Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

War on the Edge of Europe The Chechen conflict in a new light?

Uwe Halbach SWP Comments

The hostage drama has brought the war in back into public discussion. Spectacular kidnappings with large numbers of casualties were a feature of the escalation of violence in the North in the past. But never did the out- pouring of violence from the war in Chechnya strike and the rest of the world as directly as it did this time. The Russian Government’s official position on the act of terrorism in Moscow, and its alleged link with international terrorism, is an occasion to re-examine some aspects of the long war in the region.

Already President Putin’s first statement fighting Islamic fundamentalist aggressors on the terrorist attack emphasised its inter- in the North Caucasus region. This expla- national dimension: the alleged organi- nation, which obscures the origins and the sation of the attack from abroad. According substance of the Russian-Chechen war, has to Putin, an international terrorist group become standard since the end of the first planned and carried out the attack in Chechen war, which ended in a humilia- Moscow, which is part of a series of attacks tion for Russia. Since then, Russian com- on targets in Indonesia and the Philippines. mentaries have linked the growth of On 24th October, the Russian Ministry of Islamic fundamentalist («Wahhabi») move- Foreign Affairs called upon all nations from ments in the North Caucasus with the whose territories the Chechen terrorists spectre of foreign infiltration. receive support to take measures to put an This interference theory in regard to immediate end to this situation. international Islamist terror networks is not entirely plucked from the air. From the Islamic parts of South East Asia to the Notes on the conflict’s Balkans, there is hardly a regional conflict external dimension in which this element is not caught up. The As expected, the Kremlin’s comments involvement of Islamic brigades under the regarding the hostage drama picked up on command of Emir Khattab in both Chechen a pattern of interpretation that has become wars is undeniable. The Jordanian national, its strategy of legitimisation for the second who was killed during a special operation Chechen war. According to this, Russia is of the FSB in April 2002, became a symbol

SWP Comments 4 November 2002

1 for Moscow’s theory that the «war against Chechnya. The turned Russia in Chechnya» should be understood the entire North Caucasus region into as an aspect of international terrorism and an even more attractive point of attack for Islamic extremism. Islamic fundamentalists than it was before, In both wars, foreign Mudjahedin fought and the regional focus of a «Wahhabi- side-by-side with Chechen fighters, just as hysteria» in the Russian media. turned up amongst the in . However, the suggestion of links between the Jihad nerve centres in A Problem of Differentiation: Afghanistan and representatives of the «Moderates», «Radicals», «Chechen », such as Shamil «Separatists», «Terrorists» Bassayev and Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, «The mass-kidnapping in Moscow has to be who had been spotted in Kabul, hardly a moment of truth for those who divide the justifies claims of a substantial and specific terrorists in Chechnya into ‹good› and role for Chechnya in international Islamic ‹evil›,» was the message of the declaration fundamentalist networks. Russian alle- of the Russian Foreign Ministry above. gations about the «internationalisation of Since the beginning of the second war, the rebel camp» in Chechnya vary sharply, and with added emphasis since September and often seem markedly exaggerated. The 11th, Russia has criticised the classification opposite side, in the shape of Aslan of her military opponents in the North Maschadov, recently admitted that 200 Caucasus abroad into «moderate» and foreign fighters are currently situated in «extremist» forces, instead of generally Chechnya. As far as Chechen complicity qualifying them as «terrorists». The West is with the Taliban and Al Qaeda is con- sticking to this distinction in its negotia- cerned, only minor numbers of Chechens tion recommendations with Moscow. A were amongst the international Islamic «moderate camp» around Aslan Maschadov, brigades arrested in Afghanistan by US who is remembered as the pragmatic chief units and the Northern Alliance. negotiator in the ending of the first When the secession conflict between Chechen war, and voted by the people as Russia and Chechnya broke out – which is the President of the «Chechen Republic of only the most recent chapter in a history Ichkeria», is suggesting itself as a partner full of conflicts and violence – Islamic for negotiations. On the other side, there is fundamentalism only played a marginal the «radical camp» of fanatical field com- role. At the beginning of the independence manders and terrorists such as Shamil movement, it occupied a position at the Bassayev and Emir Al Chattab, Islamic edges of the ideological spectrum of the ideologists such as or «Chechen revolution». This only became Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev and criminal more Islamised after the clashes with the warlords such as , who was Russian army in the killed in 2001. (December 1994 to September 1996). The Moscow’s opponents in Chechnya, then, then leader, , once said form a split «rebel camp» from which, in retrospect that Russia had catapulted along with the autonomously acting war- Chechnya into Islam. Islamic fundamental- lords, three main groups stand out: ist currents increased in the period between ! The group around Maschadov, the so- the wars (1996–1999), when the «Chechen called Chechen , Republic of Ichkeria», vacated by the Rus- ideologically based on a rather secular sian troops, slipped into chaos, and the comprehension of national indepen- terms «Islamic State», «» and «Jihad» dence, even though Maschadov fell back were the war cries in the power-struggle on Islamic attributes for the self-asser- between divergent political actors within tion of the «Chechen Republic» during

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2 his term in office from 1997 to 1999 tiations. Maschadov himself condemned (introduction of Sharia courts, etc.). In the act of terrorism. But his speaker Moscow, he is only considered one of pointed out that such events could repeat many warlords in the second Chechen themselves if Moscow did not agree to nego- war, not as the most powerful of them. tiations or put an end to the military cam- ! The radical Islamic fundamentalist paign. The co-operation of the «Chechen (Wahhabi) camp, comprising the field secessional government» in the act of terror commanders Bassayev and Chattab, is has neither been excluded nor proved. the most active group, and receives funding and other support from radical Islamic organisations abroad, but which The Illusion: «Normalisation» and is widely considered an alien body by «Chechenisation» the local population. The main funda- Since 2001, President Putin promoted the mentalist-oriented figures include idea of transferring control of the police Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, the first and administration to the Chechens, in successor to Dudayev in the office of order to gain greater acceptability amongst President, and Movladi Udugov, head of the local population. The military in the in the first Chechen war, North Caucasus and Kremlin speakers have and interim foreign minister under long heralded the end of the war and a Maschadov. transition to a civilian administration as a ! An ideologically neutral group around precondition for the peaceful reintegration split from Maschadov in of the breakaway republic into the Russian summer 2000, and retreated to . Federation. At a press conference in Gelayev’s fighters stand at the centre of Moscow on 24th June 2002, President Putin Russian concerns about bases to which held out the prospect of an end to the Chechen rebels withdraw in the neigh- «mopping-up campaigns» carried out by bouring country. Russian military units in Chechnya, and of There are two different possible expla- strengthening the «justice and security nations for Maschadov’s co-operation with components of the Chechen administra- his former enemies: after the long and fruit- tion». «Then, we will move to the next step less demands that Moscow accept him as a in the normalisation – we will proceed to negotiating partner, he saw no further the adoption of a constitution». In order to possibility of reaching a political solution underpin the «normalisation», Chechen to the conflict, and devoted himself wholly refugees in the neighbouring regions were to the struggle, especially since he saw that pressurised to return to their homes – espe- international politics had let Chechnya cially the approximately 150,000 refugees down after 11th September; or he wanted in Ingushia. These, however, saw that not to force the other side into negotiations even the most basic conditions for their through increasing the military pressure. return to Chechnya had been fulfilled. The The Russian Government now also war has destroyed up to 80 percent of blames Maschadov for the hostage drama housing. 80 percent of those able to work in in Moscow. There is allegedly a video are without work and means. The recording in which he announces a turn- city has neither a water supply nor elec- around in the Chechen war just a few days tricity. Above all, though, a rigid series of before the attack, which Moscow interprets «mopping-up campaigns» of Chechen settle- as meaning the terrorist action. In a tele- ments by Russian forces continued to exert vision interview, , the com- a murderous pressure on the civilian popu- mander of the hostage-takers, named lation, even during the «normalisation Bassayev as the architect of the campaign phase». meant to force Moscow to enter nego-

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3 The intensification of the conflict rebut- 160 km long and 80 km wide, namely in ted all claims regarding ending the military the most densely populated areas around campaign and a successful transition to Grozny and the lowlands. The mountainous «normalisation» and «Chechenisation» third of the country in the south, and the over the last months: battles between the steppes along the Terek in the north are Russian military and the rebels increased, mostly free of military action. Around 80 attacks were carried out against the 000 men of the combined Federal troops «Chechenised» authorities and adminis- were concentrated in an area spanning trative bodies, and «mopping-up cam- approximately 60 km times 30 km. The paigns» occurred at ever shorter intervals. rebels continue to resist this concentration because they obviously have the support of a considerable section of the population, «Campaign against terrorists», even though their hate for some of the or war of extermination rebel warlords of the «resistance» is no less against a country? than for the Russian forces. The resistance Even if – following the Russian guideline – mostly feeds on the brutal war strategies on one were to generally classify the armed the Russian side. According to the Russian forces on the Chechen side as «terrorists», military specialist, Felgenhauer, the the actions of the Russian army against struggle against the Russian troops does them would still be the classic example for not make the rebels «terrorists», as defined how «war on terrorism» should not look. by the Geneva Convention. The atrocities Precisely because the fight against ter- these troops constantly commit in Chech- rorism has become a global challenge, nya are the main reason for the continued world opinion cannot allow this action to resistance, says Felgenhauer. be sold under this name. In Moscow, com- In 1999, NATO’s war in Kosovo served as parisons were made between the military the model for Moscow’s renewed military measures against the armed forces in operation, which was supposed to avoid the Chechnya and anti-terror measures in disastrous military blunders of the first Spain and Northern Ireland: Sergei Kara- war. The Russian leadership wanted a «low ganov of the Moscow Institute of Europe casualty engagement» with regard to its said in the Washington Post on 29th July own soldiers, and the swift and thorough 2001: «The nation states of the EU have defeat of the opposing side. Putin’s «anti- situations that are similar to Chechnya, for terror campaign», initially planned as a example in Northern Ireland or the Basque «blitzkrieg», included arms and services from region.» Already the choice of weaponry which carefully targeted violence was not and the number of civilian casualties make to be expected, and degenerated into a war this line of argumentation absurd: the of extermination. With the alleged end of measures in Chechnya more closely re- the massive military intervention, the time semble a massive military offensive against of the «mopping-up campaigns» began, an external enemy than a limited action in which were even more devastating for the an internal conflict. In the first Chechen settlements than the bombardments. This war, the number of dead amongst the label conceals massive terrorisation of the civilian population stood between 35,000 civilian population. After September 11th and a much higher figure (up to 100,000); 2001, the «mopping-up campaigns» of in the second, the order of magnitude is Chechen settlements suspected of main- comparable. In order to envisage the taining contacts with the rebels occurred in severity of the war one has to consider the even quicker succession. There are settle- spatial dimensions of the war zone. The ments that have been «purged» dozens of military campaign is concentrated in an times consecutively, and there are hardly area of the small republic, which is only any from where young men have not «dis-

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4 appeared». The director of the International Economic aspects of the war Helsinki Federation for Human Rights in the Caucasus spoke of a systematic decimation of the Besides the domino theory, according to male population. which releasing Chechnya into indepen- There have been attempts to civilise the dence would inevitably have a copycat Russian military operations. In spring 2002, effect amongst other states of the Federa- for example, order No. 80 was issued, tion, and induce the break-up of the Rus- according to which soldiers should identify sian Federation, the idea that Russia is themselves, and draw up lists of those defending a part of the country that is arrested during the implementation of the essential from the economic point of view «mopping-up campaigns». Local officials is another of the stereotypical, mostly from Kadyrov’s Chechen administration, flawed explanations for the conflict in who repeatedly complained about the high- Chechnya. Is the region not a historic loca- handedness of the military, were supposed tion for oil production and processing, and to be allowed to accompany and observe an important transit area? So is it just a the military operations. However, the order «war for oil» – in the geostrategic context of was never implemented. Masked soldiers a «great game» going on in the Caspian continued to carry out the «mopping-up region? campaigns». President Putin took measures As a crude oil production area (less than to limit the scope of the military’s power, 1 percent of Russian oil production even and to increase it for the Chechen admini- before the war began), Chechnya is just as stration under Kadyrov. But the distribu- dispensable as it is avoidable as a transit tion of power between military and civilian area. However, oil does play a role in the authorities in Chechnya remained con- conflict – in the sense of a «civil war econ- fused. The most recent regulation, a decree omy». The production, processing and from 8th October 2002, boils down to in- export structures, now «privatised» by creased military rule, not a strengthening Chechen warlords, have become the main of the civilian sector. basis for illegal trading that ignores the The actions of the Russian troops not fronts of the conflict. In spring 2001 the only encourage arbitrary retribution for the director of the Chechen administration many fallen comrades (by now, the «low touched on a taboo topic when he spoke of casualty engagement» has cost almost as caravans of petrol that were able to pass many lives as the war in Afghanistan), but 20 Russian control-points unchecked. Other also has features of a predatory attack. The criminal transactions, such as the trade in Russian Caucasus Army became a conflict human beings and weapons, pass through entrepreneur. In Russia, the question arose as the fronts. Weapons and ammunition for to whether, amongst the military and the rebels are mainly procured on the black political personnel dealing with Chechnya, market in Russia, from the manufacturers some forces may have gained a material and from military units stationed in interest in the continuation of the war. Chechnya. A Chechnya expert in Russia, Of course, there are also entrepreneurs Sanobar Shermatova, says: «The scale of dealing in violence on the other side too. these illegal transactions extends far A real «kidnapping industry» had already beyond the economy, and has far-reaching developed in the period between the wars – political consequences. Illegal business as a main aspect of the criminalisation of relations that link the Russian military economic activity and escalation of violence with Chechen fighters completely trans- in Chechnya. And after the second Chechen form the situation in Chechnya. Russian war had begun, Russian soldiers also military personnel are showing an interest became the victims of atrocities. in the continuation of the war.»

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5 The «mopping-up campaigns» of the The negotiation option Chechen settlements are often organised as Even before the recent turning point in the kidnappings, through which Russian Chechen conflict, the political will for military personnel improve their pay. negotiations was lacking on the Russian Chechen men are arrested and their side, especially as regards the military. The families blackmailed. But profits are also Russian government held the opinion that made from reconstruction programmes for the solution to the conflict lies in the the economy and the infrastructure. In «normalisation of the situation in Chech- March 2002 President Putin admitted that nya, not in negotiations» (according to the confusing structure of the civilian Prime Minister Kasyanov on the 4th July administration in Chechnya, and the 2002). The negotiations that brought an Federal offices responsible for Chechnya end to the first Chechen war (the treaty of generate corruption: »The funds flow to Khassavjurt in August 1996), are considered Chechnya and move through labyrinthine as treason by elements of the Russian elite. channels». In 2001, aid totalling 166 m Even so, there have been contacts between Euro was meant to flow from the Federal Moscow and the rebel leaders in the second coffers into Chechnya. The reconstruction Chechen war since April 2000. Regional of hospitals and other medical centres North Caucasian politicians, such as the stood at the top of the list of priorities. former Ingushian President Aushev and his Observers from outside and officials acting North Ossetian colleague Dsasokhov, as within Chechnya discovered «renovations well as politicians and delegates of the à la Potemkin», aid deliveries that had Federation, proved to be helpful. Most vanished and fake invoices – all in all a recently, the former chairman of the huge potential for corruption and security council, Ivan Rybkin, risked an embezzlement. attempt and warned in the Kremlin that Not least the Islamisation of the resis- the «blitzkrieg strategy» in the northern tance ideology became a resource for the Caucasus region would lead nowhere, and rebels. Even though Moscow’s allegations of began dealing with Maschadov’s represen- substantial links between the Chechen tative Sakayev in summer 2002. At that rebels and Al Qaeda, or of decisive military time, Maschadov turned to the G-7 states support from Islamic brigades may be with an appeal. Zbigniew Brzezinski and exaggerated, there is no doubt about the Alexander Haig proposed a compromise for existence of financial support for the the resolution of the Russian-Chechen con- resistance movement – especially for its flict. Next, Ruslan Khasbulatov, himself a Islamic wing – from the Middle-East. Less Chechen national and a former speaker of state bodies than religious foundations, the Russian parliament, presented a model solidarity groups and charities in Saudi for Chechen autonomy. During a meeting Arabia, the Arab Gulf states, Jordan and in Liechtenstein between Rybkin and other countries have gathered millions in Khasbulatov on the Russian side, and donations. Donations also come from the Maschadov’s chief negotiators on the north Caucasian diaspora in the Middle Chechen side, the «Khasbulatov plan» and East. Some Russian sources, on the con- the «Brzezinski plan» were merged into trary, consider the main source of income one proposal based on extensive self- for the Chechen resistance to lie in illegal determination powers for Chechnya in economic activities that Chechens organise internal and foreign matters, while with business partners in Russia. affirming the integration of the republic within the territory of the Russian Federa- tion. It calls for a special status for Chech- nya, with guarantees from the OECD and the Council of Europe, the delegation of

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6 specific functions to the Federal level, and violence face opponents of the continuation for demilitarisation while maintaining of the war in the Caucasus. In November Russian border controls along the southern 1999, 61 percent of those poled voted for border of Chechnya. The Liechtenstein military action in an opinion poll by the discussions were not backed by Moscow. VCIOM (Russian Centre for Public Opinion Nevertheless, they were judged to represent and Market Research), only 27 percent one of the clearest indications for the desire demanded a peaceful resolution of the for a peaceful solution to the conflict in conflict. In July 2000, only 49 percent were analyses by regional specialists. for war, and 41 percent for negotiations. After the terrorist attack in Moscow, the The proportion of pacifists grew to 53 Kremlin turned against any foreign contacts percent by summer 2001. After 11th of the «Republic of Ichkeria» more resolute- September, the number of people advocat- ly than ever before. Denmark and the Euro- ing negotiations reduced in comparison to pean Union were the first to notice this. On the previous months, but still reached 45 28th/29th October, the «World Chechen percent. A first VCIOM poll after the hos- Congress for a peaceful solution to the tage drama ended shows the following Russian–Chechen conflict» met in Copen- situation: the majority approve of the hagen. Originally, it was meant to take government’s actions under the crisis place in Istanbul in May 2002, but was situation from 23rd to 26th October (85 cancelled by the Turkish authorities. The percent for Putin’s position, 72 percent for main organisers are the Danish assistance the government’s actions, and 82 percent committee for Chechnya and the Chechen for the actions of the secret services). Each World Congress (Chechen Diaspora). People second respondent demands an even who «could play a role in the resolution of tougher approach in Chechnya. 46 percent the conflict, and in bringing peace to (12 percent more than in the previous Chechnya» were meant to be invited to the month) approve of the continuation of the congress, including representatives of the military campaign, only 16 percent are for Chechen Diaspora, human rights organi- a dialogue with the armed factions in sations dealing with Chechnya, delegates of Chechnya; 37 percent are convinced that the Russian Duma, the Council of Europe, the situation in Chechnya will deteriorate the UN and Maschadov’s representatives. further. For Moscow, the participation of Sakajew But tensions are increasing in Moscow and other Maschadov representatives was and Russia. During the hostage drama, an occasion to declare the conference an right-wing extremist organisations and an event supportive of terrorism. This received «autonomous combat unit for Russian self- more than just a caution from Moscow (the defence» heralded retributional attacks Russian side forced the EU summit planned against citizens of Chechen background in for November 11th to be transferred from Moscow. An organisation of the Armenian the Danish capital to Brussels): Moscow also Diaspora warned its community that anti- had Interpol arrest Sakayev at the confer- Caucasian sentiments amongst the Russian ence venue. The charges include the public and the legal authorities do not accusation of organising illegal armed differentiate between the different groups. Caucasian ethnic groups. All «persons of Caucasian nationality» would have to pre- pare for reprisals. Armenians, traditionally The mood in Russia after the allied to Russia, are no exceptions. terrorist attack Before the hostage drama in Moscow, the Opinions regarding the Chechen war situation regarding the Chechen conflict became polarised amongst the Russian was: the Kremlin cannot cope with the con- population. Advocates of an escalation of flict, despite (or because of) the massive

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7 repression going on in Chechnya, and it does not have the will to deal with it politically. The negotiation option is now being restricted more than before, especially because the Russian Government blames Maschadov for the Moscow attack. Even before this, the recommendation of negotiations with him was characterised by a dilemma: either the differentiation between the «moderate» Maschadov camp and his «radical» opponents applies, then this camp only represents one resistance group amongst many, and he will not be able to push through the results of the

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und negotiations amongst the rebels. Or it joins Politik, 2002 its opponents, which would reverse the All rights reserved criterion for differentiation that legitimises SWP it as a partner for negotiations. But how- Stiftung Wissenschaft und ever Moscow describes its military oppo- Politik German Institute for nents in Chechnya – the negotiation option International and can only be directed at them if the dirty Security Affairs war in the Caucasus is to end. Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

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