SUPPORT DE COURS DE SÉCURITÉ INFORMATIQUE ET CRYPTO. Raphael Yende

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SUPPORT DE COURS DE SÉCURITÉ INFORMATIQUE ET CRYPTO. Raphael Yende SUPPORT DE COURS DE SÉCURITÉ INFORMATIQUE ET CRYPTO. Raphael Yende To cite this version: Raphael Yende. SUPPORT DE COURS DE SÉCURITÉ INFORMATIQUE ET CRYPTO.. Master. Congo-Kinshasa. 2018. cel-01965300 HAL Id: cel-01965300 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/cel-01965300 Submitted on 25 Dec 2018 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. SUPPORT DE COURS DE SECURITE INFORMATIQUE ET CRYPTO. YENDE RAPHAEL Grevisse, Ph.D. Docteur en Télécoms et Réseaux Inf. Cours dispensé aux Facultés Africaine BAKHITA en Première Licence : Réseaux informatiques. ©YENDE R.G., 2018 1 BIBLIOGRAPHIE . Jain, R. M. Bolle, S. Pankanti, “Biometrics: Personal Identification in Networked Society” , Kluwer Academic Press, 1998. R.M. Bolle, J.H. Connell, S. Pankanti, N.K. Ratha, A.W. Senior, “Guide to Biometrics”, Springer-Verlag, New York, 2004 . D. Maltoni, D. Maio, A.K. Jain, S. Prabhakar, “Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition”, Springer-Verlag, New York, 2003. H. NSENGE MPIA, « Sécurité Informatique », Institut Supérieur Emmanuel d‟Alzon / Butembo, cours inédit, 2017. LESCOP Yves, « Sécurité Informatique», 2002 . Simon Singh, « Histoire des codes secrets », JC Latt_es _editeur, 1999. Claude Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication”, Bell system technical journal, 1948. Touradj Ibrahimi, Franck Leprevost, Bertrand Warusfel, « Enjeux de la sécurité multimedia », Hermès Science Lavoisier, 2006 . Laurent BLOCH et Christophe WOLFHUGEL, « Sécurité informatique. Principes et méthode à l'usage des DSI, RSSI et administrateurs », 2e édition, Eyrolles, Paris, 2009. Mark Allen Ludwig, « Naissance d'un virus : Technologie et principes fondamentaux », Diff. Bordas, 1993, 47 p . Peter Szor, “The Art of Computer Virus Research and Defense”, Addison-Wesley Professional, 2005, 744 p . J. Dressler, “Cases and Materials on Criminal Law”, Thomson/West, 2007 « United States v. Morris » . Greg Hoglund et James Butler; « Rootkits : infiltrations du noyau Windows », Paris, Campus Press, 2006 (1re éd. 2005), 338 p. Ric Vieler, “Professional rootkits, Indianapolis, IN, Wiley/Wrox, coll. « Wrox professional guides »”, 2007, 334 p. William Stallings, “Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice”, 3eme ed. Prentice Hall, 2003. 1 Cours de Sécurité Informatique & Crypto. / Dr. YENDE RAPHAEL Grevisse. PhD 2 TABLE DES MATIERES BIBLIOGRAPHIE ................................................................................... 1 TABLE DES MATIERES ........................................................................... 2 AVERTISSEMENTS ................................................................................. 8 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 9 OBJECTIFS DU COURS ........................................................................ 10 PREMIER CHAPITRE – GENERALITES SUR LA SECURITTE INFORMATIQUE ................................................................................... 11 I.1. DEFINITION & CONTEXTE D’ETUDES .............................................. 11 I.2. ETUDES DES RISQUES LIES A LA SECURITE INFORMATIQUE .......... 12 I.2.1. TYPOLOGIE DES RISQUES INFORMATIQUES................................ 14 A. RISQUES HUMAINS .......................................................................... 14 B. RISQUES MATERIELS ........................................................................ 15 I.2.2. GESTION DES RISQUES INFORMATIQUES .................................... 16 A. ETUDIER LES RISQUES POTENTIELS ............................................... 16 B. IMPOSER DES RÈGLES DE SÉCURITÉ ADÉQUATES ........................... 17 C. FORMATION DES UTILISATEURS ..................................................... 18 I.3. ETABLISSEMENT ET ELEMENTS D’UNE POLITIQUE DE SECURITE INFORMATIQUE .................................................................................. 19 I.4. PRINCIPAUX DEFAUTS DE SECURITE INFORMATIQUE ................. 21 DEUXIEME CHAPITRE – FAILLES LA SECURITTE SUR INTERNET ET MODE DE PIRATERIE ......................................................................... 22 II.1. DÉFINITION DES FAILLES SUR L’INTERNET .................................. 22 II.2. PRINCIPALES ATTAQUES INFORMATIQUES ................................ 24 II.2.1. LES LOGICIELS MALVEILLANTS ................................................. 24 II.2.2. LES VIRUS INFORMATIQUES ..................................................... 26 II.2.2.1. BREF HISTORIQUE .................................................................. 27 2 Cours de Sécurité Informatique & Crypto. / Dr. YENDE RAPHAEL Grevisse. PhD 3 II.2.2.2. CARACTERISTIQUES DES VIRUS .............................................. 28 II.2.2.3. CLASSIFICATION DES VIRUS ................................................... 28 II.2.2.4. ARCHITECTURE D’UN VIRUS ................................................. 31 II.2.2.5. MODE DE CONTAMINATION D’UN VIRUS ............................ 33 II.2.2.5. CYCLE DE VIE D'UN VIRUS ..................................................... 33 II.2.3. LES VERS INFORMATIQUES ....................................................... 34 II.2.3.1. BREF HISTORIQUE .................................................................. 36 II.2.3.2. CARACTERISTIQUE D’UN VER INFORMATIQUE ..................... 36 II.2.3.3. CLASSIFICATION D’UN INFORMATIQUE ................................ 36 V.2.3.4. ARCHITECTURE D’UN VER INFORMATIQUE ......................... 37 II.2.3.5. MODE DE REPRODUCTION D’UN VER ................................... 38 II.2.4. LE CHEVAL DE TROIE ............................................................... 39 II.2.4.1. BREF HISTORIQUE ................................................................... 41 II.2.4.2. MANIFESTIONS D'UNE INFECTION PAR UN CHEVAL DE TROIE ............................................................................................................ 41 II.2.5. LES ROOTKITS ........................................................................... 42 II.2.5.1. TYPES DES ROOTKITS ............................................................. 43 II.2.5.2. MODE OPERATOIRE D’UN ROOTKIT .................................... 44 II.2.6. LES PORTES DEROBEES ............................................................ 46 II.2.6.1. TECHNIQUES UTILISEES .......................................................... 46 II.3. ESPIONNAGE INFORMATIQUE .................................................... 47 II.3.1. L’HOMME DU MILIEU ................................................................ 47 II.3.2. LES ESPIOGICIELS ..................................................................... 48 II.3.2.1. VECTEURS D'INFECTION ........................................................ 48 II.3.2.2. MODE OPÉRATOIRE DES LOGICIELS ESPIONS ....................... 49 II.3.2.3. PRÉVENTION CONTRE LES LOGICIELS ESPIONS .................... 50 II.3.2.4. LOGICIELS ANTI-ESPIONS ...................................................... 50 II.3.3. LES COOKIES .............................................................................. 51 II.3.3.1. UTILISATIONS DES COOKIES ................................................... 52 II.3.3.2. INCONVENIENTS DES COOKIES .............................................. 53 3 Cours de Sécurité Informatique & Crypto. / Dr. YENDE RAPHAEL Grevisse. PhD 4 TROISIEME CHAPITRE – SYSTEMES DE PROTECTION INFORMATIQUE ........................................................................................................... 56 III.1. LES ANTI-VIRUS .......................................................................... 56 III.1.1. FONCTIONNEMENT DE L’ANTI-VIRUS ...................................... 57 III.1.2. TECHNIQUES DE DETECTION DES ANTI-VIRUS ........................ 58 III.2. LES SYSTEMES DE DETECTION D’INTRUSION .............................. 59 III.2.1. TYPOLOGIE DE SYSTÈMES DE DÉTECTION D'INTRUSION ......... 59 III.2.1.1. LES NIDS (IDS réseau) ............................................................. 60 DIFFERENTES TECHNIQUES DES NIDS ................................................. 61 III.2.1.2. LES HIDS (IDS machine) ......................................................... 62 III.2.1.3. LES IDS hybride ...................................................................... 63 III.2.2. TECHNIQUES D’ANALYSE DU TRAFIC DES IDS ........................ 63 III.2.3. LA CORRÉLATION DES IDS HYBRIDE ...................................... 64 III.2.4. L'HARMONISATION DES FORMATS ......................................... 65 III.2.5. LA CONTRE-MESURE DES IDS HYBRIDE .................................. 65 III.3. LES FIREWALLS (PARE-FEU) ...................................................... 66 III.3.1. PRINCIPES DE FONCTIONNEMENT DES PARE-FEUX ............... 68 III.3.2. CATEGORIES DE PARE-FEU ..................................................... 72 QUATRIEME CHAPITRE - ADMINISTRATION D’ACCES AUX DONNEES INFORMATIQUES ............................................................................... 75 IV.1. MODÈLE DE LAMPSON ............................................................... 75 IV.2. MÉTHODES
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