Common Ground II Why Cooperation to Reduce Accidents at Louisiana Refineries is Needed Now Dedicated to Shonda Lee, Roberta Johnson, Gregory Starkey, Jr. and others whose lives have been impacted by refinery accidents. The BP oil disaster of 2010 was tragic for public health, the economy and the environment of Louisiana. Despite billions of dollars in profits, BP’s failure to properly man- age its offshore oil rig resulted in 400 million gallons of oil spilled in the Gulf of Mexico.

There are similar problems at refineries on shore.

Reports submitted by refineries to the ies so that potential catastrophes can be Louisiana Department of Environmental prevented. Quality document 2,607 accidents from More than 200,000 people live within two 2005 - 2009. This is an average of 10 chemi- miles of these refineries. These accidents cal accidents every week. The purpose of must be reduced now to protect public this report is to raise an alarm about the health, our environment and our economy. accident trend at Louisiana’s 17 oil refiner-

1 Common Ground II

About the Refinery Efficiency Initiative investigation of what the industry calls “upset reports” — oil refineries’ letters to Common Ground II is the second publica- tion of the Refinery Efficiency Initiative, a the Louisiana Department of Environmental program to reduce chemical exposure by Quality (LDEQ) describing their accidents. preventing accidents at Louisiana refineries. These reports are made in compliance with This Initiative is a collaboration of the Loui- the Emergency Planning and the Commu- siana Bucket Brigade, the Environmental nity Right to Know Act. Industry calls these Working Group, the Environmental Integrity problems “upsets”, “incidents” or “un- Project, the United Steelworkers and com- planned events.” We call them accidents. munity groups from parishes where the The Louisiana Bucket Brigade obtains these refineries are located, including Community accident reports through public records Empowerment for Change (Baton Rouge), requests in order to gain a comprehensive Residents for Air Neutralization (Shreve- understanding of refinery accidents and port), Concerned Citizens Around Murphy what can be done to prevent them. Five (Meraux), St. Bernard Citizens for Environ- years of refinery accident data is now avail- mental Quality (Chalmette) and Concerned able via our Refinery Accident Database at Citizens and Youth of Highway 44 (Convent). www.labucketbrigade.org.

Each chemical release has a threshold that Research Methodology triggers a reporting requirement from the At the heart of the Refinery Efficiency Initia- polluter to LDEQ. These thresh- tive is the Louisiana Bucket olds are called “reportable Brigade’s quantities.” Hydrogen sulfide, for example, has a reportable quantity of 100 pounds. Refin- eries are not required to file reports if the total is below reportable quantities.

To communities, workers and those concerned with health and safety, accidents of any size are important and worth reporting. A release of 83 pounds of hydrogen sulfide — below the re- portable quantity — killed a worker at ConocoPhil- lips on October 22, 2007 (LDEQ #100322). Our accident total differs from the refineries and even the LDEQ be- cause we include all such accidents.

2 Findings

1. Refinery accident data is underestimated; the number of accidents is likely far higher than detailed in this report.

2. accident reduction is an opportunity for job creation and economic growth. Hiring more workers and adding maintenance programs will make a refinery safer. Emis- sions control technologies can save corporations money and product in the long term.

3. Refineries do not have sufficient storm and hurricane preparedness plans. Twenty- seven percent of all emissions to the air and 64% of emissions to the ground and water between 2005 - 2009 occurred during bad weather like storms or hurricanes. Many of these accidents could have been prevented if storm preparedness plans were followed, facilities invested in back up power systems and wastewater treat- ment capacities were increased to handle Louisiana rains.

4. Refineries are not being thorough in their investigations of the accident causes; from 2005 - 2009, 20% of all accidents had no information about the cause.

5. Management trends — including laying off workers and deferring maintenance — may result in short-term profits for the parent corporation but are generally making refineries more dangerous.

6. ExxonMobil’s two refineries (Baton Rouge Refinery and Chalmette Refining) have the most frequent accidents and the largest emissions from accidents.

7. The refining industry is not capitalizing on this opportunity to collaborate to solve the accident problem.

Twelve of the state’s 17 refineries — including worst offenders ExxonMobil, Calumet Lubricants and CITGO — have refused repeated invitations to collaborate in good faith. ConocoPhillips, Valero Refining, Marathon Petroleum and Pelican Refining have responded positively. The Louisiana Mid-Continental Oil and Gas Association, while somewhat responsive, is ultimately ineffective since it cannot speak for the corporations involved.

3 Common Ground II

Evidence suggests that the refinery accident rate is actually higher than refineries are reporting.

Problems with Emissions Factors judgment and emission models that are not approved by the Environmental Protection Fuzzy Math: Refineries report emissions to Agency (EPA) or independently verified. In the flare using calculations that may not be the Marathon DIAL study, EPA found a dra- consistent or accurate. matic example of underreporting because The graph below shows the calculation a refinery had misapplied emissions factors 1 methods in use by the state’s refineries. known as AP-42 factors. Some of these factors, like engineering A more accurate approach would be to judgment, are vague. The majority of emis- actually measure — rather than estimate — sions are reported based on engineering what is being released.

Emission Factors Used by Louisiana Oil Refineries

Material Balance

Engineering Judgement 12% EPA Emission Factors

19% 12% Continuous Emission Monitors: 1% EPA Published Criteria: 1%

4% Other Vendor Emission Factor: 1% Direct Measurement: 1% 4% Emission Factors: 0% Stack Test 4% Emissions Model 41% Facility Specific Emission Factor

SOURCE: LDEQ Emissions Inventory

1 office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, EPA, Review of Dial Emission Test Data and AP-42 Emission Estimation Procedures for BP Petroleum Refinery in Texas City Draft (July 2010)

4 Overestimation of combustion rate: true; only 1 or 2% of the chemicals would be Flares do not combust 98% of vented going into the neighboring community. gas. There is, however, no engineering proof to The flare is an important piece of equipment support these calculations. The evidence at a refinery; it acts like a relief valve. When shows that actual combustion efficiency of accidents happen, chemicals are sent to the flare can be as low as 50%. The Mara- the flare to be incinerated, thus preventing thon Passive FTIR study study demonstrated harmful releases to the air. This is the point that the high incineration rates of 98 or 99% — incineration to the flare during accidents are achieved only under perfect conditions — at which Louisiana refineries seem to be – when the weather is good and the refinery inaccurately measuring emissions. is functioning well. Accidents, by nature, are One of the emissions factors Louisiana refin- not perfect conditions. They occur during eries use is called the AP-42. This calculation storms and when the refinery has problems. refers to the flare incineration rate. Three studies have concluded that emissions Refineries routinely overestimate the effi- from flares can be up to six times greater ciency of flare incineration rates. Refinery -ac than what is reported to EPA and state 1 cident reports show the plant environmental agencies. In practical terms, this means managers make assumptions that the flares that the total refinery accident releases from will incinerate 98 or 99% of chemicals. This flares to the air from 2005 - 2009 are likely calculation would be good news if it were much greater than the 21.8 million pounds reported to LDEQ.

Solution: The best way to under- stand emissions from the flares is to actually measure those emissions through continuous emissions moni- toring on the stack. According to the studies cited here, Louisiana refineries rou- tinely fail to use this technology and instead simply estimate emissions based on false assumptions. Louisiana refineries’ failure to modernize and use the best technology pro- vides inaccurately low emissions numbers in refinery accident reports.

1 RTI International, Review of DIAL Emission Test Data and AP-42 Emission Estimation Procedures for BP Petroleum Refinery in Texas City, Texas DRAFT; Marathon Petroleum Company, LLC; Performance Test of a Steam-Assisted Elevated Flare with Passive FTIR; Industry Professionals For Clean Air – Houston, REDUCING EMISSIONS FROM PLANT FLARES

5 Common Ground II

Refineries in Louisiana There are 17 refineries in Louisiana. They are listed here in order of refining capacity. The demographic data provided in the table below is the population by census tract within two miles of a refinery from the 2000 Census.

Refining Capacity Accidents Population Within % African % Children Refinery, City Emissions (Pounds) Emissions (Gallons) (Barrels Per Day) 2005 - 2009 2 Miles American in poverty

ExxonMobil Refining and Supply, Baton Rouge 504,500 569 4,187,339 35,611 55,303 86.7% 45.3%

Marathon Petroleum, Garyville 436,000 115 161,127 1,220 4,706 66.2% 37.9%

CITGO Petroleum, Lake Charles 429,500 386 3,062,135 2,329,469 2,918 0% 6.6%

ConocoPhillips, Belle Chasse 247,000 112 2,650,410 78,110 2,270 29% 24.3%

ConocoPhillips, Westlake 239,400 243 423,327 373,059 8,308 18.1% 17.1%

Motiva Enterprises, Convent 235,000 159 870,706 12,548 2,393 69% 33.2%

Motiva Enterprises, Norco 234,700 135 1,414,563 18,825 5,147 29.5% 17%

Chalmette Refining, Chalmette 192,500 419 6,221,685 11,679,706 59,584 0% 18.6%

Valero Refining, Norco 185,003 155 292,094 2,116,693 11,454 21.8% 14.7%

Murphy Oil, Meraux 120,000 122 1,074,392 5,436,277 33,766 7.1% 13.4%

Alon Refining, Krotz Springs 80,000 24 28,290 255 1,242 0% 25.2%

Calcasieu Refining, Lake Charles 78,000 19 344 66,116 1,019 0% 0%

Calumet Lubricants, Shreveport 57,000 69 281,400 60,303 49,920 84.7% 48.2%

Placid Refining, Port Allen 57,000 45 170,864 53,120 10,355 56.3% 39.2%

Shell Chemical, St. Rose 55,000 21 913,798 26,662 6,036 26.5% 21%

Calumet Lubricants, Cotton Valley 13,020 1 0 42 798 47.7% 44.5%

Calumet Lubricants, Princeton 8,300 13 25,471 3,667 2,059 20.3% 15.5%

Total 3,109,926 2,607 21,777,945 22,291,683 257,278

6 “Bad air emissions from plant. Difficulty breathing at night and early mornings.” — Princeton Citizen Report to LDEQ #83652; November 4, 2005

Refining Capacity Accidents Population Within % African % Children Refinery, City Emissions (Pounds) Emissions (Gallons) (Barrels Per Day) 2005 - 2009 2 Miles American in poverty

ExxonMobil Refining and Supply, Baton Rouge 504,500 569 4,187,339 35,611 55,303 86.7% 45.3%

Marathon Petroleum, Garyville 436,000 115 161,127 1,220 4,706 66.2% 37.9%

CITGO Petroleum, Lake Charles 429,500 386 3,062,135 2,329,469 2,918 0% 6.6%

ConocoPhillips, Belle Chasse 247,000 112 2,650,410 78,110 2,270 29% 24.3%

ConocoPhillips, Westlake 239,400 243 423,327 373,059 8,308 18.1% 17.1%

Motiva Enterprises, Convent 235,000 159 870,706 12,548 2,393 69% 33.2%

Motiva Enterprises, Norco 234,700 135 1,414,563 18,825 5,147 29.5% 17%

Chalmette Refining, Chalmette 192,500 419 6,221,685 11,679,706 59,584 0% 18.6%

Valero Refining, Norco 185,003 155 292,094 2,116,693 11,454 21.8% 14.7%

Murphy Oil, Meraux 120,000 122 1,074,392 5,436,277 33,766 7.1% 13.4%

Alon Refining, Krotz Springs 80,000 24 28,290 255 1,242 0% 25.2%

Calcasieu Refining, Lake Charles 78,000 19 344 66,116 1,019 0% 0%

Calumet Lubricants, Shreveport 57,000 69 281,400 60,303 49,920 84.7% 48.2%

Placid Refining, Port Allen 57,000 45 170,864 53,120 10,355 56.3% 39.2%

Shell Chemical, St. Rose 55,000 21 913,798 26,662 6,036 26.5% 21%

Calumet Lubricants, Cotton Valley 13,020 1 0 42 798 47.7% 44.5%

Calumet Lubricants, Princeton 8,300 13 25,471 3,667 2,059 20.3% 15.5%

Total 3,109,926 2,607 21,777,945 22,291,683 257,278

7 Common Ground II

RefineryA ccident and Pollution Totals 2005 - 2009

Figure 1: Louisiana Oil Refinery Accidents from 2005 - 2009

600 500 400 300

Accident s 200 100 0

ExxonMobil Murphy Oil lero Refining Placid ShellRefining ChemicalAlon VaRefining Calcasieu Refining Citgo Petroleum Calumet,Calumet, PrincetonChalmette Shreveport Refining Marathon Petroleum Motiva Enterprises, Norco ConocoPhillips,ConocoPhillips, Lake Charles BelleMotiva Chase Enterprises, Convent ExxonMobil’s Baton Rouge and Chalmette facilities top the state in the number of accidents.

Figure 2: Accident Emissions Released to the Air From 2005-2009

7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000

Pounds 3,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000

ExxonMobil Murphy Oil lero Refining Placid ShellRefining ChemicalAlon VaRefining Calcasieu Refining Citgo Petroleum Calumet,Calumet, PrincetonChalmette Shreveport Refining Marathon Petroleum Motiva Enterprises, Norco ConocoPhillips,ConocoPhillips, Lake Charles BelleMotiva Chase Enterprises, Convent ExxonMobil’s Chalmette Refining, the state’s worst polluter via accidents, is responsible for 28% of all emissions to the air.

8 Figure 3: Accident Emissions Released to the Ground and Water From 2005-2009

14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000 8,000,000

Gallons 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 0

ExxonMobil Murphy Oil Alon Refiningalero Refining Citgo Petroleum Placid ShellRefining ChemicalV CalcasuieuCalumet, RefiningCalumet, PrincetonChalmette Shreveport Refining Marathon Petroleum Motiva Enterprises, Norco ConocoPhillips,ConocoPhillips, Lake Charles BelleMotiva Chase Enterprises, Convent Most of the refinery ground and water pollution is from a few sources, namely Chalmette Refining, CITGO, Murphy Oil and Valero Refining. The majority of pollution released to the water is from a single accident: Chalmette Refining’s 11.6 million-gallon dump of wastewater into neighborhood canals that drain into Lake Borgne in 2008.

9 Common Ground II

Causes of accidents

Figure 4: Causes of Accidents 2005 - 2009 Corrosion Under Investigation 3% 1% Equipment Design Start Up, Shut Down 1% Equipment Failure Weather 7% 6% Seal Gasket 3% 16%

Process Upset Human Error/Factors 7% 5% Power Failure 2% 4% Instrument Failure

5% 12% Maintenance Procedures Piping or Tubing 20% 8%

Other No Information Given

The most common causes of accidents were No Information Given, Equipment Failure and Piping or Tubing. In explaining the cause of an accident, the most common response given by Louisiana refineries was “No Information Given.” Such imprecise reporting is not only evidence of a poorly run refinery, but also inhibits understanding of the cause and potential solutions of accidents.

ExxonMobil’s Baton Rouge and Chalmette facilities frequently do not provide information on the causes of accidents.

Figure 5: Accidents Without Causal Explanation

300

250

200

150

Accident s 100

50

0

Murphy Oil ExxonMobil Alon Refininglero Refining Citgo Petroleum Placid ShellRefining ChemicalVa CalcasuieuCalumet, RefiningCalumet, PrincetonChalmette Shreveport Refining Marathon Petroleum Motiva Enterprises, Norco ConocoPhillips,ConocoPhillips, Lake Charles BelleMotiva Chase Enterprises, Convent

10 Certain types of accidents, most notably those caused by bad weather, cause more pollution than others.

Figure 6: Causes of Accident Emissions to the Air From 2005-2009

Start Up, Shut Down 1% Under Investigation Corrosion 5% <1% Equipment Design Weather 5% 27% Equipment Failure 16%

Seal Gasket Human Factors 9% Process Upset 8%

Power Failure 6% Instrument Failure 11 % 7% Piping or Tubing 1% Maintenance Procedures Other No Information Given 2%

Weather related accidents are the single largest cause of emissions to the air by Louisiana refineries.

Figure 7: Causes of Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water From 2005-2009

Corrosion <1% Equipment Design

10%

Equipment Failure

25%

Weather 64% No Information 1% Given

All Other Causes 1%

The majority of the emissions to the ground and water caused by weather are from an oil spill at CITGO Petroleum and from an accident at Chalmette Refining during Hurricane Gustav.

11 Common Ground II

Analysis

Inadequate storm preparation

Bad weather is the leading cause of acci- lated accident emissions to the air and 84% dent emissions. Bad weather events include of emissions to the ground and water. rainstorms, wind, lightning and freezing Facilities usually deem these releases “un- temperatures. preventable” because bad weather is an act Among bad weather events that disrupt of God and beyond human control. Howev- the refinery’s production, hurricanes are the er, storms and hurricanes in South Louisiana most significant problem. Hurricanes were are predictable. Refineries need to improve the reported cause of 55% of all weather-re- their hurricane preparedness.

“Rotten eggs smell from Exxon. Particularly bad when it’s overcast or rainy. Can see visible plumes of materials in the air.” — Baton Rouge Citizen Report to LDEQ #115633; July 11, 2009

Hurricane Gustav, ExxonMobil and the Neighborhood of Istrouma, Baton Rouge

When Hurricane Gustav made landfall in September 2008, Baton Rouge residents wit- nessed some of the worst winds the city had ever experienced. Most businesses and gov- ernment buildings remained closed for several days.

In North Baton Rouge’s Istrouma neighbor- the facility was not shut down, the cooling hood, residents were without power for tower was operating when winds knocked it almost two weeks. They sat on their front over, releasing 599,122 pounds of pollutants porches or in their backyards, seeking relief for what residents say was 12 days of flaring. from the heat indoors. But outside they Most of the emissions were sulfur dioxide, a faced another problem: ExxonMobil. Be- chemical known to cause respiratory prob- cause of improper hurricane preparedness, lems. the refinery was spewing pollutants over the “We had to sit outside all day and all night already ravaged city. breathing in some of the worst pollution I Exxon failed to properly shut down the facil- have ever experienced. On top of the stress ity before Gustav made landfall. Because from the hurricane, we were all sick from

12 “Fumes in the air after Hurricane Gustav. Observed numerous flare ups and black plumes of smoke from Murphy Oil.” — Meraux Citizen Report to LDEQ #108958 9/12/2008 chemical exposure,” said Seabell Thomas, hurricane made landfall endangered work- leader of Community Empowerment for ers. According to OSHA, “ExxonMobil ex- Change and an Istrouma resident. posed its employees at the second-largest oil refinery in the nation to life-threatening After the storm, the Occupational Safety conditions by failing to implement an emer- and Health Administration fined ExxonMobil gency plan when Hurricane Gustav struck.”1 $5,000 for this incident, stating that the de- lay in shutting down the plant until after the

1 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123758642112499625.html

13 Common Ground II

Deferred Maintenance

Poorly Maintained Pipes at working on had been clamped for two ExxonMobil’s Chalmette Refining weeks, as shown in Chalmette Refining’s ExxonMobil’s Chalmette Refining is a case report to the state. study for a recurring cause of accidents: “Gas line … started leaking sour gas to the repeated quick fixes instead of proper main- atmosphere through a previously installed tenance. The refinery’s accident data clearly clamp.”2 demonstrates a need for an improved preventative maintenance program: 11% of A safer scenario for workers would have accidents and emissions to the air are the been to repair the pipe under controlled result of problems with piping or tubing. conditions, not during an accident. Chal- mette Refining management, however, In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health made a decision to leave the clamp on the Administration cited Chalmette Refining for leak for an extended period, perhaps creat- ignoring nine safety recommendations on ing a tragedy that might have been avoided. piping. The OSHA investigators found that problems with pipes “were still not resolved This is a corporate culture of lean manage- six years later.”1 ment. Companies try to save money by cutting preventative maintenance and safety This deferred maintenance has real im- programs. This may result in short-term plications. Problems with the pipes were savings for the refineries, but the long-term involved with the death of Gregory Starkey costs are higher for all parties — the work- October 6, 2010. The pipe Starkey was ers, the communities and the refinery.

Motiva Enterprises, Norco Motiva’s Norco Facility was cited by OSHA in 2006 and 2008 for having “no written emer- gency shut down and operation procedures” and “a lack of routine inspections and tests on process equipment” endangering workers with “exposure to highly hazardous chemicals,” “inhalation of toxic vapors” and “serious injury and death.”3

Calumet Refining, Shreveport Calumet’s Shreveport refinery has had consistent problems with leaks from its tank farm.I n 2009 alone, Calumet had six accidents (LDEQ #s 117003, 117485, 118112, 119092, 119349, 120035) involving the tanks in the tank farm including an asphalt fire and the collapse of a floating roof releasing more than 32,000 gallons of oil products spilled to the ground and water and 193,000 pounds of Volatile Organic Compounds released into the air. The Oc- tober 29, 2009 incident report (LDEQ #119092) detailing the floating tank collapse states “Plans were in place to move the contents of T-44 [Tank 44] to the other gasoline storage tank T-68 [Tank 68] when the floor of T-68 developed a leak.” Since 2005, there have been a total of 16 accidents in Calumet’s tank farms resulting in more than 58,000 gallons of oil products spilled.5

1 United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. “Freedom of Information Act-files.’ U.S.C.552(b), Public Law 93-502. 2 Letter from Chalmette Refining to LDEQ #126868, 10.11.10 3 U.S. Department of Labor, Ibid. 4 incidents from 1/11/05, 78/22/05, and 1/05/2008 do not have LDEQ#s 5 LDEQ #s 76443, 76500, 78362, 79672, 93398, 97165, 99432, 102405, 106519, 107039, 1076174

14 Slashing the workforce

Lean management also includes an attempt fewer people to act in an emergency re- to save money by laying off full-time work- sponse capacity. ers — often well-trained, long-time union A lean staff is particularly disastrous during members — and replacing them with con- startup and shutdown of a unit. According tract labor. Fewer workers mean there is less to workers, starting up a unit is the most time for maintenance. dangerous time in a facility. The accident re- A smaller workforce also means there are ports support this claim. More than 195 ac- not as many people on hand during an cidents (7% of the total) involved the startup emergency. When a malfunction occurs, the or shutdown of refinery units. More workers operator on the unit is the intervention. In might help to prevent these accidents. a lean management style, there are fewer operators and support workers onsite, thus

BP Oil Disaster The BP oil disaster illustrates what happens when companies make management decisions to save money by not investing in equipment or maintenance. The Oil Spill Commission hearings revealed that BP chose the cheaper well design, saving the company millions of dollars, over a safer, yet more expensive option. “BP felt it could get a safe cement seal on its wild Macondo well by simply spreading out stabilizing devices, rather than by following a contractor’s recommendation to add more of them, engineering team leader Gregg Walz testified.”1

1 http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/10/bp_engineers_decided_to_spread.html

15 Common Ground II

“Smells like rotten eggs. Headache, nausea and nasal passages burning. Murphy Oil’s flare has been burping all weekend.” — Report to LABB Crisis Map; May 13, 2010

Flaring

As the graph illustrates, 38% of acciden- refineries can reduce their flaring through tal emissions from Louisiana refineries are flare gas recovery systems (see Recommen- sent to the flare. Some neighbors call it the dations page), a significant percentage of midnight sun because it burns all night. If emissions can be cut.

Figure 8: Total Accident Emissions to the Air and Accident Emissions Sent to the Flare From 2005-2009

7,000,000

6,000,000

5,000,000

4,000,000 Total 3,000,000 Flare

Pounds 2,000,000

1,000,000

0

stlake We Murphy Oil ExxonMobil Alon Refining Shell Chemical Valero Refining Placid Refining CITGO Petroleum Calumet,Calcasieu Princeton Refining Chalmette Refining Calumet,Marathon Shreveport Petroleum ConocoPhillips,Motiva Enterprises, Norco MotivaConocoPhillips, Enterprises, Convent Belle Chasse

“The flaring at Calumet is causing my house to shake.” — Shreveport Citizen Report to LDEQ #102197; January 10, 2008

16 Refinery Accidents and Public Health

Louisiana refineries report the release of up to 80 different chemicals during accidents in any given year. These releases create chemical emer- gencies, defined as “any actual or imminent threat of a hazardous chemi- cal release that has the potential for causing harm to people, property or the environment.”1

Carbon Monoxide Carbon monoxide is considered a Crite- alertness and vision, causes dizziness and ria Pollutant by the EPA and “reduces the can lead to unconsciousness or death.”2 It is amount of oxygen reaching the body’s particularly dangerous for pregnant women organs and tissues. Cardiovascular patients and children. High exposure in children can may experience chest pain or other symp- lead to delayed mental development.3 toms. Carbon monoxide affects mental

Motiva enterprises Convent Carbon monoxide was not the only pollut- At Motiva’s Convent Refinery in December ant released during these accidents. About 2009, a temperature drop during a thunder- 170,548 pounds of sulfur dioxide were also storm caused the Fluid Catalytic Cracking released. Unit’s wet gas compressor to shut down, releasing 214,000 pounds of carbon mon- Norco oxide into the air. According to the refinery At Motiva’s Norco Refinery in October 2008, report, “Severe weather is beyond Motiva’s the refinery released more than 800,000 control and considered an act of God.” pounds of carbon monoxide as well as more But Motiva had consistent problems with than 40,000 pounds of nitrous oxides, sulfur the FCCU wet gas compressor various dioxide and particulate matter because of times before the thunderstorm. There were tube leaks in the Residual Catalytic Crack- at least five accidents (LDEQ #s 85744, ing Unit. According to the report, personnel 116576, 117144, 119480, 119481) leading found 76 tubes in the unit that needed to up to the December 2009 incident high- be replaced. The unit leaked carbon mon- lighting the recurring problem with the unit. oxide into the surr ounding environment for more than five days.

1 Chemical Emergencies Draft Report, National Conversation on Public Health and Chemical Exposures, September 2010 2 http://www.capcoa.org/health-effects/#AIR_QUALITY_GUIDE_FOR_CARBON_MONOXIDE 3 http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=1163&tid=253

17 Common Ground II

EPA Takes Action on Sulfur Dioxide A new rule issued by EPA in June 2010 places stricter regulations on sulfur dioxide pollution. Industry — including refineries — must comply with a stricter one-hour air quality standard to protect people from short-term exposure. The EPA estimates that the rule will save between $13 billion and $33 billion a year in health care costs, prevent 2,300 to 5,900 900 premature deaths as well as 54,000 asthma attacks a year. This rule took effect on June 2, 2010.

Sulfur Dioxide

According to refinery reports, sulfur dioxide is by far the biggest problem from refinery accidents. From 2005 - 2009, Louisiana refineries reported releasing 8,737,103 pounds via accidents.

Sulfur dioxide is a known trigger of asthma and respiratory problems. Children, the el- derly and those with existing cardiovascular and respiratory problems are at a higher risk for health issues if exposed. Sulfur dioxide is also a major component of acid rain.1

“Strong sulfur odor from Exxon gives me a headache.” — Baton Rouge Citizen Report to LDEQ #99847; September 28, 2007 “Sulfur smell from Murphy Oil is so strong you cannot go outside. Children cannot go out and play.” — Meraux Citizen Report to LDEQ #117632; August 31, 2009

ExxonMobil’s Chalmette Refining Chalmette Refining has by far the largest sulfur dioxide releases via accidents in the state. On October 10, 2006 (LDEQ #91273), the refinery released 1,068,405 pounds of sulfur di- oxide during a single accident that lasted more than 78 hours. The report states under the “Health Risks” section: “No evacuations or road closures occurred. A few potential acute health effects were reported by community members.”

1 http://www.epa.gov/air/sulfurdioxide/

18 Benzene

Louisiana refineries emitted 134,558 pounds of benzene, a known carcinogen, via ac- cidents from 2005 - 2009. According to the EPA, benzene is the most significant toxic air pollutant by which to measure cancer risks.

A 2008 report by EPA’s Air Quality Planning and Standards calculated the benefits of a regulation for benzene, Health Benefits of Benzene Reductions in Houston, 1990 - 2020, quantifies the economic benefits of reducing benzene emissions. The Houston- based study concluded that the new regu- non-fatal leukemia cases by 2020, with a lation will result in nine avoided fatal and total health benefit of $9 - $13 million.

CITGO Petroleum, Lake Charles On December 18, 2008 (LDEQ #111417), CITGO Petroleum in Lake Charles reported a release of 92,578 pounds of benzene into the air. The reportable quantity for benzene is 10 pounds due to its hazardous nature. The ref inery’s report states “the entire spill vaporized into the air.” There were no evacuations or road closures as a result of this release.

Oil Spills

Refineries in Louisiana have spilled more from Valero’s Norco Refinery in 2008 (LDEQ than 5.4 million gallons of oil into the envi- #109833). “Crude oil has many highly toxic ronment via accidents in the last five years. chemical ingredients that can damage every system in the body.”1 The two largest oil spills reported from refin- eries onshore were 2.2 million gallons from Oil spills vaporize, but many of the emis- CITGO Petroleum in Lake Charles in 2006 sions to the air from vaporization are not (LDEQ #100322) and 2.1 million gallons measured or reported.

1 http://www.sciencecorps.org/crudeoilhazards.htm

19 Common Ground II

Smog

Refineries released 6,561,994 pounds of chest tightness, wheezing, or shortness of ground-level ozone-producing chemicals to breath.”1 the air via upsets from 2005 - 2009. Ground- On March 2, 2010, the Rand Corporation level ozone-producing chemicals include released a study showing the link between Volatile Organic Compounds, hydrocarbons, ozone and particulate matter air pollution flammable gas and particulate matter. and health problems such as asthma attacks, Ground-level ozone is smog caused by in- pneumonia, heart attacks and bronchitis. dustrial and vehicular emissions. The effects The study examined air pollution and hospi- include: “induction of respiratory symptoms, tal admissions trends in California from 2005 decrements in lung function, and inflam- - 2007. mation of airways.” The term “respiratory Rand concluded “improved air quality would symptoms” includes: “coughing; throat have reduced total spending on hospital irritation; pain, burning, or discomfort in care by $193,100,184 in total.”2 the chest while taking a deep breath; and

1 http://www.epa.gov/o3healthtraining/population.html 2 http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR777/

20 Who pays for the health costs of air pollution?

Medicare > $100 million

Medicaid and Medi-Cal > $27 million

Private insurers > $55 million

http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR777/

Air Quality Index The EPA developed the following scale that relates short-and long-term exposure to the ambient ozone concentrations, in parts per billion (ppb), to health risk. To get up-to-the- minute air quality readings for your area, visit www.airnow.gov.

Air Quality Index for Ozone

Air Quality Index Levels of Colors Cautionary Statements for Ozone (AQI) Values Health Concern

When the AQI is in ...air quality ...as symbolized this range: conditions are: by this color:

0 to 50 Good Green No health impacts are expected when air quality is in this range.

51 to 100 ModerateYellow Unusually sensitive people should consider limiting prolonged outdoor exertion.

Unhealthy for Active children and adults, and people with respiratory disease 101 to 150 Orange Sensitive Groups such as asthma, should limit prolonged outdoor exertion

151 to 200 Unhealthy Red Active children and adults, and people with respiratory disease, such as asthma, should avoid prolonged outdoor exertion; everyone else, especially children should limit prolonged outdoor exertion

201 to 300 Very UnhealthyPurple Active children and adults, and people with respiratory disease, such as asthma, should avoid prolonged outdoor exertion; everyone else, especially children should limit prolonged outdoor exertion

21 Common Ground II

High Ozone Days Louisiana 2006 - 2008 (American Lung Association) The following chart correlates refinery releases of ozone-producing chemicals to the num- ber of ozone days by parish.

Refinery contribution to Parish smog pollution from 2005 - 2009

R ed D ays P urple D ays A I R Q UA LI TY Grade O range D ays 192,956 pounds and 52,580 gallons Caddo Parish F 20 0 0 (Calumet Refining) 590,771 pounds and 20,575 gallons Calcasieu F 14 1 0 (CITGO and ConocoPhillips) 1,969,448 pounds and 1,072 gallons East Baton Rouge F 37 5 0 (ExxonMobil) 502,596 pounds and 25,148 gallons Plaquemines * * * * (ConocoPhillips) 1,927,080 pounds and 20,376 gallons St. Bernard * * * * (Chalmette Refining and Murphy Oil) 1,190,576 pounds and 336 gallons St. Charles F 11 0 0 (Motiva, Shell and Valero)

St. James F 12 0 0 37,722 pounds and 965 gallons (Motiva)

St. John the Baptist F 17 0 0 36,569 pounds and 284 gallons (Marathon)

West Baton Rouge F 18 2 0 23,794 pounds and 52,500 gallons (Placid)

*Do not report to American Lung Association

22 Recommendations for Louisiana Refineries

1. Apply the lessons from this report to refinery operations. The data in this report comes from the refineries’ own reports. Instead of wasting time arguing with this report’s findings, refineries should apply the information to their operations. A consultant would charge refineries tens of thousands of dol- lars — if not more — for this information. • Lion Oil Company’s El Dorado refinery in Arkansas installed two flare gas recov- 2. Accept the standing invitation to ery systems, which “reduced flaring to collaborate on accident reduction. near-zero levels, thereby achieving the refinery’s emission reduction objectives 2 3. Implement flare minimization and conserving facility resources.” programs. • From 2001 - 2003, Dow Chemical Com- Flare recovery systems should be a require- pany in Freeport, Texas, reported a 54% ment for all flares in the refineries. Flare reduction in emissions from startup, gas recovery technologies allow plants to shutdown and off-specification incidents recover gases, which are valuable prod- through a flare minimization strategy. In ucts, rather than simply burning them off. doing so, Dow documented savings of It makes business sense. By recycling the $2.5 million.3 gases recovered through these important • South Coast Refineries in California emissions control technologies, companies reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by 73% can recover the costs of the systems and (from 2,633 tons to 735 tons).4 make a profit off the gases captured. The systems pay for themselves within a few • Flint Hills Resources has reduced its years. annual flaring time by 88% at its Pine Bend, Minn and Corpus Christi, Texas • California’s Bay Area Quality Manage- plants.5 ment District found that adding com- pressor capacity and instituting better For many accidents, safer technologies and flare management practices resulted in management procedures can remove the an 85% reduction in emissions of Volatile possibility, or significantly reduce the poten- Organic Compounds from 2002 - 2005.1 tial, of a chemical emergency.

1 BAAQMD, Staff Report, Proposed Regulation, regulation 12, Miscellaneous Standards of Performance, Rule 12, Flares at Petroleum Refineries (July 8, 2005) p. 1. 2 hydrocarbon Processing, Minimize Flaring with Flare Gas Recovery (June 2002), pp.83 - 85. 3 Krietenstein, S., Dow Chemical Co., Flare Minimization Strategy During Plant Upsets: Freeport (April 12, 2005). 4 industry Professionals for Clean Air. Reducing Emissions from Plant Flares. 5 ibid.

23 Common Ground II

4. Improve storm preparedness 5. Improve emergency response Refineries should implement a number of First responders are “individuals who in the measures to reduce accidents caused by early stages of an incident are responsible weather. Sufficient backup power systems for the protection and preservation of life, should be a necessity to handle fluctuations property, evidence and the environment.” during bad weather. Many of these facilities (OSHA 2007). Those who live closest to a are decades old, some nearly a century. In petrochemical facility — the neighbors — addition to implementing new technologies are the de facto first responders to public for pollution reduction, infrastructure at re- health emergencies that occur during ac- fineries should be improved to a storm and cidents at the plants. wastewater capacity level that is appropri- Current chemical emergency response ate for local weather conditions. Guidelines operations in the state are completely de- on the time of shutdown prior to hurricanes pendent on information (or the lack thereof) should be created and enforced for worker from the company and do not involve and community safety. Also, practices like citizen groups in the response. Refineries allowing more time for the shutdown of a must immediately disclose all details of ac- plant — the largest source of hurricane ac- cidental releases to the public in order for cident pollution — can help reduce pollu- first responders to do their job to prevent tion and a potentially hazardous situation. chemical exposures in the community as a Emergency shutdowns cause large amounts result of an accident. of pollution, increase flaring at startup and create dangerous conditions for workers. Enforcing a longer time guideline for shut- down procedures could significantly miti- gate emissions from hurricanes.

24 Calcasieu Refining Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Equipment Design

5% Weather Human Factors

26% 16% Accident Emissions to the Air 400

350

300 Instrument 250 11% Failure s 200 und Start Up, Po 150 Shut Down 11% 100

50

0 5% Seal or Gasket 21% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 No Information Given 5% Process Upset

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 70,000 14

60,000 12

50,000 10 s 8

40,000 ent ns llo ccid 6 30,000 A Ga

20,000 4

10,000 2

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Calumet Causes of Accidents 2005-2009 Princeton

Start Up, Shut Down

25% Equipment Failure Accident Emissions to the Air 16,000

14,000

12,000 50% 10,000 s 8,000 und

Po 6,000

4,000 Human Factors

2,000 25%

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 2,500 6

5 2,000 4 1,500 s ent ns 3 llo ccid A Ga 1,000 2

500 1

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

25 Common Ground II: Appendix

Calumet Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Weather Corrosion 1%

Shreveport Equipment Failure 6% Seal or Gasket

13% 22% Accident Emissions to the Air 250,000 Process Upset 4% 200,000 Human Error Power Failure 4% 150,000 s 12% und

Po 100,000 6% Piping or Tubing

50,000 9% Human Factors Other 3% 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 10% Instrument Failure 6% 4% No Information Given Maintenance/Procedures

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water 25 Oil Refinery Accidents 40,000

35,000 20

30,000 s ent 15

25,000 ccid A ns of

20,000 llo er 10 Ga

15,000 mb Nu 10,000 5 5,000

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 0% Chalmette Refining Corrosion Equipment Design Unreported Weather 1% Start Up, Shut Down 1% Chalmette Equipment Failure Seal or Gasket 6% 1%

Process Upset 10% 28% Accident Emissions to the Air 2,500,000

2,000,000 9% Piping or Tubing 1,500,000 s

und Human Error Po 1,000,000 7% 10% 500,000 5% 0% Human Factors 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Other 1% Instrument Failure 0

No Information Given Maintenance/Procedures

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 160 14,000,000 140 12,000,000 120 10,000,000 100 8,000,000 s ns ent 80 llo

6,000,000 ccid Ga A 60

4,000,000 40

2,000,000 20

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

26 Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Citgo Petroleum 1% Corrosion Under Investigation 1% 1% Equipment Design Lake Charles Weather Equipment Failure 5%

Start Up, Shut Down 14% 12% Human Error Accident Emissions to the Air 4% 2,000,000 Seal or Gasket 2% 4% Instrument Failure 1,800,000 1,600,000 Maintenance/ 4% 1,400,000 Procedures 7% 1,200,000 Process Upset s 1,000,000 und

Po 800,000 0% 600,000 Power Failure 400,000 11% 200,000 25% No Information Given 0 Piping or Tubing 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 9% Other

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 2,500,000 120

100 2,000,000 80

1,500,000 s ns ent 60 llo ccid Ga

1,000,000 A 40

500,000 20

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 ConocoPhillips Corrosion Weather 2% Lake Charles Equipment Failure 9% Start Up, Shut Down 17%

10% Accident Emissions to the Air Human Error Seal or Gasket 2% 250,000 Process Upset 3% 200,000 7%

150,000 s 11% 6% Instrument Failure und

Po 100,000 Piping or Tubing 50,000 12% Maintenance/ 0 9% Procedures 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 12% Other No Information Given

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 400,000 90

350,000 80 70 300,000 60

250,000 s 50 ns 200,000 ent llo 40 ccid Ga 150,000 A 30 100,000 20 50,000 10 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

27 Common Ground II: Appendix

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 ConocoPhillips Equipment Failure Belle Chasse Weather

14% 18%

Human Factors Start Up, Accident Emissions to the Air Shut Down 2,500,000 4% 14% 2,000,000 Instrument Failure 1,500,000 10% s und

Po 1,000,000 4% Seal or Gasket

500,000 7% Maintenance/ 12% Procedures 0 4% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 1% No Information Given 5% Process Upset 7% Other Power Failure Piping or Tubing

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents

60,000 35

30 50,000 25 40,000 s 20 ns 30,000 ent llo

ccid 15 Ga A 20,000 10

10,000 5

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 ExxonMobil Under Investigation Weather Corrosion Start Up, Shut Down Equipment Design Baton Rouge 1% 2% Seal or Gasket 2% 0% Equipment Failure 2% 8% Process Upset Human Error 7% Accident Emissions to the Air 8% 1,600,000 0% Human Factors 3% 1,400,000 Instrument Failure 1,200,000 13% 4% Maintenance/ 1% 1,000,000 Procedures Piping or Tubing s 800,000 und Po 600,000 3% Other 400,000

200,000

0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 No Information Given 46%

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 250 30,000

25,000 200

20,000

s 150 ns ent

llo 15,000 ccid

Ga 100 A 10,000 50 5,000

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

28 Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Under Investigation Marathon oil 2% Corrosion Weather 2% 1% Equipment Design Garyville Start Up, Shut Down 2% 7% Seal or Gasket

5% Accident Emissions to the Air 21% Equipment Failure 70000 Process Upset 60000 11%

50000

40000 7% Human Factors s Power Failure 3% und 30000 Po 2% 20000 Instrument Failure

10000 5% Maintenance/ Procedures 0 23% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 7% Piping or Tubing 2% No Information Given

Other

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 450 30 400 25 350 300 20

250 s ns ent 15

llo 200 ccid Ga 150 A 10 100 5 50 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Motiva Enterprises Corrosion Weather Convent 1% Equipment Design 4% Start Up, Shut Down 8%

Equipment Failure 8% 16% Accident Emissions to the Air Seal or Gasket 4% 350,000

300,000 Human Error Process Upset 6% 4% 250,000 Instrument s 200,000 4% Failure und

Po 150,000 9% 5% 100,000 Piping or Tubing Maintenance/ Procedures 50,000

0 15% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 16% Other No Information Given

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents

10,000 60 9,000 50 8,000 7,000 40

6,000 s ns ent 30

llo 5,000 ccid Ga

4,000 A 20 3,000 2,000 10 1,000 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

29 Common Ground II: Appendix

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Motiva Enterprises Corrosion Weather 2% Norco Equipment Failure

13% 13% Start Up, Human Error Shut Down Instrument Accident Emissions to the Air 4% Failure 8% 1% 1,000,000 900,000 800,000 Seal or Gasket 3% Maintenance/ 8% Procedures 700,000 600,000 s 500,000 10% und

Po 400,000 300,000 Process Upset 8% No Information 200,000 Given 100,000 0 9% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Piping or Tubing 21% Other

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 9,000 40 8,000 35

7,000 30 6,000 25 s 5,000 ns ent 20 llo 4,000 ccid Ga

A 15 3,000 10 2,000 1,000 5 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Murphy OIL Under Investigation Corrosion 1% 2% Meraux Weather

10% Start Up, Shut Down

6% Equipment Failure Accident Emissions to the Air Seal or Gasket 1% 700,000 33% 600,000

500,000 15%

s 400,000 Process Upset und 300,000 Po

200,000 Power Failure 100,000 1% 7% 0 6% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Human Error Piping or Tubing 6% 5% Other 3% 4% Instrument Failure No Information Given Maintenance/Procedures

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents

6,000,000 40 35 5,000,000 30

4,000,000 25 s ns 3,000,000 ent 20 llo ccid Ga

A 15 2,000,000 10 1,000,000 5

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

30 Causes of Accidents 2005–2009

Placid Refining Corrosion Weather Port Allen 2%

11%

Accident Emissions to the Air Start Up, Shut Down 29% Equipment Failure 120,000 13%

100,000 Seal or Gasket 80,000 2% s 60,000 5% und Process Upset Po 40,000 2% Power Failure 20,000 9% 9% Human Factors 0 No Information Given 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 7% 11% Instrument Failure

Maintenance/Procedures

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 120,000 20 18 100,000 16 14 80,000

s 12 ns 60,000 ent 10 llo ccid

Ga 8 40,000 A 6 4 20,000 2 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Shell Chemical Maintenance/ Procedures

St. Rose Weather 5%

Other 14% Accident Emissions to the Air 29%

900,000 800,000 700,000 600,000

s 500,000

und 400,000 Po 300,000 200,000 33% 100,000 19% 0 Power Failure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Process Upset

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 25,000 8 7 20,000 6

5 15,000 s ns ent 4 llo ccid Ga

10,000 A 3

2 5,000 1

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

31 Common Ground II: Appendix

Alon Refining Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Weather Krotz Springs

13%

Equipment Failure

Accident Emissions to the Air 33% 30,000 Start Up, Shut Down 17% 25,000

20,000 s 15,000 und Po 10,000 8% Process Upset 5,000 4% Human Factors 0 4% 4% 2006 2007 2008 2009 Other- Fire 4% Maintenance/Procedures 13%

No Information Given Other

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 250 12

10 200

8

150 s ns ent 6 llo ccid Ga

100 A 4

50 2

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Causes of Accidents 2005–2009 Valero Under Investigation 2% Corrosion Weather 1% 1% Equipment Design

Norco Start Up, Shut Down 5% Seal or Gasket 1% 6%

Process Upset Accident Emissions to the Air 8% 26% Equipment Failure 120,000 Power Failure 100,000 1%

80,000 s 60,000 und 15% Po Piping or Tubing 1% Human Error 40,000 4% Instrument Failure 20,000 8% 0 Maintenance/Procedures 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 13% Other 8% No Information Given

Accident Emissions to the Ground or Water Oil Refinery Accidents 2,500,000 45 40 2,000,000 35 30

1,500,000 s 25 ns ent

llo 20 ccid Ga

1,000,000 A 15 10 500,000 5

0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

32 Acknowledgements

Produced by Community Empowerment for Change, Concerned Citizens Around Murphy, Louisiana Bucket Brigade, Residents for Air Neutralization, and St. Bernard Citizens for Environmental Quality.

Released by the United Steelworkers and the Environmental Working Group.

Written by Anna Hrybyk, Anne Rolfes, Mariko Toyoji

Research conducted by: Anna Hrybyk, Mariko Toyoji, Daniel Bugress, Brian Confrey, Monica Diep, Salah Gadalla, Pearl Kuo, Courtney Mader, Danielle Major, Michael Schachtman, Austin Smith, Heather VanOrman and Nicole Youngman

Edited by Ken Ford, Lenora Gobert, Benjamin Leger, Sonjya Thomas, Velma White and the Environmental Integrity Project

Special thanks to Chris Campbell and the Environmental Working Group.

Thanks to our funders: Norman Foundation, Ben and Jerry’s Foundation, Patagonia, Louisiana Disaster Recovery Foundation, Cornell Douglas Foundation, Ms. Foundation, and the Sisters of St. Francis.

Photo credits: Louisiana Bucket Brigade, Monique Verdin

Map insert by Jakob Rosenzweig