Modulation of Tuition Fees

MODULATION OF TUITION FEES

The Students Population’s Contribution to University Financing

Adopted at the Member Associations’ Caucus on April 6, 2018

CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

WRITING: Yasmine Jouhari, Permanent Researcher Catherine Grondin, Academic Affairs Coordinator

REVISION: Catherine Grondin, Coordinator of Academic Affairs

This document was presented and adopted on April 6, 2018

Member Associations’ Caucus

The Quebec Student Union’s (QSU) mission is to defend the rights and interests of the student community, of its member associations, and of their members by promoting, protecting, and ameliorating the conditions of students and those of local and international communities. The QSU represents more than 79,000 university students from across Quebec. Its intention is to act as the primary interlocutor for all relevant actors at the different levels of government and with civil society organizations on matters relating to the accessibility of higher education and the living conditions of students.

April 2018 2 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ...... 7

1. CONTEXT AND ISSUES ...... 9 1.1 MODULATION BY PROGRAM ...... 10 1.2 MODULATION OF TUITION BY ANTICIPATED INCOME ...... 13 1.3 EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES ...... 15 1.3.1 OBLIGATORY INSTITUTIONAL FEES ...... 16 1.3.2 NON-OBLIGATORY AUTOMATIC FEES ...... 17 2. ONTARIO: A CASE STUDY FOR THE MODULATION OF TUITION FEES ...... 18

3. CONSEQUENCES OF MODULATING TUITION FEES...... 20 3.1 CHANGES TO THE SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF STUDENTS ...... 20 3.2 STUDENT DEBT ...... 23 3.2.1 DATA ON STUDENT DEBT ...... 23 3.2.2 STUDENT EMPLOYMENT ...... 25 3.2.3 THE DROPOUT RATE ...... 26 3.3 STUDENT FINANCIAL AID ...... 28 3.4 CASTRO AND POITEVIN - SOCIAL AND PERSONAL BENEFITS ...... 29 3.5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION ...... 30

CONCLUSION ...... 32

4. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 33

April 2018 3 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Modulated Tuition Fees for Undergraduate and Master’s students (2011-2012) ...... 11 Table 2: Average Tuition Fees for Full-Time Undergraduate Students in Canada and Average Student Debt, by Province in 2015 ...... 24 Table 3: Employment Rates for Students in Canada and Quebec, as a percentage (%) ...... 25

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart 1: Impact of Average Debt on Canadian Students’ Decisions about the Future ...... 27

April 2018 4 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

List of Acronymsi

AFE Student Financial Aid [Aide financière aux études] ASSÉ Association pour une solidarité syndicale étudiante CADEUL Confédération des associations d’étudiants et étudiantes de l’Université Laval CANO Non-obligatory Automatic Fees [Cotisation automatique non-obligatoire] CAQ Coalition Avenir Québec CASA Canadian Alliance of Student Associations CUSC Canadian University Survey Consortium FAÉCUM Fédération des associations étudiantes du campus de l’Université de Montréal FECQ Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec FEUQ Quebec Federation of University Students [Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec] FIO Obligatory Institutional Fees [Frais institutionnels obligatoires] MEES Ministry of Education and Higher Education OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development RMDH Per-capita Disposable Household Income [Revenu disponible des ménages par habitant (et par habitante)] QSU Quebec Student Union TaCeQ Table de concertation étudiante du Québec

i Translator’s note: The common usage in Quebec is to maintain the original acronyms associated with French terms, even in English. For reference, the French term is provided in brackets in these cases.

April 2018 5 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1 That the Quebec Student Union reaffirm that AFE’s role is to support students in financial need, not to act as a solution to the underfinancing of universities. Recommendation 2 That the government of Quebec preserve the single tuition rate for all Quebec universities. Recommendation 3 That the Quebec Student Union oppose all forms of modulation for tuition fees. Adopted Position That the government provide universities with a level of financing that at least covers annual increases to their system costs, every year. [Position Code] Adopted Position That the government of Quebec reinvest in higher education to offset budget cuts since 2014, to give universities the flexibility needed to fulfill their missions. [Position Code] Adopted Position That the government conduct a thorough review of the weighting for each family of programs included in the CLARDER, based on an assessment of the real costs for each type of activity. [Position Code]

April 2018 6 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

INTRODUCTION

University financing has undergone many changes throughout the years. In addition to the difficulty of coming to a consensus on a financing formula that satisfies all parties, one predominant question persists: what share of financing should students contribute? This question, and the issue of accessible education, is at the heart of the recent student crises, particularly the mobilization against the tuition fee hike in 2012.1 To settle the issue, the Marois government organized a Summit on Higher Education in the winter of 2013, where the idea of modulating tuition fees was presented.

For many, the modulation of tuition fees seemed to be an ideal solution to both the underfinancing of universities and the fact that students oppose an across the board tuition fee increase. As such, just before the 2013 summit, the rector of Université de Montréal, Guy Breton, began speaking in favour of a new system governing tuition rates that would allow universities to charge a different amount for each program it offers. Known as modulation, he insisted that this system would resolve the recent cuts to university budgets (Chouinard 2013; Breton 2013a, 2013b et 2013c). The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) also strongly pushed for this option during the 2013 Higher Education Summit, where Francçois Legault called for tuition fees to be differentiated by field of study and by university (Corbeil 2013). At the time, the Liberal Party leadership candidate Raymond Bachand also argued for modulation (Dutrisac 2013). Modulation was again proposed in the Tremblay-Roy report (2014, 108-109), although just for international students. It rejected the system for Quebec’s own students, due to the dangers it posed to the accessibility of higher education and to the social diversity of students within programs.

The active student federations at the time (the Quebec Federation of University Students [FEUQ], la Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec [FECQ], l’Association pour une solidarité syndicale étudiante [ASSÉ], and the Table de concertation étudiante du Québec [TaCeQ]) responded by unanimously denouncing this possibility (Marsan 2013), pointing to the dangers of this new system—especially in reducing the accessibility of education and social mobility. Modulation of tuition fees is a recurrent theme in Quebec’s political discussions and a financial orientation that

1 It is important to differentiate between “tuition fees” and “education costs” in this report. Tuition fees are an amount set by the government of Quebec, calculated by unit (normally called a “credit”). The government sets the cost of tuition each year in the Règles budgétaires et calculs de fonctionnement des universités du Québec. Education costs correspond to the total amount charged to students each semester. As such, they include every billable amount included in a semester (UEQ 2017a). This research focuses on the modulation of tuition fees, as it is discussing the issue of modulating the cost of a university credit.

April 2018 7 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees seems to be shared among many of the actors at the periphery of higher education. This reality naturally gives rise to important and valid concern among students.

Although the modulation of tuition fees was abandoned during the 2013 Summit on Higher Education and the CAQ also seems to have distanced itself from this option, it is important that the Quebec Student Union prepare a defensive discourse on this subject. This report starts by discussing the two most common models for modulation in Quebec—by program and by anticipated income. It then looks more closely at the case of Ontario, where tuition has been modulated by program since 1998. The last section is dedicated to the consequences a modulation of tuition fees would have. It shows how it harms the accessibility of education, changes the socio-economic profile of students, and causes increased student debt.

April 2018 8 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

1. CONTEXT AND ISSUES

The issue of modulating tuition fees arises as a result of the questions being posed by Quebec society about the way it finances universities. Tuition fees in Quebec are among the lowest in Canada2 and are standardized—that is, there is all university credits are charged at the same rate, regardless of academic program (Statistics Canada 2015). Since 2013, the cost per credit has been indexed (Biron 2013) to Per-Capita Household Disposable Income (RDMH) and an academic credit in 2017-2018 cost $79.70 for a Quebec student (UdeM 2017). The government currently contributes a higher share to university financing than students. In 2013, CADEUL estimated that the student community paid around 24% of the cost of their education through tuition fees, leaving a balance of 76% for the government (CADEUL and ULaval 2014,9). Many people, including the authors Castro and Poitevin, believe that the student share should increase, and this is driving the debate on implementing a modulation of tuition fees in Quebec. The report will return to this in the next sub-sections.

The standardized rate for tuition can be traced all the way back to the Parent commission’s 1964 report on university education in Quebec, which argued that standardizing tuition would improve access to higher education and favour greater social mobility and diversity. This equality was not maintained for all categories of students. An additional amount, known as the forfaitaire and which varies by university, is added to the per-credit cost of international and out-of-province students form the rest of Canada (Tremblay and Roy 2014). Additionally, since 2008-2009, some disciplines (engineering, mathematics, pure sciences, administration, computer science, and law) have been completely deregulated for international undergraduate students, meaning universities have total latitude in the amounts they charge these students (Tremblay and Roy 2014). Students from France pay the same tuition as out-of-province Canadian students, rather than international student rates, thanks to an agreement with the French government (UdeM 2017). This is a recent agreement, as prior to September 2015 French students paid the same tuition as Quebec students (Despatie 2015).

The modulation of tuition fees would involve setting a different per-credit cost for different students, based on a set of pre-established criteria. The per-credit cost could therefore be based on the real cost of delivering programs, the anticipated income of graduates, or by level of study. Fundamentally, modulation is a political question, since it would result in a dramatic transformation

2 As an example, table 2 in Section 3 shows the average tuition fees by Canadian province.

April 2018 9 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees of university financing. Modulation is usually based on the assumption that more expensive programs lead to the best-paying jobs, even though this correlation has not been fully proven. Based on this assumption, sections 1.1 and 1.2 of this report outline the arguments associated with the two types of modulation that are most likely to be implemented in Quebec: modulation by program and by anticipated income. Section 1.3 covers the ways in which tuition fees in Quebec are already subject to “modulations”. Sections 2 and 3 elaborate on the reasons why the QSU believes that a modulation of tuition fees would reduce the accessibility of education for disadvantaged communities.

1.1 MODULATION BY PROGRAM The modulation of tuition fees by academic program is among the most commonly discussed and well-known in Quebec (CADEUL 2011; FEUQ 2013). In such a system, the tuition charged to each student would vary based on the real costs associated with delivering their program. This modulation’s basic premise is that it would be fairer and more equitable for the entire student community if each student paid for the cost of delivering their program (CADEUL 2011). Some programs of study do require a larger investment from their universities than others, as they require more material, infrastructure, etc., increasing their costs. As such, students in programs such as medicine, dentistry, or veterinary science would see their bills increase substantially, as these programs are more expensive to deliver. Table 1 presents an estimate of how much Quebec university programs would cost if tuition were to be modulated. For reference, the average annual cost of a full-time education in Quebec (minus FIOs) was $2,168$ in 2011-2012. (Castro and Poitevin 2014, 224).

April 2018 10 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Table 1: Modulated Tuition Fees for Undergraduate and Master’s students (2011-2012)

Castro and Poitevin 2014, 225

The proponents of a per-program modulation, such as Guy Breton, and Castro and Poitevin, claim that it would provide a major reinvestment for universities and a more equitable division of costs among students. According to calculations by Castro and Poitevin, universities could bring in an additional $200 million a year (Castro and Poitevin 2014, 255) by modulating tuition fees. As regards equity, they argue that students in programs with less expensive delivery costs should not be asked to partially pay for those who choose to enter into more expensive ones. According to their projections, only a small number of students would be affected but universities would greatly benefit. They base this statement on their calculations, saying that “financial constraints are not the main barrier to the accessibility of a university education [and that] other socioeconomic factors

April 2018 11 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees play a much more significant role” (Castro and Poitevin 2014, 240; translated from the original). According to these authors, the causal factors are a student’s social environment and intellectual capacity. However, we believe that modulation would have a major impact on the accessibility of education and the ability of students to continue studying and that financial insecurity is intimately tied to these other issues, as was explained by the researcher Valérie Viestrate in her 2007 study for the Ministry of Education, Recreation, and Sports (CSQ 2012). Her study found a clear link between increasing tuition fees in Quebec since the 1990s and a drop in participation in higher education.

Additionally, the QSU would like to highlight that, in Table 1, only the “Lettres” program has an educational cost that is less than the current average tuition fees. This means that modulation would not have a ‘minor impact,” as all other disciplines would see their tuition fees increase, even if universities were to receive an additional $200 million in annual revenues.

The idea behind having a single tuition rate is that it enables the state to equalize cost differences between programs so that everyone is able to study in their desired program regardless of socioeconomic status. Modulating tuition fees is a false solution, not just because it would reduce the accessibility of education by double-dipping into students’ pockets but also because analyses suggest that any form of direct or indirect increase to students’ contribution causes the state to reduce its own investments, meaning that the overall amount of university funding remains unchanged (CADEUL and ULaval 2014). Bear in mind that the QSU’s brief on university financing (2017a) called instead for a massive reinvestment in universities to offset previous years’ cuts, as well as a thorough review of the CLARDER3 codes to better distribute financing among disciplines.

Adopted Position That the government provide universities with a level of financing that at least covers annual increases to their system costs, every year.

Adopted Position That the government of Quebec reinvest in higher education to offset budget cuts since 2014, to give universities the flexibility needed to fulfill their missions.

Adopted Position

3 The CLARDER codes (which classify the domains of teaching and research in universities) are composed of 23 program families, which the weighting of total enrollment is based on. They are thus the base of per-capita, or per student, financing. Financing of enrollment and differences between programs relies on these codes. They are used as the base on which the average cost of a student for a university by field of study is calculated. Weighting varies from 1.00 (standard measure) to 10.69 (QSU 2017a, 8).

April 2018 12 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

That the government conduct a thorough review of the weighting for each family of programs included in the CLARDER, based on an assessment of the real costs for each type of activity.

A single tuition rate ensures that every program is equally accessible, even the most expensive. It supports the democratization of education, universal access, individuals’ choice of their own academic path, and social mobility. It also helps disadvantaged communities have equal opportunity in getting a higher education.

1.2 MODULATION OF TUITION BY ANTICIPATED INCOME The modulation of tuition fees by anticipated income sets tuition fees according to the salary received once the person has graduated. This report has already established that modulation is based on the largely unproven assumption that more expensive programs lead to the best-paying jobs. This second form of modulation is based on a different paradigm than modulation by program, one that views post-secondary education as a lop-side division between individual and collective benefits. The modulation by anticipated income approach requires a proper definition of “public benefits” and “personal benefits.”

The personal benefit rate is calculated based on a student’s anticipated income, tax exemptions, and bursaries, minus their tuition fees (including ancillary fees) and opportunity costs. Together, these represent the benefit that an individual draws from their education. Public benefits represent how society is positively impacted, particularly through taxes from which education-related costs such as state subsidies, student financial aid spending, and exemption-related tax losses are collected. Demers 2008 in CADEUL 2011, 10; translated from original Castro and Poitevin distinguish between two types of benefits (public and personal) and justify the modulation of tuition fees by claiming that public and personal gains can be separated and distributed between the different benefits. Using an econometric model, its partisans have decided that post-secondary education provides more benefits to individuals than to society. However, our education system was designed to uphold the idea that access to university is a driver of Quebec’s economic development (Doray and Lessard 2016, 3).

These proponents argue that it is up to those who benefit from university to cover institutional deficits and make up for the government’s disengagement, at a level equal to their future earnings. Under this system, students would be charged tuition based on the benefits they derive from their

April 2018 13 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees education, which are calculated based on a graduate’s expected income4, as well as their other personal and social benefits.5 The main argument for social benefits is the fact that education provides benefits to society that exceed those gained by the student themselves.

Behind this system, we can identify econometric research documents (OCDE 2010 and 2016; CADEUL 2011) that analyze post-secondary education’s personal and social benefits.

[The personal benefits] from education, those for which individuals are recompensed by society, are numerous. These benefits are primarily related to the expectation of a better salary: a higher income, a greater likelihood to be hired, and better opportunities for work. Additional personal benefits are improved health and a greater sense of personal achievement. Castro and Poitevin 2014, 226, translated from original

In terms of social benefits, there are two different approaches: one that focuses on “the role of education and human capital on economic growth” (Castro et Poitevin 2014, 229) and one that focuses on economic growth.

Castro and Poitevin conclude that the universities produce more individual benefits that it does social benefits, either economic or otherwise.6

Total social returns, both economic and otherwise, are on the order of 3% to 8%. These social returns are less than individual returns, which are on the order of 11% in Canada. In total, higher education provides returns of between 14% and 19%, of which students personally receive over 60%. Castro and Poitevin 2014, 235, translated from original

These estimates result in a proposed system of modulation based on the personal benefits students are expected to garner. Castro and Poitevin state that students’ financial contribution should represent 33% of the real costs for their studies, since students receive 60% of the benefits (Castro and Poitevin 2014, 251).7

Understanding university education in these terms also underlies support for modulation by expected revenue. Academic programs that tend to offer a more advantageous wage post-

4 This argument is based in a micro-economic paradigm, which concentrates on the individual benefits derived from the system of education, based on certain economic variables. 5 Social benefits is a concept that claims the state’s involvement in an issue should be equivalent to how much society benefits from it. Social benefits here are the share of benefits that are not “personal.” 6 CADEUL (2011, 10) provided a succinct definition of the parameters used to calculate personal benefits: “Personal benefits are calculated based on a student’s anticipated income, tax exemptions, and bursaries, minus their tuition fees (including ancillary fees) and opportunity costs. Together, these represent the benefit that an individual draws from their education.” (translated from original) This calculation also includes parameters for health and rates of unemployment. 7 For those who wish to examine their calculations in greater detail, the information used and the detailed calculations are on pages 251-255 of Castro and Poitevin’s research, a reference to which can be found in the bibliography.

April 2018 14 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees graduation should be more expensive than other programs, regardless of the cost required to deliver the program. For example, law programs are relatively inexpensive to offer but law students would be charged as much as engineering students—despite the significant gap between the programs’ costs—because graduates from both programs could expect a similar level of remuneration. While law graduates may get a high-paying job with a private firm, they may also end up working for non-profit organisations for much a lower salary. According to Statistics Canada’s National Household Survey, a lawyer in Quebec (including notaries) makes between $26,121 and $208,319 per year (Statistics Canada 2018b). Lawyers working for the government of Quebec earn $106,000 a year on average, and can earn $144,000 if they work 40 hours a week, while lawyers working for large firms such as Norton Rose Fulbright earn between $220,000 and $239,000 a year (Glassdoor 2017), and lawyers who provide legal aid earn $25,000 a year (Gobert 2016). Another example illustrates this issue from the other side: music programs are very expensive to offer, yet their graduates are rarely expected to receive a very high income—barring certain exceptions (CADEUL 2011). As can be seen, it is impossible to predict a graduate’s future income. As such, any attempt to modulate tuition as a function of expected revenue will inherently prove ineffective.

The arguments in support of this system are based on pay equity and a re-balancing of the government’s contribution in keeping with the benefits it derives. While the argument for modulation by program is based on a form of equity between students, modulation by expected revenue focuses on striking a balance between students and the government. As such, the idea of equity is transposed onto an altogether different domain, where it comes into conflict with a much larger political principle: that a socially-responsible government should democratize access to university education and ensure equal access to all academic programs (social mobility). Despite the arguments in support of such a system, we do not believe that the modulation of tuition fees succeeds in achieving its own stated goals.

1.3 EXISTING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIVERSITIES The beginning of this section discussed how tuition rates are standardized in Quebec. Even though this is true for tuition, the situation is very different for the total cost of education. This section will describe the fees that universities add to tuition, such as Obligatory Institutional Fees (FIO) and Non-Obligatory Automatic Fees (CANO). The QSU and the student movement argue that these fees serve to demonstrate the underfinancing of universities and that they are a way to indirectly increase the cost of education. This section looks at how the government has been

April 2018 15 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees divesting itself of its responsibility for financing universities over the past several years by accepting these fees. Although FIOs and CANOs are not the main focus of this report, it is important to properly describe them in order to show the government’s disengagement from universities. These fees are not a modulation of education costs themselves, but they are driving the debate on issues of social equity and access to higher education.

1.3.1 Obligatory Institutional Fees Obligatory Institutional Fees (FIO) are defined as the entire set of obligatory fees charged to students by universities, other than tuition fees, and are governed by regulation 3.1 of the Budgetary Rules. FIOs include general fees (admission, registration, examination, internship, etc.), technology fees, student services fees, contributions to student life, copyright fees, continuation fees, premiums for certain obligatory insurance plans, recreation and athletics fees, and various other miscellaneous fees (transcripts, mailing diplomas, laboratories, uniforms, etc.). Fees charged when undertaking certain recourses, such as grade reviews, are also considered as FIOs (QSU 2017b)8 There is already a debate around questions of social equity and access to higher education being driven by the fact that different FIOs cause costs to vary by university. The QSU’s prior report on FIOs shows that some universities, such as the Université du Québec à Chicoutimi (UQAC) and the Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières (UQTR), have FIO costs that are almost three times lower than those at McGill University (QSU 2017b). This means that, each year McGill, students pay an additional $1,432 on top of their government-regulated tuition fees, compared with $511 and $513 for students at UQAC and UQTR. This is an enormous difference and shows that, despite having identical per-credit tuition fees, some universities are more financially accessible than others. FIOs therefore serve to reduce the accessibility of higher education for disadvantaged students.

Government regulations on FIOs does require university administrations to negotiate with student associations if they want to increase these fees beyond the allowed annual limit. This consent allows the student community to regulate these fees and require transparent reporting on the services they fund, making arbitrary increases impossible (QSU 2017b). However, this merely serves to maintain a minimum relationship between student associations and their university

8 For more details and to know more about our demands, consult the Quebec Student Union’s report on FIOs on its website.

April 2018 16 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees administrations. Students remain staunchly opposed to FIOs and associations only tolerate them due to their minor ability to control the total cost.

1.3.2 Non-Obligatory Automatic Fees Non-Obligatory Automatic Fees (CANO) are billed in a similar way to FIOs, though they are not obligatory, as the name indicates.9 They include student-run radio stations, campus newspapers, and sometimes university foundations. Students who want to opt-out can do so for a semester, but must repeat the process each semester. CANOs are also part of the issue around the fees charged by universities, though less so as they can technically be reimbursed. However, the methods used for billing and reimbursing them aren’t standardized between universities and many students are unaware that they are not obligatory. There are no regulations that require universities to publicize the processes required to opt-out, which is a problem.

9 Information on CANOs can be found in the report on FIOs, which describes CANOs and lists the QSU’s demands.

April 2018 17 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

2. ONTARIO: A CASE STUDY FOR THE MODULATION OF TUITION FEES

This section considers the empirical evidence on the consequences that follow a modulation of tuition fees. Many studies on the effects of rapid tuition increases have been conducted in Canada, Germany, England, and the United States. This section focuses on one of these, a study (Knowg et al. 2002) on the consequences Ontario’s decision to modulate tuition by program in the late 1990s had on medical programs. This study is particular useful as it directly addresses per- program modulation and was conducted entirely in a Canadian context, increasing its relevance to Quebec.

Knowg et al. also takes many other studies on increased tuition fees into account: from Canada (Frenette 2005 and 2007; Mackenzie 2005; Coelli 2004; Jonhson and Rhaman 2005; Quircke and Davies 2002), the United States (Kane 1995; Marcucci et al. 2007), Germany (Hübner 2009; Dwenger et al. 2009) and England (Daerden et al. 2011). The Canadian studies use statistical data compiled by the Labour Force Survey to determine what sub-populations are at-risk of significant tuition hikes. The dataset was compiled over the course of 30 years, beginning in the 1970s. It shows that young adults from families with household revenues below $40,000 a year (adjusted) are the most heavily affected by tuition increases. This will be looked at again in sections 3.2 and 3.3. These increases have a direct impact on the accessibility of education and the diversity of classrooms, which will also be addressed in section 3.1. This conclusion is further supported by studies in the United States and England. Germany provides a slightly different case study. It switched from a model of free education to one that charged tuition in the 2000s. Hübner shows that, although university enrolment remained constant, there was a clear reduction in the socio-economic diversity of students. All of these studies corroborate or cite the findings in Ontario, which is why it forms the primary case-study for this section.

We’ll begin with a quick overview of the situation in Ontario. In 1998, the government of Ontario decided to unfreeze registration costs at universities, to provide a greater flexibility in how much was being charged. The model they adopted for this was a modulation of fees by program.

A 1996 report, titled Our Themes: Excellence, Accessibility, Responsibility (Smith et al. 1996), recommended greater flexibility in the amount universities could charge for tuition, an increase in students’ financial contribution, and an investment into additional loans and bursaries to maintain accessibility. In May 1998, the government of Ontario made the switch from a single tuition rate for all students to a system that modulated tuition fees by program.

April 2018 18 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

The 1996 report took a clear position on the different sources of funding for Ontario universities, in order to find solutions to an underfinancing of both teaching and research. The report’s very first recommendation was to re-evaluate students’ financial contribution to universities. The report also spoke to the importance of having the government adopt a policy on research, recognize the need to invest more in university research, and set a maximum limit on increases universities could apply to each their programs.

The recommendation to deregulate tuition fees and modulate them by program was based on the argument that students are the primary beneficiaries of a university education and that it would be easier to deregulate tuition than it would be to revise the government’s financing formula.

The Advisory Panel on Future Directions for Postsecondary Education was appointed in mid-July, 1996 by the Minister of Education and Training, with the following terms of reference: - to recommend the most appropriate sharing of costs among students, the private sector, and the government, and ways in which this might best be achieved (…) Students, the reason we have postsecondary education, are part of the network of responsibilities. They are responsible for making the most of the public investment in their education and for contributing as best they can to the costs. We have already referred to the public responsibility for appropriate support for access. That support should include, to the extent that is reasonable or possible, the student's and family's financial support for access.10 (Smith et al. 1996) These recommendations were lauded by university administrators at the time and were rapidly institutionalized, in 1998, as a system for modulating tuition fees by program. Ontario applied modulation based on program costs, which caused tuition fees to skyrocket until 2002 for medicine, dentistry, and law students (Statistics Canada 2008). According to CADEUL’s report, “the above programs increased by 241%, 315%, and 141% respectively” (CADEUL 2011, 8). The next section will look at the consequences of Ontario’s modulation according to the research of Knowg et al. (2002), and will demonstrate how this modulation affected the sociodemographic profile of students in medicine, dentistry, and law.

10 Translator’s note: This footnote provided information about the translation of this passage from French to English. It was left in the text solely to retain equivalence in the numbering of footnotes in both languages.

April 2018 19 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

3. CONSEQUENCES OF MODULATING TUITION FEES

Now that the different forms that modulation of tuition fees could realistically take in Quebec have been explained and an empirical case has been identified that shows the real impact of these changes, it is time to discuss the consequences that follow from modulation. The following subsections focus on the theoretical impacts of a modulation of tuition fees and the arguments against it. These theoretical impacts are then supported by examples drawn from prior cases and other information. It begins with possible changes to the socioeconomic profile of students and how debt affects those students. It then moves on to address Student Financial Aid (AFE), which the defenders of modulation use to minimize the impacts of modulation and debt on students, to show how this is not a viable option. Castro and Poitevin’s theory on social and personal benefits will also be discussed. A summary of arguments against modulation will then be presented in the final section.

3.1 CHANGES TO THE SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF STUDENTS This section is mainly based on a 2002 study conducted in Ontario, Effects of Rising Tuition Fees on Medical School Class Composition and Financial Outlook (Knowg et al. 2002). Although the study is somewhat old, its conclusions have proven robust and continue to be confirmed by other studies on deregulated tuition fees in the United States and England (Daerden, Fitzsimons and Wyness 2011; Phillips, Weismantel, Gold and Schwenk 2010). Knowg et al. (2002) begins with an analysis of the precipitous increase to tuition fees in medical programs, which tripled in the three years after modulation began. In 1997-1998, tuition in medicine was $4,844 a year, by 2000- 2001 it was $14,000. At the outset, the researchers expected to find a drop in enrolment rates in these programs. However, no such drop was found (Knowg et al. 2002). They instead found that modulation’s most significant impact was on the composition of the student body in these programs. Their study found a 7% decrease in students from families with household incomes below $40,000 a year.

We found that as tuition fees increased in Ontario, the proportion of students from families with incomes less than $40 000 decreased from 22.6% to 15.5%. […] Our finding is in concordance with older US data, which showed that, as tuition fees rose in the 1970s and the 1980s, the socioeconomic status of students enrolling in medical school increased.11

11 Translator’s note: This footnote provided information about the translation of this passage from French to English. It was left in the text solely to retain equivalence in the numbering of footnotes in both languages.

April 2018 20 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Knowg et al 2002, 1026

These findings are clear, and they corroborate the studies by Frenette in 2005 and 2007. Frenette (2005) sought to verify the results obtained by Kwong et al. and King 12 et al. (2004). Frenette argued that both of these studies may include a certain bias, as a result of their focus on single programs (medicine and law, respectively). The 2005 and 2007 studies collected data on all programs, in both Ontario and other provinces. In so doing, these studies confirm the findings of Kwong et al. and King et al. Modulating tuition fees by program has significant negative impacts on accessibility—impacts that cannot be measured solely by rates of enrolment. Rather than seeing declines in enrolment, increasingly expensive programs instead result in a significant loss of diversity in the student body. In terms of harm to accessibility, we are specifically referring to the heterogeneity of the student body in different programs, a thorough undermining of social mobility, and reversals to the democratization of education.

Ontario is a convincing case for what could happen in Quebec, though events in England also show how increasing tuition fees precludes disadvantaged communities from pursuing higher education. Following the increase of tuition fees to a maximum of 9,000 pounds sterling a year (about $16,275 with the exchange rate), a study done by England’s Department for Education showed that the percentage of public school students moving on to higher education in 2013-2014 dropped from 66% to 62% in one year (O’Carroll and Fishwick 2016), while the proportion of private school students going on to university did not change, at 85%. The majority of advocacy organizations, such as the National Union of Students, say that tuition fees have become prohibitive for students from middle and lower-income families. CADEUL’s report on the modulation of tuition fees makes the link between this data and debt, which will be further addressed later on:

Students from less wealthy backgrounds already avoid programs with quotas and higher standards out of fear of failure, and not because they lack motivation. For these students, failure means an additional, much more significant cost. If they don’t succeed, their socioeconomic situation prevents them from getting a second chance. If programs with quotas provide graduates with the best working conditions and have the highest cost, it is possible that there will be a large shift towards less expensive disciplines, especially since disadvantaged students are more reluctant to take on debt. CADEUL 2011, 31; translated from the original

12 King et al. studied the impact of tuition increases in Law programs, following the implementation of a modulation by program in Ontario. Its findings are entirely consistent with those for Ontario’s medical programs.

April 2018 21 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

It is also important to consider how lack the of accessibility for certain programs can have oversized impacts on communities with specific needs, particularly students with fewer financial resources. Tuition fees obviously make up a large share of expenses in a student’s life, but there are other expenses as well, such as housing and food. It is easy to imagine how a drastic hike of tuition fees could create a disadvantage for students with specific needs, such as student-parents, Indigenous students, and first-generation students. For example, Indigenous students are usually older than other Quebec students when they enter university and “are often supporting a family, which requires more financial resources” (Loisell 2010 and Joncas 2013 in FAÉCUM 2016). The same logic applies to student-parents, who need access to larger and often more-expensive housing to accommodate their children, and who must feed and clothe their children and pay for childcare. It is therefore important to consider these communities when reflecting on the issue raised by a modulation of tuition fees, as they will also have to suffer the consequences.

If accessibility for all to higher education is to remain an important value, and we are to keep certain professions from being exclusively practiced by people from upper-class backgrounds due to tuition fees, then modulation must not be implemented. If it is, universities would stop playing their critical role in social mobility. Students are faced with a significant narrowing of their academic choices, solely due to their socioeconomic position. This runs counter to every political value enacted in Quebec’s education policy since the Parent Report.

The studies by Knowg et al. (2002), King et al. (2004), and Frenette (2005) on modulation of tuition fees in Ontario all come to the same conclusion: modulation has non-trivial effects on the accessibility of education. Although it doesn’t significantly decrease enrollment in programs, modulation changes the background of people who are enrolled in them. This is what happened in England when they increased their modulated tuition fees, as students from public schools have begun enrolling less frequently in university than students from private schools (O’Carroll and Fishwick 2016). Further, as has been shown, modulation disproportionately affects students with specific needs.

These findings prove that the first problem to arise from a modulation of tuition fees is a loss of accessibility for disadvantaged students. We believe that governments that have chosen to deregulate tuition fees, such as those in the United States, Australia, England, and the provinces of English Canada, are in the wrong. Modulation prevents the poorest students from pursuing

April 2018 22 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees higher education, even if they have the aptitudes to do so, and the previously cited studies (Knowg et al. 2002; Daerden, Fitzsimmons and Wyness 2011; Phillips, Weismantel, Gold and Schwenk 2010; O’Carroll and Fishwick 2016) demonstrate this. The next section shows why students who can afford graduate programs, even with modulation, would still be penalized by increased debt.

3.2 STUDENT DEBT As shown above, the modulation of tuition fees often results in higher education costs for certain students. Modulation will affect different groups of students, depending on the form used. Either way, for many students the increase will result in more student debt. Proponents of modulating tuition fees, particularly modulation by anticipated income, do not consider this debt to be a serious problem, as student will be able to quickly repay it once they begin their future careers. The following sections demonstrate why increasing student debt during school, under the pretext of quick repayment, is not effective. 3.2.1 Data on Student Debt Before presenting arguments on student debt, it is important to provide context through a comparison between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The following table links two different sets of data, average student debt and average tuition fees for full-time undergraduate students by province.

April 2018 23 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Table 2: Average Tuition Fees for Full-Time Undergraduate Students in Canada and Average Student Debt, by Province in 2015

Average Average Tuition Fees Province Student Debt (Adjusted Dollars) New Brunswick $35,200 $6,353 Nova Scotia $30,400 $6,817 British Columbia $29,000 $5,305 Newfoundland and $2,660 $27,300 Labrador Prince Edward Island $27,000 $6,119 Canadian Average $26,819 $6,191 Alberta $26,300 $5,738 Ontario $22,400 $7,868 Manitoba $19,600 $3,930 Saskatchewan $19,600 $6,885 Quebec $11,900 $2,799 Alini 2017 and Statistics Canada 2015

This table shows two things. The first is that tuition fees in Quebec are the second lowest in the country and the second is that, although students still have some debt in Quebec, it is by far the lowest among the provinces. Students in Ontario, which has implemented the modulation of tuition fees, have a level of student debt that is twice as high as those in Quebec. British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Alberta also have modulated tuition and significant levels of debt. Saskatchewan also modulated tuition, though it has a slightly lower level of debt (Frenette 2005). It seems like an important correlation that the provinces that modulated tuition are those with more student debt, compared to Quebec which has a low level of debt and a single tuition fee rate.

It is also interesting to note the amount of debt by number of years spent studying. Figures from the Unité de travail pour l’implantation de lodgement (UTILE) PHARE study indicate that the average student debt in Quebec after 3 to 4 years in school is $17,745, with a median of $14,463, while the average for a student who spends 5 to 6 years in school is $19,785, with a median of $18,214 (UTILE 2017). Debt increases with more time spent in school. Though there are no precise figures for average debt as a function of time spent in school for Canada, it is possible to

April 2018 24 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees compare age and average debt. A Canadian University Survey Consortium (CUSC) study showed that average debt increases with a student’s age. Average debt for students 20 and under is $22,505. For students 30 and up, it is $36,000 (CUSC 2015). What we can conclude from this is that, putting aside students who are returning to study, the further into graduate studies a student goes in their education, the more debt they have to take on.

3.2.2 Student Employment As was shown, student debt in Quebec is significantly lower than in other provinces, with an average debt of $11,900 among graduates. It is interesting to note that students in Quebec also work the most while in school, when compared to the rest of Canada. However, the following table shows that, although the rate of employment is higher in Quebec, it is increasing in the rest of Canada. This section will show how the modulation of tuition fees can affect how much students work.

Table 3: Employment Rates for Students in Canada and Quebec, as a percentage (%)

Rate of Employment 2013 2014 2015 2016 15-24 38.6% 39.5% 39.5% 39.1% Students 25-29 51.8% 54.1% 54.6% 53.7% 15-24 36.6% 37.8% 37.5% 37.1% Canada Full-Time Students 25-29 40.4% 43.5% 43.8% 43.9% 15-24 66.6% 65.1% 69.8% 68.1% Part-Time Students 25-29 77.1% 79% 80.2% 79.2% 15-24 45% 46.8% 47.4% 46.7% Students 25-29 58.8% 58.9% 56.3% 58% 15-24 43% 44.7% 4.9% 44.6% Québec Full-Time Students 25-29 46.5% 47.9% 45.8% 50% 15-24 72.8% 71.9% 79.6% 73.3% Part-Time Students 25-29 80.5% 82.7% 81.9% 80.3%

Statistics Canada 2018a

These statistics show that, even without modulation, students in Quebec are already working to make ends meet, yet they are still graduating with an average debt of almost $12,000. What’s more, it is clear that academic success and time spent studying go hand in hand and that students with jobs have less time to study. A CUSC 2015 survey demonstrated this crucial link. Students

April 2018 25 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees with an A- average or better spent an average of 35.5 hours on academic activities. Students with a B- to B+ average spent an average of 31.1 hours and C+ or worse students spent an average of 29.2 hours on academic activities (CUSC 2015). These students find themselves in a vicious circle. They work to be able to study, but working leaves them with less time to study and their grades suffer as a result. Working to pay for an education inevitably creates additional stress on students, which is already exacerbated by studies themselves and anxiety related to their inevitable debt. Table 2 showed that debt and modulation seem to be associated. The next section will address the link between debt and the dropout rate.

3.2.3 The Dropout Rate Modulation of tuition fees can also decrease the number of students in graduate studies. As shown above, debt increases with time spent in school, and so it may also increase with additional degrees. Increasing debt can cause many students to hesitate when deciding whether or not to continue studying after graduation. According to CUSC’s studies in 2015, around 23% of students surveyed said they were discouraged by their debt load from continuing their education, while 9% said that, even if they would like to continue, it would not be possible due to their financial burden (CUSC 2015, 41). The following chart, based on the survey’s findings, demonstrates this.

April 2018 26 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Chart 1: Impact of Average Debt on Canadian Students’ Decisions about the Future

i Title: Average Debt by Debt’s Effect on Future Plans; Columns from left: I am not in debt, My debt did not affect my decision, Debt discouraged me from pursuing further studies, My debt prevented me from pursuing any other studies, Pursuing studies to improve income/pay back debt

CUSC 2015, 41

Chart 1 shows that Canadian students begin to hesitate to pursue their studies when their debt load reaches $22,000. Table 1 showed an example of a tuition fee formula modulated by program where, for 2011-2012, a year in a dentistry program would cost $13,314 more for an undergraduate student. As a year in the undergraduate dentistry program is part of five-year Doctor of Medicine, this degree would cost around $66,500. This is more than three times the amount of debt that leads students to hesitate about continuing their studies, according to CUSC. It is inevitable that many students who lack the means to pay for their education outright, even if they work while in school—which is not recommended—will choose to drop out rather than take on this much debt.

We’ve already established how higher levels of student debt are seem to be related to higher tuition fees, which modulation would serve to increase. As such, it is reasonable to posit that modulation would also increase dropout rates in universities. If a student’s debt reaches the critical point of $22,000 during their first degree, such as a Bachelor’s, it is likely that they will decide not to continue into a graduate program, even if they want to and are able to. For these students, paying back their debt becomes their main objective once they graduate, so as to reduce their financial stress. CADEUL’s report on the modulation of tuition fees also demonstrated how the

April 2018 27 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees rate of enrollment in graduate programs is higher in Quebec than other provinces, which indicates that lower levels of debt encourage students to continue studying (CADEUL 2011, 35). The next section moves on to discuss the AFE, which is often used in arguments by proponents of modulation to explain how they would safeguard the accessibility of education.

3.3 STUDENT FINANCIAL AID Supporters and opponents of modulation frequently refer to financial measures and programs to support their arguments. The Student Financial Aid program, and possible improvements to it, are often used in this way by proponents of modulation. This can be seen in Our Themes: Excellence, Accessibility, Responsibility (Smith et al. 1996), Marcucci and Johnston (2007), Coelli (2009), CADEUL (2011), and Asplund et al. (2007). All of these studies argue that a deregulation of tuition fees must be accompanied by an overhaul of the government’s financial aid programs to support the students who would otherwise be the most affected. As such, AFE in Quebec13 would become little more than a safety net, supporting a higher education policy that helps the government abdicate its responsibility for financing universities. Some people, such as Castro and Poitevin, even suggest that the surplus from modulating tuition fees could be invested in AFE to offset the increase for students from the poorest communities.

This argument overlooks the whole point of AFE, which already provides financial support to the students who are most in need. When a student requests financial aid, the government starts by providing them with a loan. That amount is then supplemented by bursaries, based on the person’s financial situation. To be eligible for financial aid, the student must satisfy certain criteria, including citizenship, Quebec residency, and a student status. Additionally, the student must be lacking sufficient financial resources to cover expenses related to their education, such as rent, food, and tuition fees.

If modulation took place, it would enormously discourage lower-income students, but they would probably continue to at least receive some bursaries. Modulation would instead affect middle- class students the most (Frenette 2017), who often have access only to loans through AFE, as their family income is too high to make them eligible for bursaries. These loans only serve to push the problem of debt back, as repayment must begin after graduation. Relying on AFE is therefore not a viable solution, as the program is incapable of meeting everyone’s needs. The number of

13 AFE provides financial aid in the form of both loans and bursaries to students, primarily based on household income.

April 2018 28 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees applications for financial aid has steadily increased over the five years prior to the 2014-2015 report, with a total of 206,455 applications in 2014-2015 (MEES 2017). 8,353 requests were rejected due to non-eligibility for AFE based on the Regulation respecting financial assistance for education expenses. Half of these requests, or 4,251, were ineligible due to having external financial resources that were deemed sufficient (MEES 2017).

Further, if the loans and bursaries program was improved, so that it applied to a larger share of students, this would simply serve to provide these students with loans that will have to be repaid. With the current tuition fees in Quebec, the level of defaults on student loans has remained fairly constant, with the possibility that it may actually be in decline (QSU and FECQ 2017). This situation is altogether different in the United States and the rest of Canada, where defaults on student loans are increasing. Higher tuition fees result in more loans, and it is the increase of the average loan total that explains these defaults (QSU and FECQ 2017). The more students take on debt, the more difficult it is to eventually repay their loans, which leads to more prolonged debt. For all these reasons, we disagree with the idea of using the AFE program to offset a hidden increase in tuition fees.

Recommendation 1

That the Quebec Student Union reaffirm that AFE’s role is to support students in financial need, not to act as a solution to the underfinancing of universities.

3.4 CASTRO AND POITEVIN - SOCIAL AND PERSONAL BENEFITS The last three subsections have explained the consequences of modulation on the socioeconomic profile of students and their debt loads, as well as reasons why AFE cannot be used to compensate for modulation. For the QSU, modulation would act as a barrier to the accessibility of education and social mobility. However, there is a final idea that must be refuted, Castro and Poitevin’s concept of personal and social benefits.

Castro and Poitevin are the authors of the most recent research on the benefits of modulating tuition fees. In it, they discuss modulation by program and by anticipated income using the concepts of personal and social benefits. These concepts were described in sections 1.1. and 1.2, however, the following section explains why they are not an effective justification for modulation.

First, Castro and Poitevin claim that modulation by anticipated income is a poor solution, as it generates adverse effects. This is in line with the QSU’s thinking on the subject. Their argument

April 2018 29 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees relies on the fact that the cost of delivering a program can sometimes be inversely related to anticipated income:

If education costs were lowered for disciplines with lower anticipated income but high costs of delivering the program, these would become more attractive than they should be. They would attract too many students in relation to other disciplines and this would result in social inefficiency. Too many resources would be invested in disciplines with weak social benefits and not enough in disciplines with strong social benefits. This would be a collective loss. Castro and Poitevin 2014, 248; translated from original However, the researchers insist that the public subsidy of tuition fees should match the share of social benefits derived from a student’s education, out of total benefits, as well as the proportion of direct costs of the education out of total costs (Castro and Poitevin 2014, 251). We must point out that, although social benefits are used in all of their calculations, the researchers take the time to state that this measure is unreliable and cannot be used, as there are many biases inherent in social factors. Despite the existence of this bias, they still make a comparison that allows them to arrive at a rate of 33%. However, the QSU believes that these measures are unreliable and that the use of these social factors introduces a methodological bias into Castro and Poitevin’s research. The idea of comparing the social benefits of education to the personal benefits cannot, in our view, be used to determine a “fair” share of university financing per student. These concepts can, however, allows us to observe several warning signs that show modulation would severely hamper the accessibility of education for disadvantaged students.

3.5 PARTIAL CONCLUSION The preceding subsections have shown why the QSU believes that the modulation of tuition fees in Quebec would be detrimental. The most significant consequence would be to change the socioeconomic profile of students in certain programs. Modulating by the cost of delivering a program would mean that a non-trivial number of students would no longer be able to study in more “expensive” programs, such as veterinary science, music, or engineering. We want to reiterate that the importance of higher education, in particular universities, as a vehicle of social mobility and a driver of equal opportunity. The report has shown that the modulation of tuition fees would increase student debt, which can have serious consequences. For example, students have to work to pay for their expenses while in school, which reduces the time they can spend studying and affects their grades and academic success. It also needs to be mentioned that once a certain level of debt is reached, $22,000 in the case of Canada, students start thinking more seriously about dropping out or refraining from pursuing a graduate degree.

April 2018 30 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

It has also been demonstrated that AFE should not be used to offset the underfinancing of higher education and that, despite any possible improvement to AFE’ modulation would negatively affect middle-class students. These students often receive little in bursaries from AFE, due to their family’s income, and will be required to repay loans, leading to increased debt. Lastly, we have also explained why Castro and Poitevin’s analysis, which compares social benefits with personal income, is an unreliable measure for arguing in favour of modulation. Based on these arguments, the QSU presents the following recommendations:

Recommendation 2 That the government of Quebec preserve the single tuition rate for all Quebec universities. Recommendation 3 That the Quebec Student Union oppose all forms of modulation for tuition fees.

April 2018 31 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

CONCLUSION

For us, the idea of modulating tuition fees in Quebec confronts the fundamental principle of equal accessibility to higher education for everyone. This principle was established by the Parent Report at the very beginning of the higher education network in Quebec, in the 1960s, and has been defended ever since. It must be preserved. After a brief presentation of the two most likely forms of modulation that could be applied in Quebec, modulation by program and by anticipated income, this report went on to explain existing differences between tuition fees in Quebec universities. It then examined the case of Ontario, which began modulating tuition fees for medicine, dentistry, and law at the end of the 1990s.

Having established the necessary context, the report then addressed the consequences of modulation. These consequences all affect the equal accessibility of higher education for all residents of Quebec. The first and most harmful consequences would be changes to the socioeconomic profile of students. It was shown that, although enrollment did not decrease in most of the cases where programs were affected by modulation , the social background of students changed, with decreased enrollment for students from lower-income families. Students with specific needs are particularly hard hit by modulation. Other consequences included increased student debt, rising dropout rates, and more widespread student employment. It is proven that, after a certain amount of debt, students refrain from continuing to study, so they can pay off their debts—even if they wish to continue or have the aptitudes to do so. The report went on to demonstrate that AFE cannot be used to offset a modulation of tuition fees. We finished by arguing that Castro and Poitevin’s theory of social and personal benefits is too weak to adequately support the case for modulating tuition.

Finally, we argue that all of these points, when considered together, rigorously demonstrate the dangers that a modulation of tuition fees would pose in a society that has always relied on its higher education network to promote social mobility and access to an education.

April 2018 32 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

4. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alini, Erica. “Experts warn about private vs. government student loans.” Global news, August 23, 2017. https://globalnews.ca/news/3687793/experts-warn-students-about-private-vs- government-loans/ Asplund, Rita, Oussama Ben-Abdelkarim and Ali Skalli. 2007. “An equity perspective on access to enrolment in and finance of tertiary education”. Econstor. Helsinki. Breton, Guy. La modulation a bien meilleur goût (1), January 25, 2013. http://recteur.umontreal.ca/carnet-du-recteur/article/la-modulation-a-bien-meilleur-gout- 1/ Breton, Guy. Modulation et accessibilité: une question d’équilibre, February 1, 2013. http://recteur.umontreal.ca/carnet-du-recteur/article/modulation-et-accessibilite-une- question-de-1/ Breton, Guy. Modulation et accessibilité: une question d’équilibre (2), February 7, 2013. http://recteur.umontreal.ca/carnet-du-recteur/article/modulation-et-accessibilite-une- question-de/ Confédération des associations d’étudiants et étudiantes de l’Université Laval (CADEUL). 2011. “Avis sur la modulation des droits de scolarité. Une analyse approfondie de la modulation en fonction du programme d’études et selon le revenu estimé.” Québec: CADEUL. Confédération des associations d’étudiants et étudiantes de l’Université Laval (CADEUL) et Université Laval (ULaval). “FSSEP – Fonds des services de santé et d’éducation postsecondaire.” Québec: CADEUL et ULaval. Caron, Régys. “Grève générale chez les juristes de l’État.” Journal de Québec, October 12, 2016. http://www.journaldequebec.com/2016/10/12/greve-generale-chez-les-juristes-de-letat Castro, Rui et Michel Poitevin. 2004. “Éducation et frais de scolarité”. L’Actualité économique. Revue d’analyse économique (90): 223-262 Chouinard, Tommy. “Le recteur de l'UdeM plaide pour des droits de scolarité modulés.” La Presse, January 23, 2013. http://www.lapresse.ca/actualites/education/201301/23/01-4614041-le-recteur-de- ludem-plaide-pour-des-droits-de-scolarite-modules.php Coelli, Michael B. 2009. “Tuition Fees and Equality of University Enrolment”. The Canadian Journal of Economics 42(3): 1072-1099. Canadian University Survey Consortium (CUSC). 2015. 2015 Graduating University Student Survey. Ottawa: CUSC. Corbeil, Michel. “La CAQ plaide pour des frais de scolarité modulables”. Le Soleil, January 28, 2013. https://www.lesoleil.com/actualite/education/la-caq-plaide-pour-des-frais-de- scolarite-modulables-0cbe35416caae7bd5da67c608a26ec0a Corbo, Claude. 2016. “Le rapport Parent: Une longue préparation et un héritage durable”. In 50 ans d’éducation au Québec. Under the supervision of Pierre Doray and Claude Lessard. Université du Québec Press. Quebec: 13-23. Centrale des syndicats du Québec (CSQ). 2012. "L’accessibilité et la participation aux études supérieures: un chantier inachevé". Montreal: CSQ.

April 2018 33 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Daerden, Loraine, Elma Fitzsimons and Gill Wyness. 2011. “The Impact of Tuition Fees and Support on University Participation in UK”. Centre for the Economics of Education. London School of Economics. Despatie, Anne-Louise. “Québec triple les droits de scolarité des étudiants français au bac”. Radio-Canada, 12 février 2015. http://ici.radio- canada.ca/nouvelles/politique/2015/02/12/002-droits-scolarite-quebec-france.shtml Doray, Pierre, Benoît Laplante and Nicolas Bastien. 2015. “Quel est l’impact de la hausse des frais d’inscription à l’université? L’exemple du Québec”. La Découverte 1(16): 162-175. Dutrisac, Robert. “La CAQ créerait deux classes d’universités. January 29, 2013. http://www.ledevoir.com/politique/quebec/369534/la-caq-creerait-deux-classes-d- universite# Dwenger, Nadja, Johanna Storck and Katharina Whrohlich. 2009 “Do tuition fees affect the mobility of university applicants? Evidence from a natural experiment”. Econostor. Berlin. Fédération des associations étudiantes du campus de l’Université de Montréal (FAÉCUM). 2016. « Répondre adéquatement aux besoins des étudiants et des étudiantes autochtones ». Montréal : FAÉCUM. Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec (FEUQ). “Les futurs ingénieurs, médecins et gestionnaires se joignent à la FEUQ pour dénoncer la modulation des frais de scolarité proposée par l'Université de Montréal”, August 25, 2013. http://www.newswire.ca/fr/news-releases/les-futurs-ingenieurs-medecins-et- gestionnaires-se-joignent-a-la-feuq-pourdenoncer-la-modulation-des-frais-de-scolarite- proposee-par-luniversite-demontreal-545220582.html Fédération étudiante universitaire du Québec (FEUQ). 2013. “Avis sur la modulation des frais de scolarité”. Montreal: FEUQ. Frenette Marc. 2005. “The Impact of Tuition Fees on University Access: Evidence from a Large- scale Price Deregulation in Professional Programs”. Statistics Canada Catalogue11F0019 (263) Frenette, Marc. 2007. “Why are Youth from Lower-income Families Less likely to attend University? Evidence from Academic Abilities, Parental Influences and Financial Constraints”. Statistics Canada 11F0019 (25). Frenette Marc. 2017. “Postsecondary Enrolment by Parental Income: Recent National and Provincial Trends”. Statistics Canada 11-626-X (70). Glassdoor. 2017. “Salaires chez Norton Rose Fulbright”. https://fr.glassdoor.ca/salaire/Norton- Rose-Fulbright-Salaires-E36196.htm Gobert, Céline. “L’enfer des mandats d’aide juridique : des avocats témoignent !”. Droit-inc, November 4, 2016. http://www.droit-inc.com/article19066-L-enfer-des-mandats-d-aide- juridique-des-avocats-temoignent Hübner, Malte. 2009. “Do tuition fees affect enrollment behavior? Evidence from a ‘natural experiment’ in Germany”. Work in progress. Johnson, David R. and Fiona T. Rahman. 2005. “The role of economic factors, including the level of tuition, in individual university participation decision in Canada”. The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 35(3): 101-127.

April 2018 34 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Kane, Thomas J. 1995. “Rising public college tuition and college entry: How well do public subsidies promote access to college?” Working Paper N°5164. King, Alan J.C., Waren, Wendy K. and Miklas, Sharon R. 2002. “Study of accessibility of Ontario law schools”. Social Program Evaluation Group, Queen’s University. Knowg, Jeff C., Irfan A. Dhalla, David L. Streiner, Ralph E. Baddour, Andrea E. Waddell and Ian L. Johnson. 2002. “Effects of rising tuition fees on medical school class composition and financial outlook”. Canadian Medical Association Journal 166(8): 1023-1028. Mackenzie, Hugh. 2005. “The Tuition Trap”. Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations. Marcucci, Pamela N. and Bruce D. Johnstone. 2007. “Tuition Fee Policies in Comparative Perspective: Theoretical and Political Rationales”. Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management 29(1): 25-40. Marsan, Ève. “Les frais de scolarité en quatre scenarios”, February 12, 2013. http://quartierlibre.ca/les-frais-de-scolarite-en-quatre-scenarios/ Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEES). 2017. RAPPORT 2014-2015 Statistiques de l’aide financière aux études. Québec: MEES O’Carroll, Lisa et Carmen Fishwick. “Fall in state-school university entrants since tuition fees hit £9,000”. The Guardian, August 3, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/aug/03/tuition-fees-state-school- university-education-jo-johnson?CMP=share_btn_tw Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2010. “Education at a Glance.” http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/education-at-a- glance-2010/what-are-the-incentives-to-invest-in-education_eag-2010-12- en#.Wd5MK7KGPb0 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2016. “Education at Glance”. http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/education-at-a- glance-2016_eag-2016-en#.WbrXzYqDOV7. Phillips, Julie P., David P. Weismantel, Katherine Gold and Thomas Schwenk. 2010. “Medical Student Debt and Primary Care Specialty Intentions”. Fam Med 42(9): 616-622. Quebec Student Union (QSU). 2017. “Obligatory Institutional Fees – University Financing”. Montreal: QSU. Quirke, Linda and Scott Davies. 2002. “The New Entrepreneurship in Higher Education: The Impact of Tuition Increases at an Ontario University”. The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 32(3): 85-110. Parent Report. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec. Quebec: Éditeur du Québec, 2nd edition, 1963-1966. - Our Themes: Excellence, Accessibility, Responsability, http://www.tcu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/reports/futuree.html#summary, 1996. Rexe, Deanna. 2015. “Anatomy of a Tuition Freeze: The Case of Ontario.” 15(2), 41-59.

April 2018 35 CAUCUS014-05 Modulation of Tuition Fees

Smith, David, David Cameron, Fred Gorbet, Catherine Henderson and Bette Stephenson. 1996. “Excellence Accessibility Responsibility.” http://www.tcu.gov.on.ca/eng/document/reports/futuree.html Statistics Canada, 2008. “Tuition fee deregulation: Who pays ?”. http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/81- 004-x/2006001/9183-eng.htm Statistics Canada. 2015. “Weighted average undergraduate tuition fees for Canadian full-time students, by province, Table CANSIM 477-0077”. https://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily- quotidien/150909/t001b-eng.htm Statistics Canada. 2018a. “Labour Force Survey estimates (LFS), by full- and part-time students during school months, sex and age group, Table CANSIM 282-0095”. http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=fra&id=2820095 Statistics Canada. 2018b. “Explore Careers – Wage Report: Lawyers in All Regions Across Canada and Quebec Notaries”. https://www.jobbank.gc.ca/LMI_report_bynoc.do?lang=eng&noc=4112&reportOption=w age Tremblay, Hélène P. and Pierre Roy. 2014. “Pour une réforme du financement des universités québécoises”. Government of Quebec. Quebec Student Union (QSU). 2017a. “Avis sur le financement des universités”. Montreal: QSU. Quebec Student Union (QSU). 2017b. “Avis sur les frais institutionnels obligatoires – Le financement des universités”. Montreal: QSU Quebec Student Union (QSU) and Fédération étudiante collégiale du Québec (FECQ). 2017. “Des taux d’intérêt sur les prêts étudiants : Le programme d’Aide financière aux études”. Montreal: QSU and FECQ. Université de Montréal. 2017. “Coûts des études”. http://registraire.umontreal.ca/droits-de- scolarite/couts-des-etudes/ Unité de travail pour l’implantation de logement étudiant (UTILE). 2017. Le logement étudiant au Québec en 2017: Rapport de recherche PHARE-2017. Montreal: UTILE

April 2018 36