DOCSLIB.ORG

The Independence of the Judiciary

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Independence of the Judiciary THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY W. R. LEDERMAN Halifax , III. Status ofSuperior Court Judges in Colonial North America (a) Before the American Revolution The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw extensive settlement and development of the American colonies under British auspices. It was at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when principles of colonial government were already rather well defined, that the Act of Settlement in England provided that judges' commissions should be made quamdiu se bene gesserint and their salaries as- certained and established. Looking back, one rather expects to find that this statutory guarantee would have taken effect con- temporaneously in overseas territories as well as in Britain. British settlers were deemed to take with them to colonies ac- quired by settlement most of the common law of -England and so much of the total body of English statute law as was applicable in the early days of the colony concerned to conditions in the New World. In addition, there was always the over-riding legislative supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. That body could at any time legislate for the colonies by statutes made applicable to them expressly or by necessary intendment. 1os Why would not one or the other of these principles of Imperial constitutional law transport the seventh paragraph of the third section of the Act of Settlement to the New World? Certainly the first two sections of the statute were expressly applicable in all British territories, determining as they did (and still do) the suc- cession to the throne. The fourth and last section looks applicable overseas by necessary intendment, and the same comment seems appropriate concerning at least some of the paragraphs of the third section other than the one about the judges. Finally, the *The first two parts of this article appeared in the issue of the Review for August-September 1956, pages 769-809. 101 See J. E. Read, The Early Provincial Constitutions (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 621. 1140 THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . XXXIV seventh paragraph itself is not limited in its terms : it speaks only ofjudges' commissions in general. Nevertheless, this guarantee of judicial independence was confined in its application to the judges of the central courts of common law in London, and was thus severed from most other parts of the Act of Settlement for purposes of extension overseas. As a matter of legal and con- stitutional history, then, neither the rule of necessary intendment nor the rule of general suitability to early colonial conditions was considered to carry this paragraph of the Act of Settlement to the New World. In retrospect this seems anomalous, but the reasons lie in the original English conceptions of the basis of colonial government, and partly also in conditions in these early days in the colonies themselves. In the first place, provision for governmental institu- tions in overseas territories, even after 1688, was almost exclusively a preserve of the royal prerogative. True enough, after 1688, the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament over the royal prerogative could have been asserted at any time, but it was in fact late in the eighteenth century before this happened. The Quebec Act of 1774 was the first important parliamentary intervention to deter- mine the nature of a colonial government. Hence, before 1774, the accepted constitutional position was that full power and respon- sibility to prescribe the nature of colonial governmental institu- tions, including the judiciary, rested with the king. He proceeded with the advice and assistance of English ministers and appro- priate committees of the Imperial Privy Council, and the critical legal instruments were orders in council, royal proclamations, instructions to colonial governors, or other prerogative acts not requiring the concurrence or even the notice of the English Parlia- ment. It is true, though, that the representative assemblies in the colonies were permitted some influence. Frequently the Crown approved, or at least accepted, statutes of the American colonial assemblies establishing various courts for the colonies concern- ed. But the superiority of the royal prerogative remained and was asserted on several occasions by royal disallowance of colonial judicature statutes that were disapproved in London."' Thus it 'OIL. W. Labaree, Royal Government in America (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1930) p. 380. And see generally chapter IX on the administration of justice . Henceforth this work will be referred to as Labaree, followed by the page number. Apparently, even today, the normal rule in British colonies that have not attained full self-government is that judges' commissions run during pleasure only. See Terrell v. Colonial Secretary, [19531 2 All E.R . 490. Here, the claimant had been a judge of the Supreme Court of the Straits 1956] The Independence of the Judiciary 114 1 was natural for English law officers and privy councillors in the early eighteenth century to consider that the Parliament at West- minster was speaking only of English judges in the Act of Settle- ment and did not intend to take a hand in the details of colonial government. Parliament just did not concern itself with such de- tails of colonial government at this period. Hence the original prerogative power to issue judicial commissions during pleasure simply continued for colonial judges, untouched by the Act of Settlement . Moreover, this power was jealously guarded in Lon- don, as we shall see, by royal disallowance of colonial statutes that were inconsistent with judicial tenure during pleasure for the colonies concerned. Now we may turn briefly to a general picture of the judicial system that was established in the West Indies and colonial America by this uneasy collaboration between the Privy Council and the colonial governors, on the one hand, and the local as- semblies, on the other : The Governor, with the consent of his Council, could create courts ofjustice to administer the common law. It was generally assumed in the eighteenth century that he could create courts of equity-though the legality of the exercise of this power was perhaps more doubtful. But the power to create courts was also claimed by the Assemblies ; and Acts were passed to establish new courts. In some places the Governor, or the Governor and Council, acted as a court of Ex- chequer, as a court of probate, and as a court for matrimonial causes. In many colonies the Governor and Council were the highest court of appeal in the colony ; and sometimes the Governor or the Governor and Council sat as a court of Chancery, and administered an equitable jurisdiction .101 , Also, appeal lay in cases of sufficient impdrtance from the Gover- nor in Council to the Privy Council in London. The judges of Settlements . He alleged that he had been prematurely retired, and that this was contrary to the tenure during good behaviour he enjoyed because the 7th paragraph of the 3rd section of the Act of Settlement applied in Malaya . Lord Justice Goddard seems right in his conclusion that this provision did not apply in Malaya, but, with respect, he is wrong to sug- gest this was because of the "repeal" of this part of the Xct of Settlement by the English Statute Law Revision Act of 1881 (44 & 45 Vict., c. 59) . If the life-tenure provision of the Act of Settlement had been carried to Malaya by the rule of necessary intendment, the exception in the Statute Law Revision Act found in section 4(b) would have continued the life- tenure provision after 1881 in Malaya . On the other hand, if the life- tenure provision had been extended to Malaya before 1881 by the rule of general suitability, a later repeal in England would not have changed the law of Malaya. There are many examples of this in Canada's legal history . (For the restricted effect of the English Statute Law Revision Acts, see Halsbury's Statutes of England (2nd ed.) Vol . 24, p. 451 .) 101 Holdsworth, Vol. XI, p. 59. 1142 THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . XXXIV these colonial courts were usually appointed by the governor and his executive council as agents under the governor's commission and instructions to exercise the royal appointing power in this respect. The chief justice of a colony was often an exception to this ; frequently he was directly appointed at the instance of the Privy Council in London and also paid from London. In any event, with only a few anomalous exceptions, the tenure of office of all colonial judges, London-appointed or not, was during the royal pleasure only. In addition to the colonial courts proper, there was another group of courts directly and entirely under the control of the British government. "By commission from the Lords of the Ad miralty the Governor was given power to act as Vice-Admiral, and to appoint deputies to act as judges and officials of the vice- admiralty courts. In all, twelve such courts were established from New Hampshire and Massachusetts to Barbados." 101 These courts had the customary admiralty jurisdiction, which came to include enforcement of the hated Imperial Acts of Trade and revenue measures like the Stamp Act. Thus they became objects of intense hostility for the American colonists in the contest for power that marked this period. It is the implications of this contest for the judiciary that must now concern us. The eighteenth century in colonial America witnessed a great constitutional struggle strikingly similar to that of the seventeenth century in England. In America, too, the climax was revolution. The British governments concerned tried to insist on the widest scope for the royal prerogative as a means of detailed control from London, but in opposition the colonists insisted on their ancient common-law rights as Englishmen and on a major part of governmental control for their representative assemblies.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic
    Chicago Journal of International Law Volume 10 Number 1 Article 13 6-1-2009 The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges Shimon Shetreet Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil Recommended Citation Shetreet, Shimon (2009) "The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 10: No. 1, Article 13. Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol10/iss1/13 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Normative Cycle of Shaping Judicial Independence in Domestic and International Law: The Mutual Impact of National and International Jurisprudence and Contemporary Practical and Conceptual Challenges Shimon Shetreet* I. INTRODUCTION The creation of the culture of judicial independence has been a combined process of national and international developments. The process consists of a cycle of normative and conceptual impact of national law on international law and later, of international law on national law. In the cycle's first phase, which began in 1701 with England's enactment of the Act of Settlement,' judicial independence was conceived domestically. In the second phase, which began shortly thereafter, this domestic development crossed national boundaries and impacted the thinking of scholars and political leaders in the international community.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development
    Michigan Law Review Volume 60 Issue 4 1962 Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development Luke T. Lee Research Fellow in Chinese Law at Harvard University Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, Legal Education Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons Recommended Citation Luke T. Lee, Chinese Communist Law: Its Background and Development, 60 MICH. L. REV. 439 (1962). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHINESE COMMUNIST LAW: ITS BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENTt Luke T. Lee* I. INTRODUCTION T is perhaps axiomatic to state that law is more than an instru­ I ment for the settlement of disputes and punishment of wrong­ doers; it is, more importantly, a reflection of the way of life and the philosophy of the people that live under it. Self-evident though the above may be, it bears repeating here, for there is a much greater need for understanding Chinese law now than ever before. China's growing ideological, political, economic, and military impact on the rest of the world would alone serve as a powerful motivation for the study of its law. Certainly, we could not even begin to understand China's foreign policies, its future role in international organizations, its treatment of foreign rights and interests in China, and, above all, the acceptability of the Com­ munist regime to the Chinese people, without some knowledge of its legal system and its concepts of justice and law, both domestic and international.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rule of Law and Judicial Independence: Protecting Core Values in Times of Change
    THE RULE OF LAW AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: PROTECTING CORE VALUES IN TIMES OF CHANGE Antonio Lamer' I. Introduction For many, Ivan C. Rand is a name from the past. For me, he is far more than that. When I was called to the Bar of Québec in 1957, Ivan Rand was still a member of the Supreme Court of Canada. The contribution that Ivan Rand made to this country remains significant even after his untimely death in 1969. The Rand formula remains a part of our labour law lexicon. The many thoughtful articles that he contributed to legal journals over the course of his career, as a practitioner, as a judge, and finally as a legal academic, continue to stimulate and to enlighten us. Most importantly the judgments that he wrote, particularly in the area of constitutional law, still provide us with inspiration and guidance as we face the challenges that confront our legal system, particularly those posed by the Charter. In fact, it is a rare decision of the Supreme Court of Canada that deals with one of the fundamental freedoms in the Charter for the first time and does not invoke a passage from one of Justice Rand’s memorable decisions from the 1950s, such as Boucher v. R.,1 Saumur v. Québec (City of),2 or Switzman v. Elbling.3 What makes the decisions of Justice Rand such useful sources of guidance on the interpretation and application of the fundamental freedoms of the Charter is that, unlike most Canadian judges prior to the advent of the Charter, Justice Rand recognized the importance of analyzing issues of constitutional policy in terms of the fundamental or core values of our system of government.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Judicial Independence Fails
    Copyright 2021 by Aziz Z. Huq Printed in U.S.A. Vol. 115, No. 4 WHY JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE FAILS Aziz Z. Huq ABSTRACT—Judicial independence seems under siege. President Trump condemns federal courts for their political bias; his erstwhile presidential opponents mull various court-packing plans; and courts, in turn, are lambasted for abandoning a long-held constitutional convention against institutional manipulation. At the same time, across varied lines of jurisprudence, the Roberts Court evinces a deep worry about judicial independence. This preoccupation with threats to judicial independence infuses recent opinions on administrative deference, bankruptcy, patent adjudication, and jurisdiction-stripping. Yet the Court has not offered a single, overarching definition of what it means by the term “judicial independence.” Nor has it explained how its disjointed doctrinal interventions add up to a coherent theory of institutional autonomy. And it remains unclear how debates on judicial independence among jurists relate to debates about the same term in the larger public sphere. This Article’s first contribution is to analyze how the Roberts Court understands the term judicial independence and how its doctrinal rules fall far short of realizing even the aspirations the Court has for that term. This case study in doctrinal specification illuminates the gap between the Justices’ own ethical aspiration toward judicial independence and its institutional realization—a gap that generates confusion, uncertainty, and opportunities for circumvention. This Article then abstracts away from the particulars of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence to explore the origins of this aspiration– implementation gap. To motivate this more general analysis, it first demonstrates that there is a large range of constitutional-design options for a founder seeking to create independent courts.
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial and Prosecutorial Independence and the Rule of Law
    1 Which Independence for the Rule of Law? Lessons from Europe by Carlo Guarnieri and Daniela Piana (University of Bologna) Tentative draft The rule of law is increasingly considered to be a necessary condition for the development of a market economy and a successful democracy. The creation of a stable institutional setting, the introduction of transparent, well‐formulated and predictable legal norms, the establishment of a system of checks and balances restraining the exercise of political power, have all been the preferred target of policies promoted by international organizations. In this context, an independent judicial system has emerged as one of the pillars of the rule of law. Independent judges – and, as we are going to see, also independent prosecutors – have been increasingly considered fundamental in order to establish and implement a system of fair rules. However, the concept of courts’ independence is not always well defined, often referring to related but different phenomena. Moreover, to a more careful consideration, the relationship between independence and rule of law seems more complex than expected. The case of Europe – where, in recent decades, significant reforms have been implemented in the realm of the administration of justice ‐ is a good case in point. In Western Europe the relationship between courts’ independence and the rule of law is not always clear, maybe thanks to different institutional traditions. The new Eastern and Central European states can provide important insights in the matter, thanks to their relative common institutional development: a long period of communist rule and a transition to democracy which is still in the process of consolidation.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Canada
    Chapter 48 The Rule of Law, the Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Canada Warren J. Newman* The Constitution of Canada was modelled on the British tradition of unwritten principles and conventions governing the exercise of legal power to produce a constitutional mon- archy, parliamentary democracy, and responsible government, as well as the American paradigm of constitutional supremacy embodied in written provisions, required in turn by the federal rather than unitary structure of the state. This hybrid model is reflected in the Canadian understanding of the rule of law, which is embodied implicitly in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867— Canada was to enjoy ‘a Constitution simi- lar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom’—and explicitly in the preamble to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (itself a part of the Constitution Act, 1982)— ‘Whereas Canada is founded upon principles which recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law’. The idea of the rule of law is also intrinsic to provisions such as section 7 of the Charter, guaranteeing the right to life, liberty, and security of the per- son and the right not to be deprived thereof ‘except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice’; section 15, protecting and expanding upon Dicey’s1 understanding * BA, BCL, LL.B (McGill), LL.M (Osgoode), Ad E; of the Bars of Quebec and Ontario; Senior General Counsel, Constitutional, Administrative and International Law Section, Department of Justice of Canada. The views expressed in this chapter do not bind the Department. 1 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed.
    [Show full text]
  • Bureaucracy and Law a Study of Chinese Criminal Courts and Social Media
    BUREAUCRACY AND LAW A STUDY OF CHINESE CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA A dissertation presented by Yu Zhang to The School of Criminology and Criminal Justice In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Criminology and Criminal Justice Northeastern University Boston, Massachusetts August, 2014 1 BUREAUCRACY AND LAW A STUDY OF CHINESE CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL MEDIA by Yu Zhang ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Criminology and Justice Policy in the College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University August, 2014 2 Abstract Born in a firmly-rooted bureaucratic society, Chinese judiciary has never gained the opportunity to build its own identity. Concurrently, Chinese people, immersed in a bureaucratic culture, always pin their dream of justice on a powerful bureaucracy rather on a weak judiciary. The current study discusses the thousands years of Chinese history and the significant impact of bureaucracy on Chinese society and courts, and then look into the potential change in a global era revolutionized with technology and internet. A story-telling mode is used to analyze eleven important criminal cases to disclose the operations of criminal courts in China. Large amount of social media data are presented to showcase the dynamic legal community and online activism. We do not know exactly the impact of government monitoring of the social media and it is an open question. Chinese online legal activism derives its methods and vitality from multiple and intersecting forces, including the particular internet transmitting formats, actual contemporary protest forms, incipient public space promotion.
    [Show full text]
  • Preserving a Fair, Impartial and Independent Judiciary
    Preserving a Fair, Impartial and Independent Judiciary A white paper prepared by the Judicial Independence Committee of the American Board of Trial Advocates Inside: 3 Introduction 4 Historical Background 7 Jury Trials and Judicial Independence 8 Political Interference and Intimidation 2001 Bryan St., Suite 3000 10 The Skyrocketing Costs of Judicial Elections Dallas, Texas 75201 14 Judicial Independence Maintained Through Adequate Funding www.abota.org 15 White Paper Conclusion Founded in 1958, ABOTA is a national association of experienced trial lawyers and judges. ABOTA and its members are dedicated to the preservation and promotion of the civil jury trial right provided by the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Foundation of ABOTA is an affiliated charitable entity, the mission of which is to support the purposes of ABOTA through education and research. ABOTA membership consists of more than 7,000 lawyers and judges spread among 97 Chapters in all 50 States and the District of Columbia. ABOTA publishes VOIR DIRE magazine, which features in-depth articles on current and historical issues related to constitutional rights, in particular the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. ©2013 by the American Board of Trial Advocates 2001 Bryan St., Suite 3000, Dallas, Texas 75201 All rights reserved. No part of this product may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, without the express written permission of ABOTA unless such copying is expressly permitted by federal copyright law. 2 Produced in the United States of America Preserving a Fair, Impartial and Independent Judiciary Introduction eginning with the Declaration of Independence and culminating in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, the Founders of our nation adhered to a steadfast dedication to the rule of law.
    [Show full text]
  • Separation of Powers and Independence of Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Bodies” Rio De Janeiro, 16-18 January 2011
    2nd Congress of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice “Separation of Powers and Independence of Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Bodies” Rio de Janeiro, 16-18 January 2011 "Separation of Powers and Independence of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia" Laila Jurcena Adviser to the President of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia [1] Role of the Principle of Separation of Powers in Independence of the Court and the Judges. The Latvian View. The principle of separation of powers plays a substantial role in a democratic state because it not only restricts discretion of the state power but also facilitates ensuring rights and freedoms of persons. This principle functions as a balance between branches of power by giving a possibility to one branch of power to restrict other branches of power in accordance with the authority conferred by the Constitution. Regardless the precise definition of authority of each branch of power established in the Constitution, a democratic state cannot be imagined without an institution that exercises constitutional review disregarding the fact whether it belongs to the judicial power or does not fall under the system of division of power. According to Article 85 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, this function in Latvia is exercised by the Constitutional Court, an institution belonging to the judicial power. The Constitutional Court can exercise constitutional review, namely, it can carry out its function of safeguarding the respect for the constitution and protecting human rights if it is genuinely independent from branches of power and institutions, the activates of which it controls.
    [Show full text]
  • JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS an ESSENTIAL ASPECT of the RULE of LAW1 Thomas S
    Thomas S. Masuku J 3 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW1 Thomas S. Masuku J2 The Importance of Judicial Gatherings to Advocate for Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law The independent judiciary and the rule of law is a modern “gospel” that should be spread across the continent. Vast amounts of money and time is spent for the political elites across Africa to come together and discuss these issues. This practice leads to a recurring question. Why should we meet and expend money only to preach, as it were, to the converted? Would it not be better and more beneficial for the political elites to leave the comfort and serenity of air-conditioned and beautifully adorned venues and instead go to the highways and by-ways of this region. They could look for the “heathen” so to speak, in order to preach the “gospel” or good tidings related to the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law. This premise is based on an assumption that the judiciary acts in a way separate from the other members of the trias politica, namely members of the executive and legislative organs of State. These two “usual suspects” have become notorious for continuously violating the twin core principles of an independent judiciary and the rule of law. Additionally, there may be other constituencies who have joined the bandwagon in this regard, including some captains of business and other people with financial and political muscle and prowess or those who have untrammelled access to political influence in various countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Protecting the Supreme Court: Why Safeguarding the Judiciary’S Independence Is Crucial to Maintaining Its Legitimacy
    Protecting the Supreme Court: Why Safeguarding the Judiciary’s Independence is Crucial to Maintaining its Legitimacy Democracy and the Constitution Clinic Fordham University School of Law Isabella Abelite, Evelyn Michalos, & John Roque January 2021 Protecting the Supreme Court: Why Safeguarding the Judiciary’s Independence is Crucial to Maintaining its Legitimacy Democracy and the Constitution Clinic Fordham University School of Law Isabella Abelite, Evelyn Michalos, & John Roque January 2021 This report was researched and written during the 2019-2020 academic year by students in Fordham Law School’s Democracy and the Constitution Clinic, where students developed non-partisan recommendations to strengthen the nation’s institutions and its democracy. The clinic was supervised by Professor and Dean Emeritus John D. Feerick and Visiting Clinical Professor John Rogan. Acknowledgments: We are grateful to the individuals who generously took time to share their general views and knowledge with us: Roy E. Brownell, Esq., Professor James J. Brudney, Christopher Cuomo, Esq., Professor Bruce A. Green, and the Honorable Robert A. Katzmann. The report greatly benefited from Gail McDonald’s research guidance and Stephanie Salomon’s editing assistance. Judith Rew and Robert Yasharian designed the report. Table of Contents Executive Summary .....................................................................................................................................1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: Promoting Justice and Maintaining Democracy
    JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: Promoting Justice and Maintaining Democracy August 2019 BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE WORKING GROUP Renée Landers (Co-Chair) is a Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Health and Biomedical Law Concentration at Suffolk University Law School. She is a former BBA President and served as Vice Chair of the Commission on Judicial Conduct. She also sat on the task force that drafted the revised Massachusetts Code of Judicial Conduct and currently is a member of the Committee on Judicial Ethics which advises judges on compliance with the Code. Lisa Goodheart (Co-Chair) is a partner at Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, P.C., where her litigation practice includes environmental, energy, land use, real estate, insurance, and business matters. In addition to being a former President of both the BBA and the BBF, Lisa has served as Chair of both the Judicial Nominating Commission and the Court Management Advisory Board. Jon Albano (Boston Bar Association President) is a partner at Morgan Lewis, where he focuses his practice on trial and appellate work in commercial, media, and First Amendment matters. Before becoming BBA President, Jon co-chaired the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Steering Committee. Hon. Robert Cordy (Ret.) was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court in 2001 and served for 16 years as associate justice. Currently, as partner at McDermott, Will & Emery, he focuses his practice on white- collar defense, internal investigations, and appellate work. For the last 18 years he has worked with judiciaries from around the world on furthering rule of law principles, adversarial justice and judicial independence.
    [Show full text]