ANZAM 2OO9
Aurirullisn npd $fe* Ieulc*d Acodemy ol lScncgement
Strategies to eliminate negative effects of optimism in organizations
23rd Annual Australian and New Zealand Academy of Management Jou rnal : Conference
Manuscript ID: draft
Manuscript Type: Paper
decision making < 10, Organisational Behaviour, group dynamics < Keywords (Select the 10. Organisational Behaviour, group processes < 10. Organisational keywords for the Track(s) Behaviour, managerial thinking and cognition < 10. Organisational which you have selected on Behaviour, perceptlon < 10. Organisational Behaviour, values < 10. the previous step): Organisational Behaviour
# scholarorur" " lJlanuscript Central Page 1 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
Strategies to eliminate negative effects of optimism in organizations
ABSTRACT
People in Western cultures value positive and optimistic outlooks. This is supported by a robust literature indicating that people in these societies are excessively and unrealistically optimistic and that they see their future as rosier than that of the average person. Such optimism places priority on feeling good and in its various iterations is associated with numerous well-documented benefits for individuals and organilations. Optimism, however, sometimes comes with a cost-the denial of reality. The two values can peacefully co-exist and for maximal effectiveness both optimism and realism ore necessary. Because optimism is the ambient state for most individuals, organizations should ensure that realism in decision-making is not neglected. A number of strategies designed to surface realistic optimism are offered.
Keywords: Optimism, decision-making, group dynamics, group processes, management thinking and cognition, perception, and values.
People, at least in Westem cultures (Judge, Erez, & Bono, 1998; Woolfolk, 2A0D,
value having positive and optimistic viewpoints-and with good reason. Optimistic
outlooks appear to provide numerous and varied benefits (Scheier & Carver, 1993).
Optimism, conceptualized as a generalized expectancy that good as opposed to bad
outcomes will generally occur across important life domains (Scheier & Carver,
1985,1992), generally enhances the performance of individuals (Luthans & Youssef,
2004) and has been associated with enhanced organizational effectiveness (Luthans,
Avolio, Avey, & Norman, 2001).
The rationale behind these assertions is grounded in a subsiantial body of work from
positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and positive
organizational behavior (Luthans & Youssef, 2001) which has empincally
demonstrated the benefits of optimism on both physical (Peterson & Bossio, 2001)
and psychological well-being (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999) for individuals
and increased efficiencies for organizations (Nelson & Cooper, 2AU). These benefits
are thought to snowbali and create upward spirals of additional benefits such as the
ability to form coalitions and lasting friendships (Fredrickson, 2001), increased
hardiness and resiliency to distress (Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004), and higher levels ANZAM 2OO9 Page 2 of 16
of organizationai citizenship behavior (Li-Yun, Aryee, & Law, 2047). Moreover, it feels good to believe in a bright future; believing otherwise can lead to anxiety causing stress (Shepperd, Carroll, & Sweeny,2008).
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH OPTIMISM
Despite such an endorsement for ali things positive and optimistic it is important for executives to beware of four particularly noteworthy problematic situations involving excessive (some might say "unrealistic") optimism: groupthink, the planning fallacy, the "winner's curse," and leader hubris. It appears that unrealistic optimism in some form or the other is associated with these four problem areas and organizational ineffectiveness.
Groupthink
One type of decision making effor is groupthink which is the tendency for members of highly cohesive groLrps to minimize conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, or evaluating ideas (Janis, 1982). The problem is that members of such groups may exhibit illusions of invulnerability creating a sense of invincibility and excessive optimism that encourages extreme risk taking that may lead to mistakes and misjudgments (e.g., the U.S. fiasco in the Cuban Bay of Pigs, Challenger disaster;
Von Bergen & Kirk, 1978). Groupthink seems to occur most often when there is a clear group identity, when members hold a positive image of their group that they want to protect, and when the group perceives a collective threat to this positive image (Turner & Pratkanis, 1997).
The planning fallacy
Optimistically biased predictions are costly in terms of money, jobs, prestige. or even lives (Sanna, Parks, Chang, & Carter, 2005). Large-scale planning debacies abound, supplying poignant public illustrations of overly optimistic plans gone a'r/ry
(Flyvberg, Holme, & Soren, 2002;Hall,1980; Schnaars, 1989). So frequent is this phenomenon that it has been given a name-the planning fallacy. an eror in Page 3 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
underestimating the time it will take to finish tasks (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002).
For example, the Sydney Opera House, begun in 7951 , was originally estimated to be
completed in 1963, but a scaled-down version actually opened in 1973-a decade
later. More recently, former U.S. President George W. Bush under a sign indicating
"Mission Accomplished" spoke of the end of major combat operations in haq in 2003
yet the conflict continues to this day with all U.S. troops now scheduled to depart kaq
by Dec. 37,2017.
Winnerts curse
Excessive optimism has also been implicated for the well documented phenomenon
called the "winner's curse" (Hendricks, Porter, & Tan,2008), an occurrence akin to a
Pyrrhic victory in which individuals bid above an item's (e.g., an acquisition or
merger) true value and thus are "cursed" by acquiring it (Lovallo, Viguerie, Uhianer,
& Horn, 2001). By exaggerating the likely benefits of a project and ignoring the
potential pitfalls, executives often lead their organizations into jnitiatives that are
doomed to fall weil short of expectations. For example, the intemational raw
materials boom due to the rapid industrialization in China and other developing
countries resuited in excessive optimism and the 2008 takeover battle between BHP-
Billiton and Rio Tinto the biggest and third biggest mining companies in the world,
respectiveiy (BHP Billiton, 2008). In a pre-emptive endeavor to stave off any
potential BIIP-Billiton takeover offers Rio Tinto acquired a controlling interest in
Alcan Inc. (Rio Tinto, 2008) and generated a large level of debt which was an
acceptable game plan when the metal markets were booming and share prices were
high. However, with the downtum in the world economy from late 2008 and the
BHP-Billiton offer lapsing, the pitfalls of a large debt and falling demand and prices
saw Rio Tinto planning to eliminating some 14,000 positions and seeking input
funding from the Aluminum Corporation of China (Rio Tinto, 2009a). Strong
opposition to this plan has more recently resulted in it collapsing and a joint venture -l ANZAM 2OO9 Page 4 of 16
iron ore partnership being established between BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, with the latter also going to the equity market for funds (Rio Tinto, 2009b; Rio Tinto, 2009c).
Leader hubris
It has been argued that excessive optimism can lead to hubris or extreme arrogance, causing executives to engage in excessive risk-taking, grandiose initiatives, and acts of intimidation (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005). An example of such negative effects were found in a study by Hayward and Hambrick (1991), whose results showed firms with
CEOs suffering from hubris to be more likely to acquire other businesses for excessive premiums. Kroll, Toombs, and Wright (2000) explain why such actions are common among executives by arguing that hubris can result in a drive to dominate others and engage in empire building for its own sake. Similarly, Kets de Vries and
Milier (1984) have made the case that CEOs' belief that they will achieve positive outcomes can often lead them to experience delusions of grandeur. Such excessive optimism can cause executives to stubbomly persist in behaviors that have worked well for them in the past and undervalue new or dissenting information (Kroll et al.,
2000). In short, success often breeds failure because leaders that have tremendous successes begin to believe in their own invulnerabiiity, become arogant, and lose their competitive edge (Dess & Picken, 1999).
Indeed, leader hubris is a contributing factor to the well documented decision-making error of escalation of commitment which involves the irational continuance in a project or plan due to time, money, and energy which has previously been "sunk" into the project (Staw, 1981). Because many executives are overly optimistic about their strategies and reluctant to face reality, they are hesitant to back away and iook for new alternatives (Brockner, 1992). Such decision biases cost these ieaders and their organizations much time, money and energy which could better be spent on other options. Page 5 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
REALITY CHECKS TO HELP AVOID UNREALISTIC OPTIMISM
Researchers have recommended that facing reality should be emphasized as a
counterweight to "delusions of snccess" and the tendency to believe that "all is well"
(Keegan & West, 2008; Lovallo & Kahneman,2003; Webber, 2008). Few, however,
have offered concrete suggestions on how such optimism can be moderated. Hence, a
number of approaches, herein cailed reality checks that organizations might use to
address problematic optimism are offered. We have drawn from work in both the
psychology and management disciplines and have developed the following specific
guidelines that could be used to counter optimistic biases in organizations and provide
a greater balance between optimism and reality.
Don't shoot the messenger
Some managers seem to be hopeiess wonywarls, but remember former Intel CEO
Andrew Grove's waming that only the paranoid survive (Grove, 1999). Grove
emphasized the need for CEOs to be sensitive to potential future problems, even to
the point of behavior so diligent that others might perceive it to be compulsive or
neurotic. It is better to be aware of a potential problem than not. Over time, executives
can calibrate whether some managers or units are indeed canaries in the mineshaft
and, conversely, whether managers who dismiss possible dangers do so for valid
reasons-or do so out of inertia. The moral is to not ignore such Cassandras who may
be cautioning against risky and overly optimistic initiatives. Listen to the naysayers
and don't "diss" the dissenters.
Promote open inquiry
Because there is sometimes a tendency for groups to be highly optimistic, leaders
shouid encourage members to be skeptical of all potential solutions and to avoid
reaching premature agreements (Steers & Black, 1994). It sometimes heips to play the
role of devil's advocate by intentionally finding fault with a proposed solution
(Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986). Research has shown that when this is done,
groups make higher-quality decisions (Schweiger, Sandberg, & Rechner, 1989). In ANZAM 2OO9 Page6of16
fact, some corporate executives use exercises in which conflict is intentionally generated just so the negative aspects of a decision can be identified before it is too late (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990). This is not to say that leaders should be argumentative. Rather, raising a nonthreatening question to force both sides of an issue can be very helpful in improving the quality of decisions.
Use subgroups
Because the decisions made by any one group may be the result of optimistic biases, basing decisions on the recommendations of two or more groups can be a useful check. If the groups disagree, a discussion of their differences is likely to raise important issues. However, if the groups agree, one can be more confident that their conclusions are not all the result of optimistic biases. The split between governance and management in businesses is a way of allowing for the checks and balances that subgroups bring to decision-making. The failure to separate out management from the board of an organization as is the case when the position of CEO and Managing
Director are held by one person who then holds sway over both executive and board decisions has been suggested as a reason for many of the major corporate failures of recent times (Monks & Minow, 2008).
Provide feedback, good and bad
It would seem that through iife experience people wouid learn that occasionally they are not as competent as their overconfidence might suggest. However, this seems not to be the case. Some time ago Sullivan (1953) marveied at individuals' "...failure of leaming which has left their capacity for fantastic, self-centered delusions so utterly unaffected by a life-long history of educative events" (p. 80)- One reason is that people seldom receive negative feedback about their skills and abilities from others in everyday life (Darley & Fazio, i980; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Matlin & Stang,
1978). The concepts of 360' feedback aliows for positive and negative feedback
(Cederblom & Lounsbury, 1980; Nowack, 1993). Page 7 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
Associated with this approach is a recommendation to focus on past history. A
willingness to ask how things emerged-in effect, holding a conversation about
conversations with key people-shows that the company can iearn from its mistakes.
Executives should track the expectations of individuals against actual outcomes in
order to examine the processes (such as sales forecasts) that underlie strategic
decisions. Companies should review these processes if forecasts and results differ
significantly. They can also provide feedback where necessary and show clearly that
they remember forecasts, reward realistic optimism, and frown on excessive and
unwarranted optimrsm.
Show interest in the upside and downside
Executives should be grilled with respect to the risks inherent in their forecasts. One
means of doing this would be through effective governance mechanisms. Managers
should display interest in bad or problematic news, and express interest in having
more early-warning systems for adverse developments. If a company has deeply
ingrained prohibitions against bringing up bad news-particularly if it is considered
to be a sign of professional weakness-then it might be appropriate to have brief one-
on-one reviews individualiy with key business managers to discuss their operations
and build a spirit of greater openness- Later, in a larger group setting, use the
information gathered, starting with challenges common to several units so as not to
put any one executive on the spot.
Beware of sunflower management
In an effort to gain favor with their bosses and to advance their own careers, some
employees are inclined to give biased favorable, or unfavorable, decisions, depending
on what they think senior management most wants to hear. Boot, Miibourn, and
Thakor (2005) have labeled this phenomenon "sunflower management," based on the
way sunflowers bend their heads toward the sun, seeking its life-sustaining rays. The
researchers contend that this type of misinformation can have undesirable
repercussions on decision-making and, ultimately, affect bottom-line profits in ANZAM 2OO9 Page 8 of 16
business organizations, and may help to explain why some organizations and individuals make poor investment decisions, pursue bad projects, or discard good ideas altogether. In some cases managers may surround themselves with sycophants who echo what they believe the leader likes to hear, even if they inherently consider the leader's choices to be flawed (Kroll et al., 2000).
Take the outside view
More formally labeled reference class forecasting (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003;
Flyvbjerg, 2008), this procedure is particularly important for planning and forecasting. Taking an outside view results in much more accurate forecasts and requires planners to examine the experiences of a class of similar projects outside the firm. Steps involved in this scheme require an identification of a reference class of analogous past initiatives, determination of the distribution of outcomes for those initiatives, and placement of the project at hand at an appropriate point along that distribution to obtain a more realistic prediction. Taking such an outside perspective may be vitally important because scholars have noted the inward focus of failing firms (Barker & Duhaime,799'7; Barker & Patterson, 1996; D'Aveni & MacMillan,
1 990).
Pay attention to doublespeak
Also called framing or reframing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), this activity involves the search for positive aspects of a situation to neutralize or overcome negative aspects. Executives should be aware that situations and proposals in business are often presented as particularly optimistic or favorable. For example, with doublespeak, banks do not have "bad loans" or "bad debts"; they have "nonperforming assets" or
"nonperforming credits" which are "rescheduled." Even simple reframing in hypothetical decision scenarios (e.9.,807o of goal vs.20Vo goal shortfall) has been shown to influence willingness to take risks, perceived decision conflict, and aspiration levels as well as the perceived favorability and persuasive appeal of messages (Von Bergen & Parnell, 2008). Page 9 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
Conduct an independent second opinion
This resource-intensive way of avoiding overoptimistic thinking involves bringing in
experienced outsiders to develop a second draft initiative. These individuals should
have a relevant memory to draw upon and are typically much less optimistic and
much more accurate than the actual planners and implementers. It is important that
these outsiders do not review the initial plan before soliciting their opinions. An
executive/consultant with a fresh pair of eyes and no emotionai connections can
sometimes see things that escape the notice of more knowledgeable in-house
colleagues.
But all consultants are not created equal. The compromised advice given by
accounting consultants to companies (e.9., consider Author Anderson and Enron;
Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002) audited by the same firm should be warning
enough that objectivity or bias can be bought. Consultants can often maximize their
income by never being the bearer of "too bad" of news and certainly by providing
support for management's existing views. Buyer beware!
Hold second-chance meetings
Before implementing critical decisions, it is often a good idea to hold a second-chance
meeting during which group members are asked to express doubts and propose any
new ideas they may have. Alfred P Sloan, former head of General Motors, is known
to have postponed acting on important matters until any group disagreement was
resolved (Sloan, 1964). As people get tired of working on problems, they may hastily
reach agreement on a solution. Second-chance meetings can be useful devices for
seeing if a solution still seems good even after "sleeping on it."
Present next-best ideas
Companies can ask that recommendations include at least one alternative or
contingency pathway to the preferred proposal with an accompanying action plan.
Such "next-best" ideas are useful not only to calibrate the level of a manager's risk -'l ANZ.AM 2OO9 Page 10 of 16
l0
aversion but also to identify opportunities that a manager might otherwise consider
insufficiently safe to present to senior management.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Even though there is an overwhelming emphasis on optimism today, over the years, it
has had somewhat of a checkered reputation. From Voitaire's Dr. Pangloss in
Candide (1947) who blathered that we live in the best of all possible worlds to
Porter's Pollyanna (1913), who celebrated every misfortune befalling her and others,
to politicians who compete vigorously to see who can best spin embarrassing news
into something wonderful, optimism has often given thoughtful people pause. While
connotations of naivet6 and denial have adhered to the notion, we believe that
optimism is a powerful force and is widely seen as a virtue in Western cultures and a
key to success in business because it can fuel the drive to achieve goals and objectives
and sustain an individual or a firm through difficulties.
On the other hand, a sense of realism matters, too, grounding optimism before it flits
into fantasy and wishful thinking as well as protecting individuals from self-deception
in which persons convince themselves that things are different from what available
information would suggest. Untethered by reality, optimism can become false or
uninformed hope or blind faith that everything will turn out fine and leave individuals
and organizations unprepared for what can be grim reality. This can lead to disastrous
results. Thus, striking a balance between the two is important. That balance is what
we label as realistic optimism.
We are not suggesting thar optimrsm is bad. or that mrnagers should try to root it out
of themselves or their organizations. Optimism generates enthusiasm and it enables
people to be resilient when confronting difficr-rlt situations or challenging goa1s.
Organizations have to promote optimism to keep employees motivated and focused.
At the same time, though, companies have to generate realistic forecasts and address
real problems and opportunities. Page 11 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
11
A lack of optimism could undermine the visionary qualities essential for superior
research and development departments and rhe esprit de corps centrai to successful
sales forces. In recent years research by a number of scholars has documented that
optimism appears to be the ambient state for most people at most times and offers
numerous and diverse benefits. Indeed, optimism, conceptualized and assessed in a
variety of ways, has been linked to positive mood and good morale; to perseverance
and effective problem solving; to academic, athietic, military, occupational. and
political sllccess; to popularity; to good health; and even to long life and freedom
from trauma.
Research has likewise shown that optimism in some circumstances can have
drawbacks and costs, that optimism's benefits are not unbounded, and may not be an
appropriate strategy for all persons at all times. In fact, a downward shift from
optirnism to an emphasis on reality also offers benefits. People who are overly
optimistic about the future may be ill-prepared to respond to setbacks that might
occur. When available information indicates that expectations are inaccurate, shifting
outlooks prepare people to deal with the most likely outcomes. Likewise, when an
undesired outcome seems possible, shifting expectations downward prepares people
by providing protection from an emotional blow. "When troubling winds abound the
pessimist complains, the optimist expects the winds to change and the realist adjusts
the sails" (Ward, 2009). What is suggested in this paper is a balance between
optimism and realism: business people should be optimistic enough to take advantage
of the many benefits of a positive outlook, but they should also sufficiently temper
that optimism so that they can motivate preventative action and avoid being caught
off guard and unprepared. ANZAM 2OO9 Page 12 of 16
t2
REFERENCES Barker, V., & Duhaime, I. (1997). Strategic change in the turnaround process: Theory and empirical evidence- Strategic Management Journal 18: 13-38-
Barker, V., & Patterson, P. (i996). Top management team tenure and top manager cansal attributions at declining firms attempting turnarounds. Gror.tp and Or g anization M anag ement 21 : 304-336.
Bazerman, M.H., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D. A. (2002). Why good accountants do bad audits. Harttard Business Review 80: 96-103.
BHP Billiton (2008). Our offer fo, Rio Tinto, accessed oI huo://www.bhpbilliton.com./bb/investorsMedia/shareholderNewsletter/ourOfferForRi oTintojsp on 10 June 2009.
Boot, A. W. A., Milbourn, T. T., & Thakor, A. V. (2005). Sunflower management and capital budgeting. Joumal of Business 78: 501-528.
Brockner, I. (1992). The escalation of commitment to a failing course of action: Toward theoretical progress. Academy of Management Review 11:39-67.
Buehler, R., Griffin, D., & Ross, M. (2002). Inside the planning fallacy; The causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions. ln T. Gilovich, D. W. Griffin, & D. Kahneman (Eds.) Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment pp. 250-210, Cambridge University Press: New York.
Cederblom, D., & Lounsbury, J. W. (1980). An investigation of user acceptance of peer evallrati ons. P e r s onnel P sy c ho I o gy 33 : 5 67 - 57 9 .
Cosier, R. A., & Schwenk, C. R. (1990). Agreement and thinking alike; Ingredients for poor decisions. Academlt of Management ExecLttive 4: 670-614.
Darley, J. M., & Fazio, R. H. (1980). Expectancy confirmation processes arising in the social interaction sequence. American Psychologist 35: 867-881.
Dess, G. G., & Picken,L C. (1999). Creating competitive (dis)advantage: Learning from Food Lion's freefall. Academy of Management Executive 13 91-17I.
Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., & Smith, H. L. (1999). Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress. PsychoLogical Btilletin 125 2'/6-302.
D'Aveni, R. A., & MacMillan, I. C. (1990). Crisis and the content of managerial commLrnication: A srudy of the focus of attention oi rop managers in surviving and failing firms. Administrative Science Quarterly 35:. 634-651 .
Flyvberg, B. (2008). Curbing optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation in planning: Reference class forecasting in practice, European Planning Studies 76 3- 21.
Flyvberg, B., Holme, M. S., & Soren, B. (2002). Underestimating costs in public works projects; Error or lie? Journal of tlte American Planning Association 68 219- 29s.
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist 56 218-226. Page t3 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
13
Grove, A. S. (1999). Only the paranoid survive: How to exploit the crisis points that challenge every company. Broadway Books: New York.
Hall, P. (1980). Great planning disasters. Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London.
Hayward, M. L. A., & Hambrick, D. C. (1991). Explaining the premium paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly 42: 103-127.
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., & Tan, G. (2008). Bidding rings and the winner's curse. RAND Journal of Economics 39: 1018-104i.
Hiller, N. J., & Hambrick, D. C. (2005). Conceptualizing executive hubris: The role of (hyper-) core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making. Strategic Management Journal 26:291-319.
Janis,I. L. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions andfiascoes (2"d ed.). Houghton Mifflin: Boston.
Judge, T. A., Erez, 4., & Bono, i. E. (1998). The power of being positive: The relation between positive self-concept and job performance. Human Performance 7l:
161 -187 .
Keegan, D., & West, D. (2008). Reality check: The unreported good news about America. Regnery Publishing, Inc: Washington, D. C.
Kets de Vries, M. F. R., & Miller, D. (1984). The neurotic organirytion Jossey-Bass: San Francisco.
Kroll, M. J., Toombs, L. 4., &. Wright, P. (2000). Napoleon's rragic march home from Moscow: Lessons in hubris. Academy of Management Executive, 14, 111 -128.
Kruger, J., & Dunning, D. (i999). Unskiiled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 11: 1721-1134
Li-Yun, S., Aryee, S., & Law, K. S. (2007). High-performance human resource practices, citizenship behavior, and organizational performance: A relational perspective . Academy of Management Journal50: 558-577.
Lovallo, D., & Kahneman, D. (2003). Delusions of success: How optimism undermines executives' decisions. H arvard Business Review 8 1 : 56-63.
Lovallo, D., Viguerie, P., Uhlaner, R., & Horn, J. (2001). Deals without delusions. Har-vard Business Review 85 92-99.
Luthans, F., Avolio, B. J., Avey, J. B., & Norman, S. M. (2001).Positive psychological capital: Measurement and relationship with performance and satisfaction. Personnel Psychology 60 541-512.
Luthans, F., & Youssef, C. M. (2004). Human, social, and now positive psychological capital management: Investing in people for competitive advantage. Organizational Dynomics 33 143-160. ANZAM 2OO9 Page 14 of 16
14
Luthans, F., & Youssef, C. M. QAU). Emerging positive organizational behaviour. Jovtntal of Mctnagetn.ent 33: 321-349.
Matlin, M., & Stang, D. (1978). The Pollyanna principle. Schenkman: Cambridge, MA.
Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. (2008). Corporate governatlce (4'h ed.). Wiley & Sons: Chichester.
Nelson, D. L., & Cooper, C. L. (2007). Positive organiz,atiottal behaviottr. Thousand Oaks, Sage: New Delhi & London.
Nowack, K. (1993). 360 degree feedback: The whole story. Training cud Dev elopment J otunal 41 : 69 -7 2.
Peterson, C., & Bossio, L. M. (2001). Optimism and physical well-being. In E. C. Chang (Ed.), Optimism & pessimism: Implications for theory, research, and practice, pp. 127-745. American Psychological Association: Washington, DC.
Porter, E. H. (1913). Pollyanna. Harrap: London.
Rio Tinto (2008). PDAC annual convention: Strong markets, big challenges, accessed at http://www.riotinto.com/media/speeches 7268.asp on 10 June 2009.
Rio Tinto (2009a). Rio Tinto announces pioneering srrategic partnership with Chinalco, accessed at http://www.riotinto.com/doctrments/Media,fPRT I 69 Rio Ti nto announces pioneerin g strateeic partnership with Chinalco.pdf on 10June2009.
Rio Tinto (2009b). Rio Tonto and BHP Billiton announce West Australian iron ore production joint venture, accessed at http://www.riotinto.com/media/5157 l8100.asp on 10 June 2009.
Rio Tinto (2009c). The boards of Rio Tinto plc and Rio Tinto Limited announce fully underwritten rights issues to raise Bross proceeds of approximately US$l5.2 billion, accessed at http://www.riotinto.com/rightsissue/ENG/media/2 i 0 989.asp on 1 0 June 2009.
Sanna, L. J., Parks, C. D., Chang, E. C., & Carter, S. E- (2005). The hourglass is half ful} of half empty: Temporal framing and the group planning fallacy. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice 9: 173-188.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1985). Optimism, coping, and health: Assessment and implications of generalized outcome expectancies. Health Psychology 4: 219- 241.
Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1992). Effects of optimism on psychological and physical well-being: Theoretical overview and empirical update. Cognitive Therapy and Research 16 201-228.
Scheier, M., & Carver, C. (1993). On the power of positive thinking: The benefits of being optimisric. Current Directions in Psychological Science 2:26-30. Page 15 of 16 ANZAM 2OO9
15
Schnaars, S. P. (1989). Megamistakes: Forecasting and the myth of rapid technological clmnge. Free Press; New York.
Schweiger, D. M., Sandberg, W. R., & Ragan, J. W. (1986). Group approaches for improving strategic decision making: A comparative analysis of dialectical inquiry, devil's advocacy, and consensus. Academy of Management Journal 29: 5l-77.
Schweiger, D. M., Sandberg, W. R., & Rechner, P. L. (1989). Experiential effects of dialectical inquiry, devil's advocacy, and consensus approaches to strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal 32:145-112.
Seligman, M. E. P., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). Positive psychology: An introduction. American Psychologist 55:. 5-14.
Shepperd, J. A., Carroll, P. J., & Sweeny, K. (2008). A functional approach to explaining fluctuations in future outlooks: From self-enhancement to self- criticism. In E. Chang & L. Sanna (Eds.), Self-Criticism and Self-Enhancement: Theory, Research, and Clinical Implications, pp. 161-180, American Psychological Association : Washington, DC.
Sloan, A. P. h. (1964), My years with General Motors. Doubleday: New York.
Staw, B. M. (1981). The escalation of commitment to a course of action. Academy of Management Review 6: 577-587.
Steers, R. M., & Black, J. S. (1994). Organizational behaviour (56 ed.). Harper Collins: New York.
Sullivan, H. S. (i953). Conceptions of modern psychiatry. Norton: New York.
Tugade, M. M., & Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). Resilient individuais use positive emotions to bounce back from negative emotional experiences. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 86: 320-333.
Turner, M. E., & Pratkanis, A. R. (1991). Mitigating groupthink by stimulating constructive conflict, In C. De Dreu and E. Van de Vliert (Eds.), Using conflict in or ganizations, pp. 53-7 1, Sage: London,
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decision and the rationality of choice. Science 221: 453-458.
Voltaire, R. (1947). Candide (J. Butt, Trans.). Penguin Books: Baltimore. (Original work published 1759).
Von Bergen, C. W., & Kirk, R. J. (1978). Groupthink: When too many heads spoil the decision. Management Review 61: 44-49.
Von Bergen, C. W., & Pamell, J. A. (2008). Framing in organizations: Overview, assessment, and implications. Leadership and Organizational Management Journal 2008:83-95.
Ward, W. A. (2009). William Arthttr Ward quotes, accessed al http://www.finestquotes.com/author quotes-author-WilliamTo20Arthur%20Ward- page-0.htm on 09 June 2009. ANZAM 2OO9 Page 16 of 16
16
Webber, S. T. (2008, January,February). The dark side of optimism. The Conference Board Review 30-36.
Woolfolk, R. L. (2002). The power of negative thinking: Truth, melancholia, and the tragic sense of life. Journal of Theoretical and PhilosophicaL Psychotogy 22: 79-27 .