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Collapse in and 153

Chapter 5 Collapse in Sarawak and Borneo: 16 –3 April 1942

Introduction

Borneo commanded a vital position within the East Indies Archipelago. It cov- ered the approaches to and Malaya along the South Sea. In addition, control of Borneo’s coastline was necessary for the Japanese in order to continue their drive towards , and New Guinea. , Victoria ( Island) and (British ) were good har- bours. In the many rivers and inlets which intersected the coastline, seaplane and submarine anchorages were available. Moreover, Borneo is rich in natural resources like oil and minerals like diamond, mercury, copper, etc.1 The greater part of Borneo was under the Dutch. comprised the two states of British North Borneo and Sarawak. was a small indig- enous state under British protection and Labuan an island which was a situated at the entrance of . The British and Dutch Borneo covered an area of roughly 289,000 square miles. And the state of Sarawak occupied an area of about 50,000 square miles along the north-west coast. Most of the coastal area in Borneo was swampy and malarious. In places, the coast was fringed with Casurina trees and there were forests (as in Malaya) near the mouths of some rivers. The towns and seaports were few in number and found at the mouths of the rivers. Inland, the country is moun- tainous and was covered with swamps, rivers and jungles. The jungle was dense and prolific. The principal varies in height from 4,000 to 10,000 feet and runs in the south-westerly direction. The principal from Kuching was in an easterly direction to and connected Matang and Serian. Another road went in a westerly direction and connected Bau and Krokong.2

1 Lieutenant-Colonel B.L. Raina (ed.), Medical Services: Campaigns in the Eastern Theatre, Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939–45 (Combined Inter- Services Historical Section & : 1964), p. 18. 2 K.D. Bhargava and K.N.V. Sastri, Campaigns in South-East Asia: 1941–42, Bisheshwar Prasad (ed.), Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War: 1939–45 (New Delhi: Ministry of Defence Government of India, 1960), pp. 361, 364–65; Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Australia in the War of 1939–45, Series One, Army, vol. 4 (Canberra: Australian

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004306783_008 154 Chapter 5

There were no railways in Sarawak. The main rivers are the Rejam and the Baram. Some of the other rivers have rapids in their upper reaches. The oil fields, which were worked by the Sarawak Oil Fields Limited, were in two groups—one at in Sarawak, a short distance from the coast up the Miri River and the other at in Brunei, close to the seashore. From the oil field at Miri, the oil was pumped to the refinery at Lutong on the coast. From the Seria Oil Field, oil was pumped through pipelines to the Lutong refinery.3 The only regular unit in Sarawak was the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Regiment.

Defensive Preparations

In a conference held in Singapore in October 1940, it was estimated that a mini- mum of one brigade of regular troops was required to hold British Borneo.4 However, when the war broke out, instead of one brigade, only a regular - talion would be in place. The 2nd Battalion of the 15th arrived in November 1940 from Singapore. This unit was composed of , Jats, Punjabi and Pathans. C Company was sent to the Miri-Kuching area in December.5 The rest of the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Punjab Regiment went to Kuching, the capital of Sarawak, in May 1941. The objective was to defend this centre near the south-western extremity of the state because of the airfield located seven miles south of the town. The Dutch airfield, known as II, was located 60 miles to the south-west. In Sarawak, the other forces included a local Volunteer Corps, a Coastal Marine Service, the armed police, and the Sarawak Rangers (indigenous troops). Together these units, along with the Punjabi formation, were known as SAFOR and commanded by Lieutenant- Colonel C.M. Lane (b. 1899).6 In August 1941,the application of a partial denial scheme had reduced the oil output by 70 per cent.7 The coastline between Miri and Kuching was low and

War Memorial, 1957), p. 179; Raina (ed.), Medical Services: Campaigns in the Eastern Theatre, p. 18. 3 Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival, The War in Malaya (1949, reprint, Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1957), pp. 165–66; Bhargava and Sastri, Campaigns in South-East Asia: 1941–42, p. 361. 4 Raina (ed.), Medical Services: Campaigns in the Eastern Theatre, pp. 20–21. 5 Compton Mackenzie, Eastern Epic, vol. 1, September 1939–March 1943 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1951), pp. 265, 267; Bhargava and Sastri, Campaigns in South-East Asia: 1941–42, pp. 367–68; Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, p. 179. 6 Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, p. 180. 7 Ibid., p. 179.