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France and the Politicization of Trade and Investment Agreements

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France and the Politicization of Trade and Investment Agreements Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 312–324 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i1.2616 Article Missing in Action? France and the Politicization of Trade and Investment Agreements Sophie Meunier 1,* and Christilla Roederer-Rynning 2 1 Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA; E-Mail: [email protected] 2 Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, 5000 Odense, Denmark; E-Mail: [email protected] * Corresponding author Submitted: 4 November 2019 | Accepted: 7 February 2020 | Published: 31 March 2020 Abstract Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) and for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada have provoked massive mobilization throughout Europe, both on the streets and online. Yet France, long at the epicenter of anti-globalization and anti-Americanism, has played a surprisingly modest role in the mobilization campaign against these agreements. This article asks why France did not contribute to anti-TTIP mobilization and, more broadly, how patterns of French mobilization over trade have changed over the past two decades. Using comparative-historical analysis, we explore to what extent this puzzling French reaction can be traced to changing attitudes towards the US, agenda-shaping by the French government, and transformations in the venues and techniques of social mobilization. We thus contribute to the growing literature on the politicization of trade agreements and offer insights into the links between domestic and inter- national politics. Keywords Common Commercial Policy; Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement; European Union; France; investment; multilateral investment agreement; politicization; trade; Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Issue This article is part of the issue “Politicization of EU Trade Policy across Time and Space” edited by Dirk De Bièvre (Univer- sity of Antwerp, Belgium), Oriol Costa (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain/IBEI, Spain), Leif Johan Eliasson (East Stroudsburg University, USA) and Patricia Garcia-Duran (University of Barcelona, Spain). © 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction a broader pattern of politicization in the EU, defined as increasing polarization of opinions and public salience Over the past decade, several trade and investment (De Bruycker, 2017; de Wilde, 2011; Schimmelfennig, agreements negotiated by the European Union (EU) have Leuffen, & Rittberger, 2015). Others have focused on drawn massive protests both on the street and on- explaining why trade policy became politicized after line, especially during negotiations for the Transatlantic decades of relative public obscurity (De Bièvre & Poletti, Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United 2017; Eliasson & Garcia-Duran Huet, 2019; Laursen & States (US), and the Comprehensive Economic and Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Young, 2017). Others yet have Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. This development emphasized variation in the degree of politicization over has spawned scholarly interest in the politicization of time, and across agreements and countries (De Bièvre & European trade policy. Some scholars have pointed to Poletti, 2019; Meunier & Czesana, 2019; Young, 2019). Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 312–324 312 This article adds to this recent focus on variation in Two important developments took place in the politicization by tackling an intriguing paradox in the poli- 1990s. One was the deepening of the trade liberal- tics of contestation of recent trade and investment agree- ization agenda. With the Uruguay Round of negotia- ments. The TTIP and CETA negotiations have been the tions (1986–1994), the General Agreement on Tariffs and subject of massive public protests throughout the EU, Trade took on ‘behind the border’ trade issues (Young eliciting levels of contestation arguably not seen since & Peterson, 2006); subsequently, this new ‘deep trade’ the 1930s (Donnan, 2016). At the height of contestation, agenda extended to a variety of economic sectors and in 2015, more than 3.2 million Europeans had signed regulations, including services, competition policy, envi- the ‘STOP TTIP!’ petition aimed at pulling the EU out of ronmental standards, labor rights, and investment. The the TTIP negotiations (Euractiv, 2015). Demonstrations other development was the growing involvement of in 2015 and 2016 brought hundreds of thousands into non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in global trade the streets throughout the EU, with a particular concen- politics. “Before the 1990s,” as Graham (2000) argues, tration of protesters in Germany (Deckstein, Salden, & “the world of the environmentally oriented NGOs and Schießl, 2016). Yet the voice of French protesters, tradi- the world of international trade and investment agree- tionally one of the loudest and fiercest countries in de- ments were essentially disjoint. They coexisted, but they nouncing globalization, has been conspicuously absent. did not touch or overlap to any significant degree” (p. 35). How important was France in the European anti- This all changed in the 1990s when NGOs engaged in TTIP mobilization campaign? Why did France play such a the negotiations of the NAFTA (North American Free surprisingly modest role? This pattern of muted French Trade Agreement), ratified in 1993 by the US, Canada mobilization in a context of heightened contestation and Mexico, before shifting their focus to the global level, in Europe is puzzling for several reasons. France has where all these ‘new’ trade issues were being discussed a culture of protest. It also has a history of strong (Deslauriers & Kotschwar, 2003). anti-globalization mobilization, particularly in the late This new NGO activism interacted with the ‘deep 1990s. Finally, France is notoriously anti-American. One trade’ agenda during negotiations for the MAI, launched would therefore expect France to have spearheaded in May 1995 under the aegis of the OECD (Organisation anti-TTIP and anti-CETA mobilization, yet it did not. Our for Economic Co-operation and Development). The aim in this article is to map out patterns of French mo- agreement aimed to provide an institutional framework bilization against global trade deals like TTIP and CETA, for international investment, which, unlike trade, lacked and to develop potential explanations for these pat- any formal multilateral rules. The negotiations started terns. Using comparative-historical analysis, we explore outside of the public glare, but very soon turned into this puzzle in light of prior patterns of dynamics of so- the first public mobilization against globalization of the cial mobilization, governmental strategies, and societal new global era. In February 1997, an early draft of anti-Americanism. the MAI was leaked to Public Citizen, a rights advo- The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss cacy NGO, and published online, stirring opposition from the argument of France as a leading actor in the global more than 600 organizations in almost 70 countries, mobilization against trade and investment agreements from labor groups to environmental activists (Kobrin, in the 1990s—the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 1998; Walter, 2001). The opposition reflected a general (MAI) between 1995 and 1998, and the failed Seattle anxiety about globalization, with a particular focus on Millennium Round of the World Trade Organization the political power of large multinational corporations; (WTO) in 1999. Second, we present puzzling findings on namely, the capacity of multinational corporations to French public contestation on TTIP and show, through sue sovereign governments for democratically agreed comparative analysis, that France was ‘missing in action’ upon laws and policies through Investor–State Dispute (MIA) in extra-institutional arenas of politicization, while Settlement (ISDS) systems. other countries led the contestation. Finally, we advance While opposition to the MAI was multinational, there a range of possible explanations, which we probe in is broad acknowledgment in the literature that France greater detail in a within-case analysis of TTIP politiciza- played a pivotal role in its demise (Waters, 2004). We ar- tion in France. gue that France was at the epicenter of the contestation as a result of three key factors. 2. France as the Epicenter of Anti-Globalization Contestation: The Critical Juncture of the late 1990s 2.1. Culture at the Heart of the Contestation To grasp recent changing patterns of global trade politics Though the agreement was multifaceted and covered and the role of France in anti-globalization mobilization, a whole range of economic sectors, opposition to the we must go back to the late 1990s, when a new, and MAI focused on culture in particular. By addressing more constraining, multilateral trade system emerged non-discriminatory treatment for foreign investors in around the creation of the WTO. France found itself at all sectors, the MAI negotiations extended to cultural the center of both the shaping of this new order and goods and services—a vigorous and popular sector of its contestation. the French economy and an essential component of Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages
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