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What Lies Behind Chinese Cyber Warfare What Lies behind Chinese Cyber Warfare Gabi Siboni and Y. R. ␄⃚ㇱ᧨挎⹵力㝙壪 “Avoid strength, attack weakness.” Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare Introduction Over the past several years China has been developing operational capabilities in the field of cyberspace warfare. A cyber attack may be defined as the unauthorized penetration of computer and communications systems belonging to individuals or organizations for the purpose of espionage and information theft, in order thereby to damage or disrupt the functioning of these systems or to damage other systems dependent on them, even to a point of causing actual physical damage. Despite denials by the Chinese government, researchers posit that China is behind a string of cyber attacks1 against the United States,2 Japan,3 France,4 Australia,5 and other Western nations.6 Chinese activity in the field of cyberspace warfare is intensive and aggressive. It appears that China, focusing on extensive collection of intelligence and commercial information in various fields, is targeting a range of companies – from those with specific technological expertise to organizations with financial and economic knowledge, such as in the cyber attack on the International Monetary Fund in late 2011.7 However, the fact that companies and organizations providing essential services and communications infrastructures have also been attacked suggests that Dr. Gabi Siboni is a senior research associate and head of the Military and Strategic Affairs Program and Cyber Warfare Program at INSS. Y. R. is a senior figure at the Prime Minister’s Office. Military and Strategic Affairs | Volume 4 | No. 2 | September 2012 49 GABI SIBONI AND Y. R. | WHAT LIES BEHIND CHINESE CYBER WARFARE 50 there many be other motives in play. If so, what underlies these attacks, and is it possible to identify the strategic principle with which China operates in the West in general and the United States in particular? To this end, one must examine China’s cyber warfare strategy, the Chinese organizations involved in recent years, and the resources invested to realize China’s goals through this type of warfare. It is commonly assumed that before 2009, most of the attacks attributed to China were directed against the American military and the administration, such as Operation Titan Rain against American government agencies8 and | Volume 4 | No. 2 | September 2012 4 | No. Volume | Operation Ghost Net against diplomatic targets in the UN. By contrast, in recent years the attacks attributed to China have been directed against civilian targets, including national infrastructures of critical importance, companies forming a part of the chain of access to those targets, and Strategic Affairs Strategic companies that if attacked, generate an outcome that serves an economic and or commercial need. In recent years there has also been a quantitative leap in attacks against Military infrastructures. The first was the Shady RAT series of attacks from mid- 2006 until February 2011.9 The second series was Operation Aurora, an especially sophisticated series targeting Google, a critical infrastructure at the global level. These started in mid-2009 and lasted until the end of that year. The third, which received a great deal of media attention, was against RSA, a company specializing in information security and internet servers providing secure ID and one-time password services. This essay argues that an analysis of the publicly available information about the more recent attacks makes it possible to establish that China does in fact stand behind these attacks and also makes it possible to identify the link between China’s cyberspace warfare strategy and its choice of targets. The analysis includes an examination of the companies attacked to identify possible motives for the attacks. For example, attacking companies and organizations supplying technology allows access to general cutting-edge technology, military technology, and so on. The motives for these attacks are presumably to steal capabilities and conduct industrial espionage against nations and commercial competitors. Attacking companies and organizations in the financial and even political sectors allows access to valuable intelligence in these fields. By contrast, the intelligence value for immediate use in attacking companies providing critical infrastructures and communications services is usually relatively low. Rather, gaining GABI SIBONI AND Y. R. | WHAT LIES BEHIND CHINESE CYBER WARFARE 51 access, if only to some providers of communications and internet services in the West and the United States, is liable to give attackers the ability to damage these services. China’s Cyberspace Warfare Strategy China’s strategy of cyberspace warfare was formulated in the previous decade as part of a profound modernization process undertaken by the Chinese military. Based on the awareness that when it comes to kinetic warfare the Chinese armed forces are structurally inferior to the armed forces of the West, such as the United States military, the strategy reflects 2| September 2012 4 | No. Volume | the understanding that in order to confront an enemy with technological superiority in the area of information flow, it is necessary to disrupt the enemy’s access to this information. The approach involves dealing an opening blow comprising a cyber attack, an electronic attack, and a kinetic Affairs Strategic attack on the enemy’s information web and military technology centers. and Such a blow will lead to the creation of blind spots on the enemy’s part, allowing Chinese forces to operate with greater efficiency.10 The Chinese Military assumption is that by disrupting the flow of information it is possible to cause significant damage to the capabilities of a sophisticated enemy and gain an advantage in the early stages of a confrontation. The strategy developed by China in the last decade sees integrated network operations11 as a key platform for the field. The strategy is based on a combination of four types of operations:12 attacks on computer networks; electronic warfare, including anti-electronic and anti-radar measures; computer network protection; and computer network exploitation.13 One of the key components in the Chinese strategy is controlling the enemy’s flow of information, on the operating assumption that China’s enemies (especially Western nations, with an emphasis on the United States) are highly dependent on information flow-based technology. The assumption is that during a confrontation, the ability to damage the flow of information would allow China to attain an advantage in the physical battlefield. This integrated approach gives China interdisciplinary operational capabilities, allowing it to use force effectively to attack an enemy. Selected publications have undertaken detailed analyses of the most important institutions in the Chinese military in terms of network operations.14 This essay describes two of these central military bodies: the Third Bureau (in the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army), GABI SIBONI AND Y. R. | WHAT LIES BEHIND CHINESE CYBER WARFARE 52 responsible for SIGINT, and the Fourth Bureau, responsible for ELINT and electronic warfare. The Third Bureau employs experts in many fields: technicians, computer experts, language experts, intelligence experts, and more. Indeed, several Western researchers have surmised that the manpower operating in the Third Bureau numbers over 130,000 personnel.15 The vast scope of the bureau’s activity and the range of missions with which it is charged make it eminently fit to carry out cyber operations on the web. This bureau has many “collection stations” throughout China; it is responsible for gathering intelligence from voice and related data, | Volume 4 | No. 2 | September 2012 4 | No. Volume | and fully processing and assessing it. The department is also apparently responsible for internal intelligence gathering in the Chinese military for the purpose of internal information security and protection. The Fourth Bureau, responsible for ELINT, i.e., electronic intelligence operations and Strategic Affairs Strategic electronic warfare, seems to operate also in the field of integrated network 16 and operations. It appears that the Third Bureau is the body coordinating overall activity in this field. Military In addition to the military organization, China also has a very large hacker community,17 including hackers who have claimed responsibility for a number of cyber attacks and are apparently involved in operations driven by national goals. Although the Chinese government presumably takes steps to enforce Chinese law, which prohibits this type of activity, it often turns a blind eye to the phenomenon and even provides material support for some of it, in a type of outsourcing of government cyber activity.18 In addition, the Chinese army recruits civilians – from the hacker community and hi-tech industry – to its web militia units.19 The web militia is integrated with the regular military, though its members are unpaid volunteers. In contrast to the common perception of Chinese cyber activities, some researchers claim that these activities are designed first and foremost for internal needs, and that Western nations need not be overly concerned about the threat to their cyberspace. In this view, the Chinese have developed capabilities primarily to monitor opponents to the regime and control information available to Chinese citizens, essentially for political needs largely directed at preserving the regime.20 However, while totalitarian regimes, including
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