Colombia: Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCSD) 2007
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POLICY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC SECURITY PCSD(PCSD) Ministry of National Defense Republic of Colombia Overall Coordination Ministry of National Defense Design and Diagramming Adriana Marcela Ruiz Printing Imprenta Nacional de Colombia 2007 Ministry of National Defense Juan Manual Santos Calderon – Minister of Defense Juan Carlos Pinzon – Vice Minister for Strategy and Planning Sergio Jaramillo Caro – Vice Minister for International Policy and Affairs Luis Manual Neira Nunez – Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense Armed Forces General Fredy Padilla de Leon – General Commander of the Armed Forces General Mario Montoya Uribe – Army Commander Admiral Guillermo Barrera Hurtado – Navy Commander General Jorge Ballesteros Rodriguez – Air Force Commander National Police General Oscar Naranjo – Director General of the National Police POLICY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC SECURITY PCSD 5 his document on the Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCDS) has been prepared by Tthe Ministry of Defense as part of the National De- velopment Plan 2006-2010 “Community State: Develop- ment for Everyone.” The document describes the strate- gic objectives that will receive the focus of each one of the institutions in the defense sector. TABLE OF CCONTENTS Presentation ............................................................ 9 1. Introduction ..........................................................15 2. New strategic scenario .........................................19 3. Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Security (PCDS) .....................................................25 3.1 Principles for implementation ................................................ 27 3.2 Strategic objectives ............................................................... 29 3.2.1 To consolidate territorial control and strengthen the rule of law across the entire national territory. ............................... 29 3.2.1.1 Strategy for the consolidation of territorial control ..... 30 3.2.1.2 Development of the Integrated Action Doctrine (DAI) .. 33 3.2.2 To protect the public and hold on to strategic initiative against all threats to citizen security. ...................................... 34 3.2.3 To drastically raise the cost of trafficking drugs in Colombia. .. 36 3.2.4 To keep our public security forces modern and effective, with a high level of legitimacy based on public confidence and support. ........................................................................ 38 3.2.4.1 Strengthened capabilities in the public security forces . 38 3.2.4.2 Structural reforms..................................................... 40 3.2.5 To maintain the downward trend in all crime rates in the country’s urban centers. ........................................................ 41 3.2.5.1 Citizen security strategy ............................................. 42 3.3 International initiative ........................................................... 43 3.4 Plans, programs, and initiatives ............................................. 45 POLICY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC SECURITY Presentation PBY MINISTER OF DEFENSE, JUAN MANUEL SANTOS n modern day societies it is clear that security is not an end in itself, but serves rather as a foundation for Ibuilding a future with progress and social justice. From the very first day, the main goal of President Al- varo Uribe’s government has been to make Colombia safer, free from threats to its citizens’ security, where legitimate government authority can promote the eco- 9 nomic and social development of all Colombians. These goals for the 2002-2006 period were outlined in the Democratic Defense and Security Policy and deve- loped by the Ministry of Defense and the public security forces. The policy’s main objective was to recover state control over the majority of the national territory, particularly areas affected by the activity of illegal armed groups and drug traffickers. The results by the end of the first term were decisive. Colombians enjoyed huge improvements in security, and improved security brought with it significant increases in investor confidence and quality of life. From 2002 to 2006, to cite just a few indicators, we were able to reduce the number of homicides by 40%, the number of kidnappings for extortion by 83%, the MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE number of victims from collective homicides by 72%, terrorist attacks by 61%, and kidnappings at illegal roadblocks by 99%. By the start of Uribe’s second term on August 7, 2006, as is normal in every dynamic process, many things had changed. The different actors threatening society began to adapt to the new circumstances, making it necessary for the government to respond by changing the emphasis and parameters under which it had been operating. For example, with the demobilization of the illegal self- defense groups and the beginning of the application of the Justice and Peace Law, the Colombian paramilitary phenomenon came to an end. Nevertheless, once the demobilization of close to 32,000 members of parami- litary groups and their leaders had taken place, criminal bands closely tied to drug trafficking emerged in some of their former zones of influence, requiring a new stra- tegy. Meanwhile, the FARC recognized it could not engage in a war of movements, and was forced to return to 10 guerrilla warfare with its sporadic ambushes, quick es- capes, and terrorism. Drug traffickers also transformed their business in order to adapt to the government’s ambitious anti-narcotic strategy. They switched from large plantations of illicit crops to small parcels in difficult to access sites with the coca hidden under legitimate crops. In brief, after four years, the Democratic Defense and Security Policy needed adaptation to the new strategic scenario. Its initial objective of territorial control by the public security forces gave way to the goal of social re- covery of that territory through integrated state action. The Ministry of Defense undertook a rigorous analysis of these developments, with the active participation of the Armed Forces General Commander, the Comman- ders of the different Armed Forces, the Director Gene- ral of the National Police, and high-level officers at the Armed Forces and Police. The resulting adjustments are contained in the Policy for the Consolidation of De- POLICY FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC SECURITY mocratic Security (PCDS). This policy has been imple- mented since the beginning of President Uribe’s second administration and is described in this document. We have already gained control of the vast majority of our national territory. Now we must consolidate that control, meaning that, in addition to the presence of the public security forces, we must bring in the diverse institutions and agencies that provide every type of go- vernment service. A return of institutionality will bring a definitive end to the isolation to which many zones of the country had been condemned by the violence they experienced. The Policy for the Consolidation of Democratic Secu- rity will bring that institutionality back to the country through its five strategic objectives, broken down into 28 plans, programs, and initiatives led by executive managers who will follow-up, supervise, and measure results. This policy is a mandate from the President of the Repu- blic and the Ministry of Defense establishing priorities, criteria, and instructions on how efforts by the Armed Forces and the National Police are to be organized as 11 they fulfill their constitutional mission during the second administration of President Uribe. It is, in synthesis, Colombia’s national defense policy for the 2006-2010 period. The PCDS includes new elements such as a three-phase strategy to consolidate territory in different areas in the country according to the individual security characte- ristics. This means that military operations and police presence will be more or less intense according to the presence and threat of illegal armed groups, drug tra- ffickers, and criminal bands, until normal activity by all government institutions can be guaranteed. Another new element is the Integrated Action Doctri- ne, which is a methodology for consolidating territorial control that prescribes combining the legitimate use of force with state and community social action. Members of the security forces apply principles and protocols for proper coordination with representatives of other go- vernment institutions. MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The public security forces will work together closely with the Center for the Coordination of Integrated Ac- tion (CCAI for its Spanish initials), in places where that agency is present. When not present, the public secu- rity forces will work directly with local authorities and state agencies in the area, coordinating social work that will satisfy the most urgent needs of the people. To adapt to the new dynamics for illicit crops, we will put greater emphasis on manual eradication as an im- portant aspect in the fight against drug trafficking. The advantage of manual eradication is its precision com- bined with durable effects. We will not give up on ae- rial spraying, however, but will continue to use it when warranted by the circumstances and the size of the plantations. If criminals change, then the strategies to fight them must also change, and that is why the notion of flexibili- ty will be one of this policy’s guiding principles. Special attention will also be given to improving urban security. Urban security