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The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines

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The Demise of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southern Philippines JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 The Demise of the Abu Special Forces have rotated in and out Current State of the ASG of the southern Philippines where they While a handful of press reports4 and Sayyaf Group in the provide training and intelligence for analysts5 asserted that the ASG had Southern Philippines their AFP counterparts. appointed the Middle East-trained Yasser Igasan as their new leader, there By Zachary Abuza The capture and killing of several ASG was no evidence to support this claim. leaders in 2002 actually had a backlash: Igasan had been in Saudi Arabia since since launching a major offensive Janjalani’s younger brother, Khadaffy, 2001 studying religion and fundraising against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in consolidated a degree of power and for Moro causes. An April 2008 press August 2006, the Armed Forces of the re-oriented the group back toward its report from the Philippines later denied Philippines (AFP) have dealt the group ideological principles. At the same that Igasan had become the group’s a number of crippling blows. While time, the members of the Indonesian- new chieftain, and Philippine security members of the ASG are still at large, the officials acknowledged that the ASG frequency and lethality of their attacks “Fleeing the authorities “haven’t been able to come up with a have dropped precipitously since the single, influential leader who can unite first quarter of 2007, when several top and short of funds, the the different factions.”6 Some of the commanders were killed. The ASG lack ASG is a diminished remaining ASG leaders still at large any semblance of central leadership include: at this point. Indeed, their continued terrorist threat.” existence seems to be more due to the - Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, alias Salahuddin AFP’s failings than to any concerted or Abu Mus`ab effort to regroup. Moreover, the ASG - Radullan Sahiron, alias Kumander Putol appears short on financial resources dominated terrorist organization, - Umbra Abu Jumdail, alias Dr. Abu Pula and has reverted back to spates of Jemaah Islamiyah, based in MILF - Albader Parad kidnappings for ransom, effectively camps, established ties with the ASG. - Osman, alias Usman or Rizal jettisoning what little ideological By 2003, all kidnappings had ceased, - Gumbahali Jumdail pretensions the group ever had. and starting in 2004 the ASG and JI had - Ustadz Hatta Haipe begun a new wave of terrorist bombings - Tahil Sali Background from Mindanao to Manila, prompting - Abu Sofian Formed in 1991 by a veteran of the several offensives by government - Suhod Tanadjalan, alias Kumander Suhod Afghan jihad, Abdurrajak Janjalani, the forces. An AFP bombing of a MILF safe ASG developed as a small-scale terrorist house in the Liguasan Marsh where The AFP asserted that Isnilon Hapilon organization committed to establishing several ASG and JI members were holed was wounded in late April in a battle an Islamic state in the Sulu archipelago.1 up prompted the MILF to oust them.2 By that killed his son.7 Hapilon, who has Yet, unlike the larger Moro National January 2005, top JI members Dulmatin a bounty from the U.S. government Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro and Umar Patek were based with the of up to $5 million, remains one of Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the ASG in Jolo. the leading figures of the movement. ASG was decidedly sectarian in its Although Radullan Sahiron remains killings. The group attacked churches Operation Ultimatum began in August at large, at 71-years-old and missing a and kidnapped or killed Christian 2006 and continues to this day, limb the AFP no longer see him as an priests or missionaries. By 1996-1998, although the real operational tempo active leader. Umbra Abu Jumdail (Abu the group had been seriously degraded diminished by mid-2007. U.S. military Pula) remains the second-most wanted with the loss of their al-Qa`ida advisors and analysts were surprised figure, although Albadar Parad is often funding and the death of their leader, that the AFP was able to maintain the described as the group’s most violent Abdurrajak. From 1996-2002, the Abu offensive on Jolo Island for as long and dangerous commander. What is Sayyaf were no more than a group of as they did. In all, eight battalions clear is that there are distinct factions, well-armed kidnappers, driven by profit of AFP and Philippine Marines were and the ASG in no sense is a cohesive rather than ideological fervor. Although deployed. Five years of U.S. training organization. they gained international notoriety in and assistance began to bear fruit and 2000-2001 with several high-profile for the first time joint inter-service Fleeing the authorities and short raids and large-scale kidnappings on operations were showing real gains. In of funds, the ASG is a diminished Philippine and Malaysian dive resorts, September 2006 and March 2007, two terrorist threat. In September 2007, an they remained a criminal threat. The top leaders, Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu 3 2001 hostage taking of an American Solaiman, were killed. Since then, the 4 Jim Gomez, “Militant May Lead Philippine Terrorists,” missionary couple and the beheading ASG has fallen into a tail spin. Associated Press, March 3, 2007. of another American citizen were the 5 See, for example, Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, “Abu casus belli for the U.S. intervention in the Sayaf’s New Leader: Yasser Igasan The Religious Schol- southern Philippines. Since then, U.S. 2 “Istiada Bte Oemar Sovie Interview,” Philippine Na- ar,” RSIS Commentaries, July 9, 2007. tional Police, November 9, 2006. 6 “Abu Sayyaf Hit by Leadership, Funding Woes,” As- 1 For more, see Zachary Abuza, “Balik Terrorism: The 3 Zachary Abuza, “On the Defensive: Rebels Lose sociated Press, April 4, 2008. Return of the Abu Sayyaf,” Strategic Studies Institute Ground in the Southern Philippines,” Jane’s Intelligence 7 Joel Guinto, “Abu Sayyaf Leader Hapilon, Son Wound- Monograph, September 1, 2005. Review, April 1, 2007. ed—Military,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 1, 2008. JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 ASG operative was arrested en route the May 29 bombing of an Air Force kidnapping, while a teacher from the to Manila where he was ordered to facility in Zamboanga that killed three parochial school was taken hostage. stage diversionary attacks. The most and wounded 18.12 What is all the The teacher was released in late March spectacular attack in the past year was more remarkable is that due to being after his family paid a 200,000 peso the November 13, 2007 bombing-cum- constantly on the run, the ASG has been ($4,880) ransom. In March, a South assassination of Basilan Congressman unable to leverage the technical bomb- Korean and Filipino were abducted. In Wahab Akbar, a former member of the making expertise of two JI operatives early April, ASG members kidnapped ASG who had become an outspoken implicated in the 2002 Bali bombing— a Department of Education official and opponent against them.8 In February Dulmatin and Umar Patek—who have several teachers. On April 10, ASG 2008, two suspected ASG operatives been with the ASG since early 2005. gunmen released seven persons they were arrested in Davao Oriental with abducted separately. On May 28, a an Indonesian JI member, Baihaqi. On The AFP has engaged the ASG in a Filipino businessman in Zamboanga March 1, a homemade bomb ripped small number of fierce encounters. Two was abducted.17 In all of these cases, the through a bar near an army base on Jolo, police were killed in Jolo in January captives were released after ransoms 2008. At the end of that month, a were paid, suggesting that the ASG is pitched battle in Tawi-Tawi led to the short of funds. “What is more troubling is death of Wahab Opao, as well as reports that clashes with the ASG that JI operative Dulmatin was killed.13 What concerns Philippine officials most Although a body was later exhumed and about the trend is that the ASG seem to on Basilan, which had been DNA tested, U.S. officials have failed be planning a new wave of high profile clear of the ASG for several to conclude whether the body was in kidnappings of tourists. On March fact Dulmatin’s. Between February and 13, a suspected Indonesian member years, are now drawing the April, nearly 10 soldiers and marines of JI and ASG member were arrested AFP into battles with the were killed in clashes on Jolo. What is on the resort island of Boracay, where more troubling is that clashes with the authorities assert they were “casing” MILF.” ASG on Basilan, which had been clear hotels and bars.18 Most recently, on of the ASG for several years, are now June 8 Ces Drilon, a popular senior drawing the AFP into battles with the reporter for ABS-CBN, was kidnapped MILF, who maintain a camp in Tipo- by suspected ASG militants; a ransom is wounding six people. In mid-April, two Tipo. In July 2007, 14 AFP were killed, being demanded for her release.19 bombs fashioned from 60-millimeter 10 of whom were beheaded, when the and 81-millimeter mortar shells were ASG sought refuge in the MILF camp.14 How Does the ASG Survive? detonated outside of a Catholic cathedral While the MILF admitted to killing Into the eighth year of U.S. training and cafe in Zamboanga, although no one the AFP in self-defense, they denied and hundreds of millions of dollars in was injured.9 That same month, police that they were fighting alongside the military aid, not to mention the bulk arrested an ASG operative in Quezon ASG, giving them sanctuary or that of USAID funding being concentrated City, Alpaker Said (Abu Jandal), and they had beheaded the troops.15 On May in Sulu and Mindanao, why have the charged him with the attack on Wahab 25, fighting again broke out between ASG not been finished off? The current Akbar.
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