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IW¶'bWE PolicyResearch WORKING PAPERS FlnancaleSector Development FinancialSector Development Department Public Disclosure Authorized TheWorld Bank July 1993 WPS1154 Optionsfor Pension Public Disclosure Authorized Reformin Tunisia DimitriVittas Public Disclosure Authorized Tunisia's financiallypressed pensionsystem needs to rational- ize benefits and improve investmentperformance in the near Public Disclosure Authorized future. To anticipatedetericrating demographics, steps should also be taken to prepare for more radical reform: one pillar for redistribution,and one fully capitalized. PonLcyRar WoikingPapcrsdi aminate thcndings of wokmprogre andenougethexhngc of ids amngPank staffand llothers need in developtetiseLitsepapcsc ddistributed by theRearchAdvisoy Staff,caryhenama of theaiutbos,rdlcct ot eytirvie ,ondshouldbeused Bndadtedaccor sgly.lefindMintgeipmntdonsandconclusios m an:theauthoesown.Teyoul no be attributedtrothe WorldBank its Boart of Dircors, its mangagmntn,or any of its mamoercountries. Policy Research Financial Sector Development WPS 1154 This paper- a productof the FinancialSector Development Department -is part of a largereffort in the departmentto study pension systems. Copiesof the paper are availablefree from the World Bank, 1818 H StreetNW, Washington,DC 20433.Please contact (PriscillaInfante, roomN9-003, extension 37664 (July 1993, 32 pages). Tunisia's pension systemprovides old age, capriciousfavoring of workers with low incomes survivorship,and disabilitybenefits to retired and short credited service). and disabledworkers and their dependents.It is a partally funded system basedon solidarity * Faces increasingfinancial pressuresbecause between generations.It is designedto provide it is maturingand expandingbenefits, but its insuranceagainst loss of incomein old age, reservesshow poor investmentperformance and especiallyfor people who live longer than it has failed to adjust contributionrates. average,and to redistributeincome more favor- ably toward low-'ncome retired workers.Only to Vittasproposes the followingmain reforms: a limitedextent does it achieve a third objective: compulsorylong-term saving. * In the short run, reallocatingsocial security contributionsfrom family allowancesto pen- Vittas analyzesthe structureof Tunisia's sions and improvingthe financial performanceof pensionsystem, assesses its financialcondition, reserves. and sets out optionsfor pensionreform. He finds that the current system: * In the mediumterm, rationalizingbenefit formulasthrough gradual use of lifetimeactual- * Is fragmented,comprising several schemes ized earnings, indexingpensions, gradually with differentrules and conditions. increasingthe normalretirement age, and expandingthe use of proportionalpensions for . Promisesgenerous benefits, with high workerswith short careers. targeted replacementrates that may be unsustainable. * In the longer term, a more radical program to create a fully capitalizedpillar that comple- * Despite high benefits,operates with low ments a redistributivepillar paying basic ben- contributionrates, because both the system and efits. This wouldgenerate long-term savings, the labor force are young. stimulatethe developmentof capital markets, and facilitatethe privatizationprogram. A third * Only weakly links contributionsand ben- pillar, voluntarysavings encouragedby tax efits. Is suffers from evasion of contributionsand savings,would cover self-employedpeople not inflatedbenefit claims and redistribution(from coveredby occupationalschemes. ThePolicyResearch Working Paper Series disseniinates the findings of workunder way in theBank. An objectiveofthe series is to get these findings out quickly,even if presentationsare less than fuly polished.The findings.interpretations, and conclusionsin thesepapers do not necessardlyrepresent of ficial Bank policy. Producedby thePolicy Research Dissemination Center Financial Sector Development Department World Bank OPTIONS FOR PENSION REFORM N TUNISIA Dimitri Vittas Table of Contents Introduction 1 The Present System 4 International Experience 19 Options for Reform 25 References 32 Introduction The Tunisianpension system offers old age, survivorshipand disabilitybenefits to retired and disabledworkers and their dependents. Its mainobjectives are insuranceand redistribution:insurance against the loss of incomein old age due to retirementand against the risk of excessivelongevity; redistribution in favor of low incomeretired workers. Compulsorylong-term saving, the third main objectiveof pensionsystems, is attainedonly to a limitedextent in Tunisia. In principle,the systemis based on the conceptof solidaritywithin and across generations. Beinga compulsorypublic system it aimsto coverrisks, such as increasesin life expectancyor high inflation,that privateinsurance markets find it difficultto cover. In practice,however, attainment of these objectivesdepends on the effectivedegree of solidarity withinand across generationsand on the abilityof the systemto withstandthe increased costsof high inflation,increased longevity and changesin demographicstructure. Formally,the Tunisiansystem is a partiallyfunded defined benefit system based on scaledpremiums. In these systems,the contributionrate is set at a high enoughlevel to enablethe creationof a reservefund so that projectedinflows from annualcontributions and investmentincome cover the projectedoutflows during a givenperiod, knownas the period of equilibrium. In principle,only the investmentincome of the reservefund is used to cover currentbenefits, with the principalleft intact. When_urrent receipts from contributionsplus investmentincome are no longer adequateto covercurrent benefits, the contributionrate is raisedto the levelcorresponding to anotherperiod of equilibrium.The period of eqLilibrium shouldbe sufficientlylong to guaranteea certaindegree of premiumstability. Scaledpremium systems require periodic adjustments in contributionrates based on actuarialstudies' and reflectingchanging demographic structures, the growingmaturity of the system,any expansionof benefits,and the investmentincome of the fund. However,in manycountries with such systems,problems occur because of delaysin actuarialreviews and adjustmentof contributionrates. Moreover,raising the contributionrate may not be feasible beyonda certainpoint, in whichcase reductionsin benefitsas well as altemativeforms of pensionschemes may need to be contemplated. In additionto beinga partiallyfunded, defined benefit system based on scaled premiums,the Tunisianpension system exhibits the followingfeatures: I At the time of writingthis paper, the latestactuarial review was effectedby ILO in 1989and was based on data for 1986/87. The Tunisianauthorities have arguedthat this was a bad year for assessingthe long-termfinancial prospects of the pensionfunds because of the reducedlevel of employmentand the adverseeffects of the economicrecession. Sincethen, a furtheractuarial review was undertakenand completedin 1992. This reviewconfirms the findingsof this pape-. * It is a. fragmentedsystem, comprising several schemes with different rules and conditions. * It promisesgenerous benefits with high targetedreplacement rates, whichare difficultto sustainin the long run2. * Despitethe high level of benefits,it operateswith relativelylow contribution rates, mainlybecause of the youngdemographic structure of the labor force and the youngage of the system. * The systemhas a weaklink betweencontributions and benefits. As a result, it has sufferedfrom eclecticsolidarity, which manifests itself in evasionof contributionsbut inflatedbenefit claims, and from capriciousredistribution, whichfavors workers with low incomesand short creditedservice. Like other definedbenefit pension systems, the Tunisiansystem is also exposedto perverseredistribution arising from differencesin life expectancybetween low and high incomepeople and from differencesin career patternsof earnings. * Afterbuilding significant reserves in its early years of operation,the system, especiallythe fund coveringthe private sector, has facedfinancial pressures. These haveemanated from the growingmaturity of the system,the expansion of benefits,the poor investmentperformance of reservesand the failureto adjustcontribution rates. * Macroeconomicdevelopments in the 1980shave contributedto the poor financialperformance of the system,but demographicfactors have continued to be favorable. In the long run, the demographicstructure will becomeunfavorable. System reform needsto be consideredand implementedat an early stageto avoid a painfuladjustment and transitionlater on. First and foremost,there is a strongneed to rationalizethe benefit formulasused in order to minimizethe redistributiveand disincentiveeffects of existing rules. But measuresto reformthe systemmay also includea reductionin benefits,an increasein contributionrates, an improvementin the financialperformance of reserves, integrationof existingsystems into a nationalfirst pillar offeringbasic benefits,and developmentof privately-runsecond and third pillarsto offer complementarybenefits. 2 Achievementof these pensiontargets is, however,undermined by two factors:the partial indexationof pensionsin the privatesector; and the fact that a substantialproportion of workersdo not have full careers to entitlethem to a full pension. Nevertheless, pensionersof the public sectorand financialinstitutions with full careersobtain very high pensions. 2 The basic objectives of pension reform should be: * the payment of adequate, but affordable and therefore sustainablebenefits;