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642 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS IDEOLOGY, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND JUDICIAL ETHICS ERWIN CHEMERINSKY Reprinted from THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 1989 Copyright © 1989 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 643 Ideology, Judicial Selection and Judicial Ethics ERWIN CHEMERINSKY* In the fail of 1986, there was a bitter fight against the retention of three members of the California Supreme Court, Rose Bird, Joseph Grodin, and Cruz Reynoso. Exactly a year later, the nation's attention focused on the battle over Robert Bork's confirmation to the United States Supreme Court. There were ironic parallels between these two events. In both instances, pub- lic opinion and media reporting played an unprecedented role in the judicial selection process. In each situation, there were arguments over whether the candidates' ideology should be a major factor in the evaluations. Liberals in California argued that assuring judicial inde- pendence required that the evaluation be limited to the justices' competence; that the individuals' ideology and prior votes should play no role in the re- tention election. But the sides were reversed in tflMMMMBtfMHMMWM the liberals who ^rgUcd that B<^^^~^v^ml^giig^t^bmtKHmmK tiv&jfem••91& prior votes asri^Bi^gJHBB^rtii^ Conservatives argued that evaluation should be limited to the nominee's competence—that his ide- ology and prior votes should play no role in the Senate's confirmation decision. A cynic might observe that these experiences reflect a pattern of public rhetoric. If jjnp |n nil kill liriHTfihi liiffti jiniiWHi iilmii ni'^nTiTfrrMTITri'P as an issue in your arguments; bat if your candidate's positions ate against the weight of public opinion, you maintain that ideology is irrelevant and that judicial candidates should be evaluated solely on the basis of profes- sional qualifications. Such an appraisal, while an accurate description of the recent «vents, ig- nores the crucial underlying question of how judicial candida£e& taoeld be evaluated. The issue will certainTy arise in the future, \f^rfto?&$<&:taaot^ than that ideology was successfully used to defeat Bird, Bork/Gfoffin, and* Reynoso. Moreover, the simultaneous election of George Bush as President and of a Democratically controlled Senate will likely lead to conflicts over judicial nominees. While the experiences of the past two years are still fresh in mind, it is important to consider what criteria should be used in evaluating candidates for judicial office. Many scholars have criticized the Senate's re- jection of Bork and the California voters' rejection of Bird, Grodin, and Rey- * Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I would like to thank Doug- las Cramer and Shirley Paine for their excellent research assistance 643 644 644 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 2:643 noso.' Are these objections valid? If so, how should the process of evaluating judicial candidates be conducted? Allowing such ideological evaluation raises the question of how a person's ideology can be ascertained; what ques- tions may prospective judges be required to answer? The basis for ideological evaluation is discussed in part III. Finally, part IV considers whether such an approach to judicial selection is consistent with the current standards of judicial ethics and, if not, what changes should be made. This article does not directly address the issue of what system for selecting judges—elections or appointments—is best2 Rather, The phrase "judiaaTcandidate" is used throughout this article to refer to a person being considered for any state or federal judicial office. Whether the evaluator is the President, the Senate, a governor, a state legislator, or a voter, the underlying issue is essentially the same: what are the permissible grounds for evaluating potential judges? I. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO EVALUATING JUDGES I can identify three different models that have been advanced as to how judicial candidates should be selected and evaluated. Each has its strong supporters. One might be termed the professional qualifications model. Under this approach, candidates for judicial office—state or federal—should be evaluated only on the basis of their credentials: their education, the nature of their legal practice, their prior judicial experience, and any other indicia of their competence and ability to serve as a judge. The professional qualifica- tions model expressly excludes consideration of an individual's ideology or likely voting in particular cases. For the most part, the criteria used by the American Bar Association in evaluating nominees reflect this model. The American Bar Association's rat- ing of a judicial candidate is based on the individual's "character, tempera- ment, and professional aptitude and experience"; evaluation is not supposed 1. See. eg., Ackennan, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988) (criticiz- ing Boric rejection); Udman, California Judicial Retention Elections, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333 (1988) (criticizing rejection of California Supreme Court Justices in 1986 retention election). 2. However, I do discuss whether differences in the method of selection justify differences in the criteria used in evaluation. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31. 645 1989] JUDICIAL SELECTION 645 to include consideration of the individual's views or ideology.3 The Twenti- eth Century Fund's Task Force on Judicial Selection recently declared that "choosing candidates for anything other than their legal qualifications dam- ages the public's perception of the institutional prestige of the judiciary and calls into question the high ideal of judicial independence."4 Supporters of both Bird and Bork argued that this was the model to be used and that each should be approved because of excellent professional qualifications.5 For example, Professor Bruce Ackerman described the rejec- tion of Robert Bork as a "tragedy" on the grounds that Bork was "among the best qualified candidates for the Supreme Court of this or any other era. Few nominees in our history compare with him in the range of their profes- sional accomplishments."6 A second approach can be termed the judging skills model. Under this approach, in addition to professional qualifications, it is permissible for the evaluator—be it the voter, the Executive, or the Senate—to examine the can- didate's skills as a judge, assuming that the candidate has served in a prior judicial position. Supporters of this approach look to factors such as the judicial candidate's use of precedent, the quality of his or her written opin- ions, his or her temperament on the bench, and the like. As with the profes- sional qualifications approach, the judging skills model expressly excludes consideration of an individual's ideology in evaluating potential judges. For example, Professor Michael Moore argued against the retention of Chief Justice Rose Bird, but expressly disclaimed that his position was based on an ideological disagreement.7 Professor Moore maintained that Chief Justice Bird should have been rejected because he believed that her vote to reverse every death penalty case to come before her reflected closed-minded- ness and impermissibly result-oriented judging.8 Similarly, Professor Judith Resnick in her Senate testimony against Robert Bork focused on his judging skills and not on his ideology.' She specifically criticized the breadth of his 3. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA'S STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICI- ARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1983). 4. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, Ju- dicial Roulette (1988) [hereinafter TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND REPORT]. 5. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Judicial Conscience of a Conservative, L.A. Herald Examiner, Sept. 24, 1986 at A13, col. 1; Chemennsky, High Court Vote, San Fran. Examiner, Sept. 4, 1986; Cutler, Saving Bork from Both Friends and Enemies, N. Y. Times, July 16, 1987 at A27, col.l. 6. Ackerman, supra note 1, at 1164. 7. See, eg., Moore, Politics is Not the Basis for Judging the Judges, L.A. Times, July 29, 1985, Part II at 5, col. 1; Moore, Justices' Personal Values Must at Times Give Way, L.A. Times, July 30, 1985, Part II at 5, col. 4; Moore, Rose Bird Should Go: On Death Penalty She Has Taken Law Into Her Own Hands, L.A. Times, July 31, 1985, Pan II at 5. col. 3. 8. Moore, Rose Bird Should Go, supra note 7. 9. Transcript of Proceedings, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Hearing on the Nomination of Honorable Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 646 646 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 2:643 opinions and his resolution of questions net raised m the specific cases before him.10 A third approach can be termed the ideological orientation model. Although this model certainly includes evaluation of professional qualifica- tions and judging skills, it differs from the irst two approaches because it expressly permits consideration of an individual's ideology in the selection process. Specifically, the evaluator is allowed to examine a judicial candi- date's views on important issues in deciding whether to approve or reject the individual. Many of the critics of both Bird and Bork employed this model. Chief Justice Bird, for example, was opposed for her opposition to capital punishment and also for her liberal rulings protecting consumers and em- ployees.11 Judge Bork was attacked for his writings criticizing Supreme Court cases protecting the right of privacy, applying the equal protection clause to gender discrimination, and using the First Amendment to protect speech not concerned with the political process.12 In short, the debates over Bird and Bork were primarily battles over which of these three models should be followed. The model selected determines the appropriate criteria for evaluation. It must be recognized that, as with any such models, these are only de- scriptions of approaches in very general terms.