The Neglected Element: Prestige and British Decision-Making in the Age of

Decolonization

A Master’s Thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master’s Degree in History

Theodore J.L. Theopolos

December 2020

© 2020 Theodore J.L. Theopolos. All Rights Reserved. 2

This Master’s Thesis titled

The Neglected Element: Prestige and British Decision-Making in the Age of

Decolonization

by

THEODORE THEOPOLOS

has been approved for

the History Department

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

John Brobst

Associate Professor of History

Florenz Plassmann

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

Abstract

THEOPOLOS, THEODORE J. L., Master’s Degree, December 2020, History

The Neglected Element: Prestige and British Decision-Making in the Age of

Decolonization

Director of Master’s Thesis: John Brobst

The following thesis seeks to explore how the concept of prestige affected decisions made by the British Government relating to the raise of nationalism and decolonization. To define and characterize prestige, the thesis examines how other social science fields studied prestige. From there, the thesis synthesizes these as well as develop expanding ideas on prestige, such as the concept of universal prestige and particular prestige, in order to grasp the dynamics of the concept both within the British government and in the wider international scene. It then proceeds to put these concepts into context into three episodes in the mid-twentieth century: The Suez Canal Crisis, the Wind of Change speech, and the withdrawal of British forces East of Suez. Throughout each chapter will be the continued examination of the sterling area, the Anglo-American alliance, Britain’s leadership in

Liberal Europe, and Britain’s efforts in the British Commonwealth. Each factor placed into context as to how they relate to British prestige and the decisions made by the Eden,

Macmillan, and Wilson Governments. In the conclusion, the thesis will postulate how the topic of prestige can be expanded to more recent history, current events, and other approaches to history as well as the nature of British prestige within the ‘Official Mind’.

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Dedication

To Dr. Arvind,

For all the Time and for all the Chai

5

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to the kind efforts, encouragement, and guidance from several individuals for making this thesis possible. Any errors in this thesis are the author’s alone.

First, my advisor Dr. John Brobst for his guidance, supervision, and tremendous depth of historical and historiographical knowledge I needed throughout the process. Dr. Robert

Ingram for giving criticisms and input that proved essential when writing my introduction and refining my approach to the concept of prestige. Alden Library’s archives for providing the microfilm as well as new microfilm readers to make the backbone of my research possible. Shane Hapner for lending his command of the English language and narrative for much needed input during the initial proofreading process. Finally, Dr.

Arvind Elangovan for being such an affable and supportive mentor throughout my academic education. While this type of political history may not be his cup of tea, I nonetheless dedicate this thesis to him.

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Table of Contents

Page

Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 4 Acknowledgments...... 5 Introduction ...... 7 Prestige and Its Meanings ...... 8 Prestige and the ‘Official Mind’ ...... 13 Prestige and Decolonization ...... 17 Chapter One: Prestige and the Suez Canal Crisis ...... 21 The Jugular Vein of the Empire ...... 22 Aftermath and Reflecting on Prestige ...... 36 The Plunge and Prestige...... 54 Chapter Two: The Macmillan Government and Navigating the “Wind of Change” in Africa ...... 61 You Need Us: For Ourselves; for Commonwealth; and as Leaders of Europe ...... 62 Navigating Between Race, Federation, and ‘Police State’ ...... 74 Wind of Change in Africa and in Commonwealth ...... 80 Chapter Three: East of Suez and the Last Vestige of Empire...... 90 At World Role’s End ...... 92 The Last Vestige of Empire ...... 107 Conclusion: What is British Prestige? ...... 119 Bibliography ...... 127

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Introduction

A country’s prestige is a commonly-mentioned element in any discussion of hegemony, imperialism, and statecraft. Yet, rarely do scholars focus on this concept as a subject for observation. Any dissection of its dynamic or specific attributes are often ignored and relegated as an afterthought by scholars. They tend to make jests of it as a reason to a decision without explaining its importance. Prestige somehow surfaces as an element to be mentioned within a narrative, but few bother to explain why it needs to be mentioned in a narrative. Absence of this observation is not entirely lost on scholars. In the forward of British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind by Frank Heinlein, British historian Robert Holland acclaimed:

Prestige and power, not money, lies at the root of the process [of decolonization]. This is surely true, and one is left with a feeling that what we need now is not more accounts of decolonization in its political guise, but an exploration of the meanings of prestige — or what Lord Palmerston called moral power — in the general context of modern British history, including the ending of empire.1

This thesis will attempt that exploration. It will endeavor to focus upon the dynamics of prestige along with the sentiments that prestige invoked in policymakers. However, the concept of a country’s prestige varies not just by country, but by different governments in certain periods of time. To attempt a complete analysis of nation’s relationship and conceptualization of prestige is a wary and winding task. In order to prevent this exploration from being aimless, a solid exploration of interpretations of prestige along with a framework must be constructed by which to analyze this influential, abstract, and neglected element.

1 Robert Holland, “Foreword,” in Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945-1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind, (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002), viii. 8

Prestige and Its Meanings

Prestige proves to be difficult to distill into a firm definition. However, one must attempt to present greater understanding in how the social sciences and past observers wrote about prestige. In the field of psychology, hierarchies form based on the amount of influence a group bestows upon an individual. Prestige “refers to social rank that is granted to individuals who are recognized and respected for their skills, success, or knowledge.”2 Those with prestige are found to be worthy of emulating and often sway others, out of deference, to heed to their wishes despite disagreements. Contrarily, dominance acts as the other manner in which hierarchies form. This comes when an actor’s aggressive and forceful behavior results in that person controlling resources.

Then, the actor uses their material gains to form compliance from others. Power, the asymmetrical possession of materials, alone does not determine hierarchy in the field of psychology. One may possess substantial power but little influence and vice versa.3

Power combined with dominance, however, can enable an individual to generate influence and status in a group. Status is the position of an actor within a group’s hierarchy. That said, status and prestige remain separate; one can employ dominance and power to achieve status, but they can still lack the skills, success, and knowledge that a group values and respects.

Anthropology share similarities with these concepts of hierarchy. Prestige also stems from one’s possession of desirable traits, such as skills or knowledge. This leads

2 Joey T. Chang, Jessica L. Tracy, Tom Foulsham, Alan Kingstone, and Joseph Heinrich, "Two Ways to the Top: Evidence That Dominance and Prestige Are Distinct Yet Viable Avenues to Social Rank and Influence," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 104, no. 1 (2013): 103-125, accessed February 14, 2020, https://web-a-ebscohost- com.proxy.library.ohio.edu/ehost /detail/detail?vid=3&sid=3ef2d579-70a1-4053-9907-e2e9900 17667%40sessionmgr4007&bdata= JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl#AN=84731308&d b=a9h , 105. 3 Note: Holland’s call beckoned the observation of power and prestige. This showed he understood there existed a fundamental difference between them. 9 less prestigious individuals in a group to desire to be around the prestigious individual because of their admiration and desire to imitate that individual. Prestigious individuals can then generate cooperation within a group and influence group decisions. “Skill, success, and expertise turn into prestige, as learners alter their views of others in response to the patterns of attention, deference and imitation they observed.”4 A prestigious individual can also organize a system of reciprocity. By displaying generosity, the individual both binds followers by obligations as well as increase the individual’s prestige for such generosity to others. Status remains separate from prestige in the field of anthropology as well. Prestige can suppress differences in status because of the influence a prestigious, lower-ranked individual can garner in comparison to an individual that uses power and dominance to create subordination.

However for this argument, there needs to be observations of prestige in the context of British politics and history. Harold Nicolson’s 1937 Cambridge lecture, “The

Meaning of Prestige,” fills this role nicely. His inspiration for the lecture came after a trip to central Africa and the Sudan, where Britain maintain control with such minimal presence. He traces the word from the Latin verb praestringere whose noun form, praestigia, meant “jugglers” and/or “tricks”.5 Prestige only became popular in the British lexicon in the last fifty years according to Nicolson in 1937.

He then postulates the nature of prestige. Nicolson questions whether the word possesses universal meaning in various different countries. If not, he then ponders the particular meaning of the word to the British people. Proceeding in comparisons, he

4 Joseph Heinrich, Maciej Chudek, and Robert Boyd, "The Big Man Mechanism: how prestige fosters cooperation and creates prosocial leaders," Philosophical Transaction 370, no. 1683, 1-13, accessed February 14, 2020, https://web-a- ebscohost-com. proxy.library.ohio.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=5&sid=3ef2d579-70a1-4053-9907-e2e990017667%40 sessionmgr4007&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl #AN=1106653 26&db=a9h , 3. 5 Harold Nicolson, “The Meaning of Prestige,” Lecture, Cambridge University, Cambridge, April 23, 1937, 7. 10 examines the closest word to prestige in French, Italian, and German. Only the German

Ansehen related to political usage. From this analysis Nicolson declares, “I think, that the

English interpretation of prestige is in fact different from that obtaining in other countries and that our whole conception of both ‘reputation’ and ‘power’ is peculiar to ourselves.”6

While the French distinguishes concepts of reputation and power with precision, the

English language forms “that curious amalgam which we call by the name of ‘prestige.”7

As for Ansehen, “it is something intensely personal, rigid and tense,” unlike prestige which is “impersonal, fluctuating, and elastic”8

As for the particular interpretation of the word and its meaning to the English people, Nicolson argues that it is narrower than glamour or national pride: “[prestige] implies the extent to which subject races and foreign countries are prepared to believe in our own power without that power having either to be demonstrated or exercised.” When it comes to British politics, Nicolson concludes, “Our conception of prestige… is closely identified with our conception of policy.”9 He propounds that England, a nation of shopkeepers, conducts their diplomacy with the same mindset as their business—in a mercantile manner. “This mercantile conception of policy carries with it an equally mercantile conception of prestige,” where prestige acts as credit in which little expenditure of capital, in this case power, is required. Aligned with psychology’s and anthropology’s viewpoint, Nicolson rejects the notion that prestige and power are one and the same. To his irritation, the fascists of Europe along with their sympathizers too easily conflate the two. There exists a need for reputation to synthesize with power for

6 Nicolson, “Meaning,” 13-14. 7 Ibid. 16-17. 8 Ibid. 18-20. 9 Ibid. 20-21. 11

“you cannot retain prestige without reputation.”10 Reputation itself relies heavily on the national character. Here, Nicolson departs from the two other interpretations of prestige and expands it from groups of people to entire nations. On this scale one needs power along with reputation—a mixture of achievement and national character—in order to create prestige.11 Refuting the thoughts of fascists, Nicolson asserts that control over materials is not the only ingredient to create prestige.

The one regrettable critique to this fine examination of such a pervasive yet nebulous concept lies in how dismissive it is of other countries lacking a notion similar to prestige. Nicolson even admits there might be a word in French that may function like prestige in usage, but he claims it is hard to find.12 Four days after Nicolson’s lecture, an intellectual who employed prestige in his later influential writings died. Antonio

Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, constructed the relationship between the hegemon and the subaltern in his exasperatedly long, and often contradictory, writings dubbed the Prison

Notebooks. In Nicolson’s lecture, he describes the Italian word prestigio/prestigioso denotes something as dazzling, deceptive, or legendary.13 Yet in the Prison Notebooks,

Gramsci does use the word prestigio in describing how hegemony forms when the masses give spontaneous consent to a particular group, who then dictate social life. This group receives this consent traditionally because of their prestige that stems from their position and function within the production of wealth.14 While this prestige appears to

10 Ibid. 29-30. 11 Ibid. 23. 12 Ibid. 15. 13 Ibid. 12. 14 Luigi Rosiello, “Linguistics and Marxism in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci,” in Gramsci, Language, and Translation, eds. Peter Ives and Rocco Lacorte (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2010), 38. See also James P. Hawley, “Antonio Gramsci’s Marxism: Class, State and Work,” Social Problems 27, no. 5 (June 1980), 584-600. Accessed October 4, 2018. http://www.jstor.org/stable/800198. 12 lack the concept of reputation that is not based on power, it does use prestige in a social and political manner that creates hierarchy within a group without explicit coercion.

The concept of prestige, or a concept similar in nature, proves not to be strictly bound to the continent of Europe either. Ronald P. Dore explored in his article, “The

Prestige Factor in International Affairs,” how prestige can be seen in affecting the mindset of nations. As a sociologist studying Japan, he became curious as to why the

Japanese proved sensitive to their country’s external image despite their post-war prosperity. He observed hierarchy and noted that a prestige hierarchy is not a pecking order, but, a hierarchy which indicated a certain consensus shared by all within the hierarchy. A pecking order emphasizes too much on power according to Dore.15 Due to

European domination in the past, prestige confers onto their culture and peoples, which in ways promote emulations within non-western countries, like Japan, in order to achieve what was considered ‘modern’.

Dore noted at the time of writing that there existed acute urge to modernize.

Decision-makers in countries, like foreign ministers and academics, prove conscientious about their country’s status.16 There exist aspirations for status that feed into the decision- making process. Status can stem from possessing tangibles traits, like military force and wealth, along with intangibles traits, such as justice and equality, which help develop this hierarchal consensus.17 He even corroborates with the notion that prestige and power

15 R.P. Dore, “The Prestige Factor in International Affairs,” International Affairs 51, no. 2, (1975), 190-208. Accessed October 6, 2019. http://go.gale.com.proxy.library.ohio.edu/choa/retrieve.do?sgHitCountType=None &sort=DA-ASC- SORT&inPS=true&prodId=CHOA&userGroupName=athe17405&tabID=T001&searchId =R1&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&contentSegment=&searchType=BasicSearchForm¤tPosition=4&contentSet=G ALE%7CTLNCUI504355161&&docId=GALE|TLNCUI504355161&docType=GALE&viewtype=Manuscript&facete dsearch=no , 190-192. 16 Dore, “Factor,” 193, 197-198. 17 Ibid. 202. 13 exist separately. Similar to Nicolson, prestige exist as a deterrent to prevent the actual need of using power: “Prestige is the way you gain the coercive deterrent advantages of power without actually having to use it… Prestige, then, is not an end in itself, but only a means of economy in the use of power.” Even more peripheral countries like China half acknowledge this ranking according to Dore. However, ‘peripheral’ now proves to be dated term when describing China today. Howard French explores China’s own sensitivities to past Western, and Western inspired, dominance. French explores this past in Everything Under the Heavens to better understand China’s ambition to reclaim its perceived lost status, and, how that affects today’s world, such as with the South China

Sea dispute.18 To some extent, the Chinese do possess a sense of prestige; or at the very least, they harbor a desire to be viewed with a certain perception and deference. This is simply known as miàn zi (面子), or “face.”19 In conclusion, this thesis asserts an existence of a universal concept of prestige. While not the same quiddity as the actual word ‘prestige’ in the English language, there exists a desirability to advance in, or maintain, a hierarchy by other means than power alone.

Prestige and the ‘Official Mind’

The one certainty that can be noted about prestige lies in its desirability. Pursuing and maintaining prestige remains a fixed factor in the decision-making process to most individuals in a certain class previously described by Dore. Such lends credence to the importance of exploring prestige. Its desirability stems from its relationship to hierarchy and power, acting as an essential but often neglected, component in global status. Pierson

18 See Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2017). Note: The Western inspired dominance being Imperial Japan. 19 Joshua Hill, interviewed by author, Athens, Ohio, February 24, 2020. 14

Dixon, the British Permanent Representative in the United Nations during the Suez

Crisis, poignantly illustrated this. He stated, “’Power, of course, is not to be measured in terms alone of money and troops: a third ingredient is prestige, or in other words what the rest of the world thinks of us.’”20 In the context of this thesis, the exploration of prestige will be a key aspect of the process in British decolonization. In the case of the British during the decolonization era, officials placed an incredible, even inordinate, importance on prestige. To use the words of British historian John Darwin, prestige is a “crucial lubricant of world power,” and great power diplomacy relies on the deployment of prestige.21

When applying prestige to British policymakers in the decolonization era, there exists two distinct levels of analysis. First, a level in which policymakers attempt to garner prestige among nation-states through valued actions and achievements. Second, the decision of officials to make these attempts with the belief said attempts will preserve or generate prestige. This second layer allows insight into what policymakers valued themselves, or, expect other nation-states to value. Such provides insight into how officials themselves valued Britain herself within the global hierarchy. With prestige’s nature relying on others’ opinions and recognition, officials anticipate how others will perceive them based upon their own internal understandings of prestige—what they find prestigious themselves.

Therefore, an exploration of prestige acts as a gateway into the ‘Official Mind,’ providing insight into British officials’ values, sentiments, and ambitions. This concept

20 Minute by Sir P. Dixon, 23 Jan. 1952 FO 371/96920, PRO. Quoted in H.V. Brasted, Carl Bridge, and John Kent, “Cold War, Informal Empire and the Transfer of Power: Some ‘Paradoxes’ of British Decolonisation Resolved?”, in Europe within the Global System 1938-1960, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany: From Great Powers to Regional Powers, ed. Michael Dockrill (Bochum, Germany: Universitatetsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1995), 21. 21 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire: A historical Debate (New York: Blackwell, 1991), 74. 15 can be linked to P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkin’s conception of a gentlemanly class, or the

English gentlemen, in which there exist a set of characteristics and values among officials.22 Said officials wished to implement policies reflective of their characteristics and values.23 They strove for a particular projection of Britain and how they wished others to see Britain. Referring back to Nicolson’s lecture, Nicolson described Britain’s national character pertaining to mercantilist, or shopkeeper, tendencies. These are traits such as being pragmatic, being a fair if not chivalrous, and being one to uphold agreements in order to build credit.24 Yet, this preoccupation with prestige and its projection also allows for an analysis of its antithesis, a periodic fear elites shudder from—not simply the absence of prestige, but abject humiliation. As H.V. Brasted, Carl

Bridge, and John Kent stated in their article on Britain during the Cold War, “If the avoidance of humiliation is accepted as important, the ‘order of Britain’s going’ [in the context of the article refers Britain not just accomplishing decolonization, but the manner in how they accomplish it] is of crucial significance.”25 Returning to the two facets of prestige when it comes to decision-making, there exists two sides of prestige to observe.

One, the decision-making process of officials based on their values and perception of prestige as well as their sense of rank within the global hierarchy. Second, the global community’s consensus in what ideas and traits deserved value and emphasis, which became the basis of the global hierarchy and order. Ergo, prestige can be divided into two categories: the universal and the particular.

22 See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkin, British Imperialism: 1688-2015, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2016). 23 Note: These characteristics and values, according to the Cain and Hopkins, stem from the service and commercial sectors of London. Two notable values imprinted in the British ‘Official Mind’ stem from the occupations of these sectors; fairness and pragmatism. See P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2015, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 42-50. 24 See Nicolson, “Meaning,” 22 and 26-27. 25 Brasted, Bridge, Kent, “Transfer”, in Global System, 21. 16

Universal prestige can be characterized as it sounds. Despite Nicolson’s assertions, there exist some universal sense of prestige. As Dore argued, prestige can be detected and perceived by policymakers of nation-states leading to a consensual hierarchy. Continuing with Dore’s argument, there exist qualities, either tangible or impalpable, that are nearly universally sought, coveted, and admired by countries.26

While universal, prestige does not remain permanently static, but, it can transform based on changes in collective perception, opinion, and emphasis on values. Despite stability and prosperity of a country being widely admired, it can just as easily be deemed an anathema if enough of a collection of countries so chooses. These dynamisms and contours of prestige is the same reason why the decolonization era proves fundamentally important to the examination of prestige: the agreed-upon concept of universal prestige period shifts away from the prior notions of prestige of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Perceptions of Britain’s empire rapidly and starkly shifted from an envy and an admiration for their vast colonial territories to being an anathema and a relic from a dark period in history. Universal prestige therefore represents the broader definition of prestige which demands analysis, but it does not wholly describe the nature of prestige.

Decolonization occurred differently under each colonial power. Therefore, one must revisit the additional layer of prestige—the one beneath the straightforward perception that forms a consensual, global hierarchy. This layer identifies these deviations: that a country, while desiring universal prestige, also carries within itself

26 Note: When it comes to periods that predate the nation-state system of the 20th and 21st century, it will be those collective countries that are predominant in global affairs, in which the subaltern do not, nor cannot, contribute with their values on a regional or international scale. 17 particular traits that it finds prestigious. One might call this concept particular prestige: what a country deems prestigious from its roots in history, heritage, culture, geography, and other factors that shapes each country’s respective ‘Official Mind’. In turn, that country’s ‘Official Mind’ will emphasize these particulars and shape their foreign and domestic policies around them. If successful in amplifying their prestige, they might influence other nations so greatly that universal prestige might come to take on some trappings of these officials’ own particular concepts of prestige. John Gallagher and

Ronald Robinson presented a similar line of thinking in their approach to the ‘Official

Mind’. James Belich’s book, Replenishing the Earth, investigates British settlerism as well as metropole-periphery relations which illustrate one manner of expanding a country’s values to shape the global order.27 Such interplay between particular and universal prestige allows for analysis of policymakers’ sensitivities and their perception of their country as well as their country’s relationship to universal prestige; and therefore, it can describe their behavior and motivations with greater understanding.

Prestige and Decolonization

This thesis sets out to explore these facets of British prestige and how particular and universal prestige influenced the decisions of British officials as well as observe the consequences and dynamics of these two types of prestige during the decolonization era.

Of the several particular-concepts and constructs the United Kingdom viewed as crucial to their international prestige during this period, this thesis will study four of the most critical: the British Commonwealth of Nations, the sterling area, the Anglo-American

27 See John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015). AND See also James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 18 relationship, and the defense of the Liberal West and Western Europe.28 By studying how the British emphasized these four concepts and how they aligned and conflicted with universal prestige, two questions can be framed: “what makes British prestige uniquely

British?” and “what makes British prestige prestigious?”

Prestige, as Robert Holland acclaimed, innately influenced the decisions made by

British officials during the decolonization era. Chapter one examines the key decision by the Eden administration to launch an Anglo-French military operation on Port Said,

Egypt in order to occupy the Suez Canal that birthed the infamous Suez Canal Crisis. The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize the reader to the particular prestige-concepts of

British officials and how they connected with, and influenced, the events that took place in British foreign policy leading up to the decision. This entails the maintenance of the sterling area with Middle Eastern oil and how Col. Gamal Nasser of Egypt became such an antagonist to British officials who tried to safeguard their country’s prestige. It also attempts to illustrate the dynamics between Britain’s particular prestige-concepts and the new universal prestige which the world came to acknowledge in the post-war era, and, how it posed a challenge to British foreign policy over Suez and future decisions.

Chapter two concerns itself with “The Wind of Change” speech by British Prime

Minister Harold Macmillan, acknowledging the inherit rights of native Africans in British

African colonies, their nationalist aspirations, and their demands for their governments to be representative of them. This explores the fallout of the Suez Crisis by showing the greater pressure on British officials to comply with the new conception of universal

28 Note: This mirrors similarly to the ‘Three Circles’ Prime Minister Winston Churchill conceived as a strategy for Britain to maintain her world power status: Empire and Commonwealth, Anglo-American relationship, and relations with Western Europe. Also, the “Commonwealth of Nation” will be referred by its more common descriptor, the “Commonwealth.” 19 prestige. It will also discuss how particular prestige-concepts, especially the sterling area, led to preoccupation with the economies in these colonies. These schemes were to bolster the sterling area and promote future stability in the sterling area for when the colonies became independent. However such schemes like grouping colonies into federation led to greater unrest within the colonies, thus forcing a similar dilemma between British particular prestige-concepts and the new, anti-colonial universal prestige of the day.

Britain’s political situations changed post-Suez and they affected decision-making in the

African colonies. Situations like in Rhodesia, where minority whites advocated for disproportionate political power in the Central African Federation, will be subject to analysis in how prestige shaped the eventual decisions made. With these pressures, the

Macmillan administration decided for expedient withdrawal from the African continent.

Chapter three examines the Harold Wilson administration and the decision to conduct a withdrawal ‘East of Suez,’ effectively ending Britain’s world role. This examines again how Britain’s situation affected its relationship with its particular prestige-concepts and universal prestige. Defense commitments East of Suez, including

Commonwealth members like Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia, became harder to maintain as the pound’s volatility forced the Wilson Government to eventually devalue the pound. With the pursuit of membership into the European Economic Community and rapid independence of colonies, the Wilson administration needed to re-evaluate the priorities and the capacity of Britain. Its emphases on its particular prestige-concepts changed with its eroded status from a nation-state being second to only the superpowers to one with serious economic and military enervation. All this led to the decision to withdrawal from its defense commitments East of Suez, and, it proceeded to do so in a 20 manner that symbolized the abandonment of certain particular prestige-concepts along with its world role.

In the conclusion, a final examination of prestige will occur to postulate how prestige as a subject can expand for further discussions in foreign policy and the historiography. The conclusion will also attempt to answer “what makes British prestige

British?” and “what makes British prestige prestigious?” Prestige is a neglected element in understanding both world affairs and historical events, and by examining it, one will gain valuable insight into the ‘Official Mind’ and the decisions made by Britain during the decolonization era.

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Chapter One: Prestige and the Suez Canal Crisis

After World War II, the world began to reshape itself, and the concept of universal prestige shifted significantly alongside the other tumultuous changes of the time. The most important change to universal prestige stems from the strong pursuit of peace sought after through aspiring international institutions and organizations. These institutions covered international disputes (the United Nations), defense pacts (the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization), mutual trade agreements (the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs), and financial aid as well as services (the International Monetary Fund).

Universal prestige began to shift as there began a swelling optimism in peace and prosperity for mankind in this new era via international cooperation and collaboration.

None so cherished these as the newly-independent nation-states and aspiring colonies.

Referring back to Dore, the international prestige hierarchy was heavily based on

European standards. A well-developed, industrial economy became a tangible criteria within this hierarchy. Former colonies wanted to replicate this in the belief of raising standard of living for their people and to tacitly advance higher in the hierarchy. This postwar perception significantly augmented sensitivities to any signs of reversal or infringement on the progress being made to liberate colonies and developing young nation-states.29 For instance, infringement of sovereignty proved to be a sensitive issue for these new nation-states because it acted as a safeguard against the colonialism of yesteryears as well as other forms of coercion and exploitation. Naked dominance was not going to be tolerated. In a Lok Sabha discussion on the idea of force being utilized

29 Kristan S. Tassin, “’Lift Up Your Head, My Brother’: Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement,” Journal of Third World Studies 23, no. 1 (Spring 2006), 147-168. Accessed March 22, 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45198721, 147-148. 22 over the issue of the Suez Canal, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru rebuked the notion stating, “It fails to take account of the world as it is today and the Asia of today.”30

The Jugular Vein of the Empire

Yet with these changes, the British developed an international organization of the own to adapt to the times. The British Commonwealth of Nations suited the new universal prestige well. It enabled the British to garner and maintain prestige as it gradually transformed and phased out its Empire. One of the first key adjustments in this vein was the founding the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1947, achieved by combining the Dominion and Indian Office.31 British officials developed the

Commonwealth concept as a halfway house to appease anticolonial sentiments as well as placating pro-empire stalwarts. Yet the structure of the Commonwealth was centered on

Britain to demonstrate she still played a major role in the world—and to maintain her prestige.32 John Darwin claims that, “it became commonplace in the 1950s and 1960s [to believe] that the Commonwealth was a natural successor to the empire and was held together by devotion to common ideals, such as democracy and racial partnership.”33

Members joined with similar notions of peace and prosperity that other international

30 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Extracts from a statement by the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, in the Lok Sabha, 8 August 1956,” in Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 1952-1962, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 485. 31 Peter Lyon, “The Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, (New York: Clarendon Press, 1980), 259. 32 H.V. Brasted, Carl Bridge, and John Kent, “Cold War, Informal Empire and the Transfer of Power: Some ‘Paradoxes’ of British Decolonisation Resolved?”, in Europe within the Global System 1938-1960, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany: From Great Powers to Regional Powers, ed. Michael Dockrill (Bochum, Germany: Universitatetsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1995), 30. 33 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 153. Note: A good example demonstrating Darwin’s description can be found in a broadcast by Deputy Labour leader James Griffith; “During the past half-century we have been slowly but surely achieving an ideal unique in human history… We have been transforming an Empire into a Commonwealth of free and equal nations, and this has become the greatest interracial body ever known to mankind.” See “Extract from broadcast by the Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Labour Party, Mr. James Griffiths, 8 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth and Suez: a Documentary Survey, ed. James Eayers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 221. 23 organizations sought, along with the hope to utilize it to exert their own influence.34

Desiring to remain a world power, the Commonwealth acted as a means for Britain to convert colonies from direct rule to nominally coequal member-states. Yet, it was achieved in such a way as to ensure that the British still maintained some influence as head of the group. British officials often upheld the idea of the Commonwealth, an international organization of close-nit nations with association to the British crown, to obscure the impact of World War II. Acting as a veil, it masked Britain’s postwar weakness and persuaded the British public and others of Britain’s world power status.35

Though it failed to endow Great Britain with superpower status, the Commonwealth distinguished Britain from other colonial powers; and more importantly, the

Commonwealth contributed significantly to Britain’s financial well-being by maintaining the sterling area.36

The importance of the sterling area preoccupied the ‘Official Mind’ extensively.

As a political concept and matter of prestige, it strongly underpinned British capabilities to remain a world power. With its origins in the early 1930s, the sterling area was created in reaction to Britain’s currency crisis with its gold and dollar shortage, but as a result, its lesser value in comparison to gold promoted British exports.37 It provided an alternative to the American gold dollar. By the 1950s, about half of all trade took place in the

34 Note: These notions of peace, unity, and prosperity can be observed from a statement by Pakistani Prime Minister H.S. Suhrawardy defensive argument for staying in the Commonwealth post-Suez by asserting, “We have a unity of purpose and common belief in the democratic way of life and we are prepared to cooperate with each other for the peace, progress and security of mankind.” See “Extracts from speeches by the Prime Minister, the Hon. H. S. Suhrawardy, in a foreign affairs debate in the National Assembly, 22 and 25 February 1957,” in Mansergh, Affairs, 528. 35 Kenneth Robinson, “The Intergovernamnet Machinery of the Commonwealth Consultation and Cooperation,” A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-1964, eds. W.B. Hamilton, Kenneth Robinson, and C.D.W. Goodwin, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1966), 97. AND Darwin, Debate, 35-36. 36 John Darwin, The Empire Project (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 572. 37 Peter J. Henshaw, “Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area: Gold Production, Capital Investment and Agricultural Markets, 1931-1961,” in The Historical Journal 39, no. 1 (March 1996): 197-223. Accessed January 17, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2639946, 201 and 204. 24 sterling area. Producing this high level of commerce, only the United States outspent the

United Kingdom in terms of military as well as civil research and development.38 This allowed London to continue as a financial center and facilitated flows of needed resources for production from colonies and new Commonwealth members without critical scrutiny.39 British policymakers, across political parties, government departments, and administrations desired sterling to be maintained at a steady rate with the dollar to insure sterling remained an international currency. The consequences of being unable to do meant a loss of prestige and credibility, especially for a country with a long history of predominance in finance.40 Its history in global finance and monetary management provided a skill that countries in the post-war world needed and valued.41 Britain’s long history in finance also created a dynamic in the post-war world where the Treasury held more power because of the urgency to maintain this particular prestige-concept, in which they consulted those in the service sector, particularly the Bank of England.42

Maintenance of the sterling proved vital in the ‘Official Mind’ as illustrated in a letter by

Permanent under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ivon Kirkpatrick to H.M. ambassador to the United States, Roger Makins. Kirkpatrick explained bluntly that if the sterling area disintegrates, Britain can’t pay for defense, and, if they cannot pay for defense, Britain is finished as a country.43

38 Darwin, Project, 581. Note: That research and development included Britain’s nuclear weaponry and energy programs. 39 Kenneth Robinson and C.D.W. Goodwin, “Preface: Ten Years of Rapid Change,” in A Decade of the Commonwealth, 1955-1964, eds. W.B. Hamilton, Kenneth Robinson, and C.D.W. Goodwin, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1966), ix. 40 Steven G. Galpern, Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East: Sterling and Postwar Imperialism, 1944-1971 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 186-187. 41 Note: For instance, New Zealand and Australia remained with Britain after its transition into the sterling area because they lacked the central banking capabilities that Britain provided. See Henshaw, “Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area,” 198. 42 Galpern, Oil, 8-9. 43 Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A personal account (New York: Lexington Books, 1978), 131. AND Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan, vol. I, Volume I: 1894-1956 (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), 416. 25

Defense played a large role in the maintenance of prestige because it fed into two particular prestige-concepts: the Anglo-American relationship and being a defender of the

Liberal West. While their origins of these particulars varied, they undoubtedly became entrenched in the ‘Official Mind’ from the Second World War and remained so in the

Cold War. Where the sterling area and the British economy limped out of the Second

World War, the dollar and the United States’ economy found themselves the center of the new global monetary system, the Bretton Woods system. America’s economic strength salvaged the British economy with the Anglo-American Loan Agreement. However in the ‘Official Mind’, Britain needed to perpetually reinforce the special relationship with defense commitments, as doing so bolstered Britain’s prestige and position it as a coequal partner with America by providing a valuable ability that not many in the post-war era could.44 Britain found itself in a unique position to contribute against the communist threat alongside the United States and save the Liberal West and Western Europe yet again.

Great Britain needed to keep pace with defense commitments to be a viable partner, one the United States can count on the most in the fight against communism. In providing this support to the United States, Britain hoped to garner American support for its foreign policy in turn—to ensure that Britain was always backed in her ventures. So in return of earning a reputation as a reliable ally and military power, Britain sought to

44 Note: A memo by Lord Salisbury in July 24, 1954 best reflects this sentiment. He stated the main objective is to avoid another major war. “To that end we must strengthen our position and influence as a world Power and maintain and consolidate our alliance with the United States.” In order to do so, Britain must possess the most modern arms, fight and contain communism, and smoothly develop the colonies. To achieve the first two required a certain level of commitment to defense as to help achieve both world power status and a consolidated relationship with the United States. See Lord Salisbury, “Report by the Committee on Defence Policy,” 1954, in The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1951-1957, ed. S R Ashton, series A, vol. 1, Part 1: International Relations, ed. David Goldsworthy (London: HMSO, 1994), 45-46. 26 combine it with American power to generate more prestige. “The aim, as The Economist once put it, was British negotiation from [a position of] American strength.”45 It will be this balancing of interconnecting prestige-concepts and political commitments that will lead to heated contentions and disaster for the British in the Middle East.

For decades British companies developed the oil fields of the Persian Gulf nations, creating an informal empire that a post-war Britain needed. World War II left

British reserves exhausted of both gold and dollars, leading to fragile confidence in the pound. If the world lost confidence in the pound, then Kirkpatrick’s anxiety that Britain could not defend itself—and therefore could not exist as a player on the world stage— might be realized. Oil became essential for Britain because of its favorable balance of payment for being a universally sought and demanded commodity for energy. Due to oil companies being British and being associated with the British government, the United

Kingdom imported oil using sterling payments and re-exported it for gold and dollars; filling reserves. Also, the company produced a vital amount of invisible income, such as dividends and interests earned in foreign investments.46 Thereby, the Conservatives increased reserves and warded off an episode of devaluation and spared the sterling area, unlike what occurred under the Attlee Government in 1949.

Still greater economic hardships continued for Great Britain from the policies of the Attlee administration. Full employment began taking its toll on the British pound.

With a high level of employment came a high amount of spending for both government and consumer, it generated inflation that jeopardized the confidence in the pound.47

45 Wm. Roger Louis, “Introduction,” in Suez 1956, 104. 46 Galpern, Oil, 6-7. 47 “The Economic Situation,” memorandum, 27 July 1955, secret, CAB 129/76, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthews Publications. 27

Spending also made it difficult to be ahead in the net import-export exchange, where imports continued to increase while exports struggled for various reasons, such as increases in industrial competition elsewhere and dock strikes.48 What remained more concerning was the decline in coal production, forcing import payment in dollars and gold in large amounts, leading officials to suggest using oil to sustain energy production in the domestic economy without depleting reserves.49

The strategy in maintaining Britain’s other prestigious political obligations all centered on cementing British prestige in the Middle East, therefore safeguarding her oil interests. Prestige mattered in the region because the officials believed it would prevent another Abadan. Losing the Abadan refinery, the world’s largest oil refinery, along with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to Iranian nationalization in 1952 greatly injured Britain.

While not fatal to Britain’s hopes to maintain world-power status, the episode made a lasting impact on what nationalism in the Middle East symbolized in the ‘Official Mind,’ and the episode emphasized the need to maintain prestige in the Middle East. They sought to remain on top of the hierarchy without force, and, to remain a country these oil states valued as a business partner with knowledge and success to benefit both sides.

The Suez Canal symbolized the linchpin of British strategy in the region—what one historian dubbed “the jugular vein of the Empire.”50 In 1955, 70 million tons of oil flowed through the Canal, representing half of Western Europe’s supply. With it moving

154 million tons of goods per day, it helped tie trade with Commonwealth members like

48 “Economic Survey: 1956,” note, 12 March 1956, confidential, CAB 129/80, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthews Publications. 49 “Fuel Policy,” memorandum, 18 May 1954, secret, CAB 129/68, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthews Publications. 50 Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2008), 491. 28

India and Australia.51 This gave the Suez Canal a strong association to the particular prestige-concepts British officials associated with. Due to this strong association with it, contentions with Egypt appeared to heavily preoccupy officials, and later, alter the way they perceived and interacted with what was universally prestigious.

The first bone of contention the Conservative officials experienced came when they attempted to resolve the issue of British troops in Egypt. A coup occurred in Egypt in 1951, in which several high-ranking Egyptian military officers, known as the Free

Officers, ousted the British-leaning King Farouk I out of power for their own nationalist agenda. General Mahomed Neguib led the Free Officers and became Egypt’s first president.52 Egyptian nationalists took a hostile stance towards Britain for their withdrawal from the Palestinian Mandate which left the Arabs there to fend off the

Israelis.53 Egypt, under this new nationalist regime, claimed that the treaty that granted the stationing of British troops at the Canal was voided under the United Nations

Charter.54

For Britain, the entire concern over the issue became whether they could maintain a troop presence at the canal specifically. In 1954, then Secretary of State for Foreign

Affairs Anthony Eden determined the consequences of maintaining troops at the canal: it would upset many other Arab states and make it difficult to draft deals to redeploy troops elsewhere. Furthermore, there did not exist the resources to fully staff and maintain the base. However, the more important point came with the guerilla skirmishes troops

51 “Extracts from statement by the Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons, 2 August 1956,” in The Commonwealth and Suez: a Documentary Survey, ed. James Eayers, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 29. 52 Michael Doran, Ike’s Gamble: America’s Rise to Dominance in the Middle East (New York: Free Press, 2016), 3, 14. 53 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 17. 54 “Egypt,” memorandum, 9 February 1954, top secret, CAB 129/65, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 29 perpetually faced by Egyptian nationalists. While not stated, Eden insinuated a scenario where British troops faced the prospect of defending a deteriorating base—a scenario not too different to the insurgencies they faced currently and in the recent past. To stay and fight meant gambling their prestige in which they face the pressure of the need to succeed and hold a rundown base, or, fail in which British military skill and knowledge proved unable to resolve a nationalist driven insurgent conflict.55 In this case, their prestige in the oil rich Middle East lied at stake. Pro-British monarchies in the region, like Jordan and

Iraq, needed to be reassured Britain possessed the skills and knowledge to handle armed nationalists. Therefore, they can rely on British prestige to deter zealous nationalistic machinations.

An exit strategy proved essential, but the British needed to avoid withdrawing too quickly or they risked being seen as bullied out by Egypt. They wanted to prevent rising nationalism from becoming a force they could not circumvent and shrewdly manage. To save face, they added a condition to the withdrawal from the Canal whereby British technicians were to remain behind, maintaining key facilities so that the British may return upon the advent of another expansive war. With this condition secured in an agreement between the two governments in 1954, the British officials saw their exit as an honorable withdrawal that outwardly displayed mutual agreement with a nationalist administration while extolling that Britain shall return in defense of the West and other allies. To them, this kept their reputation intact.56 Eden earlier assessed, “It is clear that, if substantial cuts are to be made, the Middle East is the least dangerous theatre to make

55 “Egypt: Defence Negotiations,” memorandum, 13 March 1954, secret, CAB 129/66, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 56 Ibid. See also “Egypt: Defence Negotiations,” memorandum, 27 January 1954, confidential, CAB 129/65, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publication. 30 them.”57 Despite a withdrawal with honor while easing spending, the British faced a continuous struggle for influence in the Middle East.

Events after the withdrawal from the Suez base greatly damaged British prestige in the Middle East courtesy of the Egyptian Government and Col. Gamal Nasser. Nasser was a charismatic Free Officer that informally headed the Egyptian government until he was voted in as president of Egypt in 1954. During this time, Nasser utilized radio broadcasts, developed with the help of the CIA, to place pressure on other Arab governments by stimulating nationalist sentiments among the common Arab with The

Voice of the Arabs broadcast.58 Using this, he amplified Egypt’s prestige by accounting their success in forcing the British from the Canal.59 It led to the dismissal of General

John Glubb and other British officials in Jordan’s Arab Legion by King Hussein of

Jordan, who came under pressure by nationalists in his own country.60 Not only that, it resulted in the balking of Lebanon and Jordan from joining the Baghdad Pact, a British led military alliance for Middle Eastern countries to combat Soviet penetration in the region.61 “There is a serious danger,” the Chancellor of Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, warned, “that the Middle East will slip away from us. The Egyptians, the Saudi Arabians and now the Russians are making great efforts to undermine our position, and spending large sums of money.”62

57 “Middle East Policy,” memorandum, 7 January 1954, secret, CAB 129/65, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publication. 58 Doran, Gamble, 10-11. 59 Doran, Gamble, 75-76. 60 Kyle, Suez, 92. 61 Note: Macmillan, upon discussing Glubb’s dismissal, stated, “Sir John Glubb, the British creator of the Jordanian army, was a legendary figure, and the blow to British prestige was serious.” See, Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm (New York: Macmillan and Co. LTD, 1971), 92. 62 “Middle East Oil,” note, 14 October 1955, secret, CAB 129/78, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 31

In light of this waning reputation, the Middle East Oil Committee released a memo to counterbalance Egyptian influence in November of 1955. Despite the critical importance of maintaining prestige in the Middle East to deter another Abadan, the

British Government neglected programs of soft power.63 With Egyptian teachers pervasive throughout the region to compliment the Voice of the Arabs radio broadcast, the British found themselves needing to play catch up with its own soft power efforts.

Concerns that Britain’s reputation will dwindle deepened evermore as Egypt attempted to influence Arabs in various ways. “They claim the cultural leadership of the Arab world and their main weapons are press, radio, and education.”64 This required strategic yet minimal spending which included funding for a Boy school, media development, teachers and trainers, the British Council, air conditioning in officer facilities, and “launches, for prestige and recreational purposes” at Persian Gulf posts.65 While some measures come off as far-fetched, all attempted to appeal to tangible, such as wealth and luxury, as well as intangible, such as education, criteria for prestige ranking. Many of the programs they believed needed two to three years to be in full effect. However by the next year in 1956,

British soft power aspirations in the Middle East proved futile because of an operation that British officials themselves decided on.

Upon the agreement of the evacuation of British troops in 1954, there also lied other agreements concerning the Canal. While Nasser wanted to control the Canal, the

Suez Canal Company which operated the Canal, compelled Nasser to agree to Company control of the Canal until 1968.66 Nasser needed to wait in order to showcase Egypt’s

63 Note: There were spending less than 2.5 million pounds on these types of programs annually. 64 Ibid. 65 “Middle East Oil,” note, 14 November 1955, secret, CAB 129/78, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 66 Kyle, Suez, 120-121. 32 skill in handling an internationally important waterway. With universal prestige among countries being industrial and developed, Nasser sought to imitate the industrial West with the construction of a hydroelectric dam to elevate his countrymen’s image of themselves.67 The Aswan Dam Project, however, needed tremendous funding that required Egypt to look outside the Middle East for lenders. At the World Bank’s estimate of nearly $900 million after foreign exchange, it became a major credit risk.68 In order for the World Bank with Anglo-American backing to work, it demanded total control of the

Egyptian economy to insure no squandering of resources and to regulate inflation, and even still, there existed no guarantee in full funding of the project.69 Eventually the offer collapsed by the summer of 1956.70 With British troops evacuated from the Canal and with the need for funds, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956.

The decision to nationalize the Canal impacted Britain the most. It owned 45% of the controlling interests in the Suez Canal Company, it received roughly a quarter of its imports from ships that went through the Canal that included precious oil, its ships consisted of a third of all usage of the Canal annually, and it used the Canal to annually rotate 60,000 troops between Europe and the Far East. Yet more importantly, Britain’s prestige, the element that held their influence in the Middle East, seemed to be greatly endangered. Hugh Thomas wrote in The Suez Affair that, “Britain’s general position in the Arab world, which rested so much on prestige, was threatened even more than it had seemed to have been over the Glubb affair.”71 While obvious that Egypt held the

67 Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1966), 36. 68 Kyle, Suez, 82-83. Note: There exist other estimates for the project in other sources. For instance, Eden claimed the project cost $1,300. See Anthony Eden, Full Circle (London: Cassell & Co., 1960), 420. 69 Kyle, Suez, 123. 70 Kyle, Suez, 127-130. 71 Thomas, Suez Affair, 39. 33 capabilities to disrupt oil flow, the move also insinuated more damaging ramifications to

British prestige. Nasser believed that the success of nationalization of the Canal lied in

Egypt’s ability to run the Canal’s operations without disruption.72 So long as Egyptians displayed the knowledge and skill to operate an internationally important waterway, they can keep control of the Canal. This threaten British prestige in the Middle East because success from this move may lead to greater prestige for Nasser, who took a relatively

British company for the purpose of funding the development of his nation. With elevated prestige from such a move, Egypt might encourage Arab nationalists to pressure their leaders to imitate Egypt and boldly nationalize other British companies, most importantly oil companies and refineries. If rebuffed by the monarchs, they might overthrow their leaders and do it themselves.73

British officials, who already held a growing distrust of Nasser after an arms deal with the Soviets the previous year, now saw Nasser as someone too mistrustful and too dangerous.74 Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor of Exchequer, wrote in his diary the day after nationalization. He described the speech Nasser gave on nationalization of the Canal as “very truculent – an Asiatic Mussolini full of insult and abuse of US and UK.”75

Macmillan became a driving force within the Eden Government to remove Nasser by use of force, but he was not alone. Franco-Israeli relations blossomed over arms deals and mutual hatred of Nasser, who aided Algerian rebels against the French on one side and helped Palestinian insurgents in the Gaza strip, known as fedayeen, on the other.76 The

72 Kyle, Suez, 132. 73 See Doran, Gamble, 197-188. 74 Note: Reports by an agent codenamed “Lucky Break” also fed the Government information that made Nasser look like a leader under Soviet influence than in actual reality. See Kyle, Suez, 108. 75 Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, vol. 1, The Cabinet Years, 1950-1957, ed. Peter Catterall (London, Macmillan LTD., 2003), 578. 76 Kyle, Suez, 79. 34

French Prime Minister, Guy Mollet, wanted Nasser ousted to demoralize Arab nationalists in Algeria, and, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wanted access to the Red Sea via the Straits of Tiran to bypass the Egyptian controlled Canal. Their dovetailing interests sprouted a scheme that Mollet approached to Eden with—the forceful removal of Nasser.77 As multilateral pursuits to establish international status of the Canal fell through as well as Egypt successfully operating the Canal, British officials became convinced on the use of force to rid Nasser.78

On October 29th, 1956, Israeli forces commence the three-country operation and engaged Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, pushing the Egyptian backwards.79

Britain and France, on the surface acting concerned about the disruption of peace and

Canal operations, gave a 36 hour ultimatum to both sides in which both needed to withdrawal forces—Egyptian forces 10 miles west of the Canal and Israeli forces 10 miles east.80 If not, Anglo-French forces were to intervene. Nasser refused it as a bluff by

Eden and proceeded to send his armor brigade to the frontlines.81 As for the Americans, the Anglo-French planners assumed inactivity because they believed the Eisenhower administration wanted to not anger the Jewish vote as the presidential election was soon.

Instead, the Eisenhower administration moved briskly, putting forward a cease-fire resolution to the UN.82 Security Council resolution for the cease-fire failed with vetoes from France and Britain, who argued that the UN will be too slow to end the conflict.

This conflict, they claimed, held the potential of escalating exponentially and needed an

77 Thomas, Suez Affair, 55 and 90-91. 78 Kyle, Suez, 191. AND Thomas, Suez Affair, 79 and 87. Note: More about these multilateral efforts and discussions below. 79 Hugh, The Suez Affair, 133. 80 Hugh, The Suez Affair, 121-122. AND Kyle, Suez, 358-359. 81 Hugh, The Suez Affair, 141-142. AND Doran, Gamble, 193. 82 Kyle, Suez, 353. AND Hugh, The Suez Affair, 149. 35 immediate response.83 Ariel bombings on Egyptian targets commence on October 31st, in which there was overall success, especially with grounding Egyptian air forces that worried the Israelis because of their cities’ vulnerability to air bombings.84

On November 5, 1956, Anglo-French paratroopers landed and engaged Egyptian ground forces at Port Said, the north entrance of the Canal. Backed up later by forces by sea, they made their way south to capture the Canal completely. By doing so, they may dictate terms for its international status.85 Egyptian forces sunk ships to block the Canal’s entry. However, world and American favor responded critically to Britain and France, especially in the markets. British reserves bled, in which Macmillan informed his colleagues nearly an eighth of the reserves were lost.86 Word came from the UN in New

York, the Americans were discussing oil sanctions. In British Foreign Secretary Selwyn

Lloyd’s account, “Macmillan threw his arms in the air and said, ‘Oil sanctions! That finishes it!’”87 Lloyd, Macmillan, and others no longer saw it feasible to resist the US, the

UN, and the Commonwealth members. Understanding the situation, Eden ordered forces to halt. Midnight on November 7th, the Battle of Suez was over. The British had failed.88

Their failure stemmed partially from there misperceptions caused by their concern of prestige, frustration with universal prestige and its values, and their neglect of their particular prestige-concepts, such as their ‘special relationship’ with the United States.

83 Kyle, Suez, 359 and 364. 84 Kyle, Suez, 384. AND Hugh, The Suez Affair, 121-122. 85 Kyle, Suez, 444-448. 86 Note: However, Macmillan greatly exaggerated the losses in the first week of November by stating it was £100 million rather than the roughly £31.7 million. See Kyle, Suez, 464. 87 Lloyd, a personal account, 206. 88 Kyle, Suez, 467-468 and 476. 36

The Aftermath and Reflecting on Prestige

The United Kingdom’s particular prestige found in their ‘special relationship’ with the United States distorted the reality of their situation surrounding Suez. In the memoirs of Eden and Macmillan, many heated words targeted American officials during the period leading up to and through the Suez Canal Crisis.89 Their grievances towards

America during the crisis reveals how prestige influenced the decision-making of British officials. British officials misjudged the American administration’s reaction because they struggled to properly understand the new universal prestige and how they prioritized their own particular prestige-concepts.

British officials, particularly Eden, saw the nationalization of the Suez Canal

Company as a violation of an international agreement and an illegal appropriation of an international waterway. Internationalism proved to be the key value in the new universal prestige, so an issue involving an international waterway should prove to be one in their favor. However, the nationalist aspect of the Canal needed to also be addressed. The Suez

Canal Company was technically Egyptian, and the British conceded that the Canal was an integral part of Egypt as read in the 1954 treaty. These facts made the issue more complex as it dealt with the sovereignty of a nation victimized by colonialism.90 Two key values in universal prestige seemed to be at conflict, but, if countries found it within

Egypt’s right to nationalize the Canal, the Canal by perception becomes Egyptian. Thus, it was up to the international community to help resolve the matter.

89 Note: Macmillan portrayed American U.N. ambassador Cabot Lodge as a vapid and vindictive Bostonian who acted on the long standing bad blood between Boston and Great Britain. See Macmillan, Storm, 151. 90“Egypt: Defence Negotiations,” memorandum, 17 November 1954, secret, CAB 129/67, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthews Publication. Note: It does pose a puzzling situation as Nasser violated the treaty that conceded that, which makes it perplexing what weight to give words in the treaty. 37

This complication in interpreting what aligned with universal prestige, along with the American government wanting to play mediator rather than hardline ally, made

British efforts at multilateralism frustrating and abortive. While US Secretary of State

John Foster Dulles denounced Nasser in a meeting with Eden, the idea of force rested in the opinion of the international community.91 Eden’s Government proceeded with the

London Conference where the signees of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and other Canal users came together with the determination to put the Canal under international authority, but Nasser rejected the conference and lodged a complaint to the

United Nations.92 Australian Prime Minister Harold Menzies met with Nasser on behalf of the British and French, where he warned Nasser that the British and French still saw force as an option. Yet at that same time, Eisenhower’s affirmation to a peaceful resolution during a press conference dashed such persuasion.93 Dulles’s efforts to resolve the matter came in the form of SCUA (Suez Canal Users’ Association), in which there existed a board of users along with Egypt to discuss policies on the Canal. British Foreign

Secretary Selwyn Lloyd became enthused by the American investment in it, but only for

Dulles to attest it possessed no teeth, and therefore, it did not act as a check to Egyptian control.94 After the realization of SCUA being impotent, Lloyd in his memoir concluded,

“It was unlikely that effective international control of the Canal would be achieved without the use of force.”95 Discouraging results came with a Soviet veto in the Security

Council meeting rejecting the six principles of the London Conference that established international principles inherit to the Canal, which included free and open passage of the

91 Keith Kyle, Suez, 159-160 and 145. 92 Kyle, Suez, 183. 93Anthony Eden, Full Circle, 506. 94 Macmillan, Storm, 138-139. 95 Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: a personal account, 133. 38

Canal.96 All this wore the British officials into dismay and frustration.97 Such can be noted when examining the Queen’s Speech in 1954 where HMG affirmed explicit support for both NATO and the UN in the same sentence. Come the Queen’s Speech in the fall of 1956 there was no mention of explicit support for the UN, but instead, the UN appears to be relegated to “those international agencies of which the United Kingdom is a member.”98 The UN, the institution symbolizing universal prestige, no longer received the same firm support as NATO, the organization linked with a particular prestige of the

United Kingdom. This foreshadowed the priorities in prestige that British officials acted on.

Eden in his memoir stated, “The guardian of internationalism [the UN] might have been expected to defend this successful experiment. Nothing of the kind… It is inevitable that there will be a reckoning for this moral backsliding.”99 Internationalism failed to show any signs of being able to protect British interests and British prestige from nationalism. Universal prestige, in the ‘Official Mind’, seemed impotent and unpractical. To the British officials, Nasser’s move have been one of dominance, in which one forcefully takes resources to dictate terms to others. Such contrasts with the explanation of how Nasser’s conduct reflected universal prestige, where his actions were driven by more nationalistic, anti-imperial intentions. British officials, in their mercantile mentality of prestige that Nicolson observed, saw Nasser breaking an agreement—a

96 Thomas, Suez Affair, 106. 97 Note: Macmillan illustrated the frustration in which all this enable Nasser and the fear of its ramifications. “If Colonel Nasser’s prestige is put up sufficiently, and ours is put down sufficiently, the effects in that part of the world will be that our friends desert us because they think we are lost.” See Macmillan, Storm, 131. 98 See “The Queen’s Speech on the Prorogation of Parliament,” note, 13 November 1954, secret, CAB 129/71, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. AND “The Queen’s Speech on the Opening of Parliament,” note, 24 October 1956, top secret, CAB 129/83, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. AND “The Queen’s Speeches on the Prorogation and Opening of Parliament,” memorandum, 5 October 1956, top secret, CAB 129/84, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 99 Eden, Full Circle, 506. 39 deal—without any penalty. This was highly contrary to their idea of prestige in their eyes.

Selwyn Lloyd commented in his memoir on Nasser’s rhetoric on nationalization of the

Canal: “That is, whether we like it or not, the language of Hitler and the rule of the jungle.”100

Another great illustration of their sentiments of universal prestige can be seen by the Churchillian stalwart Harold Menzies at a debate in the Australian House of

Commons. Menzies propounded that the British today must remain practical as it was central to the prosperity and survival of the British Empire. “It would be a sad day if it allowed itself to be theorized out of existence.”101 Later he asserted, “We are not living in an academic world.”102 Yet the problem with prestige lies in not what is, but what the collective perceives, regardless of the true nature of things. If enough believe in an academic world, then people will judge actions as if it was. At that moment in time, there appeared to be a divergence in perception, but not in the way a self-proclaimed realists like Eden or Macmillan expected.

Nasser came to symbolize something quite different between Eisenhower and

British officials. To his British counterparts, they drew comparisons of Nasser, who broke an agreement, with someone else who did the exact same thing. In Eden’s memoir,

Eden compared the Suez situation with Hitler breaking the Munich Agreement and that

Nasser followed the patterns of Hitler.103 Yet, the US president saw differently. On

100 Lloyd, personal account, 137-138. 101 “Extracts from speeches by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. RG. Menzies, and by the Leader of the Opposition, the Rt Hon. Dr H.V. Evatt, in the House of Representatives, 25 September 1956,” in Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 1952-1962, 489. 102 The leader of the opposition party, Dr. Evatt, denounced such rhetoric. “That language is not the language of the twentieth century. It is the language of the years before there was a League of Nations of a United Nations.”. See ibid. AND “Extracts from speeches of the Prime minister, the Rt Hon. R.G. Menzies, and the Leader of the Opposition, the Rt Hon. Dr H.V. Evatt, in the House of Representatives, 1 and 8 November 1956,” in Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 518. 103 Eden, Full Circle, 131. 40

September 3rd, 1956 Eisenhower sent a letter to Eden and clearly stated his opposition to force. In a later telegram he went even further by rejecting Eden’s rationale for the use of force by stating that Eden held a too grandiose view of Nasser, and that he should instead brainstorm alternative sources for oil.104 Two statesmen who once fought the tyrannical fascists of the Second World War came to two different conclusions about a dictator in

Egypt. One saw him as ruthless despot that clothed himself in Arab nationalism to deceive and rile the people in order to incite instability, install puppet governments, and nationalized oil industries to create a pan-Arab empire with Soviet backing. The other saw him as a dictator of country that became an irritant but not dangerous. Egypt proved so financially enfeeble that Eisenhower allowed his secretary of state to peddle off the

Aswan Dam project to the Soviets in the hopes giving them the financial burden rather than convincing Congress for such funds. This led to the Anglo-American loan offer for

Aswan to fall through.105 Eisenhower held some disdain towards Nasser because the dictator acted in bad faith after receiving American help, but it did not pose such a tremendous threat as to violate universal prestige in order to remove him. Instead, he wanted to be a mediator to facilitate peace as a neutral third party, unlike his British counterparts.106 It appeared that Eden and others, for being the victims of Nasser and emphasizing so much on prestige in the Middle East, believed in Nasser’s own prestige too much.

This stems from how the British officials attempted to interpret universal prestige versus the interpretation of the Eisenhower administration. British officials took note of

104 Kyle, Suez, 224-225. AND Lloyd, personal account, 130. 105 Doran, Gamble, 170-171. Note: Eisenhower regretted the abrupt style of the withdrawal later on. 106 Doran, Gamble, 145, 206. 41 the growing excitement and hope for international collaboration and cooperation. In

Nasser’s collection of writings called The Philosophy of Revolutions, it describes

Nasser’s desire for an Arab bloc in which Egypt heads the organization.107 From this, officials added together the universally prestigious values of nationalism and international cooperation together. Their calculation created the sum of all possible threats to British prestige: an expansive multinational Arab empire fueled by the unyielding forces of postcolonial nationalism.108 Macmillan’s final diary entry in 1956 on

October 4th highlighted this fear. It read, “Nasser may well try to preach Holy War in the

Middle East and (even to their own loss) mob and the demagogues may create a ruinous position for us.”109

Then, one observes how the Eisenhower administration interpreted universal prestige. The idea of a pan-Arab empire in the middle of the twentieth century seemed extravagant to the Americans. Free from alarmism in their more removed and neutral position, they better understood the emphasis of sovereignty in universal prestige: that countries will not out of some ideal allow their sovereignty to be subverted. Eisenhower began courting Saudi Arabia to reaffirm this reality against Nasser’s ambitions. Arab rivalries became utilized with the new emphasis on sovereignty of nation-states to negate pan-Arab ambitions.110 For the Americans, they did not perceive the situation as a zero sum dilemma, which one either stays high in the hierarchy or plummets downward in the region. Rather, a nation’s prestige can be used to attract some followers who admire and

107 Doran, Gamble, 82-83. 108 See Eden, Circle, 543. 109 Macmillan, Diaries, 607. Note: It is difficult to interpret the term “Holy War” in this context. Nasser was a secularist who suppressed Islamist political aspirations; but, the term can also be framed in a way that Nasser’s brand of Arab nationalism is being ridiculed as a religion because of its zealous promotion and adherence. 110 Note: Michael Doran stated, “In a world dominated by gangsters, Eisenhower advocate[ed] managing the rivalry between them [Arab states], not choosing sides.” See Doran, Gamble, 235. 42 have deference for that nation’s knowledge, skills, and success these followers valued. To conduct themselves in a manner that contradicts the emphasized values of universal prestige only can lead to squandering of that leadership position, especially as a hegemon.

As a hegemon in competition with another hegemon, the United States did not find it advantageous at the moment to conduct themselves contrary to what was universally prestigious. While it appears that the Soviets could nullify international efforts with its veto in the Security Council as seen with the six principle, universal prestige remained a useful tool for the Eisenhower administration. Universal prestige promoted nationalism and promised sovereignty to burgeoning nations. Given how

Soviet calculations disregarded human life and sovereignty for control as seen in their blockade on Berlin, the Soviets were internationally perceived as being likely to replicate that same brutality—something that, while not quite humiliating, was assuredly un- prestigious. One reason that Eisenhower bought into universal prestige was because of his belief that the liberal values of the West will be perceived more generously—and thereby more prestigiously—than Soviet strategy. Therefore, they expected remain high in the hierarchy because of the conglomerate of developing nations that will be attracted to the United States while the Soviet Union proceeded to openly violate the values seen universally prestigious. Then, his administration might therefore use universal prestige to undermine and enervate Soviet expansion and power.111 That opportunity came at

Hungary, and it was simultaneously lost at Suez.

111 Note: Michael Doran’s thesis in Ike’s Gamble centers on the Eisenhower administration’s “honest broker” strategy in order to win over nationalists in developing nations, in this case, Arab nationalists. See Doran, Gamble, 9-10. 43

Eden in his memoirs rued how the United Nations allowed for the brutal crushing of the Hungarian revolution to go unpunished, but failed to realize the existential danger the Suez intervention posed to universal prestige.112 The United States needed to address the actions of her allies over the actions of her enemy in this circumstance. French and

British forces invading Egypt so seriously violated the popular conception of what was universally valued. Since the invasion mirrored the taboo tactics and dominance that many associated with colonialism, there was no realistic possibility of receiving support by Eisenhower. Though the Soviets had violated the concept of universal prestige in its invasion of Hungary, if both hegemons went on to ignore universal prestige and acted or complied with imperialist endeavors, then universal prestige itself likely have been in jeopardy. If the current universal prestige was not useful for protecting nations from blatant militarist dominance, then the post-war order and the conception of a proper, upstanding nation-state may fall by the wayside—no longer able to command deference and enforce the behavior of others. This may cause another shift in universal prestige or possibly erode and fray universal prestige in which there exists no strong emphasis on a set of values. Consequently, this meant a hegemon cannot influence the hierarchy by imprinting their particular values deemed prestigious in order to develop a world order favorable to them.113 Therefore, the United States needed to act in order to preserve a

112 Note: Eden’s statement: “The pitiable failure of the United Nations to influence Hungarian events in the slightest degree lit up that tragedy in flaming colors.” Eden, Full, 544. 113 Note: A good illustration of this anxiety over universal prestige’s existence, at least from a nascent country’s viewpoint, can be found in Pakistan’s UN diplomat Begum Shaista Ikramullah. He propounded a resolution for immediate withdrawal of forces. He stated, “It is imperative that this should be done immediately to restore the shattered confidence of the World in the principles of the Charter.” With the invasion in Egypt eroding such confidence, smaller countries only grow most disillusioned like they have been over recent years, thinking the UN is a “holy alliances for the unholy purposes.” See “Extracts from speech by the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Mr. R. S. S. Gunawardene, to the General Assembly, 3 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth and Suez: A Documentary Survey, ed. James Eayers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 367-368. 44 universal prestige that they determined was useful against Soviet expansion and influence. 114

Alistair Horne points out in his biography of Harold Macmillan that officials like

Eden and Macmillan contributed to the Eisenhower administration’s punitive reaction not to him but to other people in the administration like John Foster Dulles. However,

Eisenhower commanded the entire affair himself. Dulles was recovering from cancer surgery during the affair. Yet in the weeks leading up to the intervention, Eisenhower had instructed Dulles to blow hot and cold over Suez as to deter the British and the French from using force.115 In the British ‘Official Mind’ this tactic led to misinterpretation, in which their particular understanding of the prestigious ‘special relationship’ gave some leeway to their actions. Some believed that if they pushed the United States into a corner that the Americans will acquiesce to British reasoning. In this paternal disposition, they saw themselves as the experienced ones in Middle Eastern affairs and that the Americans would come around to understanding their actions.116 However, Eisenhower saw no clemency for the threat the British and French posed to universal prestige after making

114 Doran, Gamble, 197. Note: Doran also argues the Eisenhower would have allowed Suez to happen had the operation occurred swiftly. However, it difficult as to whether this comes from retrospection of what proceeded afterwards in the Middle East rather than Eisenhower at that moment when he wanted America to be the honest broker. Even still, a swift operation may afforded the US wiggle room for excuse because they were not in the most ideal position to respond quickly enough. See Doran, Gamble, 199. AND See Kyle, Suez, 376. 115 Horne, Macmillan, 424. Note: The best example of this display by Dulles can be found in Lloyd’s account of the events. For example, during a meeting between the two as the U.N. Security Council deliberated six principle resolution Dulles told Lloyd they needed to make it clear to the Security Council that a lack of a peaceful settlement meant consideration of force. What Lloyd mistook for the actual use of force proved in reality chicanery by Dulles. See Lloyd, personal account, 154. 116 Diane B. Kunz, “The Importance of Having Money: The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis,´ in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, (New York: Clarendon Press, 1980), 223. Note: Harold Macmillan drew comparison between the Suez operation and the World Wars, stating that Great Britain first did the right thing and the Americans joined later. See Macmillan, Storm, 154. Even Churchill himself held similar sentiments in a letter: “The American alliance remains the Keystone of our policy. I am confident that our American friends will come to realize that, not for the time, we have acted independently for the common good.” See “Letter from the Member for Woodford, Sir Winston Churchill, to the Chairman of the Woodford Conservative Party Association, 3 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth and Suez: a Documentary Survey, ed. James Eayers, 216. 45 various efforts to make them understand and to dissuade them.117 Eisenhower thus cunningly went after where the British felt it most, the sterling area—the particular prestige-concept which most compelled British actions.118

Despite the health of the sterling area lying at the forefront of the British officials’ minds, it received little forethought when it came to considerations of international reaction to Suez. Earlier that year in March, the Treasury, with the Bank of England, unified the bilateral and transferrable account areas to increase sterling convertibility.

They hoped to make a transition to full convertibility less traumatic with this move. Full convertibility meant sterling became easier to manage and increase its popularity for both trade and being a reserve currency.119 Back in July of 1955, Harold Macmillan lamented the sterling’s lack of popularity with foreigners, who saw little need or urgency to purchase sterling.120 Convertibility, the Treasury and Bank of England believed, needed to be a vital step taken in order for London to remain a leading financial center.121

However, as Steven Galpern observed, “The measure taken the previous year [the

Treasury began the convertibility process in 1955] to encourage the currency use was producing the opposite effect.”122 Faith in the pound and sterling remained shaky because of factors like the pound’s inflation issues. In an economic survey for the year 1955,

Macmillan reported a staggering £826 million trade deficit with a balance of payment that erased a fifth of their gold and dollar reserves. Britain, the leader of the sterling area,

117 Note: In later years, Eisenhower regretted the harshness he treated his allies with. See Doran, Gamble, 214. 118 Horne, Macmillan, 425. 119 Galpern, Oil, 146-147. 120 “The Economic Situation,” memorandum, 31 August 1955, secret, CAB 129/77, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 121 Kunz, “Economic Diplomacy,” in Crisis and Consequences, 219. 122 Galpern, Oil, 167. Note: Diane Kunz also made a similar conclusion. “The irony is that had Britain not accorded transferable sterling convertibility eighteen months earlier she would not have faced such a perilous financial predicament during the Suez crisis.” Kunz, “Economic Diplomacy,” in Crisis and Consequences, 219. 46 dragged the sterling area into a £180 million deficit with the non-sterling world.123

Speculators distanced themselves from the pound that inflicted a £144 million drain on reserves that year as well.124 The intervention at Port Said confirmed speculators’ fears, and British officials disregarded the precautions needed.

While the vulnerability of the pound proved self-evident, there was little precautionary measures taken to reinforce it from the international reaction to British actions over Suez. The French took out a loan from the International Monetary Fund in advance, but Macmillan failed to do so as well. When his biographer Alistair Horne inquired why he neglected to take such precautions, Macmillan explained that the

Treasury and the Bank of England advised against it. “Misguided, as it now seems,

Macmillan took the Bank’s and Treasury’s advice, and did nothing.”125 During the intervention, the United States blocked Britain from accessing a loan from the IMF that

Macmillan regarded as “a breach of the spirit [of the IMF].”126

Other American retributions included strict enforcement of anti-trust laws to prevent American oil companies coordinating with British ones for oil relief efforts, blocked access to the Export-Import Bank of the United States for loans, and a declaration that any discussions of financial aid were non-negotiable till a complete withdrawal. This culminated in devastation: £85 million lost in the first week in

123 “Economic Survey: 1956,” note, 12 March 1956, confidential, CAB 129/80, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publication. 124 Galpern, Oil, 148. 125 Horne, Macmillan, 443. Note: It may be debatable as to the fact Treasury officials advised against it. Many Treasury officials proved quite alarmed of the latent backlash regarding the actions over the Canal. Furthermore, Macmillan neglected to relay warnings from the Treasury to the Cabinet about the consequences of military action without U.S. support. This makes the idea of them advising against precautions from the very thing they fretted over seem unlikely. Rather, Macmillan in his memoir visited the IMF during his visit to Washington and saw no difficulties in drawing from it to keep sterling strong. It may be that he misread the situation that drawing from it will be unconditional. See Galpern, Oil, 171 and 174. AND Macmillan, Storm, 135. 126 Macmillan, Storm, 163-164. 47

November, Middle East oil cut off with the Canal blocked and the Syrian oil pipeline sabotaged, loans like the Anglo-American Loan Agreement due for payment, and no relief in sight leading to a loss of 15% of the total British reserves by the end of the month. British reserves fell below the Treasury’s threshold of $2,000 million to keep stability in the sterling area.127

Facing these difficulties, the pound became susceptible to being devalued, which meant an end to the sterling area being a viable alternative to the American system.128

With their particular prestige that enable their defense commitments, their ‘special relationship’, their financial leadership within the Commonwealth, and their defense of the Liberal West, the British relented. As Diane Kunz noted, “the United States had a monopoly on the world’s dominant currency,” which was why “its use of financial weapons against Britain was so strikingly successful.” However, such results only happened at that particular time in the infancy of the international financial system, the apex of American financial predominance.129 Timing hurt the British operation in Suez not only when it came to lack of consultation with their American allies, but with their

Commonwealth allies as well.

In a House of Commons debate shortly after the announcement of the Anglo-

French ultimatum to the belligerent parties in the Sinai, Labour MP Denis Healey inquired to the prime minister about the consultation of the United States, the

Commonwealth, and other allies about this decision. Eden replied that the Government was in close contact with the United States and the Security Council as well as close

127 Galpern, Oil, 179, 185. And Eden, Circle, 557. And Kunz, “Economic Diplomacy,” in Crisis and Consequences, 128 Note: The Bank of England on November 22, 1956 sold $100 million in gold to the New York Federal Reserve to stave off devaluation. Kunz, “Economic Diplomacy,” in Crisis and Consequences, 229. 129 Kunz, “Economic Diplomacy,” in Crisis and Consequences, 228-229. 48 consultation with the Commonwealth.130 The prime minister lied. Peter Lyon argues in

“The Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis” that Eden demonstrated erratic, lukewarm ambitions for the Commonwealth. For example, the Commonwealth meeting in late July to early August of 1956 brought together all Commonwealth prime ministers. Eden never discussed the Suez Canal or attempted to form a cooperative policy on it. Despite his ominous arguments in the House at how Nasser’s dominance threatened Commonwealth members’ trade, he took little action in coordinating a policy with members at an opportune time. 131

Lying about consultation, Eden’s administration proceeded to conduct strategic bombings in Egypt the next day. As for the legality of the bombings, Eden asserted the

UN Charter sanctions such actions, but, he never bothered consulting the Foreign

Office’s Legal Adviser, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, on whether that stood to be the case.132

This demonstrates a sense of dismissive callousness over a global system that, in Eden’s eyes, proved inept and morally backsliding. Leader of the Opposition Hugh Gaitskell, on the day of the bombings in the House of Commons, charged the Government of betraying the tenets of British post-war foreign policy, which included unity with the

Commonwealth. Selwyn Lloyd response demonstrated an admission of guilt by asserting in a critical emergency such as this, that “it is not practicable to have prior agreement.”133

130 “Extracts from a speech by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, questions by Mr Denis Healey, and a reply by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, 30 October 1956,” in Affairs, Mansergh, 493. 131 Peter Lyon, “The Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956, 260, 263. 132 Keith Kyle, “Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956,” in Suez: 1956, 115. 133 “Extracts from speeches of the Leader of the Opposition, the Rt Hon. Hugh Gaitskell, and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Rt Hon. Selwyn Lloyd, in the House of Commons, 31 October 1956,” in Affairs, Mansergh, 493- 495. Colonial Secretary doubled down this stance taken by Lloyd about a week later. “There was clearly no time whatever to consult the Commonwealth in advance if we were to take timely action to protect the Canal and stop the conflict.” See “Extracts from speeches of the Rt Hon. Kenneth Younger; the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Rt Ho. Alan Lennox-Boyd; the Rt Hon. Aneurin Bevan; and the President of the Board of Trade, the Rt Hon. Peter Thorneycroft. In the House of Commons, 8 November 1956,” in Mansergh, Affairs, 504. 49

However, the Eden administration once again misjudged the importance of universal prestige in relation to one of its particular prestige-concepts.

The Commonwealth members viewed the nationalization of the Canal as a concern to both their interests and fears. Upon nationalization of the Canal, Nehru declared Suez a vital waterway for India yet desired for a calm atmosphere to avoid conflict over it.134 Ceylon Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike echoed similar sentiments for his country and their interests in the Canal and the aversion for violence.

He stated, “We cannot run any risk in the world today of any of the various disputes… reaching a point when the danger of a war, perhaps a war of a general nature, becomes imminent.”135 New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland noted the seriousness of the situation in that any disruption of British and Western markets affects New Zealand and other Commonwealth members.136 Richard Casey, Australia’s Minister of External

Affairs, also propounded the importance of the Canal, which 2/3rds of Australia’s imports and exports traveled through.137 In a broadcast, Menzies urged the need for the

Commonwealth to lean on the UK, its most experienced member, to retain its prestige, power, and moral force to uphold the peace in the world.138 Yet those fears became reality due to British actions. The Economist famously described Canada’s shocked and sorrowful response to be that of discovering a beloved uncle who had been arrested for rape.139

134 “Nehru, in the Lok Sabha, 8 August 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 484-485. 135 “Questions by members of the House of Representatives and extracts from the replies by the Prime Minister, the Hon. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 30 July, 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 481-482. 136 “Report of statement by the Acting Prime Minister, Mr. Keith Holyoake, 31 July 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 58- 59. 137 “Report of statement by the Minister of External Affairs, Mr. R.G. Casey, 2 August, 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 53. 138 “Extract from broadcast by the Prime Minister, Mr. R.G. Menzies, 13 August 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 56. 139 James Eayrs, “Commentary,” in The Commonwealth, 181. 50

“The Suez crisis took the Commonwealth by surprise, and threw it briefly into shock, threatened dissolution, and paralytic inactivity,” Lyon claimed.140 The real anger caused by the decision was visibly evident when Canadian Prime Minister Louis St.

Laurent made an infamous outburst:

I have been scandalized more than once by the attitude of the larger powers… who have all too frequently treated the Charter of the United Nations as an instrument with which to regiment smaller nations and as an instrument which did not have to be considered when their own vital interests were at stake… the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world has and is coming pretty close to an end.141

St. Laurent’s tirade continued by stating British actions disparaged the value of people in smaller countries being counted equally to those in larger countries. This carried a visible sentiment shared across the Commonwealth.142 Due to the lacking of a bilateral communication system between members, in which Eden held no interest to improve, there existed no coherent response from the Commonwealth members.143 The Australian and New Zealander governments supported the British Government in the UN, voting against the American cease-fire resolution. However, governmental support does not efface the mixed public reactions in their respective countries.144 The British

Government’s disregard of universally prestigious values— which they saw as morally backsliding—did not match with the general Commonwealth impression that it made progress in the right direction towards peace and prosperity.

140 Peter Lyon, “Commonwealth,” in Suez: 1956, 258. 141 “Extracts from speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. L.S. St. Laurent, in the House of Commons, 26 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 416-417. 142 Ibid. 416-417. 143 Lyon, in Suez: 1956, 259, 264, 267. 144 The Australian press showcased sharp criticism of British actions. James Eayrs notes, “So it was [the return of old Britannia], but many Australians seemed to be more chagrined than delighted by her reappearance… When it was stopped [the military intervention], twenty-four hours later, the sigh of relief was almost audible from Perth to Sydney.” See James Eayrs, “Commentary,” in The Commonwealth and Suez, 186. See also James Eayrs, “Commentary,” 389. 51

For the newly-independent nations, their acute upholding and esteem for the values that compose universal prestige came from their belief that its requirement for a more ‘civilized behavior’—circumscribed by prestige—protected their countries. They saw this as a definitive improvement from the dominance of gunpoint-diplomacy of yesteryears. Nehru decried, “In the middle of the 20th century we are going back to the predatory method of the 18th and 19th centuries.”145 He also feared if the current principles for peace and sovereignty have no meaning then “the world reverts to international barbarism.”146 Pakistan participated in a delivered statement by Baghdad

Pact Premiers which resolved that, “They [Pact members] confirmed their promise to respect the principles of the United Nation’s Charter, and declared that aggression in whatever manner, is resented by them. The independence and sovereignty of all nations must be respected and safeguarded.”147 Upon the success of international pressure,

Pakistan’s prime minister H.S. Suhrawardy extolled in the UN General Assembly,

“Threats need not be invoked to explain actions [of the British and French withdrawing forces], when moral forces also dictate the same cause.”148 Concerned about a reversal towards colonialism upon the Afro-Asian nations who relied on justice, the Prime

Ministers of the Colombo Plan affirmed the confidence in the United Nations Charter and pledged to “support the cause of freedom and oppose every attempt to revive or continue colonialism.”149 Bandaranaike, in a speech, addressed the United Nation’s importance in

145 “Extracts from speech by the Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, 1 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 251. 146 “Message from the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N.A. Bulganin, 8 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 257. 147 “Statement by the Premiers of the Four Muslim Powers of the Baghdad Pact, 8 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 266. 148 “Extracts from speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, in the National Assembly, 25 February 1957,” in Affairs, 460. 149 “Extracts from statement by the Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers, 14 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 462-463. 52 the world, despite its erratic efficiency, and for the Afro-Asian block to continue efforts together in it to shape world affairs.150 He also admits the material weakness, or the lack of power, countries like his possess. That said, he exclaimed, “But today the people are beginning to understand that force alone cannot solve problems. The moral force of Asia is a potent thing, believe me.”151

There were expectations that the Commonwealth should demonstrate itself as a global organization out to promote international coordination to upholding peace, fostering the development of nascent countries, and encouraging economic growth. But,

British action on Suez demonstrated the opposite of those universally prestigious values.

The British Government failed to coordinate with fellow members, it caused a blockage in an important waterway vital to many members’ economies, it jeopardized the sterling area, and it violated the sovereignty of a burgeoning nation by way of a belligerent military operation. Despite the shaken confidence in the idea of the Commonwealth, its members elected to stay in order to fulfill and reinforce the prestigious values it promoted. Suhrawardy in Pakistan’s General Assembly commended the British for its compliance with the Security Council, and he dismissed the notion of leaving the

Commonwealth. With its values of peace, progress, and security for mankind, he insisted that if they continue to involve themselves in the Commonwealth with these values, “we are bound to exert strength and moral influence on international affairs.”152 With heated debates in India, where some accuse the Commonwealth of deceptively propping up

150 Note: He admits the UN in the past “dilly-dallied,” but accepts it as a natural characteristic of the international organization. 151 “Extracts from speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 6 December 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 262-264. 152 “Extracts from speeches by the Prime Minister, the Hon. H. S. Suhrawardy, in a foreign affairs debate in the National Assembly, 22 and 25 February 1957,” in Mansergh, 527. 53

British prestige and undermining India’s, Nehru also insisted on staying because leaving would accomplish nothing, and, supporting the Commonwealth connection can prevent war. “We think it is helpful, it can help peace; it has helped peace.”153

The last phase in British officials’ struggle over prestige in Egypt centered on the

Anglo-French salvage fleets. With the Canal riddled with blockships, the Eden administration persisted that the salvage fleets, which accompanied the military forces, remain for immediate clearing of the vital waterway. Pierson Dixon, UK representative in the UN wrote a letter just after the British Government relented their efforts in capturing the Canal to UN General Secretary, Dag Hammarskjold. Dixon informed him of the already present salvage crews at Suez. “They [the British Government] wish to point out, however, the clearing of the obstructions in the Suez Canal… which in no sense a military operation is a matter of great urgency in the interests of the world shipping and trade. The Franco-British force is equipped to tackle this task.”154 However, the United

Nations and the Egyptian Government demanded all Anglo-French personnel vacate the

Canal. British troops were not to participate as part of the United Nations Emergency

Force (UNEF) and the salvage ships were not to take part in the international effort to clear the Canal. This proves to be a sticking point in the memoirs of Eden and

Macmillan.155

Yet, the question must be asked as to why this episode received such emphasis by

British officials after they capitulated their daring operation. The surface level

153 “Extracts from a debate in the Lok Sabha on India’s membership of the Commonwealth and from statements of the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, 19-29 November 1956,” in Affairs, 523, 526-527. See also “Extracts from speech by the Member for Mysore, Shri M.S. Grupadaswamy, in the Lok Sabha, March 25 1957,” in The Commonwealth, 455. 154 “Letter from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Sir Pierson Dixon, to the Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, 6 November 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 311-312. 155 See Eden, Full Circle, 564-565. AND Macmillan, Storm, 212. 54 examination may be used to explain, particularly writing with a British audience in mind, the rationale of why inconvenient economic disruptions which persisted after the Crisis concluded, such as petroleum rationing. This needed to be resolved with great expediency. Anthony Eden stated, “The delay [of clearing Suez] was due to fear of offending Nasser.”156 Underneath these surface excuses, officials wanted to punctuate the impracticality that universal prestige promoted and that baffled British officials throughout the Crisis. Macmillan accused Hammarskjold of showing “an inexplicable pliability and weakness,” for appeasing to Nasser on this issue disallowing British and

French salvage ships. What one saw as feeble and impractical, another saw as adhering to the sovereignty of a country that was just invaded.157 In the end, it only reinforced universal prestige by hammering the significance and reverence of sovereignty, which now involved the ‘jugular vein’ of the British Empire. In an arrogant pursuit of their particular prestige-concepts, they failed to take notice the relationship between said particular prestige-concepts and what was universally prestigious at the time. Failing to do so led them to be bested by the pressures that came from dissenting from that universal prestige. Yet, it is best to review the decision that faithful November day.

The Plunge and Prestige

November 4, 1956 at 10 Downing Street, the Cabinet met on the eve of

“Musketeer Revise”, the operation to use Anglo-French forces to capture the Suez Canal.

Their decision at this meeting reveals how prestige influences decisions. General Dayan,

Ariel Sharon and the rest of the Israeli forces reached all their target objectives in the

156 Eden, Full Circle, 573. See also Eden, Full Circle, 564-565. 157 Macmillan, Storm, 168. 55

Sinai Peninsula four days ahead of schedule.158 Yet, both memoirs of Harold Macmillan and Anthony Eden point to the Egyptian-Israeli compliance of their 36 hour ultimatum as the reason for the halt of British and French troops before completion of the capturing the

Canal.159 Neither official displayed conviction that continuing their capture of the Suez

Canal will grant American clemency or achieve international status for the waterway. So, one now must ponder why British officials went ahead with the assault of Port Said if the

Eisenhower administration clearly opposed current British actions as well as the British officials losing, or on the verge of losing, their casus belli long before the halt of the

Anglo-Franco advance.160

In a note circulated in January 1957, Eden rebuffed Harold Macmillan’s prior memo that stated, “The Suez operation has been a tactical defeat.”161 Eden countered the claim by asserting the victories that came from that operation: the Egyptian’s Soviet bombers neutralized, the Egyptian army with Soviet weapons lost a third of its forces,

Nasser’s influence in Jordan and Syria stymied, and the Americans now made the Middle

East a region of importance in their foreign policy.162 Later in his memoir, Eden also stated that the Israeli-Arab tensions needed to be channeled so as to not cause a larger war that may involve their ally Jordan, and so, he argued that Israel gaining access to the

158 Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan, vol. I, Volume I: 1894-1956 (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989), 439-440 159 Anthony Eden, Full Circle, 557-558. AND Horne, Macmillan, 442-443. 160 Alistair Horne, Harold Macmillan, 439-440. Note: Horne notes that the Israelis already accomplished their objectives. However in his memoir of the Suez Crisis, Selwyn Lloyd indicates that the Israelis forces still engaged in combat at Sharm al-Shaikah and quickly disbursed the fortified Egyptians there. That said, his account also details the beginning of a cease-fire agreement between the two countries’ officials in New York prior to the fateful Cabinet meeting. See Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A personal account, 205-206. 161 “The State of the Economy,” memorandum, 4 January 1957, top secret, CAB 129/84, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 162 “The Economic Situation,” note, 7 January 1957, top secret, CAB 129/84, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publication. Note: The statistic concerning the elimination of a third of Egyptian forces proves to be a gross exaggeration on Eden’s part. In Lloyd’s account, somewhere between 45,000 to 50,000 Egyptians fought in the Sinai- Suez conflict. The estimation that Hugh Thomas presented lied somewhere between 2,650 to 3,000 Egyptians deaths. See Lloyd, 1956, 254. AND Thomas, The Suez Affair, 169. 56

Gulf of Aqaba for trading diverted this potential conflict.163 However, the first three accomplishments in the note along with the added objective in the memoir came before the operation of Port Said even took place on November 5th.

Air strikes by the British devastated Nasser’s Soviet bombers while the Israelis routed Nasser’s Soviet-supplied army. Egypt at this point posed no threat. Even with

Soviet weaponry, Nasser failed to demonstrate himself as a transcendent figure of Arab nationalism with the ability to resolve the dispute of Palestine. The British noted how

Palestine posed their greatest political and economic threat in previous years and how they worried that its deterioration might unleash Arab resentment of the West and Soviet penetration. They were well-aware of how Nasser used the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to bolster himself as the ascending champion of the Arabs and a nationalist defying the

West.164 Egypt’s relationship with the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian refugees had helped garner influence under the banner of Arab nationalism as well as sponsored fedayeen raids, including ones on Tel Aviv.165 Nasser played to the values of Arab nationalism and offered skills and knowledge that produced materials, such as arms, to be distributed and elevate Egypt’s prestige—to elevate its influence so as to be on top of the regional hierarchy. He utilized prestige of the economically-modest Egypt to challenge his oil-rich

Arab rivals with some success.

Yet Israel’s clear victory in the Sinai demonstrated that Nasser’s army, if not the man himself, did not hold such skills and knowledge but rather incompetency. Despite

163 Anthony Eden, Full Circle, 518-519. Note: That stated, Eden worried early on about Israel’s maritime restrictions, and how Israel will try to “hit out now, while they have the strength to do so.” See “Palestine Settlement,” memorandum, 6 April 1955, top secret, CAB 129/74, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 164 See “Palestine Settlement,” memorandum, 6 April 1955, top secret, CAB 129/74, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. AND “Palestine Settlement,” memorandum, 13 July 1955, top secret, CAB 129/76, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 165 Michael Doran, Ike’s Gamble, 120, 159. 57 access to materials and power, it became clear Egypt lacked the skills and knowledge to produce the success needed. Therefore, the prestige of being the leader to deliver the

Palestinians their homeland crumbled. With that, the dictator lost his moral high ground.

An enervated Egypt, both militarily and in moral force, no longer posed a threat to oil- rich Arab states that wielded superior economic advantages that Egypt struggled to rival.

Furthermore, the defeat also demonstrated to Arab states that being cordial with the

Soviet Union would not assure a favorable change in dynamics with Israel. Coupled with a harsh Soviet crackdown on nationalist aspirations in Hungary, the threat of sweeping

Soviet penetration in the Middle East via Arab nationalism appears exaggerated. At this point in the operation, the British had achieved enough to stymie further instability in the

Middle East without forsaking universal prestige by engaging in dominance. Even with the bombings, Britain still possessed the position to assert its desire to prevent escalation of the conflict, concerning itself about Israeli cities. In this phase, the British engaged in a proxy war that did not seriously threaten their prestige. Despite the success already at hand, the emergency Cabinet meeting did not halt the landing the next day.

That fateful decision in November, the question remains as to why the British decided to move ahead with the operation. Selwyn Lloyd’s account contains the most details of the meeting, and he claims that Eden presented the Cabinet members with three options: (1) To continue as planned and insist the UN to include Anglo-French forces into the UNEF; (2) To delay the operation one more time for a second appeal to the UN in allowing troops from permanent Security Council members into the UNEF; (3) To suspend operations indefinitely. When asked his opinion, Eden preferred the first option.

The UNEF, he believed, will not form or be allowed into Egypt without troop presence 58 already on the ground. Logistics also came into play, in which the UNEF needed two to three months to assemble.166 Lloyd recounts that three or four members chose the second option and an ambiguous number voted for the third. He does not specify the total count in favor of each option but insist all but one consigned to the majority vote, which became the first option.167 They took the plunge.

Prestige once again must be brought into focus on this decision. On the matter of

Sir Anthony Eden’s health, some like British historian Ronald Hyam place great emphasis on it. Eden’s health caused him to act “out of character” and, in the opinion of some of his peers, caused him to behave even more irrationally as time went on and it deteriorated further.168 Refusing advice from others, cutting ambassadors out of the loop, and becoming bedfellows with French, Eden began “seizing the helm and driving the ship into the rocks.”169 However, Hugh Thomas’s opinion differs. He claims, “Eden’s health

[did] not seem to have had a decisive effect on events.”170 Keith Kyle also arrived at a similar conclusion on Eden’s health on the basis that several other major actors, such as

Dulles, Ben-Gurion, and Eisenhower himself, were not all in top form during the Suez

Crisis.171

When factoring prestige into the decision-making process, the latter assertion proves to be more plausible. Such emphasis on Eden’s health detracts from years of concern for prestige that predated Eden’s medical condition. The Suez Canal fastened

166 Lloyd, personal account, 207-208. Note: How Lloyd came upon this number is not well detailed. Eden does corroborate with Lloyd’s account on his preference with the first option. “The main question is whether inertia would have brought better results for the peace of the world than action. I think not.” See Eden, Full Circle, 559. 167 Ibid, 207-208. 168Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonization, 1918-1968, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 232. 169 Hyam, Declining Empire, 232-236. 170 Thomas, Affair, 181. 171 Kyle, Suez, 579. 59 tightly as a linchpin to British prestige. Prestige enabled Middle Eastern oil to buoy the sterling area, thus making Commonwealth ties stronger and defense commitments for the

West and their special American friends plausible. All elevated the United Kingdom into a status short of superpower but above enervated Western Europe. This illness narrative insulates the episode of Suez to one person’s delusions rather than collective fears. It forsakes how the ‘Official Mind’ perceived universal prestige and how officials struggled in grasping it, which injected anxieties into how to protect their particular prestige- concepts. Eden was not alone in imagining Nasser becoming the next Hitler with a Pan-

Arab empire. He was not subject to some fever-dream, or, if he was, much of the British government suffered it alongside him. Macmillan, Kirkpatrick, Lloyd, and even

Opposition Leader Hugh Gaitskell all voiced the same interpretation, especially after the nationalization of the Canal.172 An exaggeration that led to a critical disconnection with the Eisenhower administration but one nonetheless collectively shared.

Grappling with universal prestige proved difficult for those in the Eden administration. The changes in reverence to sovereignty, encouraging nascent nations to develop, and upholding peace without force precipitated frustrating dead ends, such as

SCUA and the six principle resolution at the UN Security Council. With vital elements to

British prestige at risk, it became disheartening and disgruntling process that invited desperation. Nasser, in the ‘Official Mind’, became a cancer of sorts that they believed ate away at their prestige, and they did not want to stand by and allow for his machinations to consume their prestige, and world role, entirely. Prestige to British

172 See “Extracts from speech by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, in the House of Commons, 2 August 1956,” in The Commonwealth, 33-34. Note: Lloyd also notes how Gaitskell and others saw nationalization as another Munich. See Lloyd, personal account, 191-192. 60 officials, in a sense, proved to be an element viewed in a similar way as some view power.

While power is defined, psychologically and anthropologically, as something based on asymmetrical possession of materials, prestige does not base itself in a materialistic manner. Yet in the ‘Official Mind’ there lied a notion of scarcity. Prestige possesses a mercantilist quiddity in which one will have and another will have not.

Therefore, one must insure as much possession of it as possible. This created the belief that if they failed to rid Nasser entirely, then Nasser will unabatedly siphon British prestige in the Middle East, and with it, Britain’s ability to defend the Liberal West as it has done before. Macmillan illustrates this sentiment poignantly and passionately:

The alternative [to intervening in Suez] was, of course, to surrender altogether, not only the Canal, but Western prestige in the Middle East, and to abandon our old friends throughout the area – countries we had ourselves liberated by the defeat of Turkey in the First World War, many of whose statesmen and leaders of opinion had stood loyally with us. This would mean Pan-Arabism, dominated by Communism, and the right flank of Europe turned.173

Yet the actions they decided on led to conceding to universal prestige and endangering their particular prestige-concepts even more. The shift in universal prestige blew in one direction ever harder, and Britain under Macmillan needed to maintain their remaining prestige as they marched in confluence with it.

173 Macmillan, Storm, 149. 61

Chapter Two: The Macmillan Government and Navigating the “Wind of Change”

in Africa

Universal prestige and the direction it blew forced the new Macmillan administration to concentrate on the African continent. The empowerment of people universal prestige gave enabled aspirations to mimic those countries that once struggled under the yoke of colonialism. However, the situation of British particular prestige- concepts on the continent meant British officials needed to make decisions in order to keep their perceived apparatuses to world power status as much intact as possible. Yet during this process, their behavior towards both their particular prestige-concepts and the universal prestige altered from the pre-Suez period.

To Macmillan, the concept of capitulation from Britain’s world role seemed ludicrous. As retorted to the idea of decay and inability to govern in his memoir Pointing

The Way: “This is an underserved libel on a people who twice in my lifetime demonstrated their courage and tenacity, as well as against its leaders.”174 Though, there existed complications to Britain after Suez. As historian John D. Hargreaves noted that the Suez Crisis proved not fatal but it “dealt a blow to British aspirations to exercise moral influence in the world as a leader of a multi-racial Commonwealth.”175 The importance of examining the decolonization of Africa stems from that aspiration of

Britain to use the Commonwealth to bolster their claims as a world leader with acknowledged moral force. Such involves maintenance of the sterling area. British involvement in Africa during the Macmillan Government concerned itself with Africa’s future in the sterling area as they matured into members of the Commonwealth. Yet the

174 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 116. 175 John D. Hargreaves, Decolonization of Africa (New York: Longman Group, 1990), 156. 62 maturing process proved at times arduous as the British attempted to retain their influence among the African colonies as to prevent another flank of Europe to be exposed to the Soviet threat. All the while, the United Kingdom still maintained concern for their

‘special relationship’ as the Americans showed some interest in the transition of these colonies and their affairs. As for the preservation of the Commonwealth, Britain attempted navigate the turbulent issues such as race, all of which culminated in the

“Wind of Change” speech given by Macmillan during his African Commonwealth Tour in February of 1960. South Africa’s departure as a member in 1961 also poignantly marked the changes of Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth.

You Need Us: For Ourselves; for Commonwealth; and as Leaders of Europe

Due to the strain on all these components, it becomes apparent how interlocking and crucial these particular prestige-concepts were. As the Commonwealth Relations

Office (CRO) stated in a brief, “No Commonwealth Association: no world power status.

No world power status: no Commonwealth. No Commonwealth: no strong pound. No strong pound: no Commonwealth.”176 This left the Cabinet to admit they cannot draw order of priority without complications.177 The affairs and management of Britain’s

African decolonization tied intimately to all the factors that Britain valued as important to her prestige and world power status. The effort to handle all these matters, like Suez, led to tough decisions that affected Britain’s trajectory as a world power.

With the ever vigilant maintenance of the sterling area, British officials examined the prospects and connections of African colonies to the sterling area, and with it, the

176 “[Overseas interests of the UK],” 1958, in The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1957-1964, ed. S R Ashton, series A, vol. 1, Part 1: High Policy, Political and Constitutional Change, ed. Ronald Hyam and Wm. Roger Louis, (London: HMSO, 2000), 41. 177 “The position of the UK in world affairs,” 1958, in Hyam and Louis vol. I, 44. 63 ability to secure the Commonwealth connection. Peter Thorneycroft, the Chancellor of

Exchequer, reinforced the importance of sterling to Britain’s position by declaring, “This country is the centre of world-wide monetary nexus and sterling is a major international currency in which much of the world’s trade is conducted.”178 The spring following the

Suez Crisis brought with it the Cabinet’s economic survey. While the oil shortage of the

Suez Crisis failed in inflicting severe economic damage, surpluses still remained lowered than hoped.179 Britain in the prior year netted a surplus, and in the year before that, they found themselves with a net negative. The net negative likely was due to imports such a coal, but the balance did not prove to be as promising. In 1956 sterling area produced

£269 million surplus with internal trading, but with the non-sterling area continued to trend with a net negative of £63 million. Reserves came to £830 million, which the

Exchequer claimed to be its lowest since the early post-war period.180 Convertibility coming into full affect in 1958, there lied some concerns about this trend and what it threatened. Colonies increased their imports which kept the surplus from increasing, and with exports like cocoa in West Africa falling in price, there existed a growing imbalance with damaging potential in the long run. Such threatened Britain’s position as a titan in finance. Officials in a report claimed, “We need a current surplus sufficient to finance our long-term investment overseas and to strengthen our position as an international banker.”181

178“Economic Survey, 1957,” note, 12 March 1957, confidential, CAB 129/86, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 179 Note: This observation demonstrated how exaggerated the threat of closing the Canal was, at least, in a temporary rather than an indefinite period of time. 180 “The position of the UK in world affairs,” 1958, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 46. 181 Ibid. 47. 64

Despite the desire to continue as international bankers, they themselves needed bankers at the conclusion of the Suez Crisis in order to prevent their reserves, and the pound, from collapsing. Long term loans from the United States and Canada needed the annual payment of £60 million annually, and short term loans like that of the IMF (£200 million) and the Export-Import (£90 million) demanded to be financed in a shorter period.182 As for the prospect of future loans to fend off any downturn, officials ruled it out of the question. They believed further loans may cause a loss of confidence in the pound, and with full convertibility looming, it became important to build confidence in the pound as to not exhaust reserves.183 “The main issue,” officials from the previous report stated, “is whether the economic situation and the financial policy which has been designed to meet it can be reconciled with the expenditure overseas which will be necessary to maintain the United Kingdom’s position in the world.”184 This compelled

Britain to seek adequate balance of payments in order to maintain the reserve levels, the confidence in the pound, and the sterling area along their external obligations related to their world role.185 This led British officials to eye her colonies, including those in Africa, in order to expand exports in the sterling area.

In a memorandum discussing the sterling area and Commonwealth, Thorneycroft indicated that there needed to be surplus that exceeded £350 million annually to account for expenses and to build reserves. Failure to develop this trend meant threats to “not only sterling area and the sterling system, but also all our policies—social, political and military—at home and abroad will be insecurely based.”186 Understanding the situation

182 “[Overseas interests of the UK],” 1958, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 46. 183 Ibid. 46. 184 Ibid. 39. 185 “The position of the UK in world affairs,” 1958, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 47. 186 “Nigeria,” note, 14 May 1957, secret, CAB 129/87, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 65 with external affairs upon entering 10 Downing Street, Harold Macmillan requested upon

Lord Salisbury, Lord President of Council, in a minute for a profit and loss account for each colony. It became evident that nationalism proved a force harder to counter, and there needed to be an assessment on the effect of the sterling area as the Macmillan

Government granted independence.187 The committee that was set up to examine such colonial policies revealed the intimacy of the colonies and the sterling area. In total, the colonies held in 1956 roughly £1,311 million in sterling assets. Furthermore, they contributed to the strength of sterling over the previous five years. However, this came mostly from the dollar-earning commodities.188 As for trade, roughly thirteen percent of exports went to the colonies, with no significant advantage over other trading competitors.189 Despite on the surface appearing to possess limited contribution to the sterling area, the economic consequences of mishandling the colonies’ development and independence proved acute to many.

It still remained the pursuit of the British officials to carefully devolve responsibility of the colonies while still insuring the stability of the sterling area. For instance, if the colonies of East Africa left the sterling area, it will force Britain to reorganize her imports for commodities like coffee and sisal.190 Also, they presumed that racially charged political chaos in the region will hinder British businesses from continuing—a reflection upon what happen to British businesses in Egypt in the aftermath of Suez.191 If things went awry in Nigeria for instance, their departure from the

187 Harold Macmillan, “Future constitutional development in the colonies,” 1957, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 1. 188 Norman Brook, “Future constitutional development in the colonies,” September 1957, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 32-33. 189 Ibid, 33-34. 190 Norman Brook, “Future constitutional development in the colonies,” May 1957, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 16. 191 Ibid, 16. 66 sterling area will leave a moderate impact as Nigeria consumed £50 to £60 million in

British exports.192 In an annex, the Colonial Office asserted timely independence will not endanger economic links with the United Kingdom, but a rash departure jeopardizes policy everywhere.193 Secretary for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, voiced his concerns of hurried departure, stating the failure to install stable successor governments will create a widespread impact. Her Majesty’s Government must not be reckless and hasty in the need to comply with colonial peoples’ wishes. “I think all agree,” Lennox-

Boyd wrote, “that nothing is more dangerous than to gain a reputation for forsaking one’s friends.”194 He continued:

It might be argued that the United Kingdom should relinquish colonial responsibilities as soon as possible, in view of post-war attacks on us for being a colonial power. But the constructive nature of our colonial policy is being increasingly recognised and to abandon it would mean a great loss of prestige, play into the hands of the communists and extreme nationalists and jeopardise “evolving Commonwealth” policy which offers best hope of reconciling emergent nationalism with our interests.195

This sentiment highlights the existing dynamic between the universal and the particular.

Officials believe the pushes caused by universal prestige prove reckless and backed by radical elements. Yet, there now lies the idea of needing to reconcile the two in which the

Commonwealth can act as an institution to reflect the values of universal prestige.

Reconciliation will lead British officials to reconsider their notions of development and political readiness as they try to tread this path as stewards of their country’s prestige.

192 Brook, “Future,” 7. AND “Nigeria,” note, 14 May 1957, secret, CAB 129/87, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 193 CO, Annex in “[Overseas interests of the UK],” 43. 194 Minute by Lennox-Boyd, “Future constitutional development in the colonies,” January 1957, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 3. 195 CO, Annex in “[Overseas interests of the UK],” 43. 67

Colonial development to support the sterling area existed beforehand, but the pressure to develop in a short period as nationalistic forces pressed for independence led to conflict between the particular prestige-concepts. The Treasury sought to cut back on spending wherever it saw necessary. In a memo by Thorneycroft, it proposed to quietly forge stricter criteria for Commonwealth member borrowing and to bar any loans from the Colonial Development Company post-independence.196 It became so, but prompted the question as to why colonial development became a target for cutbacks. Even though funds for development through the FO, CO and CRO were less than 0.5% of gross expenditures in 1957, it fell mostly on the external balance “and in total it is equal to half our oversea[s] current surplus in the last five years.”197 In his memo regarding the

Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, Thorneycroft noted the viability of members to borrow from the International Bank of Research and Development.

Simultaneously, he attempted in the same memo to allay concerns of Britain being more aloof by alluding to future prospects of expanding Commonwealth development.

Nonetheless, there existed tensions in how the Treasury began rearranging and changing development programs to lower spending.198

Two assets gave Britain the ability to maintain their leadership role among the newer and upcoming nations economically: capital and technical assistance. Britain’s technical knowledge, both in administration and economic development, gave Britain influence because new nations needed this knowledge. This knowledge held values that

196 “Sterling and Commonwealth Economic Development,” memorandum, secret, 30 May 1957, CAB 129/87, Adam Matthew Publications. 197 “The position of the UK in world affairs,” 1958, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 47. Note: CO (Colonial Office), FO (Foreign Office), and CRO (Commonwealth Relations Office) 198 “Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference,” note, 5 September 1958, secret, CAB 129/94, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 68 promoted both nationhood and imitation of western industrial economies. With nascent countries’ basic economic statuses, capital provided the means in achieving an industrial economy.

Both became points of contentions between the Treasury trying to preserve the sterling area and those who sought a need for greater British involvement in colonial development. For instance, Lord Homes, Secretary of State for the Commonwealth

Relations, argued against the Chancellor of Exchequer’s assertions of their inability to invest any more than £5 million into the Commonwealth education program. The

Chancellor furthermore stated that there existed no good reason to increase this figure.

“But in my opinion there is [a good reason], a matter of presentation,” Lord Homes stated in a memo. He conveyed how much more alluring a sum like £10 million can impress underdeveloped colonies and Commonwealth members. Such initiatives might reinforce a system of reciprocity that can further strengthen Britain’s leadership and prestige.

Believing in Britain’s natural ability to provide leadership on this front, he warned “if we fail to help, some parts of the Commonwealth will look elsewhere for assistance.”199

Departments conflicted over the issue of paying and compensating for British overseas civil servants who acted in administrative and technical capacities. On a scheme in which the Nigerian Government must compensate their servicemen by their own arbitration, Lennox-Boyd spoke out on this fiscal scheme and how it will lead to waves of officer retirements rather than retentions. He emphasized the economic repercussions of receding British guidance: “If British officers leave, there may well be something like

199 “Commonwealth Education Conference,” memorandum, 28 April 1959, confidential, CAB 129/97, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 69 chaos in parts of the country.”200 It will open Nigeria up to foreign competition leading to loses in big engineering and supply contracts. Other officials voiced their concern about

Nigeria’s future in the Commonwealth if British guidance receded, as one official recalled the exodus of officers in Pakistan: “All this notably reduce[d] Pakistan’s usefulness as a member of the Commonwealth.”201 Lord Homes followed these complaints up. Appealing to Thorneycroft directly, he asserted the future of the

Commonwealth lied in jeopardy, and should such fiscal practices be implemented, future economic opportunities will be lost because trade follows technical advisers and technicians.202

While there existed reasons for policies to develop the territories in Africa, British officials also viewed the larger Cold War implications surrounding decolonization.

During an encounter with French President Charles de Gaulle in 1959, Macmillan in his memoirs detailed how de Gaulle asserted Marxism possessed a natural attraction to underdeveloped countries such as China and those in Africa.203 Such sentiments appeared attuned with the long-running anxieties and fears of mismanagement of African independence. Matters of multi/non-racial development in East African countries like

Kenya held potential consequences if they failed. Their geopolitical location made them susceptible to the turmoil erupting in the Middle East at the time. If that occurred, it might expose a flank for Soviet penetration into the Indian Ocean and interfere with

British interests there.204 Such ideas became worrisome as British officials attempted to insure defence agreements in Africa. Though Ghana rejected such moves, the British

200 Lennox-Boyd, “[Overseas Civil Service],” 1957, in Hyam and Louis vol. 1, 310. 201 J.M.C. James, “Minutes 82” in Lennox-Boyd, “[Overseas Civil Service],” 1957, in Hyam and Louis vol. 1, 310. 202 Lord Homes, “[Overseas Civil Service],” 1957, in Hyam and Louis vol. 1, 313. 203 Macmillan, Pointing, 111. 204 Brook, “Future,” September 1957, 16-17. 70 received hope from Nigeria during their independence negotiations, where the Nigerian

Prime Minister and regional Premiers liked the idea. Though, Lennox-Boyd indicated it required overseas obligations. “This country must be prepared to accept [the conditions for a defense agreement] if, on independence, Nigeria is to remain firmly inside the

Western orbit.”205 Nigeria’s position in West Africa made it a nodal point for wireless communication to the rest of Commonwealth as well as possessing position and facilities essential to Britain’s worldwide interests.206 Furthermore, the CRO also touted that while the Commonwealth may not insure pro-Western stances among its members, that it will only at worst become uncommitted like India.207 Such utilities in fending off the Soviet threat were perceived as valuable not only to shield a flank of Liberal Europe, but to demonstrate ability in their ‘special relationship’ that suffered strain over the Suez Canal

Crisis.

Mending Anglo-American relations became Macmillan’s top and immediate priority, and there existed some concerns when it came to African decolonization. The

Bermuda Conference in March 1957 highlighted the durability of the relationship, but also how this particular prestige-concept interlocked with other prestige-concepts. During his speech at the conference’s opening, Macmillan spoke of the vacuum left by great powers and those who can fill them, such as Russia or China. With colonies becoming independent, there existed a pool of uncommitted and undecided countries. “We in

Britain cannot stop [this process of decolonization]; but we might now and then control this process.” In evoking full confidence and restoration in the Anglo-American

205 “Nigeria,” note, 2 October 1958, secret, CAB 129/95, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 206 Minute by M E Allen, in “[Nigeria],” 1958, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 347. AND Brook, “Future,” September 1957, 35. 207 CRO in Annex, “[Overseas Interests of the UK],” 41. 71 relationship, he declared, “powerful as you [the United States] are I don’t believe you can do it [fight against communism] alone. You need us: for ourselves; for Commonwealth; and as leaders of Europe.”208

This line delivered those essential elements of prestige that showed how interlocking they situated themselves in the Anglo-American relationship. “Ourselves” may refer to Britain’s military and economic capacity that she possessed and was capable of deploying. “Commonwealth” referred to Britain’s ability to at least alter the trajectory of the previously referred newly independent nations away from communism, if not foster new allies in a bloc of liberal-minded nations. Leader of Europe referred to the continued belief among British officials to defend Western Europe, and her liberal values, from ideological and existential threats.209 In a somewhat paternal manner, Macmillan flexed Britain’s prestige in the ‘special relationship’ in that they possessed the knowledge, the skills, and the success in fighting communism: something Macmillan framed as being aligned with the American government’s values. Therefore, American policies should include, and potentially be influenced by, the British government.

Behind the scenes, there still persisted anxieties in backing up those claims of being an able partner in the relationship because so much appeared at stake. The Treasury sought to cut expenditures as a way to increase the surplus in sterling. Defence spending occupied roughly 8% of the UK’s gross expenditures in 1957, and so, the Government

208 Macmillan, Riding, 252. 209 Note: Prior to the quoted statement, Macmillan referred to a “confusion” in Europe and whether weary European countries should fight or remain on the sidelines. “I believe Britain… will be for staying in the game and pulling our weight.” It cannot be helped but to draw on such association of interwar weariness and the lax attitudes toward Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. This prevailing conflict of good and evil and liberal values can still be seen in the same speech upon his mentioning Nasser: “After all, he [Nasser] is just a self-elected dictator, who plays off the West and East—but is more and more sold to the Communist. It’s like Mussolini…” See Macmillan, Storm, 252-253. 72 needed some bold strokes with cuts in order to maintain the sterling area.210

Simultaneously, they hoped to maintain the ability to employ force without endangering the domestic economy and pound. Macmillan managed to negotiate troop reduction in

Germany, Britain’s largest oversea obligation, earlier that March. While Eisenhower found the steep troop reduction from the current level of 80,000 alarming, Macmillan convinced him during the conference on how essential it was for the UK to keep their economy solvent.211 Despite cutbacks, British officials did not want to be seen as tight- fisted. A Foreign Office brief stated, “we cannot expect United States co-operation in these important fields of policy [policy of containment] unless we can contribute something, however small, to meeting the costs.”212 It remained the hope for officials to still be able to influence the Americans on certain policies, but in concerns for African decolonization, it appeared that the ‘special relationship’ influenced some affairs.

The scholarship on the Anglo-American relationship at the time of British decolonization in Africa remains rather sparse.213 It appeared that there seemed little change in the attitude towards the Americans as the British planned their policies for decolonization in Africa. In discussing the matter, the British officials concluded a need to consult the Americans on this delicate manner, but not before they formulated their own plan in advance to influence their ally. “It should be borne in mind that discussions

210 “The position of the UK in world affairs,” 1958, in Hyam and Louis vol. I, 44. 211 Macmillan, Riding, 247. See also Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, ed. Peter Catterall, vol. II Prime Minister and After, 1957-66 (London: Macmillan, 2011), 12. 212 “[Overseas interests of the UK],” in Hyam and Louis vol. 1, 40. 213 Note: The historiography on the explicit involvement of Anglo-American alliance in the decolonization in British Africa remains tragically scarce, with some of the few notable ones being done by Wm. Roger Louis together with Ronald Robinson as well as Hollis R. Lynch. However, neither works reach to the time frame of this paper. See, Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, “The United States and the Liquidation of the British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941-1951,” in The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940-1960, eds. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven: Yale University, 1982). AND Hollis R. Lynch, “Pan-African Responses in the United States to British Colonial Rule in Africa in the 1940s,” in Transfer. 73 with the Americans would also give us the opportunity of influencing their thinking,” read a document by the Africa (Official) Committee.214 Such sentiments proved similar to the sentiments previously in the Middle East, in which British officials wished to manipulate American backing and power for their foreign policy.

However, the Eisenhower administration demonstrated they were not to be aloof on the matter. Upon the massacre at Sharpeville, South Africa in March of 1960,

Macmillan questioned whether to block the ‘inscription’ of the Sharpeville massacre in the UN that faulted the South African government. South Africa’s Prime Minister,

Hendrik Verwoerd, requested Macmillan to do so. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, who was in Washington at the time, discouraged any challenge to the Sharpeville matter in the

UN. Macmillan complied with the advice, knowing the United States’ planned to vote for it.215 Instead of openly opposing the United States’ vote as with Suez, the British chose to only abstain. Then the following week, Macmillan visited Washington to discuss the issues including Africa with Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter.216

Despite some officials’ dismissive attitudes towards America, there appears to be a more acute awareness by British officials on needing to coordinate with the United States.

However, there still also needed to be coordination in successfully guiding the African colonies to independences.

214 “The next ten years in Africa,” 1959, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 109. 215 Macmillan, Pointing, 166-168. AND Macmillan, Diaries, vol. II, 282. 216 Macmillan, Pointing, 166-168. Note: Curious, Macmillan only mentioned that the discussion happened, but never went further on the subject. Earlier that year when on his African Commonwealth Tour, Central African Federation Prime Minister Roy Welensky heard the Macmillan had discussed Africa with Eisenhower. Upon inquiring what they spoke about, Macmillan gave a terse and guarded answer about how close Britain and United States cooperate, especially in intelligence, and so forth. Welensky just said it was an inquiry not a complaint. There appeared to be some restrain from Macmillan, even in his diary. See “Prime Minister’s African Tour,” note, 12 April 1960, secret, CAB 129/101, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 74

Navigating Between Race, Federation, and ‘Police State’

Independence for these colonies proved challenging as Britain desired to structure politically and economically sound nation-states. Precautions were needed in order avoid any political chaos that might reverberate politically in Africa or economically in the sterling area. Ghana’s independence, in the minds of officials, acted as an accelerating catalyst for the other African colonies.217 There remained a series of worries about the rushed political development such as a lack of a middle class, a sense of unity, and a mature racial policies. Schemes like federations posed as both a solution and a problem with these issues that needed to be resolved.

Federations posed as a viable way of insuring a country possessed economic viability and potential in order to permit political stability and possibly ward off the

Soviet specter.218 Federation models already existed in the Malaya, the Caribbean,

Nigeria, and Central Africa.219 When British officials examined smaller African colonies like “a happy backwater” such as the Gambia, they noted its size and economy as a reason to dismiss the idea of independence by itself, and so they proposed possible federation or union with its sole neighbor Senegal.220 There existed a certain disregard of universal prestige in this context as it dismissed the concept of state and sovereignty by a

217 Note: For instance, in Nigeria, officials believed it pushed independence fifteen to twenty years ahead. See “Future,” in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 9-10. 218 Note: Economic assistance from the Soviet Union to African colonies appear rather mixed. While officials and Macmillan glowered at Ghana recruiting Soviet assistance for his economic schemes, there remained an openness in allowing Soviets to help provide capital in order to insure African colonies did not stagnant in economic development when Britain lacked the providing capital, but not for urgent requests. See Iain Macleod, “[Nigerian defence agreement],” 1960, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 362. And See CRO, Annex in “Overseas interests,” in Hyam and Roger Louis, 42. 219 Note: A conference in London in 1953 in determining the merit of federation for the central African colonies concluded, “The Territories, for the time being relatively prosperous, were individually economically vulnerable and would be much stronger as a single unit with a more broadly based economy.” See “The Conference on Federation held in London in January 1953: extract from the Report,” in Documents and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 1952- 1962, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 115. 220 See Brook, “Future,” 11-12. AND “The Future of Gambia,” memorandum, 12 January 1961, secret, CAB 129/104, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 75 people’s aspirations. Though well-meaning, British officials pushed schemes such as federations so they can comply with universal prestige without the fear of endangering particular prestige-concepts, such as defending Western Europe or the sterling area. Their goal was one that centered on the avoidance of humiliation: “not as fast as the Congo and not as slow as Algiers.”221 However, the schemes of federation proved difficult in places like the Caribbean, Malaya, and especially the Central African Federation, particularly in

Nyasaland.

On March 3, 1959, the Governor of Nyasaland (modern day Malawi), Sir Robert

Armitage, called an emergency in the colony due to growing violence since the beginning of that year. Of the three territories of the Central Africa Federation (Southern Rhodesia,

Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland), Nyasaland hosted the lowest white population in the

Federation and also the most destitute population. There brewed increased suspicion of the Federation, whose seat in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia hindered political aspirations of Africans. Dr. Hastings Banda, leader of the Nyasaland African Congress, proceeded to stir anti-Federation sentiments and questioned a political system that enabled whites from a distant capital to make public policy decisions for Malawians. However, there existed reports of a meeting between high level figures of the Congress Party, excluding Dr.

Banda, which decided to engage in non-cooperation with the government.222 However,

Intelligence and Security Department of the CO (ISD) acquire dubious information through unsound methods that the meeting entailed plots of instigating violence and

221 Iain Macleod, “Colonial problems in 1961,” 1961, in Hyam and Louis vol. I, 184. Note: Congo referring to the abrupt departure of Belgium authorities in the colony that led to bloody factionalism. Algiers, or Algeria, being France’s prolonged conflict there with Arab nationalists. 222 Brian Simpson, “The Delvin Commission (1959): Colonialism, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 22 no. 1 (Spring, 2002): 17-52, accessed December 14, 2019, https://www/jstor.org/stable/3600633, 20-21. And Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 270. 76 engaging in assassinations.223 Armitage acted to curtail such by announcing an emergency and conducting pre-empted arrests, including Dr. Banda, placing 1,328 in detention. That led to escalation culminating in the Nkata Bay incident where troops fired upon a crowd killing 20 people. Another 31 Africans were killed in separate incidences during the emergency.224

Lennox-Boyd, while supportive of Armitage in the House of Commons, sought reassurance of colonial policies and initiated an inquiry into the emergency, similar to that of the Simon Commission that investigated the Amritsar Massacre.225 Even the

United States inquired about an explanation to the emergency via embassy to ISD head

Duncan Watson.226 Lord Delvin became appointed head of the commission, and released a report on the investigation in July of 1959, known as “The Delvin Report.” Its investigation into the interrogation methods used, in which witnesses recanted their stories of the Congress Party meeting. One compared the ISD’s style of intelligence gathering to that of the Gestapo.227 Along with that, they found the utter lack of police compelled the colony to use soldiers for domestic enforcement that resulted in cruder handling. Cruder handling of affairs, such as crowds, led to incidences like Nkata Bay.228

Factors like these led the Report to state that Nyasaland temporarily became a ‘police state’. To the historian John Darwin, the accusation that the British created a ‘police state’, “rang out like a pistol shot… Less than fifteen years after the defeat of Hitler, the

223 Philip Murphy, “A Police State? The Nyasaland Emergency and Colonial Intelligence,” Journal of Southern African Studies 36, no. 4 (December 2010): 765-780, accessed December 14, 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/29778066, 772-774. 224 Simpson, “The Devlin Commission,” 21. 225 “Nyasaland Emergency,” memorandum, 16 March 1959, secret, CAB 129/97, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 226 Murphy, “A Police-State?,” 771. 227 Ibid. 771. 228 Ibid. 777-778. Note: In Nyasaland, the ratio between cop and civilian stood at 1:1,300. 77 implicit parallel with fascism had a peculiar and brutal force.”229 While some like

Macmillan tried to dismiss the accusation, it did strike a nerve with officials as it undermined their particular prestige of being a defender of Europe against such ‘police states’.230 With the Nyasaland Emergency centering on the dynamics of race and nationalism, the British government decided to inquire about the future of the Central

African Federation.

The Delvin Report noted the frustration of Africans in Nyasaland against the

Federation. Despite Federation subsidies of £3 million to mostly health and education programs, the Report noted Africans’ desire for political freedom and that they rather be impoverish than enslaved.231 Darwin noted, “Far from being a skillful prelude to the conferment of independence on the Federation, the 1959 Emergency turned out to be its death warrant.”232 Lennox-Boyd, who Macmillan kept as Colonial Secretary despite domestic criticisms of both the Emergency and the Hola Detention Camp incident, resigned for “purely personal” reasons after the 1959 elections. Someone special was required to balance stability and speed for prestige’s posterity. Macmillan reminisced, “It would need a Minister of great imagination, even genius, to follow [Lennox-Boyd]… It was without hesitation therefore that I selected Iain Macleod.”233 Wanting to prevent any more divisive strife within the Federation, Macmillan’s Government set up a commission of inquiry headed by Walter Monckton, who resigned previously as Secretary for

229 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 250. 230 Note: Even Lord Delvin himself regretted the wording and apologized in a letter to the Colonial Secretary of the time, Lennox-Boyd, for how it placed Lennox-Boyd’s service and integrity under such scrutiny. 231 ”The Advisory (Monckton) Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960: extract from the Report,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 141-144. 232 Darwin, Britain and Decolonization, 271. 233 Macmillan, Pointing, 18-19. Note: The Hola Camp incident occurred in Kenya, where Mau Mau insurgents were kept in detention camps. In one such camp, 11 detainees were beaten to death by guards for refusing to do forced labor. 78

Defence because of his opposition to the Suez intervention. Macmillan thought his “name would command universal support.”234 Yet, the controversy surrounding the decision to release Dr. Banda before the Commission’s visit to Nyasaland proved difficult between the British Government and the Federation as well as the Southern Rhodesian government. However, the victory in the 1959 election marked the shift of perspective on the issue of Africa within the Government.

Attitudes of race and federation already appeared to shift within the Government more dramatically after the 1959 elections. Macleod’s biographer, Robert Shepherd, claims the lax pace by the British Government up till that point stemmed from the belief that force was viable to hold off nationalist agitations till political maturity, but Macleod saw it differently and how speed needed to be seen more as an ally.235 Macmillan tried to explain the shift in policy by stating that African nationalism failed to be evident in

1958.236 Now supposedly evident, Macmillan understood the consequences of failure and stuck with Macleod and his efforts, including releasing Dr. Banda before the Monckton

Commission’s visit. Macleod swayed Macmillan after threatening resignation over the issue.237 According to Macmillan, de Gaulle’s astounding declaration of withdrawal of

France from Africa convinced him that there existed no chance to hesitate on the matter.238 After all, with both the Belgians and French withdrawing from the continent, it left Britain with the unsavory status of being paired with Portugal as the remaining colonial holders. During his African tour, Macmillan preached in Salisbury that greater racial equality will lead to a legacy of goodwill throughout the continent. In his memoirs

234 Ibid. 139. 235 Robert Shepherd, Iain Macleod (London: Random House, 1994), 162. 236 Macmillan, Pointing, 119. 237 Shepherd, 198-201. 238 Macmillan, Pointing, 133. 79 however, he rued his previous support of creating the federation knowing in hindsight the racial animosity it posed, and something that former Prime Minister Clement Attlee warned about in 1953.239

Federation soon became less and less viable in Central Africa because of the unresolved racial issues. Macleod in a minute to Macmillan stated, “I am myself absolutely convinced that whether the Federation like it or not an imaginative offer on constitutional advance [for Nyasaland] at a fairly early date is certainly the best, and perhaps the only, hope of holding the position [the continuation of the Federation].”240

The Monckton Commission’s report corroborated with his conviction. While it concluded dissolution of the Federation likely led to poverty and hardship, “the strength of African opposition in the Northern Territories is such that Federation cannot, in our view, be maintained in its present form.”241 It noted the Northern Territories of overwhelming black majorities saw Ghana as a sign that independence can be achieved and that it should be a right. They also feared European immigrants will decrease economic opportunities from them and lead to Southern Rhodesian land policies that unequally benefitted whites.242 These Africans noted the success of Ghana in achieving nationhood and development for its people and aspired to imitate that success rather than comply with the federation model.

239 “Prime Minister’s African Tour,” note, 12 April 1960, secret, CAB 129/101, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. AND Macmillan, Pointing, 133. AND “Extracts from speeches by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Rt Hon. Oliver Lyttleton, and the Rt Hon. C R. Attlee on the Second Reading of the Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation Bill in the House of Commons, 6 May 1953,” in Document and Speeches on Commonwealth Affairs, 1952- 1962, ed. Nicholas Mansergh, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 129-130. Note: Clement Attlee at that time was leader of the Opposition; a position he held after losing his premiership. 240 Iain Macleod, “[Reflections on policy in East Africa, Malta and Nyasaland],” 1959, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. I, 167. 241 “The Advisory (Monckton) Commission on the Review of the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1960: extract from the Report,” in Commonwealth Affairs, 149. 242 Ibid. 146. 80

“Ultimately, Federation must rest on a general willingness to accept it, or it must be preserved by force,” concluded the report.243 Force not being an option in Macleod’s eyes, the issue needed to be resolved with imaginative solutions. Britain needed to avoid another episode of imperialistic dominance or lose more prestige. However, at the

London conference between the three territories and Federation government, negotiations broke down. Macmillan, tired of Macleod’s pressing for a deal as Northern Rhodesia went into an emergency, sacked Macleod, but, his successor Reginald Maudling proved to be as committed to a speedy approach as Macleod.244 Yet, this was not be the only breakdown in negotiations Macmillan faced in trying to steer Britain through the shifting winds of universal prestige.

Wind of Change in Africa and in Commonwealth

The Union of South Africa, under the leadership of Apartheid architect and Prime

Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, lingered as an element of anxiety as Britain sought to advance the Commonwealth along the lines that would be universally prestigious. In

1957, Lord Homes worried that Ghana will set the pace for new members, and it will be an unenviable task to convince current Commonwealth members, in particular South

Africa, “to accept an inexperienced and, at the least, ill-run African territory as a fellow- member.” He stated, “The effect on Commonwealth unity would be serious indeed.”245

Apartheid itself became the ire of the United Nations, and there existed fear of a South

African exit by 1970. If that took place, Britain and Portugal may be South Africa’s only friends.246 This anxiety reveals that despite its shortcomings and inconveniences, there

243 Ibid, 150. 244 Shepherd, Macleod, 249-250. 245 Lord Homes, “[HM Overseas Civil Service],” 1957, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. 1, 313. 246 “Africa in the next ten years,” 1959, in Hyam and Roger Louis vol. 1, 118. 81 existed a want in British officials in insuring that they associate Britain with those who do comply with universal prestige themselves. Yet, there existed the possibility of a

Commonwealth member not being a member of the UN. Such a scenario might threaten the stability of the Commonwealth or reduce its prestige. Upon the wake of the massacre in Sharpeville, Macmillan was not concerned about the handling of it in the House but rather at the UN. “My concern was how to deal with the matter in the United Nations without leading to a break-up of the Commonwealth into two opposing groups.”247 In order to resolve this pressure upon Britain’s institution and particular prestige-concept,

Macmillan decided for an audacious move and made it on February 3, 1960 at Cape

Town.

In the Parliament building in Cape Town, Macmillan gave his “Wind of Change” speech to both Houses of the Union. A speech that touched upon familiar and important elements. As he did often for his speeches during his African tour, he initially highlighted the economic connections. British investments consisted of roughly two thirds of South

Africa’s overall foreign investment in 1956, and Macmillan stated that such came from

Britain despite enduring two wars that bled Britain’s economy white. Such a statement demonstrates a sense of economic leadership within the sterling area regardless of the wars and that Britain remained a world power as well as a reliable economic partner. To bind Commonwealth with the sterling area, Macmillan mentioned the exchange of British goods and capital for South African raw materials, specifically agricultural goods and gold.248

247 Macmillan, Pointing, 166. 248 Macmillan, “Appendix One: Address by Harold Macmillan to Members of both Houses of the Parliament of the Union of South Africa,” in Pointing, 474-475. 82

Gold and agriculture provided the economic bond that suppressed an Afrikaner nationalist’s agenda which opposed participation in the sterling area when it formed in

1931. British markets provided South African farmers’ generous pricing and the gold mining industry was capital-intensive and relied greatly on British capital. With farmers holding disproportionate amount of political representation and the gold mining industry wielding huge political influence itself, they pressed South Africa into the sterling area, forging this economic bond.249 Britain enjoyed the world’s leader in gold production being in the sterling area along with being a market for agricultural goods and capital.

Historian Peter Henshaw stated, “British costumers continued to acquire South African agricultural goods at ruling prices; British capital gained a stable and more profitable field of investment and sterling’s prestige was enhanced.”250 The prestige came with the success of this relationship between capital, investments, goods, and gold that showcased the benefits of being part of the sterling area. This can be especially be targeted to Africa where nations desired to imitate this relationship of exchange between capital and commodity to develop economically.

As for the developments politically in the continent, Macmillan voiced sympathy for such anxieties about them. He attempted to frame it as corollary since the fall of

Rome when Europeans started to develop a sense of nationalism, and now it sweeps over the African continent where now different races and civilizations beckon for independence. “In different places it takes different forms, but it is happening everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through the continent, and, whether we like

249 Peter J. Henshaw, “Britain, South Africa and the Sterling Area: Gold Production, Capital Investment and Agricultural Markets, 1931-1961,” in The Historical Journal 39, no. 1 (March 1996): 197-223. Accessed January 17, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2639946, 201 and 204-206. 250 Henshaw, “Sterling Area,” 206. 83 it or not, this growth of consciousness is a political fact… our national policies must take account of it.”251 With the shift in universal prestige being something of an unreconciled force, it is needed to be adhered to in order to defend western civilization. Macmillan stated:

if we cannot do so we may imperil the precarious balance between the East [referring to the Soviet bloc and China] and West on which the peace of the world depends… will they be drawn to the Communist camp? Or will the experiments in self-government that are now being made in Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful and by their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom and order and justice?252

Macmillan illustrated the importance of the Commonwealth and the prestige the British see in it. “The struggle is joined, and it is a struggled for the minds of men.” Military might, diplomatic skill, administration efficiency will not be what they judge to make their decision according to Macmillan, but “It is our way of life.”253

From that, there existed a need to appeal in a more abstract sense to win minds, and such needed the deployment of moral force. Therefore, there existed a need to align with the values of universal prestige in allowing nationalist aspirations to form nation- states. Britain, for being in a leadership position in the hierarchy both within the

Commonwealth and the West, needed to allow these nationalistic aspirations to be realized. These countries’ success and cooperation with Britain and the West will attract others to imitate that success. In the battle for minds, prestige proved critical. While his speech assured the Commonwealth will not intervene in a member’s domestic affairs,

Macmillan forewarned that in a shrinking world, internal affairs affect others. Apartheid,

Macmillan implied, posed as an issue for Britain, the Commonwealth, and the West if it

251 Macmillan, “Appendix One,” 475. 252 Ibid. 475-476. 253 Ibid, 476. 84 continues. He concluded with, “Let us remember these truths. Let us resolve to build, not to destroy, and let us remember always that weakness comes from division, strength from unity.”254

Apartheid divided the Commonwealth and continued to escalate tensions until the

Meeting of the Prime Ministers in the spring of 1961. Macmillan in his memoir asserted,

“Apartheid to him [Verwoerd] was more than a political philosophy, it was a religion.”255

While Macmillan dismissed the follow-up, impromptu speech Verwoerd gave following the “Wind of Change” speech that day in February, Saul Bubow argues that Verwoerd’s rebuttal marked the beginning of his increasing command in domestic South African politics.256 So, the South African Prime Minister proceeded with the constitutional referendum to make South Africa a republic in 1960. When it passed, Verwoerd needed to renew his country’s Commonwealth membership at the Prime Minister Meeting in

1961, where he misjudged the other Commonwealth members’ feelings about apartheid and the Commonwealth.

Leading into the debate, Verwoerd admitted to the South African Parliament there lie some resistance with the younger members.257 Ghana and Malaya already boycotted

South African goods, and strong efforts to follow suit existed in the Nigerian House of

Representatives. Even a Nigerian representative who opposed the boycott measure nonetheless asserted, “The attitude shown by the white men in South Africa is quite

254 Macmillan, “Appendix One,” in Pointing, 477-482. 255 Macmillan, Pointing, 152. 256 See Saul Bubow, “Macmillan Voerwoerd and the 1960 ‘Wind of Change’ Speech”, in The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization, eds. L.J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013). 257 ”South Africa: statement by the Prime Minister, Dr. the Hon. H.F. Verwoerd, in the House of Assembly, 23 March 1961,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 376-377. 85 against democracy. It is worse than communism or Hitlerism.”258 Come spring of 1961,

Macmillan attempted to thread the needle like the previous year, in which he managed to cool tempers despite never finding a resolution. He tried to persuade John Diefenbaker, the Canadian prime minister, preemptively with a letter to allow South Africa to remain, invoking the intimate history of South Africa with Britain and the Commonwealth. That failed as Diefenbaker led the charge in interrogating Verwoerd about apartheid.259

Macmillan believed the issue of race devolved the conversation in which, “the purely constitutional point [about South Africa becoming a republic] was overshadowed.” The breaking point came when Verwoerd rebuffed the idea of hosting diplomatic representatives from African members.260 To the Canadian House of Commons,

Diefenbaker explained, “if the commonwealth is to be a force for good, as it should be, there must be a measure of general agreement that discrimination in respect of race and colour shall not take place.” An example of a force for good he highlighted was the

United Nations because, “the United Nations answers to these principles, and that the

Commonwealth cannot do less.”261 Nehru also explained his decision to a comparison to the United Nations when it came to defining the Commonwealth along the line of racial equality. He exclaimed in the Lok Sabha, “As a matter of fact, the United Nations Charter itself concerns this, and what the South African Government has been doing was in direct violation of the Charter.”262

258 “Importation of South African goods into the Federation of Nigeria: extracts from a debate in the Nigerian House of Representatives, 5 April 1960,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 355-356. 259 Macmillan, Pointing, 295-298. 260 Macmillan, Pointing, 298. 261 “Canada: extract from a speech by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. J.G. Diefenbaker, in the House of Commons, 17 March 1961,” in Commonwealth Affairs, 667-669. 262 ”India: extract from a speech by the Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharalal Nehru, in the Lok Sabha, 24 March 1961,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 390. 86

Despite Macmillan’s attempts to keep South Africa within the Commonwealth, it appeared the pursuit for the Commonwealth to be optimally reflective of the values found universally prestigious led to the outcome. During his “Wind of Change” speech, he spoke about the appeal of the Commonwealth possessing no written constitution.

Reflecting the sentiments of political thinkers of old like Walter Bagehot, Macmillan compared this constitution with the English Constitution and how the unwritten constitution enabled practical flexibility.263 Yet at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, this particular aspect that Macmillan found functional for success became usurped by those wanting to impose rigidity to the ‘constitution' in order to reflect values universally prestigious, like in the United Nations Charter. While multiracialism became a goal of the

Commonwealth, universal prestige codified it in an orthodox adherent manner. The ending result led to various conclusions on the future of the Commonwealth.

With the departure of one its oldest members, there existed different conclusions on the future of the Commonwealth. In Cape Town, Verwoerd recited his statement from that faithful Prime Minister Meeting: “The practices which have led to the present unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in the United Nations will, I venture to predict, lead to the eventual disintegration of the Commonwealth, which all would regret.”264

Diefenbaker in the Canadian House of Commons responded to such by asserting that the

Commonwealth was but changing from its earlier days of intimacy while maintaining multiracialism as the foundation.265 Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies felt the

Commonwealth falling away from what it was intended claiming, “Its membership grows

263 Macmillan, “Appendix One,” in Pointing, 481. 264 “South Africa: statement by the Prime Minister, Dr. the Hon. H.F. Verwoerd, in the House of Assembly, 23 March 1961,” Affairs, 389. 265 “Canada: Prime Ministers’ Meeting held in London, 8-17 March 1961: communiqué on South Africa issued on 15 March 1961,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 369-370. 87 out of a special history, and is not conditioned by rules or procedures of the United

Nations… a relationship quite different from that of members of the United Nations.”266

Macmillan also noted changes of the Commonwealth to the House of Commons since the war, and it must rely on “the new principle of a common idealism.”267

Despite such, Secretary of Commonwealth Affairs Duncan Sandy voiced optimism in the Commonwealth’s future in a telegram he sent out to the High

Commissioners. South Africa’s departure will unite the Commonwealth and allow it to be a bridge to all peoples, races, and creeds. “The removal of any doubt about the acceptance of the principle of multi-racialism should embrace the prestige of the

Commonwealth in the world as well as its own solidarity,” and its members possess the opportunity to extend their collective influence.268 British officials still thought, or at least hoped, the Commonwealth remain an institution, through its prestige, to enable lasting influence and status in a post-colonial world.

Hope and optimism appeared to fall away as the British continued into the 1960s.

It appeared that British officials wanted to look pass the departure of South Africa to a new phase and shape of the Commonwealth. Macmillan stated in his memoir, “I felt the heavy responsibility of presiding over so tragic a break.”269 However, the Queen’s

Speech unceremoniously informed, “The Union of South Africa withdrew from the

266 “Australia: extract from a speech of the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. R. G. Menzies, in the House of Representatives, 11 April 1961,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 394. Note: By no way does Menzies condone apartheid, but believed that it was possible through Commonwealth relations to maintain a responsibility to give hope to the three- quarters of South Africa’s disenfranchised under apartheid. 267 “United Kingdom: extracts from a speech by the Prime Minister, the Rt Hon. Harold Macmillan, in the House of Commons, 22 March 1961,” in Mansergh, Commonwealth Affairs, 374-375, 268 “The Commonwealth,” note, 5 April 1961, confidential, CAB 129/104, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 269 Macmillan, Pointing, 300-301. 88

Commonwealth on 31st May, 1961 and has become a Republic.”270 For all the sentiments and anxieties surrounding South Africa’s departure, the disinterested wording proves curious. As for the new phase of the Commonwealth relations, it began to fissure rather than coalesce. Nigerians, according to the Governor-General at the time of the African

Tour, were not swayed by Macmillan at Cape Town. Rather, they thought British leadership to be inconsistent to what they say, such as the ‘Wind of Change’ Speech, and what they do, such as abstain at the UN over South Africa. The High Commissioner in

Salisbury noted the dissatisfaction of CAF officials with Macmillan leaving various questions, such as the future of the Federation, unanswered.271 Federations as a concept to promote more robust members economically also fell away as a working party concluded in late 1960 that all future Commonwealth members should be accepted regardless of size.272

However, Britain already began moving forward with their own economic interests in their bid to join the European Economic Community (EEC). Britain faced the economic reality that its economy demanded more developed goods and capital from

Europe and the United States to grow rather than the commodities that the colonies and

Commonwealth members, such as those in Africa, produced.273 Their intent drew concerns from Commonwealth members in Africa. Ghana Prime Minister Kwame

Nkrumah considered leaving the Commonwealth upon the UK’s acceptance into the

EEC. The CAF demanded at minimum to be classified by the UK as an Associated

270 “The Queen’s Speech on the Prorogation of Parliament,” note, 3 October 1961, secret, CAB 129/106, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 271 “Prime Minister’s African Tour,” note, 12 April 1960, secret, CAB 129/101, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 272 “Future Expansion of Commonwealth,” memorandum, 2 November 1960, secret, CAB 129/103, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 273 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 237. 89

Overseas Territories in order to maintain some semblance of the trading privileges they shared with Britain if Britain succeeded.274 Through the trials and turbulence in maintaining the Commonwealth for the sterling area, blocking out communism in the continent, and making the Commonwealth an institution for suitable to the universal prestige, the seams of British leadership began to become undone as some questioned

Britain’s leadership and how British officials needed more than their particular prestige- concepts in order to resolve domestic issues.

274 See “Visit to Commonwealth Capitals in Africa, June-July, 1961,” memorandum, 11 July 1961, CAB 129/105, secret, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 90

Chapter Three: East of Suez and the Last Vestige of Empire

With the ascension of Harold Wilson’s Labour Government in 1964, Britain’s capabilities dwindled in comparison to that of the Eden Government nearly a decade before. Despite this, Wilson in the House of Commons at the end of 1964 pledged that the cost cutting that may be needed will not, nor can Britain afford to, relinquish its role in the world.275 “Why Britain should want to keep a world role was a difficult question,”

Ben Pimlott surmised in his biography of Wilson. Pimlott detected in his investigation of the ‘Official Mind’ that when officials tried to give a reason, they were “half-consciously thinking another.”276 Pimlott deduced that prestige possibly played a role in the Labour

Government’s efforts to maintain a world role:

In particular there was confusion about whether Britain wanted to continue to be the same kind of world power for reasons of national prestige; or to provide a post-imperial sense of national purpose; or, to contribute to Western struggle against Communism; or simply to guarantee American financial support when the British economy got into difficulties.277

However, it will be the contention of this thesis that all these possibilities actually feed into the ideas of prestige. That in the broader timespan of British foreign policy, British officials saw the interconnections between all these variables: fighting Communism both throughout the world especially to safeguard Western Europe; fostering close relations with the United States; and shaping a post-imperial identity and role such as being the leader of the Commonwealth and sterling area. Among these facets lied the prestige that they sought in order maintain a world role. The Wilson Government’s pursuit of prestige

275 Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez: 1947-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 383- 384. 276 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: HarpersCollins, 1992), 382. 277 Pimlott, Wilson, 282. 91 became dictated by the constraints they inherited from the previous government along with Britain’s changing economy.

Facing needed changes in the British economy, the Labour Government targeted military spending and defense commitments overseas in order to achieve domestic policies, sustain confidence in the pound, and join the European Economic Community

(EEC). Cutting the coat by the cloth resulted in shifts in emphasis of particular prestige- concepts. Britain’s military withdrawals east of the Suez Canal and concentration of effort on Western Europe reflected not only this shift, but it also revealed a major change in sentiment towards prestige itself. A shift in emphasis on the particular prestige-concept of defending Liberal Europe via NATO fed into their plans of hopefully prevailing where the Conservative Government failed—acceptance into the European Economic

Community. Yet, the ambitions for their bid came at the expense of the Anglo-American relationship with a Lyndon B. Johnson administration increasingly invested in Southeast

Asia. It also put stress on the particular prestige-concept of the Commonwealth, particularly those in, or in proximity of, Southeast Asia. Wilson’s decision in November of 1967 on devaluation in turn devalued not only the British pound but these British particular prestige-concepts. The Wilson Government’s aspirations for a commanding regional position by entering the EEC and concentrating military commitments on

Europe signified that the prestige and world role that had been safeguarded throughout the post-war era proved no longer worth preserving at the United Kingdom's own expense.

92

At World Role’s End

Sterling, like past administrations, dictated heavily in the decisions of the Wilson

Government. It happen to be the past administration’s decisions that constructed an arduous situation for the Wilson Government. Conservatives previously implemented a reflationary package with tax cuts to promote economic growth. These actions risked inflation and led to an unstainable balance of payments, which endangered the confidence in sterling. Sterling needed to be reinforced, but that meant trying to correct the balance of payment issue which proved difficult to accomplish.278

Despite 1964 showing modest growth and increase in productivity, it lagged behind other Western countries in both categories as Western Europe economically rebounded from the Second World War. Reemergence of a competitive European market made the balance of payment issue difficult. Britain’s economy shifted from importing commodities from Commonwealth members and colonies towards importing capital from

Western markets. This encouraged large amounts of imports outside the sterling area and its members. European competition also forced prices for British capital to remain low which curtailed increases in wages. Tax cuts done by the Conservative administration created a scenario in which Britons used their savings to consume potential exports and increased imports.279 All this coupled with slow growth in labor productivity from ill- equipped industries made Britain a buyer’s market rather than a seller’s. Gold and dollar reserves became vulnerable to drainages from lopsided balance of payments. In 1964, the balance of payment became a deficit with a £373 million in the red.280 If enough drainage

278 Nicholas Woodward, “Labour’s economic performance, 1964-70,” in The Wilson Governments: 1964-1970, eds. R. Coopey, S. Fielding, and N. Tirastsoo (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 73-74. 279 Woodward, “performance,” in Governments, 75. 280 Woodward, “performance,” 75-76. 93 occurred in the reserves, then markets will rush to convert their sterling while they still believed in receiving a good rate for them before British reserves ran out of gold and dollars, or, stop honoring the exchange altogether. Therefore, the Wilson Government sought to implement supply-side economic measures to increase productivity, renew competiveness, and reverse balance of payment trends, but, that also required fiscal measures to compensate the expenses of these endeavors.281

The defense budget became a subject to these fiscal measures, forcing decisions and priorities of British officials that led to conflict with Britain’s world role. In the

Queen’s Speech October of 1964, it revealed officials’ intentions to reassess the budget with the line: “They [Her Majesty’s Government] will review defence policy to ensure, by relating our commitments and our resources, that My Armed Forces are able to discharge many tasks with effectiveness and economy.”282 Politically, Cabinet members like First Secretary of State George Brown understood the need to uphold the Labour

Party’s election manifesto and commit resources towards efforts to lift the living standards in the country.283 It was in early the next year with the publishing of the

Defence White Paper that showed Wilson how reckless, both politically and economically, current levels of defense spending were.284 According to Wilson in his memoir, he noted that upon this review that there were not be any sacred cows.

Commitments, which Labour for years felt had overstretched and overstrained troops,

281 Woodward, “performance,” 78-80. 282 “Defence White Paper,” note, 9 February 1965, confidential, CAB 129/120, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 283 Barbara Castle, The Castile Diaries: 1964-70 (London: Winfield and Nicolson, 1987), 5. 284 Darby, Defence, 288. 94 must possess justifying merits with their price tags.285 Britain spent £20,000 million on defense since 1952, and her situation did not permit continuing this trend.286

Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey, faithfully committed himself to this notion of corresponding the budget with the importance of the commitment. In his first

Defence Review to the Cabinet, he laid out two objectives for Britain’s defense policy: to insure the country’s security and “contribute towards peace and stability in the world as a whole.”287 The latter to be done through the United Nations’ peace-keeping efforts—a different posture towards the UN for British foreign policy that will pervade throughout the Wilson administration. However, there existed wiggle room in British actions, in which they acknowledged and respected a nation’s autonomy. However, “if our friends turn to us for help we must be ready to give it where we can.” Alongside nuclear disarmament, the other major problem they faced was “to meet those military responsibilities throughout the world from which we cannot honorably or prudently withdraw.”288 While it appeared to attempt to change the course of past governments, the

1965 Defence White Paper revealed some consistency in thinking and awareness of prestige. To continue to maintain influence and their position in the international hierarchy, Britain must continue to be a reliable partner for those who admired Britain or forged commitments to them. In the latter’s case, it is a deal that Britain cannot go back on without repercussions to their influence—or credit—with its allies.

285 Harold Wilson, A personal record: the Labour Government, 1964-1970 (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1971) 42. 286 “Defence White Paper,” note, 9 February 1965, confidential, CAB 129/120, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 287 Ibid. 288 “Defence White Paper,” note, 9 February 1965, confidential, CAB 129/120, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 95

Despite the constraints Britain faced with the likes of the foreign exchange costs in stationing troops overseas, the Labour Government maintain similar themes from the

Macmillan administration of seeking to insure stability and supporting allies. Failure meant a blow to their prestige. Yet to the Labour Government, they failed to see the justification of the past governments’ trend of basing future defense spending with economic growth. “It would mean that Britain was steadily raising the percentage of her national income at a time when Russia and the United States were reducing theirs,”

Healey noted.289 While subtle, this comparison along with the objective of world stability reveals officials early on still saw themselves as a world power like the Soviet Union and the United States. At the same time, they were cognizant of the economic constraints and looked to operate through international organizations, like the United Nations and North

Atlantic Treaty Organization, to garner prestige to which these institutions provided.

UN peace-keeping enabled British forces to remain and keep stability, like in

Cyprus after years of counter-insurgency efforts, without violating a nation’s sovereignty.

When referring to instability outside Europe, there existed an emphasis on Africa.

Therefore if instability broke out in former British African colonies as the Macmillan

Government feared throughout the decolonization process, Britain hoped to utilize the

United Nations as a way to rectify the situation on terms suitable to the international environment as well as maintain their sphere of influence.290 This proved not too far off from Eden’s hopes of using the UNEF in a similar manner during the Suez Crisis. The

Defence Review even continued about its East of Suez commitments and described them as essential obligations to their Commonwealth partners. “Our presence in these areas

289 Ibid. 290 Ibid. 96

[Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Southeast Asia among others] forms in effect a substantial reinforcement for the peace-keeping role of the United Nations.”291 To demonstrate this commitment, they planned for three aircraft carriers to remain East of Suez. Here, the

Labour Government schemed to pursue their particular prestige-concept of

Commonwealth by coupling it with the universally valued concept of peace. By doing so, they reinforced the importance of East of Suez policy, both to other countries and to themselves. However, as they attempted to advance the particular prestige-concept of

Commonwealth to their world role, the Labour Government also turned to Europe in pursuit of status.

Being a defender of Western Europe and Liberalism became a more prominent prestige-concept for the Wilson Government, which led to a greater pivot down the road.

Initially, Wilson was a Eurosceptic who attempted to form tighter economic bonds with the Commonwealth nations, especially those in the Third World.292 However, discussion on Europe occurred early on as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Michael Stewart alerted the current shift in the spring of 1965. He announced in his memo that the EEC now outpaced the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in trade, and this was something to be concerned about. Stewart proclaimed the Government’s policies and attitude will not “prevent General de Gaulle achieving his object of making this unit

[EEC] into a close shop.”293 To the Foreign Secretary, there was no love lost with de

Gaulle. Stewart saw him as an enthusiastic schemer in undermining Anglo-American

291 Ibid. 292 Pimlott, Wilson, 433. 293 Memorandum, (C (65) 51), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March 26, 1965. CAB 129/121 (PRO). 97 interests, such as NATO, for the sake of carving out a major position in world affairs for

France.294

If de Gaulle locked the shop’s door before Britain can enter, Stewart feared the repercussions, such as the United States bypassing Britain to make deals with the EEC for economic and trade agreements.295 Those in the EFTA will rush to join the EEC, making trading with Europe more difficult and more imbalanced than currently. Britain needed capital, but more unfavorable trading terms only augmented the balance of payment problem. Yet, the important concern relates to prestige in which the failure to join and integrate with the rest of Europe will increase the difficulty in influencing

Atlantic policies.296 Britain’s commanding hierarchal position in NATO and defending

Western Europe found itself in jeopardy, and with it, their prestige and influence in the region’s affairs. Therefore, Stewart advocated in the memo to follow friendlier policies towards Europe, to exploit other members’ mistrust of de Gaulle, and to present a more

European slant of Britain.297 As the Government progressed through their trials, the more convincing this argument became.

The summer of 1965 hosted the first test with sterling’s volatility for the Labour

Government. Speculation by the press on the pound from lackluster balance of trade figures forced the Labour Government to reevaluate its spending.298 In British Defence

Policy East of Suez: 1947-1968, Phillip Darby wrote, “Viewed sympathetically the 1966

White Paper may be regarded as a reasonable compromise between political exigency

294 Memorandum, (C (66) 16), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, January 28, 1966. CAB 129/124 (PRO). 295 Memorandum, (C (65) 51), Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March 26, 1965. CAB 129/121 (PRO). 296 Note: “Atlantic policies” refer to policies relating to North Atlantic affairs, which includes Canada, the US, Western Europe, and NATO among other things. 297 “Europe,” memorandum, 26 March 1965, secret, CAB 129/121. Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 298 Wilson, record, 125-126. 98 and economic necessity. Less charitably it might be described as the final monument to the inability of post-war British government to bring commitments into line with capability.”299 The 1966 Defence White Paper opens up with the line, “Military strength is of little value if it is achieved at the expense of economic health.”300 No longer should the Government continue to spend seven percent of Gross National Product on defense.

Also, any more loans will only further reduce confidence in sterling.301 The fiscal goal became to lower the defence budget to £2,000 million by 1969/70 fiscal year.302

It reiterated the first purpose of the armed forces: “to ensure survival of the British people. The security of these islands still depends above all on preventing war in

Europe.”303 Therefore, NATO was vital to that insurance of survival. Technological advancements and beneficial political developments cannot be the basis for examination as white papers in the past because they led to bleeding precious resources needed. Like previously iterations, the document referred to the United Nations as the main instrument for keeping peace: “But it remains a major aim of British policy to enable the United

Nations capability in this field.”304 Most shockingly came the changes of attitude towards overseas commitments outside of Europe, which were found not to justify the high expenditures despite their economic assets. Expenses, such as the development of the

CVA-01 aircraft carrier and refitting another two, needed to be halted despite fierce opposition and resignations within the Admiralty.305 Despite these issues, cuts and

299 Darby, 306. 300 “Defence Review: The statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Part 1,” memorandum, 11 February 1966, confidential, CAB 129/124, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 301 Castle, Diaries, 142-143. 302 “Defence Review: The statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Part 1,” memorandum, 11 February 1966, confidential, CAB 129/124, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 303 Ibid. 304 Ibid. 305 Darby, 298. 99 reductions were deemed essential. The document’s conclusion insisted on troop levels in

Europe to remain at current levels, which offered attractive avenues for Britain’s future.

Despite the onus on the Britain’s balance of payment, Britain still committed more troops to Germany than all their overseas commitments East of Suez.306 This relates to the survival of Western Europe as well as attempting to use it in a matter economically advantageous to Britain. German relations improved by the summer of 1965, and Stewart proceeded in his strategy to convince the Government on befriending members of the

Six.307 He insisted that Germany orbited desirable spheres for British exploitation. These included Germany’s potential in being a closer ally to the Americans if Germany increased its military spending, Germany being only second to the United States in deciding terms and loans from international organizations such as the IMF, and

Germany’s important relationships within the EEC. Being a strong supporter of the

EFTA, Stewart suggested they will be more sympathetic to Britain’s cause to become more involved in the Western European economy. “If we can secure German co- operation, our prospects of shaping Western Europe’s economic and political future to the designs which suit us best will be greatly improved.”308 Promising as it sounded, it also meant not to dampen German goodwill. So, the government needed to eschew any rapid reduction of British troops in Germany. However, that did not stop sentiment among ministers that Germany needed to compensate for the occupation given how the

306 “Defence White Paper,” note, 9 February 1965, confidential, CAB 129/120, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. Note: According to the 1965 White Paper, there were 62,000 troops deployed in Germany in comparison to the 58,000 troops deployed in East of Suez commitments. 307 Note: The Six refers the founding members of the EEC (France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Belgium, and the Netherlands). 308 “Policy Towards Germany,” memorandum, 5 August 1965, secret, CAB 129/122, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 100 foreign exchange imposed a heavy burden on the balance of payment.309 Luckily by early

1967, even the United States wanted to enter discussion on troops due to the foreign exchange, which made the matter a NATO issue rather than a personal one.310

By late 1966, Wilson replaced Michael Stewart with the well-oiled George Brown as he sought to shift gears in foreign policy. The summer of that year proved brutal when a seamen strike and speculation led to raids on the pound, which despite efforts by central banks, caused people to sell sterling short that induced more panic.311 Calls for devaluation occurred within the Cabinet and backbench, but Wilson resisted both to avoid smearing Labour as the party of devaluation as well as its repercussions proved to be an unknown at the time.312 Eyes became more focused on Europe as the Prime

Minister informed the Cabinet his intentions in touring Europe early next year. This trip with Brown included touring the capital cities of the Six and meeting their respective heads of state. During the trip, Wilson and Brown sought to appraise the EEC, and then decide whether to make a second attempt to join.313 The two reported their observations in a joint memo in March of 1967, in which they wrote on the commanding position waiting for them if accepted:

The fact is that there is, within most of the Community, a clear recognition that, with the entry of Britain, they will be taking into partnership a major European Power, with the economic and technological capacity, the political will and the kind of associates to ensure that the enlarged Community will at last have the

309 Castle, Diaries, 5. 310 “Defence Estimates 1967: Draft White Papers,” note, 2 February 1967, confidential, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 311 Note: As Wilson described the event created by these speculators, “They had slashed with their razors and fainted at the sight of blood.” 312 Pimlott, Wilson, 406. AND and Woodward, “performance,” 81. 313 “Europe,” note, 10 November 1966, confidential, CAB 129/127, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. Note: To emphasize the seriousness of this prospect he poignantly wrote, “We mean business.” 101

strength and the balance to play the role in the world which the importance of Europe warrant.314

The Eurosceptic had been converted, and so, policies began to drift towards a continental commitment.

Later that month, Brown and Healey released a memo on the studies of the defense expenditures reflecting this conversion. In it, they explained that the Government attempted to reduce cost but maintain their overseas commitments.315 While they did reduce troop numbers over the years with the goal to bring 28,000 home by 1968, the new savings plan increased by another £25 million.316 The Government’s previous goal of saving £200 to £300 million proved arbitrary and did not factor in the aid promised to allies after they withdrew. “It is, therefore, plain that we must either accept a much smaller saving than had been hoped for on the Defence Budget or change our oversea policies.” Echoing the remarks of last year’s Defence Review, the memo asserted, “For the health of our own economy we must change our overseas policies.” Southeast

Asia, where the majority of deployed troops east of Suez were stationed, became the subject of that change. In light of this study, the memo argued the necessity of withdrawing troops from the Commonwealth countries of Singapore and Malaysia. To compensate for this, they should develop a base in Australia with minimum troop presence. Healey believed savings ran around £150-200 million by 1970/1 and up to £300 million by 1975/6.317 These savings at the expense of Commonwealth members will

314 “The Approach to Europe,” memorandum, 16 March 1967, secret, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. Memorandum. 315 “Defence Expenditure Studies,” memorandum, 31 March 1967, top secret, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 316 “Defence Estimates 1967: Draft White Papers,” note, 2 February 1967, confidential, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 317 Brown and Healey, “Defence Expenditure Studies,” memorandum, 31 March 1967, top secret, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 102 contribute to rectifying and bolstering the balance of payments. Doing so would boost sterling as well as encourage supply-side endeavors to make Britain a more attractive

EEC candidate. They decided to gamble their prestige of being leader of the

Commonwealth for the potential material gains and influential status on the continent.

Yet not everyone saw the plan as something aligned with British prestige, and sought to urge otherwise. Herbert Bowden, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, launched a defense of the Commonwealth the following week. Bowden argued that such a withdrawal will mainly impact Commonwealth members and contradicts the reassuring policies stated by the Government last year. Rather than one swift blow to these members, he proposed a gradual withdrawal similar to what the defense study proposed in which the number of troops will reduce to half, but, the remaining half stayed until proper consultation and acceptance by Commonwealth members.318

In another appeal a month later, he conceded the changes in the Commonwealth were due to the Afro-Asian members by stating, “The Commonwealth can no longer be regarded as an association in which Britain could continue on getting her own way and where the other Members supported Britain.”319 Yet, it still maintained its principal roles of being “a bridge between races. And it provides opportunities for Britain to influence other Members.” This argument attempted to appeal to the prestige that the

Commonwealth provided for Britain: an international institution for British influence while at the same time being universally prestigious for its role in uniting nations and races. Secondly, Bowden argued that there still remained strong economic ties with the

318 Bowden, “Defence Expenditure Studies,” memorandum, 31 March 1967, top secret, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 319 Ibid. 103

Commonwealth, in which joining the EEC “may well progressively affect our ability to play as large a political role in the Commonwealth as in the past.” Continuing, he posited the effect of the Commonwealth’s demise. It will not go out in a whimper, “but would break up in hostility towards Britain. We should then be released from the special pressures by our partners as a Member of the Commonwealth. But the disadvantages would be serious. Our prestige throughout the world would take a heavy knock.”320

However his arguments, despite trying to appeal with prestige, fell on deaf ears. Wilson in the past attempted to strengthen Commonwealth ties with a trading scheme presented at the Prime Minister Meeting of 1965. It never gained traction as Caribbean and African members desired to safeguard their commodities rather than be involved.321 Though,

Healey later noted the needed consideration of Commonwealth members when it came to withdrawal, in which half the troops will withdrawal by 1970/1 and complete withdrawal will occur by 1975.322 Now, the Wilson Government sought to appeal to the EEC, but that held its own consequences.

The Six Day War in June of 1967 rattled confidence in the pound as the Suez

Canal closed and Arab states proceeded to impose an embargo on Britain for allegations of aiding Israel. By early July, all the fiscal gains earned over the course of the Wilson

Government to produce a surplus in balance of payments—which occurred in the first

320 “The Value of the Commonwealth,” memorandum, 24 April 1967, confidential, CAB 129/129, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 321 Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations and the ‘Turn to Europe’” 1961-1972 (Rochester, NY: The Boydell Press, 2008), 92-92. AND S.R. Ashton, “British Governments Perspectives on the Commonwealth, 1964-71: An Asset or a Liability?,” in The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 35, no. 1 (March 2007), 73-94. Accessed January 26, 2020. https://web-a-ebscohost-com.proxy.library.ohio.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=c29cb569-3181- 4380-8a95-d182ddcca406%40sessionmgr4006& bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY29wZT1zaXRl£AN=242 33378&db=a9h, 80-81. 322 “Defence Expenditure Studies: Consultation on Defence Policy,” memorandum, 23 May 1967, top secret, CAB 129/130, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 104 quarter of the year— dissipated.323 At this point Richard Crossman, Lord President of the

Council, scrutinized the withdrawal plans. He questioned why leisurely go about withdrawal for the next eight to ten years.324 “For the British Government it involves the need to maintain the posture of withdrawal and slow post-imperial decline over nearly a decade.” With their economic position, Crossman argued an immediate withdrawal provided better certainty to allies rather than dangle onto these outposts while battling economic crises. He argued for a bold Middle East withdrawal by canceling their treaty obligations in the Persian Gulf and opt out of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), known before as the Baghdad Pact Organization. For Southeast Asia, a military force under attrition posed no actual deterrent for enemies. “In fact,” he scoffed, “it would be a residual delusion of grandeur with which we would delude only ourselves.”325 This acerbic comment reveals sentiment not of doubt, but of confidence in the descent of

Britain’s prestige. A small force of British troops no longer functioning as a deterrent for enemies meant that Britain’s prestige no longer proved able enough to act as a sinew for a world role—that oppositional forces will not give deference to Britain in recognition of their abilities.326

The crisis forced Healey to revisit defense spending again as “Defence policy can never be static.”327 Britain’s influence and world role continued to depend on her

323 Richard Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. II, Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons, 1966-68 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, 1976), 414. AND Wilson, Record, 379-380. 324 Note: The sentiment can also be found within the Conservative Party as well. Shadow Defence Secretary Enoch Powell railed against this gradual withdrawal as he believed it will recreate the withdrawal at Aden in which British troops faced increased hostility. See P.L. Pham, Ending ‘East of Suez’: The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 190. 325 “Defence Withdrawal,” memorandum, 4 July 1967, secret, CAB 129/131, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 326 Note: Crossman wrote in his diary back in 1966 that Britain needed to give up her East of Suez to join the EEC. “It is an illusion that we could remain Great Britain by becoming a member of the E.E.C.” See Crossman, The Diaries, vol. II, 88. 327 “Defence: Draft White Paper,” memorandum, 4 July 1967, secret, CAB 129/131, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 105 economic strength as much as her military strength. While his conclusions since the 1966 study admitted that expenses on some troops and facilities may not be needed, he asserted that a small force can serve as a deterrent.328 With technological improvements, British troops stationed in the United Kingdom can be deployed throughout the world in case of a crisis.329 Even though troops cannot be everywhere, Healey insisted that goodwill can be made if Britain contributed sophisticated forces and equipment to non-European allies, like Singapore and Malaysia. Healey in the memo asserted that Britain shall uphold its obligations in Southeast Asia, specifically the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO) and the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Along with that, he reaffirmed no major changes to NATO contributions and postulated decrease tensions between East and West may enable decreases in contributions there.330 Healey’s memorandum provides a foil to Crossman’s. The latter was convinced that British prestige meant very little at that point, the former still insisted its effectiveness in providing Britain with a world role and was worth protecting. If Britain went back on its commitments to her allies—its deals—in Southeast Asia and Europe only then Britain’s prestige will collapse along with her world role.

Britain’s ambition to continue her world role dwindled that November of 1967.

Once again, speculation evaporated confidence in the pound. This occasion centered on the rumor of devaluation in order for Britain to join the EEC. In his memoir, Wilson characterized the market as volatile and neurotic as both the British pound and the

American dollar faced strains. The torrent of raids on the pound proved devastating, and

328 Ibid. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. Note: Yet, such postulation makes Healey rather hypocritical of the past administrations’ defense budgets where he previously criticized them for designing defense policies on future political developments. 106 with the United States not willing to give them a large, direct loan, they faced two options: devaluation or unemployment.331 In the Cabinet meeting on November 8th,

Wilson finally became willing to devalue.332 Despite adamancy on never devaluing,

Chancellor of Exchequer James Callaghan acquiesced to the Cabinet and Wilson’s decision to go forward with it. On November 18th, Wilson announced on television and radio about the new parity the pound held with the dollar: from $2.80 for every pound to

$2.40.333 Later that month, de Gaulle once again vetoed Britain’s entry into the EEC. As for sterling, the particular prestige-concept that heavily dictated British foreign policy finally lost its shine as an instrument for worldwide influence. Towards the end of 1968, the new Chancellor of Exchequer Roy Jenkins noted how sterling area members since devaluation diversified their reserves away from sterling.334 Jenkins concluded, “It no longer seemed likely that the United Kingdom, acting alone would be able to contain the situation in traditional ways.”335 The Wilson Government needed to adjust to this new reality, one that left them facing a closed shop door that they must continue to knock on.

At the beginning of 1968, Healey released a memo concerning the direction the defense policy needed in order to adapt with the pound’s decreased value. By this point, there existed a general acceptance in the need to accelerate withdrawal from overseas commitments. This was to be done in the hopes of decreasing the budget by £100 million pounds by the next year. By the end of January, Healey circulated a memo on defense

331 Castle, Diaries, 330. AND Pimlott, Wilson, 473. 332 Crossman, The Diaries, 561. 333 Pimlott, Wilson, 481-481. Note: As for the broadcast itself, Wilson characterized it as “somber” while Pimlott wrote that Wilson’s disposition proved disastrous in instilling hope in the public by acting cherry about it. Roy Jenkins also noted it being a disaster. See Pimlott, Wilson, 483. AND Wilson, Record, 463. AND Roy Jenkins, Life at the Centre: Memoirs of a Radical Reformer (New York: Random House, 1991), 203. 334 “White Paper on the Basle Facility and The Sterling Area,” note, 8 October 1968, CAB 129/129, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publication. 335 Ibid. 107 estimates that fully fleshed out the new direction in British foreign and defense policies.

To suit Britain’s objectives within its new abilities, the memo announced that “Britain’s defence effort will in future be concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic area.” Other decisions included a hard withdrawal from Southeast Asia by 1971, decrease manpower by 75,000 more men than predicted, minimize naval construction, and phase out the carrier force East of Suez.336 Any commitments outside Europe will be evaluated based on circumstances, which included UN peace-keeping operations. Not even utilizing an institution like the UN to garner prestige by promoting universal values matter as much as domestic economic well-being. Instead, they directed their efforts for prestige towards Europe in the hopes of a commanding regional, not a world, role. On January

16th 1968, Wilson walked into the House of Commons, presented the post-devaluation economic package, and declared that Britain’s world role was over.337

The Last Vestige of Empire

According to P.L. Pham in his monograph, Ending ‘East of Suez’, Southeast Asia received separate and special consideration when it came to East of Suez policies.338

Particular prestige-concepts, such as relations with the United States and the

Commonwealth, proved to be more cemented in the region in comparison to other parts of East of Suez. America’s increase geopolitical interest in the region augmented as it engaged troops in Vietnam, and she desired support and stability in the region from their

British counterparts. Commonwealth members in the region, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as those nearby, especially Australia, still relied on British policy for military and

336 “Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1968,” note, 29 January 1968, confidential, CAB 129/135, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. Note: The memo acknowledge that it still intended participate in SEATO but with reduced troops as well as honor their commitment to Hong Kong. 337 Pham, Ending, 230. 338 Pham, Ending, 8. 108 economic support. However as the economic crunches delivered blows to the defense budget, Britain’s ‘turn to Europe’ generated mutual disinterest between the periphery and the metropole, damaging relationships deemed essential for a world role that British officials saw themselves unable, or uninterested, in maintaining.

The ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom and the United States tumbled to their lowest in the post-war era due to the withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

Throughout the post-war era, Britain and the United States engaged in containment activities in the region, where the anti-colonial rhetoric of American administrations were muted.339 Initially, Labour’s defense policy strongly aligned with their American counterpart’s, and the United States desperately wanted allies dedicated to

Containment.340 Americans feared Singapore may become the next Cuba, which convinced Michael Stewart on continuing East of Suez policies when he was head of foreign affairs in early 1966.341 Containment served as the centerpiece for Anglo-

American relations, and British administrations were cognizant that this particular prestige-concept rested on its political and military capabilities to contain Communism and promote Liberalism.

Upon their first meeting, Johnson inquired to Wilson about troop contribution to

Vietnam. In the prime minister’s memoir, Wilson invoked Britain’s position as co-chair of the Geneva conference along with the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements as a way of rebuffing the notion. Throughout his premiership, Wilson never condemned American actions in Vietnam, but several times in the Queen speeches insisted on peaceful

339 Pham, Ending, 3. 340 Darby, Defence, 293. AND Robert Self, British Foreign and Defence Policy since 1946: Challenges and Dilemmas in a Changing World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 109. 341 Castle, Diaries, 107. 109 resolutions.342 There was some strategy to this position. First, officials hoped this stance allowed them to be a force to prevent polarization between the United States, Soviet

Union, and China.343 Wilson’s neutral stance in a way recognized the dynamics of particular prestige-concepts and universal prestige. The sterling area gave Britain an economic sphere to exercise its influence on. It also served as a manner of separating

Britain and the American systems as to enable Britain, supposedly, to act separately on the world stage with her own economic sphere. To acquiesce to American demands on foreign policies that the British public found unsavory for the sake of American support for sterling proved contradictory.344 As for universal prestige, the Wilson administration’s activism for multilateralism and peace made it difficult for Third World countries to criticize Britain. Though according to Chris Wigley, Wilson flexed this neutral stance in a delusional manner that never garnered any moral force on the world stage.345

However, the economic crisis in mid-1967 enervated Britain’s ability to maintain being on the world stage. Yet Healey, Wilson, and Brown all agreed it was essential to maintain capabilities in Southeast Asia.346 To maintain it meant keeping their world role as well as instill faith in their American allies. Despite Britain’s aversion to Vietnam,

British officials wanted to eschew the appearance of abandoning their closest ally in a region that became of increased importance to said ally.347 Their solution involved a base

342 Wilson, record, 48. AND See “The Queen’s Speech on the Prorogation of Parliament,” note, 19 October 1965, secret, CAB 129/122, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. AND “The Queen’s Speech on the Prorogation of Parliament,” note, 11 October 1968, secret, CAB 129/138, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 343 Pham, Ending, 110. 344 Chris Wigley, “Now you see it, now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy 1964-1970,” in The Wilson Governments, 130-131. 345 Ibid. 126. Note: Later records reveal that Wilson did acquiesce to deploying secret special forces operations in Vietnam. See Self, Foreign and Defence, 86. 346 Note: The Johnson administration monitored British defense policy closely and used back channels to be informed about the changes made. From there, they tried to influence not the decision itself but how the Government went about it to best suit American interests. See Castle, Diaries, 273. 347 Pham, Ending, 193. 110 in Australia to replace those in Singapore and Malaysia. That did not stop some in the

Cabinet like Crossman from calling it, “a barmy compromise.”348 By late 1967 and early

1968, the years of tension between the two over East of Suez finally came to a head.

Secretary of State of Commonwealth Affairs George Thomson’s visit to

Washington in January of 1968 allows insight into the Johnson administration’s reception to the United Kingdom’s post-devaluation defense policy. “I had a bloody unpleasant meeting in Washington this morning with [Dean] Rusk,” he informed the Cabinet in a telegram.349 The American Secretary of State proved to be in a foul and visceral mood for

Thomson, where he belittled the Wilson Government’s decision to withdrawal forces

East of Suez and continue to pursue entry into the EEC, and, how it affected America’s position in Southeast Asia. He argued that the cuts will be offset by all the commercial disruption to British enterprises in the region as well as in the Middle East.350 Crossman wrote in his diary that the Americans pressed Thomson for about an hour. “L.B.J. had certainly stepped up his threats to George,” he commented and noted the Americans’ punitive economic threats “will be a terrible blow to British foreign trade in the

U.S.A.”351 Thomson, in his account, remained firm on the Government’s position.

Yet, Rusk’s argument does relate to prestige. In Thomson’s telegram, Rusk recounts to Thomson how the British set the example for the Americans in fighting for peace back in the 1930s and 1940s. He inquired why a government so interested in world peace choses to opt out and refuse to fight. “He found it embarrassing to say to his British

348 Crossman, The Diaries, 313. 349 Telegram, Thomson to Wilson, in “Public Expenditure: Post-Devaluation Measures Defence Cuts: Far East,” not, 12 January 1968, top secret, CAB 129/135, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 350 Ibid. 351 Crossman, The Diaries, 650. 111 colleague quote For God’s sake be Britain unquote.”352 Such an appeal finds resonance with the rhetoric of British officials in the past decades. Both Eden and Macmillan

Governments found prestige in the Anglo-American relationship impart because of their paternal attitude towards the United States, but also, their views of the ‘special relationship’ and prestige were shaped by their experiences from the First and Second

World Wars. Wars in which British minds guided American muscle. The rhetoric now proved antiquated.

Wigley commented, “Britain (or rather Britain within the sterling area) could no longer pose as a world power, even of second ranking and buttressed by the US.”353

Brown experienced a similar fate on his visit to Washington and reported how unhappy the Americans were as well as the fragility of the ‘special relationship’. Wilson replied that each country must look after their respective economic interests. With the withdrawal, the ‘special relationship’ morphed into a partnership more based on self- interest, where British officials worried less on how their policies might affect the relationship and their prestige.354 Other relationships frayed over the issue of East of Suez as well.

The particular prestige-concept of the Commonwealth also waned as relationships experience bitter rows over the withdrawal from East of Suez. Upon the Wilson

Government’s announcement to apply for EEC membership, Herbert Bowden informed the Cabinet of the reaction of some Commonwealth members. He concluded that after the

352 Telegram, Thomson to Wilson, in “Public Expenditure: Post-Devaluation Measures Defence Cuts: Far East,” not, 12 January 1968, top secret, CAB 129/135, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 353 Wigley, “Now you see it,” in 123. 354 Note: Wilson later that year visited Washington to meet President Johnson. There, Johnson gave a supportive speech of Britain, and while the storm caused by the withdrawal dissipated, it did not mean a return to normal for Anglo- American relations. See Pham, Ending, 234. AND Castle, Diaries, 274. 112 bid by the Macmillan Government most understood the United Kingdom joining the EEC stood as an inevitability. Greater criticism came after the changes in defense policy in mid-1967, in which they sought withdrawal but with goodwill between Commonwealth members. Healey, in a memo, asserted that the changes in expenditure did not give

Britain the right to brush aside her non-European allies, especially with obligations to

SEATO and the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.355

Malaysia, in contrast with most former British colonies, preserved military relations with the United Kingdom post-independence with the Anglo-Malaysian

Defence Agreement. To officials, unilateral termination of the agreement meant a blow to prestige. The reason lied not that Britain breaking an agreement, but breaking an agreement that affected one of the Commonwealth members that remained close in its relationship with Britain.356 With the end of Malaysian-Indonesian conflict in 1966,

British officials began to hope for the blooming of nationalist rhetoric into public policy.

Nationalists pressuring a government to evict British presence in the country no longer became a dreaded specter for British officials but a wishful godsend.357 They now hoped that compliance to what was universally prestigious might mitigate any damage to

Commonwealth relationships and prestige. Visiting the Far East in early 1967, Herbert

Bowden noted the stability within Malaysia and how relations with Britain improved dramatically since last year as a way of reassuring that the 1967 White Paper did not

355 “Defence: Draft White Paper,” memorandum, 4 July 1967, secret, CAB 129/131, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 356 Pham, Ending, 28. Note: 30,000 of the 54,000 British troops deployed in Southeast Asia were stationed in Malaysia. 357 Pham, Ending, 92. 113 dramatically sour relations. Britain looked to withdrawal once Malaysia and Indonesia signed the Bangkok Agreement, ending the conflict between them.358

Bowden’s successor to the office, George Thomson, faced a thornier situation the next year. While Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman proved calm, his chief in finance, Ton Siew Sin, took a hard line. Malaysia held the highest proportion of sterling in their reserves, and the chief of finance felt betrayed by devaluation and feared another round of devaluation might come. If Britain were to withdrawal, New Zealand and Australian forces needed to provide help because the Anglo-Malaysian Defence

Agreement stood as the only defense treaty the country had.359 In his summary of his trip to the region, Thomson indicated the Malaysian government saw military and financial aid as an inadequate replacement for British troops on the ground nor did the government desire the United States to fill the void.360 The country seemed dedicated to the hierarchy

Britain developed as a metropole, in which Malaysia relied on and valued Britain’s knowledge and past success in the region. For all their power in comparison to Britain, the Americans were not as prestigious a partner and leader to admire and give deference to. Furthermore, materials and resources were not seen as generous equivalent for what a trained and experienced British military gave them, security. Yet with the need to withdrawal East of Suez, Britain organized the Five Power Conference in order to be relieved of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement.361

358 “Defence Estimates 1967: Draft White Papers,” note, 2 February 1967, confidential, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 359 Telegram, Thomson to Wilson, in “Public Expenditure; Post-Devaluation Measures Defence Cuts: Far East,” note, 9 January 1968, top secret, CAB 129/135, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 360 “Defence Cuts: Discussions with Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore,” memorandum, 15 January 1968, secret, CAB 129/135, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthews Publications. 361 “Supplementary statement on Defence Policy 1968,” memorandum, 2 July 1968, confidential, CAB 129/138, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 114

However, Malaysia proved not to be the only Asian government upset by the decision to withdrawal East of Suez. In fact, the nascent Singapore’s anxiety on its vulnerability motivated its government officials to act more aggressively. In a 1967 letter to the Cabinet, Singapore’s Prime Minster Lee Kuan Yew voiced his concern about the withdrawal of British troops. He feared a chain reaction of events on his country’s economy and how communists will scheme to undermine the years of preparation for withdrawal.362 The troops stationed in Singapore provided stable business and became an integral part of the new country’s economy.363 He stated, “[I] believe[d] that the British

Government and people would wish us well. Britain’s withdrawal could be done in a way that would give us the maximum chance to continue as a viable community.”364 Come the next year and after devaluation, Lee and the Singapore government took a different tone to Thomson fresh off his visit from Malaysia. According to Thomson’s telegram, Lee proved “fighting mad” and threaten in a not-yet-aired interview on the BBC that

Singapore will withdrawal its sterling balance of £200 million for dollars and break trusts in commercial and service industries where British companies enjoyed monopolies.365

Thomson convinced him to pull the plug on airing it, but nonetheless, Thomson needed to endure the most intense “systematic campaign of pressurization” at a dinner table he had ever encountered.366

362 Letter by Lee Kuan Yew in “Far East Defence Policy,” note, 29 May 1967, secret, CAB 129/130, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 363 Bowden, “Defence Expenditure Studies,” memorandum, 31 March 1967, top secret, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 364 Letter by Lee Kuan Yew in “Far East Defence Policy,” note, 29 May 1967, secret, CAB 129/130, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 365 Telegram, Thomson to Wilson, in “Public Expenditure: Post-Devaluation Measures Defence Cuts: Negotiations with Singapore and Malaysia,” memorandum, 11 January 1968, secret, CAB 129/135, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 366 Ibid. 115

However, Lee refused to accept terms as they lied and later went to London to conduct some lobbying. Roy Jenkins, the Chancellor of Exchequer and architect of the post-devaluation economic package, faced him head on: “As the other ministers present were instinctive ‘world role’ men, I had no alternative but to take him head-on and tell him that he must expect his devotion to political independence and economic self-interest to be matched by a similar approach from Britain.”367 This statement proves telling in that the rhetoric illustrated the new relationship that Jenkins described. Formal or informal, the relationship between metropole and periphery has perished and should now on be one of self-interested equals. While the meeting ended with friendly relations intact and a nine month extension on withdrawal for Lee’s political benefit, Britain no longer wanted to be seen with a world role and to be bound by its history with the periphery.

The prestige from it no longer mattered. That attitude proved devastating to one former

British colony with a very intimate relationship and history with Britain: Australia.

For Australia, Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia served as a forward defense against Communist expansion with Malaysia serving as a bridgehead for Containment. It was especially crucial due to China’s newfound nuclear capabilities.368 SEATO became the organization where Australia coordinated with and access resources from the two strongest proponents of Containment—Britain and the United States.369 Yet as the economic limitations became known to the Wilson Government, Healey suggested a base in Australia to compensate for the withdrawal of forces in Southeast Asia.370 Menzies’s successor as Australia’s Prime Minister, Harold Holt, proved not as diehard an

367 Roy Jenkins, Life at the Centre, 216. 368 Note: China’s first successful detonation of an atomic weapon was in October of 1964. 369 Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, 45-47. 370 “Defence Estimates 1967: Draft White Papers,” note, 2 February 1967, confidential, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 116

Anglophile as his predecessor, whom supported Britain both over Suez and South

Africa’s Commonwealth membership renewal. Upon discovering that Britain reduced their defense budget in a manner geared towards Europe in 1966, Holt became resentful of the Wilson Government. Australian troops at the time were stationed in Malaysia to fend off the Indonesians as well as supported the Americans in Vietnam. His government saw the United Kingdom’s bid to the EEC as a sign to question Britain’s future East of

Suez.371

In an urgent May 1967 cablegram by the Australian High Commissioner from

London to Holt, Britain’s ‘turn to Europe’ aimed to leave Australia in a frightening position. According to the account, the High Commissioner’s conversation with

Chancellor of Exchequer Callaghan revealed that Britain needed to compensate for the initial, short-term net losses from joining the EEC, which ranged between £300 and £400 million. Callaghan stated that Britain found it impossible to remain in Malaysia with the needed pruning to the defense budget.372 At the same time, the Labour Government also wanted fulfill their campaign pledges and increase the standard of living with better funded government services, and so, there existed a need to cut into the defense budget to achieve both. “This, of course, is a candid admission that Britain’s global defence responsibilities are going to be sacrificed to settling into Europe, and fiscal concessions at home,” stated the high commissioner.373 This went back of past assurances the

Government made to its Australian counterparts on upholding its defense commitments.

As for the base in Australia to compensate for the withdrawal of troops in Southeast Asia,

371 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, 45-47. 372 Alick Downer to Harold Holt, cablegram, 5326, secret, 5/3/1967, NAA: M1003, in Australia and the United Kingdom, 1960-1975, eds. S.R. Ashton, Carl Bridge, and Stuart Ward (Unknown: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2010), 190. 373 Ibid. 117 the high commissioner, Alick Downer, retorted to Callaghan on the notion: “I said… we felt emphatically a base should be in forward areas to be of any real use.”374 Moves to the

EEC had severe potential impact on the Australian human cost because of the shift in trade arrangements as well as leave Australia vulnerable to Communist encroachment.

When Downer brought this to Callaghan’s attention, Downer recorded, “He [Callaghan] seemed unmoved by this.”375

Apathy returned in kind as John Gorton, Australia’s new prime minister after the disappearance and drowning of Holt, met with Wilson in January 1969. When it came to the Commonwealth, Gorton informed Wilson that Australians no longer held interest in it with the exception of its regional neighbors as well as India and the original members. As for the relationship between their two countries, “he [Gorton] thought that Australia would come increasingly to treat her relations with Britain in the same way as those she had with any foreign country, such as France or the United States.” Australia diversified its economy since Britain’s first EEC bid, and now Japan stood as Australia’s main trading partner. Even economic interests remained no longer close.376 Wilson attempted to reassure that upon any crisis the two countries will aid one another. Gorton softly rebuffed by using the Labour Government’s own argument for retreating East of Suez: that naturally the two countries will possess separate interests and how geography shapes these interest, such as Britain with Europe. When Wilson replied that Gorton was implying that the Anglo-Australian special relationship cease to exist, Gorton did not

374 Ibid. 375 Ibid. AND Bowden, “Defence Expenditure Studies,” memorandum, 31 March 1967, top secret, CAB 129/128, Cabinet Papers, Adam Matthew Publications. 376 Carl Bridge, “Introduction,” in Australia and the United Kingdom, 1960-1975, xxviii. 118 dissent nor affirm.377 One of the lasting legacies of British global predominance, kith and kin, now also seemed to consign itself as a memory along with Britain’s world role. As

P.L. Pham articulated, “the ‘world role’— that last vestige of Empire – abolished.”378

377 “Record of Conversation Between Wilson and Gorton,” 1/7/1969, UKNA: FCO 24/384/1, in Australia and the United Kingdom, 294-295. 378 Pham, Ending, 237. 119

Conclusion: What is British Prestige?

The mission of this thesis seeks not only to describe how prestige influenced decisions for British officials, but to grasp the concept itself for further study. Prestige exists currently as a concept implied in writings, but a concept not yet explored to its fullest in writing despite its influence. By striving for a concentrated effort on the concept, it is the hope of this paper in presenting it in a more tangible fashion thanks impart to the study of it in other disciplines. Hopefully this debate will expand to include non-Anglophone perspectives, postcolonial discussions on modernity as well as the subaltern, and the future of the Liberal Order.

These hopes will be elaborated on. For the non-Anglophone perspective, prestige can be utilized to better understand nations and their policies. It will hopefully permit greater understanding in moments of disconnection in foreign policy. One example being the disconnection between Great Britain and most of the world, including the United

States, during the Suez Crisis. This can help better understand more impinging countries like China. China, according Howard French, is driven by its insecurities from its history, geopolitical situation, and fear of decline. While prestige may not exist as is in Chinese, there exists something relative to its nature. Or, to put it in a different way, there exist particular prestige-concepts relative to the minds of Chinese policymakers. By gaining perspective and understanding of concepts similar to prestige, nations like the United

States can understand China and its insecurities better and be more able to treat China in closer accordance to how China sees itself in the world, which is a hope French stated in his book.379

379 Howard French, Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), 270 and 284. 120

Postcolonialism’s investment on power relations in colonial systems might also benefit from greater observation of prestige. It stands as a school of thought that took substantial inspiration from Antonio Gramsci and his ideas of hegemony. With a tenet of the school being the interrogation of power and knowledge between the hegemon and the subalterns, prestige proves to be an essential element for exploration as it pertains to possessing knowledge and other traits of value.380 Prestige can be used in further discourse on the ideas of modernity and the Western conceptualization of it, especially to dissect distinguished values and concepts as well as interrogate Dore’s notion of hierarchy among nation-states. Postcolonialism revolves around the idea and assertion of the subaltern as an overlooked political actor in history, and, this school of thought seeks to reveal the subaltern’s interactions and conflicts with colonialism.381 If non-

Anglophone perspectives on prestige can be established, there lies investigations in concerning the subaltern’s awareness of prestige. With this thesis and Dore’s conception of prestige hierarchy, it is assumed that only those with educated, established backgrounds are cognizant of their country’s prestige and develop a tacit hierarchy—a hierarchy based on the Western notions of ‘modernity’. Among other facets to explore with prestige and hierarchy is the analysis and comparison of colonial realities with the perceptions of colonial rulers. To better illustrate this last point: Why did someone like

Harold Nicolson, after his trip to the Sudan and central Africa, attributed prestige as an essential component to Empire? Why was prestige the concept he grasped as the

380 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Subaltern Studies and Postcolonial Historiography,” Nepantla: View from South 1, no. 1 (2000): 9-32, accessed November 8, 2018, https://proxy.library.ohio.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.asp x?direct= true&db=a9h&AN=9363684&site=ehost-live&scope=site, 14-15. 381 Ibid. 15-17. 121 explanation for what he observed? How far can prestige go in explaining the order of the world?

The final hope of exploration stems from the prospects of the current world order steeped in Liberal values, known commonly as the Liberal Order, and the conditions of today’s universal prestige. Several incidences in the past decades have compelled speculation of the Liberal Order and of the future of American hegemony. China’s rapid rise and its defiant aggression in the South China Sea being one cause. Another being

Russia’s successful annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. It may assist in explaining why these nations today can pull off such international violations while Britain failed with

Suez in 1956. As for the current hegemon, the United States does show how it influences the world in recent times. Meghan O’Sullivan’s Windfall: How the New Energy

Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens America’s Power explores how the unconventional oil boom of recent years contributed to the United States influence in the world. By sharing its knowledge of unconventional oil extraction and processing, the

United States imprints on other countries the ideas of transparency, open markets, and anti-corruption.382 In other words, the United States’ knowledge of unconventional petroleum proves valuable to many countries. Therefore, they imitate the United States to replicate American economic success—prestige at work in modern times. Occurrences both recently and in the past deserve observation. Studies of such can lead to discussions as to how liberal values became universally accepted and what lies ahead for the Liberal

Order. Thus, Robert Holland’s call for greater understanding of power and prestige shall be realized. Prestige will no longer be a neglected element. And now, the paper must

382 Meghan O’Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and Strengthens America’s Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), 294-298. 122 return to the two original questions it asked in the introduction: “What makes British prestige British?” and “What makes British prestige prestigious?”

To answer the former, there must be some revisiting from Nicolson in what he spoke of as the inherit qualities in prestige, which he believed to be an innate British concept. In chapter one, the Suez Crisis highlighted that Nicolson is right in his assessment that prestige and policy are conceptualized in a similar manner when prestige is applied in a political framework. In the Middle East, prestige encouraged British officials’ belief in their ability to influence the region. Influence in the region enable the extraction of oil that they saw as fundamentally important to their economy as well as the defense of Western Europe from the Soviet Union. Not only that, but there existed a mercantilist mindset concerning prestige, that it existed similar to a finite resource in which Nasser attempted to steal through Arab nationalism and propaganda. This created a stark view of the Suez situation, and, it led to drastic conclusions and actions. The mercantilist mindset can also be observed in the shopkeeper mentality Nicolson promoted, in which deals are binding. When Nasser broke the 1954 Suez Agreement by nationalizing the Suez Canal, Britain saw naked fascist-eques dominance that threaten their prestige in the region and in the world.

However, Nicolson’s constructed prestige to be based on power and reputation, the latter being based on national character, but, he never provided how to gauge a national character.383 Universal prestige can provide some basis for it, as a positive reputation stemmed from adhering and supporting the values that compose what is

383 Note: Nicholson provided only an historical anecdote about Lord Castlereagh reasoning for returning overseas possessions to France after the disposal of Napoleon. See Harold Nicolson, “The Meaning of Prestige,” Lecture, Cambridge University, Cambridge, April 23, 1937, 32. 123 universally prestigious. While Suez greatly damaged their reputation, the Macmillan administration sought to restore Britain’s reputation, or at least avoid further backsliding, with their handling of African decolonization. Aversion of devolving colonial rule into a

‘police state’ forced independence of colonies regardless of actual readiness. Britain went about decolonization in a manner they found necessary, and that differed from the likes of the French and Belgians. They wanted to utilize the time they had until they needed to acquiesce to nationalist aspirations in setting up stable states. Such led to issues in concerning federation schemes like with the Central African Federation and African nationalism. Still further, they wanted to insure that they remained in their sphere of influence with the Commonwealth as well as economic ties to support the sterling area and deter communism. In order to do so, Macmillan’s Government needed to confront the issue of race and accept African nationalism in order to not lose this influence by going against values seen universally prestigious. Despite adhering to what was universally prestigious, their desires to maintain their particular prestige-concepts shaped their policies that reflected their continual interest to maintain influence.

Interests to influence shifted during the Wilson administration, in which Britain traded a world role for a continental one. The shift can illustrate the importance of prestige at this point. Withdrawing East of Suez in the manner and rhetoric displayed by the Wilson Government—in which each country must pursue their own best interests— demonstrated that Britain no longer held an acute interest in using it knowledge, skills, or resources to project global influence. That their fears of abandoning friends no longer outweighed the material needs domestically. They were no longer invested in the pursuit to make their former colonies admired them and construct a hierarchy where they 124 imitated Britain’s success. Yet from an official’s perspective, one may ask: “What success?”

Sterling became increasingly difficult to preserve as speculations provoked episodes of volatility which restricted Britain in its spending as well as receiving loans to help sterling or reinvest in the country. This situation served more as a restraint rather than providing the freedom of leading an independent sphere of economic influence. By

June of 1972, the sterling area officially died.384 As for the Commonwealth, it became difficult to consider it a vital apparatus of influence. Even a defendant of Commonwealth like Herbert Bowden admitted to its more ungovernable, antagonistic aspects as well as stating that Commonwealth preservation should not come at any price.385 With little interests among the whole to generate closer economic ties, the Commonwealth proved to only serve as a psychological cushion as Britain shifted away from Empire. Even today with talks of renewal in the Commonwealth in light of Brexit, historian Philip Murphy, who was also director of Commonwealth Studies Institution, attests that the

Commonwealth is an impotent and irrelevant institution.386 As for the Anglo-American relationship, it became one not of equals but heavily asymmetric as the American government drove to pressure Britain into supporting the conflict in Vietnam.387 Instead of British officials believing they could appropriate American power for their own world role agenda, British officials’ biggest leverage in the relationship was devaluation and

384 P.L. Pham, Ending ‘East of Suez’: The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 296. 385 Memorandum (C (67) 59), Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, April 24, 1967. CAB 129/129 (PRO). 386 See Philip Murphy, The Empire’s New Clothes: The Myth of the Commonwealth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.). 387 See Sylvia A. Ellis, “Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson and the Vietnam War: a Not So Special Relationship?,” in Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Relations, ed. Jonathan Hollowell (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 125 forfeiting its world role.388 Lacking success, the Labour Government needed to reevaluate its course. To lack success meant lack of materials and motivation to continue their course, and so, there needed to be a coming to terms with domestic and foreign policies with what power they actually possessed. As Wigley concluded, “The starkness of

Britain’s diminished position soon revealed the absurdities of posturing as a major power or as a key intermediary between the US and USSR.”389 Yet, there are also other indicators of Britain’s lack of interests in prestige.

Prestige, the word itself, can be found less in its usage in the Wilson Government in comparison to the Eden Government. It is here that one can understand what made

British prestige prestigious—why a world role matter so much to them despite the material realities. Recalling Nicolson’s lecture from 1937, the word itself gain popularity fifty years from his time: the 1880s; the late Victorian era; the height of Empire; Pax

Britannica. In his book, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1957-67, Spencer

Mawby observed, “The imperial mission of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras survived into the second half of the twentieth century and this is evident in the marked reluctance with which responsibilities were gradually relinquished.”390 Furthermore,

Mawby asserted, “The instinct to maintain British prestige was shared widely by policy- makers in Whitehall.”391 More insight can be found from Julian Amery, a Parliament member who’s service spans most of the decolonization era: a former Minister of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the son of the renowned Conservative MP Leo Amery, and

388 Chris Wigley, “Now you see it, now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy 1964-1970,” in The Wilson Governments, 130-131. 389 Ibid. 133. 390 Spencer Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1957-67 (New York: Routledge, 2005), 183. 391 Ibid. 184. 126 the son-in-law of Harold Macmillan.392 In a retrospective about his experience during the

Suez Crisis, Amery lamented the failure of the British: “The consequences of our failure at Suez were tragic for Europe, for the Middle East, for Black Africa, and indeed for the world international order… In both Britain and France our defeat produced a collapse of the will to rule.” In his eyes, the turmoil the world experienced in the following decades stemmed from the absence of Britain in the world.393 Great Britain, for a period in time, was the world hegemon. By instinct, officials believed that Britain possessed the knowledge, the skill, the success, and the reputation based on a noble national character to lead the world towards peace and prosperity for all mankind. And within that ‘Mind’, what could be more prestigious?

392 Note: He served in as an MP from 1950 to 1992. 393 Julian Amery, “The Suez Group: A Retrospective on Suez,” in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal, eds. Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shemesh (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 121-122 and 124. Note: For example of instability, Amery later explicitly states the chaos that followed the coup in Iraq and the instability in the region that followed. However, he gives no explicit episodes beyond the coup. 127

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