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Fusion Centers FUSION CENTERS The main regulation overseeing the operation What are fusion centers? of fusion centers is 28 CFR § 23.20, which requires, for any data the fusion center holds, a basis of “reasonable suspicion” that the person “Fusion centers” are local, domestic versions concerned is involved in criminal activity. Fusion of the NSA, funded via a combination of DHS centers do not honor this requirement, and no grants, state funds, and local police budgets. external agency reviews the data that they hold. They were developed after 9/11 to provide “joined-up intelligence” that would integrate local The 2020 “Blueleaks” release reinforces police “hints and tips” with insights from federal the impression that fusion centers act in intelligence and law enforcement agencies, in defense of current economic, social, and the hope of preventing terrorist attacks. racial arrangements in society, and that they view attempts to change them, whether those Often located in large urban centers, they attempts are peaceful or not, as threatening. provide facilities for law enforcement officers from two or more agencies to gather and collaborate. There are over 80 fusion centers Why should you be worried across the nation—with at least one in every state. Inside these centers, “threat liaison about fusion centers? officers”—who are usually police officers, but who can sometimes be teachers, trash collectors, counselors or even clergy—gather to collect, After their counterterrorism-fueled inception, analyze, assess, and share information. This fusion centers quickly found that there was not information is often open source intelligence enough terrorism—however defined—being (OSINT) found on social media, but the planned in the United States to sustain such a DOJ’s Fusion Center Guidelines also suggest large and well-staffed network of centers. Rather gathering data from a wide range of non-social than scale back, many fusion centers broadened media sources, including schools, hospitals, their mission in different ways to address transportation companies, and banks. “unlawful activity” in general or even, sometimes, “pre-unlawful activity” that can include making “Anti-American Statements.” By 2010, there intelligence about local protests in order to plan were already reports of fusion centers collecting police responses. Often, this surveillance was information on third-party voters, people begun before law enforcement had reasonable attending historically Black colleges and suspicion of a crime. This could reasonably lead universities, peace activists, and advocates one to believe that law enforcement officers for Palestinian rights. During the 2010s, fusion in fusion centers view the First Amendment- centers were known to have coordinated protected act of protesting as suspicious in and surveillance of the Occupy movement, Black of itself. Lives Matter, and protesters at the Standing Rock Reservation. In a case out of Tallahassee, FL, FBI agents Questions abound as to whether fusion arrested a leftist activist and army veteran, centers serve any useful purpose. Notably, Daniel Baker, after he likely caught the attention the Senate Committee on Homeland Security of local fusion centers. Federal agents described and Governmental Affairs published a report him as being “on a path to radicalization” and in 2012 questioning their efficacy. It described had been monitoring his social media for months fusion centers as flawed and reporting “nothing before his arrest. Their main piece of evidence of value” to the federal government, and was a flyer Baker posted to his social media their terrorism data reporting as “outdated, calling for “protect[ing] capitol RESIDENTS duplicative, and uninformative.” The report and CIVILIANS from armed racist mobs WITH found that there was no known instance of fusion EVERY CALIBER AVAILABLE.” This was used centers helping to thwart a terrorist attack, but as evidence to charge him with “using interstate that there were many instances of fusion centers commerce to threaten to injure or kidnap right- wasting funds to produce alerts too late to be wing protesters”, even though generalized of use. Ingesting vastly greater volumes of calls for violence are protected under the First disparate data, as is now possible years later, Amendment. only adds to the problem. It’s a wonder our government continues to fund a vast surveillance Surveillance of Journalists apparatus when it not only can’t accomplish the one objective it set out to accomplish, but Fusion centers, while supposedly intended seemingly works against that objective. to combat terrorism, are often weaponized against journalists. There have been many Even more concerning is the lack of cases of fusion centers surveilling journalists consequences and oversight for fusion centers who are reporting on protests, surveillance, and that violate the constitution. Secrecy, drifting immigration issues. In 2015, the Boston fusion scope, unclear lines of authority, and ambiguous center designated journalist Maya Shaffer as a chains of command make it unlikely for fusion security threat for documenting the searches centers ever to punish officers for overstepping and seizures by police at the Boston Marathon their Constitutional bounds in terms of what finish line.A fusion center analyst used the information to collect, retain and share. identification of her as a security threat as an example at a geospatial surveillance conference of the capabilities of the Boston fusion center’s software. How do fusion centers There are also examples of DHS compiling contribute to mass “intelligence reports” on journalists who were covering the Portland protests in 2020. Ben surveillance? Wittes, journalist and co-founder of the Lawfare Blog, was targeted by fusion centers after sharing leaked documents detailing the federal intelligence gathering practices for the Portland Surveillance of Activists protests. Fusion centers collect data from a variety of sources, most notably social media. In one DHS, working out of a fusion center, has also example, journalists and activists in Minnesota tracked and surveilled journalists covering realized that the local fusion center was using immigration along the US/Mexico border. Leaked “sock-puppet” social media accounts in order documents show DHS, CBP, ICE and the San to monitor the feeds of local activists and gather Diego FBI collaborated to compile a database of journalists, attorneys, and activists. Agencies Partnerships with Private Companies even flagged the targeted individuals’ passports, causing them to be searched and interrogated at Fusion centers have been known to partner border crossings and even denied from entering with private companies as well. This has two Mexico. effects. It allows fusion centers to skirt FOIA requirements with respect to investigations Surveillance of Muslims that might otherwise be found to be solely and improperly based on activists’ First Amendment- Much like China’s targeting of Uighur Muslims, protected activity. Secondly, by bringing in fusion centers in the US also target Muslims private companies as partners, those companies for peacefully exercising their right to freedom are effectively immunized from investigation of religion. Fusion centers often take tips by the fusion centers themselves. These or Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) from partnerships are sometimes referred to as non-LEO individuals, and biases can often “ISACs”, or Information Sharing and Analysis show through in reports. Fusion centers have Centers. The industries we know fusion centers generated reports on Muslims for observing to have partnered with include the fossil fuel fasting traditions during Ramadan, buying too industry, the financial services industry, and the many computers at once, or looking for a job. In agriculture industry (meaning Monsanto). 2019, the Ninth Circuit ruled that these practices were “neither arbitrary nor capricious.” In one particularly egregious example, the fossil License Plate Tracking fuel companies behind the Dakota Access Pipeline hired private security firm TigerSwan. Fusion centers often host large databases from Despite the firm not being licensed in the state automated license plate readers. Because of the to provide security services, TigerSwan was nature of license plate readers and the data they hired to monitor, infiltrate and provide “threat collect, these databases are basically invasive intelligence” on the Standing Rock protests, and records of individuals’ travel patterns. share its insights with the fusion centers. The local fusion center conducted network analysis ALPR has a high error rate of 35%, according to that identified Red Fawn Fallis as a key node a randomized control trial in Vallejo, CA. These among the water protectors. Eventually, a federal errors have led to detention at gunpoint and infiltrator began a fraudulent relationship with police assault. Often, ALPR databases aren’t her, and it ended with her being tackled by actually that effective at solving crime, calling police and convicted for possession of his gun. into question why they are allowed to operate. Reporting from Vermont Public Radio showed Mass Criminalization that over the course of 18 months, “61 license plate readers operating in Vermont logged Politicians and police use the same 7.9 million license plates and stored them in a sledgehammer of surveillance and mass central, statewide database,” yet this database criminalization with respect to drug use, was only responsible for helping to solve
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