The Palestinian Exodus of 1948
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Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/16/4/3/161167/2536718.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020 The PalestinianExodus of 1948 SimhaFlapan* The exodusof Palestinian Arabs, both forced and voluntary,began with thepublication of the UN PartitionResolution on 29 November1947 and continuedeven after the armistice agreements were signed in thesummer of 1949. Between600,000 and 700,000Palestinian Arabs were evicted or fled fromareas thatwere allocated to the Jewishstate or occupiedby Jewish forcesduring the fightingand laterintegrated de factointo Israel.During and afterthe exodus,every effort was made-fromthe razingof villagesto the promulgationof laws-to preventtheir return. The magnitudeof the flight took many Jewish leaders by surprise, but as willbe seen, the flightitself was not entirelyunexpected. Accordingto the partitionplan, theJewish state would have had well over300,000 Arabs, including 90,000 Bedouin.iWith the Jewish conquest of areas designatedfor the Arab state (westernGalilee, Nazareth,Jaffa, Lydda, Ramlah, villagessouth of Jerusalem,and villages in the Arab Triangleof centralPalestine), the Arab populationwould have risenby another300,000 or more.Zionist leaders feared such numbers of non-Jews wouldthreaten the stabilityof the new stateboth militarily-shouldthey becomea fifthcolumn for Arab armies-and socially-insofaras a substan- * Simha Flapan was a foundingeditor of New Outlookmagazine and the chairmanof its Editorial Council untilhis deathin April1987. He was also a founderof the InternationalCenter for Peace in the MiddleEast in Tel Aviv. This articleis excerptedfrom a chapterfrom the forthcomingbook The Birthof Israel by Simha Flapan. Copyright ? 1987 SimhaFlapan. To be publishedby Pantheon Books, a Divisionof RandomHouse, Inc. 4 JOURNALOF PALESTINESTUDIES tial Muslimand Christianminority would challenge the new state'sJewish character.Thus the flight of up to 700,000Arabs from Palestinian villages and townsduring 1948 came to manyas a relief.Chaim Weizmannwas hardly alone whenhe describedit as "a miraculoussimplification ofthe problem."2 The Arabsattributed the flight to a deliberateZionist design to drivethe populationout of the country by means of intimidation, terror, and forceful expulsion.The Zionistsdenied all responsibility,claiming that the Arab HigherCommittee had calledupon the civilian population to clearthe way Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/16/4/3/161167/2536718.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020 forthe Arab armiesand stayout ofbattle areas until the warwas overand the Zionistswere defeated. Recently declassified documents throw a new lighton thisquestion. Let us beginwith the Zionistclaim-found in all officialZionist history and propagandaand all Israeliinformation publications-that Israel was not responsiblefor the exodus and in factdid everythingin itspower to stopit. The mostsolid evidence to supportthis contention comes from the efforts made in Haifaby Shabatai Levy, the mayor, and Abba Hashi, head of the Workers'Council, to stopthe panic flight of the Arabs by persuading them to give up the struggleand surrenderto the Haganah. In April 1948, Ben-Gurionsent Golda Meir on a specialmission to Haifa to join these efforts.The missionwas unsuccessful.In collaborationwith the Irgun,the Haganah then succeededin conqueringthe Arab sectionsof the town, drivingthe inhabitantsfrom their homes. The Haganah'sconditions for trucewere so humiliatingthat the Arab National Committee of Haifa could notaccept them. Suffering heavy casualties and unableto receivereinforce- mentsfrom other Palestinian fighting forces or fromthe Arab states,the Arabsof Haifa appealed to the Britisharmy to providethem with land and sea transportto Acre and Lebanon.3 Accordingto Ben-Gurion'sbiographer, Michael Bar-Zohar,"the ap- peals of theArabs to stay,Golda's mission,and othersimilar gestures were theresult of political considerations, but they did notreflect [Ben-Gurion's] basic stand.In internaldiscussions, in instructionsto his people, the 'old man' demonstrateda clear stand:it was betterthat the smallestpossible numberof Arabs remain within the area of the state."4 Ben-Gurion himself wrotein his diaryafter the flight of the Arabs began, "We mustafford civic and humanequality to everyArab who remains," but, he insisted,"it is not our taskto worryabout the returnof the Arabs."5 The claim thatthe exoduswas an "orderfrom above," fromthe Arab leadership,proved to be particularlygood propagandafor many years, despite its improbability.Indeed, fromthe point of view of military logistics,the contentionthat the PalestinianArab leadershipappealed to THE PALESTINIANEXODUS OF 1948 5 the Arab massesto leave theirhomes in orderto open the way forthe invadingarmies, after which they would return to share in the victory, makesno senseat all. The Arabarmies, coming long distances and operating in orfrom the Arab areas of Palestine, needed the help of the local population forfood, fuel, water, transport, manpower, and information. The recentpublication of thousandsof documentsin the state and Zionistarchives, as well as Ben-Gurion'swar diaries, show that there is no evidence to supportIsraeli claims. In fact, the declassifiedmaterial Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/16/4/3/161167/2536718.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020 contradictsthe "order" theory, for among these new sources are documents testifyingto the considerableefforts of the AHC and the Arab statesto constrainthe flight. A reportof theJewish Agency's Arab sectionfrom 3 January1948, at thebeginning of the flight, suggests that the Arabs were already concerned: "The Arabexodus from Palestine continues, mainly to thecountries of the West. Of late, the ArabHigher Executive has succeededin imposingclose scrutinyon thoseleaving for Arab countries in the MiddleEast."6 Prior to the declarationof statehood,the Arab League's political committee, meetingin Sofar,Lebanon, recommended that the Arab states"open the doorsto . womenand childrenand old people if eventsin Palestine make it necessary."7But the AHC vigorouslyopposed the departureof Palestiniansand even the grantingof visasto womenand children.8 To supporttheir claim that Arab leadershad incitedthe flight,Israeli and Zionistsources were constantly"quoting" statements by the Arab HigherCommittee-now seen to be largelyfabricated-to the effectthat "in a veryshort time the armiesof our Arab sistercountries will overrun Palestine,attacking from the land, the sea, and theair, and theywill settle accountswith the Jews."9 Some suchstatements were actually issued, but theywere intended to stopthe panic that was causing the masses to abandon theirvillages. They were also issuedas a warningto the increasingnumber of Arabs who were willingto accept partitionas irreversibleand cease strugglingagainst it. When the Arab armies came to retaliatefor what the Jews did to theArabs, such collaborators would become hostages in Jewishhands. In practicethe AHC statementsboomeranged and furtherincreased Arabpanic and flight.10 Butthere were a greatmany other statements that could not be so misconstrued.According to Aharon Cohen, head of Mapam's Arab department,the Arab leadershipwas verycritical of the "fifthcolumnists and rumormongers"behind the flight. 11 When, after April 1948,the flight acquired massive dimensions, Azzam Pasha, secretary of the ArabLeague, and King'Abdallah both issued public calls to theArabs not to leave theirhomes. 12 Fawzial-Qawuqji, commander of the Arab Liber- 6 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES ationArmy, was giveninstructions to stopthe flightby forceand to requisitiontransport for this purpose. The Arabgovernments decided to allowentry only to womenand childrenand to sendback all menof militaryage (betweeneighteen and fifty).13Muhammad Adib al-'Umri, deputydirector of the Ramallah broadcasting station, appealed to the Arabs tostop the flight from Janin, Tulkarm, and other towns in the Triangle that werebombed by the Israelis. 14 On 10May Radio Jerusalem broadcast orders on itsArab program from Arab commanders and the AHC tostop the mass Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/jps/article-pdf/16/4/3/161167/2536718.pdf by guest on 02 June 2020 flightfrom Jerusalem and its vicinity. Palestiniansources offer further evidence that even earlier, in March and April,the Arab HigherCommittee broadcasting from Damascus demandedthat the population stay put and announced that Palestinians of militaryage were to returnfrom the Arab countries. All Arabofficials in Palestinewere also asked to remainat theirposts. 15 Whydid such pleas have so littleimpact? They were outweighed by the cumulativeeffect of Zionist pressure tactics that ranged from economic and psychologicalwarfare to thesystematic ousting of the Arab population by thearmy. Thisis notto say,however, that these tactics were part of a deliberate Zionistplan, as theArabs contended. It mustbe understoodthat official Jewishdecision-making bodies-the provisional government, the National Council,and the JewishAgency Executive-neither discussed nor ap- proveda designfor expulsion, and any proposal of the sort would have been opposedand probablyrejected. These bodies were heavily influenced by liberal,progressive labor, and socialist Zionist parties. The Zionistmove- mentas a whole,both the left and the right, had consistently stressed that theJewish people, who had always suffered persecution and discrimination as a nationaland religious minority, would provide a model of fair treatment ofminorities in theirown state. In thedebates