Selected articles concerning Israel, published weekly by Suburban Orthodox Toras Chaim’s (Baltimore) Israel Action Committee Edited by Jerry Appelbaum ( [email protected] ) | Founding editor: Sheldon J. Berman Z”L

Issue 8 9 9 Volume 2 1 , Number 3 1 Parshias Shoftim August 1 4 , 2021

Israel’s Current Government Aims to Imitate Benjamin Netanyahu’s Great Economic Transformation By Haviv Rettig Gur timesofisrael.com August 8, 2021 Before the coronavirus crisis, there was the economic Many have expressed surprise that an Israeli crisis of the second intifada. government that holds the narrowest pos sible Knesset In the throes of the 2009 financial meltdown, Barack majority, bickers constantly with itself, and is largely Obama’s chief of staff Rahm Emmanuel famo usly advised managed by political neophytes could have dared to put to “never allow a good crisis go to waste.” Let the crisis, he forward such an ambitious budget. Some have suggested said, be the instigator for a transformative policy shift. that the government’s very fragility may be responsible for The aphorism didn’t begin with Emmanuel. Winston its bold plans. Ministers who fear they may not remain in Churchill was once credited with the insight. Indeed, it’s a office for very long are all the more eager to accomplish a basic truth of politics. A crisis, by definition, is a moment great deal quickly. when the old order no longer provides clear solutions to But there’s a larger phenomenon at work, too, an new conditions and threats, when predicaments proliferate implicit grasp by all parties in the new coalition that the and outcomes are unknowable. From the inadequacy of crisis that now grips the country — the combined effects the old order’s rules and privileges and from the dire peril of the resurgent pandemic and the past two years of of the moment, new ways of thinking are introduced into unprecedented political deadlock — has opened a rare the world. A crisis is a moment of creation. window of opportunity for effecting profound and long - Israel’s cu rrent political moment is no exception to delayed change. that rule. It’s been 18 months since SARS - CoV - 2 arrived In the 1970s, partly sparked by the 1973 war and high on Israel’s shores. It’s been 2.5 years since Israel first defense spending in its wake and then accelerating after embarked on this new era of repeat elections and deeply 1977 during Likud’s first term as Israel’s ruling party, dysfunctional governments. And amid the tur moil – Israel’s economy entered a slow, implacable freefall. From because of the turmoil — the most dramatic budget bill in 1979 to 1985, Israel entered a period of runaway inflation. a generation is now headed to the Knesset. The numbers were s taggering: 133% in 1980, followed by This bill is no mere budget; it’s a collection of deep 101% the following year, then 132%, 191% and 445% in and consequential reforms with the potential to change 1984. The government was at a loss. Prime Minister Israeli society in important ways. It upends the old ways of Menachem Begin cycled through four finance ministers in thinking about the Israeli state’s responsibility for its Arab six years, each tasked with righting the ship, each leaving it citizens; takes a sledgehammer to structural obstructions in worse shape than they found it. that have long plagued the Israeli economy, from Israel replaced its currency twice in that period, protectionist import policies to state price - setting on basic jettisoning the lira in favor of the shekel in 1980, then s taples; reimagines Israel’s public transportation network abandoning the shekel in 1985 in favor of the new shekel, and environmental commitments, including slashing with the new currency’s value set by erasing three zeroes regulation and easing import rules on electric vehicles; off the shekel it replaced. opens the banking system to more competition, especially The turnaround finally came in the 1984 election, online and via mobile apps; dramat ically increases which ended in a national - unity power - sharing government spending on health and defense while cutting expenditures with a rotating prime minister. Labor’s Shimon Peres went on most other things; and promises a major overhaul and first, to be followed by Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir two yea rs streamlining of governmental red tape in a plan officials later. Likud politician Yitzhak Modai was appointed are trying to sell to the public as a “regulatory revolution.” finance minister. Unlike the succession of short - lived It d oes things long deemed politically unfeasible, such finance ministers who came before him, Modai, backed by as raising the retirement age for women and opening the Peres, thought big. agricultural import market to competition. By 1985, inflation was headed past the 1,000% mark. It’s not clear that all those dramatic reforms will The emergency had finally grown gargantuan enough to survive to the bill’s final version slated to come up for a push aside the powerful interests and political partisanship final vote in the Knesset in early November. Opposition to that had previously prevented the kinds of deep reforms some of the most dramatic reforms has been fierce. But that could rescue the Israeli economy. even if it is watered down, it will still constitute the most It was an extraordinary moment. Israelis in 1985 knew dramatic and comprehensive set of governmental and they were s afe from their external enemies in a way that social reforms in a ge neration. It’s been two decades, in the Israelis 20 years earlier had not known. But as the inflation 2003 budget law advanced by then - finance minister crisis wore on and the government’s reform efforts Benjamin Netanyahu, since anyone has seen a bill that repeatedly proved fruitless, they began to wonder if Israel even aspires to such feats. itself hadn’t become its own worst en emy. F o c u s o n Is ra el August 14, 2 0 21 Page 2

It was only when the crisis became sufficiently acute dependent on the Israeli economy — and was flourishing that Peres and Modai found themselves working because of it. Israelis could safely travel in Palestinian cities harmoniously across party lines; that a Labor - led in those days and had developed a habit of buying cheaper government finally brought itself to brow - beat the labor Palestinian goods and services, from car parts to dentistry, unions into accepting salary freezes and maj or industries valued at hundreds of millions of dollars annually. into accepting price controls, that public spending could Together with overseas tourists, they dropped half a billion be drastically cut, that the Bank of Israel’s ability to lend dollars annually, equal to over 10% of the Palestinian money to cover deficits could be made illegal, and that GDP, at Jericho’s c asino. Palestinian unemployment many government - owned companies long treated as the dropped in the Oslo years from nearly 25% to 10%. About special preser ve of political apparatchiks could finally be 150,000 Palestinians, or nearly a fifth of employed privatized. Palestinians, held jobs in Israel earning higher salaries than The crisis wasn’t, at its root, merely the unavoidable could be found in the Palestinian economy. Palestinia ns aftermath of the 1973 war, Israeli leaders came to were the most highly educated Arab people at the time, understand. It was driven by a deeper and older structural constituting double - digit percentages of Hebrew problem. The inefficiencies of an economy long managed University’s student body, and Palestinian per capita by statist ideologues and institutions had reached the income was the highest of any non - oil - producing Arab breaking point, and the Peres - Shamir government of 1984 country. was wise enough to take advantage of the opportunity to The Palestinian economy needs Isra el to thrive. That’s make a clean break with the old ways of doing business. as true today as it was then, as true under occupation as it The result was an unmitigated success: inflation will be in a Palestinian state, and as galling to today’s dropped to 20% within two years, growth resumed, and Palestinian ideologues as it was to the ideologues of a the Israeli economy was humming along toward present - generation ago. day levels of stability and growth by the time the Russian - But Israel’s economy needed the Palestinians , too, at speaking immigration wave began in the early 1990s. least in those days. As they grew wealthier from trade with I t is hard to exaggerate the importance of Modai’s Israel, Palestinians became eager consumers of Israeli reforms to Israel’s future strength and prosperity. The products, with some 1.7 billion dollars in Israeli exports to Bank of Israel was freed from government control by law, the PA annually, or 7% of total Israeli exports excluding enabling it to set monetary policy independent of the diamonds. P alestinian labor drove the Israeli agriculture government’s immediate cash - flow needs. The and construction industries. government’s iron grip on vast swaths of the economy was The onset of the Second Intifada reversed those shaken loose through privatization, setting a precedent that trends, hurting both sides deeply and in interconnected would accelerate throughout the 1990s and 2000s. But ways. A flourishing customs - free trading area that was perhaps most profoundly, the old debates between pushing Palestinians ever upward and helping to drive socialists and liberalizers wer e settled, and free - market - Israeli economic growth was suddenly, in the terror wave oriented economic policy became the baseline for judging and the resulting regime of curfews and checkpoints, government spending from 1985 onward. transformed into “a war zone,” in the words of Israeli Then - prime minister Yitzhak Shamir (left) and then - economic analyst Sever Plocker. foreign minister Shimon Peres at a Mimouna celebration at So great was the pivot tha t many Israeli analysts like Sacher Park in Jerusalem, March 15, 1988. (Nati Plocker, flabbergasted by the Palestinian turn amid peace Harnik/Government Press Office) hopes and unprecedented economic flourishing toward Suicide bombers and airline privatizations massive violence, speculated that the Second Intifada was Then it happened again. driven by a “deliberate decision” by Yasser Arafat “to The Second Intifada that began in October 2000 is unde rmine what he saw as dangerous signs of stabilization little remembered today overseas. Scholars and think tank and prosperity in the West Bank and Gaza,” the sort of analysts routinely pen thi ck books on the Israeli - prosperity that might undermine his authoritarian rule and Palestinian conflict with barely a mention of the event. But sideline his revolutionary agenda. for Israelis and Palestinians, both in real time and for the Among Palestinians, unemployment quadrupled two decades that have followed, it was a searing, watershed almost im mediately to as high as 40%, while the loss of the event that upended assumptions and profoundly chan ged Palestinian labor supply was cited by the IMF as a major how each side viewed the other. factor driving the steep recession in Israel after 2000. It sparked a crisis in Israeli politics, especially on the Israeli and Palestinian consumers vanished from the left, from which the political system has yet to recover. others’ horizons. Tourism, a multi - bill ion - dollar industry in And it plunged Israelis and Palestinians into an economic the Holy Land, crashed on both sides of the Green Line. nosedive unseen before or since. The Bank of Israel estimated that the violence in 2002 It’s commonl y understood that the Palestinian alone, at the height of the Second Intifada, cost Israel 3.8% economy before 2000 was deeply integrated into and of its GDP. Checkpoints and roadblocks went up Page 3 August 14, 2021 Focus on Israe l everywhere in the West Bank and Gaza, choking the on buses and in pizzerias over three - plus years — had internal Palestinian economy. Israelis fearful of suicide nothing to do with the reforms. But as in 1985, the crisis bombings stayed away from public spaces, emptying malls was the psychic shakeup that the public and the and markets for long stretches. Extended uncertainty dried government bureaucracy needed to accept deep chang e. It up investment. The absolute number of poor in Israel silenced outrage and weakened the resolve of special grew by 22%. interests. It opened the window. The Palestinians suffered more from the economic 1985, 2003, 2021 downturn since their economy was much smaller and their Today’s Netanyahu is not the radical reformer of 2003. dependence on Israel far greater than Israel’s dependence Few fundamental reforms have moved forward since he on them. But the Israelis were nevertheless experiencing reentered the prime minister’s office in 2009. Where their sharpest - e ver recession amid a campaign of suicide Finance Minister Netanyahu hungered for momentous bombings and other terror attacks that by 2002 was in its transformations, Prime Minister Netanyahu invariably third consecutive year with no end in sight. favored stability. Even the 2011 cost - of - living protests It was into that maelstrom, amid the worst economic produced almost no policy changes from Netanyahu’s emergency since the hyperinflation of the 1980s, that governments in the decade since. Countless problems, Benjam in Netanyahu, by then already a former prime from economic marginalization and violence in the Arab minister, strode with the confidence of a revolutionary, community to price - hiking overregulation of imports to embraced the crisis — and reshaped the Israeli economy. the steadily worsening blight of traffic jams in the major As Ariel Sharon’s finance minister from 2003, metropolitan centers, have gone mostly unaddressed. Few Netanyahu’s first act was to declare that Israel’s economic reforms we re advanced, and fewer still were implemented. troubles weren’t caused by the intifada, but by “a system in Until now. Until the formation of the fragile, ever - which a smaller business sector must feed and support an teetering, crisis - born government of Naftali Bennett and enormous and expanding public se ctor.” Israeli Yair Lapid. government spending as a share of the economy was Very few of the reforms being advanced by this among the highest in the world, as was the tax burden on government have anything to do with the p andemic or the the country’s middle class. State - run monopolies had the political crisis of repeat elections. Neither the pandemic energy and infrastructure industries in a chokehold. Israel’s nor the underlying political deadlock will be ended by the own government, Netanyahu argued, was inflicting far serious attention this government is giving to those more economic harm than the suicide bombers of Fatah longstanding challenges. and Hamas. Nor is it certain that the reforms — if, inde ed, this To answer that challenge, he presented his “Economic narrow coalition manages to pass them into law by Recovery Plan,” which dramatically reduced welfare November — will prove as effective and beneficial as the spending, including child subsidies for large fami lies on changes wrought by Modai in 1985 or Netanyahu in 2003. which large parts of the Haredi community depended, The point here is simpler. As in those years, in a raised the retirement age, lowered taxes and expedited the pattern too consistent to be coinc idence, the broader crisis sell - off to the private sector of hundreds of government - liberated the political system from comfortable old habits owned companies, including the El Al airline. and assumptions, opening a political window for deep It was an extraordinary moment: Ne tanyahu used the reforms that comes but rarely in Israeli political life. economic downturn of the Second Intifada to launch a That’s the Israeli experience in a nutshell: Profound broadside on the deepest structural problems in the Israeli crises always carry a brightly shining silver lining. The crisis economy, from infrastructure monopolies to public - sector opens a window, and it’s up to the political leadership to spending. take advantage of it. The emergency Netanyahu encountered in 2003 — a recession s parked by suicide bombings detonating weekly

The U.S. Needs a Plan B for Iran By Elliott Abrams nationalreview.com August 4, 2021 If the ayatollahs don’t want to return to the nuclear policy fails. And it will surely fail, as has become deal — then what? increasingly evident this summer. The Biden administration has a very clear policy When the administration began, it was already clear toward Iran: Get back in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of that a return to the JCPOA was not guaranteed. Privately, Action (JCPOA) and then negotiate a “longer a nd officials rated it as a 75 – 80 percent chance. And it was stronger” agreement, one with longer sunsets and that already clear that a “longer and st ronger” agreement was covers Iran’s missile program and its support for terrorism. extremely unlikely. Why, after all, should Iran agree to Simple enough. What Biden, Sullivan, Blinken and more concessions after the terms of the JCPOA required company have never explained is what’s Plan B when that Foc us o n Is rae l August 14, 2021 Page 4 the United States to lift the most significant economic 2018, did not fail; it did not have enough time. Biden can sanctions? continue it and see if Iran acts differently. In any event, In the last few months, the chances of getting back to there is no defense for lifting any sanctions while Ir an the JCPOA have fallen farther. The supreme leader’s violates the JCPOA and continues to support terrorism going - away present to outgoing Iranian president Rouhani, throughout the Middle East — and even in the United in a speech the New York Times headlined as “Khamenei States. Adds to Doubts on Iran Nuclear Deal,” was to condemn Remember snapback? This provision, built into the “trust in the West.” And even if by off ering some deeper, JCPOA in 2015, permitted any party that is a participant in even more damaging U.S. concessions Biden lures Iran the deal to “snap back” all t he U.N. sanctions. Trump tried back to the JCPOA, the chances for a follow - on it, but every other country said the U.S. had withdrawn agreement are near zero. from the JCPOA and thereby lost the right to impose Meanwhile, Iran has been moving forward rapidly snapback. Then Biden returned to the agreement, and on toward nuclear weapons. It is enriching uranium to higher February 18 he informed the U.N. that everything Trump levels and preventing International Atomic Energy Agency had sai d to that body regarding the JCPOA was now inspections. The IAEA’s May 31 report on the “NPT rescinded. Biden’s job would be persuading France and the Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” U.K. to go along in the Security Council, and persuading is a catalogue of unanswered questions. In polite language, Germany to support the move. This should be far easier Rafael Grossi, the IAEA director genera l, states that there now, for two reasons. First, whatever the f acts were in are four locations where uranium particles have been 2018 when Trump left the agreement, it has become found — and no answers from Iran. Instead there is crystal clear that Iran is in significant violation of it. obfuscation, delay, and violation of Iran’s legal obligations. Second, rejecting such a move by Biden would be difficult “The lack of progress in clarifying the Agency’s questions for the Europeans given all the efforts to patch up U.S. – concernin g the correctness and completeness of Iran’s European relations since January 20. safeguards declarations seriously affects the ability of the There is a third logical step as well: getting serious Agency to provide assurance of the peaceful nature of about Iranian military activity. If Iran is going to continue Iran’s nuclear programme,” Grossi states. Translated from its recent behavior — building toward a nuclear weapon, diplo - speak, that means Iran is gettin g closer to a weapon leading Shiite militias in Iraq to attack Americans there, and keeping us in the dark. Grossi himself was engagi ng in terrorist activities — the United States should straightforward in an interview: “We found traces of respond more directly. President Biden should say what uranium that has been subject to industrial processing in President Obama did about Iranian nukes: that “all different places, which had not been declared by Iran. That elements of American power” will be used to prevent Iran is a big problem. ” Indeed it is, especially when Iran is now from getting nuclear weapons. The Unite d States should enriching uranium to 60 percent — a grade needed only also begin better planning with Israel in view of the when preparing to build nuclear weapons. potential need, at some future date, to act against Iran’s Biden officials have admitted that this can’t go on nuclear program before it creates a weapon. As to forever. At some point Iran’s activities will have made the terrorism, the president should tell Iran clearly now that if JCPOA and its sunsets a joke, by undertaking activities an American is killed by a Shiite militia in Iraq linked to supposedly forbidden for years to come. Negotiations will and armed by Iran, the United States will respond against resume in late August, with Iran’s new president, the Iran — not against some proxy group in Iraq. And he sanctioned “hanging judge” Ebrahim Raisi, having taken should state clearly that an Iranian - backed terrorist attack over. If talks go nowhere in the summe r and early fall, in the United States will result in dire ct consequences for while Iran’s nuclear - weapons program progresses, at some Iran itself. point the United States will have to say the game is over. But as noted, the problem is politics. How much Certainly Israel will be saying so more and more loudly. support is there in the Democratic Party for any such steps If a return to the JCPOA is out, what might Plan B — for any Plan B? The JCPOA has taken on sacred status, look like? In truth there are several things the Biden and Democrats have with rare exceptions bought into the administration can do — easily and logically. The problem lin e that it’s the JCPOA or war. Biden is boxed in by some is politics. of the rhetoric that he, Obama, and the Obama flacks such With Iran violating the JCPOA more and more as Ben Rhodes used in 2015. While a small handful of aggressively despite Biden’s pleas, step one should be Democrats may take a different view in public and a few maintaining all the Trump - era sanctions, inde finitely. That more may silently recognize that the Obama – Biden policy is what the Trump administration planned to do: keep is now dangerously out of date, the party will stick with the sanctions on until Iran understands that it must negotiate. old line as long as Biden does. And so far, he has shown The sanctions place Iran’s economy under enormous no willingness or ability to rethink the arguments made in pressure; recently its foreign - currency reserves were down 2015, when Obama said this at American University: to $4 billion, less than half of Afghanistan’s. The Cong ressional rejection of this deal leaves any U.S. “maximum pressure campaign,” which Trump began in administration that is absolutely committed to preventing Page 5 August 14, 2 0 21 Focus on Israe l

Iran from getting a nuclear weapon with one option, will declare the negotiatio ns and the entire deal alive long another war in the Middle East. I say this not to be after they are in fact dead. provocative; I am stating a fact. Without th is deal, Iran will A less biased press would now be asking about Plan B, be in a position, however tough our rhetoric may be, to and Republicans in Congress should certainly do so. Plan steadily advance its capabilities. Its breakout time, which is A has been on life support since Biden came into office. already fairly small, could shrink to near zero. The choice The president should now explain, to Americans and not we face is ultimately between diplomacy or some form of least to Iran, what he plans to do when the JCPOA is wa r. Maybe not tomorrow, maybe not three months from finally declared dead. now, but soon. Mr. Abrams was special representative for Iran in the Trump JCPOA or war — pretty simple formula. If Biden and administration. He chairs the Vandenberg Coalition and is a senior the Democrats continue to actually believe that, they will fellow at the Council o n Foreign Relations. make endless concessions to get back to the JCPOA or

Iran and Russia Are Growing Closer By Bat Chen Feldman and Daniel Rakov inss.org.il August 4, 2021 Putin’s foreign minister entertained Hizballah in intends to sell a satellite to Iran, and also claimed that there Moscow. is no progress on additional weapons sales between the Over the past year, Russia and Iran continued to countries. strengthen their political relations, at the center of which Clearly, the broad scope of American sanctions on are coordinated positions regarding the nuclear deal. In the Iran and Russia is pushing the two to hide the extent of summer and fall of 2020 Russia firmly opposed, including their military relations from the media. Given the at the UN Security Council, the Trump admi nistration's Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act attempt to activate the snapback mechanism and to (CAATSA legislation), countries acquiring w eapons from prevent the removal of the weapons embargo on Iran. In Moscow run the risk of paying a high political and the negotiations underway in Vienna regarding a return to economic price vis - à - vis Washington. However, Moscow the nuclear deal, which began after President Biden for its part took legislative measures to absolve military entered the White House, of the six powers involved in the bodies of publicity requirements, and imposed heavy negotiations the Russian positions the closest to the punishments on journalists wh o reported such positions of Iran. In addition, Moscow has displayed a connections. The Russian weapons industry is in great tolerant approach toward Iran's ongoing violations in the need of the Iranian market, and can provide Tehran with field of uranium enrichment and accumulated stockpiles, good, long - term financing conditions that address Iran's al though it has called on Tehran to refrain from this current financial difficulties. activity. Furthermore, the Russians are pessimistic about Iran, which in any case is under sanction s, is not the ability of reaching agreements with Iran on limiting its concerned about acquiring Russian weapons, and lacking missile capabilities and containing its aggressive regional better alternatives for purchasing advanced weapons policy, and thus also opp ose the American demand to platforms, could sign new deals with Russia after the include these issues in the negotiations. outcome of the talks in Vienna becomes clear. In the past Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif it was reported that Iran e xpressed interest in acquiring Su - visited Moscow in January 2021, soon after the 30 fighter aircraft, Yak - 130 training aircraft, the S - 400 air inauguration of the Biden administration, where he signed defense system, diesel submarines, surface ships, Bastion a cooperation agreement with Russia on the issue of coastal defense systems (which are armed with Yakhont "security in the information realm" (which in Russia's eyes missiles), and T - 90 tanks. includes the cyber field). Many interpreted the agreement In the past few month s there has also been greater intended for technological cooperation between the military cooperation between the countries, especially in countries, but in practice, it aims mainly at advancing the naval field. Since the beginning of 2021, the Russian similar worldvi ews in international organizations regarding navy has reportedly protected Iranian ships in the sovereignty in the cyber realm and non - intervention in Mediterranean Sea en route to Syria. In April, the national internal affairs. Russian news agency Sputnik reported the establishment Nine months have passed since the removal of the of a Russian - Iranian - Syrian coordination mechanism in the embargo on weapons sales to Iran, without Russia and Mediterranean Sea, in order to ensure the supply of oil Iran having publicly announced new d eals, but behind the from Iran to Syria. These reports appear to be a message scenes, their cooperation in this area is deepening. On the to Israel, against the backdr op of attacks against Iranian eve of the Putin - Biden summit (June 16, 2021), it was ships attributed to Israel. According to Israeli sources, reported in the American media that Russia was about to these ships carried "game - changing" weapons to Syria, and provide Iran with an earth observation satellite that would not just oil cargo. In February, on the eve of the start of suppl y it precise intelligence, including for military the Vienna talks, Russia conducted a joint naval e xercise purposes. However, President Putin denied that Russia with Iran (and despite early Iranian reports, China did not Foc u s o n Israel August 14, 2021 Page 6 join). In July, for the first time, Iranian ships participated in not been fulfilled. In March the sides marked the extension Russia's Navy Day parade in St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, of the "agreement on the basic principles of relations Russian and Iranian military forces in Syria continue to between Russia and Iran," which was signed in 2001. In cooperate to defend the Assad regime, but there have also practice, this is a non - event, as the agreement is been reports of tensions between them, which sometimes automatically ex tended every 5 years, unless one of the deteriorate into violent confrontations between proxy sides opposes doing so. forces of the two sides. Conclusion and Assessment In addition, this year Russia strengthened its relations Iran and Russia share a host of regional and with the Lebanese Hezbollah, and continued to maintain international interests, chief among them reducing the high - profile relations with Hashd al - Shaabi, which American presence and influence in the Middle East, but comprises dozens of pro - Iranian militias in Iraq. In March, several di sagreements limit the depth of their relations. a Hezbollah delegation visited Moscow for the first visit in Still, several trends can be identified that will provide a decade and met with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – greater impetus to continued Russian - Iranian cooperation the most senior figure that representatives of the in the coming months. First, in almost any scenario organization have ever met. Unlike European countries or regarding the future of the nuclear deal, Tehran's relations the United States, Russia opposes defining Hezbollah as a with the West will continue to be tense, such that it will terrorist organization, sees it as a legitimate political force not be able to give up on its partnership with Moscow in Lebanon, and m aintains close relations with it in the (and with Beijing). This is especially true given the context of joint combat with Iran in Syria. In April, Falih strengthening of the hardline camp in Iran with the al - Fayyadh, head of the Hashd al - Shaabi umbrella election of Ebrah im Raisi as president. Second, if the organization, visited Moscow and met with Nikolai nuclear deal is renewed, Iran will be able to return to the Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia. global oil market, in which Russia is a significant player in F ormally, Falih is Patrushev's counterpart in the Iraqi regulating its prices through OPEC Plus. Therefore, there hierarchy, but the United States is unwilling to be in will be an increasing need to coordina te their energy contact with him due to his deep ties with Iran. activity. Third, the departure of American forces from At the same time, however, there are ongoing Afghanistan will force Moscow and Tehran to tighten the conflicting interests between Russia and Iran, and t hey connection between them in order to prevent the spillover affect the two countries' ability to deepen their relations. of threats of radical Islam into their respective territories. The deep suspicion toward Russia among the Iranian Russia i s concerned that Israeli - Iranian military leadership was illustrated in April in a leaked recording in escalation on Syrian territory would harm its interests, and which the Iranian Foreign Minister accused Russia of seeks to restrain Israeli activity (as also reflected in attempting to prevent the nuclear deal in 2015. The statements by the Russian military, starting on July 22, Iranians were angry that Foreign Minister Lavrov, while in apparently following an increase in att acks attributed to Doha as part of his trip to the Gulf states last March, Israel in the preceding days). However, given Russia's announced the establishment of a new political framework broader interests, which it shares with Iran, and the including Russia, Turkey, and Qatar. Tehran is troubled by limitations of Russian power in Syria, Moscow would its having been skipped by Lavrov on this trip, as well as prefer to avoid active measures to limit Iran's by the establishment of a framework for advancing the entrenchment in the country, and, rather, continue to turn political arrangement in Syria, which is seen in Iran as a blind eye to Israel's activities in this arena. If in - depth competing with the Iranian - Russian - Turkish Astana American - Russian dialogue develops regarding Syria, Forum. Russia's strengthened relati ons with the Gulf states which would accompany readiness by Washington for a and with Israel (and in particular its acceptance of the certain quid - pro - quo, Russia could adopt a more active attacks against Iranian targets in Syria) are seen as appr oach against Iran. Though the chances of having that contravening Iran's military interests. Another dispute kind of a dialogue currently seem low due to the distrust between the countries is Russia's provision to Iran of between Moscow and Washington, Israel should consider Sputnik v accines against the COVID - 19 virus, with facilitating such a discourse. criticism sounded in Iran that Russia is not providing the Ms. Feldman is a Research Assistant in the Iran and Regional vaccines in the amounts and at the rate agreed upon. Affairs Program. Bat Chen has a B.A in Philosophy and Middle Russian - Iranian economic relations have stagnated for Eastern Studies and an M.A in Middle Eastern Studies from Ben - many years, apparently due to the competition bet ween Gurion University., Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Rakov joined them in the energy market and the limited attractiveness of the Institute for National Security Studies in mid - 2019 as a research Russia's commercial output to the Iranian economy. The fel low. Previously, he had a 21 - year career in the IDF, mainly in the expectations of signing a new strategic framework Israeli Defense Intelligence (Aman). agreement between Russia and Iran (similar to the Visit suburba northodox.or g f or t he current iss u e. agreement signed in March between Ch ina and Iran) have

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Israel Should Maintain its Mediterranean Alignment, Despite Signals from Ankara By Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman jns.org August 3 , 2021 Wit hin the last few weeks, there have been several other hand, the hope to drive a wedge between the signs that the Turkish government is seeking a members of the EMGF alignment. Moreover, this “reset” with Israel. coincides, with the decision to escalate pressure on the The most notable was President Recep Tayyip Cypriots to accept facts on the ground in the TRNC Erdogan’s conversation (July 12) with the President of controlled areas, and specifically, t he reopening of the Israel, Yitzhak Herzog, after the latter took office. This ghost city of Varosha, near Famagusta, to habitation by effort comes against the background of US - Turkish Cypriot (or Anatolian) Turks. tensions, and EU sanction threats over aspects of Turkish In this light, the courtship of Israel needs to be seen as policy, but also of an aggressive stance by Erdogan and the a bid to sow dissent among key members of the strategic Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the future of the alignment embodied in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas island. Forum (EMGF). Ankara looks upon this regional As t he visits of the Greek and Cypriot foreign organization, and the underlying logic of strategic ministers indicate (July 21 and 26 respectively), Israel’s cooperation on a broad range of issues, as a deliberate partners in the eastern Mediterranean feel the need for effort to contain the Turkish aspirations for hegemony in reassurance against an obvious attempt to drive a wedge the region. Distancing Isr ael, as well as Egypt (and Egypt’s between Israel and its Mediterranean partn ers. In line with Arab backers) from Greece and Cyprus could make it the positions taken during their meetings, it should indeed easier for Erdogan to pursue his neo - Ottoman ambitions, be made clear to all – including Egypt – that any (unlikely) re - write the rules in Cyprus, and down the road (even if improvement in relations with Turkey will not come at tensions in the Aegean have abated somewhat) implement their expense. Despite the signals, Erdogan’s basic th e concept of the “blue homeland” (mavi vatan). orientation as an Islamist is bound to remain hostile. The latter assumes an extended realm of maritime Why Does Turkey Profess to be Interested in control which ignores the EEZ rights of Greece. Turkey’s Rapprochement with Israel? map negates the EEZ delineation generated by the Erdogan’s relatively long telephone conversation with existence of Rhodes, Karpathos, and Crete. Clearly, o ne of Israel’s new president, Yitzhak (“Bougie”) Herzog, came the drivers of Erdogan’s move in Cyprus is the incessant within five days after the l atter took office. The official need for action which stems from the growing discontent readout mentioned the “potential for cooperation between and signs of domestic weakness of his ruling party, AKP the countries in many fields, in particular the areas of (and the reliance on the ultra - nationalist MHP). energy, tourism and technology,” as well as the need to Signs of Worry in Athens and Nicosia? maintain a dialogue “despite the differences of opinio n.” Not surprisingly, a note of alarm came to be felt in the (Erdogan’s version, as might have been expected, gave due Greek and Cypriot discourse with Israel. Both countries place to the need for “a two - state lasting and understand that the “alignment” is not (yet?) an alliance, comprehensible solution within the framework of UN and Israel is not and will not be committed to join a resolutions.”) This was read in Israel and beyond as a bid military confrontati on with Turkey if one erupts. Still, the to shed off the bitter tensions of th e last decade and open reality and the perception of close coordination with Israel a channel of communication. on a range of issues does contribute to the resilience of Indeed, this was not the only gesture of its kind by both Greece and Cyprus in the face of an aggressive Turkey aimed at countries in the region with which Ankara challenge. Hence the concern about a possibl e change of almost came to blows in recent years. Senior envoys have Israeli attitudes towards Turkey. gone to Egypt now that the situation in Libya has been With notable alacrity, both Greek foreign minister stabilized to some degree. Both Ankara and Cairo know Nikos Dendias (July 21) and his Cypriot counterpart Nikos that they cannot get all they want. Turkey’s allies in Tripoli Christodoulides (July 26) visited Israel within a fortnight of cannot get rid of Khalifa Haftar and the LNA; and in turn, Erdogan’s call. While there is a wide range of issues on the even with Egypt’s support, the latter cannot conquer the bilateral as well as the trilateral agenda, it was manifest that coun try’s eastern half. A political process, fragile and the recent aggressive stance taken by Turkey in Cyprus was complicated, is underway, and Turkey is obliged to seek at the forefront of their concerns. They came to be some understandings with Sisi. reassured about Israel’s stance. Significantly, Presiden t Turkey has also reached out to Saudi Arabia, after a Herzog also called his Greek counterpart, Katerina long period of tension over the siege of Qatar and other Sakellaropoulou, to inform her of the content of his point s of contention. The signaling to Israel is thus part of conversation with Erdogan; and met with Christodoulides a broader pattern. At its root lies a growing sense of during his visit, apparently with the same purpose in mind. diplomatic isolation and vulnerability, given Turkey’s Israel’s Priority: Shoring up the Mediterranean reduced standing in Washington (as demonstrated by Alignment Biden’s action on the Armenian genocid e); and on the Focus o n I srael August 14, 2021 P age 8

During both visits, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid went Even more important are the relationships with Jordan out of his way to show fraternity and warmth (also seeking, (a member of good standing of the EMGF, although it has more broadly, to repair Israel’s relations with Europe). no Mediterranean shore of its own) and with Egypt. During his meeting with Christodoulides, he publicly Stabilizing Jordan is need vital to peace and stability for the criticiz ed Turkish actions in Varosha and expressed Israeli eastern Mediterranean as a whole, The King of Jordan’s solidarity with Cyprus. These sentiments, as already trilateral summit in A thens with the leaders of Greece and indicated, need not be interpreted as a strategic Cyprus (July 28) was an important step towards the commitment. The ability of Cyprus to counter these consolidation of the alignment. actions, beyond bringing the matter to the attenti on of the As for Sisi, who at present also plays a key role in international community, is quite limited to begin with. seeking to calm down the tensions with Hamas in Gaza, Israel’s stance does, however, send a clear signal that needs the importance of his role c an hardly be overstated. While to be sustained. The alignment, as developed in recent he may be willing to engage with Erdogan over practical years, is important to Israel in many respects (including matters, such as the Libyan situation, the basic ideological some which per tain to our national security in future chasm between his regime and the Islamist orientation of emergencies, and to Israel’s diplomatic standing in the AKP is not likely to be bridged. Europe). It will not be traded away for a short - lived For Israel, t he obvious message to send is that with rapprochement with a leader in Turkey whose Islamist very few exceptions – and Erdogan’s Turkey is not one of orientation remains fundamentally hostile. them – the strategic commonality with Egypt is at the very This is also a significant aspect of Israel’s improving top of our long - term interests and must remain so. relationship with France. (That relationship has been Alongside Israel’s partners in the UAE, and throu gh the shaken, but not undermined, by the “Pegasus”/NSO utilization of the growing cooperation between Greek and scandal, which was the immediate reason for the urgent Jewish diasporic organizations in the US (and elsewhere), visit of Defense Minister Gantz to Paris). Now a member active efforts should be made to uphold the international of the EMGF, France shares with Israel a perspective on legitimacy of the Greek - Egyptian EEZ map, and to ensure Turkish ambitions, and like Israel and Egypt does not that US policy on Li bya will push back against Turkey’s bid grieve over the removal of elements associated with the for hegemony. Muslim Brotherhood from power in Tunisia.

Hizballah’s Recent Attack on Israel Could Be a Sign of Much Worse to Come By Yaakov Katz j post.com August 7, 2021 Who’s deterring whom? Syria (2007) were pursuing nuclear weapons. Nuclear, yes. On Monday, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett spoke at Regular rockets, no. the Knesset. He was met by a volley of yelling, heckling What Bennett will learn though is that it is easy to talk and name calling. but harder to act. This is despite the fact that one of the “Let’s talk about the results [of the last government],” senior members of his coalition and security cabinet, he said. “In Gaza, you show ed restraint in face of rocket Justice Minister Gideo n Sa’ar, is a longtime proponent of attacks while we attack for every incendiary balloon. You preemptive action against Hezbollah. left Hezbollah with ten times more rockets that can reach In 2018, Sa’ar warned that Israel had a narrow window any place in Israel and because of that the defense budget to attack Hezbollah to prevent it from obtaining precision - needs to be big.” guided munitions. Bennett was not wrong. Benjamin Netanyahu returned This is all important to keep in mind following to the premiership in 2009, three years after the Second Hez bollah’s rocket attack against Israel on Friday. The Lebanon War. At the time, Hezbollah had an estimated 30 barrage of about 20 rockets came just two days after three or 40 thousand rockets. Nowadays, they are believed to rockets were launched toward Kiryat Shmona. The have over 150,000. difference was that the rockets on Wednesday were said to Was it Netanyahu’s fault? That is questionable, bu t have been fired by a rogue Palestinian group. On Friday, there is no doubt that under his tenure Israel made a Hezbollah openly took responsibility. conscious decision not to launch a preemptive strike to Israel’s response until now has been mild. After stop the Iranian proxy’s military buildup. Israel allowed the Wednesday’s attack, the Air Force bombed open areas in armament to go on even though it knew that the rockets southern Lebanon from where the rockets had been fired. were intended to be used on e day against it. After Friday’s barrage, Israel responde d with artillery fire For the most part, the decision was in line with Israeli in the direction of the source of the fire. By Saturday night, military doctrine. Israel has not launched preemptive that seemed to be it. action to stop a conventional military buildup; that has This is dangerous and complicated. IDF Spokesperson been reserved for two instances when Iraq (1981) and Brig. - Gen. Ran Kochav went so far as to explain that the fact Hezbollah fired its 20 rockets int o open fields meant Page 9 August 14, 2 0 21 Focus on Israe l that the Lebanese terrorist group was deterred and scared That is happening along the northern border as well. of a larger conflict with Israel. If that wasn’t the case, he Kochav’s comment could be interpreted as normalizing told reporters in a briefing on Friday, it would have rocket fire now from Lebanon. No one was killed and no attacked population centers. one was hurt so that must mean that Hezbo llah is Is this true? We don’t know. Wha t we do know, is that deterred. it is a dangerous way to think since it sets up Israel to allow Not necessarily. What comments like Kochav’s its northern border to turn into the way things are along potentially do when coupled with a mild military response, the border with Gaza. There, for years, Israel restrained is create for Hezbollah a feeling that it – like Hamas - can itself after rocket attacks. If it responded, it hit s and dunes normalize rocket attacks against Israel’s North. or makeshift Hamas observation posts. Nothing too This would be disastro us for Israel but difficult to serious. stop. Too strong a response could lead to a larger This normalized rocket fire into sovereign Israel. As escalation – something Israel does not want – while too long as no one was hurt or killed and as long as the rocket weak a response could lead Hezbollah to learn a bad fire was sporadic, Israel could restrain itself. Did it make lesson, something Israel also does not want. sense? Maybe . Did it also erode Israel’s deterrence? That right balance of how to respond and is going to Definitely. be hard to find. Based on Friday’s events, the government needs to do so fast.

We need to keep talking about the Sbarro bombing By Aviya Kushner forward.com August 11, 2021 A lesson from the 1980s. the American Jewish community, and how there is such Twenty years ago this week, I watched a bride have widespread misunderstanding, or pe rhaps ignorance, of her wedding pictures taken along the water in Jaffa. As the how the Second Intifada changed Israel. Sometimes a photographer clicked and clicked, the radio blared from a tweet written in English breaks through the barriers of nearby car with the doors open. I will always remember language and distance and time, like this one, part of a that white car, the two front doors ope n, the news of the thread by Shany Mor, associate fellow at the Arendt Center Sbarro bombing, the death toll going up and up and up. at Bard Coll ege. The photographer I worked with then, on a travel That summer — the Dolphinarium bombing on June column, had a good eye. He was photographing the bride 1 in Tel Aviv, and the long lines of Russian immigrants in getting her pictures taken, concentrating hard, when the heels and makeup in the days afterward, waiting to pay a news reached him — or maybe it was me, waving my shiva call to the other Russian immigrants in crumbling hands, saying we had to get out of there. apartments who had lost children . More attacks, coming I was scared. closer, all the time, and then, Sbarro in central Jerusalem It was just us. The bride, her photographer. Me, my on Aug. 9, killing 15, including 7 children and injuring 130. photographer. A few guys in a car. The guys in the car, The mastermind of the bombing — who chose the looking at us. spot and led the bomber there — was a young woman. It was not the best place to be at that moment. T he And every day, with every newsflash of every empty beach. bombing, the sinking feeling that peace — and the clear, The photographer and I had seen so much. We had official promise of a Palestinian state, the result of years of paid a shiva call to the family that lost two teenage work — had been rejected. The answer was not a daughters in the Dolphinarium bombing that killed 21 counteroffer, a negotiation on this and that terrain. Israelis. He was a paratrooper, what most people would Instead , the answer was these bombings. One after call tough, but he cried at th at shiva. His tears mucked up another. The open car door, the radio blaring. Click. Click. the lens, but I calmly told him he had to clean it and take Click. pictures in time for our deadline. He did, he managed to I spent years trying to write a poem about that day. I click and click and take a photo of the mother and her son, never finished. What I remember is that it was in tercets, a boy who had just lost his two sisters to a bomb . The that the drafts in longhand on yellow legal pads are picture appeared with the very first op - ed I ever wrote. somewhere in a drawer in the house I grew up in, though I We both saw far too much wreckage, of lives, limbs, am no longer sure which drawer. Most of us are no longer homes, dreams. sure how to understand so much of what has happened I don’t know what came over me on some of those over the past 20 years, but a few things are certain. assignments — I functioned; he didn’t function. And If you have b een through a bombing, you never forget sometimes it flipped, and it went the other way — he it. If you have ever truly feared for your life, you don’t functioned, I didn’t function. forget it. If you spent a lot of time comforting the victims I write this now because I am struck by how little the of bombings, you don’t forget it. For most Israelis who events of these weeks 20 years ago are being discussed in were alive in 2001, all of those remain true. Focus o n I srael August 14, 2021 P age 10

It’s hard to see in today’s bustling Israel, hard to defined end date,” writes Michael Milshtein, head of the remember with all that has happened since, but it’s inside Palestinian Studies Forum at the Dayan Center at Tel Aviv people, in their minds, in their eyes. To me, Jerusalem will University. always be a city of the cafés I wrote in but somehow did “Some Palestinians argue that the Second Intifada not die in. The café s are gone now, though sometimes new ended with the death of Arafat in November 2004 an d the cafés have risen in their place, but in my mind, I still see rise to power of Abu Mazen, who has since led a distinctly the wreckage. different strategic vision; others maintain that the general So many elections in the Palestinian Authority in 2006, won by photographs. So Hamas, and the latter’s forceful takeover of the Gaza Strip many bombings. So in June 2007, h ad put an end to the Second Intifada; and many bombers. others still believe that the conflict never ended, only Click. Click. Click. “morphed” from suicide bombings and shootings to There were 138 military campaigns and rounds of escalation in the Gaza suicide attacks and Strip alongside lone wolf terror attacks in the West Bank,” 1,038 Israelis killed Milshtein writes. from Sept. 28, 2000 Today, it seems many younger American Jews have no — the day Ariel memory of those weeks and months — part of five long Sharon visited the years of terror — that changed Israel and permanently Temple Mount — hobbled the Israeli left because they destroyed the left’s through Feb. 8, fundamental a rgument. 2005, according to Recently, when I was giving a talk to an educated data from the Shin young Jewish crowd, reading a poem that mentioned the Bet security service. Those Israeli dead were primarily word “Dolphinarium,” someone said they had never heard civilians — kids having a pizza at Sbarro, a 16 - year - old girl of the Dolphinarium bombing. I bet the same is true for at a nightclub. the Sbarro bombing, but I did no t ask. It might be time for Compare that to the Six - Day War, which killed 777 those who do remember to talk with those who are too soldiers and wounded 2,586. In the Six - Day War, Israel young to remember. lost twice as many men in proportion to total population I sometimes think about that bride and wonder where in six days as the U.S. lost in eight years in Vietnam. she is, how she is doing. I sometimes flash back to those But in terms of the number of dead, the Second young men in the car, watching. I wonder what happened Intifada was worse. And that doesn’t count the thousands to them, what they believe now, where they were in the of people injured — some estimate that over 8000 Israelis harrowing May attacks in Israel, some in Jaffa itself. I were injured in terror attacks in five years. I saw some of sometimes wonder why the Second Intifada and the peace those injured, post - injury. A more accurate word for those offer it followed — the fact that yes, there was a clear I saw might be “maime d.” process, then, that yes , there had been years of progress The Second Intifada also took a terrible toll on toward a Palestinian state that were reversed by terror — Palestinians — in lives and in political reality. Israel’s are so much less of a presence to American Jews than Ministry of Foreign Affairs puts the death toll at “over Israelis. In Israel, it’s an understood, painful silence, a 2000” noting that “the disproportionate number of knowledge commonly shared. Palestinian casualties was primarily a result of the number I can still hear it. Tw enty years after a bomb exploded of Palestinians involved in violence. The unfortunate in a pizza place in what was probably the busiest spot to deaths of noncombatants was largely due to the practice of eat in all of Jerusalem, 20 years after the young woman Palestinian terrorists using civilians as shields.” who masterminded it escaped unharmed. She now lives in B’Tselem’s estimate is 3,189 Palestinians killed. Jordan and on the FBI’s Most Wanted List. But if you And it’s not ancie nt history. Some believe the Second w ere on the beach, being watched, if you spent your nights Intifada never actually ended. with the mourners of the bombed - to - bits, you remember. “The Second Intifada is a historical event with an It’s always in the back of your mind, a film reel you can agreed start date (on Sept. 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon visited never turn completely to black. Temple Mount, and the following day violent upheaval Ms. Kushner is The Forward’s language columnist and the author of began to spread across the “territories”), but with no “ Wolf Lamb Bomb , ” (Orison Books) and “ The Grammar of God . ”

Current iss u e also available at suburbanorthodox.org . If you see something, se nd something” – editor