Embedded Real-Time Virtualization Technology for Reconfigurable Platforms Tian Xia
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Real-Time, Safe and Certified OS
Real-Time, Safe and Certified OS Roman Kapl <[email protected]> drivers, customer projects, development Tomas Martinec <[email protected]> testing and certification © SYSGO AG · INTERNAL 1 Introduction • PikeOS – real-time, safety certified OS • Desktop and Server vs. • Embedded • Real-Time • Safety-Critical • Certified • Differences • Scheduling • Resource management • Features • Development © SYSGO AG · INTERNAL 2 Certification • Testing • Analysis • Lot of time • Even more paper • Required for safety-critical systems • Trains • Airplanes © SYSGO AG · INTERNAL 3 PikeOS • Embedded, real-time, certified OS • ~150 people (not just engineers) • Rail • Avionics • Space • This presentation is not about PikeOS specifically © SYSGO AG · INTERNAL 4 PikeOS technical • Microkernel • Inspired by L4 • Memory protection (MMU) • More complex than FreeRTOS • Virtualization hypervisor • X86, ARM, SPARC, PowerPC • Eclipse IDE for development © SYSGO AG · INTERNAL 5 Personalities • General • POSIX • Linux • Domain specific • ARINC653 • PikeOS native • Other • Ada, RT JAVA, AUTOSAR, ITRON, RTEMS © SYSGO AG · INTERNAL 6 PikeOS Architecture App. App. App. App. App. App. Volume Syste m Provider Partition PikeOS Para-Virtualized HW Virtualized File System (Native, POSIX, Guest OS PikeOS Native ARINC653, ...) Guest OS Linux, Android Linux, Android Device Driver User Space / Partitions Syste m PikeOS System Software ExtensionSyste m Extension PikeOS Microkernel Kernel Space / Hypervisor Architecture Platform Kernel Level Support Package Support Package Driver SoC / -
UG1046 Ultrafast Embedded Design Methodology Guide
UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology Guide UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 Revision History The following table shows the revision history for this document. Date Version Revision 04/20/2018 2.3 • Added a note in the Overview section of Chapter 5. • Replaced BFM terminology with VIP across the user guide. 07/27/2017 2.2 • Vivado IDE updates and minor editorial changes. 04/22/2015 2.1 • Added Embedded Design Methodology Checklist. • Added Accessing Documentation and Training. 03/26/2015 2.0 • Added SDSoC Environment. • Added Related Design Hubs. 10/20/2014 1.1 • Removed outdated information. •In System Level Considerations, added information to the following sections: ° Performance ° Clocking and Reset 10/08/2014 1.0 Initial Release of document. UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology Guide Send Feedback 2 UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 www.xilinx.com Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Embedded Design Methodology Checklist. 9 Accessing Documentation and Training . 10 Chapter 2: System Level Considerations Performance. 13 Power Consumption . 18 Clocking and Reset. 36 Interrupts . 41 Embedded Device Security . 45 Profiling and Partitioning . 51 Chapter 3: Hardware Design Considerations Configuration and Boot Devices . 63 Memory Interfaces . 69 Peripherals . 76 Designing IP Blocks . 94 Hardware Performance Considerations . 102 Dataflow . 108 PL Clocking Methodology . 112 ACP and Cache Coherency. 116 PL High-Performance Port Access. 120 System Management Hardware Assistance. 124 Managing Hardware Reconfiguration . 127 GPs and Direct PL Access from APU . 133 Chapter 4: Software Design Considerations Processor Configuration . 137 OS and RTOS Choices . 142 Libraries and Middleware . 152 Boot Loaders . 156 Software Development Tools . 162 UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology GuideSend Feedback 3 UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 www.xilinx.com Chapter 5: Hardware Design Flow Overview . -
Sistemi Operativi Real-Time Marco Cesati Lezione R13 Sistemi Operativi Real-Time – II Schema Della Lezione
Sistemi operativi real-time Marco Cesati Lezione R13 Sistemi operativi real-time – II Schema della lezione Caratteristiche comuni VxWorks LynxOS Sistemi embedded e real-time QNX eCos Windows Linux come RTOS 15 gennaio 2013 Marco Cesati Dipartimento di Ingegneria Civile e Ingegneria Informatica Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata SERT’13 R13.1 Sistemi operativi Di cosa parliamo in questa lezione? real-time Marco Cesati In questa lezione descriviamo brevemente alcuni dei più diffusi sistemi operativi real-time Schema della lezione Caratteristiche comuni VxWorks LynxOS 1 Caratteristiche comuni degli RTOS QNX 2 VxWorks eCos 3 LynxOS Windows Linux come RTOS 4 QNX Neutrino 5 eCos 6 Windows Embedded CE 7 Linux come RTOS SERT’13 R13.2 Sistemi operativi Caratteristiche comuni dei principali RTOS real-time Marco Cesati Corrispondenza agli standard: generalmente le API sono proprietarie, ma gli RTOS offrono anche compatibilità (compliancy) o conformità (conformancy) allo standard Real-Time POSIX Modularità e Scalabilità: il kernel ha una dimensione Schema della lezione Caratteristiche comuni (footprint) ridotta e le sue funzionalità sono configurabili VxWorks Dimensione del codice: spesso basati su microkernel LynxOS QNX Velocità e Efficienza: basso overhead per cambi di eCos contesto, latenza delle interruzioni e primitive di Windows sincronizzazione Linux come RTOS Porzioni di codice non interrompibile: generalmente molto corte e di durata predicibile Gestione delle interruzioni “separata”: interrupt handler corto e predicibile, ISR lunga -
Performance Study of Real-Time Operating Systems for Internet Of
IET Software Research Article ISSN 1751-8806 Performance study of real-time operating Received on 11th April 2017 Revised 13th December 2017 systems for internet of things devices Accepted on 13th January 2018 E-First on 16th February 2018 doi: 10.1049/iet-sen.2017.0048 www.ietdl.org Rafael Raymundo Belleza1 , Edison Pignaton de Freitas1 1Institute of Informatics, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Av. Bento Gonçalves, 9500, CP 15064, Porto Alegre CEP: 91501-970, Brazil E-mail: [email protected] Abstract: The development of constrained devices for the internet of things (IoT) presents lots of challenges to software developers who build applications on top of these devices. Many applications in this domain have severe non-functional requirements related to timing properties, which are important concerns that have to be handled. By using real-time operating systems (RTOSs), developers have greater productivity, as they provide native support for real-time properties handling. Some of the key points in the software development for IoT in these constrained devices, like task synchronisation and network communications, are already solved by this provided real-time support. However, different RTOSs offer different degrees of support to the different demanded real-time properties. Observing this aspect, this study presents a set of benchmark tests on the selected open source and proprietary RTOSs focused on the IoT. The benchmark results show that there is no clear winner, as each RTOS performs well at least on some criteria, but general conclusions can be drawn on the suitability of each of them according to their performance evaluation in the obtained results. -
Improving the Reliability of Commodity Operating Systems
Improving the Reliability of Commodity Operating Systems MICHAEL M. SWIFT, BRIAN N. BERSHAD, and HENRY M. LEVY University of Washington Despite decades of research in extensible operating system technology, extensions such as device drivers remain a significant cause of system failures. In Windows XP, for example, drivers account for 85% of recently reported failures. This paper describes Nooks, a reliability subsystem that seeks to greatly enhance OS reliability by isolating the OS from driver failures. The Nooks approach is practical: rather than guaranteeing complete fault tolerance through a new (and incompatible) OS or driver architecture, our goal is to prevent the vast majority of driver-caused crashes with little or no change to existing driver and system code. Nooks isolates drivers within lightweight protection domains inside the kernel address space, where hardware and software prevent them from corrupting the kernel. Nooks also tracks a driver’s use of kernel resources to facilitate automatic clean-up during recovery. To prove the viability of our approach, we implemented Nooks in the Linux operating system and used it to fault-isolate several device drivers. Our results show that Nooks offers a substantial increase in the reliability of operating systems, catching and quickly recovering from many faults that would otherwise crash the system. Under a wide range and number of fault conditions, we show that Nooks recovers automatically from 99% of the faults that otherwise cause Linux to crash. While Nooks was designed for drivers, our techniques generalize to other kernel extensions. We demonstrate this by isolating a kernel-mode file system and an in-kernel Internet service. -
The OKL4 Microvisor: Convergence Point of Microkernels and Hypervisors
The OKL4 Microvisor: Convergence Point of Microkernels and Hypervisors Gernot Heiser, Ben Leslie Open Kernel Labs and NICTA and UNSW Sydney, Australia ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. Microkernels vs Hypervisors > Hypervisors = “microkernels done right?” [Hand et al, HotOS ‘05] • Talks about “liability inversion”, “IPC irrelevance” … > What’s the difference anyway? ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. 2 What are Hypervisors? > Hypervisor = “virtual machine monitor” • Designed to multiplex multiple virtual machines on single physical machine VM1 VM2 Apps Apps AppsApps AppsApps OS OS Hypervisor > Invented in ‘60s to time-share with single-user OSes > Re-discovered in ‘00s to work around broken OS resource management ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. 3 What are Microkernels? > Designed to minimise kernel code • Remove policy, services, retain mechanisms • Run OS services in user-mode • Software-engineering and dependability reasons • L4: ≈ 10 kLOC, Xen ≈ 100 kLOC, Linux: ≈ 10,000 kLOC ServersServers ServersServers Apps Servers Device AppsApps Drivers Microkernel > IPC performance critical (highly optimised) • Achieved by API simplicity, cache-friendly implementation > Invented 1970 [Brinch Hansen], popularised late ‘80s (Mach, Chorus) ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. 4 What’s the Difference? > Both contain all code executing at highest privilege level • Although hypervisor may contain user-mode code as well > Both need to abstract hardware resources • Hypervisor: abstraction closely models hardware • Microkernel: abstraction designed to support wide range of systems > What must be abstracted? • Memory • CPU • I/O • Communication ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. -
Security Target Pikeos Separation Kernel V4.2.2
Security Target PikeOS Separation Kernel v4.2.2 Document ID Revision DOORS Baseline Date State 00101-8000-ST 20.6 N.A. 2018-10-10 App Author: Dominic Eschweiler SYSGO AG Am Pfaffenstein 14, D-55270 Klein-Winternheim Notice: The contents of this document are proprietary to SYSGO AG and shall not be disclosed, disseminated, copied, or used except for purposes expressly authorized in writing by SYSGO AG. Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 This page intentionally left blank Copyright 2018 Page 2 of 47 All rights reserved. SYSGO AG Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 This page intentionally left blank Copyright 2018 Page 3 of 47 All rights reserved. SYSGO AG Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 Table of Contents 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6 1.1 Purpose of this Document ........................................................................................... 6 1.2 Document References ................................................................................................ 6 1.2.1 Applicable Documents......................................................................................... 6 1.2.2 Referenced Documents ....................................................................................... 6 1.3 Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................... 6 1.4 Terms and Definitions................................................................................................ -
Extensible Distributed Operating System for Reliable Control Systems
194 Extensible Distributed Operating System for Reliable Control Systems Katsumi Maruyama, Kazuya Kodama, Soichiro Hidaka, Hiromichi Hashizume National Institute of Informatics, 2-1-2 Hitotsubashi, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan Email:{maruyama,kazuya,hidaka,has}@nii.ac.jp Abstract small monitor-like OSs are used. However, these monitor- like OSs lack program protection mechanisms, and program Since most control systems software is hardware-related, development is difficult. real-time-oriented and complex, adaptable OSs which help Therefore, an extensible/adaptable OS for control sys- program productivity and maintainability improvement are tems is required . We are developing a new OS character- in strong demand. ized by: We are developing an adaptable and extensible OS based on micro-kernel and multi-server scheme: each server runs • Use of an efficient and flexible micro-kernel (L4-ka). • Multi-server based modular OS. (Each OS service is in a protected mode interacting only via messages, and implemented as individual user-level process.) could be added/extended/deleted easily. Since this OS is • Robustness. Only the micro-kernel runs in kernel highly modularized, inter-process messaging overhead is a mode and in kernel space. Other modules run in a pro- concern. Our implementation proved good efficiency and tected user space and mode. maintainability. • Hardware driver programs in user-level process. • Flexible distributed processing by global message passing. 1. Introduction This OS structure proved to enhance OS modularity and ease of programming. However, inter-process messaging Most systems, from large scale public telephone switch- overhead should be considered . We measured the overhead, ing systems to home electronics, are controlled by software, and the overhead was proved to be small enough. -
Us 2019 / 0319868 A1
US 20190319868A1 ( 19) United States (12 ) Patent Application Publication ( 10) Pub . No. : US 2019 /0319868 A1 Svennebring et al. ( 43 ) Pub . Date : Oct. 17 , 2019 ( 54 ) LINK PERFORMANCE PREDICTION (52 ) U . S . CI. TECHNOLOGIES CPC .. .. H04L 43/ 0882 (2013 . 01 ); H04W 24 /08 ( 2013 . 01 ) (71 ) Applicant : Intel Corporation , Santa Clara , CA (57 ) ABSTRACT (US ) Various systems and methods for determining and commu nicating Link Performance Predictions (LPPs ), such as in ( 72 ) Inventors : Jonas Svennebring , Sollentuna (SE ) ; connection with management of radio communication links, Antony Vance Jeyaraj, Bengaluru ( IN ) are discussed herein . The LPPs are predictions of future network behaviors /metrics ( e . g . , bandwidth , latency , capac (21 ) Appl . No. : 16 /452 , 352 ity , coverage holes , etc . ) . The LPPs are communicated to applications and /or network infrastructure, which allows the applications/ infrastructure to make operational decisions for ( 22 ) Filed : Jun . 25 , 2019 improved signaling / link resource utilization . In embodi ments , the link performance analysis is divided into multiple layers that determine their own link performance metrics, Publication Classification which are then fused together to make an LPP. Each layer (51 ) Int . Cl. runs different algorithms, and provides respective results to H04L 12 / 26 ( 2006 .01 ) an LPP layer /engine that fuses the results together to obtain H04W 24 / 08 (2006 .01 ) the LPP . Other embodiments are described and / or claimed . 700 Spatio - Temporal History Data Tx1 : C1 TIDE _ 1, DE _ 2 . .. Txt : C2 T2 DE _ 1 , DE _ 2 , . .. win Txs : C3 122 T : DE _ 1, DE _ 2 , .. TN DE _ 1 , DE _ 2 .. TxN : CN CELL LOAD MODEL 710 Real- Time Data 744 704 Patent Application Publication Oct. -
Sel4: Formal Verification of an Operating-System Kernel
seL4: Formal Verification of an Operating-System Kernel Gerwin Klein1;2, June Andronick1;2, Kevin Elphinstone1;2, Gernot Heiser1;2;3 1 1 1;2 1;2 David Cock , Philip Derrin ∗, Dhammika Elkaduwe ,z Kai Engelhardt 1;2 1;4 1 1;2 1;2 Rafal Kolanski , Michael Norrish , Thomas Sewell , Harvey Tuch y, Simon Winwood 1 NICTA, 2 UNSW, 3 Open Kernel Labs, 4 ANU [email protected] ABSTRACT We report on the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, hardware, and boot code. seL4 is a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprising 8,700 lines of C and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels. We prove that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as that the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also implies much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation. 1. INTRODUCTION Almost every paper on formal verification starts with the observation that software complexity is increasing, that this Figure 1: Call graph of the seL4 microkernel. Ver- leads to errors, and that this is a problem for mission and tices represent functions, and edges invocations. safety critical software. We agree, as do most. Here, we report on the full formal verification of a critical system from a high-level model down to very low-level C kernel, and every single bug can potentially cause arbitrary code. -
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment - Usage Control and Trusted Storage for Linux-based Systems - by Javier Gonz´alez Ph.D Thesis IT University of Copenhagen Advisor: Philippe Bonnet Submitted: January 31, 2015 Last Revision: May 30, 2015 ITU DS-nummer: D-2015-107 ISSN: 1602-3536 ISBN: 978-87-7949-302-5 1 Contents Preface8 1 Introduction 10 1.1 Context....................................... 10 1.2 Problem....................................... 12 1.3 Approach...................................... 14 1.4 Contribution.................................... 15 1.5 Thesis Structure.................................. 16 I State of the Art 18 2 Trusted Execution Environments 20 2.1 Smart Cards.................................... 21 2.1.1 Secure Element............................... 23 2.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)......................... 23 2.3 Intel Security Extensions.............................. 26 2.3.1 Intel TXT.................................. 26 2.3.2 Intel SGX.................................. 27 2.4 ARM TrustZone.................................. 29 2.5 Other Techniques.................................. 32 2.5.1 Hardware Replication........................... 32 2.5.2 Hardware Virtualization.......................... 33 2.5.3 Only Software............................... 33 2.6 Discussion...................................... 33 3 Run-Time Security 36 3.1 Access and Usage Control............................. 36 3.2 Data Protection................................... 39 3.3 Reference -
Legacy Reuse
Faculty of Computer Science Institute for System Architecture, Operating Systems Group LEGACY REUSE CARSTEN WEINHOLD THIS LECTURE ... ■ So far ... ■ Basic microkernel concepts ■ Drivers, resource management ■ Today: ■ How to provide legacy OS personalities ■ How to reuse existing infrastructure ■ How to make applications happy TU Dresden Legacy Reuse 2 VIRTUALIZATION ■ Virtualization: ■ Reuse legacy OS + applications ■ Run applications in natural environment ■ Problem: Applications trapped in VMs ■ Different resource pools, namespaces ■ Cooperation is cumbersome (network, ...) ■ Full legacy OS in VM adds overhead ■ Multiple desktops? Bad user experience TU Dresden Legacy Reuse 3 MAKING THE CUT ■ Hardware level: Next week ■ Virtualize legacy OS on top of new OS ■ Operating System Personality: ■ Legacy OS interfaces reimplemented on top of – or ported to – new OS ■ Hybrid operating systems: Today ■ Run legacy OS virtualized … ■ … but tightly integrated with new OS TU Dresden Legacy Reuse 4 OPERATING SYSTEM PERSONALITIES TU Dresden Legacy Reuse 5 OS PERSONALITY ■ Idea: Adapt OS / application boundary ■ (Re-)Implement legacy APIs, not whole OS ■ May need to recompile application ■ Benefits: ■ Get desired application, established APIs ■ Good integration (namespaces, files, ...) ■ Smaller overhead than virtualization ■ Flexible, configurable, but more effort? TU Dresden Legacy Reuse 6 MONOLITHIC KERNELS App App Monolithic Kernel System Call Entry Ext2 VFAT IP Stack Disk Driver NIC Driver TU Dresden Legacy Reuse 7 DECOMPOSITION App App App App Monolithic