Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs War on the Edge of Europe The Chechen conflict in a new light? Uwe Halbach SWP Comments The Moscow hostage drama has brought the war in Chechnya back into public discussion. Spectacular kidnappings with large numbers of casualties were a feature of the escalation of violence in the North Caucasus in the past. But never did the out- pouring of violence from the war in Chechnya strike Russia and the rest of the world as directly as it did this time. The Russian Government’s official position on the act of terrorism in Moscow, and its alleged link with international terrorism, is an occasion to re-examine some aspects of the long war in the North Caucasus region. Already President Putin’s first statement fighting Islamic fundamentalist aggressors on the terrorist attack emphasised its inter- in the North Caucasus region. This expla- national dimension: the alleged organi- nation, which obscures the origins and the sation of the attack from abroad. According substance of the Russian-Chechen war, has to Putin, an international terrorist group become standard since the end of the first planned and carried out the attack in Chechen war, which ended in a humilia- Moscow, which is part of a series of attacks tion for Russia. Since then, Russian com- on targets in Indonesia and the Philippines. mentaries have linked the growth of On 24th October, the Russian Ministry of Islamic fundamentalist («Wahhabi») move- Foreign Affairs called upon all nations from ments in the North Caucasus with the whose territories the Chechen terrorists spectre of foreign infiltration. receive support to take measures to put an This interference theory in regard to immediate end to this situation. international Islamist terror networks is not entirely plucked from the air. From the Islamic parts of South East Asia to the Notes on the conflict’s Balkans, there is hardly a regional conflict external dimension in which this element is not caught up. The As expected, the Kremlin’s comments involvement of Islamic brigades under the regarding the hostage drama picked up on command of Emir Khattab in both Chechen a pattern of interpretation that has become wars is undeniable. The Jordanian national, its strategy of legitimisation for the second who was killed during a special operation Chechen war. According to this, Russia is of the FSB in April 2002, became a symbol SWP Comments 4 November 2002 1 for Moscow’s theory that the «war against Chechnya. The second Chechen war turned Russia in Chechnya» should be understood the entire North Caucasus region into as an aspect of international terrorism and an even more attractive point of attack for Islamic extremism. Islamic fundamentalists than it was before, In both wars, foreign Mudjahedin fought and the regional focus of a «Wahhabi- side-by-side with Chechen fighters, just as hysteria» in the Russian media. Chechens turned up amongst the Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the suggestion of links between the Jihad nerve centres in A Problem of Differentiation: Afghanistan and representatives of the «Moderates», «Radicals», «Chechen revolution», such as Shamil «Separatists», «Terrorists» Bassayev and Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, «The mass-kidnapping in Moscow has to be who had been spotted in Kabul, hardly a moment of truth for those who divide the justifies claims of a substantial and specific terrorists in Chechnya into ‹good› and role for Chechnya in international Islamic ‹evil›,» was the message of the declaration fundamentalist networks. Russian alle- of the Russian Foreign Ministry above. gations about the «internationalisation of Since the beginning of the second war, the rebel camp» in Chechnya vary sharply, and with added emphasis since September and often seem markedly exaggerated. The 11th, Russia has criticised the classification opposite side, in the shape of Aslan of her military opponents in the North Maschadov, recently admitted that 200 Caucasus abroad into «moderate» and foreign fighters are currently situated in «extremist» forces, instead of generally Chechnya. As far as Chechen complicity qualifying them as «terrorists». The West is with the Taliban and Al Qaeda is con- sticking to this distinction in its negotia- cerned, only minor numbers of Chechens tion recommendations with Moscow. A were amongst the international Islamic «moderate camp» around Aslan Maschadov, brigades arrested in Afghanistan by US who is remembered as the pragmatic chief units and the Northern Alliance. negotiator in the ending of the first When the secession conflict between Chechen war, and voted by the people as Russia and Chechnya broke out – which is the President of the «Chechen Republic of only the most recent chapter in a history Ichkeria», is suggesting itself as a partner full of conflicts and violence – Islamic for negotiations. On the other side, there is fundamentalism only played a marginal the «radical camp» of fanatical field com- role. At the beginning of the independence manders and terrorists such as Shamil movement, it occupied a position at the Bassayev and Emir Al Chattab, Islamic edges of the ideological spectrum of the ideologists such as Movladi Udugov or «Chechen revolution». This only became Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev and criminal more Islamised after the clashes with the warlords such as Arbi Barayev, who was Russian army in the first Chechen war killed in 2001. (December 1994 to September 1996). The Moscow’s opponents in Chechnya, then, then leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, once said form a split «rebel camp» from which, in retrospect that Russia had catapulted along with the autonomously acting war- Chechnya into Islam. Islamic fundamental- lords, three main groups stand out: ist currents increased in the period between ! The group around Maschadov, the so- the wars (1996–1999), when the «Chechen called Chechen government in exile, Republic of Ichkeria», vacated by the Rus- ideologically based on a rather secular sian troops, slipped into chaos, and the comprehension of national indepen- terms «Islamic State», «Sharia» and «Jihad» dence, even though Maschadov fell back were the war cries in the power-struggle on Islamic attributes for the self-asser- between divergent political actors within tion of the «Chechen Republic» during SWP Comments 4 November 2002 2 his term in office from 1997 to 1999 tiations. Maschadov himself condemned (introduction of Sharia courts, etc.). In the act of terrorism. But his speaker Moscow, he is only considered one of pointed out that such events could repeat many warlords in the second Chechen themselves if Moscow did not agree to nego- war, not as the most powerful of them. tiations or put an end to the military cam- ! The radical Islamic fundamentalist paign. The co-operation of the «Chechen (Wahhabi) camp, comprising the field secessional government» in the act of terror commanders Bassayev and Chattab, is has neither been excluded nor proved. the most active group, and receives funding and other support from radical Islamic organisations abroad, but which The Illusion: «Normalisation» and is widely considered an alien body by «Chechenisation» the local population. The main funda- Since 2001, President Putin promoted the mentalist-oriented figures include idea of transferring control of the police Zenlimkhan Yanderbayev, the first and administration to the Chechens, in successor to Dudayev in the office of order to gain greater acceptability amongst President, and Movladi Udugov, head of the local population. The military in the propaganda in the first Chechen war, North Caucasus and Kremlin speakers have and interim foreign minister under long heralded the end of the war and a Maschadov. transition to a civilian administration as a ! An ideologically neutral group around precondition for the peaceful reintegration Ruslan Gelayev split from Maschadov in of the breakaway republic into the Russian summer 2000, and retreated to Georgia. Federation. At a press conference in Gelayev’s fighters stand at the centre of Moscow on 24th June 2002, President Putin Russian concerns about bases to which held out the prospect of an end to the Chechen rebels withdraw in the neigh- «mopping-up campaigns» carried out by bouring country. Russian military units in Chechnya, and of There are two different possible expla- strengthening the «justice and security nations for Maschadov’s co-operation with components of the Chechen administra- his former enemies: after the long and fruit- tion». «Then, we will move to the next step less demands that Moscow accept him as a in the normalisation – we will proceed to negotiating partner, he saw no further the adoption of a constitution». In order to possibility of reaching a political solution underpin the «normalisation», Chechen to the conflict, and devoted himself wholly refugees in the neighbouring regions were to the struggle, especially since he saw that pressurised to return to their homes – espe- international politics had let Chechnya cially the approximately 150,000 refugees down after 11th September; or he wanted in Ingushia. These, however, saw that not to force the other side into negotiations even the most basic conditions for their through increasing the military pressure. return to Chechnya had been fulfilled. The The Russian Government now also war has destroyed up to 80 percent of blames Maschadov for the hostage drama housing. 80 percent of those able to work in in Moscow. There is allegedly a video Grozny are without work and means. The recording in which he announces a turn- city has neither a water supply nor elec- around in the Chechen war just a few days tricity. Above all, though, a rigid series of before the attack, which Moscow interprets «mopping-up campaigns» of Chechen settle- as meaning the terrorist action. In a tele- ments by Russian forces continued to exert vision interview, Movsar Barayev, the com- a murderous pressure on the civilian popu- mander of the hostage-takers, named lation, even during the «normalisation Bassayev as the architect of the campaign phase».