September 3, 2018 OPPOSE the CONFIRMATION of BRETT
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Load more
Recommended publications
-
Business and Environmental Policy American and Comparative Environmental Policy Sheldon Kamieniecki and Michael E
Business and Environmental Policy American and Comparative Environmental Policy Sheldon Kamieniecki and Michael E. Kraft, series editors Russell J. Dalton, Paula Garb, Nicholas P. Lovrich, John C. Pierce, and John M. Whiteley, Critical Masses: Citizens, Nuclear Weapons Production, and Environmental Destruction in the United States and Russia Daniel A. Mazmanian and Michael E. Kraft, editors, Toward Sustainable Communities: Transition and Transformations in Environmental Policy Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power Kate O’Neill, Waste Trading among Rich Nations: Building a New Theory of Environmental Regulation Joachim Blatter and Helen Ingram, editors, Reflections on Water: New Approaches to Transboundary Conflicts and Cooperation Paul F. Steinberg, Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries: Transnational Relations and Biodiversity Policy in Costa Rica and Bolivia Uday Desai, editor, Environmental Politics and Policy in Industrialized Countries Kent Portney, Taking Sustainable Cities Seriously: Economic Development, the Environment, and Quality of Life in American Cities Edward P. Weber, Bringing Society Back In: Grassroots Ecosystem Management, Accountability, and Sustainable Communities Norman J. Vig and Michael G. Faure, eds., Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union Robert F. Durant, Daniel J. Fiorino, and Rosemary O’Leary, eds., Environmental Governance Reconsidered: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities Paul A. Sabatier, Will Focht, Mark Lubell, Zev Trachtenberg, Arnold Vedlitz, and Marty Matlock, eds., Swimming Upstream: Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management Sally K. Fairfax, Lauren Gwin, Mary Ann King, Leigh S. Raymond, and Laura Watt, Buying Nature: The Limits of Land Acquisition as a Conservation Strategy, 1780–2004 Steven Cohen, Sheldon Kamieniecki, and Matthew A. -
When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: of Arms-For-Hostages, "Orderly Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups"
WHEN INTER-BRANCH NORMS BREAK DOWN: OF ARMS-FOR-HOSTAGES, "ORDERLY SHUTDOWNS," PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENTS, AND JUDICIAL "COUPS" Peter M. Shanet INTRODUCTION . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 503 I. CHECKS AND BALANCES, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INTER-BRANCH COOPERATION .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 505 II. ATTACKING CHECKS AND BALANCES: FOUR EPISODES ............................................ 514 A. ELIMATING CONGRESS'S FOREIGN POLICY ROLE: THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL . .. .. .. .. .. 514 B. SHUTTING DOWN THE EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT: THE 1995 BUDGET SHOWDOWN ..................... 516 C. SUBJUGATING THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL: THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT. .. .. .. 521 D. USURPING THE APPOINTMENTS POWER: THE STONEWALLING OF CLINTON JUDGES................. 526 III. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DELIBERATIVE LEGITIMACY AND ITS CAUSES ... .. ... .. .. .. .. ... 533 IV. WHAT NEXT? . .... .. .... .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 540 INTRODUCTION Future historians of American government surely will take note of a remarkable series of domestic political events around the turn of the Twenty-First Century. Congress impeached a President for lying about a t Joseph S. Platt-Porter, Wright, Morris and Arthur Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio State University and Distinguished Service Professor Adjunct of Law and Public Policy, H. J. Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University. I am grateful to Cynthia Farina and Saikrishna Prakash fortheir comments on an earlier draft, and for reactions from Reed -
Fewer Hands, More Mercy: a Plea for a Better Federal Clemency System
FEWER HANDS, MORE MERCY: A PLEA FOR A BETTER FEDERAL CLEMENCY SYSTEM Mark Osler*† INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 465 I. A SWAMP OF UNNECESSARY PROCESS .................................................. 470 A. From Simplicity to Complexity ....................................................... 470 B. The Clemency System Today .......................................................... 477 1. The Basic Process ......................................................................... 477 a. The Pardon Attorney’s Staff ..................................................... 478 b. The Pardon Attorney ................................................................ 479 c. The Staff of the Deputy Attorney General ................................. 481 d. The Deputy Attorney General ................................................... 481 e. The White House Counsel Staff ................................................ 483 f. The White House Counsel ......................................................... 484 g. The President ............................................................................ 484 2. Clemency Project 2014 ................................................................ 485 C. The Effect of a Bias in Favor of Negative Decisions ...................... 489 II. BETTER EXAMPLES: STATE AND FEDERAL .......................................... 491 A. State Systems ................................................................................... 491 1. A Diversity -
The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench
Indiana Law Journal Volume 83 Issue 4 Article 11 Fall 2008 Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas William S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada Las Vegas Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons Recommended Citation Lazos Vargas, Sylvia R. (2008) "Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 83 : Iss. 4 , Article 11. Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol83/iss4/11 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench SYLVIA R. LAZOS VARGAS* INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1423 I. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS TO THE JUDICIARY FROM DIVERSITY? ....... .. .. .. .. 1426 A . D escriptive Diversity ........................................................................ 1428 B. Sym bolic D iversity............................................................................ 1430 C. Viewpoint D iversity ......................................................................... -
Some Means of Compulsion Are Essential To
ªSome Means of Compulsion are Essential to Obtain What is Neededº: Reviving Congress's Oversight Authority of the Executive Branch by Imposing Fines for Non-Compliance with Congressional Subpoenas MAX G. LESSER* INTRODUCTION Congressional oversight has played a critical role in uncovering wrongdoing in the executive branch, from the historic corruption of the Teapot Dome Scandal to the presidential abuses of power in Watergate. Underpinning these investigations has been the Supreme Court's long-standing recognition of the broad oversight authority possessed by Congress, which empowers the body to compel testimony and documentation.1 Possessing investigative power allows Congress to ful®ll several critical responsibilities. First, Congress can oversee whether the laws it passes are being faithfully executed, in terms of how ªeffectively, ef®ciently, and frugally the executive branch is carrying out congressional mandates.º2 Second, Congress can identify any executive misconduct, such as ªpoor administration, arbitrary and capricious behavior, abuse, waste, dishonesty, and fraud.º3 Third, Congress can utilize the information gained from investigative oversight to address issues through appropriate legislation, the body's core constitutional function. For these reasons, the Supreme Court has described congressional over- sight as ªessentialº4 for the Article I branch of our government. When congressional oversight faces resistance, the contempt power provides Congress a tool for coercing compliance and punishing those who obstruct its investigations.5 The power has generally been utilized to address non-compliance with a congressionally issued subpoena, and has historically been enforced by the * J.D., Georgetown University Law Center (expected May 2022); M.S.Ed., Hunter College of The City University of New York - Graduate School of Education (2016); B.A., The George Washington University (2014). -
Conversations with Bill Kristol
Conversations with Bill Kristol Guest: Adam J. White Research Scholar, American Enterprise Institute Executive Director, George Mason Law School’s C. Boyden Gray Center Taped September 11, 2019 Table of Contents I. On the Supreme Court Today (0:15 – 44:19) II: The Conservative Legal Movement (44:19 – 1:21:17) I. On the Supreme Court Today (0:15 – 44:19) KRISTOL: Hi, I’m Bill Kristol. Welcome to CONVERSATIONS. I’m joined by my friend, Adam White, who has recently moved from The Hoover Institution to The American Enterprise Institute, where you’re – what’s your distinguished title there? Visiting? Resident Scholar? WHITE: Resident Scholar. KRISTOL: Did you have the same high title at Hoover, or was it just a visiting scholar? You were a resident scholar there. [Laughter] WHITE: I felt appreciated at Hoover too. KRISTOL: That’s good, yes. Anyway AEI has a new program in Social, Cultural and Constitutional Studies, which is great and you’re going to be a key part of that. You’ve obviously been a very – a lawyer and a commentator on all matters legal, judicial, the courts and the administrative state for The Weekly Standard and many other journals. And we had a conversation previously about the courts and the administrative state, before the Trump administration began I guess, I think – right? WHITE: Yeah. KRISTOL: But today we’re going to talk about the Judiciary. Kind of an important topic, a key talking point of Trump supporters, and maybe legitimately so. And I guess I’d like to begin with sort of 30,000 feet. -
Immunity of the Director of the Office of Political Strategy and Outreach from Congressional Subpoena
Immunity of the Director of the Office of Political Strategy and Outreach from Congressional Subpoena The Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Political Strategy and Out- reach (“OPSO”) is immune from the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s subpoena to compel him to testify about matters concerning his service to the President in the OPSO. July 15, 2014 MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT You have asked whether Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Political Strategy and Outreach (“OPSO”) David Simas is legally required to appear to testify at a congressional hearing scheduled for July 16, 2014, in response to a subpoena issued to Mr. Simas by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on July 10, 2014. We understand that the Committee seeks testimony about “whether the White House is taking adequate steps to ensure that political activity by Administration officials complies with relevant statutes, including the Hatch Act,” and about “the role and function of the White House Office of Political Strategy and Outreach.” Letter for David Simas from Darrell Issa, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives (July 3, 2014) (“Invitation Letter”). For the reasons set forth below, we believe that Mr. Simas is immune from compulsion to testify before the Committee on these matters, and therefore is not re- quired to appear to testify in response to this subpoena. I. A. The Executive Branch’s longstanding position, reaffirmed by numer- ous administrations of both political parties, is that the President’s im- mediate advisers are absolutely immune from congressional testimonial process. -
Congressional Record—House H435
February 12, 2003 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE H435 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRAT- Mr. KINGSTON. Mr. Speaker, I cer- court. I think it is unfortunate for the EGY—MESSAGE FROM THE tainly appreciate the opportunity to diversity of the court and for racial re- PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED address the House tonight. I wanted to lations in general; but, more impor- STATES start off by commenting on some of the tantly, somehow that they seem to be The SPEAKER pro tempore laid be- comments that were made by our col- attacking the American dream. fore the House the following message leagues on the Democrat side of the Here is a young guy that comes to from the President of the United House; but before I do that, I wanted to America when he is 17 years old. He is States; which was read and, together comment about the message that we an immigrant from Honduras. By the time he is 41, he is nominated with the accompanying papers, without just received from the President of the to be the first Hispanic to sit on the objection, referred to the Committee United States. D.C. court. He graduated Phi Beta on the Judiciary, Committee on Agri- Mr. Speaker, as you know, the Presi- Kappa from Columbia College and culture, Committee on Armed Services, dent has listed as one of his priority magna cum laude from Harvard Law. Committee on Financial Services, items this year to have a compas- By the age of 40 he had argued 15 cases Committee on Energy and Commerce, sionate, conservative model to end before the Supreme Court and was Committee on Education and the drug addiction. -
Transparency in the First 100 Days: a Report Card
transparency i n t h e first 100 days: a report card Liberty & National Security Project Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................................... 2 THE FIRST 100 DAYS.......................................................................................................................... 3 I. OPEN GOVERNMENT.................................................................................................................... 3 1. “Day One” emphasis on transparency............................................................................. 3 2. Restoration of presumption of disclosure under FOIA................................................ 4 3. Approach to public participation in policy-making ....................................................... 5 4. Support for the media’s right to report............................................................................ 6 II. PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS AND COMMUNICATIONS ............................................................. 8 5. Initiation of settlement talks in White House e-mails litigation................................... 8 6. Settlement in litigation over White House aides’ congressional testimony..............10 7. Executive order limiting former presidents’ ability to withhold records..................11 -
Letter to Senate Leaders on the Nomination of Miguel A. Estrada to Be a United States Court of Appeals Circuit Judge March 11, 2003
Mar. 8 / Administration of George W. Bush, 2003 the White House for broadcast at 10:06 a.m. was captured in Pakistan on March 1, 2003; on March 8. The transcript was made avail- Hans Blix, Executive Chairman, United Na- able by the Office of the Press Secretary on tions Monitoring, Verification and Inspection March 7 but was embargoed for release until Commission; and President Saddam Hussein the broadcast. In his remarks, the President of Iraq. The Office of the Press Secretary referred to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, sen- also released a Spanish language transcript ior Al Qaida leader responsible for planning of this address. the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, who Letter to Senate Leaders on the Nomination of Miguel A. Estrada To Be a United States Court of Appeals Circuit Judge March 11, 2003 Dear lllll : forth tactics that have marred the judicial The Senate is debating the nomination confirmation process for years, as many ju- of Miguel A. Estrada to be a Judge of dicial nominees have never received up or the United States Court of Appeals for the down Senate votes. And now, a minority District of Columbia Circuit. Miguel of Senators are threatening for the first Estrada’s life is an example of the American time to use ideological filibusters as a Dream. He came to this country from Hon- standard tool to indefinitely block confirma- duras as a teenager barely speaking English tion of well-qualified nominees with strong and went on to graduate with honors from bipartisan support. This has to end. Harvard Law School. -
Congress's Constitution
CHAFETZ REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2012 7:26 PM ARTICLE CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION † JOSH CHAFETZ Congress has significantly more constitutional power than we are accus- tomed to seeing it exercise. By failing to make effective use of its power, Congress has invited the other branches to fill the vacuum, resulting in a constitutional imbalance. This Article considers a number of constitutional tools that individ- ual houses—and even individual members—of Congress, acting alone, can de- ploy in interbranch conflicts. Although the congressional powers discussed in this Article are clearly contemplated in constitutional text, history, and structure, many of them have received only scant treatment in isolation. More importantly, they have never before been considered in concert as a set of tools in an ongoing interbranch power struggle. This holistic perspective is necessary because these powers in combination are much greater than the sum of their parts. Borrowing terminology from international relations scholarship, this Arti- cle groups the congressional powers under discussion into “hard” and “soft” varieties. Congressional hard powers are tangible and coercive; the hard pow- ers discussed in this Article are the power of the purse and the contempt power. Congressional soft powers are intangible and persuasive; soft powers considered by this Article include Congress’s freedom of speech and debate, the houses’ dis- ciplinary power over their own members, and their power to determine the rules of their proceedings. Each of these powers presents opportunities for Congress to enhance its standing with the public, and thereby enhance its power. This Ar- † Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. -
Brett Kavanaugh Nominee for the U.S
Brett Kavanaugh Nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit Brief Biography • Age 39. Born February 12, 1965. • B.A. cum laude, Yale 1987. • J.D., Yale 1990. • Law Clerk for: o Walter Stapelton, Third Circuit, 1990-91. o Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit, 1991-92. o Anthony Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court, 1993-94. • Attorney in the Office of U.S. Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, 1992-93. • Associate Counsel in the Office of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, 1994-97, 1998. • Partner at Kirkland & Ellis, Washington, D.C., 1997-98 & 1999-2001. • Associate White House Counsel 2001-03. • Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary 2003-present. President Bush’s nomination of Brett Kavanaugh for a seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit exemplifies the White House’s reliance on ideology over merit in selecting judicial nominees. Kavanaugh appears to have been chosen for a D.C. Circuit seat only because of his involvement in some of the most ideologically charged issues of his time. As an associate counsel in the office of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, Kavanaugh, among other responsibilities: (1) pursued unfounded allegations that Clinton White House deputy counsel Vince Foster was murdered rather than committing suicide, (2) worked on the Monica Lewinsky investigation, and (3) drafted the grounds for impeachment section of the Starr Report Congress. Kavanaugh’s views of executive privilege reveal his excessive partisanship. In the Independent Counsel’s office, Kavanaugh was responsible for challenging the Clinton Administration’s claims of privilege, testing the boundaries of executive and other privileges in order to gain more information for the Starr investigation.