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STATE of POPULISM in EUROPE 2020 Published By 2020 STATE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE – 2020 STATE Tamás BOROS STATE OF Maria FREITAS POPULISM Gábor GYŐRI IN EUROPE Gergely LAKI 2020 STATE OF POPULISM IN EUROPE 2020 Published by: FEPS – Foundation for European Progressive Studies Rue Montoyer 40, 4th floor – 1000 Brussels, Belgium T: +32 2 234 69 00 Email: [email protected] Website: www.feps-europe.eu Policy Solutions Révay utca 10 – 1065 Budapest, Hungary T: +36 1 4 748 748 Email: [email protected] Website: www.policysolutions.eu Copyright: FEPS and Policy Solutions, March 2020 ISBN: 978-2-930769-39-4 9782930769394 Responsible editors: Tamás BOROS, Co-Director of Policy Solutions Maria FREITAS, FEPS Senior Policy Advisor Ania SKRZYPEK, FEPS Director of Research and Training Authors: Tamás BOROS, Gergely LAKI, Gábor GYŐRI Page layout and printing: Ferling Ltd. – Hungary This study does not represent the collective views of FEPS and Policy Solutions. The responsibility of FEPS and Policy Solutions is limited to approving its publication as worthy of consideration of the European progressive movement. With the financial support of the European Parliament. This report does not represent the European Parliament’s views but only of the respective authors. Table of Contents Foreword .........................................................................................................................................6 Austria ............................................................................................................................................10 Belgium ..........................................................................................................................................14 Bulgaria ..........................................................................................................................................18 Croatia ............................................................................................................................................22 Cyprus .............................................................................................................................................26 Czechia ...........................................................................................................................................30 Denmark .......................................................................................................................................36 Estonia ...........................................................................................................................................40 Finland ............................................................................................................................................44 France .............................................................................................................................................48 Germany .......................................................................................................................................52 Greece .............................................................................................................................................58 Hungary .........................................................................................................................................64 Ireland .............................................................................................................................................70 Italy ...................................................................................................................................................74 Latvia ...............................................................................................................................................80 Lithuania ........................................................................................................................................84 Luxembourg ................................................................................................................................88 Malta ...............................................................................................................................................92 The Netherlands.......................................................................................................................96 Poland ..........................................................................................................................................102 Portugal ......................................................................................................................................106 Romania .....................................................................................................................................110 Slovakia .......................................................................................................................................114 Slovenia ......................................................................................................................................118 Spain .............................................................................................................................................122 Sweden .......................................................................................................................................126 Conclusion: The State of Populism in the European Union .........................130 Index: List of Populist Parties in the European Union .....................................136 Foreword Populism in Europe 2020 – End of an Era If we had to name a single concept from the last The alternation in government of centre-left and decade that has spilled over from political science centre-right political forces that had dominated jargon into public discourse, spreading through the post-World War II era disappeared and the latter like wildfire, then populism would most has been replaced by a tripartite or even more likely be the word to spring to everyone’s mind. In fragmented political scene, with all the concomitant political science, populism has been a major topic unpredictability and tensions. The traditional for decades now, and over time it has occasionally parties of the centre-right and the centre-left have also cropped up in public discourse – often experienced unprecedented declines in their levels erroneously used to refer to demagogy. But during of support, while alternative political formations – the past decade, it has emerged as the top issue not only populists but also greens and liberals – are for those who are interested in politics. Over this drawing a growing number of their former voters. In ten-year period, some 55,000 academic articles many countries, charismatic leaders have become have been published on the issue. The newspaper more popular than technocratic parties; the politics articles, blog and social media posts on it number of confrontation have become more appealing than in the millions.1 And even as all this attention has the politics of cooperation; emotions have become been focusing on populism – or maybe because of more important than facts; the respect of the elite the increased attention –, the various discourses have been replaced by anti-elitism; closing borders still feature numerous competing definitions for have become more popular that to open our the term. Indeed, some scholars even posit that societies up to the world outside. categorising certain parties and politicians as populists is just wrong methodologically; they There are a number of reasons to explain why would rather focus on the political breakthrough the political systems changed in such a dramatic of illiberalism, nationalism, the far-right or political manner. It is not only impossible to pinpoint a single radicalism in general. No matter one’s view of the variable that led to these changes, but even listing concept of populism, however, what is undeniable all of the trends that have contributed to the rising is that new kind of parties have emerged in politics, tide of populism would take too long here. The main and many of them have started to win elections trends that definitely deserve to be mentioned, or have established themselves as major political however, are the global economic crisis after 2008; forces in their respective political systems. Their the growing uncertainty in the labour market; the rise owes in part to the foregoing economic crisis, runaway pace of the changes in technology, society, while at the same time they also thrive by casting the economy and in societal values; the dissolution themselves as counterpoints to the established of traditional communities and the growing levels political consensus of liberal and multicultural of migration; the deconstruction of the social safety democracies. net; and the increasing convergence in the policies advocated by the centre-left and the centre-right. 1 Source: Google Scholar At the same time, voters realised that the era of 6 The State of Populism in Europe – 2020 Foreword grand economic visions has come to an end, and changes on the horizon. Over the past five years, globalisation, market economy and multinational we have highlighted numerous such developments. corporations are apparently gobbling up everything. Allow us to emphasise five important trends and As a result, the political fault lines are increasingly insights from these five years: less likely to be organised around economic policies, and they are more likely to centre on social
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