The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict a Lecture/Discussion Series Don Gall, Facilitator First Congregational Church UCC, Eugene, Oregon Summer, 2021

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The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict a Lecture/Discussion Series Don Gall, Facilitator First Congregational Church UCC, Eugene, Oregon Summer, 2021 The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict A Lecture/Discussion Series Don Gall, Facilitator First Congregational Church UCC, Eugene, Oregon Summer, 2021 Session IV The Palestinian Refugee Crisis The Arab world’s refusal to accept the U.N.’s partition plan for Palestine in 1947 resulted in what came to be known as Israel’s war of independence and the Palestinian’s Nakba, or “continuing catastrophe”. But by whatever name, the result was the same: over 700,000 men, women and children were displaced from their homes, stripped of their livelihoods, and made refugees in a land that was no longer their own. In addition, another 200,000 fled their homes in 1967 when Israel invaded and occupied Gaza and the West Bank. When new-born descendants are added into the total, the number of Palestinian refugees today exceeds 5.2 million. Most of these “refugees” now live in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, the West Bank, and Gaza. Whether they were all forcibly driven from their homes by the Israelis, or whether some fled voluntarily ahead of the fighting (believing they would return following a quick Arab victory) remains a matter of debate among Israelis and Palestinians. The facts, however, are that the lives and livelihoods of millions of men, women and children were violently disrupted and altered forever. And no just and peaceful resolution to the conflict will ever be found that does not also address and resolve the current and future status of the refugees. According to the Zionist historian, Benny Morris, the Israelis committed 34 massacres during the 1947-1948 war, killing an estimated 13,000-plus Palestinians and destroying approximately 50 percent of all Palestinian villages as part of “Plan Dalet” which was intended to “clear out the Palestinian population”. In all, 737,166 people were forced to abandon their homes and land, leaving 531 Palestinian villages entirely depopulated. This tragedy was repeated during the 1967 war when the Gaza strip and the West Bank were occupied and approximately 200,000 additional Palestinians were forced from their homes. Today, the number of displaced Palestinians still living within Israel-Palestine is approximately 355,000. A question often asked is: “Why, after the 1947-1948 war and the war of 1967, were the refugees not allowed to return and reclaim their homes and resume their livelihoods? One answer is that there wasn’t anything left to return to since most of the homes and belongings left behind by the Palestinians were destroyed by the Israelis. A second answer often given is that it was not in Israel’s self-interest as a new nation to allow these refugees to return since Israel needed a plurality of Israeli Jews to support its fledgling government, not a hostile majority of Palestinians undermining it from within. So the solution was to minimize the post-war threat by reducing the number and influence of the Palestinians and assert itself as the dominant power to be reckoned with. This is what Israel did leading up to, during, and following both the 1948 and 1967 wars-- and in connection with every other war since--with the United States serving as its major ally, supporter and supplier to the tune of $3 billion a year. To this day, the very question of refugees being allowed back into Israel is highly contentious and strongly resisted by the Israeli government. 1 Many argue, however, that any future peace plan must include a provision for the return of these refugees to their original homes and communities. But even if some magical number could be agreed upon, their return would not be as simple as it may sound since most of their homes and businesses no longer exist and where they once stood there are now 130 new Jewish settlements occupied by nearly 700,000 Jewish settlers who have moved into the occupied territories--all in violation of international law and now a major obstacle to any future peace agreement. These settlements continue to support what has been one of Israel’s strategic objectives from the beginning, which is to build and maintain a Jewish-Israeli plurality within and throughout all of Israel-Palestine--even to the exclusion of every last Palestinian, if need be. That official policy of “intentional exclusion” has led critics to accuse Israel of “ethnic cleansing” and even “apartheid,” which is the enactment of an official policy of “separation along racial or ethnic lines.” These charges have been countered by supporters of Israel, denouncing such criticism as being “anti-Semitic to the core.” The 700,000 Jewish settlers who have moved into the occupied territories and have made their homes on land originally allocated to the Palestinians by the U. N. now live-in communities, with playgrounds, gardens, cemeteries, swimming pools, schools, a university, and all the fabric of civilian life. These settlements do not exist as one, large sprawling community but instead consist of 130 separate communities spread across the occupied territories so that no single, contiguous, expanse of land remains that could viably serve as a Palestinian State, leading many on both sides of the conflict to conclude that a two-state solution may be no longer possible. To admit Palestinian refugees back into Israel would allegedly require the dismantling of many of these Jewish settlements and the uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews to accommodate them, a reverse condition equally distasteful and politically explosive which has garnered little or no support. The Israeli government’s position all along has been that Palestinian refugees should be resettled in other Arab countries, away from Israel’s own towns and borders, a position untenable among most Palestinians who still long for their own nation-state within the boundaries of historic Palestine. The two sides appear no closer to any agreement now than they had before. Another issue that generates intense passions not only because both Israelis and Palestinians regard it as their political capital but also because the city holds deep spiritual significance for Jews, Christians, and Muslims. The United Nations gave particular attention to the status of Jerusalem, both in its designation of the city as an “international zone” in its original partitioning plan and in its Special Committee’s recommendations to the General Assembly that the U.N. exercise sovereignty over the holy sites on behalf of the entire international community. When Israel occupied West Jerusalem during the 1948 war and then moved its capital from Tel Aviv to West Jerusalem in defiance of the United Nations, and President Trump subsequently ordered the U.S. Embassy to relocate from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in recognition of Israel’s move, another intractable element in the conflict was set in place. The Palestinians subsequent claim to East Jerusalem as their capital, and the Israeli’s counter move to raze Palestinian homes and block access to the Old City by the erection of a dense settlement around the northern side to block travel and access from the West Bank to sacred Muslim sites in East Jerusalem heightened the conflict again and ultimately led to the most recent outbreak of war between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza strip. Next Week The Role of Religion: From Antiquity to the Present 2 .
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