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Konsernstyring I Aksjeselskapsretten Konsernstyring i aksjeselskapsretten Funksjonsfordelingen og ansvarsreguleringen Kandidatnummer: 212 Leveringsfrist: 15. januar 2013 Antall ord: 38 385 I INNHOLDSFORTEGNELSE 1 INNLEDNING.............................................................................................................. 1 1.1 Tema .............................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Rettskilder .................................................................................................................... 4 1.2.1 Aksjelovene............................................................................................................ 4 1.2.2 Forarbeider ............................................................................................................. 5 1.2.3 Etterarbeider ........................................................................................................... 5 1.2.4 Rettspraksis ............................................................................................................ 6 1.2.5 Utenlandsk rett ....................................................................................................... 6 1.3 Aksjelovenes fravikelighet........................................................................................... 6 1.4 Interesser ...................................................................................................................... 7 1.5 Konsernbegrepet .......................................................................................................... 9 1.6 Terminologi ................................................................................................................ 10 1.7 Struktur ...................................................................................................................... 11 2 KONSERNSTYRING................................................................................................ 13 2.1 Hvorfor konsern? ....................................................................................................... 13 2.2 Konserntypologi ......................................................................................................... 14 2.3 Organisering av konsern ........................................................................................... 15 2.3.1 Konsernstyret ....................................................................................................... 16 2.3.2 Konsernsjefen ...................................................................................................... 17 2.3.3 Konsernledelsen ................................................................................................... 19 2.4 Utgangspunktet: Datterselskapets selvstendighet ................................................... 19 II 2.5 Konsernstyring gjennom datterselskapets generalforsamling .............................. 20 2.5.1 Oversikt og utgangspunkter ................................................................................. 20 2.5.2 Beslutninger i strid med aksjelovenes kompetansefordeling ............................... 22 2.5.3 Beslutninger i strid med preseptorisk lovgivning ................................................ 26 2.5.4 Beslutninger i strid med selskapets vedtekter ...................................................... 29 2.5.5 Beslutninger i strid med funksjonsfordelingen .................................................... 30 2.5.6 Beslutninger utenfor generalforsamlingen ........................................................... 40 2.5.7 Beslutningsprosessen i heleide datterselskaper ................................................... 44 2.6 Konsernstyringsavtaler ............................................................................................. 49 2.7 Datterselskapsstyrets rolle ........................................................................................ 56 2.8 Konsernenhetstanken – grunnlag for en utvidet eierstyringsadgang? ................. 63 2.8.1 Problemstillingen ................................................................................................. 63 2.8.2 Konsernbegrepet .................................................................................................. 64 2.8.3 Konserninterne transaksjoner............................................................................... 65 2.8.4 Konsernbidrag ...................................................................................................... 68 2.8.5 Konsernunntaket og konsernkontoordninger ....................................................... 69 2.8.6 Opplysningsplikter i konsernforhold ................................................................... 71 2.8.7 Ansatterepresentasjon i konsernforhold ............................................................... 74 2.8.8 Konsernenhetstanken i rettspraksis ...................................................................... 76 2.8.9 Avveining og konklusjon ..................................................................................... 81 2.9 Oppsummering ........................................................................................................... 84 3 ANSVARSREGULERINGEN .................................................................................. 87 3.1 Oversikt og utgangspunkter ..................................................................................... 87 3.2 Aksjelovene § 17-1...................................................................................................... 89 3.2.1 Morselskapets selvstendige ansvar ...................................................................... 89 3.2.2 Morselskapets medvirkeransvar........................................................................... 90 III 3.3 Selskapsrettslig ansvarsgjennombrudd ................................................................... 97 3.3.1 Oversikt og utgangspunkter ................................................................................. 97 3.3.2 Ansvarsgjennombrudd i konsernforhold............................................................ 100 3.3.3 Sammenblanding mellom selskapene ................................................................ 106 3.4 Oppsummering ......................................................................................................... 110 4 AVSLUTTENDE SYNSPUNKTER ....................................................................... 112 5 LITTERATUR OG REGISTRE ............................................................................ 118 1 1 Innledning 1.1 Tema Et aksjeselskap er et selvstendig rettssubjekt. Dette gjelder også når selskapet har en eneaksjeeier eller en hovedaksjeeier. Det enkelte aksjeselskaps selvstendighet er ansett som et grunnleggende utgangspunkt i aksjeselskapsretten. Samtidig vil et konsern ofte drives som «…en økonomisk og organisasjonsmessig enhet hvor det vil være en målsetting å utnytte konsernets samlede ressurser optimalt».1 Dette gir grunnlag for en spenning i aksje- selskapsretten mellom utgangspunktet om det enkelte aksjeselskaps selvstendighet på den ene siden, og tanken om konsernet som en økonomisk og organisatorisk enhet på den andre siden. Spenningen skaper særlige selskapsrettslige utfordringer, som kan illustreres med denne uttalelsen i Aksjelovutvalgets utredning: Spennet mellom konsernet som en økonomisk og organisasjonsmessig enhet på den ene siden og konsernselskapene som rettslige selvstendige enheter på den andre siden er problematisk for selskapsretten. På den ene siden bør det ikke stenges for den økonomiske og organisasjonsmessige realiteten, og lovgivningen bør innenfor visse grenser legge forholdene til rette for samordning og styring av konsernet. På den andre siden må aksjeselskapslovgivningen også ha regler som verner om det enkelte konsernselskaps og dets kreditorers særinteresser.2 Konserner er komplekse fenomener, og konsernstyring er et fasettert begrep. Gransknings- kommisjonen som ble nedsatt i forbindelse med UNI Storebrand-konsernets mislykkede oppkjøp av Skandia, sa det treffende i sin rapport: «En organisasjon er en levende og kompleks organisme med formelle og uformelle strukturer, ulike mennesker, ansvars- områder, holdninger og erfaringer».3 Morselskapet vil kunne styre konsernet ved hjelp av 1 NOU 1996:3 s. 87. 2 NOU 1996:3 s. 86. 3 NOU 1994:7 s. 20. 2 en rekke ulike styringsinstrumenter, både formelle og uformelle. I det aktuelle konsernet ble et «konsern er større enn selskap»-prinsipp gjort gjeldende.4 Prinsippet gir uttrykk for tanken om konsernet som en økonomisk og organisatorisk enhet. Andre har lansert begrep- ene konsernautoritet, konsernbevissthet og konsernlojalitet,5 som viser at aksjelov- givningen og de rettslige styringsinstrumentene kun er én del av et sammensatt bilde. Uformell konsernstyring er utvilsomt av stor betydning i næringslivet. Det er et sentralt poeng at morselskapet, som ene- eller hovedaksjeeier, i egenskap av datterselskapets generalforsamling i alminnelighet har rett til å velge et flertall av styremedlemmene i datterselskapets styre (aksjelovene § 6-3). Det er i utgangspunktet i tråd med aksjelovene at den eller de aksjeeiere som har flertallet på generalforsamlingen velger «sine» folk inn i styret. Det er ofte et betydelig personsammenfall mellom morselskapet og datterselskapets styre, ved at aksjonærer, styremedlemmer og ansatte i morselskapet bekler styrevervene i datterselskapet. Styret i datterselskapet kan slik fungere som morselskapets «forlengede arm» i datterselskapet.6
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