Can an Office Change a Country? T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E O F F A I T H – B A S E D A N D C O M M U N I T Y I N I T I A T I V E S, A Y E A R I N R E V I E W A report prepared for the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life by Kathryn Dunn Tenpas University of Pennsylvania Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution July, 2002 Updated October, 2002 I N T R O D U C T I O N America is rich materially, but there remains too much poverty and despair amidst abundance…In this blueprint, I outline my agenda to enlist, equip, enable, empower and expand the heroic works of faith-based and community groups across America. President George W. Bush “Rallying the Armies of Compassion” January 30, 2001 Amid great fanfare, President George W. Bush signed two executive orders that formally established a White House Office to expand opportunities for faith- 1 based and community organizations. The creation of this office not only represented the fulfillment of a campaign promise, but was the cornerstone of “compassionate conservatism.” In addition, the new president’s personal attachment to this issue could not be overstated. Bush truly believed this 2 initiative could “fundamentally change our country.” On January 29, 2001, these executive orders created the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) and executive department centers for faith-based and community initiatives within five cabinet departments (Justice, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services and Housing and Urban Development).3 The quest to ease restrictions on government funding for faith-based institutions was initiated almost five years earlier, when then- Senator John Ashcroft, R-Mo., introduced an amendment to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act.4 While this provision went relatively unnoticed throughout the Clinton administration’s second term, presidential candidates Al Gore and Bush 1 Research sources for this report included public documents, relevant secondary sources, newspapers, magazines and interviews with executive and congressional officials. 2 See Marvin Olasky, “In From the Cold,” World, February 10, 2001, p. 20, in which the author recounts Bush’s remarks to leaders of faith-based organizations at a White House event. 3 See Executive Orders 13198 and 13199 for full text. 4 See Julie A. Segal, “A ‘Holy Mistaken Zeal’: The Legislative History and Future of Charitable Choice,” in Derek Davis and Barry Hankins (eds.), Welfare Reform and Faith-Based Organizations, Waco, TX: Baylor University, J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, 1999, pp. 9-28. 1 heralded the expansion of government support for religious charities during the 2000 presidential campaign. After his inauguration, Bush demonstrated his enthusiasm and support by not only issuing two executive orders, but by subsequently promoting HR 7, the “Community Solutions Act of 2001.” It was one of the first legislative proposals of his administration. The bill sought to broaden opportunities for religious groups to compete for federal dollars that, in turn, would pay for a variety of assistance programs (e.g., drug treatment, after-school programs). In addition, the bill included broader tax deductions for Americans who make regular charitable donations. Supporters and critics alike were stunned by the magnitude of Bush’s commitment to this issue; rarely in American politics is campaign rhetoric buttressed by a formidable allocation of presidential resources. To students of the presidency, these actions are all the more interesting as they not only “break new ground,” but raise a number of important questions. Why did Bush need to issue an executive order to establish such an office?5 Why not simply allow the White House Domestic Policy staff to promote such an issue? Alternatively, why not create a “war room” that coordinates legislative strategy, communication, public outreach, political outreach and cabinet efforts? The Clinton administration utilized such a strategy in the early days when it sought support for health care reform and the economic package.6 While options were clearly available, the White House adopted a different course of action, one that would be momentous and reflect an important presidential priority. Given the unique features of this office, assessing its performance adds a new dimension to studies of the presidency. More specifically, it addresses the question, to what extent does the institutional presidency affect policy change? 5 The issuance of an executive order to create a White House Office is unusual and possibly unwise, as it can only be eliminated by issuing another executive order. E-mail correspondence with Bradley Patterson, July 2001. 6 See Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, “Promoting President Clinton’s Policy Agenda: DNC as Presidential Lobbyist,” The American Review of Politics, Volume 17, Fall 1996, pp. 283-298. 2 Put differently, can a White House Office promote and, ultimately, change social policy? This report places the White House OFBCI in the context of the institutional presidency and identifies the myriad challenges it faced, some endemic to the institution of the presidency and other, idiosyncratic obstacles reflective of the controversy surrounding charitable choice. I proceed in three stages. Part I examines the campaign creation and transition planning pertaining to the OFBCI. Part II identifies the various challenges confronting this new entity. Part III assesses the future prospects and plans of the OFBCI. I. FROM THE “OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED ACTION” TO THE “OFFICE OF FAITH-BASED AND COMMUNITY INITIATIVES”: The Politics of Creation The establishment of White House offices to address new problems or issues is by no means a new phenomenon. Simply put: No president is confined by the organization charts of the past…. If a president wants to begin important new initiatives, to dramatize the extent of his personal commitment, to respond quickly to today’s crisis or tomorrow’s threat, he will be pressed to create new organizational forms to support his efforts.7 President Dwight Eisenhower created 10 such specialized offices.8 During his tenure, President Bill Clinton established a number of specialized offices, including the National AIDS Policy Coordinator, the Office of the President’s Initiative for One America (to study race relations in America) and the Assistant to the President for Environmental Initiatives.9 During his presidential campaign, Bush pledged to create a specialized office dedicated to faith-based action. Having sponsored laws in 1997 that expanded faith-based institutions’ ability to provide social services in Texas, Bush’s record 7 Bradley Patterson, The White House Staff: Inside the West Wing and Beyond, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000, p.263. 8 Bradley Patterson, Ring of Power, New York: Basic Books, 1988, p.272. 9 The White House Staff, Chapter 17. 3 as governor demonstrates his commitment to these issues.10 Candidate Bush was convinced that federalizing these programs would bring even greater good. Though not without its problems, the Texas experience was a strong impetus for the establishment of the OFBCI, but specific planning for what this new office would do at the federal level was conspicuously absent.11 The cauldron of a presidential campaign gives birth to many half-baked ideas, but the establishment of an “Office of Faith-Based Action” was not perceived as problematic. Planning the specifics of the office was reserved for the truncated transition period that lasted fewer than 40 days.12 The transition team for this office consisted of two individuals – Don Willett and Don Eberly – with periodic consultation from a number of other individuals.13 While it may have been reasonable to begin planning during the transition period and open the office well into the first year, Karl Rove and other senior staff members had decided that the second week after the inauguration would be devoted to promoting faith-based programs. They determined that this week would feature three high-profile events, including the issuance of two executive orders. Adding to these already formidable transition tasks was the uncertainty surrounding the appointment of a director. The former mayor of Indianapolis, Stephen Goldsmith, was the leading candidate, but he eventually made it clear that he would not run the office. Predominant among the reasons purportedly accounting for this decision was the fact that he was unable to create the job he wanted. John DiIulio, a campaign adviser on the faith-based initiative and a 10 The Texas initiative was called “Faith in Action: A New Vision for Church-State Cooperation.” See Hanna Rosin, “George W. Bush: The Record in Texas,” The Washington Post, May 5, 2000, p. A1. 11 Certainly it is not unusual to find the federal government adopting a program that has been tested at the state level. However, in the case of the Bush administration, it did not appear that there was much planning in terms of how the federal government would go about implementing such a program nationwide, nor how they might prevent court challenges to the initiative. 12 Recall that the Florida recount delayed final election results for 35 days (from Election Day on November 7 to the December 12 Supreme Court decision) after the presidential election. As such, the Bush team’s attention was devoted to recount politics instead of transition planning. Typically, the transition period lasts for a full two-and-a-half months. 13 Don Willett is a lawyer who had worked in the Bush administration in Austin, Texas, and in the presidential campaign. Don Eberly had worked in the Reagan administration, consulted with the Bush campaign on the faith-based initiative and is known for his work on civil society. 4 political science professor at the University of Pennsylvania, was selected and immediately jumped on the fast-moving train.