Security Target Pikeos Separation Kernel V4.2.2

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Security Target Pikeos Separation Kernel V4.2.2 Security Target PikeOS Separation Kernel v4.2.2 Document ID Revision DOORS Baseline Date State 00101-8000-ST 20.6 N.A. 2018-10-10 App Author: Dominic Eschweiler SYSGO AG Am Pfaffenstein 14, D-55270 Klein-Winternheim Notice: The contents of this document are proprietary to SYSGO AG and shall not be disclosed, disseminated, copied, or used except for purposes expressly authorized in writing by SYSGO AG. Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 This page intentionally left blank Copyright 2018 Page 2 of 47 All rights reserved. SYSGO AG Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 This page intentionally left blank Copyright 2018 Page 3 of 47 All rights reserved. SYSGO AG Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 Table of Contents 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6 1.1 Purpose of this Document ........................................................................................... 6 1.2 Document References ................................................................................................ 6 1.2.1 Applicable Documents......................................................................................... 6 1.2.2 Referenced Documents ....................................................................................... 6 1.3 Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................... 6 1.4 Terms and Definitions................................................................................................. 8 1.5 Imperative Terms ..................................................................................................... 11 2 ST Introduction ............................................................................................................. 12 2.1 ST Reference .......................................................................................................... 12 2.2 TOE Re fe rence ....................................................................................................... 12 2.3 TOE Overview ......................................................................................................... 12 2.3.1 Usage and Major Security Services of the TOE ..................................................... 12 2.3.2 TOE Type ....................................................................................................... 13 2.4 TOE Description ...................................................................................................... 13 2.4.1 TOE Architec tu re.............................................................................................. 13 2.4.2 TOE ............................................................................................................... 14 2.4.3 TOE Operational Environment ............................................................................ 14 2.4.4 TOE Life Cycle................................................................................................. 16 2.4.5 TOE Physical Boundary .................................................................................... 18 2.4.6 TOE Logical Boundary ...................................................................................... 20 3 Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 21 3.1 CC Conformance Claim ............................................................................................ 21 3.2 Protection Profile Claim ............................................................................................ 21 3.3 Package Claim ........................................................................................................ 21 3.4 Conformance Rationale ............................................................................................ 21 4 Security Problem Definition ............................................................................................ 22 4.1 A sse t s.................................................................................................................... 22 4.2 Threats................................................................................................................... 23 4.3 Organizational Security Policies ................................................................................. 23 4.4 Assumptions ........................................................................................................... 23 5 Security Objectives ....................................................................................................... 25 5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................. 25 5.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ..................................................... 25 5.3 Security Objectives Rationale .................................................................................... 26 5.3.1 Security Objectives Rationale: Threats ................................................................ 27 Copyright 2018 Page 4 of 47 All rights reserved. SYSGO AG Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 5.3.2 Security Objectives Rationale: Assumptions ......................................................... 28 6 Extended Components Definition .................................................................................... 29 7 Security Requirements................................................................................................... 30 7.1 Security Functional Requirements .............................................................................. 30 7.1.1 User Data Protection (FDP) ............................................................................... 30 7.1.2 Identification and Authentication (FIA).................................................................. 38 7.1.3 Security Management (FMT) .............................................................................. 38 7.1.4 Resource Utilization (FRU) ................................................................................ 40 7.2 Security Assurance Requirements .............................................................................. 41 7.3 Security Requirements Rationale ............................................................................... 41 7.3.1 Security Objective: OT.CONFIDENTIALITY.......................................................... 43 7.3.2 Security Objective: OT.INTEGRITY ..................................................................... 43 7.3.3 Security Objective: OT.RESOURCE_AVAILABILITY.............................................. 44 7.3.4 Security Objective: OT.API_PROTECTION .......................................................... 44 7.3.5 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ........................................................ 44 7.3.6 Security Assurance Requirements Dependency Analysis ....................................... 44 8 TOE Summary Specification ........................................................................................... 45 9 Acknowledgment .......................................................................................................... 47 List of Figures Figu re 1: TOE and TOE Operational Environment during Operational Use ................................... 13 Figu re 2: System Integration Phase of the TOE Lifecycle .......................................................... 17 List of Tables Table 1: Applicable Documents ............................................................................................... 6 Table 2: Referenced Documents ............................................................................................. 6 Table 3: Abbreviations and Acronyms ...................................................................................... 7 Table 4: Assets ................................................................................................................... 23 Table 5: Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................... 27 Table 6: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR. “X” is for where a dependency to an objective exists. .................................................................................................................. 42 Copyright 2018 Page 5 of 47 All rights reserved. SYSGO AG Doc. ID: 00101-8000-ST Revision: 20.6 1 Introduction 1.1 Purpose of this Document This is the Security Target for the PikeOS Separation Kernel. 1.2 Document References 1.2.1 Applicable Documents Ref. Document ID - Document Title Ve rsion [Com12] Common Criteria Sponsoring Organizations, Common Criteria for 3.1, revision Information Technology Security Evaluation. Version 3.1, revision 4 4 (final), September 2012, http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/thecc.html. Table 1: Applicable Documents 1.2.2 Referenced Documents Ref. Document ID - Document Title [ANSSI15] Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information, Référentiel général de sécurité, Processus de qualification d'un produit de sécurité - niveau standard - version 1.2, 2015, https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/2015/07/RGS_qualif_standard_version_1- 2.pdf. [Bun08] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) and Sirrix AG security technologies, Protection Profile for High-Assurance Security Kernel: Version 1.14, June 2008, http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.sirrix.com/media/downloads/54500.pdf. [Inf07] Information
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