and intertwining processes created a sociocultural chimera of sorts. Prof. M.-R. Ibrahimov has written that an obvious quantitative revival of Islam failed to pro- duce a higher quality of moral and spiritual life for the Muslims.51 The trends toward the stronger position of Islam, the republic’s traditional religion, retreated under the pressure of ideological ex- pansion of ultra-liberal West European values superimposed on the highly complicated regional eth- nosocial and ethnopolitical context and of moral degradation which produced ethnic and clan crimes, prostitution, drug addiction, etc.52 Daghestani society came face to face with an internal crisis of mutual understanding and coop- eration and was divided into numerous parts, which not infrequently occupied opposite positions. “Those who moved away from traditions and the determined ‘followers of traditions’,” writes Israpil Sampiev, “existed side by side. The former lacked the moral stamina to triumph over the traditional- ists, while the latter could not fight their opponents supported by the state and official ideology.”53

46 See: V. Galitsky, Ya. Starshinov, op. cit. 47 See: S.I. Murtazaliev, Problemy identichnosti kavkaztsev i rossiian, 2nd revised edition, Format Publishers, Ma- khachkala, 2010, p. 7. 48 See: V.A. Sosin, Psikhologiia sovremennogo terrorizma, Forum Publishers, Moscow, 2010, pp. 39-42. 49 See: A.A. Saidov, “Problemy protivodeystviia molodezhnomu ekstremizmu i terrorizmu v Daghestane,” availa- ble at [http://scenceport.ru/]. 50 See: O.M. Tsvetkov, “Ideologiia i praktika ‘politicheskogo Islama’ na Severnom Kavkaze,” Kavkazskie nauch- nye zapiski, No. 1, 2009, pp. 52-53. 51 See: M.-R. Ibrahimov, “Etnosy i konfessii Daghestana v kontse XX-nachale XXI veka,” in: Etnopoliticheskie issledovaniia na Severnom Kavkaze: sostoyanie, problemy, perspektivy, Makhachkala, 2005, p. 215. 52 See: M.-R. Ibrahimov, K. Matsuzato, “Alien but Loyal: Reasons for the ‘Unstable Stability’ of Daghestan, an Outpost of Slavic Eurasia,” in: Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Impro- vised? ed. by K. Matsuzato, Slavic Research Center, Sapporo, 2005, pp. 221-244. 53 I.M. Sampiev, “Etnopoliticheskie aspekty religiozno-politicheskogo ekstremizma na Severnom Kavkaze: k postanovke problemy,” in: Aktualnye problemy protivodeystviia religiozno-politicheskomu ekstremizmu. Materialy Vse- rossiiskoy nauchno-prakticheskoy konferentsii, Lotos Publishers, Makhachkala, 2007, p. 182. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Transformations were accompanied by a crisis of spiritual and ideological identity; they trig- gered a quest for values to oppose moral degradation and civilizational expansion of alien values. Part of society was inclined to embrace the fundamental religious ideas; under the pressure of the acceler- ating disintegration of the traditional moral and ethical foundations, fundamental ideas assumed rad- ical forms promoted and approved by extremists. Prof. Kurbanov has rightly pointed out that “there was an obvious conflict between the democratic secular consciousness and sacralized traditional thinking. The extreme forms of this confrontation became radical or even extremist.”54 It should be said that the use of ideologies is one of the collective responses to the provoking conditions of life. In such cases ideology frequently serves as a cornerstone; religion is regarded as an ideology, a sum-total of ideas about a better world created through organizing a way of life compat- ible with the norms and prescriptions of the given religion.55 This explains why the ideology of ultra- conservative Islamism (known in Russia as Wahhabism) promptly spread among those who not only disagreed with the situation in the republic, but were prepared to oppose it. The ideology of “pure Islam” is attractive because of the highly topical nature of its program provisions. Wahhabism rejects many of the cumbersome traditions of non-Islamic origin; its follow- ers resolutely opposed the “Western culture of individualism and liberalism” and the arbitrary rule of the regional elites.56 In this context, the protest against cultural expansion took the form of so-called pure Islam in its extremely radical forms. The above is amply confirmed by the fact that the younger generation, which grew up in an ide- ological vacuum and spiritual-political crisis, tends toward radical ideas. Prof. Yuri Volkov has writ- ten that “the youth, which still has to identify its social-psychological and philosophical landmarks, is much more susceptible than other age groups to all sorts of social-psychological and subcultural ide- ological impacts; it responds to them much more openly and much more actively. This is conducive to a high degree of uncertainty, unpredictability of its social behavior, and high mobility of its axio- logical landmarks.”57 In this way, the Republic of Daghestan has acquired a community of people from different walks of life who do not only dissociate themselves from the currently accepted axiological and phil- osophical model, but also stand opposed to it. It was moral and axiological deformation that fed the fanatic rejection by the radical Muslim communities of the order which struck root in the republic.

Conclusion

The above analysis showed that factors conducive to religious-political extremism and terror- ism are found both inside and outside the republic and are directly connected with the current globali- zation processes. It seems that the internal factors which feed radicalization and criminalization in the republic have played a decisive role in the spread of religious-political extremism and terrorism and are responsible for the wide scope of the military-political crisis in the Northern Caucasus. The present social imbalance and the fact that society is divided into several hostile groups, as well as corruption, the clan system, and ethnocracy, have deepened the sociopolitical crisis in Dagh- estan. If the crisis zones spread far and wide, tragic repercussions might hit Daghestan and echo across the Northern Caucasus. The phenomenon is fairly complicated, which means that the measures

54 G.M. Kurbanov, “Religia i politika terrora,” in: Makhachkala: narody Daghestana, Makhachkala, 2002, p. 47. 55 See: V.A. Sosin, op. cit., pp. 16-22. 56 See: R.B. Ware, E. Kisriev, W.J. Patzelt, U. Roericht, “Political Islam in ,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, Issue 2, March 2003, pp. 287-302. 57 Yu.G. Volkov, Sotsiologiya. Uchebnik dlia studentov vuzov, ed. by V.I. Dobrenkov, 2nd edition, Sotsialno-gu- manitarnoe izdanie, Moscow, 2005, p. 231. 126 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION designed to stem religious-political extremism should likewise be integral and related to all aspects of social, economic, political, and spiritual life. It seems that those public, political, and religious figures who, contrary to common sense, insist that only “traditional Islam” should be confessed in Russia are wrong. Today, there is any number of fairly large enclaves of followers of moderate Wahhabi and Salafi, which means that if they are de- clared hostile ideological movements to be suppressed, thousands of people prepared to defend their interests and rights will be driven outside Russia’s legal system. The ethnopolitical aspects of radicalization should be addressed in the context of the federal program of stabilization of the North Caucasian Federal District. It seems that radical administrative and territorial reforms designed to unite Daghestan with the other North Caucasian federation sub- jects under a single center with broad rights to elaborate and realize large-scale social, economic, and political programs look like a logical solution; there are also plans to decentralize the lowest admin- istrative structures, which should be endowed with the broadest possible administrative powers in order to successfully address the vitally important problems of municipal and/or ethno-national units. This can be effective only if there is an understanding that there are many different ethnicities with their own history, language, culture, traditions, and ethnopolitical interests. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Irada BAGIROVA

D.Sc. (Hist.), Head of the Caucasian History Department at the Institute of History, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CONFLICTS, IDENTITY, AND INTEGRATION IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS

Abstract

his article examines some aspects of Moreover, integration trends, which T the formation of national identity in the also have historical precedents, began to Central Caucasian peoples, the influ- gain momentum. The Central Caucasian ence of this factor on their national self- community became a topic of international awareness, and the emergence among them discussions, which was enthusiastically tak- of both conflict and integration processes. en up by Western countries, but perceived All of these trends can be traced through- rather pessimistically by the local political out the 20th century, arising in one form or and intellectual elites. For the time being, another at sharp turning-points in historical ethnic affiliation dominates over regional in events when the century-long imperial tradi- the three main nations of the Central Cau- tions were broken and new states emerged. casus.

Introduction

The study of national identity and the emergence and growth of national self-awareness is a relatively new phenomenon in our historiography and political science. The influence of West- 128 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ern humanitarian sciences, which make these issues particularly important, plays a significant role.1 When the Soviet Union declared the formation of a new historical community—the Soviet people, who over time were supposed to wipe out all the differences among the peoples of the U.S.S.R.—the nationalities question seemed to have been decided once and for all. The imperial policy of the czarist authorities was given as the reason for the emergence of ethnic conflicts in prerevolutionary Russia. At the same time, talking about the existence of such conflicts in the So- viet Union was a taboo subject. In the post-Soviet period, ethnic conflicts, which are what in fact initiated the collapse of the Union, as well as increased national self-awareness, were discussed more by journalists carrying out specific political orders, than by scientists, which gave rise to the superficial and sometimes openly provocative nature of these studies. And it was not until recent years that serious academic publications began to appear that shed light on certain problems of national identity, the emergence and development of ethnic conflicts, and so on. However, the historical aspect of this problem has been given little attention. From this viewpoint, rethinking and discussing the historical processes and events in an unbiased way in the context of how they affected the awakening of national self- awareness in some ethnicities seems rather pertinent and promising and provides the opportunity to take a fresh look at how some nations and political unions were formed and their transformation into state formations. Shedding light on the genesis of national identity in the Central Caucasian peoples, on how this factor influenced the establishment of their statehood, as well as on the emergence of both conflict and integration processes among them, seems to us to be one of the most important areas of contem- porary scientific research in the sphere of Caucasian studies.

Level of National Identity of the Peoples of the Central Caucasus in the 20th Century

In the most general sense, national identity is understood as the formation of an individual’s ideas about his place in the world and relation to his own status and national group, on the one hand, and the acceptance of certain historical experience that allows individuals to perceive themselves as part of the overall political structure and sociocultural space, on the other; that is, recognition of the interests of one’s people and an understanding of their language, territory, and culture. Ethnic affili- ation is one of the ways to adapt, become better orientated, and achieve certain social goals in today’s complex world.2 Perception of one’s identity becomes especially urgent at crisis times in history, when nations are threatened with both external danger and civil war. By the beginning of the 20th century, the three titular nations of the Central Caucasus—the Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians—had reached different levels of national self-identity, which was already manifested in their self-designation. Whereas the Georgians and Armenians

1 See: T. Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan 1905-1920. The Shaping of Nation Identity in a Muslim Community, Cambridge University Press, 1985; A. Alshtadt, The Azerbaijani Turks, Stanford, 1992; R.G. Suny, The Baku Commune 1917-1918. Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution, Princeton, New-Jersey, 1972; A. Bennigsen, Ch. Lemercler- Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union, London, 1967; G. Imart, “Un intellectual Azerbaidjanais face à la revolution de 1917, ” Cahies du monde Russe et Sovietique (Paris), Oct.-Dec. 1967; Ch. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, London, 1957. 2 See: V.P. Levkovich, I.B. Andrushchak, “Etnotsentrizm kak sotsialno-psikhologicheskiy fenomen,” in: Dinamika sotsialno-psikhologicheskikh iavlenii v izmeniaiushchemsia obshchestve, Collection, Moscow, 1996. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION were called the same as they are today beyond their habitat (they, on the other hand, called them- selves “kartvelos” and “haik”), the authorities of czarist Russia called the Azerbaijanis “Tatars.” Several external and internal factors also had an influence on the level of national identity. Due to their religious affiliation with the Russians, the Georgians and Armenians were in a much more privileged position than the Azerbaijanis. Essentially until the collapse of the Second Transcaucasian Federation in 1936, Tiflis (Tbilisi) was the cultural and political center of the Cau- casus, while the Georgians and Armenians occupied several high posts, first in the Russian Empire and then in the Soviet system. The rights of the Azerbaijanis, however, were limited not only in the power hierarchy, but even in obtaining a secondary and higher education (until 1918), which greatly complicated the formation of an intellectual elite capable of expressing the national idea. However, despite even these obstacles, a national intellectually Europeanized elite had formed in Azerbaijan at the turn of the 20th century, and after the collapse of the Russian Empire, its promi- nent representatives founded the first democratic republic in the Muslim East with a parliamentary form of rule. The ethnic conflicts of 1905-1906, 1918-1920, and 1988-1994 had a significant influence on the national self-awareness of the Central Caucasian peoples, since, despite all of their blood-shedding and negative consequences for the region, they were instrumental in consolidating the Azerbaijanis and Georgians in particular. Similar examples can also be found in the history of other states (France, Russia, Great Britain, India, and others), when an external threat consolidated the nation and forced it to forget its internal contradictions. In Soviet times, ethnic contradictions were neutralized by the Lenin-Stalin nationalities policy, which drove them into a latent phase. However, they were quick to erupt again with new force at the slightest weakening of central power. The profound changes at the beginning of the 1990s that shook the foundations of socioeco- nomic life caused a new outburst of mass protest. Geography began to dictate foreign policy—the administrative borders of the former Union republics became state-political boundaries. In post- Soviet reality, traditions of ethnic community, tolerance of the interests of other ethnicities and confessions, and conflict prevention have stopped working. The Soviet imperial space was stirred by the irredentist ambitions of the new nationalist elites (“Armenia is where Armenians live,” Ab- khazia for the Abkhazians, reunification of South and North Ossetia, and so on) and claims on eth- nic self-determination. The ethnocratic egoism of politicians who acquired political, ideological, and information resources, but in so doing continued to think in narrow regional terms led to the contradictions and conflicts in the region. The leaders of the unrecognized republics continue to make the right to national self-determination absolute. However, the contradiction between the principle of self-determination and the principle of the territorial integrity of states causes a serious problem in contemporary international law.

Integration Trends of the Most Recent Times

The conflicts remain unsettled, however, paradoxically, integration trends gained momentum throughout the whole of the 20th century in the Central Caucasus. Twice during the first third of the century, in 1917-1918 and 1922-1936, Central Caucasian state unions—Transcaucasian federa- tions—were created, although in both cases they could not be preserved. It should be noted that in both cases, it was outside pressure that instigated the creation of an integrated federative union—in 1918 from Turkey and in 1922 from Russia.3 In the first case, the federation fell apart due to internal

3 See: Dokumenty i materialy po vneshnei politike Zakavkazia i Gruzii, Tiflis, 1919. 130 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION contradictions and the different foreign orientations of the Central Caucasian states. The second case can be regarded as an artificial administrative union within the framework of the single Soviet state, both created and eliminated by an order from above with the goal of equaling out the economic situ- ation in the republics of the region, mainly by means of Azerbaijan’s energy resources. At the begin- ning of the 1990s, the idea put forward by Jokhar Dudaev and supported by Eduard Shevardnadze of integrating the Caucasian states within a “Common Caucasian Home” gained popularity. In March 1996, a Manifesto on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in the Caucasian Region, which came to be called the Tbilisi Declaration, was signed between the presidents of Azerbaijan and Georgia Heydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze.4 During the Kislovodsk meeting of the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Russia in 1997, a declaration was signed “For Peace and Economic and Cultural Cooperation in the Cauca- sus.” A Pact on Stability in the Caucasus has been put forward twice in the past 10 years, first at the Istanbul summit of 1999 and the last time by Turkey in the fall of 2008 after the Georgian-Russian conflict over South Ossetia. The idea of regional cooperation was enthusiastically taken up by the West, which was striving to minimize Russia’s role in the Caucasus. The political and economic fu- ture of the region, despite the different vectors in foreign orientation of the three Central Caucasian countries, is gradually being drawn into the unified European political and economic space being created, which all three countries became a more realistic part of after signing the Action Plan with the European Union in November 2006. The idea of a Central Caucasian community within a federative state, which could later become a member of the European Union, is also being advanced at international forums. According to West- ern political scientists for the most part, such a union, which presumes mutual limitation of the sover- eignty of the member states, coordination, and joint security efforts, will help to reach compromises and, in the final analysis, a peaceful solution to the ethnic conflicts. In contrast to the foreign enthusiasts, most domestic researchers and politicians are relatively pessimistic about the prospects for this integration, motivating this by the fact that today the peoples of the Central Caucasus are experiencing that awakening of national self-awareness that was inherent in the West European countries in the 19th century but is still far from the integration processes that unfolded in the West European states of the end of the 20th century.5 This is also confirmed by the traditionally different vectors of the foreign policy of the Central Caucasian countries: Georgia to- ward the U.S. and the European Union, Armenia toward Russia, and Azerbaijan, which is trying to build equal relations with all the key players of the outside world. Georgia has recently been stepping up its activity in the Black Sea Basin, believing itself to be more a part of it than a part of the Central Caucasus. As a result, all three countries are building their relations with the European Union inde- pendently, outside the regional context, although this is envisaged in their Action Plans for the next five years. It goes without saying that globalization processes will help to accelerate this process, but so far the closest economic cooperation has developed only between Georgia and Azerbaijan, which are involved in transnational projects. Owing to its irreconcilable position in the Armenian-Az- erbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia has found itself essentially isolated from all the large regional and transnational projects. With respect to social relations, only humanitarian projects based on a coalition of nongovernmental organizations are yielding the most significant results so far. Another form of self-identification is to associate oneself with the whole of the Caucasian re- gion, that is, feel oneself to be a Caucasian with all the unique cultural and civilizational characteris-

4 See: D. Malysheva, “Security Problems in the Caucasus,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7), 2001, pp. 37-49. 5 See: G. Pashaeva, “Myths and Realities of the Southern Caucasus System of Regional Security,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 1 (7), 2001, p. 26. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tics inherent in this image. This form of self-identification is usually more characteristic of represent- atives of the Northern Caucasus or several ethnic minorities of Georgia, or can be found beyond the region, in Russia, for example, where everyone is united under the general name of “people of Cau- casian nationality.” The three leading nations of the Central Caucasus prefer to associate themselves with other regions and their sense of ethnic affiliation prevails over regional. Current trends espouse that any nation, be it the dominating one or a national minority, should link its identity not with its ethnicity, but with its citizenship. However, it has proven very difficult to confirm this principle in the post-Soviet expanse, since the Soviet mentality is still alive in the terri- tory of the former Soviet Union and manifested particularly frequently against the background of conflict situations, despite the fact that ethnic affiliation is no longer indicated in passports. When people are mainly guided by their sense of citizenship, that is, their belonging to a partic- ular country, the question of special “national” rights usually does not arise. However, when the de- termining factor is affiliation with a particular ethnic group, especially when we are talking about a national minority in the particular country, the question of acquiring special ethnic rights could be- come extremely acute. Nevertheless, it seems to us that the region’s ethnopolitical and ethnic ailments are not lethal and can essentially be cured. The peoples of the Central Caucasus should bear the burden of respon- sibility for peace and stability in the region and their own national security, remembering not only the conflicts, but also the historical achievements, and cultivating them. Ethnic contradictions can essentially be brought under state and public control and legal regulation if the fundamental pre- cepts of international law are preserved. It is crystal clear that “long-gone affairs” cannot serve as a foundation for remaking the contemporary geopolitical map of the world. There is not one place on the earth that can claim such remaking, and we do not have to go far for examples: essentially every European state (Germany, France, Italy, Greece) was formed as the result of a collective agreement of several independent kingdoms-regions, the population of which often formed a cer- tain autonomous ethnic unit. The Russian Federation is also one of the most multinational states in the world. It should be noted that the national ideas of the Central Caucasian republics, if socialized, that is, if the socioeconomic rights of all their citizens are realized, can also perform integration functions. But, as past experience shows, any union created under pressure from the outside is sooner or later doomed to failure. Only if the states themselves clearly understand the expediency of such integra- tion, no matter what form it takes, can it enjoy a certain amount of vital potential.

Problems of Regional Security in the Post-Soviet Period

The idea of regional security of the Central Caucasus put forward by the European Union and the U.S. is a new phenomenon of post-Soviet reality that appeared in the globalization era after the empire collapsed. From the viewpoint of international security, the Central Caucasian region is still a blank spot in this system due to the different vectors in the foreign policy priorities of the three countries. One of the three countries of the region, Armenia, belongs to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is officially headed by Russia. Georgia’s efforts, particularly after the conflict with Russia in August 2008, are aimed at accession to NATO and creating its lo- cators there. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia dra- matically changed the balance of geopolitical forces in the region, but there is no doubt that it more clearly designated the priorities of some of the world nations and changed the orientation of others. 132 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Security in the Caucasus, particularly in the Central Caucasus, has become a topic of international discussions, this region being classified as one of the explosive spots on the planet. It is obvious that Russia has been quite successful; it managed to curb NATO’s enlargement to the East and remove Georgia’s accession to this military-political bloc from the agenda. Russia was given the opportunity to legally determine the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. What is more, a direct threat was cre- ated to the transnational energy projects that could in the future put an end to Europe’s energy de- pendence on Russia. Of course, the U.S. also considers the Central Caucasus to be a zone of its primary interests. Along with Washington’s concern about the development of Iran’s nuclear technology, the U.S. is also worried about the security of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. This oil pipeline, like the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, runs right next to the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, promising oil and gas projects supported by the U.S., including the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, are also in a high risk zone. This justifies the U.S.’s concern about pipeline security, since all of America’s so-called projects of the century have in one way or another been threatened with failure. Keeping in mind that the Central Caucasus is a territory through which energy resources can be transported, Washington is objectively interested in the most rapid settlement of the conflicts in the Central Caucasus. Hot on the heels of the dramatic events of 2008, many analysts, particularly Russian, began talk- ing about the need to create a new security system in the Caucasus that will require categorical exclu- sion of global players who are not associated vitally and physically with the fate of the Caucasus.6 It goes without saying that the U.S. is meant by “global” and “alien” players, while Russia and to some extent the countries of the European Union, particularly France, which suddenly made an active show of their position in the current situation, are considered to be “vitally associated with the fate of the Caucasus.” While the whole world had its attention riveted on the events in Georgia, the Armenian- Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict receded into the background. However, after the end of the Georgian-Russian war, Azerbaijan unexpectedly found itself drawn into the sphere of another out- burst of attention toward the Karabakh problem from the leading world players and primarily Russia, which ended in the signing of the Moscow (Meyendorff) declaration and activation of the OSCE Minsk Group.7 In the situation created, Russia and Turkey experienced an unprecedented warming trend in their relations, the latter being able in a short time to significantly raise its role in the region. In Sep- tember 2008, Turkey put forward the idea of a Platform of Stability and Security in the Caucasus that also included the Black Sea-Caspian Basin.8 The 3+2 model offered (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia + Russia and Turkey) is not new; it was put forward as early as 1999 by President Süleyman Demirel, but this time it was filled with more specific content. As early as December 2008, a meeting of the foreign ministers of all five countries was held, and on 26 January, 2009, a meeting was held in Istan- bul of the deputy foreign ministers of the five countries.9 The consummation was Turkish President Abdullah Gül’s first state visit in history to Moscow, where the two presidents signed a declaration on multilateral partnership. Abdullah Gül’s words express the significance and informality of this docu- ment: it “is not a framework agreement, but an all-encompassing and precise document.”10 And this is confirmed by the positions voiced by Moscow and Ankara that security in the region is ensured only by its countries without involving non-regional states, that is, what Russia has precisely been aiming for during the past decade. Of course, the incredible activation of the key players in the Cauca-

6 See: M. Kolerov, “Novy Bolshoi Kavkaz: vzaimnoe sderzhivanie bez chuzhikh,” available at [www.regnum.ru], 8 December, 2008. 7 Interfax, 8 November, 2008. 8 See: New Architecture of Security in the Southern Caucasus, Round table papers, Ankara, 2008, pp. 5-8. 9 See: Milliyet, 27 January, 2009. 10 Milli gazette, 15 February, 2009. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sian region after the Russian-Georgian conflict has greatly slackened off in the past few years due to the Arab Spring events, which have placed the Middle East in the center of attention of the world nations once more. Now the region, which is delivering a large part of its oil and gas resources to the world market, is already under direct threat. So it can be asserted that there is currently no unified regional security system in the Central Caucasian region, which at one time was considered a direct sphere of Russia’s influence. Moreo- ver, the region itself is essentially in the grips of centrifugal processes, in which different countries are striving for different military-political poles. Despite several restraining, subjective, and objec- tive obstacles, Georgia is trying to accelerate its accession to NATO, while Armenia is just as quickly integrating into the CSTO (the 2009 summit of this organization led to the creation of collective rapid response forces, which the Russian president compared with similar NATO forc- es). After Georgia and the U.S. signed a memorandum on strategic and military cooperation, and after the U.S. announced, at the end of the NATO Bucharest summit, that by hook or by crook Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO, it became obvious that the security ar- chitecture in the Caucasus would change. It is entirely possible that this process has already be- gun and, in the foreseeable future, will lead to the establishment of some stability in the regional security system. In this situation, Azerbaijan, 20% of the territory of which is under Armenian occupation and which has as many as one million refugees and forced migrants, is striving, without joining either NATO or the CSTO, to preserve a balance between these poles of power and put an end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, without the settlement of which it is impossible to talk about any security system in the Central Caucasus.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it should be noted that the problems of conflicts, ethnic identity, integration, and regional security in the Central Caucasus are interrelated and interdependent. On the one hand, in the post-Soviet period, each of the countries in the region has been experiencing an aggravated sense of ethnocultural identity, leading in some cases to negative consequences in the form of eth- nic and even interstate conflicts. While on the other, not only regional nations (Russia), but also global players (the U.S. and the European Union) have been drawn into the settlement of these conflicts, competing with each other on the world geopolitical and geo-economic arena and striv- ing to draw the Caucasian region into the orbit of their strategic interests. The conflicts are also posing a serious threat to the implementation of transnational energy projects, which is significant- ly stimulating the West to create a unified regional security system. But opposition from separatist forces and their lack of desire to compromise is essentially reducing all of these efforts to naught and excluding them themselves from both regional and global partnership. So rapid settlement of the regional conflicts guarantees the realization of economic potential and geopolitical stability in the Caucasus. 134 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Revaz GACHECHILADZE

D.Sc. (Geography), Professor at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Corresponding Member of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Tbilisi, Georgia).

THE CONFLICT-PRONE POTENTIAL OF THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF EMPIRES: POLITICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC APPROACH (A CASE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN TRANSCAUCASIA, 1917-1923)

Abstract

he author discusses the emergence gion’s republics, and the border issues of T and development of the administrative- the early Soviet period. territorial division of the Transcauca- The conflicts which emerged at that sia when it was part of the Russian Em- time and have survived until today were pire, the problems created by the need to largely predetermined by the demographic delineate the state borders during the First and political-geographic processes that Independence (1918-1920/21) of the re- have been going on for a fairly long time.

Introduction

Empires1 —large groups of states ruled by one monarch, an oligarchy, or one sovereign—were created by the force of arms.2 They emerged only to fall apart after a while (usually in three to five cen- turies); on rare occasions they changed. Empires took a long time to spread far and wide3; their disinte- gration, likewise, took some time to be completed. Empires with long histories behind them left vast political and/or cultural heritages, which was not necessarily a negative phenomenon; the Roman Em- pire, for example, left behind a strong cultural tradition, the fertile soil of European culture. Nevertheless, the disintegration of empires was invariably accompanied by conflicts over “terri- torial legacy.” In the 20th century, the autochthonous ethnicities living in the parts conquered and kept together by empires moved in to carry out post-imperial territorial redistribution with the argument (fre- quently well justified) that these parts were their “historical territories.” Not infrequently the same stretch was claimed by several ethnicities who had either been living there from the very beginning or

1 The term “empire,” which I will use extensively in this article, does not necessarily have a negative connotation: many empires were products of historical logic. 2 See: Oxford Dictionaries online; A. Giddens, Sociology, Polity Press, London, 1989. 3 For more on the way the Russian Empire expanded, see: Russian Colonial Expansion to 1917, ed. by M. Rywkin, Mansell Publishing, London, 1988. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION had been moved there by the imperial authorities. and the resultant disintegration of four empires—the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman—were accompanied by numerous territorial conflicts. Those which cropped up in the 1920s in Asia Minor, the Balkans, and Central Eu- rope were caused by what some ethnicities believed to be “unfair” redistribution of the imperial inher- itance, caused, among other things, by the fairly subjective policies of the Entente, which won the war. While the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires left the historical stage forever, the Russian Empire merely changed its makeup. On 7 November, 1917, the Bolsheviks came to power in what for the last 300 years had been the Romanov Empire; on 1 September, 1917, it became the Rus- sian Republic; and on 3 March, 1918, the new rulers of Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to withdraw from the World War. They de facto accepted the victory of the Central Powers while the former, in turn, several months later accepted the victory of the Entente. The empire survived, albeit modified; between 1920 and 1940, it totally restored its old territory under a new name—Soviet Rus- sia/R.S.F.S.R./U.S.S.R.—with a new ideology and a new capital in Moscow. Very much like all other empires, the Russian Empire was a conglomerate of ethnic and confes- sional groups of all sorts. The two revolutions, which followed one another in 1917, weakened the central government (for some time it was practically non-existent) to the extent that the ethnic groups in the former empire’s periphery tried, or even managed, to set up their own states. Ethnoterritorial nationalism (unknown or latent in the Russian Empire) came to the fore as one of the politically dom- inant factors. It comes as no surprise that Soviet Russia (the new name of the restored empire) had to deal with very serious ethnic and territorial conflicts; its efforts only made things worse or, at best, achieved a temporary respite. Here I will demonstrate how the state borders were drawn in the multinational Transcaucasia4: in 1918, three independent republics appeared; in 1920/1921, when Russia returned to the region as Soviet Russia, previously unknown administrative-territorial units (formally called “state units”) emerged—the Soviet Socialist Republics (S.S.R.), Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (A.S.S.R.), and Autonomous Regions (A.R.)—their borders and statuses being finally settled in 1923. Delineation of the borders caused disagreements and even conflicts which remained smoldering (al- beit latently) throughout the history of the Soviet Union. Late in 1991, when the Soviet Union toppled and then fell, conflicts and disagreements flared up with unprecedented violence. I do not blame the Transcaucasian ethnopolitical conflicts on the Russian Empire or Soviet Russia, yet their policies inadvertently or (frequently) deliberately fanned them. I intentionally left the problems related to the region’s political and economic history outside the scope of my article to concentrate on the political-geographic approach which, in this case, means an analysis of the conflict-prone potential of political and administrative delimitation.

The Administrative-Territorial Division and Ethnic Structure of the Caucasus under the Russian Empire

In the 19th century,5 when the Russian Empire conquered the Caucasus, its administrative-ter- ritorial division followed, for a while, the traditional division into kingdoms, khanates, and prince- doms. Very soon, however, the imperial government decided to move away from it and, to a certain

4 Here I do not use the terms the “Southern Caucasus” or more recent “Central Caucasus” because at the time I wrote about it was known as the Transcaucasia. 5 The historical-geographic facts about the administrative-territorial division of the Caucasus can be found in: A. Tsutsiev, Atlas etnopoliticheskoy istorii Kavkaza (1774-2004), Evropa, Moscow, 2006. 136 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION extent, from the ethnic and sub-ethnic population structure; administrative units lost their ethnic indi- cators. For example, while until 1846 there was the Georgian-Imeretian Gubernia (which included Eastern Georgia, part of Western Georgia, and parts of the present northern territories of Azerbaijan and Armenia) and, until 1850, the Armenian region, later gubernias appeared (they disappeared to- gether with the Empire) named according to their centers (Tiflis, Kutaisi, Erivan, Elisavetpol (Ganja), Shemakha/Baku, etc.). After the Polish uprising of 1863, the empire lost all other ethnic-related ad- ministrative names: the Abkhazian Princedom became the Sukhumi District (see Map 1). Late in the 19th century, the Empire accelerated the process of assimilation of “non-Russians” to achieve unification. This suggests that manipulating the names of the administrative-territorial units in the Transcaucasia, better described as an ethnic and religious patchwork, was intended to destroy the people’s identity with their “ethnic territory.” Migration policies served the same aim even though, unlike the Northern Caucasus, Russian migration to the Transcaucasia proved to be very limited. In the first half of the 19th century, the Empire encouraged migration of Orthodox Russians, Ukrainians, and members of Russian religious sects (Molokans, Dukhobors, and Sabbatarians) from European Russia. They came in relatively small numbers to settle in big cities like Baku and Tiflis. The Empire continued insisting on ethnic diversi- fication: Armenians from Persia and the Ottoman Empire, Germans from German states, and Greeks from the Ottoman Empire were encouraged to settle in the Transcaucasia, while Poles were exiled there. In 1862-1878, large ethnic groups (Adighes from the northwestern Caucasus, Abkhazians from the Sukhumi District, and Muslim Georgians from the Batumi Region, etc.) were squeezed out of the Caucasus or encouraged to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire (earlier some of the Muslim Turks had been pushed out of the Russian Empire to Persia and Turkey).6 They left behind territories that were gradually filled with other ethnicities. During the 19th century, the demographic makeup of the Transcaucasia changed a lot. If St. Pe- tersburg intended to create an ethnic melting pot in the Transcaucasia, it succeeded, at least partially. Half a century later, all the administrative-territorial units in the region were polyethnic. The Table below cites the data of the 1897 First All-Russia Population Census related to the main ethnic groups in the region; ethnic identification was based only on native language, a method not free from flaws, the results being relative rather than exact: the polled were asked about their native language but not about their ethnic or sub-ethnic affiliation. Ethnic and sub-ethnic groups were identified by indirect methods when the returns were processed in St. Petersburg.7 The result was not free from errors: for example, those who spoke “the Kartvelian languages” (Kartvelians are the Georgians’ self-name) were divided into 11 “peoples,” 8 of which spoke the same native tongue. For example, only information about territorial distribution makes it possible to distin- guish between the “Georgians” (the blanket name for those who lived in the valleys of the Tiflis Gubernia) and the Tushins, Pshavs, and Khevsurs (small groups of mountain dwellers who used dia- lects of the Georgian language and whose written language and literature went back into antiquity). The same can be said about the Imeretians, Gurians, Ingiloyans, and Ajarians. Three “Kartvelian peo- ples” who used the Megrelian (and the kindred Laz) and the Svan language used the common Geor- gian literary language and demonstrated a clear Georgian identity. Those who organized the census pointed out that “the peoples of the Kartvelian or Iver group were a single whole to a great extent.”8 The census was not free from shortcomings: while the majority of the Georgians were Orthodox Christians, in the Tiflis Gubernia, about 30 thousand who spoke Georgian as their native language pointed to Armenian Gregorianism as their religion, which raises the question: Were they Georgians or Armenians? Six thousand in the Elisavetpol Gubernia who used “the Lezghian language” as their

6 See: A. Tsutsiev, op. cit., p. 34. 7 See: Pervaya vseobshchaia perepis naseleniia Rossiiskoy imperii, ed. by N.A. Troynitskiy, Vol. II, St. Peters- burg, 1905, p. 1. 8 Ibid., p. xxvi. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Map 1 Baku Shemakha Jevat Lenkoran

Quba

Caspian Sea Gekchay Nukha

Aresh Karyagino Shusha

Zakataly Daghestan Region

Temir-khan-shura Jevanshir Zangezur Persia Elisavetpol Signagi Telavi

Nakhchivan Sh-D

Kazakh Lake Sevan Tianeti

Tiflis Vladikavkaz Dusheti N-B Erivan Terek Region Borchalo Aleks. Gori Etchmiadzin Surmalu kalaki Akhal-

Racha Shorapani Kars

Akhaltsikhe Kagizman Ardahan

Kutaisi Lechkhumi Senaki

Olty Zugdidi Ozurgeti Batumi Administrative-Territorial Division of the Transcaucasia in Last Decades Russian Empire Artvin Erzurum State border Borders of gubernias/regions/districts Borders of uezds Sukhumi Kuban Region Sea Black Empire Ottoman S y m b o l s Gubernia centers Regional/district centers Aleks.—Aleksandropol; N-B—Novobayazet; Sh-D—Sharur-Daralagez 138 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

0.0) Total

Table 1

Other

Russian*

Osset Georgian 588(0.1) — 15,937(1.9) 58,855(7.0) 829,556(100.0)

12,394(14.7) 6(0.1) 434(0.5) 40,340(47.9) 84,224(100,0) Armenian 2,552(0.3) 779,881(96.5) 4,200(0.5) 7,476(0.9) 13,280(1.7) 807,478(100.0)

by Gubernia, Region, and District Numerical Strength and Percent (in brackets) of Azeri 2,347(0.8) 73,406(25.3) 543(0.1) 520(0.1) 27,856(9.6) 185,982(64.0) 290,654(100.0) 78,433(8.1) 194,089(20.1) 455,237(47.1) 67,262(7.0) 85,338(8.8) 86,449(8.9) 966,808(100.0) the Main Population Groups Based on Native Language

Tiflis, pp. 107-124. 485,146(58.7)534,086(60.8) 52,233(6.3) 292,188(33.3) 1,678(0.2) 1,396(0.2) — — 77,681(9.4) 209,978(25.3) 17,875(2.0) 826,716(100.0) 32,870(3.7) 878,415(100.0) Abkhazian 837(0.5) — 14,939(10.3) 63,011(43.6) 29(0.1) 9,956(6.8) 55,812(38.6) 144,584(100.0)

59,641(1.2) 1,442,138(29.2) 1,079,059(21.9) 1,340,601(27.2) 72,028(1.5) 248,564(5.0) 692,583(14.0) 4,934,614(10

58,715(55.3) — 6,552(6.2) 25,873(24.4) 11(0.1) 6,011(5.6) 9,017(8.5) 106,179(100.0) Language Kavkazskiy kalendar 1908,

:

District

Region Gubernia * Includes Great Russian, Malo-Rossian and Byelorussian. S o u r c e Tiflis GuberniaKutaisi GuberniaBaku GuberniaElisavetpol Gubernia 89(0.0)Erivan Gubernia — Batumi Region — Kars Region — Sukhumi District — —Zakataly District 313,176(37.8)Total for Transcaucasia 441,000(53.2) — — 28,950(34.4) 2,100(2.5) Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION native tongue (they were probably Udins) pointed to the same religion. Abkhazians had to be singled out from among the “Caucasian mountain people” who spoke “the Circassian language,” that is, they were “Circassians” living in the Sukhumi District and Batumi Region. In the Sukhumi District they were counted together with the Samurzakans (the population of the present Gali District) who, in fact, spoke Megrelian, one of “the Kartvelian languages.”9 The Table shows that the Kutaisi Gubernia (a large part of Western Georgia) was the only ter- ritory with a multinational population; in all the other regions, the largest ethnic-linguistic group ac- counted for no more than 60 percent. In the Erivan and Elisavetpol gubernias, the second largest groups were the Tatar-speakers in the Erivan Gubernia (37.8 percent) and the Armenian-speakers in the Elisavetpol Gubernia (33.3 percent). In the Zakataly District, the “other” ethnic groups were in the relative majority: the Daghestani peoples in the Zakataly District; while in Kars and Batumi regions, people using the Turkic or Kurd- ish languages as their native tongue can be described as “others.” Despite certain faults, the Table confirms an obvious ethnic and linguistic melee, the conse- quences of which cropped up two decades later.

The Independent States Try to Delimitate their Territories

The February revolution in Russia, the fall of the monarchy and the Bolshevist revolution left many of the outlaying regions beyond the impact of the former imperial center. Germany and the Ottoman Empire tried to capitalize on the new Transcaucasian context before October-November 1918; having defeated them in World War I, the Entente either could not fill or had no intention of filling the “vacuum of imperial power” in the region; after several half-hearted attempts, in 1918- 1919 Britain pulled out; the last British soldier left the Transcaucasia in the summer of 1920. After the war, the U.S. went back to its traditional isolationism; Turkey was building a new Kemalist state on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and fighting for its place in Asia Minor, while Russia remained di- vided by the civil war until late 1920. Before 1917, there were no separatist sentiments to speak of in the Transcaucasia: the political parties with considerable ethnic support—the Mensheviks (Social-Democrats) among the Georgians; the Dashnaktsutyun among the Armenians, and the Musavat among the Azeris—did not seek inde- pendence from the Empire; their aims were limited to cultural or administrative autonomy for their ethnicities.10 In the short period of the Russian Republic, the Transcaucasian peoples willingly sent their deputies to the Constituent Assembly. Political reality, however, was changing fast. The Transcaucasian deputies elected to the Constituent Assembly in 1917 missed its first (and only) sitting. With the Bolsheviks in the minority in the new democratically elected structure, it stood no chance of meeting for a second sitting. On 5 January, 1918, the Bolsheviks used force to disperse it; later they signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which cost them their influence in the Caucasus (they lingered in Baku for a while). In these conditions, large ethnic groups (Azeris, Georgians, and Armenians) set up their own statehood in the form of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic with Tbilisi for the capital. It was proclaimed on 22 April, 1918 by the deputies from the Transcaucasia earlier elected to the Constitu- ent Assembly of the Russian Republic.

9 R. Gachechiladze, The New Georgia: Space, Society, Politics, UCL Press, London, 1995, p. 83. 10 See: S.F. Jones, Socialism in Georgian Colors: The European Road to Social Democracy 1883-1917, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2005, p. 17. 140 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The project proved to be short-lived: under foreign pressure (from Germany and the Ottoman Republic)11 and their own inability to coordinate their foreign policy, the Georgian Democratic Re- public, the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Armenia (which preferred to keep the term “independence” out of its declaration)12 declared their independence one after another on 26, 27, and 28 May. It should be said that Azerbaijan was the first parliamentary republic in the Muslim world; in Azerbaijan the women got suffrage earlier than in Great Britain.13 National states came into being with a lot of unresolved problems in store for them. They had to sort things out with the Ottoman Empire, which had annexed the Batumi and Kars re- gions under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, captured parts of Georgian and Armenian territories, and occupied Baku on 15 September, 1918. (Late in 1918, however, Turkey as one of the defeated countries in World War I, pulled out.) The new states had to sort things out among themselves to delimitate their territories. In the post-empire period, the newly formed states had to choose either the principle of “ethnic settlement” or “historical territory” or “imperial administrative-territorial division.” The first two are too subjective to be efficiently applied without the use of force. In 1939, Stalin relied on the “ethnic settlement” principle (“Western Ukrainian and Byelorussians reunited with their homeland”) to justify occupation of part of Polish territory on the strength of the deal with Hitler (the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact14). After World War II, the Soviet Union used the far-fetched “historical territory” principle to justify the transfer of parts of Germany (“the zone the Slavs lived on one thousand years before”) to Poland to compensate for the lost eastern territories. These principles defy peaceful solutions—they are more likely to start a tug of war. The U.N. and the former colonial powers applied the principle of “imperial administrative-ter- ritorial division” in Africa which, in most cases, preserved peace among the newly formed African states even though the borders left many ethnic groups divided among different states. The same prin- ciple was applied when the Soviet Union fell apart: the administrative borders of the Union republics became state borders. Formally, the Soviet Union consisted of fifteen Union republics (“sovereign states” under the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.), which could withdraw from the Union (this was not applicable to the autonomous republics and autonomous regions). In this way, peace was preserved (with the exception of cases when individual republics or autonomous units refused to comply). In 1918, the “imperial administrative-territorial division” principle demanded a consensus of the three Transcaucasian states, which proved unattainable. Georgia wanted the Tiflis and Kutaisi gubernias, the Batumi Region, and the Zakataly and Su- khumi districts. Under the Moscow Treaty of 7 May, 1920 between Georgia and Bolshevist Russia, Moscow accepted Georgian sovereignty within these regions (with the exception of the Zakataly District, which remained outside the deal). Tbilisi also claimed a chunk of the Kars Region as part of the Medieval Georgian Kingdom. Azerbaijan looked at the Baku and Elisavetpol gubernias, the Zakataly District (which it con- trolled anyway), and parts of the Erivan and Tiflis gubernias as its territory. In 1918, for a while, it even hoped to reach the Black Sea coast, but later it dropped its claims to the Kars and Batumi regions. Armenia regarded the Erivan Gubernia (including Nakhchivan and Sharur-Daralagez) and the Kars Region as its territory; it also wanted a large part of the Elisavetpol Gubernia (the Kazakh, Zange- zur, Shusha, Jevanshir, and Karyagino/Jabrail uezds) and the southern part of the Tiflis Gubernia. Peace was obviously far away even though some countries made feeble attempts to bring it closer. The newly formed republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Mountain Peoples of the Northern Caucasus and Daghestan (the latter existed in the Northern Caucasus for a short period between May

11 See: Z. Avalov (Avalishvili), Nezavisimost Gruzii v mezhdunarodnoy politike 1918-1921 godov, Paris, 1924; R. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia: The First Year 1918-1919, Vol. I, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971. 12 See: R. Hovannisian, oð. cit., p. 33. 13 See: Th. De Waal, The Caucasus: An Introduction, University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 64. 14 See: SSSR-Germania: dokumenty i materialy o sovetsko-germanskikh otnoshenoiakh s aprelia po oktiabr 1939 goda, Moklas, Vilnius, 1989, p. 120. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

1918 and February 1919) agreed to meet in Tbilisi in November 1918 to achieve mutual recognition and settle the border issues between the four Caucasian republics. American historian Richard Hov- annisian established that the Republic of Armenia declined to participate in the conference.15 Erevan was convinced that the Entente would be more favorably disposed toward it than toward Georgia and Azerbaijan patronized by Germany and the Ottoman Empire, the Entente’s sworn enemies. Armenia refused to join the “united front of the Caucasian republics” against White General Denikin who was fighting the Russian Bolsheviks and also intended to trim “Caucasian separatism:” the people in Er- evan cherished the illusion that Russia (either “white” or “red”) would support its independence. Armenia feared that in Tbilisi the three Caucasian republics would join forces on territorial issues since their border claims, unlike those of Armenia’s which wanted vast territories demanded by Geor- gia and Azerbaijan and vice versa, were relatively unimportant and easily resolved. The conference, the opening of which was postponed several times, never took place16; this meant that the chance to settle the territorial issues peacefully was lost. The short Armenian-Georgian armed clash in December 1918 over the southern part of the former Borchali Uezd of the Tiflis Gubernia (Lori) was cut short by the Entente; the northern part of Lori be- came a neutral zone. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Zangezur and Nagorno-Kara- bakh (at that time part of the Elisavetpol Gubernia) was much longer and much bloodier. The Treaty of Sèvres signed on 10 August, 1920, which the Entente imposed on its puppet, the government of the Ottoman Empire stationed in Istanbul (the real, Kemalist government was func- tioning in Ankara), spoiled the situation both for Armenia and Georgia. Under the treaty, Armenia acquired territories in Anatolia (the new possessions were not guaranteed either by the Entente or the United States). It is not surprising that soon afterwards Armenia lost not only the Kars region, but also the territories it had inherited from the Russian Empire (the Surmala Uezd, which until 1828 was part of Persia, not Turkey) in a short war with Turkey (24 September-2 December, 1920). Early in 1921, the Turkish troops stationed in the area moved into the Batumi Region; it was after the talks with Russia that they returned the northern part of the Batumi Region and the port of Batumi to Georgia.

Sovietization of the Transcaucasia and the New Borders

In 1920, Russia (this time Soviet Russia) returned to the Caucasus: it was interested, economi- cally and politically, in Baku with its oil fields and the port of Batumi on the Black Sea (through which oil products were exported). Moscow found a common language with the Kemalists in Ankara busy fighting a brutal war against the Greeks and French in Western and Southern Anatolia. During the talks in London, Soviet Russia realized that Great Britain would not interfere in the Caucasian developments.17 On 16 March, 1921, the sides signed an Anglo-Soviet trade treaty in which Russia promised not to meddle with India and Afghanistan; “the British Government gives a similar particular undertaking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of the countries which formed part of the former Russian Empire and which have now become independent.”18 By that time, the Caucasus had been totally Sovietized: on 28 April, 1920, Bolshevik armored trains entered Baku; on 2 December of the same year, Soviet power was established in Erevan; and on 25 February, 1921, the Bolsheviks took Tbilisi.

15 See: R. Hovannisian, op. cit., p. 96. 16 See: Ibid., p. 98. 17 [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1453778.html], 8 October, 2011. 18 R.H. Ulmann, The Anglo-Soviet Accord, Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 474-478. 142 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Earlier, on 16 March, 1921, the Kemalists signed the Moscow Treaty with Soviet Russia to draw the borders between Turkey and the Caucasian republics; they were confirmed by the Kars Treaty of 13 November, 1921, signed by Turkey and the Azerbaijan, Armenian, and Georgian S.S.R., which while remaining de jure subjects of international law were acting on orders from Moscow. The decisions were made in the Kremlin; in the republics the right of decision-making belonged to the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia (Bolsheviks).19 The right of political decision-making in the Caucasus belonged to this party and government author- ity, up to and including the border issues and political structure of the local republics.20 The Caucasian Bureau decided to transfer the neutral Lori zone to the Armenian S.S.R. It also confirmed that a large part of the Kazakh Uezd of the former Elisavetpol Gubernia and a larger part of the Zangezur Uezd of the same gubernia (which had been controlled by Armenian armed forces since 1918) belonged to Armenia. It also wanted the Akhalkalaki Uezd, which remained part of the Geor- gian S.S.R. The Zakataly District claimed by the Georgian S.S.R. became part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., which also acquired small parts of the south of the Signakh Uezd of the Tiflis Gubernia. The Caucasian Bureau of 6 or 7 members decided which republics should get chunks of territo- ries and which parts should be transferred to the offended republics by way of compensation. All the leaders (they were all Communists) of the new republics were offended: in no time each of the republican Communist parties became a vehicle of national interests while holding forth on internationalism. They resented the territorial shifts: each of the republics was convinced that it had not received enough or had been robbed of its territories. No matter what, they had to accept the results; later neither the leaders nor the people showed their dissatisfaction. Other decisions proved to be an apple of discord. In 1922, Moscow insisted on uniting the Transcaucasian republics into a Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (T.S.F.S.R.) (see Map 2). This was done to remedy a situation in which the local Communist parties, while remaining regional organizations of the R.C.P.(B.), had become too independent and too “nationalistically minded.” In June 1921, Joseph Stalin, member of the Politburo of the R.C.P.(B.) and also the People’s Commissar for Nationalities, visited the Caucasian republics where he was coldly received by work- ers in Tbilisi: “Now, upon my arrival in Tiflis, I am astounded by the absence of the former solidarity between the workers of the nationalities of Transcaucasia. Nationalism has developed among the workers and peasants.”21 Many of the Communist leaders of Georgia were dead set against the T.S.F.S.R.; seen from the Kremlin they looked like “nationalist deviators” to be dissolved among other nationalities. The Soviet republics of the Transcaucasia preserved all the formal attributes of independence— governments and parliaments; Communist parties complete with the Central Committees yet they took command from the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) with its headquarters in Tbilisi, the capital of the T.S.F.S.R. The T.S.F.S.R. served as a prototype of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics set up on 30 De- cember, 1922, partly because of the “stubbornness of the Caucasian comrades!”

19 The usual abbreviation R.C.P.(B.). 20 For a vast survey of how the parts of the borders were drawn in the Caucasus and related documents, see: S. Musta- faeva, “Soviet Russia and the Formation of Borders between the Caucasian States (Based on a Case Study of Azerbaijan and Armenia),” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2, 2010, pp. 196-205. The articles inviting discussion were published by Regnum Internet portal, which put numerous hitherto unknown or little known archival documents into circulation even if their interpretation looked fairly one-sided; these documents can be used as sources for those who are studying the political decisions that sealed the fates of the Transcaucasian states in the early 1920s (see: [http://www.r egnum.ru/news/1450393.html], 29 September, 2011; [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1453778.html], 8 October, 2011; [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1433956.html], 10 August, 2011; [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1433780.html], 9 August, 2011; [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1428477.html], 24 July, 2011]). 21 J. Stalin, “The Immediate Tasks of Communism in Georgia and Transcaucasia. Report to a General Meeting of the Tiflis Organization of the Communist Party of Georgia, 6 July, 1921,” Works, Vol. 5, p. 97. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Map 2 Baku Caspian Sea Makhachkala Stepanakert A.R. Nagorno-Karabakh D a g h e s t n R. S. S. A. Persia A z e r b a i j n S. R. Chechen A.R.

Nakhchivan Sharur S.S.R.

Ingush A.R. Tbilisi Nakhchivan Tskhinvali A.R.

Vladikavkaz Armenian S.S.R. S. R. S. North-Ossetian A.R. South-Ossetian Erevan F. A.R. Administrative Borders of the T.S.F.S.R. in 1923 Kabardino-Balkarian R. S. S. R. Ajarian A.S.S.R.

G e o r g i a n S. S. R. Turkey Batumi

Treaty S.S.R. of Abkhazia Sea Sukhumi Black A b r e v i a t o n s: S.S.R. —Soviet Socialist Republic A.S.S.R. —Autonomous S.S.R. A.R. —Autonomous Region 144 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Soviet Union was set up by the T.S.F.S.R. together with the R.S.F.S.R., Ukrainian S.S.R., and Byelorussian S.S.R.; earlier, some of the Communist leaders in the Kremlin (Stalin among them) had entertained the idea that all the republics should become autonomous republics of the R.S.F.S.R. The territorial redistributions inside the republics, including newly created autonomies for some of the ethnic minorities, caused a lot of dissent as mutually unacceptable and frequently stirred up dissatisfaction in ethnic groups. The Karabakh problem turned out to be toughest. Here is what the author of the Atlas etnopo- liticheskoy istorii Kavkaza (Atlas of the Ethnopolitical History of the Caucasus) has to say: “In 1921, the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh remained disputed: the Caucasian Bureau … remained undecided. As a result the Bolshevik leaders relied on the strategy of ‘acquiring allies among the peoples of the East.’ Geopolitically, Armenia was no match to solidarity of the Muslims with Soviet Russia which meant that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain part of Azerbaijan. This was a compromise … it was suggested that an autonomous region should be set up in the mountainous part of Karabakh which meant self-determination for the Armenians within Soviet Azerbaijan. “The autonomy of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh was not ethnic; in the same way the au- tonomy of Nakhchivan (an Azeri autonomy first under the protectorate of Azerbaijan and later part of the Azerbaijan) was not ethnic either.”22 Until 1924, this autonomy remained the Nakhchivan S.S.R. In 1923, Armenia tried to join Nagorno-Karabakh and failed because the territories were separated by a stretch populated by Azeris and Kurds; the Communist party structures discussed the issue for a while; on 7 July, 1923, however, the Azerbaijan Central Executive Committee issued a decree which set up the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region with its center in Khankendi (later renamed Stepanakert). In February-March 1921, in Moscow, Turkey agreed to transfer Nakhchivan (occupied by Tur- key since late 1920) to Soviet Azerbaijan on the condition that it would not be transferred to a third party. Those who think that in this way Turkey acquired a common border with Azerbaijan are wrong; the common border appeared in 1932 when Turkey swapped territories with Iran.23 To avoid too close proximity between Turkey and Azerbaijan (the Kremlin probably suspected that Turkey might swap territories with Iran), the Caucasian Bureau agreed to include Zangezur (Syunik) in the Armenian S.S.R. to separate Nakhchivan from the rest of Azerbaijan. It became an exclave of Azerbaijan. Georgia, with 21.5 percent of its territory removed from Tbilisi’s jurisdiction as autonomous units of different levels, responded painfully to the process and the results. Archival materials show that it was a well-planned project; as soon as Soviet power was estab- lished in Georgia, the military attaché at Soviet Russia’s diplomatic mission in Tbilisi advised the central government “to set up in Georgia the largest possible number of autonomous units depending on Russia so as to prevent a flare up of the independence struggle in Georgia.”24 After Soviet power had been established in Georgia, the Caucasian Bureau at first agreed to set up an Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic with a population of barely 250 thousand (legally equal to the Ukrainian S.S.R. with a population of 40 million). Several months later, however, the Kremlin realized that the Abkhazian S.S.R. with a titular population of about 60 thousand would have been too small and that it would serve as a precedent for all other much larger North Caucasian and Volga area peoples. On 16 December, 1921, under a special decree, Abkhazia became part of Georgia as a “Trea- ty Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia.” De facto it was an autonomous republic within Georgia; it was treated as such by the first Constitution of the Soviet Union of 1924.25 In 1931, it became the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. It should be said that the Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic adopted shortly before Sovietization treated Abkhazia as an autonomous unit: the public opinion of Georgia obvious- ly accepted Abkhazia’s autonomous status.

22 A. Tsutsiev, op. cit., pp. 56-59. 23 See: The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries, ed. by G. Biger, Facts-on-File, New York, 1995, pp. 300-302. 24 P. Sitin, “Doklad pravitelstvu RSFSR, 22-30 aprelia 1912,” The Central State Archives of Georgia, rec. gr. 1874, inv. 1, f. 4, Iveria-Express newspaper, 15-24 August, 1993. 25 See: Istoria Sovetskoy Konstitutsii (v dokumentakh), 1917-1956, Moscow, 1957, p. 463. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Georgians also accepted Ajaria’s autonomous status even though the Ajarians were nothing more than Georgian Muslims who had adopted Islam in the 17th-18th centuries; the Georgian leaders had to take into account the provision of the Kars Treaty regarding Ajaria’s autonomous status. An autonomous status for the Ossets, who did not form a compact group in Eastern Georgia, invited vehement discussions. Some of the republic’s Communist leaders were against it, although not because they were against the Ossets. On 27 September, 1921, the People’s Commissariat of In- ternal Affairs of the Georgian S.S.R. submitted a memorandum to the Revolutionary Committee of Georgia in which it offered demographic, economic, and geographic arguments against an autono- mous status for the Ossets26; twice as many Ossets in Georgia would be left outside the proposed au- tonomous unit; Ossetian villages were scattered across Georgia; the Ossetian population of Tbilisi was fairly large; and Ossets lived in ethnically mixed districts and in ethnically mixed families who never believed their rights to be infringed upon. In fact, the territory of the proposed autonomy pop- ulated by Ossets was economically and geographically fully integrated into Georgia with no reliable transportation routes with the other Soviet republics (the Caucasian passes remained closed for nine months out of twelve); there was not a single town or urban settlement in the territory of the proposed autonomy. The Caucasian Bureau, Stalin, and the C.C. of the Communist Party of Georgia remained deaf to the arguments. On 20 April, 1922, a South-Ossetian Autonomous Region (SOAR) appeared with its center in the Georgian settlement of Tskhinvali. The administrative border ran alongside the settle- ment, which from that time on acquired the status of a town. Between 1934 and 1961, the town was known as Stalinir instead of its historical Georgian name. The Akhalgori District with a predominantly Georgian population 30 km away from Tbilisi was included in the newly created SOAR. Nearly 100 years later, this political-geographic decision devel- oped into a serious geopolitical problem when in August 2008 Russian troops occupied the region and set up a powerful military base there. By 1923, the territorial-administrative division in the Transcaucasia, which survived until the end of the Soviet Union, was complete.

Conclusion

As British historian Geoffrey Hosking put it, “Britain had an empire, Russia was an empire.”27 This is true: the Russian Empire spread to the neighboring lands and developed as a single state with the final aim of creating a homogenous population, which proved unattainable. The Russian Transcaucasia was free from obvious separatism, yet the developing ethnoterrito- rial nationalism in the Caucasus and elsewhere sooner or later would have destroyed the multinational Empire. World War I, the fall of monarchy, and the Bolshevik revolution speeded up the Empire’s disintegration. The demographic processes in the Russian Empire and its administrative-territorial division did not leave the newly formed independent republics of the Transcaucasia a chance to follow the path of peaceful state-building, even though there were other negative factors, the discussion of which goes far beyond the limits of this article. The Empire restored with a new name—Soviet Russia—regained its zones of influence. The very special nature of Transcaucasian statehood suggested not a unitary but an ethnofederal system (the Soviet Union) and autonomous units of different levels riveted to the one-party system and the Communist Party as the only governing body.

26 See: Iz istorii vzaimootnosheniy gruzinskogo i osetinskogo narodov (Zakliuchenie komissii po izucheniiu statusa Yugo-Osetinskoy oblasti), Tsodna, Tbilisi, 1991, pp. 59-62. 27 Quoted from: Th. De Waal, op. cit., p. 37. 146 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The Caucasian Bureau of the C.C. R.C.P.(B.) had the right of decision-making on all issues of territorial delimitation inside and outside the republics within the region; potential conflicts were smoothed over to become latent conflicts. This meant that in 1920-1923 the conflicts between the Transcaucasian republics were frozen but not resolved.

Ikram AGASIEV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Research Fellow, Institute of History, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR AND THE SETTLEMENT POLICY OF CZARIST RUSSIA IN THE CAUCASUS IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY (A GERMAN COLONIZATION CASE STUDY)

Abstract

he author concentrates on the geopo- Russia’s uncompromising rival, sought ways T litical struggle for domination in the and means to check Russia’s progress in Caucasus among Russia, other region- the Caucasus. London pinned its hopes on al states, Britain, and France late in the Scottish missionaries prepared to move to 18th-first half of the 19th century. Russia, the region from Edinburgh. St. Petersburg, which had been actively involved in the Cau- likewise, looked at the Christian missionar- casus since the early 18th century, managed ies from Scotland and Basel as potential by the end of it to squeeze the Ottoman Em- social and spiritual allies in the Caucasus. pire out of the Northern Black Sea littoral and This was the rationale of the Russian Em- the Northern Caucasus. The British Empire, pire’s settlement policy in the region.

Introduction

For over one thousand years, relations between the Caucasus and Russia were shaped by socio- economic, religious, political, and ethnodemographic logic; at all times, however, the logic of geopol- itics remained important or, most likely, all-important. We all know that the science of geopolitics dates back to the latter half of the 19th century, which explains why the geopolitical factors of Russia’s imperial policies in the Caucasus in the late 18th-first half of the 19th centuries (and German colonization of the region) are poorly studied. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

We know much less about the German colonies in the Caucasus than about the other regions of mass German colonization (the Volga area, South Ukraine, the Urals, Volhynia, Siberia, Central Asia, and Altai); students of the history of German colonization in the Russian Empire have pointed to this lacuna more than once. Its geographic location made the Caucasus a bridge between Europe and Asia and between the North and the South and, as such, a center of the great powers’ political intrigues. From ancient times on, the region was and remains objectively involved in military-political expansion. Its territory was crisscrossed by trade routes (the most important of them being the Silk Road) via which the products of India, China, and other Asian countries reached Europe. This means that domination over the Cau- casus meant control of the main transportation, trade, and economic routes.

Colonization Policy of the Russian Czars up to the Mid-18th Century

In the 17th century, the Russian rulers were driven beyond the limits of their state by an ur- gent need to colonize the vast areas to the east of the main territory joined to Russia in the 16th and 17th centuries. Until the mid-18th century, however, these efforts brought no results: serfdom kept peasants tied to their landlords, who were reluctant to move to the new unfamiliar and insecure border areas. Meanwhile, economic development of the newly acquired expanse along the Volga called for capitalist relations between the landlord and those who tilled his land. Meanwhile, all regions of the vast country were to be consolidated around its European part—a task of geopolitical importance: having entrenched itself in the Volga area, Russia could increase its pressure on the Caucasus. In the early 18th century, Peter the Great nurtured the plan of ousting the Porte from the Black Sea coastal areas to gain access to the Black Sea and consolidate Russia’s position in the Caucasus. During his lifetime, Russian troops moved into the Caspian littoral; after the emperor’s death in 1725, successive palace coups distracted the Russian rulers from pursuing an active Caucasian policy, al- though they never let the region out of their sight. They merely bided their time to reapply pressure in a more favorable domestic and foreign political context in order to realize their cherished dreams. By the first third of the 18th century, Russia had entrenched itself in the Caucasian piedmont; in the 1730s, Empress Anna Ioanovna (1730-1740) allowed South Caucasian migrants (Armenians, Georgians, and practically everyone wishing to move in) to settle in the area; the newcomers were promised financial aid and free grain. Until the mid-18th century, however, everything was in vain: the subjects of the empire could not move into the vast piedmont steppes. Serfs remained tied to their landlords, while the Cossacks, well-known for their violent and rough tempers, could hardly serve as an attractive model for economic activity. The few Georgian and Armenian migrants could do noth- ing much to develop the barren lands. The Russian government had no choice but to invite foreigners to the still undeveloped lands in the Caucasian piedmont and along the Volga. By the mid-18th century, the Germans had become the most mobile nation: they migrated to Eu- ropean neighbors and other continents. However, in Russia, the memory of the atrocities of Biron, the German favorite of Anna Ioanovna, and his compatriots made the Germans unwelcome, even though Elizaveta Petrovna, who replaced Anna Ioanovna on the Russian throne, toyed with the idea of massive foreign colonization of the still vacant lands. She believed that the subjugated Slavic Balkan peoples with similar languages and similar mentalities should be preferred to other people. On 24 December, 1751, she signed a decree which offered Russian citizenship to those Serbs who would move to Rus- sia.1 The far from rational colonization policy essentially failed; foreign colonists were few and far

1 See: Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii (Laws of the Russian Empire), First edition (further PSZ-1), Vol. 12, No. 10049, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 552-558. 148 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION between: 75% of them were Moldovans, followed by Serbs (12%), who had been expected to com- prise the bulk of the migrants. Other colonists comprised a total of 13%: 6% of them being Macedo- nians, 4% Hungarians, 2% Bulgarians, and 1% Germans.2

Mass German Colonization in the Russian Empire Begins

It was under Catherine the Great (1762-1796) that foreign, including German, colonization be- gan in earnest. The Empress, well aware of the economic and geopolitical value of the empire’s recent acquisitions, paid particular attention to their economic and demographic development: “We need more people. Fill the vast wasteland with the hustle and bustle of people if you can.”3 On 4 December, 1762, as the Seven Years’ War was drawing to a close, the Empress issued a Manifesto on Permission for Foreigners, Except for Jews, to Move to and Settle in Russia and for Russian People who Escaped Abroad to Freely Return to their Fatherland.”4 It was nothing more than a succinct declaration that failed to lure potential migrants. It was followed by another document based on what the Russian diplomats stationed in Europe thought about the matter and information supplied by all sorts of recruiting agents. The Manifesto of 22 July, 1763 On Permission for All For- eigners who Come to Russia to Settle in the Gubernias of Their Choice and on Their Rights5 offered a solid legal foundation for foreign colonization in the Russian Empire. The appendix enumerated “the vacant lands suitable for settlement,” which offered the Crimea and the recently acquired south- ern gubernias along with the Lower Volga, the Urals, and Siberia for settlement.6 Both manifestos attracted a huge number of colonists. In 1763-1767, Russia received and settled about 32 thousand foreigners, mainly in the Volga area, a sure sign of skillful state policy and the efficiency of the Chan- cellery for Assisting Foreigners. On the whole, the colonization policy bore fruit even if it had nothing in common with the em- pire’s real needs and real potential. Indeed, in 10 years (between 1756 and 1766) only about 15% of the 200 thousand German émigrés went to Russia; the rest, very much as before, preferred America.7

German Colonization of the Caucasus Begins

By the late 18th century, the Russian Empire had gained a lot of strength; foreign policy came to the fore under Empress Catherine the Great, who was well aware that Russia needed access to the Black Sea. To entrench itself in the Northern Black Sea area Russia had to overpower the Sublime Porte and the Crimean Khanate, its principal ally in the region. Between 1768 and 1791, Turkey was defeat- ed in two Russo-Turkish wars; this triggered enormous geopolitical shifts in the Northern Black Sea littoral and the Caucasus when Russia moved into the vast territory between the Bug and the Dnieper, as well as into the Crimea and the Kuban area. In 1774, Russia added North Ossetia to its domains; in 1781, Digoriya; and in the 1790s, Balkaria. Under the Georgievsk Treaty of 1783, Georgia adopted

2 See: PSZ-1, Vol. 16, No. 12099, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 750-752. 3 Ibid., No. 11720, p. 45. 4 Ibid., No. 11880, pp. 126-127. 5 Ibid., pp. 313-318. 6 See: Ibid., pp. 315-316. 7 See: Vsemirnaia istoria, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1958, p. 414. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 149 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Russian protectorate, which sealed the future of the Southern Caucasus. Russia’s interests in the new domains were not limited to strategy; their economic value was no less important. The St. Petersburg Academy was asked to start scientific research of the Caucasus. Studies began in the latter half of the 18th century; from 1770 to 1808 prominent scholars of German origin—Samuel Gottlieb Gmelin, Johan Anton Güldenstädt, Julius Heinrich Klaproth, and others—individually or as members of expe- ditions collected economic and geographical information about the Caucasus.8 The results were sum- marized and became part, directly or indirectly, of the Russian colonization policy in the Caucasus. Catherine the Great understood that the newly conquered lands should be populated with people loyal to the Russian Empire. Under the pressure of European policy, the Russians had to move fast in the Northern Caucasus: in the late 18th century, Britain and France became actively involved in the geopolitical Caucasian games. Fully aware that they had come too late, the Brits and the French still wanted a toehold in the Caucasus. They argued that the Russian Empire had captured only the North Caucasian valleys, while the Ottoman Empire, reluctant to accept the loss of the territories between the mouth of the Danube and the Kuban River, was waiting for an opportune moment. In the mid-1770s, the Germans began moving to the south; in July 1785, Catherine the Great issued a new manifesto that filled in the gaps of the 1763 Manifesto.9 The Germans first moved into the Northern Caucasus where ten fortresses (which together formed the Azov-Mozdok Line) protected the newly acquired lands. Colonization proceeded at a slow pace: serfdom created a shortage of free people, which meant that a problem of state importance remained unresolved. In an effort to speed up economic development of the new territories, the gov- ernment allowed the German settlers in the Volga area to move to the Caucasian Line. Entrusted with the task of drafting a plan to move the German colonists from the Volga to the Caucasus, Prosecutor- General of the Russian Empire Prince Vyazemsky produced a report “On Resettling Colonists of the Meadow Side of the Volga to the Line Built between Mozdok and the Azov Sea,” which the Empress endorsed by a decree of 27 October, 1778.10 Progress was slow. By 1789, only 347 colonists had ar- rived from Saratov to take up residence on the Volga in the area of Starye Mazhary, and even they, just two years later, finding this area to be “inconveniently situated,”11 scattered across the towns and cities of the Caucasian Gubernia. Owing to the absence of volunteers prepared to move to the Northern Caucasus, the govern- ment, determined to colonize this geopolitically important region, had no choice but to resort to com- pulsion. A decree of 1 July, 1794 instructed the local power bodies to collect signatures from the for- eign colonists to find out who wanted to remain in the Saratov Gubernia and who was prepared to move to the Caucasus. The document warned that after specifying their preferred place of residence the colonists should not “move from their permanent residences to other places or gubernias without written permission.”12 The decree did nothing to keep the foreign colonists in the Northern Caucasus. No matter how hard Pavel I tried to attract colonists, in the 1790s the trickle remained meager. Those who came were sent to Novorossia: in 1782, there were 0.2 thousand Germans there; by the late 18th century, there were 5.5 thousands of them.13 Late in the 18th century, the czarist government issued several documents designed to encour- age foreign colonization of the Northern Caucasus which, however, were less effective than expected: until the early 19th century, there were no German colonies in the Caucasian Gubernia.

8 See: E.-M. Auch, “Nemetskie kolonisty v Zakavkazie,” in: Rossiyskie nemtsy na Donu, Kavkaze i Volge. Materi- aly rossiysko-germanskoy nauchnoy konferentsii. Anapa. 22-26 sentyabria 1994 g., Moscow, 1995, pp. 103-109. 9 See: PSZ-1, Vol. 22, No. 16223, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 426-427. 10 See: PSZ-1, Vol. 20, No. 14814, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 757-759. 11 PSZ-1, Vol. 23, No. 17230, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 537. 12 Ibidem. 13 See: V.M. Kabuzan, “Nemetskoe naselenie v Rossii v XVIII-nachale XX veka,” Voprosy istorii, No. 12, 1989, p. 23. 150 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION European Christian Missionaries in the Caucasus

German colonization of the Caucasus coincided with the second stage of massive migration of foreigners to the Russian Empire which began under Alexander I (1801-1825). The Karras colony was the first foreign colony which appeared in the Northern Caucasus. In the summer of 1801, Scottish Presbyterian missionaries Henry Brunton and Alexander Pater- son asked the Russian authorities for permission to settle in the Northern Caucasus in the fortress of Konstantinogorskaia. In 1802, they founded a colony which they called Karras. Later, common set- tlers from Scotland14 and German ecclesiastical reformers from the Saratov Gubernia15 joined them. The Scottish missionaries were attracted not only by the possibility of spreading Christianity among the mountain dwellers; they hoped to set up an outpost to promote Great Britain’s trade and political interests. The Russian royal court, however, did not regard the Scots as British spies. It was expected that they would help to popularize Christianity among the local Muslims, Buddhists, pa- gans, and Judaists, which explains the energetic measures taken by St. Petersburg to meet the Scots’ requests. The Russian Minister of Internal Affairs promptly delivered his report to Alexander I, which was endorsed on 25 November, 1802.16 Some people, however, had their doubts: General Tsitsianov thought that the missionaries were British agents determined to persuade the mountain peoples to start trading with Britain. He was convinced that the missionaries were extending material support to the locals “to gain their confidence and are very lavish with their money to this end.” The missionaries defied their own financial problems to buy better relations with the mountain peoples. Henry Brunton earned respect by his perfect knowledge of Arabic. The Gospels in the Tatar language were published in the colony’s print shop.17 General Tsitsianov explained: “They (the mis- sionaries.—Ed.) have no other aim but to win the trust of the mountain peoples with the help of Arabic and to channel their trade across the Black Sea where the Brits feel free to navigate.”18 The general was right, at least partially: the Scottish missionaries took commands from the Edin- burgh directors, received money from them, and had to obey their instructions. They tried to increase Brit- ish influence in the Northern Caucasus by preaching Protestantism among the local mountain dwellers. British diplomats closely followed the ups and downs of the relations between the czarist author- ities and the local Caucasian peoples. Early in the 19th century, British diplomats even crossed the Cau- casus under the guise of travelers or on their way home from missions abroad; they kept their eyes open and gathered information as well as they could. For example, in 1814, William Gore-Ouseley, a Brit- ish envoy to Persia, asked for permission to cross, together with his retinue, the Caucasus on the way to St. Petersburg and further on to Britain. Once in the Caucasus, he spent some time in Karras with the Scottish missionaries. According to Russian historian S. Chekmenev, “the British diplomat was lured into this far from easy, long, and inconvenient journey not by its romantic attractions. He set out on the journey with a secret assignment from his government.”19 This may at least be partially true. The Scottish missionaries were not alone; in 1821, Christian missionaries of the Basel Evangel- ical Missionary Society, Evangelical priests August Dietrich and Felician von Zaremba, applied to the Russian Minister of Internal Affairs with a “request to permit them to found colonies of pious German families beyond the Caucasus between the Black and Caspian seas and to start an academy and print shop there for the purpose of spreading the word of God in that region among the pagans and Mohammedans and to enjoy the same rights as the colony of the Scottish missionaries of the Cauca-

14 See: Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissiey (further AKAK), Arkhiv glavnogo upravleniya namestnika Kavazskogo, Published under the editorship of d.S.S. A.D. Berzhe, Vol. VII, Section XV, Kavkazskaya ob- last, No. 898, Tiflis, 1878, p. 910. 15 See: AKAK, Vol. 7, Tiflis, 1878, pp. 930-931. 16 See: AKAK, Vol. 2, Tiflis, 1868, p. 926. 17 See: I. Apukhtin, Kolonia Karras, ee proshloe i nastoiashchee, Pyatigorsk, 1903, p. 3. 18 AKAK, Vol. 2, p. 927. 19 S.A. Chekmenev, “Inostrannye poseleniya na Stavropole v kontse XVIII i v pervoy polovine XIX v.,” in Materi- aly po izucheniiu Stavropolskogo kraia, Issue 12-13, Stavropol, 1971, p. 246. Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sian Gubernia in Karras.”20 The Basel Missionary Society entrusted its missionaries with the task of spreading Christianity in the Caucasus in full accordance of the rules formulated by the Evangelical Foreign Missions Association of Great Britain. The Russian Empire, in turn, wanted the Basel mis- sionaries to settle between the Black and the Caspian Sea “to start an academy and printing shop there for the purpose of spreading the word of God in that region among the pagans and Mohammedans.” It should be said that the Basel missionaries had perfect command of Arabic, Turkish, Armenian, and Persian, which helped them in their evangelical effort among the local peoples. Operating in the Derbent-Irevan-Karabakh triangle, they gradually widened the geography of their mission: in 1829 some of them went as far as Baghdad to study Arabic and preach Christianity. General Ermolov, entrusted with military and civilian power in the Caucasus, looked askance at what the Protestant missionaries were doing in his territory. An ardent supporter of missionary activities of the Greco-Russian faith,21 he wrote to Prince Golitsyn in 1822: “I deported Scottish missionary Blair who lived among the Ingush and behaved suspiciously.” The Russian general disapproved of the Edin- burgh Missionary Society and pointed out in the same letter: “When educating young men they teach them the language of their fatherland and do not try hard enough to make them good Russian subjects… I have to admit that unwilling to acquire new preachers from among these charges I prevent the Karras colonists from taking new charges.”22 In January 1827, in response to one of the many inquiries from the capital about the causes of the colony’s disintegration, General Ermolov was extremely outspoken: “I do not regard the missionaries’ departure a great loss for the Caucasus because they demonstrated no suc- cess either in preaching Christianity or in economic activities.”23 He went on to clarify his point: “It is unacceptable, especially politically, to allow foreign missionaries to educate the local peoples.”24 Under the Law of 22 May, 1828, the Lutheran Church acquired an official status equal to that of the Russian Orthodox Church largely thanks to Frederica Louise Charlotte Wilhemina, daughter of the King of Prussia Frederick William III and wife of Russian Emperor Nicholas I. The same law ruled that all Protestant religious organizations should merge with the Lutheran Church; it was a blow to the reform movement, which deprived the continued functioning of the Scottish Christian Mission in Karras of any meaning. The Edinburgh Missionary Society, which had poured a lot of money into the Karras colony, re- fused to accept the loss of the reform mission’s outpost; it asked for a permission to transfer its lands to the Basel Missionary Society. The persistent requests of the missionaries and numerous petitions which arrived in St. Petersburg from Edinburgh were crowned with success. In 1828, the Emperor allowed the Basel missionaries to settle in the area of the Caucasian Mineral Waters if the Karras colonists agreed.25 In1828, the missionaries of the Basel Evangelical Society joined their Scottish colleagues. Late in the 1820s, disappointed with the results of their mission, the Scots started moving away from the Northern Caucasus; there were several other reasons of their pull-out. First, according to historical sources, early in the 1830s, there were nine families of baptized mountain dwellers in the Karras colony and six baptized men from Kabarda, with English and German surnames, such as Walter, Buchanan, Abercromby, Davidson, etc., married to German women.26 The locals not merely remained indifferent to Christianity, they took up arms to rebuff foreign Christian expansion; the Muslims—Nogays and Kabardins—were the most vehement opponents.27 By the 1830s, it became clear that the missionary activities of the Scots from Edinburgh had failed. Some of them, including Alexander Paterson, refused to obey the orders from the Edinburgh headquarters

20 AKAK, Vol. 6, Part I, Tiflis, 1874, p. 468. 21 See: AKAK, Vol. 7, Tiflis, 1878, p. 932. 22 AKAK, Vol. 6, Part II, Tiflis, 1875, p. 507. 23 AKAK, Vol. 7, p. 932. 24 Ibidem. 25 See: Ibid., pp. 931-932, 940-941. 26 See: E. Weindenbaum, “K istorii Shotlandskoy kolonii okolo Piatigorska,” Izvestia Kavkazskogo otdela Imper- skogo russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva (IKOIRGO), Vol. VII, No. 1, 1881, pp. 170-174. 27 See: AKAK, Vol. 5, Tiflis, 1873, p. 909. 152 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and served Russia. His services were lavishly rewarded with the inheritance of 1,000 desyatins of land in Karras. Edinburgh, which had been supervising the Karras missionaries for about 30 years, was furious. It should be said that the Russian officials were just as displeased with the Basel missionaries. On 10 January, 1835 Baron Rosen reported: “I think that the Basel missionaries are even more harm- ful than the Scots: they do not set up colonies, they do not convert the Mohammedans and pagans (what they planned to do and for which they asked permission); instead they act on the sly among the Armenians, distribute their translations among them, and lure them to their schools. During the thir- teen years they have been in the Caucasus, they have not only failed to set up colonies, they have not converted a single pagan or Mohammedan to Christianity.”28 In 1835, the Cabinet of Ministers of Russia banned the missionary activities of foreign religious societies; they could be involved only in agriculture, industry, and handicrafts.29 According to T. Pla- khotnyuk, the Russian government banned the missionary activities of the Scots suspected of spying in favor of Great Britain; the author proceeds from the suspicions of Prince Tsitsianov.30 It seems that the ban was caused by much weightier arguments. What the foreign Christian mis- sions were doing in the Caucasus did not tally with Russia’s Christianization policy there and failed to bring the desired results. This convinced the imperial powers that since the Edinburgh and Basel mis- sionaries proved to be unable to spread Christianity in the newly captured lands their continued presence in the Caucasus was useless; it was decided to set up a society for promoting Orthodox Christianity.31

Conclusion

In the late 18th century and first half of the 19th century, Russia’s settlement policy in the Cau- casus served an important geopolitical aim: to tie the Caucasus to Russia in order to make it an inal- ienable part of the Russian Empire. Britain and France deemed it necessary to join the geopolitical struggle in the Caucasus in the late 18th century. With no colonies in the Caucasus and no common borders, these powers had to rely on their relations with Russia, which had already achieved domina- tion. Britain was especially concerned about the state of affairs: London was convinced that “savage” and “despotic” Russia should drop its claims to the region. What caused this negative yet completely justified response of the Brits to Russia’s Caucasian conquests? Britain, France, and other states were concerned about Russia’s acquisitions because this tipped the balance of power. After coming to the Caucasus, Russia could have spread its control to Western Asia and Iran. London was convinced that Russia’s claims to the Caucasus were unjustified because “barbarian Russia could not civilize the Caucasian peoples and plant liberal-democratic val- ues among them. ‘The burden of the white man’ in the Caucasus was Britain’s duty.”32 Both Britain and Russia relied on the Edinburgh and Basel missionaries. We can say that Britain failed to achieve its geopolitical aims in the Caucasus by means of the European Christian missionaries. The Russian government, likewise, failed to acquire firm support in the Caucasus; it went on with its military- political expansion and demonstrated much more cruelty when confronted by the armed riots of the mountain peoples. Britain was waiting for the opportunity to change the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus in its favor and never abandoned the idea of revenge until the Crimean War.

28 AKAK, Vol. 8, Tiflis, 1881, p. 320. 29 See: Ibid., p. 321. 30 See: E. Weindenbaum, op. cit., p. 173. 31 See: AKAK, Vol. 8, pp. 256, 320. 32 A.V. Fadeev, Rossia i Kavkaz v pervoy treti XIX veka, Moscow, 1960, p. 103.