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U.S. Should Support Japan's Enhanced Security Role

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U.S. Should Support Japan's Enhanced Security Role BACKGROUNDER No. 2871 | DECEMBER 20, 2013 The U.S. Should Support Japan’s Enhanced Security Role Bruce Klingner Abstract Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has brought a new vitality to Japa- Key Points nese security issues, reversing an 11-year trend of annual reductions in defense spending and rhetorically embracing a number of key defense n The U.S. has critical national reforms. However, the time for talk is past; Abe needs to deliver now on interests in Asia and must remain oft-delayed Japanese security promises. As China continues to flex its fully and energetically engaged in the region. geopolitical muscle, Japan’s current defense force is insufficient and therefore unsustainable. Furthermore, historical grievances should n Washington cannot protect these not be allowed to derail Abe’s reforms. The U.S. must continue to urge interests alone and therefore relies on its indispensable allies— Tokyo and Seoul to embrace the reforms needed to secure a prosperous Japan and South Korea—to future—a future in which past grievances are healed and America’s achieve mutually beneficial goals. partnership with its Asian allies can grow even stronger. n It is in Washington’s and Asia’s interest to encourage Japan to he United States has long urged its allies to assume more respon- adopt additional security respon- Tsibility for their defense and for common security threats. Spe- sibilities and engage in global cifically, Washington has asked its allies, in Europe and Asia alike, humanitarian and peacekeeping to increase their defense expenditures, accept new missions, and operations. develop new military capabilities. While some allies have tried to n By embracing a greater role in its meet Washington’s challenge, Japan’s ability to expand its security own security and that of its allies, role has been hampered by lingering memories of the Second World Japan is not signaling a return to War. Japanese politicians periodically deny Tokyo’s actions, further its militarism of the 1930s. Any exacerbating regional suspicions that Tokyo has not atoned for its assertions to the contrary are past acts of aggression. wrong and designed to appeal to base emotional responses in Despite these impediments, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has China and South Korea. brought a new vitality to Japanese security issues, even reversing an 11-year trend of annual reductions in defense spending. While n Japan must realize, however, this is welcome, Abe must do more than increase defense spending; that its new role comes with new responsibilities. Tokyo must more fully redress continued emotional This paper, in its entirety, can be found at http://report.heritage.org/bg2871 fallout from its colonial occupa- Produced by the Asian Studies Center tion of the Korean Peninsula and The Heritage Foundation wartime actions to the satisfac- 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE tion of well-meaning neighbors. Washington, DC 20002 (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress. BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2871 DECEMBER 20, 2013 he needs to deliver on oft-delayed Japanese security lic is now more willing to temper the nation’s strict promises. For too long, Tokyo has fulfilled defense post-war pacifism. agreements only grudgingly and glacially while laud- Nationalism Less Dangerous in Japan Than ing its reaffirmation of past agreements as progress. in China. In some quarters, this rise in nationalism Along with fresh hope, Abe has also sparked and willingness to defend its territory has been mis- some anxiety by flirting with historical revision- characterized as a resurgence of Japan’s 1930s impe- ism—behavior that is needlessly provocative and rial militarism, but the Japanese public’s shift to the counterproductive to allied security interests. Since right is less significant and dangerous than widely returning as prime minister, Abe has refrained from portrayed. Though “nationalism” conjures up nega- carrying out any of the nationalist goals feared by tive images of Imperial Japan, the country is simply Japan’s neighbors. While such restraint is com- beginning to adopt more of the standard nation- mendable, refraining from further alienating its alism of other countries—and certainly a far less neighbors is not enough; Japan must make a con- aggressive strain than has been exhibited in China. certed, systematic effort its alleviate its neighbors’ When emotions in both countries flared over the concerns over historic issues. Senkaku Island dispute in 2012, it was widespread The U.S. should support Japan’s defense reforms, nationalist demonstrations in China, not in Japan, including collective self-defense, while reassuring that became violent. South Korea that such steps do not pose a security Indeed, it is China rather than Japan that has risk. Washington should also urge South Korea to sought to extend territorial claims through mili- move beyond emphasizing its suffering at the hands tary intimidation in both the East and South China of the Japanese and instead work with Japan to Seas. In November, China sought to strengthen its establish a framework for resolving differences and control by declaring an Air Defense Identification reciprocating when Tokyo takes positive steps. Zone that included Japan’s Senkaku Islands. Addi- tionally, Beijing has asserted extralegal sovereignty Foundations of Japanese Security claims against the Philippines, backed by extensive At the conclusion of World War II, Japan’s mili- ship deployments and attempts at economic and dip- tary power was limited to prevent a resurgence lomatic pressure. of militarism. These limitations were imposed Unfortunately, China has benefitted from its through a combination of constitutional and legal coercive policy by gaining a strategic advantage that constraints, self-imposed restrictions on defense is now difficult to reverse. Having altered the geopo- spending and security roles, and the post-war paci- litical landscape through intimidation, Beijing will fist views of the populace. likely press sovereignty claims with a greater likeli- Over time, Japan expanded its security role, in hood of success. part due to encouragement from the United States, The Obama Administration acquiesced to the which called on Tokyo to help counter the Soviet intimidation of its long-time ally, which was discon- military threat in the Pacific. In response, Tokyo certing to Manila as well as Tokyo. Fearing simi- reinstituted a military, called the Self-Defense larly timid U.S. support in the Senkaku Islands, Forces (SDF), though subject to severe limitations. Tokyo sought to reduce its reliance on Washington Although the SDF gradually assumed additional by strengthening relations with Southeast Asian responsibilities, Japan remained reliant on the nations. Prime Minister Abe then internationalized United States for its security. the Senkaku dispute by linking it to Beijing’s actions Recently, Japan has begun discussing the remov- in the South China Sea. al of some self-imposed constraints on the use of military force. Though these reforms have been con- Abe Pushing for sidered for years, escalating security threats make Bigger Japanese Security Role their implementation more likely. To allay rising Japanese concerns over China In addition, China’s increased political and mili- and North Korea, Abe vowed to reverse the coun- tary assertiveness is fueling regional concern, snap- try’s security decline. He is advocating a more ping Japan out of its usual complacency. In order to assertive foreign policy, increased Japanese secu- confront Chinese expansionism, the Japanese pub- rity capabilities, enhanced cooperation with the 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2871 DECEMBER 20, 2013 U.S. military, and a greater regional security role egy that focused on defending the southwest island for Japan. chain against Chinese incursion. Doing so required Abe directed a comprehensive review of Japan’s an abandonment of the static, garrison-based “basic defense posture, which was completed in December. defense force concept” in which military units were The prime minister also reconvened a blue-ribbon deployed evenly throughout the country. task force, the purpose of which is to assess whether To execute this new dynamic defense concept, Japan should implement collective self-defense. Fur- Japan needed to: thermore, Abe instructed Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera to revise the 2010 National Defense Pro- 1. Develop “a dynamic defense force that possesses gram Guidelines (NDPG). readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and The foundation of Japan’s defense program, the versatility [to enable] an immediate and seamless NDPG defines the threat environment, assesses nec- response to contingencies [due to] shortening essary defense requirements, and sets procurement warning times of contingencies.”3 budgets for the next five years. The Abe-directed NDPG will be only the fifth such document; previous 2. Eliminate one-third of its heavy tanks and artil- versions were released in 1976, 1995, 2004, and 2010. lery to create rapidly deployable mobile units, 2010 NDPG. The 2010 NDPG defined Japan’s including converting some ground forces into principal defense roles as deterring and respond- amphibious units. ing to military threats, stabilizing the Asian–Pacific security environment, and contributing to global 3. Increase air and naval assets to ensure air security requirements. The addition of this third supremacy and the security of sea lanes near the role was significant because it reflected a new will- southwest island chain. ingness to assume greater security responsibilities not directly related to Japan’s own defense. Although the 2010 NDPG defined this new Japan’s desire to expand its security role was defense concept, it did not put its money (or addition- fueled at least in part by the perceived decline of al forces) where its proverbial mouth was. The need the United States. The NDPG commented on “a for additional capacity was identified, yet Tokyo con- global shift in the balance of power with the rise tinued to reduce its defense budget.
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