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Peace Talks in the Philippines: Ways out of the Impasse. National Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m Peace Talks in the Philippines: Ways out of the Impasse SWP Co SWP National Reforms Needed to End Local Conflict in Mindanao Jasmin Lorch Peace negotiations between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Libera- tion Front (MILF) have reached an impasse. The longer the peace process drags on with- out the government being able to make the independence movement any substantial concessions, the greater the risk of fragmentation and radicalisation of the MILF-led insurgency in Mindanao. Many of the obstacles to a peace treaty are structural in nature however. This includes constitutional hurdles that make it practically impos- sible to establish a largely autonomous administrative entity for the Muslim popula- tion – the Moros – in Mindanao. These difficulties are compounded by grave deficits in the Philippine security sector that encourage the activities of private and state-backed militias. Constitutional change and security sector reforms are therefore central to ending the conflict. So far, Germany and the EU have supported the peace process primarily through development cooperation. Apart from this, they should also work to promote relevant national reforms and coordinate these with the peace process. Peace talks between the Philippine gov- current round of talks under President ernment and the MILF were cut short on Benigno S. Aquino III began in early 2011. 23 August 2011 after Manila offered the In February 2011 the MILF demanded rebels limited political autonomy. The MILF the establishment of a “sub-state” where has been fighting for Moro self-determina- the Moros could run their internal affairs tion since the late 1970s, and its approxi- themselves, leaving the central govern- mately twelve thousand fighters currently ment responsible only for external rela- control a considerable swathe of territory tions, national defence, currency and on the island group of Mindanao. Since postal services. Conceding such far-reach- 1997 various Philippine governments have ing autonomy would require turning the conducted Malaysian-mediated peace talks unitary Philippine state into a federal with the MILF, and a cease-fire agreed in system of government, which would only 2003 has largely held until today. The be possible if the constitution was changed. Jasmin Lorch is a Doctoral Fellow at the SWP’s Asia Division SWP Comments 27 September 2011 1 Manila’s latest offer, in contrast, pro- significantly. Apart from beefed-up U.S. poses resolving the conflict within the counter-terrorism assistance in Mindanao framework of the present constitution, after 9/11, this is also quite tangibly an promising the MILF massive efforts to boost outcome of previous peace talks. The 2002 economic development and enhance gov- round of negotiations, for instance, estab- ernance in the Moro territories – including lished the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao which brings together members of the (ARMM) established in 1989 – as well as Philippine army and police with MILF recognition of the cultural identity of the representatives in a mechanism that allows Moros. The MILF’s emphatic rejection of both sides to take coordinated action this proposal constitutes a severe setback against criminals and terrorists. In 2005 the for the peace process. AHJAG was instrumental in the initiative to drive then ASG chief Khadaffy Janjalani and JI leaders Umar Patek and Dulmatin out of Risk of Fragmentation and mainland Mindanao. Conversely, the MILF Radicalisation of the Insurgency has so far maintained its links to terrorist The MILF explicitly pursues the realisation groups mainly because of the experience of of an Islamic way of life. It is not a terror- repeated disappointment in the peace talks ist organisation, however, and many of its with the government. goals are primarily ethno-nationalist in As the experience of the past shows, nature. Especially the current leadership the longer the peace process drags on and around Al Haj Murad Ibrahim is regarded the less able the government is to offer as moderate. Nevertheless, individual MILF substantial concessions to the Moro rebels, commanders are known to have repeatedly the greater the risk of fragmentation and cooperated with national and international radicalisation of the MILF-led insurgency. In terrorist organisations since the early 2008, for instance, under President Gloria 1990s. Macapagal-Arroyo, the parties negotiated One of these is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral a Philippine terrorist group founded in Domain (MOA-AD), which provided for a 1991 with the support of al-Qaeda that has largely autonomous administrative entity carried out numerous attacks on national for the Moros to be set up within the Philip- targets and U.S. military facilities in the pine state, but opponents of the President country. Members of this group are known and Christian politicians from Mindanao to have found refuge in MILF camps. Sim- filed a petition against the agreement with ilarly, fighters belonging to the Indonesian the Supreme Court. In August 2008, the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah court placed a moratorium on the MOA-AD (JI), whose attacks include the 2002 Bali and later declared it unconstitutional. In bombings and the 2004 Australian embassy response to the moratorium individual bombing in Jakarta, could train in MILF MILF commanders, including Ameril camps, while top JI leaders like Umar Patek Umbra Kato (Commander Kato, leader of and Dulmatin have found refuge in areas 105th Base Command), attacked Christian controlled by the Moro rebels. The MILF communities in Mindanao. Clashes cooperates with such terrorist organisa- between government forces and MILF tions largely for tactical reasons. For in- splinter groups forced more than half a stance, transnational terrorist groups have million to flee their homes. provided the insurgents with access to The current peace talks between the funds and training. Aquino government and the MILF have But in comparison to the 1990s the cemented the rupture between Commander threat posed by Islamist terrorism in Kato and the MILF Central Committee. Kato, the southern Philippines has declined who is known for his extremist beliefs, SWP Comments 27 September 2011 2 rejects the “sub-state” formula advocated switching seamlessly from the post of by the current MILF leadership and instead president to that of prime minister in demands an independent Islamic state for a new parliamentary government. the Moros. His Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom The MOA-AD of 2008 brought Arroyo’s Movement (BIMF) currently numbers a few government very close to a peace treaty hundred former MILF fighters, and credible with the MILF, but the opposition blocked reports suggest that Kato is one of the (ex- the constitutional change required for its )MILF commanders who maintain especially implementation fearing that this would close contacts to international terrorist allow Arroyo to consolidate her grip on groups like the JI. If the current round of power. If President Aquino were to propose peace talks were to fail or the MILF leader- constitutional reforms at this stage he ship were to accept a strongly curtailed would probably find himself confronted autonomy, more MILF fighters could be with similar accusations. expected to join the BIMF. This could boost terrorist tendencies in Mindanao again. The Role of Militias in Mindanao The pervasive violence in Mindanao is Debates about Charter Change caused not only by insurgent organisa- Emmanuel Piñol, former governor of North tions like the MILF but also in large part Cotabato province in Mindanao, announced by militias aligned with the state security in August 2011 that he would ask the Su- apparatus. Many of these paramilitary preme Court to review the constitutionality units provide personal security for business- of the MILF’s “sub-state” proposal as the people, politicians and clans, and have latter was still based on the failed MOA-AD mutated into the latter’s private armies of 2008. But if the constitution were to be over the course of time. changed in a political process that observed Clashes between armed political clans the mechanisms of charter change laid have always played an important role in the down in the constitution itself it would conflict in Mindanao. Successive national definitely be possible to establish a largely governments have deliberately reinforced autonomous administrative entity for the the power of such local clans, profiting in Moros in Mindanao. Under present circum- return from their patronage networks at stances it is, however, likely to be extremely election time. The violent potential of pro- difficult to carry through such a constitu- government clans and militias in Mindanao tional reform. was demonstrated by the Maguindanao The constitution of 1987 restricts the massacre in November 2009. In order to president to a single six-year tenure, prevent an opponent from standing for designed to prevent any repetition of a the post of governor, members of the dictatorship like the one of Ferdinand Ampatuan clan had fifty-seven people Marcos (1965–1986). Aquino’s predecessor murdered in broad daylight by their private Arroyo, who became embroiled in numer- army. In 2004 politicians from the same ous corruption scandals while in office clan had helped to falsify the presidential (2001 to 2010), came to power in 2001
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