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UNIFORM TRUST CODE Last Revised or Amended in 2003 Drafted by the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS and by it APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR ENACTMENT IN ALL THE STATES at its ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN ITS ONE-HUNDRED-AND-NINTH YEAR ST. AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA JULY 28 – AUGUST 4, 2000 WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND COMMENTS Copyright © 2003 By NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 3/1/04 UNIFORM TRUST CODE The Committee that acted for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing the Uniform Trust Code was as follows: MAURICE A. HARTNETT, III, Delaware Supreme Court, 144 Cooper Road, Dover, DE 19901,Chair FRANK W. DAYKIN, 4745 Giles Way, Carson City, NV 89704, Committee Member and Committee on Style Liaison E. EDWIN ECK, II, University of Montana, School of Law, Missoula, MT 59812 WILLIAM L. EVANS, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law, 525 S. Main Street, Ada, OH 45810 RUSSELL L. GEORGE, P.O. Box 907, 120 W. Third Street, Rifle, CO 81650 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06520 GLEE S. SMITH, P.O. Box 360, 111 E. 8th, Larned, KS 67550 NATHANIEL STERLING, Law Revision Commission, Suite D-1, 4000 Middlefield Road, Palo Alto, CA 94303 RICHARD V. WELLMAN, University of Georgia, School of Law, Athens, GA 30602 DAVID M. ENGLISH, University of Missouri School of Law, Missouri and Conley Avenues, Columbia, MO 65211, Reporter EX OFFICIO JOHN L. McCLAUGHERTY, P.O. Box 553, Charleston, WV 25322, President LEON M. McCORKLE, JR., P.O. Box 387, Dublin, OH 43017, Division Chair AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORS JOSEPH KARTIGANER, 955 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10021, Advisor DAVID ALAN RICHARDS, 875 3rd Avenue, New York, NY 10022, Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section Advisor RAYMOND H. YOUNG, 26th Floor, 150 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110, Real Property,Probate & Trust Law Section Advisor EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FRED H. MILLER, University of Oklahoma, College of Law, 300 Timberdell Road, Norman, OK 73019, Executive Director WILLIAM J. PIERCE, 1505 Roxbury Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48104, Executive Director Emeritus Copies of this Act may be obtained from: NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 211 E. Ontario Street, Suite 1300 Chicago, Illinois 60611 312/915-0195 www.nccusl.org UNIFORM TRUST CODE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFATORY NOTE .................................................................. 1 ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS AND DEFINITIONS SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE.......................................................... 9 SECTION 102. SCOPE. ............................................................... 9 SECTION 103. DEFINITIONS. ........................................................ 10 SECTION 104. KNOWLEDGE. ....................................................... 19 SECTION 105. DEFAULT AND MANDATORY RULES. ................................... 21 SECTION 106. COMMON LAW OF TRUSTS; PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY. 25 SECTION 107. GOVERNING LAW. .................................................... 26 SECTION 108. PRINCIPAL PLACE OF ADMINISTRATION. 27 SECTION 109. METHODS AND WAIVER OF NOTICE. 30 SECTION 110. OTHERS TREATED AS QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES. 32 SECTION 111. NONJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS. 33 [SECTION 112. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. ..........................................35] ARTICLE 2 JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS SECTION 201. ROLE OF COURT IN ADMINISTRATION OF TRUST. 37 SECTION 202. JURISDICTION OVER TRUSTEE AND BENEFICIARY. 38 [SECTION 203. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION. 40] [SECTION 204. VENUE. .............................................................40] ARTICLE 3 REPRESENTATION SECTION 301. REPRESENTATION: BASIC EFFECT. 42 SECTION 302. REPRESENTATION BY HOLDER OF GENERAL TESTAMENTARY POWER OF APPOINTMENT. ......................................................... 44 SECTION 303. REPRESENTATION BY FIDUCIARIES AND PARENTS. 44 SECTION 304. REPRESENTATION BY PERSON HAVING SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL INTEREST............................................................... 46 SECTION 305. APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE. 47 ARTICLE 4 CREATION, VALIDITY, MODIFICATION, AND TERMINATION OF TRUST SECTION 401. METHODS OF CREATING TRUST. ...................................... 50 SECTION 402. REQUIREMENTS FOR CREATION. ...................................... 52 SECTION 403. TRUSTS CREATED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS . 54 SECTION 404. TRUST PURPOSES..................................................... 55 SECTION 405. CHARITABLE PURPOSES; ENFORCEMENT . 57 SECTION 406. CREATION OF TRUST INDUCED BY FRAUD, DURESS, OR UNDUE INFLUENCE. .................................................... 58 SECTION 407. EVIDENCE OF ORAL TRUST ........................................... 58 SECTION 408. TRUST FOR CARE OF ANIMAL ......................................... 59 SECTION 409. NONCHARITABLE TRUST WITHOUT ASCERTAINABLE BENEFICIARY . 61 SECTION 410. MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF TRUST; PROCEEDINGS FOR APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL ....................................................... 63 SECTION 411. MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF NONCHARITABLE IRREVOCABLE TRUST BY CONSENT..................................................... 64 SECTION 412. MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION BECAUSE OF UNANTICIPATED CIRCUMSTANCES OR INABILITY TO ADMINISTER TRUST EFFECTIVELY. 69 SECTION 413. CY PRES. ............................................................ 70 SECTION 414. MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF UNECONOMIC TRUST. 72 SECTION 415. REFORMATION TO CORRECT MISTAKES . 74 SECTION 416. MODIFICATION TO ACHIEVE SETTLOR’S TAX OBJECTIVES . 75 SECTION 417. COMBINATION AND DIVISION OF TRUSTS . 76 ARTICLE 5 CREDITOR’S CLAIMS; SPENDTHRIFT AND DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS SECTION 501. RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY’S CREDITOR OR ASSIGNEE . 79 SECTION 502. SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION ............................................ 80 SECTION 503. EXCEPTIONS TO SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION. 82 SECTION 504. DISCRETIONARY TRUSTS; EFFECT OF STANDARD. 84 SECTION 505. CREDITOR’S CLAIM AGAINST SETTLOR. 86 SECTION 506. OVERDUE DISTRIBUTION. ............................................ 89 ARTICLE 6 REVOCABLE TRUSTS SECTION 601. CAPACITY OF SETTLOR OF REVOCABLE TRUST . 91 SECTION 602. REVOCATION OR AMENDMENT OF REVOCABLE TRUST. 92 SECTION 603. SETTLOR’S POWERS; POWERS OF WITHDRAWAL. 98 SECTION 604. LIMITATION ON ACTION CONTESTING VALIDITY OF REVOCABLE TRUST; DISTRIBUTION OF TRUST PROPERTY..................................... 100 ARTICLE 7 OFFICE OF TRUSTEE SECTION 701. ACCEPTING OR DECLINING TRUSTEESHIP . 103 SECTION 702. TRUSTEE’S BOND ................................................... 105 SECTION 703. COTRUSTEES ....................................................... 106 SECTION 704. VACANCY IN TRUSTEESHIP; APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR. 110 SECTION 705. RESIGNATION OF TRUSTEE. .......................................... 112 SECTION 706. REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE. ............................................. 114 SECTION 707. DELIVERY OF PROPERTY BY FORMER TRUSTEE . 117 SECTION 708. COMPENSATION OF TRUSTEE......................................... 118 SECTION 709. REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES ..................................... 121 ARTICLE 8 DUTIES AND POWERS OF TRUSTEE SECTION 801. DUTY TO ADMINISTER TRUST ....................................... 123 SECTION 802. DUTY OF LOYALTY .................................................. 124 SECTION 803. IMPARTIALITY ...................................................... 131 SECTION 804. PRUDENT ADMINISTRATION ......................................... 132 SECTION 805. COSTS OF ADMINISTRATION ......................................... 133 SECTION 806. TRUSTEE’S SKILLS .................................................. 133 SECTION 807. DELEGATION BY TRUSTEE ........................................... 134 SECTION 808. POWERS TO DIRECT ................................................. 135 SECTION 809. CONTROL AND PROTECTION OF TRUST PROPERTY. 137 SECTION 810. RECORDKEEPING AND IDENTIFICATION OF TRUST PROPERTY . 137 SECTION 811. ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSE OF CLAIMS . 139 SECTION 812. COLLECTING TRUST PROPERTY ...................................... 139 SECTION 813. DUTY TO INFORM AND REPORT....................................... 139 SECTION 814. DISCRETIONARY POWERS; TAX SAVINGS . 144 SECTION 815. GENERAL POWERS OF TRUSTEE...................................... 147 SECTION 816. SPECIFIC POWERS OF TRUSTEE ...................................... 148 SECTION 817. DISTRIBUTION UPON TERMINATION . 157 ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT ............................................... 159 ARTICLE 10 LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES AND RIGHTS OF PERSONS DEALING WITH TRUSTEE SECTION 1001. REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF TRUST . 161 SECTION 1002. DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF TRUST. 163 SECTION 1003. DAMAGES IN ABSENCE OF BREACH . 165 SECTION 1004. ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS ...................................... 165 SECTION 1005. LIMITATION OF ACTION AGAINST TRUSTEE . 166 SECTION 1006. RELIANCE ON TRUST INSTRUMENT . 168 SECTION 1007. EVENT AFFECTING ADMINISTRATION OR DISTRIBUTION . 168 SECTION 1008. EXCULPATION OF TRUSTEE ......................................... 169 SECTION 1009. BENEFICIARY’S CONSENT, RELEASE, OR RATIFICATION. 170 SECTION 1010. LIMITATION ON PERSONAL LIABILITY OF TRUSTEE . 171 SECTION 1011. INTEREST AS GENERAL PARTNER . 172 SECTION 1012. PROTECTION OF PERSON DEALING WITH TRUSTEE . 174 SECTION 1013. CERTIFICATION OF TRUST .......................................... 176 ARTICLE 11 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS SECTION 1101. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION . 180 SECTION 1102. ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND SIGNATURES . 180 SECTION 1103.
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