DOCSLIB.ORG

War on the Edge of Europe the Chechen Conflict in a New Light?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
War on the Edge of Europe the Chechen Conflict in a New Light? Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs War on the Edge of Europe The Chechen conflict in a new light? Uwe Halbach SWP Comments The Moscow hostage drama has brought the war in Chechnya back into public discussion. Spectacular kidnappings with large numbers of casualties were a feature of the escalation of violence in the North Caucasus in the past. But never did the out- pouring of violence from the war in Chechnya strike Russia and the rest of the world as directly as it did this time. The Russian Government’s official position on the act of terrorism in Moscow, and its alleged link with international terrorism, is an occasion to re-examine some aspects of the long war in the North Caucasus region. Already President Putin’s first statement fighting Islamic fundamentalist aggressors on the terrorist attack emphasised its inter- in the North Caucasus region. This expla- national dimension: the alleged organi- nation, which obscures the origins and the sation of the attack from abroad. According substance of the Russian-Chechen war, has to Putin, an international terrorist group become standard since the end of the first planned and carried out the attack in Chechen war, which ended in a humilia- Moscow, which is part of a series of attacks tion for Russia. Since then, Russian com- on targets in Indonesia and the Philippines. mentaries have linked the growth of On 24th October, the Russian Ministry of Islamic fundamentalist («Wahhabi») move- Foreign Affairs called upon all nations from ments in the North Caucasus with the whose territories the Chechen terrorists spectre of foreign infiltration. receive support to take measures to put an This interference theory in regard to immediate end to this situation. international Islamist terror networks is not entirely plucked from the air. From the Islamic parts of South East Asia to the Notes on the conflict’s Balkans, there is hardly a regional conflict external dimension in which this element is not caught up. The As expected, the Kremlin’s comments involvement of Islamic brigades under the regarding the hostage drama picked up on command of Emir Khattab in both Chechen a pattern of interpretation that has become wars is undeniable. The Jordanian national, its strategy of legitimisation for the second who was killed during a special operation Chechen war. According to this, Russia is of the FSB in April 2002, became a symbol SWP Comments 4 November 2002 1 for Moscow’s theory that the «war against Chechnya. The second Chechen war turned Russia in Chechnya» should be understood the entire North Caucasus region into as an aspect of international terrorism and an even more attractive point of attack for Islamic extremism. Islamic fundamentalists than it was before, In both wars, foreign Mudjahedin fought and the regional focus of a «Wahhabi- side-by-side with Chechen fighters, just as hysteria» in the Russian media. Chechens turned up amongst the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the suggestion of links between the Jihad nerve centres in A Problem of Differentiation: Afghanistan and representatives of the «Moderates», «Radicals», «Chechen revolution», such as Shamil «Separatists», «Terrorists» Bassayev and Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, «The mass-kidnapping in Moscow has to be who had been spotted in Kabul, hardly a moment of truth for those who divide the justifies claims of a substantial and specific terrorists in Chechnya into ‹good› and role for Chechnya in international Islamic ‹evil›,» was the message of the declaration fundamentalist networks. Russian alle- of the Russian Foreign Ministry above. gations about the «internationalisation of Since the beginning of the second war, the rebel camp» in Chechnya vary sharply, and with added emphasis since September and often seem markedly exaggerated. The 11th, Russia has criticised the classification opposite side, in the shape of Aslan of her military opponents in the North Maschadov, recently admitted that 200 Caucasus abroad into «moderate» and foreign fighters are currently situated in «extremist» forces, instead of generally Chechnya. As far as Chechen complicity qualifying them as «terrorists». The West is with the Taliban and Al Qaeda is con- sticking to this distinction in its negotia- cerned, only minor numbers of Chechens tion recommendations with Moscow. A were amongst the international Islamic «moderate camp» around Aslan Maschadov, brigades arrested in Afghanistan by US who is remembered as the pragmatic chief units and the Northern Alliance. negotiator in the ending of the first When the secession conflict between Chechen war, and voted by the people as Russia and Chechnya broke out – which is the President of the «Chechen Republic of only the most recent chapter in a history Ichkeria», is suggesting itself as a partner full of conflicts and violence – Islamic for negotiations. On the other side, there is fundamentalism only played a marginal the «radical camp» of fanatical field com- role. At the beginning of the independence manders and terrorists such as Shamil movement, it occupied a position at the Bassayev and Emir Al Chattab, Islamic edges of the ideological spectrum of the ideologists such as Movladi Udugov or «Chechen revolution». This only became Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev and criminal more Islamised after the clashes with the warlords such as Arbi Barayev, who was Russian army in the first Chechen war killed in 2001. (December 1994 to September 1996). The Moscow’s opponents in Chechnya, then, then leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, once said form a split «rebel camp» from which, in retrospect that Russia had catapulted along with the autonomously acting war- Chechnya into Islam. Islamic fundamental- lords, three main groups stand out: ist currents increased in the period between ! The group around Maschadov, the so- the wars (1996–1999), when the «Chechen called Chechen government in exile, Republic of Ichkeria», vacated by the Rus- ideologically based on a rather secular sian troops, slipped into chaos, and the comprehension of national indepen- terms «Islamic State», «Sharia» and «Jihad» dence, even though Maschadov fell back were the war cries in the power-struggle on Islamic attributes for the self-asser- between divergent political actors within tion of the «Chechen Republic» during SWP Comments 4 November 2002 2 his term in office from 1997 to 1999 tiations. Maschadov himself condemned (introduction of Sharia courts, etc.). In the act of terrorism. But his speaker Moscow, he is only considered one of pointed out that such events could repeat many warlords in the second Chechen themselves if Moscow did not agree to nego- war, not as the most powerful of them. tiations or put an end to the military cam- ! The radical Islamic fundamentalist paign. The co-operation of the «Chechen (Wahhabi) camp, comprising the field secessional government» in the act of terror commanders Bassayev and Chattab, is has neither been excluded nor proved. the most active group, and receives funding and other support from radical Islamic organisations abroad, but which The Illusion: «Normalisation» and is widely considered an alien body by «Chechenisation» the local population. The main funda- Since 2001, President Putin promoted the mentalist-oriented figures include idea of transferring control of the police Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, the first and administration to the Chechens, in successor to Dudayev in the office of order to gain greater acceptability amongst President, and Movladi Udugov, head of the local population. The military in the propaganda in the first Chechen war, North Caucasus and Kremlin speakers have and interim foreign minister under long heralded the end of the war and a Maschadov. transition to a civilian administration as a ! An ideologically neutral group around precondition for the peaceful reintegration Ruslan Gelayev split from Maschadov in of the breakaway republic into the Russian summer 2000, and retreated to Georgia. Federation. At a press conference in Gelayev’s fighters stand at the centre of Moscow on 24th June 2002, President Putin Russian concerns about bases to which held out the prospect of an end to the Chechen rebels withdraw in the neigh- «mopping-up campaigns» carried out by bouring country. Russian military units in Chechnya, and of There are two different possible expla- strengthening the «justice and security nations for Maschadov’s co-operation with components of the Chechen administra- his former enemies: after the long and fruit- tion». «Then, we will move to the next step less demands that Moscow accept him as a in the normalisation – we will proceed to negotiating partner, he saw no further the adoption of a constitution». In order to possibility of reaching a political solution underpin the «normalisation», Chechen to the conflict, and devoted himself wholly refugees in the neighbouring regions were to the struggle, especially since he saw that pressurised to return to their homes – espe- international politics had let Chechnya cially the approximately 150,000 refugees down after 11th September; or he wanted in Ingushia. These, however, saw that not to force the other side into negotiations even the most basic conditions for their through increasing the military pressure. return to Chechnya had been fulfilled. The The Russian Government now also war has destroyed up to 80 percent of blames Maschadov for the hostage drama housing. 80 percent of those able to work in in Moscow. There is allegedly a video Grozny are without work and means. The recording in which he announces a turn- city has neither a water supply nor elec- around in the Chechen war just a few days tricity. Above all, though, a rigid series of before the attack, which Moscow interprets «mopping-up campaigns» of Chechen settle- as meaning the terrorist action. In a tele- ments by Russian forces continued to exert vision interview, Movsar Barayev, the com- a murderous pressure on the civilian popu- mander of the hostage-takers, named lation, even during the «normalisation Bassayev as the architect of the campaign phase».
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The University of Arizona
    Sheikhs, Salafis, and the State: The Evolution of Muslim Politics in Chechnya Item Type text; Electronic Thesis Authors Haberstock, Kara Lyn Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 02/10/2021 20:02:02 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/297597 SHEIKHS, SALAFZS, AND THE STATE KmLyn Hek A Thesis Submitted to The Honors College In Partial Fmtof the Bachelors degree With Honors in htimational Studies THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA MAY 2013 - -- - - - - - Dr. Adele Bar r Department of7 wian and Slavic Studies I , I of Mzona Elmtronlc Thmm and Dl-IWS 1, Reproducflon and Dsstrlbutlon Rights Fmm The UA Campus dissemination and prmwdon of whotarship produced by Unimaf Arizona University Ubrery, in ~~ with the Honors College, hm sstabllshad a to shere, archive, and pmerve undergrolduate More theta Campus lbpcMay are available for public vleuv. Submisdon of your Umk to the Re$Mmbry pM88an your work to graduate eehods and future smployers, It also allow8 for wr work to tm In your discipline, ambling you to contribute to tha knowkdge base in your field. Your signature on whether ywr thesis Is included in Ehe r@podmy. I hemby grant to the Un of Arizona Ubrary the nonexcluslw wofidwide rigM to reproduce and dsstribute my n, the Wemad rn~Mlsn),in whole w in part; in any and all media of dieMbutlan eveloped in the hture.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chechen Mobilization in Violent Conflict
    Master’s Thesis 2016 30 ECTS Norwegian University of Life Sciences Faculty Social Sciences Department of International Environment and Development Studies The Chechen Mobilization in Violent Conflict Malikov Bekhan Ibragimovich Master of Science in International Relations THESIS CREDIT The Department of International Environment and Development Studies, Noragric, is the international gateway for the Norwegian University of Life Sciences (NMBU). Eight departments, associated research institutions and the Norwegian College of Veterinary Medicine in Oslo. Established in 1986, Noragric’s contribution to international development lies in the interface between research, education (Bachelor, Master and PhD programmes) and assignments. The Noragric Master thesis are the final theses submitted by students in order to fulfil the requirements under the Noragric Master programme “International Environmental Studies”, “International Development Studies” and “International Relations”. The findings in this thesis do not necessarily reflect the views of Noragric. Extracts from this publication may only be reproduced after prior consultation with the author and on condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation contact Noragric. © Malikov Bekhan Ibragimovich, May 2016 [email protected] Noragric Department of International Environment and Development Studies P.O. Box 5003 N-1432 Ås Norway Tel.: +47 67 23 00 00 Internet: https://www.nmbu.no/om/fakulteter/samvit/institutter/noragric i DECLARATION I, Malikov Bekhan Ibragimovich, declare that this thesis is a result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a reference list has been appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for award of any type of academic degree.
    [Show full text]
  • ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
    ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian-Speaking
    NOVEMBER 2017 ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’ FIGHTERS IN SYRIA, IRAQ AND AT HOME: CONSEQUENCES AND CONTEXT FULL REPORT Mark Youngman and Dr Cerwyn Moore Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham This report was produced out of the Actors and Narratives programme, funded by CREST. To find out more information about this programme, and to see other outputs from the team, visit the CREST website at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/actors-and-narratives/ About the authors: Mark Youngman is an ESRC-funded doctoral student and Cerwyn Moore a Senior Lecturer in the Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies at the University of Birmingham. Disclaimer: This report has been part funded by an ESRC IAA award and part funded by the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1). It draws on the existing work of the authors, and supplements their work with original research and ongoing data collection of Russian-speaking foreign fighters.www.crestresearch.co.uk The cover image, Caucasus Emirate, is a remixed derivative ofProposed divisions of the Caucasus Emirate by ArnoldPlaton, under CC BY-SA 3.0. Caucasus Emirate is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. by R. Stevens, CREST. ©2017 CREST Creative Commons 4.0 BY-NC-SA licence. www.crestresearch.ac.uk/copyright CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................4 PART I: ASSESSING THE ‘RUSSIAN-SPEAKING’
    [Show full text]
  • War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: a Case for Distinction
    The War Against Terrorism and the Conflict in Chechnya: A Case for Distinction SVANTE E. CORNELL More than any other conflict, Chechnya epitomizes the old saying that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Since the first Chechen war began in 1994, the Russian government has portrayed the war as one against ban- dits and Islamic fundamentalists. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the label changed-now Chechens are referred to simply as "terrorists." Western states have for the most part thus far refrained from accepting the Russian position at face value, seeing the conflict primarily as an ethnic war. While recognizing Russia's territorial integrity, Western and Islamic states see the Chechen rebels as more or less legitimate representatives of the Chechen people, considering that the current Chechen president, Asian Maskhadov, was elected in elections deemed free and fair by international observers in 1997. Moreover, the international commu- nity has condemned the Russian military's massive human rights violations in the prosecution of the war. That said, during the course of the second war, which began in October 1999 and rages to this day, there has been an increasing concern with regard to the radicalization of parts of the Chechen resistance movement and its links to extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East. The attacks of September 11 introduced a new paradigm into world politics, and Chechnya has since been one of the regions most affected by the increased focus on terrorism. Indeed, it did not take long after 9/11 for the Russian government to draw comparisons between the terrorist attacks on the United States and the situa- tion in Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Media Policy in the First and Second Checen Campaigns
    Laura Belin (doctoral candidate, University of Oxford) e-mail: [email protected] Paper given at the 52nd conference of the Political Studies Association Aberdeen, Scotland, 5-8 April 2002 RUSSIAN MEDIA POLICY IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CHECHEN CAMPAIGNS The military campaign in Chechnya from December 1994 to August 1996 became the "first real test of journalists' freedoms" since the end of the Soviet Union1 and loomed large in perceptions about the Russian media for the rest of the 1990s. Though some journalists had condemned "shock therapy" in 1992 and the shelling of the parliament in 1993, the Chechen war prompted the journalistic community to desert Boris Yel'tsin en masse for the first time. Moscow-based television networks were the public's main source of information on the fighting.2 The private network NTV exposed official lies about how the war was waged. Newscasts on state-owned Russian Television (RTR), which reached a nationwide audience on Channel 2, soon followed NTV's lead. Virtually all privately owned newspapers also raised their voices against the military campaign. The predominant slant of war coverage became a source of pride for many journalists. Though damning news reports did not end the bloodshed, steadfast public opposition to the war impelled Yel'tsin to pursue a ceasefire agreement while running for reelection in 1996.3 Both supporters and opponents of the military campaign believed that media coverage fostered and sustained the majority view. Yel'tsin rarely retreated from unpopular policies, but his turnaround on Chechnya arguably demonstrated that journalists had helped bring some degree of transparency and therefore accountability to 1 Frank Ellis, From Glasnost to the Internet: Russia's New Infosphere, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999, p.
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union
    Building Stability in the North Caucasus Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union SIPRI Policy Paper No. 16 Neil J. Melvin Stockholm International Peace Research Institute May 2007 © SIPRI, 2007 ISSN 1652-0432 (print) ISSN 1653-7548 (online) Printed in Sweden by CM Gruppen, Bromma Contents Preface iv Map of the North Caucasus vi Table A.1. Data on the North Caucasus and the Russian Federation vii 1. Introduction: instability in the North Caucasus 1 The structure of this Policy Paper 6 2. The roots of instability in the North Caucasus 7 Incorporation and pacification 7 The North Caucasus in the Soviet Union 9 World War II and Stalin 11 The post-Stalin era and perestroika 12 The North Caucasus in the Russian Federation 15 Nationalist mobilization 15 The failure of state building in the North Caucasus 17 Religious revival 18 The first Chechen war 21 3. The North Caucasus in the Putin era 24 Putin’s new course 24 Replacing local elites 26 The second Chechen war 28 Russia’s ‘war on terrorism’ 31 The role of the international community 35 4. Prospects for the North Caucasus 37 National–territorial issues 37 Islam and Islamism 40 Governance in the North Caucasus 43 Socio-economic issues 44 Russia’s security policies 45 The North Caucasus and the European Union 46 5. Recommendations 48 Recommendations for the Russian Federation 48 Recommendations for the European Union 54 About the author 59 Preface For most people, the notion of conflict in the North Caucasus—a region within the Russian Federation, as distinct from the independent states of the South Cau- casus—is synonymous with Chechnya.
    [Show full text]
  • Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees & Fighters
    Conflict Studies Research Centre P37 Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees & Fighters C W Blandy Prospective US/Georgian action against the 'terrorists' in the Pankisskoye gorge in Georgia requires a sensitive approach. The ethnic groups long settled in the area include Chechen-Kistins, who offered shelter to Chechen refugees in the second Chechen conflict. The ineffectual Georgian government has acquiesced in previous Russian actions inside Georgia and attempts to control the border in difficult terrain. Unless Georgian actions in the gorge have Russian support, they run the risk of souring relations in the region and may not solve the local 'terrorist' problem. Contents Introduction 2 Map 1 - Georgia 3 Background - Peoples & Frontiers 3 Table 1 - Peoples in Dagestan (RF) Azerbaijan & Georgia Divided by International Frontiers 4 Map 2 - Boundaries Between Chechnya, Dagestan, Georgia & Azerbaijan 5 The Chechen-Kistin 6 Box 1 - Chechen-Kistin Background 6 Importance of Pankisi to Chechen Fighters 7 Terrain Between the Pankisskoye Gorge & Chechen Border 7 Map 3 - Pankisskoye Gorge & Omalo NE Georgia 8 Map 4 - Securing the Checheno-Georgian Border 9 The Capture of Itum-Kale 10 Box 2 - Initial Border Operations in December 1999 10 Summer-Autumn 2001 12 Peregrinations of Ruslan Gelayev 13 Map 5 - The Sukhumi Military Road & Kodori Gorge 15 Box 3 - Violations of Georgian Airspace 27-28 November 2001 16 New Operations in Pankisi? 16 A Spectrum of Views 16 Conclusion 18 Scope of Operations 18 1 Pankisskoye Gorge: Residents, Refugees & Fighters
    [Show full text]
  • The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: an Exported Jihad?
    The North Caucasus Insurgency and Syria: An Exported Jihad? Europe Report N°238 | 16 March 2016 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. The Failure of Regional Jihad or How Syria Hijacked the Agenda ................................. 4 A. “A Thousand Times Harder than Syria” .................................................................... 5 B. From Regional to Global ............................................................................................ 7 C. Jihadists or New Muhajirun? .................................................................................... 9 D. Syria, Iraq and the North Caucasians ........................................................................ 12 III. Russian State Security Responses .................................................................................... 16 A. Controlling the Outflow: Before and After the Sochi Olympics ................................ 16 B. Clamping Down on Salafi Activism and Mosques ....................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Manipulating the Mass Consciousness: Russian and Chechen "Information War" Tactics in the 2Nd Chechen- Russian Conflict
    WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Manipulating The Mass Consciousness: Russian And Chechen "Information War" Tactics In The 2nd Chechen- Russian Conflict by Mr. Timothy L. Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Introduction How important is public opinion to the overall success of a military operation? In the information age, as Russians and Chechens clearly demonstrated, it is "more important than ever." Live feeds from all corners of the globe shape an audience's understanding of events. These digital images spawn a virtual battlefield on which the actions of soldiers and sergeants acquire strategic significance, especially when presented and explained by TV reporters who lack a military background. This makes media control of sensitive military-political situations a crucial though difficult proposition. In addition the Internet can circumvent media control by reporting directly from battle zones with no intervening media filter. The Internet can also shape images and build public and financial support. The end result is an "information war" in the true sense of the word. This chapter discusses the battle for public opinion, the "information war," during the second Chechen campaign. The discussion has a Russian, Chechen, and foreign news context, and includes the evolving Internet battle between Russia and Chechnya. Initially, the Russians were successful in capturing public opinion. Their information victory changed public support for the conflict almost overnight. For example, in May 1999 President Boris Yeltsin was almost impeached for his decision to intervene in Chechnya in 1994.
    [Show full text]
  • Shifting Faces of Terror After 9/11: Framing the Terrorist Threat
    SHIFTING FACES OF TERROR AFTER 9/11: FRAMING THE TERRORIST THREAT A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Elena Pokalova Dissertation written by Elena Pokalova B.A., Ural State Pedagogical University, 2002 M.A., Kent State University, 2010 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2011 Approved by Andrew Barnes, Ph.D., Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Landon Hancock, Ph.D., Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Steven Hook, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Karl C. Kaltenthaler, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Accepted by Steven Hook, Ph.D., Chair, Department of Political Science John R.D. Stalvey, Ph.D., Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................iii LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ v LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................................. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................................................................ vii Note on Transliteration ....................................................................................................viii List of Frequently Used Abbreviations.............................................................................. ix 1. Introduction....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Radical Islam in Chechnya
    RADICAL ISLAM IN CHECHNYA Mr. Artem Kroupenev (Researcher, ICT) 23/1/2009 ABSTRACT The permeation of radical Islam in Chechnya has served a multi-faceted function. It has been the vehicle of separatist resistance, a platform of political strife and conflict, a source of funding and external support and a unifying ideological principle that, in its various interpretations, has brought both hope and destruction for the Chechen society. More often than not, Islam served as a political-ideological tool that brought the promise of legitimacy and was the main source of contention between the Chechen political factions. For 21st century Russia, radical Islam in Chechnya provided a different type of challenge – one that turned into an opportunity for justifying its counter-terrorist operations in the Caucasus. * The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT). 2 Radical Islam in Chechnya Modern Origins of Chechen Islamization Since 1989, radical Islam has gradually permeated the fabric of Chechnya’s socio-political environment. This process was aided by internal changes in the Soviet Union – the disintegration of the communist ideology and its supporting governmental structure; and the course of Perestroika, which allowed various factions to freely propagate their moral and religious values. The resulting ideological and political vacuum in Chechnya was rapidly filled by radical Islam. From the onset of its post-Soviet attempts to achieve independence, the new secular government in Chechnya took steps that indicated an aspiration to restore Islamic traditions. In this regard, during his initiation as Chechen president on November 9, 1991, retired Lieutenant-General of Soviet Air-Forces, Djohar Dudayev was sworn in holding a Koran in front of numerous representatives of Islamic religious institutions.
    [Show full text]