From Meseberg to Sibiu Four Paths to European ‚Weltpolitikfähigkeit’

POLICY PAPER 15 NOVEMBER 2018 #WELTPOLITIKFÄHIGKEIT #MESEBERG #CFSP FROM MESEBERG TO SIBIU FOUR PATHS TO EUROPEAN ‚WELTPOLITIKFÄHIGKEIT’ Executive summary ▪ NICOLE KOENIG The EU has to become more ‘weltpolitikfähig’: it has to be able to play a role, as a Union, in Deputy Director, shaping global affairs. This was one of the key messages of Juncker’s 2018 State of the Union Jacques Delors Institute speech as well as the Franco-German Meseberg Declaration. The question is of course: how? Berlin This new label cannot conceal the fact that the EU’s Weltpolitikfähigkeit is confronted by a trilemma of three partly conflicting objectives: internal legitimacy, efficiency/speed, and effectiveness. This policy paper explores four paths towards greater Weltpolitikfähigkeit proposed by the Meseberg Declaration: It questions to what extent Paris and Berlin are truly on the same page and how these proposals interact with the trilemma identified above. 1. An extension of qualified majority voting The extension of qualified majority voting to sub-areas (passerelle clause) or selected deci- sions (enabling clause) within the realm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy aims at enhancing the EU’s efficiency and effectiveness. However, the debate is likely to run into political blockades, as member states will point to a lack of legitimacy and cling on to their national sovereignty. 2. An EU Security Council There is general Franco-German agreement on such a format but divergence on the details. There could be a less ambitious reform whereby the European Council would meet yearly in the format of a European Security Council. Its impact on efficiency and effectiveness would, however, be limited. The more ambitious version would be a body with smaller and rotating membership. While this could lead to more efficient consultation, there are doubts regarding its legitimacy and effectiveness. 3. A stronger EU voice in the UN Security Council There is no agreement on a more formal longer-term goal of establishing a single European seat in the UN Security Council. The alternative would be the German proposal to Europeanise the non-permanent seats, the details of which still need to be clarified. 4. Flexible and mini-lateral cooperation This is the default alternative to courses of reform leading to greater EU Weltpolitikfähigkeit. Smaller sub-groups consult more efficiently. Depending on the constellation, they can effec- tively contribute to the EU’s foreign policy goals. The perceived legitimacy of sub-groups does, however, depend on their inclusiveness, both in terms of membership and working methods. The overview shows that France and Germany are generally proceeding in the same direction but often on different side-paths. Convergence can, however, be seen as a pre-requisite if anything is to happen by the Sibiu Summit in May 2019. This paper therefore suggests a ‘flexi-structured compromise’ that could (a) be broadened to other member states and (b) be upgraded to a more ambitious version once the political conditions allow for it. It includes four elements: 1. An EU Security Council at 27 providing strategic direction and allowing for qualified majority voting 2. The extension of qualified majority voting to civilian CSDP as a pilot case 3. A European UN Security Council Trio Presidency and shared non-permanent seats 4. Systematic use of more balanced sub-groups of member states TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction: A loudening call for EU ‘Weltpolitikfähigkeit’ 1 1. The trilemma of ‘Weltpolitikfähigkeit’ 2 2. Four paths across the trilemma 4 2.1 Extension of qualified majority voting 4 2.1.1 Passerelle clause 5 2.1.2 Enabling clause 7 2.2 An EU Security Council 7 2.2.1 At 27 8 2.2.2 With rotating members 8 2.3 A stronger EU voice in the UN Security Council 11 2.4 Flexible and mini-lateral cooperation 11 3. Squaring the triangle: a ‘flexi-structured’ compromise 13 3.1 An EUSC providing strategic direction and allowing for QMV 13 3.2 Civilian CSDP as a pilot case for the passerelle clause 14 3.3 A European UNSC ‘Trio Presidency’ and shared seats 14 3.4 A systematic use of more balanced sub-groups 15 Conclusion 16 On the same topic 16 INTRODUCTION: A LOUDENING CALL FOR EU ‘WELTPOLITIKFÄHIGKEIT’ In his 2018 State of the Union speech, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced: “It is time Europe developed what I coined ‘Weltpolitikfähigkeit’ – the capacity to play a role, as a Union, in shaping global affairs. Europe has to become a more sovereign actor in international re- lations”.1 German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron implicitly backed this call in their Meseberg Declaration of June 2018 and promised to “look into new ways of increasing the speed and effectiveness of the EU’s decision making in our Common Foreign and Security Policy”.2 A stronger EU foreign policy is also one of four items the Commission put on the agenda of the Sibiu Summit on the future of the Union on 9 May 2019.3 Why this call and why now? Older criticism about EU foreign policy being too slow, too weak and too divided resurfaced in recent years. Individual member states visibly used their veto in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for issue linkage or to protect parochial in- CRITICISM ABOUT EU terests. Greece and Hungary, (both large recipients of Chinese investment), have, for instance, FOREIGN POLICY BEING blocked EU positions criticizing China’s human rights record both bilaterally and at the United TOO SLOW, TOO WEAK AND Nations (UN) level.4 Greece also resisted and thus significantly delayed the adoption of EU TOO DIVIDED RESURFaced sanctions towards the government in Venezuela while Italy and others have repeatedly threat- “ ened to veto the bloc’s sanctions against Russia. These tendencies are also a symptom of the EU’s greater internal political fragmentation and dissension, both of which are likely to increase in the run-up to and after the European Par- liament elections in May 2019. Meanwhile – and this has been a constant since the early 1990s – EU citizens are strongly in favour of a common EU foreign policy. If we continue on the current path, the gap between the public’s expectations and the EU’s ability to deliver on a Europe that protects and projects is bound to widen and deepen. FIGURE 1 ▪ Support for a common EU foreign policy Source: Eurobarometer (2018) 1. Juncker, Jean-Claude, State of the Union Address 2018, Brussels, 12 September 2018. 2. Macron, Emmanuel and Merkel, Angela, Meseberg Declaration: Renewing Europe’s promises of security and prosperity, Meseberg, 19 June 2018. 3. European Commission, Potential initiatives for delivery by the Sibiu Summit, fact sheet, Brussels, 12 September 2018. 4. Emmott, Robin and Koutantou, Angeliki, Greece blocks EU statement on China human rights at U.N., Reuters, 18 June 2017. 1 / 16 The one million dollar question is how this gap could be closed – how the EU’s Weltpolitikfähig- keit could be strengthened. A shiny new label (even if bulky and in German) cannot hide the trilemma that the EU faces when acting on the international stage, namely the need to balance three partly conflicting procedural aims: internal legitimacy, efficiency/speed, and effectiveness.5 In light of Brexit, the importance of the Franco-German couple for the EU’s Weltpolitikfähig- keit will grow. More than before, their ability to compromise and lead will represent a neces- sary condition for a meaningful EU foreign policy. This policy paper thus reviews four paths towards EU Weltpolitikfähigkeit outlined in the Meseberg Declaration. It explores to what extent France and Germany are truly aligned on following them and what the implications for overcoming (or not) the EU’s trilemma would be. Based on this analysis the paper suggests a flexi-structured compromise that seeks to inform the debate leading towards the Sibiu Summit on the future of the Union. 1 ▪ THE TRILEMMA OF ‘WELTPOLITIKFÄHIGKEIT’ The label Weltpolitikfähigkeit may be new, but the message is a longstanding one. Over the years, countless European decision-makers have underlined that the EU should be a more united, stronger and more effective global actor. This was also the central message of the European Security Strategy of 2003 and the EU Global Strategy of 2016.6 In practice, however, the EU’s Weltpolitikfähigkeit faces a trilemma of three partly contrasting political aims: 1. The internal legitimacy of EU foreign policy-making refers to the legitimacy of the EU’s internal decision-making processes.7 In this paper, it is understood as the (perceived) accountability, transparency and inclusiveness of EU decision-making. It thus reflects the degree to which national governments perceive their relative influence on EU policy outputs as appropriate. In the CFSP, internal legitimacy is strongly tied to national sovereignty and formally enshrined in the unanimity rule. Speaking with a single voice is thus taken literally. The importance of internal legitimacy is reinforced by the fact that the powers of the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice are very limited in this domain. National governments, answerable to their parliaments, are thus the key sources of legitimacy. If, for one reason or another, these governments question the legitimacy of the decision-making process or do not feel represented by this single voice, the incentives for uni- lateral deviation are relatively high. There are no sanctions except for diplomatic naming and shaming. Taken together, these parameters foster a very strong culture of consensus in the CFSP. 5. Delreux, Tom and Keukeleire, Stephan, Informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making, Journal of European Public Policy, vol 24 no 10, 2017, pp.

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