The NGO Safety Office Issue: 25 May 1st to 15th 2009

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Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-3 Recent events in the East and AOG Initiated Attacks per Region per Month - 2009 Northern Region 4-6 Western Regions dominated CENTRAL EAST WEST SOUTH NORTH NORTH EAST 6-9 Eastern Region the reporting period. 250 Western Region 9-11 The large scale complex at- 200 tack against GoA facilities 150 Southern Region 11-14 within Khost City; the dy- 100 ANSO Info Page 15 namic occupation by AOG of an IMF/ANSF FOB in 50

Kunar, along with 3 separate 0 significant NGO incidents JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC YOU NEED TO KNOW (also in Khost) clearly indi- attack. cate the depth, scope, and ken prior to the airstrike. • High volume civilian casu- capacity of the AOG pres- The civilian casualty toll Kunduz continues to be alties in Farah ence within this Region. from IMF air strikes follow- the most volatile province ing an AOG operation in • Complex attack in Khost The attack within Khost City within the North, and will marks the City appears to have been a clearly likely remain the AOG largest yet recorded (est. targeted attack against the centre of gravity for same. • High NGO incident vol- 140) from a single incident. GoA, (with multiple BBIED umes in Eastern Region While the air strike was the The recent escalation in being utilized) with the secu- direct cause of the casual- events within Baghlan indi- • Sustained AOG activity rity force response; success ties, the AOG occupation cate that the expected levels in Kunduz of the attack; as well as the of a civilian centre facili- AOG effort to influence size of the affected city re- tated the event. It should be the northern MSR is taking sponsible for the escalated noted, however, that the shape, with Pul-E-Khumri significance of what was ulti- as the focal point. ANSO is supported by engagement had been bro- mately a standard complex

NGO DATA & TRENDS The Eastern Region con- COMBINED (ACG/AOG) DIRECT NGO INCIDENTS Searches tinues to record the high- Arson Armed Attacks 6% 6% 15% est levels of NGO inci- Armed Robbery dents countrywide. Khost 15% Abduction was the loci this period 19% (Kunar last period) with 3 separate NGO incident recorded. These events IED/Explosives have the hallmark of 12% Beatings AOG ‘shaping opera- 4% Threats tions’ in which influential 23% civilian/GoA ‘soft’ targets are attacked/intimidated to further their influence within the civil population. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL

KABUL Year to Date 5 35 This Report Period 0 30 As has been the trend since the 25 opening of 2009, criminality has ment of an IO national staff 20 been the predominant issue within member in a store robbery re- 15 cently, as well as the physical as- 10 this province, with a particular 5 focus in Kabul City. Criminal sault of a second staff member 0 events have been trending almost also during this period. on par with AOG attributed activ- In relation to this, criminal kid- ity. With ANSF focus shifted nappings continue to remain a key AOG ACG from conflict related efforts in the element of criminal activity, as city and it’s environs, they have witnessed by the recent high- officer of Chahar Asyab District suspected of concomitantly been able to con- profile arrests of kidnapping involvement in this incident. Furthermore, centrate efforts on basic policing. groups. However, the involve- ANP also arrested four ANA officers to be The criminal threat was high- ment of these same security forces linked to a previous abduction. lighted by the collateral involve- in recent cases also serve to com- In the conflict realm, AOG focus remains in plicate this issue, as a recent kid- the southern and eastern districts of the prov- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS napping of a local businessman by ince, with the northern areas relatively unaf- !"Criminality a group wearing ANP uniforms fected. !"Suicide attacks on board an ANP vehicle was !"IED followed by the arrest of an ANP

NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK Year to Date 0 40 This Report Period 0 Despite the increase of IMF (and 30 assessment period of AOG fol- the APPF) within this province, 20 AOG have begun to assert their lowing the “surge” and now that presence with greater authority. the environment has stabilised, 10 Incident levels, which had been they are seeking to re-consolidate 0 relatively stable during the open- the gains made during the sum- ing months of 2009, have begun mer months of 2008.

to increase with this period being Thus far AOG incidents have AOG ACG no exception. It is likely that been relatively consistent with there was an initial displacement/ past efforts and included attacks threatened the local population. Of note, this on IMF convoys and DAC, IED, incident occurred in the premier deployment KEY THREATS & CONCERNS as well as attacks against road con- site of the APPF. !"AOG intimidation efforts struction elements. The most The result of increased IMF in the province !"Abduction/kidnapping troubling development this period also manifested itself, with 2 separate Force !"IED was the reported blockage of the Protection shootings being reported during main road in Jalrez in which AOG this period.

Please Note: Monthly graphs provided in this report are inclusive as of 13 May 2009. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 1 An NGO national staff member 15 (female) received a direct threat limited in number and scope, gen- 10 letter detailing her to cease em- erally restricted to attacks against 5 ployment with NGO or any other security forces. It is unclear at such “foreign” related organisa- this time if this event will indicate 0 tion. The marks the first NGO a greater effort on intimidation related incident reported in tactics, though this is fairly stan- Kapisa this year and is also a de- dard, particularly in areas where AOG ACG parture from the standard AOG they are short on tactical capacity. actions reported which is fairly In addition, the recent poisoning As part of the recent increase of IMF within incident at a school (similar in the province, there are ongoing military opera- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS nature to that of the Parwan inci- tions (joint IMF/ANSF) within the districts of !"Ongoing military operations dent) also suggests an increased Tagab, Nijrab, and Alasay all of which are typi- !"AOG intimidation efforts will to engage in intimidation cal operational areas for AOG elements in this measures. province.

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 10

This Report Period 0 8 There have been few overt ex- 6 pressions of AOG presence attack against the Kohi Safi DAC within this province thus far, indicates that there remains an 4 though the recent IED attack active, albeit limited, AOG pres- 2 against IMF, as well as the RPG ence. This presence is most often 0 noted in intimidation efforts against GoA affiliated institutions, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS as seen in the IED attack against a AOG ACG !"IED school, as well as the mysterious !"Attacks in vicinity of Bagram Air- poisoning incident at another. base

NGO Incidents DAYKONDI DAYKUNDI Year to Date 1 10

This Report Period 1 8 Following expressed intent to ab- duct IO and GoA staff members, this commander was responsible 6 the same local commander (along for the abduction of NGO expat 4 with 2 guards) visited an INGO staff in 2008 and has been re- 2 cently attempting to solidify his field site in order to question the 0 staff. While no staff was available, involvement with AOG elements. he did question the guard in re- While the initial threat of abduc-

gards to the NGO’s activities as tion did not expressly include AOG ACG well as the number of expat staff NGO, considering the opportun- in location. It is worth noting that istic nature of group in question, within Nili and as such NGO should review this threat should be accorded to staffing/travel plans to this province in order KEY THREATS & CONCERNS include NGO. to limit the exposure of international staff to !"Abduction/kidnapping this ongoing threat. As well, this group has been able !"AOG infiltration/influence to operate with relative impunity THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents FARYAB FARYAB Year to Date 2 This Report Period 1 12 On 3 May in Kohistan District, an 10 unknown person tossed a grenade may inflame the situation in the 8 into an INGO compound, caus- province. Additionally, if NGO’s 6 ing no casualties. While the exact continue to monitor the ANSO 4 actor remains unknown, the attack Weekly Incident List, they may 2 note continual ANSF confisca- 0 is believed to be resultant from a JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC personal or professional grievance tions of communications gear and with the said INGO. NGO’s weapons, which lend credence to AOG ACG should remain diligent, however, the postulation that AOG activity because of possible AOG bleed will continue to increase in the gets. Besides the abovementioned incident, over from and province. proved to be the most discon- ethnic tensions or migrations that Moreover, if NGO’s are perceived certing area during the period, with AOG at- as colluding with any local parties tacks on ANP checkpoints. Additionally, ANP KEY THREATS & CONCERNS to the conflict—whether through conducted a successful operation that gained the release of an elder in the district that had !"Local political disputes known receipt of funding or ac- been kidnapped by AOG. !"AOG activity in Western Districts tual interaction—they may find themselves deemed legitimate tar-

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN JAWZJAN Year to Date 0

This Report Period 0 10

Jawzjan Province continues to be 8 affected by elements of criminal- the exception. 6 ity, especially in Shibirghan Dis- Regardless of the apparent lack of 4 trict. Additionally, grenade at- AOG initiated activity during the tacks—probably due to personal period, NGO’s should be wary of 2 future developments. For exam- 0 grievances—continued to occur, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC and ANSF was usually occupied ple, it is suspected that a promi- in response to normal crime, with nent AOG supporter (or proxy) AOG ACG a few AOG apprehensions being remains in the area despite IMF attempts to locate him. In the provision of AOG financial incentives. Hence, past, it was a widely held belief this AOG proxy may be in hiding and have KEY THREATS & CONCERNS that this prominent personality called only a temporary suspension to his sup- !" Local political disputes was responsible for the majority porters’ activities. !"ACG activity of banditry and attacks on ANSF and infrastructure, usually after

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NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 3 20 This Report Period 0 The prevalent hindrance to NGO 15 activities in , as province, and in Dara-e Suf Bala well as across the northern region, and Dara-e Suf Payin in Saman- 10 was flooding that continues to gan Province. With additional 5 afflict residents. Flooding was floods occurring throughout the region, NGO’s travelling in the 0 reported in Sholgara, Kishindih, JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC and Zari Amrakh districts, in the north should contact stakeholders or trusted parties in areas prior to AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS travel to ensure that the areas are open to travel. And with the upcoming summer, NGO’s !"Increased AOG activity should remain diligent to theft of items left in !"Attacks against security forces Other activity in the province en- NGO vehicles, as well as opportunistic ban- !"Criminality tailed usual elements of criminal- ity, mainly drug activity and theft. ditry.

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN BAGHLAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 Rumours of AOG activity in the 10 province and the intent to utilise it (one was his son). 8 as a springboard for future AOG The remainder of incidents fol- 6 operations persist. The increased lowed typical patterns that are 4 2 precarious nature of the situation usually seen in more active prov- 0 was brought to the fore on 6 May inces, such as ANSF seizures of JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC when it is believed that AOG suc- weapons and arrests of AOG sus-

cessfully targeted the Dahana-e pects, AOG targeting of ANSF AOG ACG Ghori District Governor, killing and IMF, and AOG desires— him, the local NDS Chief, and albeit unsuccessful—to further AOG operations, however, are dependent on guards that were escorting him utilise IED’s. Although informa- further indications from IMF. Regardless, tion from the province is limited, NGO’s should not expect to see any exacting KEY THREATS & CONCERNS NGO’s should expect to see a and effective IMF efforts to assert the GoA’s !"Instability in Eastern Districts gradual, yet steady, increase in writ and, hence, should continue to focus on !"Attacks along main routes AOG activity in the area. Assess- local acceptance measures. ments on the sustainability of

NGO Incidents BADAKSHAN B ADAKSHAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 14 Activity in Badakshan during the 12 appeared not to be linked with 10 reporting period was overwhelm- 8 ingly criminal in nature and lacked any AOG’s; however, because 6 any IED incidents, in contrast to information is limited on the inci- 4 last period’s pattern. With this, dents, it is possible that some of 2 the killings occurred because of 0 ANSF efforts predominately were JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC taken in response to murders that other issues that afflict the region writ large, such as the poppy in- AOG ACG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS dustry. Of note, though, was the !"Local political conflicts 11 May arson of a girls’ secondary the first arson of a school since the August !"Infrequent IED school in Darayim District. Ac- 2008 targeting of a tent school in Darwaz Dis- cording to ANSO records, this is trict. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 5 25 This Report Period 0 AOG sustained activity in the 20 province, primarily against ANSF. AOG armed clashes with IMF or 15 ANSF, however, AOG sustained AOG conducted almost simulta- 10 significant losses, compared to neous attacks in Chahar Dara Dis- 5 trict against different targets—one minor injures of ANSF personnel. Regardless, IED attacks took a 0 an ANP checkpoint and the other JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC an IMF patrol. In all instances of secondary role during the period,

possibly due to ANSF IED dis- AOG ACG coveries in Kunduz and Archi KEY THREATS & CONCERNS districts. NGO’s should also note their lacklustre effect, NGO’s should expect !"Increased AOG coordination the 4 May RCIED discovery on close-range ambushes to continue against !"Attacks against security forces the Kunduz-Taluqan Road in ANSF in the province. Khanabad District. Regardless of

NGO Incidents KHOST KHOST Year to Date 4 This Report Period 3 60 The number of security incidents 50 involving NGO during this re- group that stole a large amount of 40 equipment and supplies, including 30 porting period reflects the high 20 levels of violence experienced the compound’s generator. In this instance staff were able to leave 10 across the province, including a 0 complex attack in Khost City that the compound before the AOG lasted an entire day. Having been entered and were not harmed. In Qalandar District, in the west of closed due to a previous AOG AOG ACG action and two months after re- the province, a rented and un- opening, an INGO clinic in marked minibus being used to people were killed and a similar number in- Lakan, east of Khost City, was convey staff from an INGO clinic jured during the day which saw ANSF and again attacked by AOG who as- was stopped and stolen by a IMF restore relative peace to the city by early saulted staff and stole a generator group of armed men on the after- evening. A SVBIED used outside the IMF in the early hours of 01 May, and noon of 11 May. base on the outskirts Khost the following who then returned to the property The most significant event in this morning killed at least nine people and rein- later in the morning and used two period was the complex attack forced widespread anticipation that several of anti-tank mines to cause substan- against the Provincial Governor’s those responsible for the previous day’s attack tial damage to the clinic. The fol- Office and Municipality Offices in were still at large in the city. lowing evening a clinic in Khulbe- Khost City that began in the During this reporting period and without tak- sat, Sabari, was also attacked by a morning of 12 May when about ing into account the 12 May complex attack, eight members of an AOG 21 IED incidents were reported, of which ten KEY THREATS & CONCERNS dressed in ANP uniforms and were detonations against targets, injuring ap- !"IED using a ‘Ranger’ marked as an proximately 30 people and killing at least ten. ANP vehicle were able to gain The use of IED in Khost is widespread and !"AOG prevalence in Sabari access to the Governor’s com- AOG have a broad targeting strategy. IED !"Abduction along Gardez-Khost road pound. Using several BBIED in therefore remain a significant threat to all op- the initial stages, approximately 20 erating in the province. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents PAKTYA

PAKTYA Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 As was seen at the end of 2008, 15 did not cause any casualties. In AOG in Paktya are well able to 10 use a range of different means to Gardez a man transporting or 5 pursue their objectives and a placing an IED died when his greater variety of incident types device detonated prematurely on 0 are seen in the province than else- 02 May. Both Lija Mangal and where in the region. An IED in Ahamabad (Sayid Karam) DAC were attacked during this period. Chamkanay killed two members AOG ACG of an ANBP patrol on 09 May. A The Ahamabad (Sayid Karam) device used against an IMF supply attack occurred in the early hours fired at Gardez ANP Regional Training Cen- vehicle in Schwak two days later of 09 May and continued for over tre. The single round that landed in the com- two hours until IMF air support pound injured six people. The find of a heavy KEY THREATS & CONCERNS forced an AOG withdrawal, at machine gun in transit at a random checkpoint !"IED which stage it could be ascer- in the northern district of Jaji on 05 May can !"Attacks on DAC tained that approximately 20 of be taken as an indication of AOG desire to !"Abduction along Gardez-Khost the attackers had been killed. The attack aircraft. Whether the weapon was in- road only use of indirect fire in the tended for use by AOG in Paktya or elsewhere province saw six mortar rounds is not known.

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 15 This Report Period 0 With a slight increase in reported 10 AOG activity levels compared to escape and another die, and at the corresponding period in 2008, least one of the attackers captured 5 this reporting period was punctu- in the security forces’ follow-up ated by two high profile events in operation. 0 Mehtarlam City. An IED was Other reported AOG activity in used to kill the Mayor as he ap- Laghman all occurred in Qarghayi,

proached his office compound on the province’s southern district AOG ACG 04 May and also killed four of his through which the Kabul- staff and a passer-by. At least ten Jalalabad road passes for a signifi- May, and encountered an AOG that engaged other people were injured. The cant part of its length. AOG in the security forces for approximately 90 min- reporting period closed with an the district mounted three sepa- utes before withdrawing. attack on the City’s jail on 15 May. rate attacks, including two against The lack of IED activity in the Alishing and A late night firefight with those security forces using the main Alingar Valleys is noteworthy, and, coupled guarding the jail saw one prisoner road. An IED was also found with the incidents outlined above, may indicate close to the road in the area of a shift of modus operandi by AOG in the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Khayrokhel where one of the at- province who in this period have demon- !"Attacks along Route 1 tacks occurred and where similar strated two clear objectives; disrupt military !"Attacks against GoA/Security incidents are often reported. In and international traffic use of Route 1 and Forces response to the level of activity conduct limited attacks against high profile !"Abduction/Kidnapping evident in the district ANSF con- targets. ducted a search operation on 11 THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents KUNAR

KUNAR Year to Date 6 160 This Report Period 1 140 The release of two people, one of 120 100 whom was a NGO employee, on bers of both the IM and ANSF. 80 01 May followed their abduction There followed a three day secu- 60 40 by AOG on 20 April and is un- rity forces operation across the 20 derstood to be due to the efforts district and into Nuristan as AOG 0 of local mediation, which was no were harried and counter- doubt helped by a recognition that attacked, eventually releasing 12 those taken were not the intended hostages they had taken and AOG ACG targets of the abduction. Else- breaking away from the attacking where in Kunar AOG and secu- security forces. This incident Narang and Chawkay. The use of IED in rity force activity continued in comes after several weeks of in- Kunar continues to be limited with two of five accordance with expectations with creased incident reporting from incidents being detonations against targets, one significant exception. A coor- Ghaziabad and after a renewed neither of which caused casualties. As cross- dinated attack by two sizeable effort by security forces to exert border access has improved there has been an AOG saw the groups takeover a control over the district. This inci- increase in the use of indirect fire, with seven combined ANSF/IMF position in dent aside, the distribution of reported incidents. None of the projectiles Ghaziabad during the early hours events in Kunar during this period fired in these attacks, including the eleven of 01 May, killing several mem- has followed recent trends. Over rockets fired at Khas Kunar ANP HQ on 05 half of all incidents were short May, hit their targets. In two instances how- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS duration direct fire attacks, al- ever the devices fired caused civilian casualties, !"Armed clashes though as summer progresses the including students and a teacher in of Mano Gai accounts for on 07 May when a projectile launched at the !"Indirect fire attacks a smaller proportion as activity DAC landed in their school compound. !"Abduction/kidnapping levels increase in districts such as

NGO Incidents NANGAHAR NANGARHAR Year to Date 4 This Report Period 0 40

The use of IED in Nangarhar 30 continues to be the main tool of ing staff to the construction site AOG in the province. During this of an ANBP post in Dih Bala and 20 reporting period there were ten resulted in the deaths of eight 10 people. As well as attacks which IED incidents, five involving 0 detonations against targets, three caused ANSF casualties in Dih of which caused a total of 15 Bala and Goshta, two separate casualties, including ten fatalities. finds of devices close to the main AOG ACG The greatest loss of life occurred Kabul-Jalalabad road in Darunta early on 06 May when an IED are worthy of note. An ongoing those involved for almost three hours. Attacks was used against a vehicle convey- poppy eradication campaign, par- against road construction crews and DAC ac- ticularly in Nangarhar’s southern counted for most other uses of direct fire by KEY THREATS & CONCERNS districts has encountered resis- AOG in the province during this reporting !"IED tance twice during early May, in- period. !"Attacks against DAC cluding an operation in on 09 May where AOG engaged THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents NURISTAN NURISTAN Year to Date 0 25 This Report Period 0 With minimal reporting from 20 Nuristan, it is nonetheless possi- reporting period only two inci- 15 ble to discern a pattern of increas- dents have been reported. None 10 ing AOG presence across the were reported in the correspond- 5 province as incidents that are re- ing period in 2008. The release of 0 ported are occurring either in dis- hostages taken in the attack in tricts where they have not been Ghaziabad happened on 06 May in Bargi Matal, and well demon- previously, or at an earlier time of AOG ACG year than is usual. During this strates cooperation between AOG operating in different areas, par- of time on 09 May, although no casualties were ticularly around the Kunar/ caused. It is reasonable to assume an AOG KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Nuristan border. Elsewhere, the prevalence across much of the province, and !"AOG presence on main routes IMF/ANA base in Kamo was all intending to travel in Nuristan should as- !"Abduction/kidnapping again attacked for a short period sume AOG activity on major routes.

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 Farah witnessed the single largest 15 incident involving civilian casual- hours the ANSF cordon seems to 10 ties by IMF initiated air strikes have been withdrawn to allow for since the arrival of foreign military an air strike which caused up to 5 forces. The incident seems to 140 dead and 40 wounded - in- cluding many women and chil- 0 have been triggered by AOG at- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC tacks on the ANP check posts in dren. These figures also include a Ganj A Bad and Garnai villages in number of AOG casualties AOG ACG Bala Buluk district, which galva- (presently 36). It should be noted nized ANSF reinforcements and that at the time of the airstrikes, opposition as close relatives of the dead seek the consequent taking up of firing the engagement had been broken alternative means to settling grievances. The positions by AOG within the (for whatever reason) and the subsequent violent demonstrations in Farah populated areas. During night AOG had clearly established their city and the still persisting air of anger and presence in a known civil popula- helplessness, add to the existing insecurity - KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tion area. It remains unclear as to considering the possibilities of crowds venting !"Collateral damage why airstrikes were nonetheless their ire on anything perceived as ‘foreign’. !"Armed clashes utilised. NGO may consider reducing their presence !"Banditry Incidents of such nature are likely and movements to a bare minimum until tem- to help bolster the ranks of armed pers are cooled and the situation stabilizes.

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provide on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents BADGHIS BADGHIS Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 20

Badghis maintained the existing 15 high levels of AOG activity dur- previous two months. IED’s are ing this report period. Since the also being employed along roads 10 reinstallation of the provincial in the districts of Murghab, 5 commander in Feb 2009, AOG in Jawand and Qadis. In view of the ANSF and IMF planned military 0 Badghis have been reorganizing JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC and planning fresh offensives. A operations and enhanced AOG activity, the risks to civilians from considerable build up in the AOG AOG ACG rank and file has been reported being caught up in the conflict along with a few cases of deser- always remains high. There is also The announcements by the umbrella AOG - tions from ANP units. Reports of the strong possibility of air strikes of the 13 May ambush on an ANA convoy in AOG setting up check points and being carried out in support of Muqor - (along with the many other AOG resorting to forced monetary col- ground operations. NGO may offensive operations in Herat and Farah) as lections have also been rife in the remain forewarned to these devel- being part of the larger Operation Nasrat an- opments and consider appropriate nounced for this year, raises the spectre of safeguards to mitigate any possi- AOG efforts being planned and coordinated at KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ble adverse effects onto their the highest levels. Such arrangements - if true !"Significant AOG presence safety and functioning in the and sustainable – may create enough synergy !"AOG check posts province. to pose serious challenges to the authority of !"IED the state in Badghis.

NGO Incidents HERAT

HERAT Year to Date 7 25 This Report Period 0 On 6 May an IO national staff 20 member was reported being way- the police chief of Kushk and his 15 laid in Gozara district at 6 AM subsequent kidnapping and killing 10 (along with his bodyguard) by the while he was driving back to work 5 AOG in Yaka Tut – throws up after a night out with relatives. He 0 described being accosted by three strong possibilities of AOG initi- JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC ated revenge against poppy eradi- armed men who relieved him of AOG ACG his cash and identity card. The cation efforts in the district. It is motive of the robbers pointedly also an indicator of the growing were attributable to AOG. The corresponding asking for his identity document strength and influence of the figures for 2008 reflected 4 AOG incidents while allowing him to retain the AOG in the area. With the in- against a total of 11; year 2007 stood at 3 car, remains to be a matter of con- creasing number of serious inci- AOG related incidents against 10; while during jecture at this point though if true, dents; Kushk is soon likely to 2006 four AOG linked incidents were re- adds a compelling aspect to this wind up being considered as one corded against a total tally of 16. The figures otherwise pedestrian incident. of the more insecure districts in for 1st to 15th May 2009 registered a 450% Herat. The ambushing of the convoy of increase in AOG related incidents over the While Herat registered few crime average for the previous three years. The oc- related incidents, the number of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS currences are not only serious in nature but AOG related incidents have been !"IED significant too; as they indicate a trend which disproportionately larger than points to a widening and deepening of the !"Suicide Attacks ever. Of the total 54 incidents conflict within Herat. !"Criminality recorded during this period, 22 THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents GHOR GHOR Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 10 During the last fortnight Ghor 8 the previous year for the corre- recorded a total of eleven security 6 sponding period. incidents - of which five were at- 4

tributed to AOG. This reflects an The return of AOG leaders from 2 increase of 67%, from the three across the international borders 0 AOG related incidents reported and the issuing of diktats asking JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC for closure of a girl’s school in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Shahrak is a sign of the hardening AOG ACG !"AOG intimidation efforts of AOG stance and possible of- fensive posturing. Going by the remains the least insecure of the provinces for !"UXO number of occurrences, Ghor still NGO activity in the western region.

NGO Incidents URUZGAN URUZGAN Year to Date 2 This Report Period 0 20 Although incidents in the prov- 15 ince, even in Tirin Kot, were tating deliberate steps while con- minimal during the period, ducting even everyday tasks. Ad- 10 NGO’s should heed the security ditionally, Chora remains semi- 5 vacuum as a precautionary warn- permissive due to the concluding ing. Moreover, because AOG’s poppy season in the province, 0 are pervasive throughout the increasing risk of AOG or ACG JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC province, and in search of GoA or targeting, and IED emplacements AOG ACG IMF collaborators, neutrality in the area of the Chora crossing. should be emphasized and collu- Additionally, NGO’s should gen- ing law and order in the district, though, assert- sion—perceived or actual—with erally avoid areas where suspected ing that AOG have primarily withdrawn from antagonists should be avoided. AOG migration into the province the urban centres. Likewise, Charar Chineh is Tirin Kot, Chora, and Dihrawud occurs, mainly in Mirabad and extremely hazardous for NGO operations, and districts remain areas that NGO’s Dihrashan, areas that border Hel- the Baluchi Valley is affected by poppy cultiva- can operate in; however, outside mand Province. AOG in the for- tion and IED emplacements, including trip- areas continue to be of concern mer district are reportedly relying wires that were seen in Kakarak. due to the dominant AOG pres- on IED’s and utilising them to Incident levels in , unfortu- ence, or merely restive local popu- channel local traffic through es- nately, do not presently allow for projections laces that are highly sceptical of tablished AOG checkpoints. Khas in relation to the conflict, because it appears outside interference, thus necessi- Uruzgan, a past AOG logistical that AOG may not be dedicating sufficient hub, also remains a precarious resources to the region. It is likely, however, if KEY THREATS & CONCERNS area for NGO’s due to ANSF and there will be any significant uptick in violence, GoA shortcomings. IMF and signs will manifest within a month’s time. !"IED along main routes ANSF suggest that they have !"Suicide attacks made limited inroads into further- THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR

KANDAHAR Year to Date 4 80 This Report Period 0 AOG and ANSF activity in Kan- 60 dahar during this reporting period Additionally, NGO’s should con- 40 sider these to be existent threats continued to have a destabilising 20 effect on the province. Of signifi- because of past AOG successful 0 cant note is a general threat con- attacks on GoA facilities during veying the AOG intent to target multi-agency meetings, which ulti- an IO’s staff and Kandahar Pro- mately will likely serve as future vincial Council members utilising AOG exemplars. AOG ACG SVBIED’s and IED’s, with the Furthermore, a 10 May grenade latter devices probably actually attack occurred on a compound prevalence of small arms, munitions, and ex- referring to BBIED’s on motor- of the abovementioned IO in Dis- plosives in the city, NGO’s should consider bikes, as is typical in AOG suicide trict 6, Kandahar City, demon- the city to be very hazardous. Conversely, it is operations. Additionally, a sepa- strating that small-scale, guerrilla important to note that AOG operations during rate, but possibly related, threat style attacks are almost impossible this period were not following the usual modus was received expressing the intent to combat in such a non- operandi of conducting sustained or lethal at- to target the Kandahar Gover- permissive environment. There tacks on ANSF: most were fleeting attacks nor’s Palace, the Provincial Coun- was also a spate of grenade attacks meant to harass ANSF and then evade capture cil Chamber, an office of the same in Kandahar City during the pe- or targeting. Thus, AOG may be intent upon IO, ANBP HQ, ANP HQ, NDS riod: on 11 May in District 2, a conducting nimble and numerous attacks, ver- HQ, and the Indian Consulate construction company compound sus concerted ambushes. This shift in tactics with SVBIED/VBIED’s. While and a PSC compound were both could be resultant from recent grandiose of- the credibility of these threats is targeted in the evening; and on 12 fensives and attacks in other provinces that unknown, NGO’s should con- May in the area of Arghand Abi required a shift in resources, or a new attempt tinually minimise trips to likely Chowk, an ANP post was tar- to further erode ANSF morale by taking away AOG-targeted venues, including geted in the evening. the elements of safety and reprieve, a tactic that may prove successful. Additionally, it may IO facilities, as a general practice. Additionally, AOG infiltration of be a new AOG method writ large, avoiding Kandahar City continues, with presenting a large target to ANSF or IMF and KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF finds of explosives, muni- keeping possible losses, especially involving !"IED tions, BBIED vests, ANP uni- manpower, low. With the upcoming surge, it is !"Suicide attacks forms, communications gear, possible this new approach will solidify. !"Armed clashes IEDs, grenades and weapons in districts 3, 4, 9, and 10. With the

NGO Incidents GHAZNI G HAZNI Year to Date 1 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC 80 This Report Period 0

The state of the conflict in Ghazni 60 Province during this reporting having at least two incidences of period was consistent with past above normal lethal IED attacks 40 AOG intentions to strike ANSF, on ANP: on 7 May, 6 were killed, IMF logistical convoys, and IMF and on 6 May, 5 were killed. 20 patrols. The overwhelming major- In spite of data suggesting that 0 ity of AOG spurred incidents oc- AOG IED strikes are more favor-

curred in Qarabagh District, fol- able for AOG’s, they continue to AOG ACG lowed by Andar, with the former employ close-range ambushes, just as is seen in other provinces NGO’s should expect AOG to continue to throughout the country. Further- employ coordinated ambushes against ANSF KEY THREATS & CONCERNS more, while these ambushes are and others in the province, likely due to an !"Indirect fire attacks generally successful against PSC’s, overabundance of manpower in the province !"Increased AOG presence almost all occurrences that in- and a desire to force ANSF or IMF to address !"Attacks along Hwy 1 volved ANP led to inordinate the attacks, spreading their numbers thin. AOG casualties. Regardless, THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 1 20 This Report Period 0 Minus a few typical AOG attacks 15 came to the fore in early May. on ANP posts in the province, 10 reported activity was very low Besides past revelations that local during this period. The incident clerics were involved in encourag- 5 levels aside, recent news that dem- ing suicide attacks in support of the opposition, new information 0 onstrates collusion between local JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC religious clerics and those in- now suggests that they are also encouraging suicide attacks volved in the poppy industry AOG ACG against counter-drug efforts. By arguing that drug trafficking is a now assert it is legitimate to conduct suicide KEY THREATS & CONCERNS viable alternative to armed jihad attacks to stymie counter-drug efforts. Al- !"Suicide attacks in Zaranj/Khash (the argument suggests that drugs, though NGO presence in the province is lim- Rod like armed resistance, damage the ited, all steps should thus be taken to avoid !"Limited security force presence in lives of non-believers, especially being present during any poppy eradication or rural areas on a global level) local mullahs associated with any counter-drug efforts.

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 35 This Report Period 0 30 The disconcerting situation in 25 Paktika persists, with a probable attack on ANP close to the Gov- 20 ernor’s compound was only extin- 15 and notable escalation in violence 10 looming over the horizon. Re- guished after IMF air support ar- 5 ports of an estimated inflow of rived. 0 700 AOG members into Turwo The abovementioned incidents District in early May support this, only distinguished themselves as well as AOG warnings to locals from typical patterns of violence, AOG ACG in Yahya Khel district that an at- including multiple strikes on tack on the local ANP HQ was ANP, IED fatalities of PSC per- threat, keeping a safe distance from typical imminent. Furthermore, the 13 sonnel, and executions, for exam- AOG target subsets—IMF, ANSF, construc- May AOG attack in Sharan Dis- ple, as seen in the killing of the tion companies, etc. Furthermore, the threat of trict was an example of AOG te- Governor on 12 kidnap is omnipresent, as seen in the kidnap nacity, when a two hour AOG May. NGO’s should also note that and later release of eight civilians in Turwo IED activity in the province, District, and the 5 May kidnap and execution KEY THREATS & CONCERNS while usually not discussed be- of four purported IMF collaborators as they !"IED cause of its regular occurrence, is were travelling in Mani Kandaw, Urgun Dis- !"AOG intimidation pervasive and of grave concern. trict. !"Increased AOG presence NGO’s should always heed this THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents HELMAND HELMAND Year to Date 1 This Report Period 0 70 The threat of AOG activity has 60 been increasingly developing over addition, AOG’s have purportedly 50 divided into teams of five or six 40 the past few reporting periods in 30 the province, with this reporting members, with each team contain- 20 period noticing the continued in- ing one or two BBIED attack- 10 tensification of a considerable ers—a method that AOG hope 0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC deployment of AOG forces as will prove successful in striking well as the severity of AOG prominent targets within popu- AOG ACG driven incidents. lated areas. self. Reported casualties from both detona- The most recent AOG deploy- The recent three BBIED attacks tions were as follows: 3 civilians, two ANP, ment has been reported in Lash- in Nahri Sarraj District reinforce and two ANA killed; and ten civilians, nine kar Gah City and its neighbouring the abovementioned theory, signi- ANP, and one ANA wounded. The com- district, Nad Ali. The AOG are fying a possible shift in AOG tac- mander, who is a former warlord and is report- reportedly equipped with vehicles tics that may promulgate through edly not held in high regard by the local popu- and motorbikes, and they are the entire SR. The first BBIED lace, escaped unharmed from the explosions. planning to attack ANP posts, attack was against a joint ANP The abovementioned attack is the latest in a emplace IED’s, and possibly en- and IMF foot patrol, which led to string of such attacks within the SR to strike gage in other offensive activities, the death of 5 IMF soldiers, 2 prominent targets through a staged multiple such as ambushes, to hinder the ANP, 20 civilians and an addi- BBIED attack. use of major routes. Furthermore, tional 12 civilians being wounded. as seen in other provinces in the The second suicide attack was Despite the AOG initiatives, IMF and ANSF SR during this period, locals in comprised of 2 BBIED attackers continued to actively engage AOG’s in Nada some villages of Nad Ali have who were on motorbikes and ap- Ali, Nawa, and Nahri Sarraj districts during the already been warned to leave their proached an ANP vehicle that reporting period. With this, AOG’s reportedly residences for possible imminent contained an ANP commander. continued to suffer a large number of casual- AOG attacks on GoA facilities. In To initiate the attack, one BBIED ties from these unabated operations. attacker dismounted and deto- As reported in the past, and highlighted by KEY THREATS & CONCERNS nated himself at the rear of the recent incidents, AOG’s are consequently !"Suicide attacks vehicle. Following this, ANA, more likely to resume an active assertion of !"Attacks against ANP ANP and civilians responded to their presence in response to increased suc- !"Ongoing military operations the scene, after which the second cesses by ANSF and IMF forces in the region. BBIED attacker detonated him-

NGO Incidents ZABUL ZABUL Year to Date 0 40 This Report Period 0 The previously reported threat of 30 IED’s has been sharply develop- phasize that their preferred and ing throughout the province. In intended targets are GoA person- 20 this reporting period, as many as nel and IMF, as opposed to civil- 10 eighteen IED related incidents, ians; however, this week’s most significant incidents included the 0 both detonations and recoveries JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC of the devices, have been experi- targeting of two different inno- cent civilians’ vehicles—in Qalat enced across the province. With AOG ACG the consistent employment of City and Shinky District—which IEDs, AOG had sought to em- resulted in the death of fifteen threats from credible sources, indicating that civilians and the wounding of two AOG have emplaced a large number of IED’s KEY THREATS & CONCERNS others, with the victims including along routes that connect Qalat City with its !"Prevailing IED threat women and children. neighbouring districts. NGOs are thus advised !"Attacks against ANP Additionally, ANSO South con- to take any sensible precautions in order to tinues to receive additional IED minimise the risk of being caught in the fray. THE AFGHANISTAN NGO OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING

CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) ANSO is hosted by This report ANSO Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Phil Priestley - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Mukhtar Hussain - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 could not provide analysis for the prov- inces of: NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Scott Bohlinger - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz Fahez - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 !" Logar To Register with ANSO !" Panjshir contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) !" Sar-E-Pul [email protected] Chris Hansen - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 !" Samangan Khisrow Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 !" Takhar

ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) This is because we Board. If you have any Mohammadi - [email protected] - 0700 300 730 do not know enough feedback, good or bad, let about the area to them know on: comment on the sig- [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) nificance of the inci- Kulvinder Brar- [email protected] - 0799 322 192 dents occurring ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0799 446 820 there.

IMF-International Military COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) If you can help us Forces / AOG-Armed Oppo- Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 understand the prov- sition Groups / GOA- Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Government of Afghanistan ince better please Chona Bollos - [email protected] - 0797 093 073 / ACG-Armed Criminal contact us. Groups / ANA-Afghan Na- Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 414 100 tional Army / ANP-Afghan National Police / IED- Improvised Exploding De- TRAINING ANNOUNCEMENT: vice / AEF-Afghan Eradica- Please note that ANSO will be hosting The Armadillo Group for the following tion Forces / RPG-Rocket training sessions: Propelled Grenade / IDF- Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- Personal Safety and Security Course: 25-27 June 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan, vised Exploding Device / ANSO Main Office PRP-Previous Reporting Period / ANBP-Afghan Na- Security Management Course (including Crisis Management): 28 June-2 July tional Border Police / SAF- Small Arms Fire / NDS- 2009, Kabul, Afghanistan, ANSO Main Office National Directorate of Se- curity (intelligence) / PSC- For further details and registration for these courses, NGO are encouraged to Private Security Company / contact The Armadillo Group directly at the following address: DC-District Centre [email protected]