The Impact of Pre-Congressional Political Experience

AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE IMPACT OF PRE-CONGRESSIONAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

JACOB R. STRAUS

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2006

Jacob R. Straus

To my wife and best friend, Sarah

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would never have been possible without the support of my wife,

Sarah, and her constant love and encouragement through all of the trials and tribulations

of data collection, writing and proofreading. My parents, Harriet and Steve Straus also

deserve a special thank you for all of their encouragement and to their unending ability to

listen and ask questions without influencing or interfering with my decision making

process.

I would also like to offer sincere thanks to Larry Dodd, for inspiring me to find a

topic that excites me and to pursue a research style that suite my strengths. In addition, I could not have completed my work without the invaluable suggestions of my dissertation committee members including my co-chair Beth Rosenson, Ken Wald, Renee Johnson and Leonard Beeghley. They have all encouraged me to think outside of my line of vision and to explore outlets that have allowed me to explore this topic with a richer perspective.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES...... viii

LIST OF FIGURES ...... xi

ABSTRACT...... xii

CHAPTER

1 THE AMATEUR PHENOMENON...... 1

Amateurs in American Life ...... 2 Music ...... 3 Science...... 5 Sports...... 6 Public Administration and Political Science ...... 8 Amateurs and Professionals in Congress...... 11 Methods ...... 17 Outline ...... 19

2 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THEIR WORLD...... 23

Freshman in the House of Representatives...... 26 Age ...... 30 Gender ...... 31 Race ...... 32 Education...... 35 Religion ...... 37 Number of Terms Served in Congress ...... 40 Classifying Amateurs and Professionals ...... 42 Pure Amateurs ...... 44 Mostly Amateurs ...... 45 Semi-Amateurs...... 46 Semi-Professionals ...... 47 Mostly Professionals ...... 48 Pure Professionals ...... 48

v 3 THE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS...... 50

Amateurs...... 54 Professionals...... 58 Committee Importance ...... 62 Primary Committee Assignments...... 65 Secondary Committee Assignments...... 70 Conclusion ...... 73

4 ELECTORAL SUCCESS...... 75

Election Literature ...... 76 Running for Office ...... 76 Fund Raising...... 80 Constituent Connections and Service...... 83 Election Results for Amateurs and Professionals...... 85 Conclusion ...... 93

5 ISSUE CHOICE AND LEGISLATIVE APPRENTICESHIP...... 95

Policy Analysis ...... 98 Views of the World...... 101 The Market Model...... 102 The Polis Model ...... 105 Pressures on Members of Congress...... 108 Constituents ...... 109 Personal Policy Goals...... 110 The President...... 111 Policy and Members of Congress...... 112 The Pure Amateur: Douglas (Pete) Peterson...... 113 The Mostly Amateur: Martha Keys...... 116 The Semi Amateur: Byron Dorgan...... 117 The Semi Professional: Kweisi Mfume...... 120 The Mostly Professional: Catherine Long...... 122 The Pure Professional: John Olver...... 124 Overall Legislative Success...... 126

6 CONCLUSIONS ...... 130

Committee Assignments...... 131 Electoral Success ...... 133 Legislative Entrepreneurship...... 134 Toward the Future...... 135 Bounded Rationality...... 137 Sensemaking...... 138 Final Thoughts...... 146

vi APPENDIX

A DESCRIPTION OF CODED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS...... 147

B ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION OF FRESHMEN DEMOGRAPHICS...... 148

C CATEGORICAL COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS OF AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS...... 152

LIST OF REFERENCES...... 157

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 165

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table page

1-1 Career commitment and partisan loyalty of congressional challengers, 1964 ...... 14

1-2 Members of Congress interviewed...... 18

1-3 Member of Congress biographies and autobiographies ...... 19

2-1 Number of freshmen elected per year...... 28

2-2 Freshmen elected per year by party affiliation ...... 29

2-3 Mean age of amateur and professional freshmen ...... 31

2-4 Gender of freshmen members of Congress ...... 31

2-5 Racial profile of the House of Representatives ...... 33

2-6 Racial profile of freshmen elected to the House of Representatives...... 34

2-7 Education levels of freshmen ...... 36

2-8 Religious identification of freshmen ...... 39

2-9 Number of terms served by freshmen elected 1974 to 1994 ...... 41

2-10 Amateur and professional categorizations...... 43

2-11 Pure amateurs with previous professions ...... 45

2-12 Mostly amateur with previous professions...... 46

2-13 Semi-amateurs with previous professions ...... 46

2-14 Semi-professionals with previous professions ...... 47

2-15 Mostly professionals with previous professions...... 48

2-16 Pure professionals with previous professions...... 49

3-1 Committee type and order ...... 65

viii 3-2 Primary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals ...... 66

3-3 Secondary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals ...... 70

3-4 Correlation coefficients for secondary committee assignments...... 72

4-1 Measures of incumbency advantage in campaign finance (in 1992 dollars)...... 82

4-2 Initial election results of amateur and professional freshmen ...... 86

4-3 Percent of freshmen elected for a second term. Expressed as a mean...... 87

4-4 Reelection percentages for all members of Congress...... 87

4-5 Reelection results for amateur and professional freshmen...... 88

4-6 Mean change in votes from the first to second election ...... 89

4-7 Correlation coefficients of electoral success and committee assignments...... 90

4-8 Correlation coefficients of electoral and legislative success...... 92

5-1 The eightfold path...... 100

5-2 Market model concepts of society...... 103

5-3 Polis model concepts of society...... 107

5-4 Freshmen representing amateur and professional categories ...... 112

5-5 Bills introduced by Douglas (Pete) Peterson...... 113

5-6 Bills sponsored by Byron Dorgan ...... 117

5-7 Bills introduced by Kweisi Mfume ...... 121

5-8 Bill introduced by Congresswomen Cathy Long ...... 123

5-9 Bills introduced by Congressman John Olver ...... 124

5-10 Number of bills introduced by freshmen: 1974-1994 ...... 127

5-11 Number of bills passed into law by freshman: 1974-1994...... 127

5-12 Number of laws passed by amateur and professional freshmen...... 128

B-1 Freshmen elected per year by amateur and professional status ...... 149

B-2 Religious identification of amateur and professional freshmen ...... 151

ix B-3 Number of terms served by amateur and professional freshmen...... 151

C-1 Primary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals with categorical breakdowns...... 152

C-2 Secondary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals with categorical breakdowns...... 154

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

2-1 Freshmen elected per year...... 29

2-2 Age of freshmen members of Congress ...... 30

2-3 Gender breakdown...... 32

2-4 Racial profile...... 35

2-5 Education levels...... 37

2-6 Religious identification...... 40

2-7 Number of terms served ...... 42

5-1 Co-sponsors for bills sponsored by Pete Peterson...... 115

5-2 Co-sponsors for bills sponsored by Byron Dorgan ...... 119

5-3 Co-sponsors for bills sponsored by Kweisi Mfume ...... 122

5-4 Co-sponsors for bills introduced by John Olver...... 126

B-1 Freshmen elected per year ...... 148

B-2 Freshmen party affiliation and year of election ...... 149

B-3 Freshmen gender...... 150

B-4 Religious identification of freshmen: 1974-1994 ...... 150

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE IMPACT OF PRE-CONGRESSIONAL POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

Jacob R. Straus

May 2006

Chair: Lawrence C. Dodd Cochair: Beth Rosenson Major Department: Political Science

This dissertation examines the differences between freshmen members of Congress during their first term in office. The analysis focuses on understanding the impact of pre- congressional political experience on amateur politicians, individuals without previous electoral experience, and professional politicians, those who have served in elected office before being elected to the House of Representatives. The central questions surround the differences between amateur and professional freshmen and the types of committee assignments they receive, their electoral success in their first two elections in Congress, and their ability to respect the norms and folkways of the institution.

In addressing these topics, the paper builds on previous literature on amateurs in

American life in general and in political specifically. It also specifically address the ideas first presented by Donald Matthews in U.S. Senators and Their World about the types of individuals that serve in Congress and whether they are descriptively representative of the constituents they serve. To examine these topics, both quantitative and qualitative

xii methods are employed using data analysis in combination with in-depth elite interviews with current and former members of Congress and through the use of their biographies and autobiographies.

This analysis demonstrates that a fundamental difference exists between the way that amateur and professional freshmen are treated by the leadership of the House of

Representatives and how they behave within the institution. For a voter choosing between an amateur and professional candidate, they are more likely to get the best

“service” from a professional candidate, as they have the best understanding of legislative politics and the need to follow the norms and folkways of the institution to be successful.

xiii CHAPTER 1 THE AMATEUR PHENOMENON

American society has a fascination with amateurs. The concept that someone participates in an activity or performs a job without prior experience holds the publics’ attention. Recent popular culture has provided numerous examples promoting amateur success. Reality television shows like “American Idol” inspire every American with the idea that they can become a rock star. Fantasy sports leagues allow football, baseball and other fans to be the general manager and “run” their own teams. The Internet allows inexperienced writers to comment on virtually any subject without the restrictions brought on by editors and publishers. Each of these experiences would not be possible with a professional dominated society.

As the fascination with amateurs became ingrained in American society, amateurs began to turn up in all facets of life. Depending on which section of the population is sampled, varying opinions about whether amateurs are positive or negative influences are prevalent. Some believe that earning money changes people from amateurs to professionals. Others look upon experience as the ultimate benchmark of professionalism. Industries such as music, sports, business and politics all take a different view of the amateur phenomenon, with each profession establishing unique guidelines and practices to define amateurs and professionals.

Webster’s Dictionary defines an amateur as “a person who engages in some art, science, sport, etc. for the pleasure of it rather than for money” (Neufeldt 1988, 42). This definition implies that enjoyment supercedes compensation to maintain amateur status

1 2

(although monetary compensation could be allowed so long as it was not the primary objective). We desire our athletes to be pure and not out only for the huge payday. We want our businesses to be proactive about consumer interests and behaving like they were extensions of our families. These ideals are reflected in many different kinds of literature, and illustrate the conflict that exists over which ideal is most essential in

American life.

This dissertation examines the amateur phenomenon in general and then differentiates amateur and professional politicians in the United States House of

Representatives. By comparing the political amateur and professional landscape with other professions, I establish that people desire a balance between the skills amateurs and professionals bring to Congress (Canon 1990, 157). Overall they value the skills and ideals that both groups bring to the institution.

In addition to a balance between amateurs and professionals in Congress, I find that differences exist between amateurs and professionals in the types of committee assignments they receive, their ability to follow the traditions of the House of

Representatives and their electoral success. In fact, the most striking finding of this dissertation, which is discussed further in Chapter 4, finds that certain categories of amateurs, on average receive a higher percentage of the vote than their professional counterparts. Each of these topic areas is treated in more depth after I establish categorization of amateurs and professionals and how we define them.

Amateurs in American Life

Amateurs hold a special place in the hearts of the American public. We hold near and dear the ideal that competing without compensation or bringing a non-traditional skill set to a job allows individuals unique opportunities. Regardless of the career path, almost

3 every American can be divided into the broad amateur and professional categories.

Whether these labels are a positive or a negative depends largely on the career path and the associated stigmas.

To get a broad understanding of the amateur phenomenon, I investigate what it means to be an amateur in multiple arenas. To get a cross section of American life, I review amateurism in music, science and sports before turning my attention to discussions in public administration and political science. Through the examination of multiple areas, a better understanding of the importance or stigma of amateurism in varying professions is established. This is important for the ultimate classification and study of amateurs and professionals in the House of Representatives because of the diverse backgrounds freshmen bring to the institution. Each member of Congress was naïve and amateurish at one point in their career and they carry that experience with them. How they grow and assimilate in the first stage of professional development has a unique effect on their first term in Congress.

Music

The debate over amateurism in music has existed since the 1930s. During that time period discussion ensued to differentiate between an amateur and a professional musician. Hargreaves (1931) argues that the divide between amateurs and professionals is at its core money, but disagrees with others when they try and insist that a degree in music should be included in the definition of a professional.

Your reply that the professional is one who derives the whole of his income from music is in my opinion the only correct one, but you add that you think the term ought to include one who also holds a recognized diploma. Now music as a subject differs very much from most other methods of earning a living, such as business, or the various crafts and professions, in that musicians are born, not made: a very old axiom, as true to-day as ever. (Hargreaves 1931, 546)

By equating income and a degree with professionalism, Hargreaves believes that other

musicians are excluding many whom could be professionals, but do not have these basic

qualifications.

While professionals and amateurs are separated by the income they make from

music, amateurs are still important within the musical community. Hargreaves goes on to

discuss the differences between amateurs and professionals beyond money. “We must

always remember that an earnest amateur has a love for music… whilst many

professionals are musicians because a doting father and mother who imagined their son to

be a second Beethoven (whereas he would probably have been better behind a grocer’s

counter) gave him a first-rate musical education, with the effect that when he attained

manhood he can do nothing else but be a musician” (Hargreaves 1931, 546). By

dichotomizing amateurs and professionals by parental upbringing and education,

Hargreaves lays out a clandestine argument that amateurs and their love of music can be

just as important as professionals and their education and training.

At the same time that those in the musical world were trying to figure out what

differentiated amateurs and professionals, other scholars were trying to understand why

professionalism was declining. Nistner (1932) investigates why amateurs become

discouraged in the musical community. “Broadcasting has undoubtedly discouraged the amateur; musical standards are to-day so high that he realizes he cannot himself compete on the old lines with that which is done so much better for him. He must henceforth work out his own salvation on different lines, and by adopting a new outlook” (Nistner

1932, 836). Nistner believes that technology, in this case radio broadcasting, has strengthened the lines between amateurs and professionals. Whereas amateurs and

professionals both had outlets to play in ensembles, radio became the medium of

professionals. Because of this restriction, amateur musicians could no longer compete

with professionals. Professionals now had a distinct advantage; they could be paid to

play on the radio.

Science

The scope of scientific literature on amateurs and professionals is vast. Out of this literature, one debate sparked a comparison to amateurs and professionals in the House of

Representatives. While the analogy is not perfect, the debate within the scientific

community about the importance of amateur fossil hunters and the advancement of fossil

collections and information about dinosaurs parallels the debate about the representation

amateur freshman provide their constituents.

Carol Potera (1995) recounts the story of the Peebles family in Montana. The

Peebles own land where two major dinosaur fossil fields have been found. After a

discovery in 1978, the Museum of the Rockies bought land from the Peebles to protect a

fossil site only to have a new discovery result in amateur fossil hunters trespassing on the

Peebles land and destroying the bones of the T. Rex. “The thousands of amateur

dinosaur fossil hunters greatly outnumber the 50 or so academic professional dinosaur

paleontologists working in the United States. Indeed, the saga of the Albertosaurus is the

latest episode in a troubled history of tensions between amateurs, paleontologists and

private property owners…” (Potera 1995, 198). Potera is clear that while amateur fossil

hunters may offer the ability to expand the number of individuals looking for dinosaurs,

they also bring risk of destruction to fossil sites.

Potera’s opinion on amateur fossil hunters is not universally accepted. Miller

(1995) disputes Potera’s outright dismissal of the amateurs as careless and reckless

collectors, instead emphasizing the contributions amateurs have made to the study of

dinosaurs. “While the specific incident described is troubling, tens of millions of dollars

worth of one-of-a-kind fossils sit in museums throughout the world because of the

generosity of many amateur fossil hunters. Untold other fossils sit rotting in the sun

because of their location on government controlled land and the fact that collecting by

amateurs is illegal” (Miller 1995, 1420). Miller’s belief is clear. Without amateurs, the

knowledge that paleontologists have on dinosaurs would be far less. The point is well

taken and easily applied to the realm of politics. Amateurs bring an element of

experience and desire to Congress that is different from professionals. They bring fresh passion to politics and view Congress with different experiences than those who have been there for years.

Sports

In American society, nowhere is the debate about amateurs and professionals greater than in sports. Entire bodies have been created to establish criteria for amateur and professional athletes. Organizations such as the American Athletic Union (AAU) and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) both regulate the principle behind being an amateur athlete. Kenny Moore, a former Olympic marathon runner who was barred from competing in the Boston Marathon because of his amateur status at the

University of Oregon, defines amateurism in terms of pure athletic pursuit. “Surely an athlete, an amateur athlete who by definition pursues his sport for the sake of simple excellence, who is unencumbered by professional contracts or owners, must have a right to compete in any event for which he or she is physically qualified” (Moore 1979, 60).

Moore’s contention that any athlete is allowed to compete in any competition he is physically capable, diverges from the standard argument that defines an amateur as

someone who does not make money at his pursuit. Moore’s definition is closer to that

which I am using to define an amateur in politics.

As American society increases the viewing of sporting events on both television and the Internet, the definition of amateurism at the college level has been stretched.

John Feinstein writes about the changing nature of college basketball in his book The

Last Amateurs: Playing for Glory and Honor in Division I College Basketball. In his account of the Patriot League1 Feinstein argues that most Division I college athletics are

not the bastions of amateurism the NCAA would like us to believe. Feinstein questions

the athletic scholarships most players have and whether those scholarships essentially

make college athletes professionals.

In contrast to all other major conferences, the Patriot League did not provide athletic scholarships to its athletes until after Feinstein wrote his book. This contrast helps to cement the ideal of an amateur in American society. No longer do Americans equate total amateurism with salary. The modern Olympics, once a competition of the best amateur athletes in the world, now consists of mostly athletes who get paid to participate in their sport as part of professional leagues. This is a stark departure from the ideals of amateurism set out in the founding of organizations like the AAU and NCAA, but provides a good bridge for amateurism in politics. Pure amateurs are those who have not previously held elective office. Adding those with experience working in Congress or on a campaign as amateurs differentiates them from those with electoral political experience.

1 The Patriot League includes Bucknell University, Colgate University, College of the Holy Cross, Lafayette College, Lehigh University, U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Naval Academy. These schools traditionally did not provide athletic scholarships and competed at the highest level (Division I) for basketball.

Public Administration and Political Science

The study of amateurism also exists in public administration and political science.

Like other social sciences scholars, political scientists are interested in the types of individuals involved in politics and their motivations. Political scientists want to understand how new voters form opinions and select candidates, how newly elected politicians form social bonds with other members and their constituents, and how veteran politicians maintain relationships and continuously reinvent themselves in the public eye.

These studies form the basis for my examination of amateurs and professionals in

Congress.

The literature on the amateur phenomenon in government can best be divided into two areas: studies of the government as a whole and studies of voters. Both of these areas help enlighten my research on amateurs in Congress and help shape where in political science literature this study fits. To begin looking at amateurs and professionals in political science, I look at studies of government and how scholars frame the debate about amateurism.

David Cohen (1998) explores what he considers to be the amateur government of the United States. With all of the political appointees in the government, Cohen argues that not using the label ‘amateur government’ for the United States system misidentifies the true nature of the American federal government. “We entrust the administration of the largest ‘company’ in the country — with the biggest budget and staff, the widest range of products and services, and the greatest influence on the life of every American

— to a cast of well-meaning political loyalists with little or no management experience”

(Cohen 1998, 451). It is amazing to think that we entrust the largest and most important functions of the government to citizens with political connections and little

accountability. The citizen executive branch that exists fits neatly into the amateur definitions that are present in other professions. These are people who are in their jobs because of their political connections, not their previous job experience.

The debate over the qualification of department heads and the relationship they

have with the chief executive exist in governments beyond the federal level. Finding competent people to run government agencies and departments is a challenge at all levels of government. To combat the struggle to find qualified and interested citizens to serve on local government boards (i.e., housing boards, zoning boards, and planning boards), some scholars have suggested pushing more power and decision making to the chief executive. “The … movement for administration consolidation and centralization of administrative responsibility in the chief executive has led some state and local governments to eliminate almost entirely, or to minimize, the importance of department- controlling boards in their administrative structure” (Stafford 1935, 260). While

Stafford’s article was written many years ago, the principle that he is arguing continues to hold true. If we do not trust the individuals that head departments and boards because they are not elected, we have two choices. Governments can eliminate the positions and concentrate power with the executive or governments can allow those positions to become elective. Neither is a great solution, and both are in disagreement with the founder’s notion of a government with a single center of power.

In addition to concern for amateurs in government, many scholars are concerned with voters and decision-making processes. Zaller (1992) and Dalton (1996) both

examine mass opinion and how society makes opinions. Zaller frames his argument on

the idea of voters making decisions as their knowledge evolves and how many

individuals may have contradictory opinions on a single issue (Zaller 1992). While

Dalton does not dispute Zaller’s point, he takes the idea further by arguing that voters concentrate on a narrow field of issues. “Many voters focus their attention on a few issues of particular interest, rather than devoting equal attention to all issues. Thus the electorate is composed of overlapping issue publics, each judging government action on different policies” (Dalton 1996, 37). By labeling voters as individuals, it becomes harder to know what they desire. These individuals are ultimately the ones who decide the future of the country as voters and as delegates at conventions and caucuses. They choose whom they believe are best to serve them as elected officials. The individual voters choose candidates that do not always have previous political experience. It is the differences between those with previous political experience (professionals) and those that do not (amateurs) in Congress that consume the balance of this dissertation.

In addition to all of these studies, we cannot rule out the impact and importance of amateurs as outsiders and the appeal they have as uncorrupted citizens. Movies such as

Mr. Smith Goes to Washington and The Candidate illustrate the weight that an outsider could have on the political process. In addition television shows like The West Wing and

Commander in Chief have brought the workings of government, albeit the executive branch, into the average house hold and have brought politics into homes. The building of the media image of outsiders has caused many candidates to conduct campaigns that frame themselves as anti-Washington and plays to their non-political roots.

The appeal of celebrities running for office is also very high. Individuals such as

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, former Congressman and mayor of Palm

Springs, CA Sonny Bono and former Governor of Minnesota Jesse Ventura all were able

11 to appeal to voters by establishing their credentials as outsiders to the regular party system. The debate over the effectiveness of former movie stars, singers or professional wrestlers as politicians continues as Governor Schwarzenegger struggles with budget problems in California and Governor Ventura chooses not to seek reelection because of his dissatisfaction with the political process. Even with all of the uncertainty that can surround celebrity politicians, “…citizens have a well-documented tendency to vote for celebrity politicians” (West and Orman 2003).

Amateurs and Professionals in Congress

Freshmen are in a unique situation within Congress. They are not fully aware of the folkways and practices of the institution, yet are expected to contribute fully to its everyday workings and operation. Even within this paradox of roles, not all freshmen are created equal. The different levels of political knowledge and experience they have when elected segregates those with more political experience from those who have little.

In order to identify different groups of freshman, we must divide them into categories that account for experience and decision-making capabilities, professionals and amateurs. These two broad categories divide purely by the number of elections won by an individual prior to being elected to Congress. Professionals are those who have won elections prior to becoming members of Congress. These elections can be at any level of government. While not all levels provide the same experiences for politicians, they do provide experience in running campaigns and appealing to voters. On the opposite end of the spectrum from professionals are amateurs. Amateurs are those who have never won an election. These politicians are serving in their first term as an elected official.

Wilson (1966) examines amateur politicians by examining club politics in three

American cities. His look into the inner workings of this type of politics shows

politicians at their most basic levels. Wilson talks about what type of person an amateur

is and what sets him/her apart from more seasoned politicians. “It is not his liberalism or

his age, education, or class that sets the new politician apart and makes him worth

studying. Rather, it is his outlook on politics, and the style of politics he practices”

(Wilson 1966, 2). Amateurs are everyday people who become involved in politics. In

many ways there is no difference between an amateur politician and someone who

dreams of being in politics.

Wilson also defines what an amateur meant to him during his study of New York,

Chicago and Los Angeles. “By amateur is not meant a dabbler, a dilettante or an inept practitioner of some special skill; many amateur Democrats have a highly sophisticated understanding of practical politics and have proved their skills in the only way that

matters — by winning at the polls” (Wilson 1966, 2). This definition is important for

setting up future research into the politics of amateurs. While Wilson does not apply this

definition to members of Congress, it helps clarify political experience at other levels of government and through alternative means (working for a politician, etc.). For Wilson all political knowledge counts, but amateurs have not put their experience into practice through winning elections.

Taking Wilson’s ideas and applying them to the democrats at the Texas State

Convention illustrates the belief there is a strong relationship between professionalism and political success. “Analysis of the political backgrounds of Texas State Convention delegates shows a pattern of strong and consistent relationships between professionalism

and political success, measured in terms of holding party and public office. This is not to

imply that all amateurs were newcomers to politics, although nowhere nearly as large a

proportion as of the professionals, were active in politics for more than ten years”

(Nyitray 1975, 697). The idea that amateurs are not newcomers to politics is important.

However, just because they are not newcomers does not mean they understand the

legislative process and can be initially successful in Congress.

While Wilson’s and his successors’ work on amateurs and professionals at the local

level illustrates some of the most basic differences between the groups, he also presents a

problem because of his intimation of the motivation of amateur politicians. Wilson

questions whether amateurs treat politics and running for office as a vocation or as a

hobby or as a full time job. King (1981) takes Wilson’s ideas of an amateur as someone

who finds politics intrinsically interesting and uses it to discuss that the number of people

running for the House of Commons in Great Britain who have no real political

experience, but see serving in the institution as a “fun” vocation. “In addition, the recent

high level of vehemence in British politics is almost certainly associated with the fact that

many more British politicians than in the past are now recruited from the ranks of

journalism, public relations and teaching” (King 1981, 284). In other words, the level of

discourse has deteriorated within the Commons at the same time that more people from

non-political backgrounds have taken positions of power.

Hofstetter (1971) explores the differences between amateur and professional

political organizations. Building on Wilson’s (1966) ideas of club politics, amateur and

professional organizations have different levels of political involvement. “…[A]mateurs become active in politics primarily as a function of purposive incentives, and the

14 purposive orientation of the insurgent, or amateur, political organization continues to tie the member to the organization. In contrast, material and solitary incentives link the regular party member to his political organization” (Hofstetter, 1971, 35). Hofstetter’s definition of amateur organizations draws a stark contrast with their professional counterparts. By defining amateurs as those who are on the outside looking in and who only become involved in politics because of purposive incentives, he casts amateurs as naïve and ambivalent. In reality, Hofstetter has identified that amateur political groups need motivation to become involved in the political process. Amateurs will not speak out if they do not directly benefit from their actions and because of their reluctance to become involved in politics, amateur organizations are viewed as greedy and self- serving.

Fishel (1971) continues to build on the concept of amateur and professional politicians. He examines party loyalty for both Democrats and Republicans in 1964 and establishes that amateurs do not identify as strongly as careerist and transitional politicians (professionals). Table 1-1 illustrates the differences in partisan identity with data adapted from Fishel’s (1971, 48) initial research:

Table 1-1. Career commitment and partisan loyalty of congressional challengers, 1964 Level of Democrats Republicans Party Loyalty Careerist Transitional Amateur Careerist Transitional Amateur High 57 % 37 % 24 % 57 % 47 % 36 % Medium 36 53 26 22 39 31 Low 7 10 46 18 11 37 NA -- -- 4 3 3 5 (64) (40) (36) (42) (36) (75)

Party loyalty for amateurs and professionals provides an interesting difference beyond basic political experience. Amateurs, like their professional counterparts,

identify with political parties, but not as strongly. “For both parties, the differences run

in expected directions: Careerists more often than Amateurs cited a ‘strong sense of party loyalty’ as their primary motivation to enter the campaign” (Fishel 1971, 48). Parties would rather have careerists (or professional) politicians in office because they are more likely to follow the party line. Amateurs believe they owe nothing to the party, as the party often is indifferent to (or works against) them during the campaign. Party loyalty must be developed over time and amateurs by their nature have not developed that attachment.

Loomis (1984) discusses the nature of the House of Representatives and how reforms to the committee system have changed the relationship between freshmen and more senior members of Congress. “The democratizing reforms of the 1970s deprived the House of one major legislative leadership stratum — the ‘powerful committee chairmen.’ As usual, the body adapted to a felt need; at the party leadership’s urging the

House centralized some powers within the ranks of the top leaders and simultaneously expanded the numbers of both continuing and temporary leaders” (Loomis 1984, 197).

The House of Representatives has become a top-heavy institution since the reforms of the

1970s. With so much power in the hands of the leadership, freshmen find it difficult to

gain experience. The leadership within the House and on each committee relies heavily

on the political experience of their fellow members. Since freshmen, especially amateur

freshmen, do not bring much experience with them to Washington, they must convince

the leadership that they can contribute in a meaningful way.

Some freshmen arrive in Congress with more experience in legislative matters.

These freshmen have served in state legislatures and have a basic understanding of the

16 legislative process. Thus, they are able to demonstrate to the leadership that they can make an immediate difference. Berkman (1994) suggests that freshmen with experience in state legislatures have slowly changed the face of Congress. “Some evidence suggests that members steeped in legislative life before coming to the House differ from their colleagues. These members consider their state legislative experience crucial to their adjustment to House life and to their success as congressional leaders” (Berkman 1994,

1053). Professional freshmen rely on their previous experience to separate themselves from their amateur counterparts. By demonstrating that they understand basic legislative activity they are quicker to endear themselves to the leadership, which may give them an initial head start in fortifying a congressional career.

Canon (1990) argues that amateurs are best examined within the context of

Congress. When looking at amateurs through the lens of Congress the differences in their perceptions of the institution become visible. Amateurs do not just have a lower level of political experience; they view politics in a different way than do professionals.

In reality, some amateurs will have different views of politics and behavior that probably will persist for their tenure in Congress. Some may resemble their experienced counterparts upon entry into office; others may reach that point when they ‘learn the ropes.’ In electoral politics, greater recognition is needed for the complex nature of amateurs’ goals and aspirations. (Canon 1990, 25)

Amateurs begin their congressional careers at a disadvantage with regards to knowledge about the institution and its practices. For some amateurs this informational disadvantage exists for their entire careers. Others are able to overcome the disadvantage and take quickly to their roles as members of Congress.

West and Orman (2003) take Canon’s thesis of Actors, Athletes and Astronauts one step further with Kerbel’s (1995) ideas on television campaigns and look and celebrity politics. Over the past couple of decades, with the advent of television campaigns,

candidates work hard to be in the public spotlight and make a connection to voters

(Kerbel 1995). West and Orman delve in to congressional and non-congressional

personalities and how they have used their celebrity to gain access to political capital and

eventual election. “Simply because there is a much larger number of channels today, 75

to 100 on most cable systems compared to a dozen viewing options three decades ago, it

is possible for larger and larger numbers of people to gain social and political prominence

through the media” (West and Orman 2003, 17). This access provides celebrities a

platform that many other candidates, amateur or professional, do not have. They can then

leverage that stage for money and potential votes on multiple election levels.

At the most basic level, amateurs and professional freshmen are separated by

electoral experience. By using electoral victories as a base criteria we can begin to

understand how amateurs and professionals approach the House of Representatives with

different experiences and extrapolate how they make decisions and make sense of the

world around them. The differences between amateurs and professionals in committee

assignments, electoral success and how they approach the apprenticeship norm within the

House of Representatives is the focus of this analysis.

Methods

Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 use a classification system (elaborated in

Chapter 2) to establish differences between amateurs and professionals. I develop an

argument for a different way to explain and measure the differences and then bring the examination together. To accomplish these goals, I combine both qualitative and quantitative methods to create a complete picture of members’ first terms. By using a varied approach I present a more complete argument illustrating the differences between amateurs and professionals when they are first elected to Congress.

Since the summer of 2001, I have conducted in-depth elite interviews with current and former members of Congress. These interviews span the entire time period of this study and include members who served both single and multiple terms. While I could

only interview members of Congress who generously gave me their time, I tried to talk

with representatives from across the country and from different size states and districts.

Those interviewed do not represent a random sample of all the freshmen members

between 1974 and 1994, but are close to being descriptively representative of the general

population of the House of Representatives.

Table 1-2. Members of Congress interviewed Amateurs Professionals W. Henson Moore (R-LA) Glenn English (D-OK) Robin Beard (R-TN) Herbert Harris III (D-VA) Martha Keys (D-KS) James Jones (D-OK) David Price (D-NC) Stanford Parris (R-VA) Congressman A (D-Mid Atlantic) Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH) Congressman B (D-New England) Ronald Sarasin (R-CT) Butler Derrick (D-SC) Albert Swift (D-WA) Congressman C (D-Southeast) Congressman D (R-Southeast) To read descriptions of Congressman A, B, C and D, please see appendix A.

In addition to these interviews, I use biographies and autobiographies about and by

current and former members of Congress. These are essential because I am unable to

interview as many current and former members as I would like. These books do a

wonderful job of supplementing my interviews and allow me to expand my first-hand

accounts with second hand reports of life in the House of Representatives and the

differences between members based on pre-congressional experience. These biographies

and autobiographies provide a candor about life in Congress that can be difficult to

19 capture through interviews. In these instances, members of Congress can easily control what they have written and ensure they are accurately quoted.

Table 1-3. Member of Congress biographies and autobiographies Amateurs Professionals David Price (D-NC) Bernie Sanders (I-VT) Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MN) Sherrod Brown (D-OH) Orrin Hatch (R-UT) Senator Harry Byrd (R-VA) Dan Quayle (R-IN) Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) Joe Evins (D-TN) James Jeffords (R-VT) Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) Jesse Helms (R-NC) Sam Rayburn (D-TX)

As you may notice, not all of these books are about people who served in the House of Representatives. In these instances, I am relying on these accounts to tell the story of

Washington, DC and legislator’s impressions of the city and the institutions that are its core. For those books by and about Senators, I rely on their accounts to interactions with the House, but not for their own first term experiences.

These interviews are used in combination with the data collected on committee assignments, election results for members of Congress’ initial and second election, bills introduced on the floor of the House of Representatives, as well as numerous demographic and amateur and professional categorizations. I begin by looking at each variable individually and then bring them together to illustrate the differences between amateur and professional freshmen.

Outline

With the groundwork established for this dissertation, I want to briefly outline the structure of the following chapters. Chapter 2 uses Donald Matthews’s 1960 book U.S.

Senators & Their World as its basis. While Matthews looked at the entire membership of

the Senate, I use his conceptions to explore the background and demographics of

freshmen members of Congress elected between the Watergate election of 1974 (94th

Congress) and the Republican revolution election of 1994 (104th Congress). Exploring the demographics is important to understanding the types of individuals elected to the

House of Representatives and how closely they match the demographics of their constituents. Chapter 2 also introduces the basic differences between amateurs and professionals.

Chapter 3 explores the committee assignment process in the House of

Representatives. It begins with a short review of committee literature to establish the basic method that most party leaders use to choose members for each committee and the importance of committees as part of the legislative process. Once the committee assignment process is established, I examine the committee assignments of freshmen and whether professionals on average receive more prominent or “better” committee assignments than amateurs.

Based on the collection of committee assignments and the ranking of each freshman within the committee, I establish that professionals receive better committee assignments than amateurs over time. Party leadership, both in the Democratic and

Republican parties, consider previous experience in assigning freshmen to committees in combination with the needs of all members of Congress to serve their constituents and represent the interests of their districts in Congress.

Chapter 4 looks at election results for freshmen over two election cycles. I begin by looking at the election where a freshman was first elected to Congress and explore the percentage by which they won their seat and how that fits into the congressional election

literature. Based on how “safe” the seat is from the last election, I then examine the

reelection of each freshmen (assuming they ran for reelection), and see whether freshman

were able to increase the number of votes they received, or whether the number of votes

received decreased. These numbers shed light on the success of each freshman in

connecting with their constituency and understanding the differences that voters

potentially see in amateur or professional freshman.

Chapter 5 looks in depth at the legislative process and freshman member’s decision to follow the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives. John Hibbing (1991) discusses the norms and folkways of Congress and the idea that freshman should be seen and not heard. By looking at the traditions of the institution and the actual trends that freshman follow, I explore whether freshman serve an apprenticeship or if that notion has changed in the modern house.

To accomplish this goal, I have collected data on the number of bills sponsored by each freshman member of Congress. By comparing that number with the number of bills each member of Congress sponsored that became law gives us a base number to be able to quantify success during a first term. Inevitably, a member of Congress will become more successful over time, but by establishing a two-step process for success, we can continue to paint a picture of the differences between amateurs and professionals during their first terms.

To conclude the dissertation, Chapter 6 looks again at the differences between amateurs and professionals. Through a recapitulation of the findings, I build to understand the differences between amateurs and professionals. Chapter 6 also looks to the future and thinks about other ways to understand how amateurs and professionals

22 behave differently within the House of Representatives. By looking briefly at bounded rationality and sensemaking, I lay the framework for a future understanding of institutional behavior and careerism.

CHAPTER 2 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THEIR WORLD

In 1960, Donald Matthews wrote his landmark study on United States Senators,

U.S. Senators and their World. The book broke ground by looking at the demographic and social construction of the Senate. Matthews is one of the first not to tell inside stories of the Senate, but to investigate the characteristics individuals bring to the Senate.

Matthews made the move to understand how individual’s background influence behavior in the Senate and whether the Senate was descriptively representative of the population at large.

To conduct his study, Matthews looks at the background of the men who were serving in the Senate. He then examines the Senators as politicians before moving to the institution as a whole and its norms and folkways. He then completes his analysis by looking at the Senate in action, and how individual Senators interact with lobbyists, reporters, constituents, and each other. Each phase of this study tells a slightly different story, but ultimately, Matthews concludes that each Senator is looking out as much for his constituents as he is for himself.

While the story Matthews tells might seem commonplace today, it was a departure from the way Congress was studied previously. As Matthews notes early on, “[t]his approach is a departure from the traditional ways of studying the Senate or, for that matter, any legislative chamber. Historians have brilliantly described the Senate’s evolution and development; political scientists have studied the chamber’s formal organization and procedure in painstaking detail. Neither type of study, however, is

23 24

particularly concerned with ‘human factors’ in the Senate…” (Matthews 1960, 7). Not

only does Matthews change the nature of legislative study, he is able to recognize his

contribution and the differences he has with other scholars.

Since Matthews, other scholars have begun to look at individual members and their

backgrounds and interactions with others. Each of these studies takes a different

approach to studying members and the Senate or the House of Representatives. Ornstein,

Peabody and Rohde (1977, 1981 and 1985) look at the changing nature of the makeup of

the Senate since the 1950s. They observe that by the mid 1980s only a handful of

Senators that served in the 1950s were still members of the Senate. With all of this

change the nature of comity in the institution has been altered. “The Senate has gone

from a close partisan balance during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies in the

1950s to dominant Democratic party control in the 1960s and 1970s to a narrow

Republican majority in the early 1980s” (Ornstein, Peabody and Rohde 1985, 31). With

this broad statement Ornstein, Peabody and Rohde are able to illustrate the overarching

party dynamics that are present in the Senate in any given period. These dynamics are

important as a basis to understand how an individual acts once elected, as the Senator

ultimately has to please the party’s leadership to be recognized.

While Ornstein, Peabody and Rohde focuses on the Senate, Sinclair (1995) focuses on the House of Representatives in the post-reform era. While the main thesis of

Sinclair’s work is that the legislative process in the House has changed over time and that the majority party dominates the agenda more than ever before (Sinclair 1995, 1), she also discusses the power of the legislative process on individuals. “The legislative process in the House of Representatives is … participatory and inclusive; it is a

considerably more democratic process than it was in the pre-reform days” (Sinclair 1995,

303). The importance of the legislative process for both the institution and the individual

is second to none. Throughout the reform period, individuals gained more power and

prominence, culminating with the creation of C-SPAN and an individual member’s

ability to be seen on television by their constituents.

Palazzolo (1992) takes a different approach in studying individual members of

Congress by examining changing expectations for the leadership. Before reform, party

leaders concentrated their efforts on such tasks as scheduling bills, building coalitions

and other tasks generally associated with party leadership. Once the reform movement

took hold in the 1970s, party leadership was released to handle other tasks. “…[P]arty

leaders need not be restricted to such traditional functions. This is attested by the wider

range of leaders’ activities in the centralized context of the 1980s — especially their

participation in formulating budget priorities, setting conference disputes, and negotiating

budget meetings with the president” (Palazzolo 1992, 126). The adaptable nature of the

party leadership opened the door for individual members to be more involved in the

decision making process of the House of Representatives. This brought the background

of each freshman to the foreground and made their personal experience that much more important.

The role of pre-congressional experience is an essential component to a new members personal experience. The role that background plays in an individual’s decision-making process cannot be underestimated. How each individual is trained ultimately influences the way in which they react to any given situation.

[C]andidate occupational labels can have a significant effect on voters’ behavior. Voters appear to use candidate occupational labels as information shortcuts -

inferring from them the potential competence or qualifications of candidates for office. As a result, these labels help voters reach a decision in elections in which they might otherwise have abstained. (McDermott 2005, 217)

While McDermott is not specifically referring to individual’s behavior inside the House of Representatives, the evidence she has uncovered about the importance of occupation infers that voters elect certain people because they believe past decision making predicts their future actions. Perhaps this is why there are so many lawyers and business people in Congress. The public believes they have the best skills to govern and make the important decisions necessary to successfully represent their constituents.

Freshman in the House of Representatives

With an understanding of previous work on individuals, I turn my attention to understanding the 790 freshmen elected to the House of Representatives between 1974 and 1994. I have chosen this time period to provide a wide range of new members of

Congress to be elected. By including both 1974 and 1994, we can observe freshmen elected in the post-Watergate time period and during the Republican Revolution. These two groups of freshmen had provided the impetus for profound change within the institution. By capturing them in this data set the opportunity arises to see how the both parties behave when they hold a large majority.

These freshmen are all unique individuals who bring with them unique backgrounds and experiences to the institution. Just as Mathews did for the Senate of the

1950s, I lay out who these individuals are as a foundation for analyzing more specific information. Through studying the demographic nature of these first term congressmen, I establish the basis for analyzing committee assignments, elections and legislative apprenticeship.

To better understand who is elected to the House of Representatives, I examine six demographic variables; age, education, gender, total terms served in Congress, party and religion. Each of these variables is examined on its own and then looked at through the basic lens of amateurs and professionals. This analysis allows a basic understanding of the types of individuals elected to Congress over a twenty-year period and illustrates the changing nature of the institution over time.

These variables shed light on the types of individuals elected to the House of

Representatives. This exercise is conducted for two purposes. First, I want to examine if the demographics of government have changed over the past twenty years. Second, I want to have an understanding of the differences between amateurs and professionals at the most basic levels. If I can understand how amateurs and professionals differ educationally or religiously, I hope to be able to create a broader understanding of the differences in the way each group behaves during their first term in office.

Before beginning to dissect the demographic variables, it is best to examine the number of freshmen who were elected to Congress during the twenty years of this study.

The 790 freshmen represent all fifty states and all 435 congressional districts. They reflect the changing nature of the country, the District of Columbia and Congress as a result of the Vietnam War, Watergate, the Iran Hostage Crisis, the Iran Contra Scandal, the end of the Cold War and the Republican revolution. This group of freshmen faced unique challenges brought about by the reorganization of Congress and the increasing importance of committee and sub-committee government (Deering and Smith 1997).

Beginning with the Watergate election of 1974, large numbers of freshmen were elected. These freshmen over time have played a large part in influencing and helping to

implement changes to the institution’s business practices. Table 2-1 shows the number of

freshmen elected per year from 1974 to 1994. The 94 freshmen elected in 1974 wielded

great influence on the institution in the post-Watergate and Vietnam War era. This class

of freshmen was only topped in number by the class of 1992 (103rd Congress). It is also

interesting to note the large number of freshmen elected in 1982, Reagan’s first midterm

election. This class helped bring the House of Representatives into a closer balance than

anytime in the previous thirty years.

Table 2-1. Number of freshmen elected per year Number of Freshmen 1974 94 1976 64 1978 76 1980 79 1982 85 1984 48 1986 49 1988 41 1990 53 1992 115 1994 86 Total 790

Figure 2-1 dissects the data on freshmen classes and looks at it by amateur and professional status. What we see is that for almost all freshmen classes the majority are professionals. The exception to this trend occurred with the Republican Revolution election of 1994 and the recruitment by Newt Gingrich of non-traditional candidates.

In addition to understanding how many amateurs and professionals were elected to

Congress in any given election, it is important to understand the party breakdown of these freshmen so that we can better understand which party controls the House of

Representatives. The size of the freshmen class can have a great influence on the operation of the House, as those freshmen can attempt to wield influence within their

29 party caucus. When large classes are elected with the majority party, they can work together to change the operational behavior of the institution by changing their party’s rules for committee assignments, chairmanships and other procedural issues.

s e

r 50

b m

u 25 N

0 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994

Figure 2-1. Freshmen elected per year. A) Amateur. B) Professional.

Table 2-2 illustrates the number of freshmen elected per year and their party affiliation. As one can see, the Democrats dominated the early elections of this study.

Table 2-2. Freshmen elected per year by party affiliation Political Party Democrat Republican Independent Total 1974 74 (78.7%) 20 (21.3%) 0 (0.0%) 94 (100.0%) 1976 44 (68.8%) 20 (31.3%) 0 (0.0%) 64 (100.0%) 1978 41 (53.9%) 35 (46.1%) 0 (0.0%) 76 (100.0%) 1980 24 (30.4%) 55 (69.6%) 0 (0.0%) 79 (100.0%) 1982 61 (71.8%) 24 (28.2%) 0 (0.0%) 85 (100.0%) 1984 18 (37.5%) 30 (62.5%) 0 (0.0%) 48 (100.0%) 1986 26 (53.1%) 23 (46.9%) 0 (0.0%) 49 (100.0%) 1988 22 (53.7%) 19 (46.3%) 0 (0.0%) 41 (100.0%) 1990 31 (58.5%) 21 (39.6%) 1 (1.9%) 53 (100.0%) 1992 67 (58.3%) 48 (41.7%) 0 (0.0%) 115 (100.0%) 1994 13 (15.1%) 73 (84.9%) 0 (0.0%) 86 (100.0%) Total 421 (53.3%) 368 (46.6%) 1 (0.1%) 790 (100.0%)

The Republican Party only claimed a majority amongst freshmen twice in 1984 and 1994.

The 1984 election was partially as the result of the landslide victory Ronald Reagan

enjoyed over Walter Mondale. The 1994 election, as discussed previously, was the

turning point for balance of power in the House of Representatives. The large group of

freshmen elected in 1994 brought fundamental change to the institution (Killian 1998).

Age

With all of these freshmen elected in any given year, understanding their age

provides a glimpse into the general level of experience. Figure 2-2 lays out the age range

of the members elected between 1974 and 1994. In general, freshmen members of

Congress are between 35 and 55 when they are first elected. The mean age for all

freshmen is 43.17 years. The youngest representative elected was Thomas Downey, who

was elected to represent the second district of New York at age 25 and served for

eighteen years. The oldest representative elected was George Crockett Jr., who was

elected to represent the thirteenth district of Michigan in 1980 at age 71 and served for

ten years. The mean age is well reflected across all elections between 1974 and 1994.

m h

s 30

r 20

u N 10

30 40 50 60 70 Age at Election

Figure 2-2. Age of freshmen members of Congress

Table 2-3 takes the data presented in Figure 2-2 and looks at the mean age of each

freshman. From anecdotal evidence, I expect that amateurs would tend to be younger

when they are first elected to Congress. Since amateurs arrive in Congress with little or

no political experience, it would make sense for them to make the transition to politics

early in their lives. On the other hand, I would expect professionals, who bring political experience with them to Congress, to be elected later in life, once they had served

multiple terms at lower levels of the political system.

Table 2-3. Mean age of amateur and professional freshmen Amateur or Professional Mean N Std. Deviation Amateur 41.81 277 8.951 Professional 43.91 510 8.204 Total 43.17 787 8.528

Gender

With age in mind, how do freshmen breakdown in terms of gender. General

surveys of Congress show that men always outnumber women within both the House of

Representatives and the Senate. “Unable to vote until 1920, women have always been

underrepresented in Congress. Beginning with Jeannette Rankin, elected as a Republican

from Montana in 1916, somewhat more than 150 women have been elected or appointed

to Congress” (Davidson and Oleszek 1996,125). As Table 2-4 shows, men outnumber

women by a large margin.

Table 2-4. Gender of freshmen members of Congress Frequency Percent Male 715 90.5 Female 75 9.5 Total 790 100.0

Of the freshmen elected between 1974 and 1994, 90.5% (715) were male and 9.5% (75)

were female. This trend follows Davidson and Oleszek’s (1996) statement that

“[w]omen now make up about 10% of Congress, even though they account for more than half of the nation’s population” (Davidson and Oleszek 1996, 125).

Understanding that 90% of all freshmen elected are male, Figure 2-3 illustrates that the balance between men and women is the same regardless of pre-congressional political experience. Women are just as likely to be amateurs as professionals, but still only make up 10% of the total House population while being about half of the overall population of the country. Women also have similar political experience as their male counterparts.

Women like Representative Karen Thurman (D-FL) had successful careers at the state level before deciding to run for Congress. No longer are the majority of women in the

House of Representatives elected to finish a term when their husbands have passed away.

A B

400

e m

h 300

r 200

u N 100

Male Female Male Female

Figure 2-3. Gender breakdown. A) Amateur. B) Professional.

Race

The balance of race in the House of Representatives has been an important issue for many years. Since reconstruction, racial minorities have been underrepresented in

Congress with less than 100 total blacks having served in Congress as of 1996 (Davidson and Oleszek 1996). The imbalance of racial representation in Congress has led to a

33 legislative body that is overwhelming white (and male). The majority of the non-white members of Congress have been elected from majority-minority districts (Rieselbach

1995 and Espstein and O’Halloran 2000). These majority-minority districts were created to help elect more minorities to the House of Representatives and have led to an increase in minority representation in Congress.

Table 2-5. Racial profile of the House of Representatives Frequency Percent White 668 84.6 Black 45 5.7 Hispanic 15 1.9 Native American 1 0.1 Asian 6 0.8 Did Not Specify 55 6.9 Total 790 100.0

The number of majority-minority districts has increased over time, especially since the 1990 census. “After the 1990 census there were thirty-two majority-black districts

(compared with seventeen before the census) and twenty majority-Latino districts (up from nine). The goal of boosting minority representation through redistricting succeeded: all but one of these districts, most of which were specially created for the purpose, elected minority lawmakers” (Davidson and Oleszek 1996, 126). While it is good news that the number of minorities in Congress increased, the House of Representatives (and the Senate to a more extreme measure) is not descriptively representative of the population at large. Since 1974, the number of minorities elected to Congress has increased, but slowly. This indicates that more minorities are able to win elections, but with the continued existence of majority-minority districts, do not have the ability to win elections across racial lines.

The breakdown for amateurs and professionals by race mirrors the overall

institution and reinforces the non-descriptively representative nature of the House of

Representatives to the general population. Figure 2-4 shows the breakdown of race for

both amateur and professional freshmen and from it we can see that both amateurs and

professionals are overwhelmingly white, but that there are larger numbers of minorities

elected to the House of Representatives as professionals than as amateurs. This would

suggest that previous experience in governing is a more important factor for minority

candidates. When a minority candidate runs for Congress and has previous legislative experience, they are more likely to be considered by the voters as a serious candidate than

if they had no prior political experience.

Table 2-6. Racial profile of freshmen elected to the House of Representatives 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 Total White 91 63 71 75 78 46 43 41 44 87 29 668 Black 1 0 4 4 4 1 4 0 5 17 5 45 Hispanic 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 2 9 0 15 Native 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 American Asian 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 6 Did Not 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Specify Total 94 64 76 79 85 48 49 41 52 114 34 736

The House of Representatives has slowly become more diverse, but not nearly as

fast as the demographics of the electorate. As I mentioned previously, the House of

Representatives is not descriptively representative of the population as a whole.

However, over the course of the history, blacks and other minorities have made great

strides. During Reconstruction, the first black members of Congress were elected from

several southern states. These basic inroads for representation of former slaves was short

lived with the rise of populism and the eventual segregation and disenfranchisement of

the black voters (McAdam 1982, 68). It took until the civil rights movement in the 1950s

for minority representation to again become a constant in the House of Representatives.

Figure 2-4 shows the inroads minorities have made in representation as well as the

distance that must still be traveled for equal representation.

A B

400

n e

300

f o

200

u N 100

White Hispanic Asian White Hispanic Asian Black Native American Did Not Specify Black Native American Did Not Specify

Figure 2-4. Racial profile. A) Amateur. B) Professional.

Education

Members of Congress are highly educated individuals. With few exceptions, members of Congress have gone to college and have often pursued post-graduate degrees. As a result of this education, they come to Congress as lawyers, business people, and with other careers that take years of education and specialization. The House of Representatives, as a whole are better educated than the American public and bring experiences from business that they hope to translate into legislative success.

The education levels of freshmen have not changed greatly over time, but reflect the high level of education that members receive. Matthews believes that the high level of education of the legislative bodies can be accounted for by the relatively high-class origins. “Numerous studies show that while the American educational system is one of

the most equalitarian in the world, substantial differences in educational opportunities

exist between social classes” (Matthews 1960, 27). If, as Matthews posits, members of

Congress come from the higher classes of society, their education levels will be higher

than the average citizen and tend towards professional and graduate degrees.

Table 2-7. Education levels of freshmen Level of Education Amateur Professional Total High School Diploma 26 (9.4%) 48 (9.4%) 74 (9.4%) Bachelor's Degree 68 (24.6%) 144 (28.2%) 212 (27.0%) Master's Degree 43 (15.6%) 69 (13.5%) 112 (14.2%) PhD 21 (7.6%) 13 (2.5%) 34 (4.3%) Law Degree 107 (38.8%) 213 (41.8%) 320 (40.7%) Medical Degree 7 (2.5%) 7 (1.4%) 14 (1.8%) Associates Degree 3 (1.1%) 9 (1.8%) 12 (1.5%) Did Not Specify 1 (0.4%) 7 (1.4%) 8 (1.0%) Total 276 (100.0%) 510 (100.0%) 786 (100.0%)

As Table 2-7 illustrates, freshman members of the House of Representatives are

highly educated. Of the 790 members elected between 1974 and 1994, 60.8% of have a

graduate or professional degree. The most surprising item is the 74 freshmen, 9.4%, who

only received their high school diplomas. These individuals are often like Charles Hayes

(D-IL) who was elected to Congress from the first district in 1984 after serving as a vice-

president of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union outside Chicago. His

career did not require that he go to college, but did allow him to connect with his constituents through his previous service to the community.

Amateurs and professionals have a similar breakdown in education across the

twenty-year time period of this study. In general, the types of degrees awarded to

members of Congress regardless of pre-congressional experience are the same, with

professionals outnumbering amateurs in each category. This makes perfect sense, as the

total number of professionals elected to the House of Representatives between 1974 and

1994 is greater than the number of amateurs. The data also confirms the large number of

lawyers who serve in Congress.

Did Not Specify

Associates Degree

Medical Degree

Law Degree

PhD

Master's Degree

Bachelor's Degree

High School Diploma

0 50 100 150 200 0 50 100 150 200 Number of Freshmen Number of Freshmen

Figure 2-5. Education levels. A) Amateur. B) Professional

Religion

Religion plays a large role for many members of Congress. Groups such as the

Moral Majority founded by the Reverend Jerry Falwell excite interest in politics amongst their parishioners. “This was a radical and controversial idea at the time. Church people had focused their energies on church issues and family life. They had separated themselves to the extent that many did not even bother to vote, and most did not voice an opinion to their elected officials” (Helms 2005, 95). Helms’ summarization of the power of the Moral Majority and other conservative religious and political movements has altered the way we think about religion in politics. While religion has always played a

role in Congress, groups like the Moral Majority brought the election process to the

church for the first time.

Religion is important in many aspects of congressional life. Former Speaker of the

House Jim Wright (D-TX) recounts a story about how two people with similar religious

backgrounds can have different interpretations of the Bible’s desire to rid the world of

poverty. Wright’s story centers on a September 1964 debate over the appropriation of

money for an anti-poverty program. While Wright firmly believed that Congress should

work to end hunger, Joel Broyhill (R-VA) spoke passionately about his religious

opposition to politicians becoming involved in a social program that might have undue

political influence on voters. Wright goes on to summarize his understanding of the

situation by saying “…men of goodwill and sincere purpose often disagree. This can

happen without either antagonist being a sycophant, a demagogue, or a rascal. Or even

stupid, for that matter. None of us is given an exclusive franchise on G-d’s truth, and we

indulge a powerful presumption when we try to create G-d in our own images” (Wright

2001, 93).

Religion has become part of the bedrock of modern politics and can no longer be

used as just a tool to separate beliefs. Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) has observed

the growing importance of religion in life and in politics. As the first Jewish person to

run for Vice-President on a major party ticket, he has been in a unique position to view

the importance of religion.

Much has been made of the fact that virtually every candidate for president in the 2000 election has put religion at the center of his or her campaign. …Cynics dismiss this as a purely political response to polls that show most Americans are more concerned right now about the moral health of our society than about even their economic well-being. But I think there is much more to his turn toward faith among presidential candidates than political strategy. I see it as a sincere reflection of the need the American people have to rebuild around themselves what has come to feel like a crumbing moral framework in the life of our nation. (Lieberman and D’Orso 2000, 139)

Lieberman sees the importance of religion in politics in a much different way than does Speaker Wright. He identifies that the use of religion goes beyond the core values of the individual and provides both a tool for use with other members of Congress and a

39 language for complex ideas to be conveyed to the average voter. Wright’s beliefs that religion is, at its core, something that brings people together, Lieberman believes religion can be used as a divisive tool to differentiate between candidate and positions within the institution of Congress. Table 2-8 lists the self-reported religion for freshmen elected between 1974 and 1994 and Figure 2-6 breaks down religious identification by amateur and professional status.

Table 2-8. Religious identification of freshmen2 Frequency Percent Catholic 148 18.7 Presbyterian 50 6.3 Protestant 37 4.7 Jewish 35 4.4 Baptist 71 9.0 Episcopalian 49 6.2 Methodist 87 11.0 Orthodox Churches 5 0.6 Church of Christ 9 1.1 Lutheran 21 2.7 Mormon 18 2.3 Other 30 3.8 Did Not Specify 72 9.1 Total 632 80.0

Freshmen are overwhelmingly Christian, with the largest group self-identifying themselves as Catholics. This trend continues for amateurs as well as professionals.

While we see that more professionals identify as Catholics, overall the breakdown between denominations is very similar for both groups. Figure 2-6 shows the breakdown between amateurs and professionals by religious identification.

One item that is very interesting in this data is the lack of individuals identifying themselves as Muslim’s, and the much smaller than anticipated number of Jewish

2 Note that Catholics and Protestants are separate categories in this analysis. While Catholic and Protestant are not mutually exclusive categories, I chose to retain separate categories because of the way that members of Congress self report their religious affiliation.

freshmen. As the number of Muslims in the general population has increased over the

last twenty years, the number of members of Congress elected to represent them has not

increased. Muslims are still represented in Congress by, primarily, white Christians and

they have not seen the boost in representation that majority minority districts have

afforded racial minorities. For those that identify themselves as Jewish, the data suggests

that while there are a large number of Jewish members of Congress in relation to the size

of the Jewish population in general, it is not as great as the public perceives (McNeely

and Tolchin 2001).

Other

Morman

Lutheran

Church of Christ

Did Not Specify

n Orthodox Churches

o i

g Methodist

l e

Espsicopalian R

Baptist

Jewish

Protestant

Presbyterian

Catholic 0 2550751000 25 50 75 100

Figure 2-6. Religious identification. A) Amateur. B) Professional

Number of Terms Served in Congress

With all of these factors separating first term members of Congress from one another, I turn my attention to exploring the number of terms served in Congress. For all

790 freshmen elected between 1974 and 1994, the average number of terms served is

4.47 terms. This average is for all freshmen regardless of amateur or professional status or year elected. Table 2-9 shows us the number of freshmen elected during this twenty- year time period and how many terms they served.

Table 2-9 illustrates that the vast majority of freshmen serve 4 terms or less. There are also a large number of Congressmen who are still serving in the House of

Representatives. Many of these individuals were elected in the 1990s and have served a total of four to ten terms thus far. This is reiterated in Figure 2-7 and is a testament to the staying power of incumbents in Congress. Getting elected is the biggest challenge that candidates face. They have numerous obstacles to overcome (see Chapter 4), but once they are elected to at least two terms, it becomes easier for members to remain in

Congress if they choose.

Table 2-9. Number of terms served by freshmen elected 1974 to 1994 Frequency Percent 1 Term 94 11.9 2 Terms 83 10.5 3 Terms 90 11.4 4 Terms 80 10.1 5 Terms 76 9.6 6 Terms 60 7.6 7 Terms 32 4.1 8 Terms 29 3.7 9 Terms 27 3.4 10 Terms 21 2.7 11 Terms 5 0.6 12 Terms 5 0.6 13 Terms 6 0.8 14 Terms 3 0.4 Currently Serving 179 22.7 Total 790 100.0

With so many freshmen serving multiple terms (88.1%), the breakdown in terms served between amateurs and professionals is also enlightening. Figure 2-7 shows the breakdown between amateurs and professionals and the number of terms they have served. Professional freshmen have a better chance of serving in Congress multiple terms than do amateurs. Once five terms has passed, the percentage of professionals serving is greater than amateurs. This could be a result of any number of factors, including

receiving better initial committee assignments and more quickly creating “safe” districts

early in their careers. What is most interesting about Figure 2-7 is the sheer number of freshmen who are not elected to a second term. It is a testament to how difficult and competitive the congressional election process is for members to serve for so many terms.

A B Currently Serving

14 Terms 13 Terms

d 12 Terms

e v

r 11 Terms

e S

10 Terms s

e 9 Terms

e 8 Terms r

g 7 Terms n

o 6 Terms

l 5 Terms

a t

o 4 Terms T 3 Terms 2 Terms

1 Term

25 50 75 100 125 25 50 75 100 125

Figure 2-7. Number of terms served. A) Amateur. B) Professional

Classifying Amateurs and Professionals

While at a basic level it is easy to see an undercurrent of difference between amateurs and professions in various careers, how do the above concepts flesh out for freshmen in the House of Representatives? As a result of the experience freshman bring with them to Congress, not all freshmen are created equal. Because of this inequality, it is important to create categorizations of amateurs and professionals within the context of the literature on amateurism and the literature on Congress.

It is important before we look further at the differences between amateurs and professionals that I am choosing only one of many ways to classify amateurs and professionals. One could choose to divide amateurs and professionals as part-time or full-time legislators (Fiorina 1994 and Fiorina 1999) or experienced or not experienced in

Congress. For the purposes of my argument, I have chosen to divide amateurs and professionals by the electoral success. I understand that this division, by definition, is inherently fuzzy and that I could have just as easily picked a different measure to divide the group. I believe that by dividing amateurs and professionals by legislative success, whether or not they have previously won an election, we can best understand the differences between the two groups and how they behave within the House of

Representatives.

The classification scheme allows for a division of previous experience that helps demonstrate that there are different ways of being an amateur or a professional.

Categorizing amateurs and professional by pre-congressional experience allows for an understanding of how each group receives their committee assignments, follows the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives and is successful in running for reelection. To better separate the differences, I have developed a six-category model of pre-congressional experience. Each category captures a different type of freshmen and their level of experience. Table 2-10 lays out the six categories and provides basic explanation as to who fits in each group.

Table 2-10. Amateur and professional categorizations Category Name Description Pure Amateurs No prior political experience Mostly Amateurs Previously ran for Congress, but did not win Semi-Amateurs Appointed to office, served as an active political party member, or studied politics as a profession (member of media, professor etc…) Semi-Professionals Elected to office at the local level (mayor, city council, county council etc…) Mostly Professionals Congressional staff member or spouse of a former member of Congress Pure Professionals Served in the State Legislature, State Senate, former Member of Congress

Within these six groups, it is important to note that there are multiple ways for one

to be classified as amateur or professional. Again, the differences between the categories

can be blurred at times, but it is important to understand that someone who has never

before won an election is not equal to someone who was appointed or volunteered to

serve in the local or state party organization, or worked as a staff member in Congress.

As I move forward with the analysis of the differences between amateurs and

professionals, I rely more on the dichotomous relationship between the categories, but I

present the groups below to show the nuances that divide freshmen members of

Congress.

Now that we have established the categories, let me explain each of the categories

and describe the number and types of freshmen in each group. In addition to

understanding a freshmen’s pre-congressional political experience, I list the official

occupation of each freshmen to create an understanding of the type of background and

experience each category has when they arrive in Congress. Official occupation is interesting, as my interviews have suggested that many new members request committee assignments and initial introduce legislation that can be linked back to their pre- congressional career.

Pure Amateurs

The pure amateur category has received the most attention in recent years. Canon

(1990) and Fenno (1996) both discuss pure amateurs. Canon looks at amateurs in general and Fenno looks specifically at Bill Bradley and John Glenn, neither of whom indicated

they were interested in politics before being elected to the Senate. Pure amateurs often

come from highly visible professions. These can be athletes, astronauts, actors, or other

prominent figures. These politicians are often the least prepared for their freshmen years

45 in Congress because they have never previously experienced anything like being a

Congressman and their careers have not prepared them for being a legislator.

Within my data set there are a number of pure amateurs. Some of these individuals were quite famous before being elected to Congress. Members of Congress such as John

Heinz (R-PA) who was heir to the Heinz ketchup family, Jack Kemp (R-NY) who played professional football for the Buffalo Bills and Steve Largent (R-OK) who is a member of the football Hall of Fame, are classic examples of Canon’s thesis of amateurs making attractive candidates. Many of those who can be considered pure amateurs are not as well known and famous nationwide, but are often well known within the district. This gives them the name recognition often required to succeed in convincing voters that they are the most viable candidates.

Table 2-11. Pure amateurs with previous professions Occupational Classifications Business Law Education Public Other Total Service Amateur Count 76 92 30 6 40 244 % 31.1% 37.7% 12.3% 2.5% 16.4% 100 % Other includes members of Congress who were members of the media, doctors, engineers and unspecified professions.

Mostly Amateurs

Most amateurs are freshmen that had previously run for office at any level, but had not won until the election that propelled them to Congress. These politicians may have run for other levels of office or may have been unsuccessful at running for Congress.

Members of Congress such as John Horn (R-CA), who ran unsuccessfully for Congress in 1988 before being elected in 1992, and Albert Lee Smith Jr. (R-AL), who ran unsuccessfully in 1978 before being elected in 1980, typify the mostly amateurs. They had tried their hand at politics, but had not been able to turn their pre-congressional

46 experience into a winning bid. While they have the same amount of elected experience as pure amateurs, they also have the added advantage of going through the election process and learning the lessons associated with campaigning.

Table 2-12. Mostly amateur with previous professions Occupational Classifications Business Law Education Public Other Total Service Amateur Count 1 1 2 27 2 33 % 3.0% 3.0% 6.1% 81.8% 6.1% 100% Other includes members of Congress who were members of the media, doctors, engineers and unspecified professions.

Semi-Amateurs

Semi-amateurs are those who have previously been appointed to office, served as an active political party members or studied politics as a professional. These amateurs draw their strength from insider knowledge of party politics or the bureaucratic side of government. Ray Thornton (D-AR) served as a delegate to the Arkansas State

Democratic convention as well as prosecutor in his home county. Chuck Douglas (R-

NH) served as legal counsel and legislative counsel to the governor and was then appointed associate justice of the New Hampshire superior court and then as an associate justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Both of these congressmen had knowledge of their state’s political systems from the inside, but had not run for office before winning seats in the House of Representatives.

Table 2-13. Semi-amateurs with previous professions Occupational Classifications Business Law Education Public Other Total Service Amateur Count 1 18 3 6 2 30 % 3.3% 60% 10% 20% 6.7% 100% Other includes members of Congress who were members of the media, doctors, engineers and unspecified professions.

Semi-Professionals

Semi-professionals are the first group of professional politicians. These politicians

have previously been elected to office at the local and/or county level. The reason that I

distinguish between politicians whose only electoral victory is to local and/or county

offices and those who have served at the state level is that their political experiences are

different. State government is often more complex than county and local governments

and the competition for seats is greater. While state governments may be more complex

and elections tighter, local and/or county government is still an important step for higher

office. It teaches politicians how to run a campaign and how the process works.

Again there are a number of freshmen that fit into this category. Those who fit into this category are often unknown by national party leaders and may not be known by many people outside of their districts. For example, Ted Weiss (D-NY) was a city councilman in New York before winning the 20th district seat in 1976 and James Martin

(R-NC) was a county official before representing the 9th district of North Carolina in

1972. Both of these members of Congress are indistinguishable from others because few people know them outside their districts and states. This does not make them bad politicians, but it does give them less legislative experience than professionals who have served in the state legislature. Freshmen who are classified as semi-professionals arrive in Congress with experience, but not in state legislative politics.

Table 2-14. Semi-professionals with previous professions Occupational Classifications Business Law Education Public Other Total Service Amateur Count 30 33 16 14 15 108 % 27.8% 30.6% 14.8% 13% 13.9% 100% Other includes members of Congress who were members of the media, doctors, engineers and unspecified professions.

Mostly Professionals

Mostly professionals are a unique group of freshmen that gained their experience by being in direct contact with members of Congress and the House of Representatives.

These freshmen are those who have served as congressional staff members or had a spouse that was a member of Congress. They bring with them an insider’s knowledge of the House of Representatives and an understanding of the lifestyle and demands of the institution. A classic example of mostly professional freshmen is Catherine Long (D-

LA). Congresswomen Long was elected by special election in 1985 to fill the seat vacated by the death of her husband Gillis Long. Congresswomen Long served out the last year and half of her husband’s term and then chose not to run for reelection again in

1986. She represents a very small, but powerful group that brings with them intimate knowledge of the institution either second hand (because they are married to a member of

Congress) or through working behind the scene.

Table 2-15. Mostly professionals with previous professions Occupational Classifications Business Law Education Public Other Total Service Amateur Count 4 2 1 2 3 12 % 33.3% 16.7% 8.3% 16.7% 25% 100% Other includes members of Congress who were members of the media, doctors, engineers and unspecified professions.

Pure Professionals

Pure professionals include those politicians who have a long history of winning elections and serving in their home states. They are politicians who may have served at lower levels of government before the state legislature, but then enjoyed a career in the state legislature before running for Congress. Pure professionals include former members of state house of representatives (or assemblies) and state senates as well as elected

49 executives (governors, elected attorney general, etc.). While governors rarely run for

Congress, other members of their cabinet often surface in congressional elections. For the most part, these freshmen are the best prepared for service in the House of

Representatives as a result of the legislative experience they developed as a state legislator.

Table 2-16. Pure professionals with previous professions Occupational Classifications Business Law Education Public Other Total Service Amateur Count 82 134 38 58 49 361 % 22.7% 37.1% 10.5% 16.1% 13.6% 100% Other includes members of Congress who were members of the media, doctors, engineers and unspecified professions.

Pure professional freshmen come from a variety of backgrounds and have a variety of experiences on the hill. Henry Hyde (R-IL), the former chair of the House judiciary committee, Henry Waxman (D-CA), David Bonior (D-MI), Senator James Jeffords (R/I-

VT) and Senator Paul Sarbannes (D-MD) all began their congressional careers after serving at the state level. This experience was invaluable to them and helped them to create long and successful careers in the House. It is also important to note that while these five examples are all successful long term members of Congress, there are others who had similar experiences in their past who have not been as successful.

CHAPTER 3 THE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS

One of the most important decisions freshmen make is the committee assignment they request. It is a decision that is not taken lightly, as it often helps or hurts the member in his/her ability to influence legislation. Fenno (1973) and Deering and Smith

(1997) have established a ranking of which committees are most important for certain goals within Congress. Depending on the members’ goal there are some committees that can better assist in achieving the desired outcome. These committees can be broken into power committees (for example Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules), policy committees (Banking, Education and Labor) and constituent committees (Agriculture and

Armed Services). These committees help the member focus on what is most important to them and allows them to pursue pieces of legislation that are most significant to them or their constituents.

Study of committee assignments began in with Ken Shepsle’s The Giant Jigsaw

Puzzle. Shepsle lays the foundation of why members of Congress request certain committee assignments and how the leadership of both political parties dealt with those requests during the mid 1970s. Shepsle (1978) finds that members of Congress request committee assignments that help them connect with their district’s policy interests wile at the same time help them with reelection goals. In addition, he finds that the House leadership works to accommodate those requests whenever possible. At the time of its publication, Shepsle’s findings were groundbreaking for the study of committee government and individual requests. Today, his study still is important to understanding

50 51 the committee assignment process, but as the result of reforms that took place in the

1970s and 1990s, the request and assignment process has been fundamentally altered.

Frisch and Kelly (2004) challenge Shepsle’s concept of committee self-selection and distributive theory by examining committee assignment requests of the Republican and Democratic parties. What Frisch and Kelly find is that while some of self-selection to committees, strong evidence does not exist for the hypothesis of members requesting committee assignments on the basis of district interests. “In the majority of cases members do not pursue committees based on a single district characteristic, party committees on committees do not accommodate all requests and, in turn, the majority of committees are not composed of preference outliers” (Frisch and Kelly 2004, 335).

These results challenge Shepsle’s thesis on the assignment process by looking at data across both political parties and outside of a single decade. It is this challenge and change that I use as a springboard to concentrate on freshmen committee assignments and how the process has evolved over time.

The committee system that exists in today’s House of Representatives took years to develop after change swept through Congress in the 1970s. Prior to 1970, seniority was the most important factor that determined committee seniority and leadership within the

House. Cox and McCubbins (1993) argument restates the theory that seniority was king in the committee autonomy. “One of the primary building blocks of the committee government model is the idea that members, once appointed to a standing committee, are automatically ensured security of tenure and promotion by seniority” (Cox and

McCubbins 1993, 45). In other words, if a member can be continuously reelected to

Congress, s/he will not loose his/her assignment and eventually has the opportunity to rise to chairman (or ranking member) should those above him leave the committee.

Violations of committee seniority were rare in the early days of committee government when the Speaker of the House controlled all committee assignments.

“Seniority violations were rare because (1) the party was divided into two regional factions, both of which could veto the punishment of any of their own; and (2) the seniority system produced a mix of committee chairs that, until the 1970s, accurately reflected the regional balance in the party” (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 58). The dominance of the seniority system provided stability to the Democratic Party and allowed the northern and southern factions to coexist. When the balance between north and south began to decay in the 1960s, violations of the seniority system began to increase and led to the reform movement of the 1970s.

The 1970s brought dynamic change to the committee assignment process in the

Democratic caucus and as a result in the House of Representatives. The caucus began, for the first time, to take power of committee assignments from the hands of the Speaker and creating the Steering and Policy Committee to assist the Speaker in assigning all members, and freshmen in particular, to the Democratic committee seats.

In December 1974, the Democratic caucus changed the party’s committee assignment process, voting 146 to 122 to allow the Speaker to nominate Democratic members to the Rules Committee, subject to the confirmation by the full caucus. The caucus also transferred control of other committee assignments from Ways and Means Committee Democrats to the recently created Steering and Policy Committee, which was chaired by the Speaker and included several leadership appointees. (Schickler 228)

By changing the way in which committee assignments were made, the Democratic

Caucus not took away a long-standing power of the Speaker but they allowed more members to be involved in the committee assignment process. As a result of these

reforms and changes, the Democratic Caucus also changed the dynamic of assignments

for freshmen. Whereas before freshmen could lobby just the Speaker, or Minority Leader

for Republicans, for assignment to a particular committee, they now had to work with all

members of the Steering and Policy Committee to request their preferred assignments.

The committee assignment process is a place where amateurs and professionals differ greatly. The type of committee assignments they request and the type of assignments they receive depend greatly on their backgrounds (i.e., lawyers are more likely to be assigned to the Judiciary Committee) and pre-congressional experience. I

will show that, freshman who served in a state legislature are more likely to receive

“better” committee assignments than those who had served at lower levels or had never

served in any capacity. The committee assignments amateurs and professionals request

are also different, and each member believes they are making a request that is best for

their legislative career.

Cox and McCubbins (1993) began the analysis of committee assignments for

freshmen by looking at loyalty to party leadership. They posit that the probability a

freshman’s request is granted ought to be influenced on the strength of their loyalty and

the type of committee requested. What they find is that they “…do not deny that

members’ preferences for assignment are important and determine much of the pattern of

actual assignment, but this fact does not make the process one of ‘self-selection’ pure and

simple, where member requests are neutrally processed” (Cox and McCubbins 1993,

186).

Cox and McCubbins’ findings reiterate the importance of committee assignment requests and the varying degree of understanding that freshmen have about the

assignment process. In general, freshmen have idealized notions of what committees do

and which ones are most important (and/or impressive). As a result of these pre-

conceived notions, freshmen request assignments from their party leadership that they

believe have the best chance of putting them in an immediate position of power. In

general, freshmen do not see the how committees differ and how they can alter

constituent relationships. The next section examines the desire of amateurs and

professionals to serve on power committees due to the appeal and centrality of committee

actions for the House of Representatives.

Amateurs

The expectations that amateur freshmen have for committee assignments are

different than those of professional freshman. Amateurs tend to request committees that

are in line with their pre-political careers and their interests, sometimes without thinking

about the needs of their constituents or party. While most freshman request to be

assigned to Ways and Means, amateurs receive the assignment at a far lower rate than

professionals. Despite this there are some examples of amateurs being placed by the

leadership on the committee for a variety of reasons.

The committee requests of amateurs illustrates that these freshmen choose their committees based on their own interests. If they served in the military before Congress, they often believe they are best qualified to serve on the Armed Services Committee, while as a lawyer they want to be on the Judiciary Committee. An excellent wonderful example of the requesting and assignment process is that of Congressman B (D-New

England). Before his election to Congress, Congressman B served as the Dean of a New

England law school. As he arrived in Congress he requested to be placed on the

Judiciary Committee, as this is where he felt he would be the most productive. “I

requested and received an appointment to the House Judiciary Committee. The House

Judiciary Committee seems to be a natural fit for a person with my background in legal

education and teaching.” Congressman B’s experience in the committee assignment

process is fairly typical for many Group I amateurs. He saw a place where he believed he

could make a difference and requested that assignment.

In this instance, the Democratic leadership agreed with Congressman B and assigned him to the committee. The leadership often uses the members’ request as a starting point for the assignment process. For Congressman B, his experience as a law school Dean helped convince the leadership that he would be a good choice for the panel.

Many amateurs do not make a convincing case as to why the leadership should take a gamble on a new congressman for an important seat, when there are more senior, more experienced members who may want to move to the committee in question. The ultimate responsibility for assignments is in the hands of the party leadership. The lobbying process new members go through to get the assignments is often arduous and can be confusing. If the leadership believes that a certain committees will assist a freshman in securing reelection, an assignment is made to help them achieve that end.

Other amateurs bring with them knowledge of the institution as an outsider who

wants to be on the inside, having attempted to run for Congress previously. Congressman

Ron Paul (R-TX) is a good example of this subgroup. Congressman Paul first attempted

to run for Congress in 1974. He then was able to win a special election in 1976 to fill the

seat of Robert R. Casey (R-TX) when he left to take an appointment to the Federal

Maritime Commission. Paul unsuccessfully ran for reelection in 1976 but then was able

to win two more terms in 1978 and 1980. He then tried unsuccessfully to run for Senate

56 in 1984 and as the presidential candidate of the Libertarian Party in 1988. Paul was then reelected to Congress in 1997 and has been serving since.

Congressman Paul’s political experiences are unique for freshmen. Even with his experience as a medical doctor before arriving in Congress, he served on the banking committee throughout his career. The banking committee did not play to his strengths, but gave him the opportunity to promote his libertarian agenda on sound monetary policy and on the return to the gold standard (Paul Bioguide 2005). For Congressman Paul, his ability to work on his agenda and represent his constituents was more important to him than gaining power within the House of Representatives.

W. Henson Moore (R-LA) typifies another group of amateurs that is interested in figuring out the best committee assignment to represent their district. Moore served on the Louisiana Republican State Committee before being elected to Congress. As he was running for Congress, he realized that once the Democratic incumbent had been defeated in the primary, Louisiana was no longer represented on the Agriculture Committee.

Moore believed that he should campaign on his ability to represent Louisiana on the

Agriculture Committee. He went to see a man named Jimmy Grunyard who was then president of the Louisiana Farm Bureau. Grunyard agreed to support Moore in his campaign if he kept his promise to seek a seat on the Agriculture Committee when he won the election.

Moore had secured important help for his campaign by agreeing to seek a seat on

Agriculture. The Louisiana Farm Bureau had not supported a Republican candidate in more than a generation, so this was an essential step toward winning the election. To help make sure that such a seat was possible, Moore went to Washington to speak with

Minority Leader John Rhodes. Rhodes assured Moore that if he could win the special

election; he would be seated on agriculture. Moore went back to Louisiana with the news

and campaigned on Rhodes’ promise. Moore won his election and was then appointed to

the Agriculture Committee as Rhodes had promised.

Moore saw the big picture as a result of his experience in Louisiana Republican leadership. He saw other candidates make promises they could not keep and make requests that would never have been granted. Moore understood the importance of agriculture for Louisiana and because no one from the state would be seated on the committee in the 94th Congress, believed that he had a good chance of being seated.

Moore kept the seat on Agriculture for four terms, until a seat on Ways and Means opened up. He then believed that he could better serve his constituents by serving on

Ways and Means and focusing on agricultural issues from a monetary instead of a policy point of view. Before he took the seat on Ways and Means, Moore recalled in our interview that he went back to Jimmy Grunyard to ask his permission. Grunyard was impressed by this move, gave his blessing, and continued endorsement to Moore.

Some amateurs struggle with the committee assignment process. They can be

overly ambitious and only at times do they request assignments that make sense for their

district or reelection. Congressman B relied upon his extensive law training to be

appointed to the committee he wanted, (but one that may not have been the best for his

constituents). On the other hand, Moore had the foresight to understand the importance

of a seat on Agriculture for his district and state. While these stories to do not typify the

misguided image of many amateurs, they are good representatives of the type of

58 experiences amateurs have in the assignment process and how they work to do what they believe is best for them and their constituents.

Professionals

Professional politicians face some of the same difficulties that plague amateur freshmen. They rely on their previous government and legislative experience to guide their requests, which are sometimes unrealistic. Professional freshmen have a tendency to request the more prestigious committees regardless of their qualifications and the openings on the committees. They want to move up within the power structure as quickly as possible and sometimes forget about the need to serve on committees that help them connect with their constituents.

Some professionals bring with them experience at the local and county level. This experience does not truly help them understand the legislative process but does give them many of the same observations as some amateurs. These professionals see how the previous congressmen from their districts handled committee assignments and formulate how they might do a better job of representing the district. At the same time that try and balance what they know about the district with their desire to be influential players in the

House of Representatives. They look to overcome a lack of state and national level political experience with an assignment that propels them into the spotlight.

Herbert Harris (R-VA) is a good example of this type of professional. When he arrived in Congress he believed strongly that he could make a difference by using issues that were important to his constituents. His district was so close to Washington, D.C., he asked for a seat on the Committee on the District of Columbia. On this committee he believed he could make a difference for thousands of his constituents that commuted to work in Washington. He made this request to the Democratic leadership and was placed

59 on the committee. Harris was then able to parlay his constituent committee request into a leadership position when the Speaker’s office asked him to serve as the chair of the

Bicentennial sub committee based on his experience in the area and knowledge of what would be appropriate to celebrate the nation’s birthday.

The Committee on the District of Columbia was not a desired committee by most members of Congress and Deering and Smith (1997) classify it as an un-requested committee. Harris saw an opportunity “where I can serve most directly and successfully.” His goals of advancing both his legislative agenda and setting himself up for a possible move to a more important committee later in his career weighed on his assignment request. He believed that the leadership would reward him with more power down the road if he agreed to work hard and serve on a committee that few others wanted. Harris did not mind this assignment as it benefited him among his constituents.

These professionals are in the unique position that they have elective experience, but often not the sophistication that is necessary to be seated on the best committees as freshman. They have the potential to become excellent legislators but they arrive without the worldly knowledge needed to be successful immediately. The leadership must assume a responsibility to help them get on the committees they need for their districts and to put them in positions where they are ready to step up to a more powerful or prestigious committee when a seat comes open. This fine balance is most difficult because they often believe they have more experience and knowledge than they really do.

Other professionals, who have worked in Congress as staff members or who had a spouse who served in Congress, find themselves in a position to understand the political system in a unique way, but without their own direct legislative experiences. A classic

60 example is James Symington (D-MO). Symington grew up in a family of Congressmen.

His grandfather, James Wadsworth, had served in the House of Representatives and the

U.S. Senate as a representative from New York. His father, Stuart Symington (D-MO), also served in the U.S. Senate and Symington had the opportunity to meet many of their acquaintances. This gave Symington a unique multi-generational approach to Congress.

“It was a valuable lesson to observe a Democratic father and a Republican grandfather as they shared confidences, insights, and initiatives bearing on the nation’s welfare…. I think that is why I felt perfectly comfortable as a Member of Congress wandering across the aisle from time to time to chat with Republican friends” (Symington 2001, 39-40).

Symington’s comfort with his role as a member of Congress is unique and rare among freshmen. Instead of feeling overwhelmed by the experience of serving in

Washington, D.C., Symington was comfortable because of the time he had spent with this father and grandfather watching them legislate. “Arriving at the House floor as a new member in January 1969, tingling with anticipation at the prospect of contributing ideas and sweat equity to its deliberations, I stopped at the threshold as one might at the entrance to a great cathedral, humbled by the thought of those who had gone before and what they had built” (Symington, 2001, 41). Symington had great respect for the institution and understood what he could contribute and what he should expect in return.

He knew that even though being a member of Congress is special, they are all still citizens and mortals who are no different than their constituents.

Professionals who have served in state legislatures have the best understanding of the committee system. These freshmen understand that they should have goals for committee assignments, and that even though they might not receive a seat on Ways and

Means immediately, they should request it for their first term to demonstrate to the

leadership they are interested for the future. Leadership wants new members to see

beyond the first few weeks in office.

James Jones (D-OK) is a good example of the experienced professional during the committee assignment process. Jones made requests based both on his desires to serve on prominent committees and on his understanding of the institution from his service in the executive branch. Jones began his political career as a staff member for a member of

Congress from Oklahoma. After this experience, he left the congressional world and joined the Johnson White House as his last Chief of Staff.3 This experience in the White

House complemented his understanding of Congress from his time as a staff member. It

gave him perspective as to how the institution worked and which committees were the

most prestigious.

When Jones arrived in Congress for his first term, he requested a seat on the Ways

and Means Committee. To express his desires, he met with Speaker of the House, Carl

Albert, to discuss his options. Albert informed Jones that there were no current openings

on Ways and Means and that he would put him on Armed Services and Interior. While

these were not his first choices, Jones made the best of his time on both committees.

Interior became a significant committee during his first term because of the importance

the legislation passed in the committee had for the people of Oklahoma.

At the beginning of his second term, Albert informed Jones of an opening on Ways

and Means and seated him on the committee. Jones thus succeeded in getting on the

Ways and Means Committee even though it was not during his first term. Other

3 The Chief of Staff position did not exist in the Johnson White House under that name. Jones served as Johnson’s chief advisor in a role identical to the Chief of Staff in today’s administration.

professionals take the same strategy in trying to get on the most prestigious committees.

They will ask to be placed on them during their first term to inform the leadership of their

interest and will then continue to lobby for a seat if it should come open while serving on

another committee.

Success in the committee assignment process is important for new members of

Congress. If they can be seated on a committee that is important to their district, they can make a difference in legislation and become better known with their constituents.

Amateurs tend to ask for committee assignments that are not ideal for their current situation. They should be looking for committees that fit their pre-political careers and that allow them to highlight existing knowledge during the first months in Congress.

Professionals come at the assignment process in a different manner. They often see a big picture and want to be on the most prestigious committees but they understand that they must start where the party leadership needs them most and then hope to be reassigned in future terms. To achieve that end, they continuously lobby the leadership for advancements and work as hard as possible and work to be rewarded with more prestigious assignments in the future.

Committee Importance

The next step is to look at whether amateurs are treated differently than professional freshman when they are assigned to committees during their first terms in

Congress. I hypothesize that amateur freshman are treated differently in committee assignments. Amateur members do not receive assignments to the prestigious committees nearly as often as professional freshman because the leadership respects legislative experience above other pre-congressional careerism.

Before continuing with the discussion of the difference between amateurs and

professionals on their committee assignments, it is important to discuss some of the

literature on congressional committees to better understand the different kinds of

committees. While there are numerous studies of committees in Congress, the most

influential and groundbreaking work is by Richard Fenno. Fenno (1973) broke the ice

for the study of committee government and set the stage for future study of how

committees work and influence the legislative process. He sets out to look in depth at the

committee process, trying to understand why some committees appear to be more

prestigious than others.

One of the biggest contributions that Fenno makes is his classification of committees into three large but distinct groups that serve different purposes for their

members. “Of all the goals espoused by members of the House, three are basic. They are

re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy” (Fenno, 1973, 1). These

basic goals translate into three different groups of committees. These committees help

members cater to their needs of re-election, influence within the House, and good public

policy. This is essential later for the analysis of the difference between amateur and

professional freshman and the committee assignment process.

While Fenno establishes the idea that congressmen have three different goals in

mind when they request committee assignments, he only provides examples from a

limited number of committees and never establishes which other committees would fall

under these broad categories. Deering and Smith (1997) expand upon Fenno’s definition

of Members committee’s goals and break down all the committees into categories based

upon the same ideas that Fenno had previously established. They use the categories of

64 prestige, policy, constituent and un-requested committees to differentiate the types of committees that exist in Congress.

Each of Deering and Smith’s committee categories provides a different opportunity for their members. The Prestige Committees include Appropriations, Rules, Ways and

Means and Budget, and are the committees with the most power within the House.

Members who serve on these committees do so because they believe they receive the most influence and political exposure. By serving on these four committees Members serve because they want to be leaders and power brokers within Congress.

Policy committees including Banking, Education and Labor, Energy and

Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Judiciary and Government Operations committees, are the second most important group of committee according to Deering and Smith. These committees allow members to be leaders in the public policy arena. Members on these committees often can be referred to as policy “wonks” (Fenno 1996) and are interested in assuring that the best possible policy becomes law.

Constituent committees are the third category and include Agriculture, Armed

Services, Interior, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Public Works, Science, Space and

Technology, Small Business and Veterans’ Affairs committees. These committees allow members to serve in a way that addresses the interests of their districts. For example members from Kansas or Iowa might request the agriculture committee because their district include predominately farmers or a member from Huntsville, Alabama, or Cocoa

Beach, Florida, might want to serve on the Science, Space and Technology committee to influence legislation for their constituents. These committees are essential for these purposes and freshmen may request them to establish a bond within their districts.

The fourth group that Deering and Smith establish is un-requested committees and includes District of Columbia, House Administration, Post Office and Civil Service,

Standards of Official Conduct and Select Intelligence committees. These are the most undesirable in terms of help with re-election, policy and constituent services. These committees do not normally do anything for the Members, but do allow them to establish a record within Congress and gain the knowledge and experience that could be helpful if and when they move on to a more prestigious committee.

Table 3-1. Committee type and order Prestige Committees Policy Committees Constituent Committees Un-requested Committees Appropriations (1) Banking (5) Agriculture (11) District of Columbia (19) Budget (2) Education and Armed Services (12) House Labor (6) Administration (20) Rules (3) Energy and Interior (13) Post Office and Commerce (7) Civil Service (21) Ways and Means (4) Foreign Affairs (8) Merchant Marine and Standards of Fisheries (14) Official Conduct (22) Judiciary (9) Public Works (15) Select Intelligence (23) Government Science, Space, and Operations (10) Technology (16) Small Business (17) Veterans’ Affairs (18) Numbers in ( ) represent the coding number given to each committee and the order in which Deering and Smith list the committees.

Primary Committee Assignments

Now that we have established an order of importance for committees in Congress, we examine what this means for amateur and professional politicians. One way to look at how amateur and professional freshman are assigned to committees is to look at how many amateurs and professionals serve on each committee type that Deering and Smith

66 establish. To do this I have looked at how amateurs and professionals are assigned to committees during their first term by looking at the raw numbers of freshman placed on each committee and how freshman fit into each of the categories that Deering and Smith establish for the committee system.

Table 3-2. Primary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals Amateur Professional Total Appropriations 4 (20.0%) 16 (80.0%) 20 (2.7%)

Budget 11 (48.0%) 12 (52.0%) 23 (3.1%)

Rules 3 (75.0%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (0.5%)

Ways and Means 9 (69.2%) 4 (30.8%) 13 (1.8%)

Power Committee Totals 27 (45.0%) 33 (55.0%) 60 (8.1%)

Banking 39 (33.9%) 76 (66.1%) 115 (15.6%)

Education and Labor 20 (30.3%) 46 (69.7%) 66 (9.0%)

Energy and Commerce 19 (44.2%) 24 (55.8%) 43 (5.8%)

Foreign Affairs 11 (29.7%) 26 (70.3%) 37 (5.0%)

Judiciary 8 (38.1%) 13 (61.9%) 21 (2.9%)

Government Operations 29 (43.3%) 38 (56.7%) 67 (9.1%)

Policy Committees Totals 111 (31.8%) 223 (68.2%) 349 (47.4%)

Agriculture 43 (43.0%) 57 (57.0%) 100 (13.6%)

Armed Services 23 (34.8%) 43 (65.2%) 66 (9.0%)

Interior 20 (45.4%) 24 (54.6%) 44 (6.0%)

Merchant Marine and Fisheries 8 (34.8%) 15 (65.2%) 23 (3.1%)

Public Works 23 (39.7%) 35 (60.3%) 58 (7.9%)

Science, Space and Technology 4 (28.6%) 10 (71.4%) 14 (1.9%)

Table 3-2. Continued. Amateur Professional Total Small Business 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.6%) 3 (0.4%)

Veterans Affairs 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.1%)

Reelection Totals 123 (39.8%) 186 (60.2%) 309 (42.0%)

District of Columbia 4 (40.0%) 6 (60.0%) 10 (1.4%)

Post Office and Civil Service 4 (50.0%) 4 (50.0%) 8 (1.1%)

Un-requested Totals 8 (44.4%) 10 (55.6%) 18 (2.5%)

Total 284 (38.6%) 452 (61.4%) 736 (100.0%) House committee rankings come from Deering and Smith (1997).4

Table 3-2 presents the distribution of committee assignments for the freshman elected to the House from 1974 to 1994 and shows that more professional freshman are assigned to the top committees. As we can see from the table, more professional freshman serves on each of the second tier committees (Banking, Education and Labor,

Energy and Commerce, Foreign Affairs, and Judiciary) than amateurs. This is particularly evident on the Banking committee where 66.1% of those assigned were professionals. As we move down the committee ranks, amateur and professional freshman receive approximately the same assignments at the same rate, and there are even some committees with more amateurs than professional freshman.

It appears that a norm exists within the House to give better committee assignments to professional politicians over amateurs. The data seem to confirm this norm. On the top four committees, 55% of freshmen are professionals compared with 45% amateurs.

4 To simplify the analysis I have combined our amateur and professional categories into the broad categories of initial analysis from Chapter 2. To see the detailed breakdown by type of amateur and professional and a brief discussion of why I have chosen this method of analysis, please reference Appendix C.

This is interesting in relationship to the concept that freshmen are almost never assigned

to the most prestigious committees (Shepsle 1978). It would appear from this data, that

freshmen are assigned to the top four committees. As I will demonstrate later, there are

individual reasons for many of these assignments and the party leadership often directs

them for specific purposes.

The data shows that a greater percentage of professionals, 55%, receive the top

committee assignments. It appears the party leadership looks for freshman that they can

mold and mentor. While they do choose amateurs to receive these top assignments, they

are slightly more likely to turn to professionals who have experience in government and

work with them to ease their transition from state or local politics to the House of

Representatives. Also by choosing a professional to immediately serve on a prestigious

committee, the leadership is indebting the freshmen to the leadership for placing them in

an immediate position of power.

The power committees are the most important primary committee assignments for

all members of Congress. For freshmen, the assignment to a power committee represents

the pinnacle of success amongst their cohort. Knowing that power committee

assignments are so sought after, it is interesting to note that professional freshmen are

underrepresented on the power committees in relation to their overall numbers in the

House of Representatives. For some reason, the party leadership chooses to seat more

amateurs, in relation to their overall numbers, on the power committees.

Butler Derrick (D-SC) was first elected to Congress in 1974 after serving in the

South Carolina state legislature. After serving for four terms, he moved from the Budget

Committee to the Rules Committee and then shortly after was appointed to the

Democratic Steering and Policy Committee by then Speaker Tom Foley (D-WA). As part of his responsibilities on the Steering and Policy Committee, Derrick helped the speaker assign freshmen to committees. In this role, Derrick believed his job was to

“look at the abilities and geography to assign freshmen to committees and to work with the leadership to boost Democrats in marginal districts by providing them with higher profile committee assignments.” These goals served the Democrats well for forty years and helped them maintain control of the House.

With the ultimate assignment of committees falling to the Steering and Policy

Committee, it is hard to measure the influence and power of the party leadership. While the raw numbers tells us that more professionals than amateurs were seated on the

Prestige Committees as freshmen and the percentages tell us the opposite, the truth lies more with the raw data. As Derrick stated, the leadership looked at prior experience in combination with geography and type of district when making all committee assignments. If the leadership felt that an amateur would be well served for future elections by being on Ways and Means or Appropriations, then they might make that assignment to try and keep a swing district seat in their party’s column.

Ultimately, the assignment of a new member to a committee follows a basic pattern. Very few freshmen have the opportunity to serve on the most prestigious committees. Most freshmen are assigned (as their primary committee assignment) to either policy or reelection committees. This fits with the concept that freshmen need to have the ability and opportunity to connect with their constituents and provide them with the opportunity to return to Congress for multiple terms, where they can make the most of their career.

Secondary Committee Assignments

Most members of Congress serve on multiple committees. With this in mind, I turn my attention briefly to the secondary assignments of freshmen. As Table 3-3 shows, the distribution of secondary committee assignments favors reelection committees over both policy and un-requested committees. Also of note, there are no freshmen assigned to the power committees as a secondary assignment, as serving on Appropriations, Ways and

Means, Rules and Budget are often exclusive committee assignments that prevent a member from serving on a second committee.

Table 3-3. Secondary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals Amateurs Professionals Totals Appropriations 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

Rules 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

Ways and Means 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%)

Budget 2 (28.6%) 5 (71.4%) 7 (1.1%)

Total for Prestige Committees 2 (28.6%) 5 (71.4%) 7 (1.1%)

Banking 4 (66.7%) 2 (33.3%) 6 (0.9%)

Education and Labor 10 (50.0%) 10 (50.0%) 20 (3.1%)

Energy and Commerce 6 (66.7%) 3 (33.3%) 9 (1.4%)

Foreign Affairs 4 (26.7%) 11 (73.3%) 15 (2.3%)

Judiciary 8 (28.6%) 20 (71.4%) 28 (4.4%)

Government Operations 17 (29.3%) 41 (70.7%) 58 (9.0%)

Total for Policy Committees 51 (35.7%) 92 (64.3%) 143 (22.2%)

Agriculture 1 (100.0%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.2%)

Armed Services 1 (50.0%) 1 (50.0%) 2 (0.3%)

Table 3-4. Continued. Amateurs Professionals Totals Interior 10 (33.3%) 20 (66.7%) 30 (4.7%)

Merchant Marine and Fisheries 13 (24.0%) 41 (76.0%) 54 (8.4%)

Public Works 20 (27.8%) 52 (72.2%) 72 (11.2%)

Science, Space and Technology 47 (42.7%) 63 (57.3%) 110 (17.1%)

Small Business 42 (40.0%) 63 (60.0%) 105 (16.4%)

Veterans Affairs 38 (48.7%) 40 (51.3%) 78 (12.1%)

Total for Reelection 172 (38.0%) 280 (62.0%) 452 (70.4%) Committees

District of Columbia 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 3 (0.5%)

Post Office and Civil Service 9 (39.1%) 14 (60.9%) 23 (3.6%)

Standards of Conduct 1 (16.7%) 5 (83.3%) 6 (0.9%)

Select Committees 11 (73.3%) 4 (26.7%) 15 (2.3%)

Total for Un-requested 22 (46.8%) 25 (53.2%) 47 (7.3%) Committees

Total 245 (38.2%) 397 (61.8%) 642 (100.0%) The rankings for House committees come from Deering and Smith (1997).

As we can see from Table 3-3, the majority of freshmen, 88%, are assigned a second committee assignment. With few exceptions, these secondary assignments are often to reelection and un-requested committees. These assignments are perceived by the leadership as helping freshmen balance their personal needs with those of their constituents. The literature on secondary committee assignments is almost non-existent and the reasons why freshmen are assigned to certain committees seems to be based more on personal interest and reelection reasons than any solid strategy by the House leadership.

In addition to understanding that 70.4% of all freshmen are assigned to reelection

committees as their secondary assignment, the correlation between secondary

assignments and a freshmen’s pre-congressional political experience has the same

slightly negative correlation with their amateur/professional status. The difference

between primary and secondary assignments is the significance of the negative

correlation of secondary assignments.

Table 3-4. Correlation coefficients for secondary committee assignments Amateur and Professional Status Kendall’s Deering and Smith Correlation Coefficient tau_b Committee Ranking -.067(*) (Second Committee) Sig. (2-tailed) .033 N 642 Spearman’s Deering and Smith Correlation Coefficient rho Committee Ranking -.085(*) (Second Committee) Sig. (2-tailed) .032 N 642 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

The significance of the correlation between amateur and professional status is the simple fact that when assigning freshmen to a secondary committee the leadership does not work as methodically in picking what freshmen would be most appropriate for each committee. The data illustrates that secondary assignments are bound by pre- congressional experience. A farmer who was assigned to the Agriculture committee as a primary assignment might be assigned to Interior as a secondary assignment because of a perceived expertise in land management.

Former members of Congress support the supposition that leadership relies on pre- congressional career experience for secondary assignments. John Buchanan (R-AL) was

elected to the House in 1964 as the first Republican to represent the city of Birmingham in Congress. Buchanan grew up as a self described Lincoln Republican who did not believe in segregation and was helped into office by Barry Goldwater’s run for president.

When he arrived in Congress, Buchanan, like many other freshmen, requested to serve on the Banking and Government Operations committees. Having served as a church pastor and as the budget officer for the Alabama Republican Party, Buchanan felt that these

were logical and reasonable requests. Even with his background, Buchanan was assigned

to the Post Office and Civil Services committees and the House Un-American Activities

committee. The later assignment played directly into his personal beliefs against

segregation to lead investigations into the Ku Klux Klan throughout the south.

Buchanan’s experience illustrates the way in which leadership can look at an individual’s pre-congressional experience and put them in a position that they can make a difference and connect with their constituents. Through his representation of

Birmingham and its large population of African-Americans, Buchanan was in a unique position to work on investigations of the Klan without radically affecting the majority of his electoral base.

Conclusion

Overall, the committee assignment process can be a myriad of puzzles for any freshmen members of the House of Representatives. When freshmen are first elected to the House, they are asked by their party’s leadership to provide committee preferences.

The party leadership then considers these preferences and assignments are made to primary committees (for all), secondary committees (for most) and in some cases a tertiary committee. Chapter 3 concerned itself with whether pre-congressional political

experience of amateurs and professionals is an influencing factor of primary and

secondary committee assignments. As the data has shown, for primary assignments the

leadership does not seem to take amateur/professional status into consideration as a

primary factor.

However, we know from interviewing members of the leadership that the data does not tell the full truth. Derrick clearly stated that the Democratic Policy and Steering

Committee used pre-congressional experiences, both political and apolitical, to determine the committee assignments of many freshmen, particularly those who were chosen to serve on the most prestigious committees. The assignments to Appropriations, Ways and

Means, Budget and Rules wielded the most power, and the leadership wanted to ensure that the correct person was selected to serve.

Even with the entire behind the scenes activities playing out for committee

assignments, ultimately, members of Congress in the correct place secure the best

assignments at the correct time. Ben Erdreich (D-AL) secured his assignment to the

Banking committee through a senior Democrat. Congressman C (D-Southeast) was

seated on Ways and Means as a freshman because there were no women from her state on

the committee at the time of her election and she had served on the revenue committees

in the state legislature. Stories like those of Erdriech and Congressman C are typical for

committee assignments to many of the top committees. These individuals are chosen

because of their previous experience at the state level and their potential to win multiple

elections and make a difference over their career.

CHAPTER 4 ELECTORAL SUCCESS

Beyond the Constitutional requirements of age and citizenship there is only one other characteristic that all members of Congress share. Each member of Congress is elected to the institution to represent constituents in their home district. The process by which each member of Congress decides to run for office and the path they take to win an election are as varied as the 435 members. However, there are a number of common traits that candidates must pay attention to in order to successfully win, and defend, their seat.

David Mayhew (1974) examines the congressional election process from the perspective of the candidate and member of Congress. In his analysis, Mayhew assumes that each member of Congress is a single-minded seeker of reelection. In this assumption, Mayhew supposes that Congress is a desirable place to spend part of ones career and that reelection is more important than any other goal. Members of Congress, for the most part, seem to live by this theory. They continue to run for reelection and have a desire to serve in Congress until a higher position becomes available or they decide to spend more time with their family.

As the second part of his idea, Mayhew works to figure out how a group of 435 single-minded seekers of reelection can work together once they arrive in Washington.

Mayhew concludes that reelection and comity in Congress are not opposite goals. “It will be useful to start here with two… points…. The first is that the organization of

Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs of its members. …The second point

75 76 is that satisfaction of electoral needs requires remarkably little zero-sum conflict among members” (Mayhew 1974, 81-82). Mayhew finds that reelection, as a penultimate goal, can be a benefit for collegial relations within the House of Representatives. This is an important finding, as each member of Congress must win an election to be seated and then win again if they hope to gain committee or party seniority.

This Chapter 4 works to understand whether amateurs or professionals receive more votes in their initial election to Congress and which group of freshmen is able to carry their initial electoral success to a sophomore term. To do this, I first establish a base understanding about the rigors of running for office and the inevitable sacrifices candidates make for votes. After reviewing the literature on congressional elections, I turn my attention to election results from 1974 to 1994 to see how amateurs and professionals fared in various elections and whether one group is more successful than others.

Election Literature

The literature on congressional elections is vast and covers topics that range from voters, to political parties, to special interest groups and money. For the purposes of this study, I concentrate my review and analysis of amateurs and professionals in congressional elections by focusing on three areas; the reasons people choose to run for

Congress, the impact of raising money on candidates and the realities of life in Congress and the pressure of constituent service. These three topics create a foundation for analysis of electoral success for amateurs and professionals.

Running for Office

Deciding to run is the most important decision a potential member of Congress makes. Before declaring oneself a candidate, an individual has only his/her work and life

77 experience to lean on. Moncrief, Squire and Jewell (2001) conducted a study to understand who runs for Congress and why they choose to leave other professions (or state legislative bodies). Moncrief et al. work through many of the different types of people who run for Congress, discussing those who leave state legislatures to run, those who have no political experience and even those who choose to run as third party candidates. In the end, they conclude that running for office is the ultimate form of public participation. “Running for any political office is a very demanding form of participation because it requires a heavy commitment of time and effort. Yet the political system needs the best possible participants” (Moncrief, Squire and Jewell, 2001, 116).

When an individual feels he or she can handle an increase in participation and chooses to run for office they do so for personal reasons. These reasons vary from wanting to be more involved in government to having a desire to change specific laws that affect their family and community. In general, amateurs and professionals decide to run for Congress for different reasons. Professionals, such as Bernie Sanders (I-VT), decided to run for office almost by accident. After being involved in the radical movement of the 1960s while an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, Sanders attended a meeting of the Liberty Union Party in 1971 in Plainfield, Vermont at the suggestion of one of his friends. The meeting was being held to nominate candidates for the Senate and House of Representatives as a result of the death of Senator Winston

Prouty and the decision by Congressman Robert Stafford to run for the open seat. “The small Liberty Union Party was not exactly overflowing with individuals who were interested in running for the two seats. So, full of enthusiasm for what I believed was right and just, I raised my hand and offered my views on education, the economy, and the

78 war in Vietnam. An hour later, I had won the nomination as the Liberty Union candidate for the open Senate seat. Talk about grassroots democracy!” (Sanders 1997, 15).

Sanders’ experience is unique. His choice to attend the political rally of a third party resulted in his winning the party’s nomination for the U.S. Senate. This experience turned out to be invaluable for him in later campaigns. Sanders’ first campaign allowed him to build the necessary political skills to run unsuccessfully in other statewide campaigns and finally to become mayor of Burlington, VT, and win a seat in the House of Representatives in 1990. Sanders brought his unique, and often losing, electoral experience to Congress and he has been serving ever since as a progressive and independent.

In contrast to Sanders’ experience, Paul Wellstone (D-MN) came to politics as an amateur after a career as a political science professor at Carleton College in Northfield,

Minnesota. After years of teaching politics and political movements, Wellstone had developed a rapport with the citizens of northern Minnesota and had students working in many different facets of government. These individuals encouraged Wellstone to become active in politics and run for an open Senate seat in 1990. At first, Wellstone was apprehensive about becoming involved in politics, but he received encouragement from the citizens of Minnesota and workers of the Iron Range. “Gabe [Brisbois] and his wife,

Mary Ann, told me when I first called them for their support that they had made an extra key to their house, which I was to make my home while on the Range. I made my final decision to run for the Senate in their Iron Range home on March 31, 1989. This was critically important because I had to have strong support on the Range” (Wellstone 2001,

13).

Wellstone decided to run as a populist candidate who could reunite the Democratic-

Farmer-Labor Party (DFL)5 and combine the interests of the cities with the needs of the farmers and workers in the rural areas of the state. As happens with many amateurs,

Wellstone decided to run not as the front-runner, but as an outsider to the party. While some people in Minnesota knew who Wellstone was, he had a tough job convincing the

DFL party leadership that he would be the strongest candidate. He was able to make this happen by picking up key endorsements in rural Minnesota against two seasoned politicians, Tom Berg who had served as state legislator, U.S. Attorney and assistant to the governor and Jim Nichols, who had served as agriculture commissioner (Wellstone

2001).

Like many amateurs, Wellstone used his charisma and personal politics to convince party leadership and constituents to send him to Washington. His decision to run came out of teaching so many students who later became involved in politics and their constant pressure that he should join them practicing politics in a “real world” setting. Ultimately,

Wellstone came around to their point of view and decided that he could best serve by running for office. He made his decision based on an evaluation he conducted of the political landscape. “Potential candidates survey the local political scene to determine whether conditions are ripe for a competitive election” (Herrnson 1995, 15). Wellstone saw that the climate and condition of Minnesota politics was ready for him and he was able to run and win a Senate seat.

5 In Minnesota the Democratic Party is known as the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party (DFL).

Fund Raising

Once the decision to run has been made, candidates must move quickly to build a

campaign staff and raise money. Since the 1970s, money has become an essential

resource that serious campaigns cannot do without. Jacobson (1997) studies the

congressional campaign and election process and reiterates that without money, winning

an election is almost impossible. “Congressional aspirants are wise, indeed to worry

about the availability of money for the campaign. How well non-incumbent candidates

do on Election Day is directly related to how much campaign money they raise and spend

(Jacobson 1997, 38). Amateurs and professionals both face the same challenge for

fundraising. If they are running to unseat an incumbent, they must raise sufficient funds

to match the current members resources. If they are challenging for an open seat, the

playing field is evened, as everyone must attempt to raise money to fend off others who

might want to run.

Herrnson (2001) takes Jacobson’s proposition about the importance of money one step further and by placing classic Congressional fundraising side by side with the 1974

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and the increasingly professional (and permanent) nature of campaigns. “The fund-raising restrictions imposed by the law combined with the professionalization of congressional campaigns and candidates’ fears of losing to encourage congressional campaigners to retool their fund-raising operations”

(Herrnson 2001, 109). Both amateurs and professionals need to raise money at the same rate as incumbents, especially if they are running against them. Famous amateurs, such as Bill Bradley or John Glenn, often rely on their celebrity status to raise money from sources not available to others. Professionals have often raised money before and work with, and rely on, the same sources that helped them get elected to lower office. For the

81 rest of amateurs, fundraising is a new task and one that is almost as challenging as the campaign itself.

For those individuals who choose to run against an incumbent, they must overcome the vast resources and experience that comes from pervious campaigns. “Between 1950 and 1990, House incumbents enjoyed reelection rates of better than 90%; the 1988 and

1990 elections returned to Congress 98.3% and 96%, respectively, of those who sought to keep their jobs” (Herrnson 1997, 15). The task of defeating an incumbent is immense.

Challengers must identify issues that the incumbent is not addressing or otherwise convince constituents that they can do a better job in Congress. For amateurs this is particularly difficult, as they do not have political experience to fall back on.

Incumbents have a tremendous advantage because of higher district name recognition and their congressional record. The reason for the disparity between incumbents and challengers can be partially explained by voters taking shortcuts in choosing a congressional candidate on the President’s approval rating and his relationship with Congress in off year elections. “At the level of congressional voting the decreasing reliance on party as a ‘shorthand’ cue may not run voters toward issue voting but may simply increase their reliance on other rules of thumb such as incumbency or satisfaction with presidential performance” (Ferejohn 1977, 174). Both amateur and professional challengers must overcome the incumbency advantage and challenge the voters to move beyond a shortcut and choose the best candidate, not the easiest choice.

For amateurs and professionals, the result of previous service also manifests itself in campaign finance disparities between incumbents and challengers. Table 4-1

82 illustrates the differences in average fundraising by incumbents and challengers between

1978 and 1996.

Table 4-1. Measures of incumbency advantage in campaign finance (in 1992 dollars) Year Average Average Number of Ratio of I to Median Incumbent Challenger Races C Spending Ratio Spending ($) Spending ($) 1978 284,577 202,863 235 1.40 1.93 1980 298,510 174,031 338 1.72 3.82 1982 400,630 202,689 315 1.98 3.24 1984 417,815 192,433 338 2.17 4.47 1986 488,447 175,418 319 2.78 5.39 1988 496,894 148,723 328 3.34 7.08 1990 479,969 124,899 321 3.84 10.02 1992 609,060 172,802 307 3.52 5.35 1994 573,374 223,664 328 2.56 4.68 1996 630,852 254,964 357 2.47 5.11 All Years 473,421 187,587 3,186 2.52 4.66 (Ansolabehere and Synder 2000, 68)

The fundraising and spending discrepancies clearly demonstrate that challengers have an uphill battle when trying to unseat an incumbent. The cost of a successful House campaign “…easily exceeds $500,000. By business standards, this is a small investment, but by political standards the cost is enormous. To amass a half million dollar fund, House candidates must raise $1,500 a day” (Ansolabehere and Synder 2000,

70). The task that challengers face is daunting, regardless of previous political experience. That said professionals often have an easier time with the transition because they have fund raising experience from previous elections.

Amateurs particularly struggle with fundraising. Despite his amateur status David

Price (D-NC), a college professor, was successful in getting elected in 1986 because of his connections in Washington that made fundraising a little easier for him. “By April

1986, we had raised $155,000, a sum that, though quite respectable for a challenger running in a contested primary, is hardly enough to permit an extensive television

campaign” (Price 1992, 13). Price realized that even though $155,000 is a lot of money,

it would not be enough to win both the primary and the general election. In the end, Price

raised and spent over $500,000 in both the primary and general elections and was able to

win his seat in Congress.

Constituent Connections and Service

Once the decision to run for Congress has been made and sufficient money has

been raised to make the challenger a legitimate threat, the candidate must then ensure that

s/he has connected with their constituents in order to get them out to vote on Election

Day. Challengers, when they choose to face an incumbent, are up against an individual

who often has a better understanding of the district landscape. Sherrod Brown (D-OH)

chose to run from the newly created thirteenth district in 1992 instead of challenging a

five-term incumbent who represented his hometown. Brown did not take his decision lightly. Having served in the state legislature and as the state’s attorney general, he

understood the political ramifications of his decision. He expected, and received charges

of being a carpetbagger, but ultimately he was able to defeat eight Democratic

challengers for the nomination and the Republican candidate in the general election

(Brown 2000).

Brown’s decision-making process has resulted in his continued reelection and

successful representation of his district. Constituency representation and connection are

essential to a successful career. Fenno (1978) establishes concentric circles of

constituency moving out from the candidate to his immediate family, to his constant

supporters and finally swing voters who choose to support a candidate for a single

election and then evaluate the candidate again in the next election. Each and every

activity in which members of Congress engage, have some affect on the district. “Of

course, House members do many things in Washington that affect their electoral support

at home. Political scientists interpret much of their behavior in Washington, particularly

their voting records, as a bid for the support of their constituents” (Fenno 1978, 31).

Without the support of the constituents, members of Congress could not be reelected.

This is an especially important issue for amateurs in Congress. They must realize that without the support of voters they cannot return to Washington. Instead of thinking of themselves first (more on this in Chapter 5), they need to look at the complete picture of their district when introducing legislation or voting.

Dan Quayle (R-IN) is a good example of an amateur whose self-confidence allowed him to challenge the system and connect with constituents in a way that long serving incumbents could not. Quayle, in the first political act of his life (outside of

voting), won election to Congress by defeating a sixteen-term incumbent. Once he

arrived in Congress, Quayle set out to better connect with his constituents. “Once in

Congress, he exhibited a similarly prototypical style to superintend his constituency

relations. In several ways that contrasted with his predecessors but imitated his House

colleagues, he set out to create binding personal ties to his constituents” (Fenno 1989,

11). Quayle was an atypical in that he understood that he needed to connect with his

constituents if he wanted to be reelected. Most amateurs do not realize this during their first months in office, and the voters notice this acutely.

Making the decision to run, raising money, competing in elections and establishing

a rapport with constituents all help members of Congress gets elected. With this

information, I turn my attention to the number of votes received by amateurs and

professionals in their initial election to Congress. All members of Congress want to turn

their decision to run into the ability to win elections. Amateurs and professionals both

have the same goal, to maximize their election results. They also both have the same

challenges to their continual service and the overall connection to their districts. With

this in mind, I hypothesize, that, in general, professionals will do better in elections as a

result of their previous legislative success.

Election Results for Amateurs and Professionals

In order to examine the election results of all freshmen elected between 1974 and

1994, I collected election results from the official election records of the Clerk of the

House of Representatives6 to test my hypothesis that professionals should have better electoral results than amateurs because of their pervious success in winning elections at the state and local level. To test this hypothesis, I look to see how many votes each freshman received and if the district can be considered “safe” (more than 60% of the total vote) or if they are holding onto a “marginal” (less than 59% of the total vote) seat. Once that first election has taken place, I examine each members first reelection campaign as an incumbent to see what the reelection rate has been over time and whether those freshmen who are reelected are able to increase the percentage of the vote over their initial election.

To best understand the nature of election results, I want to first understand the percentage of the vote received by each freshman in their first election. At this level all freshmen have one thing in common, they all have won their first election to Congress.

Table 4-2 demonstrates the number of votes that amateurs and professionals received in their initial election. I have included the raw numbers of votes in the table to show the

6 These reports are available through the Clerk’s office and on the Clerk’s webpage

mean level of support each congressman received, however, the mean total votes do not

give us any indication of actual support, as the turnout in each district varies from

election to election.

Table 4-2. Initial election results of amateur and professional freshmen Percentage Votes Opponents of votes Received Votes in Total Votes received in in First First in First first Amateur or Professional Election Election Election election Amateur Mean 96297 75740 172038 56.54 N 277 277 277 277 Std. 27273 26250 46104 8.84 Deviation

Professional Mean 99104 73501 172267 58.82 N 509 509 510 508 Std. 30550 31544 54362 11.37 Deviation

Total Mean 98115 74290 172186 58.02 N 786 786 787 785 Std. 29450 29788 51577 10.60 Deviation

As one can see from table 4-2 the mean percentage by which members of Congress won their initial election is greater for professionals than amateurs. On average, professionals get almost 59% of the vote in their initial election, while amateurs get

56.5%. This suggests that overall voters prefer freshmen with professional backgrounds to serve in Congress. However, it is important to note that neither group is able to secure

a safe seat in their initial election.

Once a freshman arrives in Congress, a decision regarding whether to run for

reelection must be made almost immediately. The task of raising the $1500 per day for a

reelection campaign could be insurmountable if a freshman waited to make a decision.

Over the course of this study, amateurs decided not to run for reelection in eight cases,

while professionals choose not to seek a second term 21 times. In addition to those who

choose not to run, there were six amateurs and eleven professionals who ran unopposed

in their reelection campaign.

Table 4-3. Percent of freshmen elected for a second term. Expressed as a mean7 Mean N Std. Deviation Amateur .8773 277 .32874 Professional .8824 510 .32251 Total .8806 787 .32451

Of the 787 freshmen who had data about their reelection, over 85% of freshmen

were sent back to Washington. These numbers approach the overall average for

incumbency retention as shown in Table 4-4. The figures from the data set of amateur

and professional freshman illustrate two things. First, none of the groups, with the

exception of mostly amateurs approach the mean level of reelection for the twenty-year

period of this study. Second, freshmen running for reelection are returned to Washington

at a slightly lower rate than other incumbents. The true incumbent advantage would

appear to solidify after serving two terms in Congress.

Table 4-4. Reelection percentages for all members of Congress Election Percentage Reelected 1974 87.7 1976 95.8 1978 93.7 1980 90.7 1982 90.1 1984 95.4 1986 97.7 1988 98.3 1990 96.0 1992 88.3 1994 90.2 Adapted from http://www.rhodescook.com (2005)

7 Those who did not run for reelection were coded the same as those who lost their election. Their vote totals were recorded as 0.

When a freshman chooses to run for reelection, statistically they receive significantly more of the vote than they did in their first election. For example, pure amateurs improve their share of the vote from a mean of 56% in their first election to a mean of 64% in their bid for reelection. Table 4-5 shows that for all of the amateur and professional freshmen, the overall mean percentage of the vote increased. The mean percentage of reelection votes for all freshmen is well over the “safe” district threshold of

60%. In fact, both amateurs and professionals, when they choose to run for reelection, had strong showings. The incumbent advantage is evident in the improvement that freshmen experience in their quest for reelection. Once a freshman is elected to

Congress, they receive the benefits of incumbents and can leverage that into reelection.

Table 4-5. Reelection results for amateur and professional freshmen Percentage Votes Opponents of votes Received in Votes in Total Votes received in Second Second in Second second Amateur or Professional Election Election Election election Amateur Mean 111279.43 66735.26 178014.68 63.6231 N 277 277 277 270 Std. Deviation 88442.083 36158.441 100600.67 15.24943

Professional Mean 106236.67 62118.29 168354.96 65.2657 N 510 510 510 490 Std. Deviation 42262.058 35140.833 66215.324 14.36265

Total Mean 108011.57 63743.32 171754.89 64.6822 N 787 787 787 760 Std. Deviation 62522.797 35547.890 80089.813 14.69488

Once freshmen enter Congress they become incumbents and are afforded the advantages that come with currently serving in Congress. They are able to consistently reach all four types of constituents described by Fenno (1978) which and provide constituents with a record on which to base future elections. The increase in votes for a

second term is not unexpected, but does demonstrate the power of incumbency. Overall,

amateurs see a greater bump in votes in the second election. This makes intrinsic sense,

as amateurs arrived in Congress with the least experience and constituents had the least knowledge of their actions and behaviors.

The incumbency advantage has caused a decline in competitiveness in elections and has made winning an initial election much more difficult. As more districts become

“safe” districts, fewer and fewer races are decided by 10% or less. In 2004, 172 winning candidates either had no major party opposition or won by at least 40% (Abramowitz,

Alexander and Gunning 2006). These figures are staggering and speak to the power of incumbency. When incumbents choose to run for reelection they win at a higher rate than potential freshmen. This dissuades challengers from running for contested seats and puts the balance of power of the House of Representatives on the few races where an incumbent chooses to retire or run for higher office.

Table 4-6. Mean change in votes from the first to second election Amateur or Professional Mean N Std. Deviation Amateur 7.1849 270 12.71699 Professional 6.4528 488 12.58554 Total 6.7136 758 12.62900

The affect of pre-congressional experience on votes received has an impact on the day-to-day operation of the House. Freshman who find themselves in the relative safety of winning 60% of the votes are more likely to win subsequent elections. The safety of a district can help determine the type of committee a freshman is assigned to and whether the freshman chooses to violate the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives.

Table 4-7 and Table 4-8 explore the correlation between the percentage of votes received in a freshman’s initial election to Congress, their ability to receive top-flight

90 committee assignments and their choice to honor the norms and folkways of the House of

Representatives through their choice to sponsor legislation when they are discouraged from doing so by tradition. Both tables illustrate the struggle that freshman face when choosing how to behave in Congress during their initial weeks.

Table 4-7. Correlation coefficients of electoral success and committee assignments Deering and Smith Committee Ranking (First Committee) Kendall's Percentage of votes Correlation tau_b received in first Coefficient -.052(*) election Sig. (2-tailed) .043 N 733 Spearman's Percentage of votes Correlation rho received in first Coefficient -.073(*) election Sig. (2-tailed) .049 N 733 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

As Table 4-7 illustrates, there is a slightly significant negative difference between the rank of the committee assignment received by a freshman (for his/her first committee assignment) and the percentage of the votes received by that individual in their initial election. This is an interesting result that speaks directly to the influence of each party’s leadership when assigning freshman to committees. While we would have thought that freshman that are elected from “safer” districts would receive better committee assignments, the correlations are telling a slightly different story.

The type of district is a factor that the leadership considers (in this case as a slight negative toward any given assignment), but the overarching decision making process happens for other reasons. These reasons are as varied, as Butler Derrick suggested in his interview, as geographical region, gender, and other x-factors that are important to

91 multiple members of the leadership at any given time for both political and non-political factors. The leadership chooses to seat new members on a committee for all of the reasons suggested in Chapter 3 while also considering politics and the potential benefits for the party, the individuals in charge of committee appointments or the party leadership.

Harry Johnston (D-FL) transitioned from being the president of the Florida State

Senate to being a member of Congress in 1988. As part of that transition, Johnston was struck by the highly partisan nature of committees in Congress compared to the bipartisan approach that exited in Florida.

In Florida, the staff are employed by the institution itself. In Washington, they are employed by individual members and serve at the member’s will. In the Florida legislature, the staff is party neutral. In Washington, committee staff is political in nature, and partisan loyalty is rewarded. Each committee and subcommittee has two completely separate and competing staffs, the larger and more powerful of which is hired by the majority. Every decision, large or small, is formulated in a political context. (Johnston 2001, 185)

While Johnston is not speaking directly to the committee assignment process, the point he makes is essential to understanding how committee assignments and electoral success are related. Ultimately, the process is political. While the leadership wants to choose freshman for the elite assignments who have the best chance of staying in Congress the longest, they also want to make sure that they have ultimate control over the committee system and sometimes choose people who are not from “safe” districts as a way to ensure that if that member wins multiple elections they are beholden to the leadership for years to come. This helps explain the slightly negative correlation between committee assignments and electoral success and why we find all sorts of individuals on the most prestigious committees, regardless of their pre-congressional experiences.

As we can see from Table 4-8, the correlation between the number of bills sponsored and the electoral success of freshman are strongly significant in the negative

92 direction. The relationship between electoral success and the number of bills sponsored, as an indicator of legislative apprenticeship, should be negative. The more successful a freshman is during his/her initial election, the more likely s/he is to take time to follow the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives. Freshman who are now representing “safe” districts, or those who are very close to having safe districts, are in a position to potentially serve in Congress for many terms and do not have to introduce multiple pieces of legislation immediately.

Table 4-8. Correlation coefficients of electoral and legislative success Number of Bills Sponsored Kendall's Percentage of votes Correlation tau_b received in first Coefficient -.078(**) election Sig. (2-tailed) .001 N 788 Spearman's Percentage of votes Correlation rho received in first Coefficient -.113(**) election Sig. (2-tailed) .002 N 788 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The safety of electoral success provides freshman with the ability to follow the apprenticeship norms of being seen but heard without jeopardizing future elections. By following the apprenticeship norms, these freshman have an opportunity that did not exist before the creation of C-SPAN. They can sit back and learn from more senior members of the House and still make speeches during special orders or in their district to demonstrate to their constituents that they are making a difference in Washington.

With C-SPAN’s coverage of Congress, the floor of the House had become a center of the electronic network stretching across the nation, and COS (Conservative Opportunity Society) members took advantage of it. They might meet early in the morning, then walk over to the House floor and, taking advantage

of the time at the beginning of the day set aside for one-minute speeches, deliver a series of observations on subjects that mattered to them, such as balancing the budget. (Cheney and Cheney 1996, 193)

The ability for all members to use one-minute and special order speeches to reach across

America and still learn from more senior members during floor debate has created a

generation of congressman with the traditional skills learned during apprenticeship. It

also provides them with real opportunities to demonstrate their skills to their constituents,

by showing up on their television through C-SPAN.

Conclusion

The electoral process provides freshmen members of Congress with multiple

opportunities to demonstrate their abilities to their constituents and to their party’s

leadership. When an individual makes the decision to run for Congress they must

evaluate the situation in the district they live in and decide if it is appropriate to run. The

evaluation process hinges on the role of the incumbent in the district and whether they

appear vulnerable. “Beyond showing that electoral security and the partisanship of the constituency influence candidate emergence, I also demonstrate that the amount of money spent by the incumbent in the pervious electoral cycle can deter potential challengers from running in House races” (Carson 2005, 24). Incumbents who raise significant sums of money are less likely to face a noteworthy professional challenger.

Amateurs, on the other hand, may decide to challenge incumbents regardless of the difficulties they face, as they do not have the political knowledge to understand what they face.

While the decision to run for office is important, the result that occurs when a freshman wins is more significant for understanding the difference between amateurs and professional in Congress. As we have seen from the data, amateurs and professionals

have different electoral experiences during their first terms in Congress. Professionals

receive a greater percentage of the vote than amateurs in their initial elections. This trend

carries over into reelection, as more professionals secure “safe” seats than do their

amateur counterparts.

For both groups, reelection rates are high as a result of the incumbency advantage

they gain by being a member of the House of Representatives. They almost

automatically gain advantages in fundraising, free media and name recognition in their

district. In addition, outlets such as the Internet and television are provided by Congress and offer each member with the ability to create a webpage and be seen on C-SPAN by anyone with a computer or TV. “The Internet has given members of Congress an attractive yet inexpensive way of communicating their views and legislative activities to constituents directly, without the filter of the media. It also enables members to link their

state or district pages to other useful state and federal government sites” (Wolfensberger

2000, 231).

The advantages that members of Congress receive are invaluable. For freshman the transition from outsider to insider provides them with the ability to tap into the resources that the institution provides. Ultimately, the most challenging aspect of elections in

Congress is winning the initial election. Professionals have an advantage in winning initial elections, as they understand fundraising and have competed in the past. When amateurs win, they do so with between 56 and 60% of the vote, compared to 54 to 58% for professionals. Amateurs may be inexperienced, but they often have the ability to win when no one expects.

CHAPTER 5 ISSUE CHOICE AND LEGISLATIVE APPRENTICESHIP

Congress is a dynamic institution with 535 members moving in different directions and working for distinct goals. Members of Congress realize these goals through elections and reelections, the introduction of legislation, and through their service on committees. While all three of these goals are important for a long and successful tenure in Congress, the introduction of legislation is the most telling for the understanding of policy aims. The types and quantity of bills introduced allows us to understand what individuals see as the most important issues for their constituents and their own personal policy goals. These goals help shape the path that members of Congress choose and whether they are ultimately successful.

Traditionally, all freshmen members of Congress in the House of Representatives and the Senate serve an apprenticeship period. During this time, they are expected to behave as a traditional backbencher would in a parliamentary system, seen but not heard.

Freshmen are expected to go about the daily business of Congress, but not to speak on the floor of the House of Representatives or introduce legislation. In other words, they are expected to observe the world around them and react instead of direct.

Donald Matthews (1960) lays out an unambiguous picture of the apprenticeship norm. Matthews makes it clear that the apprenticeship norm is continuously impressed upon freshmen during their first weeks and months in the institution. As part of the duties of an apprentice, freshmen must accept their fate and figure out how to complete the tasks they are assigned by the party and leadership to their advantage. “He receives

95 96

the committee assignments the other senators do not want. The same is true of his office

suite and his seat in the chamber. In committee rooms he is assigned to the end of the

table. He is expected to do more than his share of the thankless and boring tasks of the

Senate, such as presiding over the floor debate or serving on his party’s Calendar

Committee” (Matthews 196, 93). The treatment that freshmen receive is designed to

teach them the institution through observation and experience. Older members of

Congress believe that through this experience they learned about the institution and that it remains the best way to teach new members.

Matthews also believes that the apprenticeship norm applies to legislation. He quotes Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona who remembers being told, “there are two kinds of Congressmen — show horses and work horses. If you want to get your name in the papers, be a show horse. If you want to gain the respect of your colleagues, keep quiet and be a work horse” (Matthews 1960, 94). By being a workhorse, freshmen members of

Congress do not introduce the most legislation, but work quietly and efficiently behind the scenes to ensure that good public policy is passed and implemented.

Hibbing (1991) expands upon Matthews’s analysis of the apprenticeship norms of

Congress by conducting an analysis of legislative behavior between eight term members

of Congress and freshmen. Hibbing finds that the apprenticeship norm is alive and well

in Congress, despite recent sentiment to the contrary. “Some readers may be surprised to

discover a decline in relative first-term activity levels from earlier classes to later ones.

In contrast, eighth-termers have become more active during the same period first-termers

have become less active. The apprenticeship norm may or may not be dead but

apprenticeship is stronger than it has been in decades” (Hibbing 1991, 117). The

97 pressure of apprenticeship greets all freshmen. For the most part, freshmen do not expect such a system to exist and some freshmen, particularly amateurs, attempt to work against the system until they realize it is not to their benefit.

Part of the apprenticeship process is for freshmen to understand the myriad rules and procedures for passing legislation in the House of Representatives. Whereas freshmen used to learn how to legislate via trial by fire, today, the leadership of both parties jointly holds an orientation at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard

University. While the courses freshmen take at Harvard are useful and instructive, it still takes time to learn the legislative process and how to navigate multiple pathways.

Freshmen learn quickly that the legislative process in Congress is complex and non- linear. “The act of introducing a bill sets off a complex and variable chain of events that may or may not result in the final passage of a bill by Congress” (Oleszek 1996, 91).

The fact that the legislative process is not straightforward can be a big revelation for professional freshmen that are used to state legislative systems. Greg Wawro (2001) creates the concept of the legislative entrepreneur (LE). “By gathering information, drafting legislation, and pushing legislation through the legislative process, members who assume the role of LEs help the House to satisfy its policy-making goal. The House would have great difficulty producing any legislation without LEs, who coordinate the efforts and resources of other members” (Wawro 2001, 21). Wawro goes on to remind us that the legislative process is so complex; it cannot operate without members of Congress willing to bear the brunt of the work. This is important for the study of amateurs and professionals, as the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives would dictate that freshmen not become legislative entrepreneurs during their apprenticeship.

To understand better the differences between amateur and professional freshman, it is useful to think theoretically about their experiences. This exercise illuminates some of the thought processes of freshmen and how these differ among amateurs and professionals in the House. To think about the differences between and the problems faced by freshmen, I employ two different models to distinguish between amateurs and professionals. I start by discussing the difference between the market model and the polis model. These two models describe how individuals think about the world around them. Amateurs and professionals each use a different model to understand their jobs as representatives, and through the market and polis models it becomes clear how they interpret their jobs on Capitol Hill. Second, I look specifically at a member of Congress in each of the six amateur and professional categories and the type of legislation they introduced during their freshman terms. This shows that amateurs and professionals have

different levels of success in sponsoring legislation. Why they choose these strategies for

legislation can then be examined, in part, through the market and polis models within the

context of the institution.

Policy Analysis

Before looking at the market and polis models and how they relate to amateur and

professional members of Congress, let us first look at policy analysis and how it

illuminates the choices members of Congress make when introducing legislation. Policy

analysis helps us understand if members of Congress are choosing effective pieces of

legislation to introduce. It also gives insight to the goals that new members of Congress

have for their careers and how they perceive their personal policy goals and the goals of

their constituents. I revisit the policy goals of individual members of Congress a little

later, but concentrate now on “textbook” policy analysis.

Weimer and Vining (1999) lay out a specific formula for analyzing policies. They explain that the importance of policy analysis lies in the ability of the analyst to see not only the goals of the original policy, but also the implications for the policy. Weimer and

Vining identify four broad steps to conducting a policy analysis. “Teachers of policy analysis usually specify the components of the analytical process as a series of steps along the lines of the following: Define the problem, establish evaluation criteria, identify alternative policies, display alternatives and select among them, and monitor and evaluate the policy outcomes” (Weimer and Vining 1999, 256). The analysis makes it clear if the policy has been effective in solving the problem and if the member of Congress understood the problem when s/he created the legislation.

Just evaluating policy is not usually enough to understand whether a policy has truly been effective. Analysts must keep the goals of their clients in mind. For most analysts this means a government agency or a non-profit firm, but in this study the clients are the constituents. “Once you have specified the relevant evaluation criteria and policy alternatives, you must bring them together in a way that facilitates choice. You face three tasks: (1) predicting, or forecasting, the impacts of the alternatives; (2) valuing the impacts in terms of criteria; and (3) comparing alternatives across disparate criteria”

(Weimer and Vining 1999, 282). Evaluating the possible outcomes to mesh with the client’s goals is probably the most difficult part of any analysis. This can be especially difficult if the client does not articulate firm goals. Goal vagueness or multiple goals can make the policy analysis more complex, but is probably one of the most common ways policy analysis is conducted.

100

Goal vagueness or multiple goals is a problem for members of Congress as they craft legislation addressing constituent’s concerns. The goals of a community as a whole are difficult to understand. Members of Congress must deal with approximately 600,000 different voices asking them for help on a variety of subjects. To sort through all of these opinions and create legislation is a daunting task. Members of Congress must decide if they want to write the legislation or if they want to cosponsor bills introduced by others.

For the purpose of this analysis, I concentrate on the bills sponsored by six members of

Congress, one representing each amateur and professional category.

Bardach (2000) takes Weimer and Vining’s ideas a step further. He creates a simplified, eight-step model for policy analysis. He developed this model through years of teaching policy analysis and using Weimer and Vining’s methods. Bardach’s eight steps are a simplification of the policy analysis process and allow the analyst to assess the success or failure of the policy. Table 5-1 shows the eight steps of Bardach’s “Eightfold

Path.” The use of these steps allows a successful policy analysis to take place.

Table 5-1. The eightfold path Steps of Policy Analysis 1. Define the Problem 2. Assemble Some Evidence 3. Construct the Alternatives 4. Select the Criteria 5. Project the Outcomes 6. Confront the Trade-Offs 7. Decide! 8. Tell Your Story Bardach (2000), xiv

These eight steps are the foundation of good policy analysis. Through talking with members of Congress in interviews about legislation, they go though many of these steps internally and with their staff members when formulating bills. Each of the steps must be

101 understood if successful laws are to be written, which address the personal concerns of the members of Congress and the concerns of their constituents.

Now that policy analysis at a basic level has been discussed, it is time to set up a framework of the differences between amateurs and professionals using the market and polis models. These two models allow a look at the type of legislation each member introduced during their first term in office and how they differ from each other. At a basic level, all freshman members of Congress are the same as they are all newly elected.

Beyond that basic level they are as different as night and day. The distinction between levels of political knowledge and how they view the world makes those differences stand out and expose the contrast between how they approach legislation.

Views of the World

Just studying how amateur and professional politicians are different within the

House of Representatives is not enough for a satisfying understanding of decision- making. Members of Congress look at the world around them through different lenses.

These lenses shape the ideals about the institution and how members of Congress interpret the goals of constituents. Amateurs see the world in relation to their limited experiences with politics just as professionals use their pre-congressional political experience to their advantage. The differences between amateurs and professionals are brought out through the differences between the market and polis models. Each model describes one of the two general types of freshman and the way they view the world.

These models allow a better understanding of why amateur and professional politicians introduce different amounts and types of legislation, and whether they follow the norms and folkways of apprenticeship.

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The Market Model

The Market Model is born out of economic theory and looks at the world with an emphasis on the rational actor and individuality. Markets, in the theoretical framework, work with perfect information and perfect understanding of that information by the participants. In the real world, perfect information is not possible, but individuals still strive to learn as much as possible before making a decision. The concept behind the quest for perfect information and understanding creates a “man” who is both rational and always acts in his own rational self-interest (Levy 1995, 9). The idea of a person engaging in an activity only if it benefits them has found a home within political science.

Rational choice theory advocates these ideas within the political world and assumes that actors want to maximize their benefits from activities such as voting, donating money to campaigns, or working for the government.

The market model also shapes society. Political economists view the world as a collection of individuals all working to make the individual better off. “…[P]olitics cannot be about collective mutual gains and authority cannot be about what everyone approves. The focus on legitimacy is a diversion that distracts us from the cleavages overridden by state policies” (Caporaso and Levine 1992, 17). By thinking about politics in a personal way, the idea of representation is changed. Instead of thinking that a member of Congress is in Washington D.C. to be a delegate for constituent ideals, members serve as trustees for themselves and their personal beliefs. This concept is telling for decision-making and influences how freshmen adjust to life on Capitol Hill.

The market model also helps us understand that collective action is essential for the understanding many aspects of political science. Collective action provides an underlying theory that helps explains social dilemmas and issues of cooperation and

103 governing. “…[T]he theory of collective action is the central subject of political science.

It is the core of the justification for the state. Collective-action problems pervade international relations, face legislators when devising public budgets, permeate public bureaucracies, and are at the core of explanations of voting, interest group formation, and citizen control of governments in a democracy” (Ostrom 1998, 1). Using collective action to solve social dilemmas is particularly useful for members of Congress, who must balance the needs of their constituents with their own personal beliefs.

Beyond thinking of politics in an individual way, the Market Model also gives a clear vision as to how society is shaped. The focus on the individual is the biggest contribution of this model. By emphasizing the struggle between individuals in the political system, we are reminded of Hobbes’ view of the world without the leviathan, where society risks being tossed into chaos as everyone fights for their own ideals

(Hobbes 1960). While there is concern that where individuals are only preoccupied with themselves society can break down, this is not a concern for the Market Model.

Table 5-2. Market model concepts of society Market Model 1. Unit of Analysis Individual 2. Motivations Self-Interest 3. Chief Conflict Self-Interest vs. Self-Interest 4. Source of People’s Ideas Self-generation within the Individual and Preferences 5. Nature of Collective Competition Activity 6. Criteria for Individual Maximizing Self-Interest, Minimizing Cost Decision Making 7. Building Blocks of Individuals Social Action 8. Nature of Information Accurate, Complete, Fully Available 9. How Things Work Laws of Matter (e.g., material resources are finite and diminish with use 10. Sources of Change Material Exchange; Quest to Maximize own Welfare Stone (1997), 33.

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Each of these ten concepts separates the rational self-actor from those who do not think in this fashion. The rational choice model of political science uses these concepts to establish how politics work. While there are many detractors of rational choice theory in political science (Green and Shapiro 1994), many scholars use it as an effective way to explain individual behavior within the system (Riker 1982 and Laver 1997). The market approach and the emphasis on individual satisfaction can be used to explain individual members of Congress.

Amateur Freshmen. The individual nature of the market model fits well with the way amateur freshmen behave during their first term in Congress. Amateurs, because they do not have political experience, are more concerned with their own well being when first elected. They arrive in the House of Representatives in awe of the institution and rely on their instincts to help guide them. They want to prove that they can be successful legislators and remain a member of Congress (Mayhew 1974). In order to convince other members and their districts that they can be successful legislators, amateurs must focus on reelection and try to maximize their own experience to impress constituents.

As a result of the desire to maximize their self-interest, amateurs’ request

committee assignments that they believe will help them accomplish these goals.

Amateurs will also introduce legislation they believe impresses other members and

allows them to become successful politicians. Often freshmen arrive on Capitol Hill and

request assignments to unrealistic committees because they do not know any better.

Amateurs are especially susceptible to this phenomenon because they hear other

members talk about committees such as Appropriations, Rules and Ways and Means and

understand that if they are assigned to one of these committees they could wield power

105 within the House (Fenno 1973 and Deering and Smith 1997). These assignments are unrealistic because very few freshmen are ever seated on them (as we saw in Chapter 3), due to the fact that amateurs are at the bottom of the leadership’s lists for committee assignments.

While committee assignments help to illustrate the desire amateur freshmen have for fame and success in the House of Representatives, it is not the focus of this analysis.

The type of legislation introduced by freshmen members of Congress follows the same pattern and tends to be quite ambitious. While they usually stick to items under the jurisdiction of the committee upon which they serve, they choose topics that are politically important and they believe will help them gain respect and give them an advantage within the House of Representatives. This may not be the best approach from an efficiency standpoint, as it can result in multiple attempts to find legislation that best matches with constituent or personal needs.

The Polis Model

The Polis Model is another way to think about society and how individuals interact and make decisions. Whereas the Market Model concentrates on the actions of an individual as a rational self-actor, the Polis Model focuses on communities. Deborah

Stone (1997) introduces the idea of thinking about policy and actions on a community level. She saw that public policy goes deeper than individuals attempting to institute a plan; it is about how a community reacts to the plan. “Unlike the market, which starts with individuals and assumes no goals, preferences, or intentions other than those held by individuals, a model of the polis must assume both collective will and collective effort”

(Stone 1997, 18). These ideas challenge the market model at its core. Instead of thinking

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about individuals and their goals, the focus is on how communities create and act upon goals.

Community is a crucial level of analysis, but more difficult to define than is an individual. An essential question when trying to gauge what goals are present is who counts as a member of a community. This question of membership can also be thought of as the classic cost-benefit question of standing. In cost-benefit analysis, certain

individuals or groups are excluded from the process because they are do not have a stake

in the outcome as an affected member of society. “Society places moral bounds on the

application of cost benefit calculations by not granting standing to certain individuals or

to the preferences of certain individuals in specific situations” (Whittington and MacRae

1986, 668). While Whittington and MacRae are discussing standing within cost-benefit

analysis, the issue is still relevant for the polis model. In order to establish the goals of

the community, we must understand who is a part of the community.

Stone discusses two ways in which communities can define their membership.

These two practices can have different results, but inevitably restrict certain people from

being members of the community.

A community must have a membership, and some way of defining who is a member of the community and who is not. Membership is in some sense the primary political issue, for membership definitions and rules determine who is allowed to participate in community activities, and who is governed by community rules and authority. Nation-states have rules for citizenship. Private clubs have qualifications for members and procedures by which people can join. Churches have formal rituals for new members to join. Neighborhoods may have no formal rules limiting who may become a member, but informal practices such as restrictive covenants on property deeds, bank redlining in mortgage lending, and sheer harassment may accomplish racial exclusion when formal rules cannot. (Stone 1997, 18-19)

This discussion of membership can be confusing for anyone trying to figure out

community goals. With so many different voices trying to be heard it can become

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dizzying for representatives to make everyone happy with the type of policies that are

implemented. It is this challenge that the Polis Model tries to address as its concepts of

society differ from those discussed in the market model.

Table 5-3. Polis model concepts of society Polis Model 1. Unit of Analysis Community 2. Motivations Public Interest (as well as self-interest) 3. Chief Conflict Self-Interest vs. Public Interest (commons problems) 4. Source of People’s Influences from Outside Ideas and Preferences 5. Nature of Collective Cooperation and Competition Activity 6. Criteria for Individual Loyalty (to people, places, organizations, products), Decision Making Maximize Self-Interest, Promote Public Interest 7. Building Blocks of Groups and Organizations Social Action 8. Nature of Information Ambiguous, Interpretive, Incomplete, Strategically Manipulated 9. How Things Work Laws of Passion (e.g., human resources are renewable and expand with use 10. Sources of Change Ideas, Persuasion, Alliances; Pursuit of Power, Pursuit of own Welfare, Pursuit of Public Interest Stone 1997, 33.

The polis model has a fundamentally different concept of society than does the market model. Instead of examining policy on an individual level, a community level of analysis is used. While community may be difficult to define, using it as a level of analysis can be extremely useful for understanding the behavior of representatives as they struggle with the variety of goals a community may have. Dealing with ambiguous information and other problems of community action is a small price to pay if a representative can create policy that can make a community happy. While this is difficult, many representatives continue to attempt this goal. Some are more successful than others, but all have a firm understanding of politics and attempt to translate it into success when they are elected to Congress.

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Professional Freshmen. The Polis Model is a useful way to view professional freshmen in the House of Representatives. Chapter 3 showed us that professional freshmen often put their constituent’s interests ahead of their own when requesting committee assignments from the party leadership. The congressional leadership is happy to assign professional freshman based on the concepts of community as it helps them secure a connection with their constituents and gives them valuable experience about how the committee system operates.

Again, while committee assignments are not the focus of this paper, they are useful for understanding some of the basic differences between amateurs and professional freshman and the market and polis models. Professional freshmen try to emphasize the role of community in many of their actions. This carries through in the legislation they introduce. While the number of bills introduced is different from their amateur counterparts, professionals also choose issues that are covered by the committees on which they serve. While this is a similarity between amateurs and professionals, there are other differences, which are discussed in detail below.

Pressures on Members of Congress

While amateur freshmen often think as individuals in the Market Model and professional freshmen think of community in the Polis Model, there are other influences that they must all consider when formulating policy. Constituents, personal policy goals, and the president all influence the types of legislation freshmen choose to introduce. The challenge for all members of Congress is how to balance these voices and be a successful legislator. Each group wants to be the primary concern for the representative, but as we have shown with the market and polis model, amateurs and professionals deal with these

109 in different fashions. Next, I explain each of the three ways in which members of

Congress are influenced while trying to create legislation.

Constituents

The first group that members of Congress must listen to when formulating policy are their constituents. This group is essential to both amateur and professional freshman, as they are the voters who elected them to Congress. Members of Congress perceive of their constituents in different ways. Fenno (1978) discusses four different groups of constituents, each important in their own way. “Each member of Congress perceives four concentric constituencies: geographic, reelection, primary, and personal…. It is a set of perceptions that emphasizes the context in which, and the strategies by which, the House member seeks electoral support” (Fenno 1978, 27). Each group provides something different to a member of Congress. The geographic constituency represents all of the people who live within a district. The reelection constituencies are those who vote for the member during the general election. The primary constituencies are those who support the representatives in the party primary. Finally, the personal constituencies are those who are personal friends of the member of Congress.

Each member of Congress deals with these groups of constituents in different ways.

Some pay more attention to personal friends or the interests of primary constituents, while others concentrate on the reelection constituents hoping to receive their votes again in future elections. As a result of different goals, these constituency groups can be hard for the member of Congress to deal with. Each has his or her own agenda and the representative must deal with each as s/he fells appropriate. It is the balance between the groups that makes the type of policy introduced by members of Congress so important.

Representatives must attempt to make as many constituents happy as possible through the

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legislation they introduce. Finding this balance is a tough task, and one which freshmen

have the most difficulty accomplishing.

Personal Policy Goals

The second item members of Congress must consider when they are creating

legislation is their own personal policy goals. Each member of Congress has an agenda

they would like to accomplish in Congress and they work hard to introduce legislation

that accomplishes those goals. Fenno (1996) provides us with an example of a senator

who worked hard to advocate the issues he believed in. Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI)

believed strongly in education. He campaigned on issues of education and made a point

that he would try to make a difference if he were elected to the Senate. “He sees himself

as a person of strong policy convictions, in a job that gives him the opportunity to

implement those views. Over and over, he repeats his seven-word political mantra:

‘Translate ideas into events and help people’” (Fenno 1996, 245-246). Senator Pell understood that his service at the national level gave him position to implement his policy ideas. By campaigning on the education issue and then delivering once he was in the

Senate, he fulfilled his own goals and impressed his commitment upon the voters.

While Senator Pell was not a member of the House of Representatives, the lesson is the same. Some members of the House of Representatives believe strongly that they should be advocating policy that they consider to be personally important. The trick to promoting personal policy goals is to convince voters that they too should be concerned about the same goals. Senator Pell was successful in convincing his constituents, partly because he chose an issue that is important for many members of society. Most members of Congress who believe in personal policy as their primary goal pick issues such as

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education. If they chose more abstract goals they create an uphill battle between

reelection and the satisfaction of personal policy success.

The President

The third influence members of Congress face when formulating legislation is the

president. While the president does not have a direct role in introducing legislation, he

does have a significant role in shaping policy and a final say in which bills become law.

Clausen (1973) discusses the role the president plays in the formation of policy. In

Clausen’s model, the president plays an important part, one that cannot be duplicated by

any other political entity. “…[P]residential influence is a fullfledged member of the set

of factors that should always be included in the study of the decisions made by individual

congressmen. In terms of the very early discussion of the policy dimension theory, the

president is one of those elements in the congressman’s political environment that the

congressman must deal with in adopting his policy position…” (Clausen 1973, 194). The

role the president plays in policy formation cannot be underestimated. He has the ability

to stop policy from being seriously considered just by threatening a veto (Neustadt 1990).

The president also tries to sway members of Congress to vote for items he believes are

most important. Each member of Congress must think about how the president will react

to a piece of legislation if they want bills they introduce to become laws.

The president’s influence is especially present for members of his party. Sundquist

(1980) and Rhode (1991) state, “the party position in Congress is either the presidents

program or none at all” (Sundquist 1980, 199 and Rhode 1991, 139). This statement is

profound and true, especially for the president’s party. If the president does not support a

policy or piece of legislation, it is much less likely that his party will push it in Congress.

Under a situation of divided government, however, the party in control of Congress may

112 push a policy without the president’s approval to put blame on him for any possible failures (Mayhew 1991). Either strategy makes sense for many members of Congress as they try to figure out what type of legislation they should be introducing. In the end they must remember that the president can make their lives miserable if he does not like the policy. He can always take out his pen and veto their ideas.

Policy and Members of Congress

Now that I have established the framework to examine how members of Congress choose types of legislation to introduce, let me show how amateur and professional freshmen fit into this mold. To look more closely at amateur and professional freshmen and the type of legislation they introduce, I have chosen one freshmen to represent each of the six types of amateurs and professionals presented in Chapter 1. I then examine the legislation they have been the primary sponsors on during their first term in the House of

Representatives.

Before I move on to the members of Congress I have chosen, let me take a brief moment and explain why I have selected these particular members. Table 5-4 shows the freshmen I have picked for each of the amateur and professional categories.

Table 5-4. Freshmen representing amateur and professional categories Name State District Pure Amateur Douglas Peterson FL 2 Mostly Amateur Martha Keys KS 2 Semi Amateur Byron Dorgan ND At Large Semi Professional Kweisi Mfume MD 7 Mostly Professional Catherine Long LA 8 Pure Professional John Olver MA 1

These members were selected because they are spread across 1974 to 1994 and they allow an in-depth look at the six different types of freshmen. Since the Democratic Party was in the majority for all twenty years of this study, I have chosen six Democrats to

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eliminate the differences between majority and minority for legislative introduction and

institutional power. Having all freshmen from the same party also eliminates the

influence of the president on legislation, as each member of Congress are expected to be

on the same side of the president’s agenda. This frees freshmen to pursue personal and

constituent interests and makes the analysis more even.

The Pure Amateur: Douglas (Pete) Peterson

Douglas (Pete) Peterson was elected to Congress in 1990 to represent the second

district of Florida. Peterson came to politics after serving in the Air Force, being an

administrator at an all boys’ school, and a professor at Florida State. Immediately before

deciding to run for Congress, Peterson also owned his own business. Running for

Congress based on this experience was not a sure thing. Peterson had to overcome name

recognition problems within his district and prove to voters that he could represent them

well in Congress (Peterson Bioguide 2005).

Once Peterson arrived in Congress, he was assigned to the Public Works and

Veterans Affairs Committees. Through these two committee assignments, Peterson chose the legislation he introduced. As table 5-5 shows, Peterson chose issues that fit well with his committee assignments and spoke to the large veteran community from the

Pensacola Naval Air Station that resided in his district.

Table 5-5. Bills introduced by Douglas (Pete) Peterson Bill Number Title H.R. 2538 To amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act H.R. 3100 To designate the building located at 4396 Lafayette Street in Marianna, Florida, as the “T. Thomas Fortune Post Office Building” H.R. 3765 To suspend temporarily certain bars to the furnishing of veterans benefits to certain former spouses of veterans and to suspend temporarily a bar to the recognition of certain married children of veterans for veterans benefits purposes

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Table 5-5. Continued. Bill Number Title H.R. 4137 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax relief and encourage economic recovery H.R. 4502 To amend title 10, United States Code, to provide for the award of the Purple Heart to persons wounded by friendly fire H.R. 5020 To provide for the minting of coins in commemoration of Americans who have been prisoners of war, and for other purposes H.R. 5307 To amend title 10, United States Code, to remove the limitation on the number of units of the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps that may be established and maintained at secondary educational institutions that apply for such units Adapted from a list of bills sponsored as found by conducing a search of the Library of Congress (2005).

Of the seven bills Peterson introduced in his first term, five dealt with military

issues. His first two bills, H.R. 2538 and H.R. 3100 focused on water pollution control,

and issue important to him and to honor a member of his district. Once Peterson

introduced his first two bills, with no co-sponsors, he realized that in order to pass

legislation he needed the support of other members of Congress.

Figure 5-1 illustrates Peterson’s success in gathering co-sponsors for his legislation.

After his first four bills did not garner support from other members of Congress, Peterson found success in his last three. By focusing on issues like Purple Hearts, prisoners of war and ROTC for college students, Peterson was able to find other like-minded members of

Congress who would support his initiatives. While Peterson had success in securing co- sponsors for his last three bills, none of his measures became law.

Peterson’s success in gaining co-sponsors for his final three bills showed that the

issues those bills covered were important for other constituents in other districts.

Peterson typifies one of the two ways pure amateurs behave during their first term. Pure

amateurs either act in a way that violates the norms and folkways of the House of

Representatives by introducing multiple bills throughout their term, or, as Peterson has,

115 they stick to subject areas that fit with their committee assignments and personal interests.

s 40 ponsor

Co-S 30

0 H.R. 2538 H.R. 3100 H.R. 3765 H.R. 4127 H.R. 4502 H.R. 5020 H.R. 5307 Bill Number Figure 5-1. Co-sponsors for bills sponsored by Pete Peterson

As with other amateurs, Peterson used market model concepts in his first term to promote his own self-interest, which happened to coincide with a majority of his district, and concentrate on issues that were important to him because of his military background.

Peterson’s military background, which worked well with his constituents’ interests, allowed him to introduce legislation that someone without a military background could not easily support. In this manner, Peterson was able to promote his own standing on the

Veteran’s Affairs Committee by demonstrating to his fellow representatives that he was savvy on veterans’ issues, while also supporting issues that are important to many of his constituents.

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The Mostly Amateur: Martha Keys

Martha Keys was elected to represent the second district of Kansas as a Democrat in the Watergate election of 1974. Keys ran for Congress in 1974 after volunteering on the McGovern for President campaign in 1972 and had been a supporter of her predecessor Congressman Bill Roy. When the other Democratic primary contenders did not live up to the high level she believed Congressmen Roy established in office, she decided that she would run for the Democratic nomination and was able to win her mentor’s seat (Keys Bioguide 2005).

As a mostly amateur who had been involved in politics at a very basic level, Keys decided that she would observe and try to understand what serving in Congress was all about. She was invited to be one of seven Democrats at the freshman orientation seminar at Harvard University. There she made friends who she leaned on in Congress and was able to convince the leadership to appoint her to the Ways and Means committee. This was a coup for a freshman, let alone a woman who had never served in the state legislature. Keys took advantage of the retirement of the only other women to ever serve on Ways and Means, Martha Griffith, and succeed in being seated.

During her first term, Keys concentrated solely on being a member of Ways and

Means and the responsibilities that it entailed. After attending the Harvard orientation and having senior members of the House advise her to follow the norms and folkways of the institution she did not introduce legislation during her first term. In fact, she dedicated herself so fully to Ways and Means, that she also did not co-sponsor any legislation during her first two years.

Keys decision not to introduce legislation works well in the market model of rational choice and self-preservation. She chose a course of action that maximized her

117 own importance in the House of Representatives. By securing a seat on the Ways and

Means Committee and choosing not to introduce legislation, she furthered her own career in the hope that this choice would pay dividends for her constituents in future terms. For

Keys, this strategy worked to win a second term, but she was an unsuccessful candidate for reelection in 1978.

The Semi Amateur: Byron Dorgan

Byron Dorgan was elected to the ninety-seventh Congress in 1980 as the at-large representative for North Dakota. Before his election to Congress, Dorgan served as

North Dakota’s tax commissioner for eleven years and was a frequent delegate to the

North Dakota State Democratic conventions. He grew up in North Dakota and earned a bachelors degree from the University of North Dakota and an M.B.A. from the University of Denver. When he was elected to Congress, Dorgan had long served at the state level as an appointed official, but had not run for previous office. Since his first election,

Dorgan was reelected to five more terms in the House of Representatives before being appointed by the Governor to the Senate in 1992 (Dorgan Bioguide 2005).

When Dorgan arrived in Congress, he was appointed to the Agriculture committee as his primary assignment. This assignment worked well for his constituency in North

Dakota, a primarily agricultural state. In addition to his assignment to the Agriculture committee, Dorgan was seated on the small business committee. This assignment also made sense from his days as the tax commissioner of North Dakota and his involvement with the state’s business community.

Table 5-6. Bills sponsored by Byron Dorgan Bill Number Title H. Con. Res. 124 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that 48 percent of any business tax reduction should go to small businesses

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Table 5-6. Continued. Bill Number Title H. Con. Res. 195 A concurrent resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the President should fill the 1982 vacancy on the Federal Reserve Board with a person of substantial small business or agricultural experience H.R. 1640 To amend the Federal Reserve Act to provide that the Chairman of the Board of Governors may be removed from such position by the adoption of a concurrent resolution by a 3/5 vote for both Houses H.R. 2363 To amend the Internal Revenue Code H.R. 2923 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow each individual to exclude $1,000 of interest on savings deposits H.R. 3014 To provide for the reinstatement and validation of U.S. oil and gas lease No. M-15450 (ND) H.R. 3015 To provide for the reinstatement and validation of U.S. oil and gas lease No. M-16402 (ND) Acq. H.R. 3169 A bill for the relief of Juan Esteban Ramirez H.R. 3747 A bill for the relief of certain employees at antiballistic missile sites H.R. 4562 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny all deductions for interest paid or incurred on loans in connection with an unfriendly takeover, or attempted takeover, of a corporation H.R. 4925 To provide improved congressional oversight of cost overruns of major defense systems H.R. 5114 To require the forfeiture of railroad land grant lands in proportion to rail serve abandonments H.R. 5115 Amending title 49 of the United States Code to require the Interstate Commerce Commission to consider income from land grants in rail line abandonment and discontinuance proceedings, and for other purposes H.R. 6075 To amend the Agricultural Act of 1949 to increase the levels of loans, purchases, and payments applicable to the 1982 through 1985 crops of feed grains and wheat H.R. 6416 To provide for the distribution of funds awarded the Pembina Chippewa Indians in dockets numbered 113, 191, 221 and 146 of the Court of Claims H.R. 6523 To repeal section 603 of the Public Utility Regulatory Polices Act of 1978 H.R. 6925 To amend title 49 of the United States Code to authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to order actions which ensure the financial vitality of railroads managed or otherwise controlled by another entity, and for other purposes H.R. 6940 To authorize the purchase, sale, and exchange of lands by the Devils Lake Sioux Tribe of the Devils Lake Sioux Reservation, North Dakota, and for other purposes Adapted from a list of bills sponsored as found by conducing a search of the Library of Congress (2005).

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Dorgan’s bill introduction pattern, in general, followed his committee assignments or spoke directly to his constituents in North Dakota. His first three bills all dealt with either agricultural or small business issues. This follows the pattern, as freshmen often feel most comfortable with legislation their committees hold hearings on and have control over.

After his initial introductions, Dorgan also introduced many bills that had a direct effect on the citizens of North Dakota. Bills such as H.R. 3015, H.R. 3747, and H.R.

6416 all effect either a specific segment or the entire state of North Dakota. For example,

H.R. 6416 asks for the redistribution of funds for one of the Native American tribes in

North Dakota. As North Dakota’s lone representative in the House of Representatives,

Dorgan, regardless of his seniority was responsible for ensuring that his constituents had a voice in Washington.

20 -Sponsors

o 15 C

0 4 5 2 9 1 1 1640 2363 2923 3014 3015 3169 3747 4562 4925 5114 5115 6075 6416 6523 6925 6940 S S E E R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R. R...... H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H ON.R ON.R H.C H.C Bill Number

Figure 5-2. Co-sponsors for bills sponsored by Byron Dorgan

Figure 5-2 shows the number of co-sponsors for each of Dorgan’s eighteen bills.

These numbers shows a varying level of success by Dorgan to sign co-sponsors onto his

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legislative agenda. Congressman Dorgan was able to secure multiple co-sponsors for

seven of his bills, while ten measures were referred to committee and never received

additional co-sponsors.

The pattern of legislative introduction follows the market model of legislative

introduction by initially picking bills that satisfied his personal interests in tax law and

small business protections. Dorgan also tried to promote his own self-interest with a

handful of private bills designed to assist specific individuals in North Dakota. As his first term moved along, Dorgan, as would be expected from a semi amateur, began to see that he needed to promote other issues for his constituents and could not introduce only bills in which he either had a personal stake or a personal interest based on his previous career interests. At that point, he began to act a little more like a professional and

promote legislative issues only he could introduce as the only member of congressman

from North Dakota.

The Semi Professional: Kweisi Mfume

Kweisi Mfume was elected to the House of Representatives from the seventh

district of Maryland in 1986. The seventh district includes the City of Baltimore and the

surrounding area. Mfume grew up in Baltimore and attended the Baltimore public

schools before getting a bachelors degree from Morgan State University and a master’s

degree from Johns Hopkins University. After graduating college, Mfume served as an

assistant professor at Morgan State, as a radio station program director, and was then

elected to Congress in 1986 after serving 8 years on the Baltimore City Council (Mfume

Bioguide 2005).

As a semi-professional, Mfume understood election rigors when he decided to run

for Congress. He had been active in the community as a radio station program director

121 and was able to translate that into winning a seat on the city council. As a visible figure,

Mfume understood that when he was elected to Congress he had a responsibility to introduce legislation that benefited the district and the people of Maryland as a whole.

Table 5-7. Bills introduced by Kweisi Mfume Bill Number Title H.J.RES 572 A joint resolution designating November 28 through December 2, 1988, as “Vocational-Technical Education Week” H.R. 1190 A bill for the relief of Egya Quaison-Sackey H.R. 1656 To require the Secretary of the Treasury to develop a program to expand the use of underutilized banks by Federal agencies H.R. 1769 To establish the Minority Business Development Administration in the Department of Commerce, to clarify the relationship between such Administration and the Small Business Administration, and for other purposes H.R. 3050 To amend title 18, United States Code, to specify that public corruption cases can be prosecuted as frauds in certain cases H.R. 3671 To amend the Job Training Partnership Act to establish a demonstration program for employment opportunities for severely disadvantaged youth, and for other purposes Adapted from a list of bills sponsored as found by conducing a search of the Library of Congress (2005).

The type of legislation Mfume introduced was in line with his committee assignments of banking and small business, and that of a semi professional freshman who relies on his previous city council experience. As a typical professional freshman,

Mfume introduced only a few pieces of legislation in his first term. Mfume picked places where he believed he could be successful in gathering co-sponsors and hopefully pass laws. Of the six bills that Mfume introduced, five of the six gathered co-sponsors, and one (H.J.RES 572) was passed into law.

For a freshman to have a bill pass rate of 17% is very respectable. When compared to his first term counterparts, Mfume is one of 182 freshmen, 23%, to have a bill they sponsored become law. Of these 182 freshmen, two-thirds were professionals but only

16.5% were semi professionals. For Mfume to be one of a small group of semi

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professionals to succeed in passing a measure into law speaks volumes for his political

skills and ability to connect with other members of Congress.

250

200

15 0

10 0

0 H.J.RES 572 H.R. 1190 H.R. 1656 H.R. 1769 H.R. 3050 H.R. 3671

Bill Number

Figure 5-3. Co-sponsors for bills sponsored by Kweisi Mfume

The Mostly Professional: Catherine Long

Catherine Long was elected to Congress in 1985 after the death of her husband

Congressman Gillis Long on January 20. Her husband had served in Congress for twelve years previous to his death. Congresswomen Long was born in Ohio and attended school in both Pennsylvania and Louisiana before serving in the United States Navy in World

War II. While her husband was a famous congressman Mrs. Long served as an aid to

Senator Wayne Morse and to Representative James Polk. She also served as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention in 1980 and 1984 and as an active member of the

Louisiana Democratic Party in support of the Democratic agenda and her husband’s career (Long Bioguide 2005).

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When she was elected to fill her husband’s seat in 1985, Long arrived in Congress

with experience both as a congressional aide, but also with knowledge of her husband’s

career and how he adjusted to life in Congress when he was first elected in 1972. Using

this knowledge, Long was cautious with the introduction of legislation and choose to

introduce only one piece of legislation on her own. This bill was H.R. 5218, an

amendment to Title 5 of the U.S. Code. In choosing this legislation, Long was able to

secure 19 co-sponsors and pass the bill into law in October 1986 (Public Law No: 99-

586).

Table 5-8. Bill introduced by Congresswomen Cathy Long Bill Number Title H.R. 5218 To amend title 5, United States Code, to provide that certain individuals be accorded competitive status for purposes of transferring to the competitive service Adapted from a list of bills sponsored as found by conducing a search of the Library of Congress (2005).

Congresswomen Long followed the traditional norms of the House of

Representatives for freshmen. She did not introduce legislation until July of 1986 and succeeded in passing a law in late October, making it one of the last bills passed in the

99th Congress. Instead of concentrating on creating her own legislation, Mrs. Long was a

co-sponsor on 135 other pieces of legislation on issues that went before numerous

committees, including her assigned committees of Public Works and Small Business.

Long’s behavior typifies the experience for a spouse of a member of Congress. She

picked her issues carefully and relied on others to pull her through her first, and only,

term. She typifies the thought of the Polis Model. She understood that her time in

Congress was short and that she had the opportunity to finish the work her late husband

had started and serve the people of her district and the state of Louisiana to the best of her

124 ability. She was elected to Congress to finish serving her husbands term, but made her own mark as a diligent servant of her constituents.

The Pure Professional: John Olver

To represent pure professional freshmen, I have chosen John Olver. Olver was elected in 1992 to represent the first district of Massachusetts. Born in 1936, Olver received a B.S. from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, an M.S. from Tufts University and a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. After graduation, Olver served on the faculty of Franklin Technical Institution in Missouri and as a member of the faculty at the University of Massachusetts. In 1969, Olver ran for and won a seat in the

Massachusetts House of Representatives where he served for 4 years. He then ran for and won a seat in the state senate where he served until his election to Congress in 1991 by special election to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Silvio Conte. Olver has served in Congress since, having won his seventh term in the 2004 election (Olver

Bioguide 2005).

Table 5-9. Bills introduced by Congressman John Olver Bill Number Title H.RES 525 Relating to the Privileges of the House H.R. 2818 To designate the Federal building located at 78 Center Street in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, as the “Silvio O. Conte Federal Building”, and for other purposes H.R. 4720 To permit individuals to waive their rights to unemployment compensation based on military service in order to qualify for other unemployment benefits H.R. 5161 To establish a Small Business Manufacturing Extension Service, and for other purposes Adapted from a list of bills sponsored as found by conducing a search of the Library of Congress (2005).

As a pure professional, Olver arrived in the House of Representatives with an in- depth understanding of legislative politics and the role of the individual within the

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legislature. Like other pure professionals, Olver was able to immediately use the skills he

learned in the Massachusetts House and Senate to his new role in Congress. Table 5-9

lists the bills that Olver introduced during his first term in the House of Representatives.

Olver’s choice to introduce only a few bills and to keep them within the confines of

the committees he served on, Small Business was a choice made as direct result of his

previous legislative experience. With these bills, Olver had a 25% success rate in

passage to public law when H.R. 2818 was signed into law on July 2, 1992 as Public Law

102-313, to honor Silvio Conte, the man he replaced in Congress.

It is important to note that H.RES 525 has no co-sponsors in part because of the

nature of the legislation. H.RES 525 dealt with a personal issue between Olver and

members of the Task Force to Investigate the Operation and Management of the Office of

the Postmaster. Olver was under investigation by the taskforce even though he did not

hold a box at the House post office and the legislation served to force an apology from

the investigating committee. Ultimately, the outcome of Olver’s attempt is unknown as

the status of the bill is considered a privileged matter and has not been published for

public viewing.

Figure 5-4 shows the number of co-sponsors to Olver’s bills. Overall, Olver was

not very successful in securing co-sponsors for his legislation, but was successful in passing H.R. 2818 into law. Part of the Olver’s success comes from proposing a bill that he knew other members of Congress would support, naming a federal building for a former colleague who had passed away. Otherwise, Olver picked legislation within his committee assignments and only on issues he felt strongly about.

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6 ponsors S Co-

0 H.RES 525 H.R. 2818 H.R. 4720 H.R. 5161 Bill Number Figure 5-4. Co-sponsors for bills introduced by John Olver

Olver relied on his previous legislative experience to understand that he should honor the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives and serve an apprenticeship before becoming an active participant in daily legislative life. One of

Olver’s first acts upon his election was to introduce H.R. 2818 to honor Congressman

Conte. After introducing and passing that legislation, Olver laid low and did not introduce another piece of legislation until March 31, 1992. This long period of legislative inactivity allowed Olver to study the differences between the Massachusetts legislature and Congress and make the best decisions about what legislation to introduce going forward.

Overall Legislative Success

With case studies of all six types of freshmen completed, I turn my attention to understanding how freshmen acted when introducing legislation during their first terms in the House of Representatives. Overall, freshmen introduce little legislation during their first terms. For the 790 freshmen elected between 1974 and 1994, more than half

127 introduced less than ten bills during their first term. In fact, seven freshmen introduced no legislation. At the other extreme, one freshmen introduced 90 bills (Gladys Noon

Spellman D-MD) and one 114 bills (Richard Ottinger D-NY) during their freshmen term.

Table 5-10 shows the how many freshmen introduced bills.

Table 5-10. Number of bills introduced by freshmen: 1974-1994 Number of Bills Sponsored Frequency Percent Number of Bills 0-10 440 55.70 2533 11-20 223 28.23 3218 21-30 70 8.86 1755 31-40 23 2.91 802 41-50 17 2.15 759 51-60 10 1.27 549 >60 7 0.89 537 Total 790 100.00 10153

Once a bill is introduced, the next measure of success if how many bills became law. Of the 10,153 bills introduced by freshmen members of Congress 231 pieces of legislation (2.27%) became law. Table 5-10 shows the number of freshmen that were successful in having bills become law. Overall, most freshmen do not succeed in passing legislation; 76% have no bills become law. Of the 182 freshmen that had bills become law. The vast majority had only one successful measure. The remaining 39 freshmen had greater success and only one individual, Tom Davis R-VA, succeeded in having four measures become law.

Table 5-11. Number of bills passed into law by freshman: 1974-1994 Number of Bills Frequency Percent 0 606 76.71 1 143 18.10 2 30 3.80 3 8 1.01 4 1 0.13 Total 788 99.75

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With the number of freshmen who introduce legislation and the relatively low passage rate, the next step is to see which group of freshmen has the greatest success in having a bill become law. Table 5-12 shows the breakdown in introduction and passage rate by type of freshmen.

Table 5-12. Number of laws passed by amateur and professional freshmen % of total Total freshmen Number of Public Laws from Sponsored Bills passing bills 0 1 2 3 4

Amateur 225 38 12 1 1 52 277 37.2% 26.8% 41.4% 12.5% 100.0% 19.0% 35.3%

Professional 380 104 17 7 0 128 508 62.8% 73.2% 58.6% 58.6% 0.0% 25.0% 64.7%

Total 605 142 29 8 1 180 785 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 23.3% 100.0%

Professionals are much more likely to pass a bill than amateurs. Of the 508 professionals in my data, 128 (25%) passed at least one bill. Amateurs faired a bit worse with 52 (19%) having passed a bill into law. These results are interesting and confirm my initial hypothesis that professional freshmen are more likely to pass legislation than are amateurs. Professional, because of their pre-congressional experience have the tools to be more effective legislators early in their careers than amateurs. This does not mean that amateurs are poor legislators, just that they do not have the skill set necessary to pass legislation at a high rate during their first term. Amateurs who do pass legislation tend to be those who have worked in or around Congress and have an idea about how the legislative process works.

These results tell us that districts represented by professional freshmen are more likely to have their members of Congress pass legislation during their first term than

129 districts served by other types of freshmen. If voters measure congressional success through the ability to pass legislation on a consistent basis they are best served by choosing candidates who have served in the state legislature. These professional freshmen, more than any other group, are most likely to work to pass legislation that benefits the members of their district.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

Members of Congress come from diverse backgrounds with different levels of education, experience and motivation. The districts they represent are also quite diverse.

They consist of large cities, rural farming communities, sprawling suburbs, and vast national parks and forests. This diversity is what makes Congress such a special institution. It is the only institution in the federal government that represents the people directly. It is the only institution that is elected to represent the people on a personal level. Members of Congress are beholden to the voters in their districts and if they do not represent their interests, then they will not be reelected.

The pressure that voters put on members of Congress can be intense. As we have seen, the reelection rates for incumbents is over 90% (Hibbing 1991, Davidson and

Oleszek 1991, Rieselbach 1997, and Jacobson 1997) and just to get elected freshman have to cross a high threshold. The experience that freshman bring with them to the

House of Representatives influences the way they behave once in office and influences how party leadership assigns them to committees and treats them in party caucus situations. These are all conditions and situations that can be overcome by freshman through hard work, dedication to the party’s agenda and respect of the norms and folkways of the institution.

The three variables this work focuses on all illustrated the differences between amateur and professional freshman. By using both quantitative and qualitative data, I have shown that general categories of freshman exist and are used by party leadership to

130 131 assist them in placing freshman on committees and helping them to recognize potential in freshman that otherwise are anonymous to senior members. With so many freshmen entering the House of Representatives in any given election, the party leadership needs these shortcuts to best assign freshman and assist them in getting reelected.

To differentiate between types of freshmen, I created the six-category system presented in Chapter 2. These six categories initially separate freshmen by pre- congressional political experience. Through the evaluation of committee assignments, legislative introduction and election results, we have also seen that these categories serve to divide freshmen by experience. The information these categories provide about amateur and professional freshmen allow a deeper understanding of group behavior, from which we can infer individual choices. Amateurs and professionals rely on their experience (or lack thereof) to guide them in their acclimation to the institution and their decision-making.

Committee Assignments

Chapter 3 provided an in-depth look at the committee assignment process and the types of committees the party leadership assigns to freshmen. Once elected all freshmen are assigned to committees. Freshmen hope to be assigned to the most prestigious committees that have the most influence within the House of Representatives. What our data showed was that very few freshmen are assigned to the most prestigious committees.

Instead, the party leadership often chooses assignments that help the freshmen connect with their constituents and be reelected.

The party leadership often sees reelection as the most important criteria when making committee assignments. If the leadership can help assure that a freshman gets reelected, the individual often feels indebted to the leadership and becomes a strong

132 supporter of the party position. John Buchanan (R-AL) initially requested the Banking

Committee and the Government Operations Committee when he was elected in 1964.

The Republican Party leadership chose to assign him to the Post Office Committee (an undesirable committee) and Civil Service Committee for his first term. In addition to these assignments, the Republican Party leadership recognized his past accomplishments in fighting against the Ku Klux Klan and assigned him to the House Committee on Un-

American Activities (a non-standing committee) to help investigate Klan activities.

While these assignments were not what Buchanan requested, he made the best of his situation, was able to connect with his constituents through his investigation of the Klan and was reassigned to more prestigious committees for his second term.

It is also important to reiterate that the party leadership does not assign all freshmen to committees that they do not request. Robin Beard (R-TN) requested and received an assignment to the Armed Services Committee. Beard identified during his campaign the importance of military issues to his district and was able to combine that with his experience as a Marine to convince the party leadership that Armed Services was a good assignment for him.

Striking a balance between requests by freshmen and the importance of longevity in the House of Representatives for party stability is a constant struggle for the party leadership. Butler Derrick (D-SC), a member of the Democratic Steering and Policy

Committee reminds us that the committee looked beyond requests when making assignments. The Steering and Policy committee tries to balance committees by looking at individual talents and geography when assigning freshmen. They wanted to ensure that every region was covered and that the individual congressmen on each committee would

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be able to contribute to the committees’ mission. Ultimately, the differences between

amateurs and professionals for committee assignments are minimal, with the politics of

party leadership having the biggest role in assigning freshmen to committees.

Electoral Success

Chapter 4 discusses elections and how successful amateurs and professionals are in

securing safe seats (more than 60% of the vote) over their first two elections. What I find

is that professionals receive a higher percentage of the vote in their initial election to the

House of Representatives, but that only semi-amateur freshmen receive more than 60% of the vote on average. This result was interesting, as semi-amateurs are those who have a detailed knowledge of politics without having ever been elected in their own right. This suggests that working on campaigns, having been appointed to office or studying politics can make a difference in winning elections.

Following the initial electoral success freshmen become incumbents and share in the advantages that come with higher name recognition and more fundraising opportunities. Of all freshmen in the House of Representatives, 88% are returned to

Washington for a second term. This number is less than the standard 90% over the last

20 years (see Table 4-3 for details) because there is a group of freshmen that, for whatever reason, choose not to seek reelection after their first term. While this group is not large, it is enough to bring the overall reelection rate below the rest of the institution.

With so many freshmen returning to Washington for a second term, it is not surprising that all freshmen (with the exception of mostly professionals) win more than

60% of the vote, on average, in their initial bid for reelection. At this point in their careers, these members of Congress are known in their districts and have a record of success in the House of Representatives for their constituents to see. Glenn English (D-

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OK) was the first Democrat elected from his district in more than 30 years when he won in 1974. English was able to use his record in the House of Representatives to serve 10 terms in Congress before retiring in 1994. Without his legislative record to turn to during his first reelection campaign, English would not have been able to convince his constituents that a Democrat was still the best choice to serve them in Washington.

Legislative Entrepreneurship

Chapter 5 examines freshmen’s ability to follow the norms and folkways of the

House of Representatives through the introduction and passage of legislation.

Traditionally, freshmen were to be seen and not heard during their first term in office

(Matthews 1960, Hibbing 1991). In today’s modern legislature with C-SPAN, the

Internet and other mass media outlets covering every aspect of the institution, freshmen must strike a balance between the expectations of more senior members of Congress and their need to be seen by constituents. The balance that is struck is astounding. Most freshmen follow the norms and folkways of the House of Representatives and are able

(through one-minute speeches and district publications and events) to demonstrate their involvement in the institution without upsetting the apprenticeship environment.

Through the use of the market and polis models of policy analysis, I was able to differentiate between amateurs and professionals and illustrate the personal importance that amateurs have (market model) during their first term with the more community and district centered (polis model) approach of professionals. Through the individual case studies of each type of amateur and professional, we saw their distinctive ability to use either the market or polis models as the central theme in the introduction of legislation and the ability to get it passed into law.

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Overall, the case studies showed that amateurs are more willing to break the norms and folkways of legislative introduction during their first term. On average amateurs introduce more pieces of legislation but have a lower passage rate than do professionals.

The data suggests that when a professional chooses to introduce a piece of legislation, they do so with the utmost care and on issues that they have researched to show that other members of Congress will support the measure. Professionals have a much higher percentage of bills become law because they understand the importance of working with others on issues and that, during their first term, they do not have to take the lead on every issue important to them and their district.

In today’s House of Representatives, norms and folkways are still important but the leadership of both parties understands that everyone needs to connect with their districts and demonstrate that they are successful. To that end, members of Congress rely heavily on C-SPAN, the Internet, district newsletters, town-hall forums and other events to show their constituents their successes in the House of Representatives. These tools have become invaluable for members of Congress and allow them to continue to follow the norms and folkways of the institution and still demonstrate to their constituents that they are making a difference in Congress.

Toward the Future

Amateur and professional freshmen have distinct experiences in Congress.

Professionals receive marginally better committee assignments than do amateurs, professionals receive higher percentages of the vote in their first elections to Congress than do amateurs, and professionals are more likely to observe the norms and folkways of the institution than amateurs. These three concepts help us to form a basic understanding of the differences between amateurs and professionals.

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For future research, it is essential to understand that amateurs perceive the House of

Representatives in a different way than professionals. Amateurs tend to be in awe of

Congress when they first arrive in Washington, D.C., and they do not adapt as well to the

pressures of being a legislature as professionals. Still, they are elected at a high rate, and

are able to work during their first term to, on average, receive over 60% of the vote when

they run for reelection. There are multiple reasons that amateurs receive so many votes.

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the American public is fascinated with amateurs and

amateurism. Voters seem to believe that lack of political and institutional experience

translates into the best representation.

We also cannot discount the role that term limits at the state level has had on the desire of state legislators to “move up” to the House of Representatives. Opheim (1994) looks at the effect of term limits on the state legislatures. She shows that roughly 40% of state legislators choose to leave the institution within eight years of winning their initial seat. For states with term limits many of these individuals choose to run for the House of

Representatives. For those states without term limits the reason why representatives choose to leave after a relatively short time is unclear.

Mondak (1995) looks at how term limits impacts the composition of the House of

Representatives. He concludes that the quality of the legislature, for both the state and

the House of Representatives, may suffer with term limits of 6 to 8 years. This means

that for states that have term limits of 6 to 8 years in the legislature, the pure

professionals elected to Congress do not have the same knowledge base as some of their

cohort because they have not been provided with the option of staying in the state

legislature and are “forced” to move up if they want to stay in a legislative body.

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To better understand how amateur and professionals are truly different for future studies, I believe that bounded rationality and sensemaking provide a platform from which to delve deeper into the differences between amateurs and professionals. Both of these concepts could be integral for future differentiation of amateurs and professionals and could allow for a different theoretical perspective to freshmen.

Bounded Rationality

Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality helps to explain decision making by members of Congress (Simon 1947 and Simon 1957). Individuals often make decisions that would not be optimal given complete information. They will choose an alternative that seems easiest not necessarily what is best for the individual or the group. “In

Simon’s concept of bounded rationality, people do not optimize (i.e., choose the best of all possible alternatives). Instead, they satisfice, by which is meant that they seek a satisfactory alternative” (Hogarth, 1987, 65). Those making decisions with a bounded understanding will not seek more information to optimize their decision, but will take what they already know and make a choice based on that. This can be dangerous, especially if it applied to a legislative situation.

Examining members of Congress in each of the four amateur/professionals categories shows that bounded rationality does hold back those with less experience.

How decisions are made is a direct consequence of understanding one’s surroundings.

Members of Congress, like other members of society, make decisions based on their experiences and the understanding of the world around them. For freshmen members of

Congress, these experiences are varied and thus a wide variety of decisions will be made.

As a group freshmen do not have a collective understanding of the political world, and

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thus need to categorize by similar knowledge, which allows for a general look at the

types of experience they may have once in Congress.

Pre-congressional political experience proves to be invaluable, as it provides a better understanding of the power of Congress and how experience can be the difference between making a good and bad decision in the first years in office. Senator Joseph

Lieberman reinforces this idea in his book on his experiences in government.

In most cases, in most professions, expertise comes from experience. It is built over time. It is typically attained by working with and learning from other professionals in the same field. This is as true in government as it is of carpentry. What I learned about the complexities of legislation during the ten years I spent as a state senator in Connecticut was invaluable when I became a United States senator. (Lieberman, 2000, 21)

Senator Lieberman makes an important point about experience. He believes that experience is the key to have a successful career. Without his time in the Connecticut senate he would not be as effective a senator as he is today. The experience gave him the tools to make decisions without being bounded by the lack of information that plagues amateur politicians.

Sensemaking

Sensemaking is a second part of understanding the differences between amateurs and professionals. How freshmen internalize decision-making and understand the world around them is a key element that separates amateurs from professionals. Amateurs tend to view the world in an action-driven fashion, while professionals see their surroundings through a more belief-driven lens. These two types of sensemaking can cause tension between the two groups as they try to create legislation. By looking at the world through different lenses, amateurs and professionals see themselves differently and how much influence they have within Congress differently.

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Weick (1995) clarifies the differences between belief and action driven sensemaking. Belief driven sensemaking has two distinct characteristics, arguing and expecting. “In short, expectations are more directive than are arguments. Because expectations operate with a heavier hand, they tend to filter input more severely, which raises a host of issues concerning accuracy, error, and the limits of social construction”

(Weick 1995, 145). Professionals use argument and expectation to help them make sense of their surroundings. Weick believes that when people depend on belief-driven sensemaking, they are prone to mistakes that could be avoided if they did not allow their expectations of a situation or their desire to argue to attain those ideals get in the way.

Professional freshmen tend to believe that their experiences in politics are enough to guide them through their first years in Congress. They rely on this experience to guide how they see Congress. These expectations set up professional freshmen for an easier transition to the House of Representatives as they seize on the similarities to their previous elected job. It is then up to the individual professional to make their expectations a reality within the context of the institution. This often leads professionals to engage in argument to try to persuade others to help them change the institution.

Inevitably their belief driven nature makes it difficult to get others to change an institution that has worked well for two hundred years and professionals begin to understand the norms of Congress and make sense of their new surroundings.

Sherrod Brown brings these ideas to life in his discussion of what life has been like for him in Congress. He reminds us that when professional politicians arrive in Congress they expect that they are just as important as they were in their previous political careers.

On a more serious note, I did learn a telling lesson about Congress and about power. In early December, the representatives-elect spent several days in

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Washington. One morning, Cincinnati Democrat David Mann and I were eating breakfast at a Capitol Hill hotel. Seated at the next table was former Speaker Jim Wright. No one petitioned him. No one approached his table. No one was even sitting with him. Three years earlier, he had been the most influential man in Congress and probably the most powerful Democrat in America. That December morning Jim Wright sat alone, largely unnoticed, a grim reminder to a new member of Congress that fame, attention, and power are fleeting. (Brown 2000, 11)

Brown’s account of observing of former Speaker Wright is a telling example of belief

driven sensemaking. Professionals strongly believe that they are more important than

they really are. Brown came to Congress as a professional freshman, and expresses that he always believed he was more important than he probably was before learning the lesson he is passing along to us.

Action driven sensemaking is the other way that freshmen members of Congress try to understand the world around them. Amateur freshmen are most likely to engage in this form of sensemaking. Action driven sensemaking involves a commitment and manipulation. Both committing and manipulating are essential elements for amateurs in the quest for a better understanding of their new jobs. Each has unique properties but almost all amateurs use manipulation. “Processes by which an organization impresses itself into its environment can be called manipulative. The manipulative process includes constructing desirable niches and negotiating domains, forming coalitions, educating clients and employees, advertising to potential clients and customers, and resolving conflicts” (Hedberg, Nystrom, and Starbuck 1976, 46). Amateurs often use manipulation to bring Congress to them. Instead of standing back and watching everything go on around them, many amateur freshmen will try to work the system to get the best offices or the best committee assignments. While professional freshmen may also try to manipulate the system, amateurs are often unsuccessful as a result of their political naiveté.

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Action driven sensemaking can lead amateurs into unrealistic expectations of their first term in Congress. They expect that they will be given the best assignment available

and the benefit of the doubt if they make early mistakes. This is often not the case, as

freshmen are expected to contribute immediately by their constituents and are expected to

sit back and watch by more senior members of Congress. This paradox of participation

can be confusing and drive many freshmen to manipulate the system for their own

personal benefit. This manipulation can be successful and lead to good committee

assignments or it can backfire and set freshmen a number of steps back in their quest to

become important and influential, long-term members of Congress.

To adequately look at amateurs and professionals, I must first expand the number

of cases. To do this I will look at all members of Congress elected between 1970 and

2000. This will give me members from a number of different congressional eras and

allow me to trace many of their careers through Congress. Examining how successful

former amateur and professional freshmen rose through the ranks of their party apparatus

will allow me to test my hypothesis. A thirty-year time period also gives me the

flexibility to see if Congress has changed since 1970 and if the amateur and professional

model still exists in the modern age of television campaigns.

Future research should take the ideas of bounded rationality and sensemaking and

concentrate aspects of the relationship between amateur and professional freshmen where

there can be a clear difference. These topics could include, but are not limited to, party

loyalty, committee assignments versus committee requests, and career paths within

Congress. Each of these topics can explain further the differences between amateurs and

professionals and help us understand if amateurism is truly good for an institution.

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The first area for future research is party loyalty in Congress. By understanding whether amateurs or professionals are more likely to vote with the party on important issues will illuminate how each group views the dynamics of party in the institutions and the balance between constituent representation and personal goals. Amateurs may be more likely to vote with the party because they are unsure of their role within the House

and look to the party for guidance. Professionals are initially more self-sufficient because

of their political experience and believe they can make voting decisions on their own.

Within their respective roles, amateurs and professionals have the same ultimate goal.

They want to be in the good grace of the party leadership through support of their agenda.

As their first term commences, these initial roles may reverse as professionals fall back

on their understanding of party ties from previous experience and amateurs strive to

distinguish themselves from other freshmen.

The literature on partisan voting in Congress suggests that partisan voting has

increased substantially in the House of Representatives. Truman (1959) discusses the

importance of party line voting for passing laws. Without party voting, organizing the

House and passing legislation would be difficult. Parties allow members of Congress to easily identify who agrees with them and who opposes them on many issues. In addition, members will turn to the party when they must vote on an issue that they either have no position on or are uniformed about. They look towards more senior members of the party to gain cues as to what is the most appropriate position for their party and possibly their state (Matthews and Stimson 1975). In fact, after a period of partisan decline in

Congress, there is an increase in strong party identifiers in recent years (Bartels 2000).

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The classic way to study partisan voting in the House of Representatives is through

roll call voting. Krehbiel (2000) suggests that while roll call voting is useful to identify party votes and patterns, a better model exists. Krehbiel believes that roll call voting is suspect because “perfect party discipline does not imply that party voting scores will always reach their maximum values….” (Krehbiel 2000, 217). To ensure that we get a good measure, he takes into account the number of seats a party has in Congress. This enables us to see partisanship even as the number of seats a party has goes up and down.

If a party has a large majority the need for partisan voting is not as important as when the institution is almost evenly divided.

To test the hypothesis that the votes of amateurs are more partisan than the votes of professionals, I propose an analysis of roll call votes over the period of 1974 to 1994 to see if a pattern of partisan voting exists among both amateurs and professionals. I expect to find that amateurs and professionals do vote differently. This expectation comes directly from the interviews that I have already conducted. A few amateurs I interviewed expressed that they looked to other members of the party when they were unsure how to vote on an issue. This suggests that amateurs are more likely to look to other party members, especially if they are also members of the state delegation, when searching for voting cues. Professionals may also experience the same phenomenon, but not to such a strong degree.

The second area where future research needs to be conducted is the relationship between committee assignments and committee requests. While I have demonstrated that there is a difference between amateurs and professionals in the types of committee assignments they receive, it would be useful to see what types of committees amateurs

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and professionals request on a larger scale than was done in Chapter 3. The difference

between requests and actual assignments is important because it demonstrates the

different priorities that amateurs and professionals have when they are first elected.

I hypothesize that professional committee requests will be much different from the

assignments they actually receive compared to amateurs. To test this hypothesis, I will

create a database and look for existing data with both the actual assignments of freshmen

and the committees they request. To collect this data I will use a mail survey and

interviews to ascertain the requests freshmen make. I believe that because professionals

have a better understanding of politics they desire the most prestigious assignments and

request them. Leadership often cannot and will not grant such requests and as a result,

professionals do not receive the assignments they really want. Amateurs, on the other

hand, because they have less knowledge of the legislative process may make more

“reasonable” requests.

The third area where research needs to be done is to understand whether amateurs or professionals are more successful over the entire legislative career. There have been examples of both amateurs and professionals becoming prominent members of Congress since 1974, but I believe that overall professionals are more likely to hold leadership posts and serve for long periods of time. Because professionals already have a reelection constituency (Fenno 1978) from their previous offices, they have an easier time winning a second election than to amateurs. Amateurs must work hard during their first term to stabilize their electoral base. The first election as an incumbent can be the most dangerous because freshmen only have two years of experience upon which to run. This

145 experience can either be a positive or negative factor depending on how well they appealed to constituents through fieldwork and high profile activity within the district.

Fowler and McClure (1989) and Reeves (1993) explore the professional members of Congress and their ability to become prominent members of Congress. Fowler and

McClure discuss Congressman Fred Eckert and his struggles to solidify his electoral base during his first term in office. Congressmen Eckert is a typical professional freshman, as he understands how to appeal to the voters of his district, but struggles his attempts to ward off potential challengers in a marginal district. Reeves explores the typical professional freshmen and looks into the later part of their careers. She explores the different leadership styles of each chairman on the Education and Labor Committee from

1951 to 1984 and identifies that all have been professional politicians. This suggests that chairmen are more likely to be professional freshmen and that pre-congressional experience may count in the eyes of the party leadership.

Wilcox (1995) and Peters (1999) both discuss Newt Gingrich and his rise to become Speaker of the House of Representatives. Gingrich is the prototypical amateur as he was a history professor before his election to Congress. By becoming Speaker of the

House, Gingrich overcame his amateur status to create the Republican revolution.

“Gingrich differed from all previous Speakers because he had created his own majority.

Political scientists can identify the many factors that come into play in enabling the

Republicans to capture the House in 1994; but from the perspective of the House

Republicans, their majority was due to Gingrich’s leadership” (Peters 1999, 50).

Gingrich was extremely charismatic and carried the Republican Party to the majority

146 through his insights into grassroots politics and his nationalization of the campaign with the Contract with America (Wilcox 1995).

Final Thoughts

These topics are suggestive for future research but are not essential for the conclusion of the current research. This work has demonstrated that a difference exists between amateurs and professionals in the types of committees they are assigned, their electoral success in their initial election to Congress and their subsequent reelection campaign, and in their ability to follow the norms and folkways of the House of

Representatives. Each freshman has a unique experience, but all freshmen also deal with similar issues and concerns when working to demonstrate to their constituents that they are the best person to represent the district in Washington.

Each of the suggested topics for future research can shed more light on the differences between amateurs and professionals and help political scientists and voters choose the best candidate to represent them in Washington. Whether the voters choose amateur or professional, they should know the most likely career paths, legislative success and ability to represent the district of their choice. It is my hope that this research can provide an insight into the world of a member of Congress and provide voters, parties and others with valuable knowledge about whom they are electing and their likelihood for success.

APPENDIX A DESCRIPTION OF CODED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Congressman A (D-Mid Atlantic)

Congressman A is a Democrat from a Mid Atlantic state and represents a swing district. The district is majority Republican by registration and had elected a Republican to Congress for at least the five preceding elections. Congressman A has had to work hard to convince his constituents and the leadership in the House that he is not a one-term member.

Congressman B (D-New England)

Congressman B is a Democrat from New England. He is a lawyer and was the dean of a prominent New England law school before being elected to Congress. Congressman B comes from a fairly liberal district and retired of his own accord and returned to teaching law.

Congressman C (D-Southeast)

Congressman C is a Democrat from the Southeast. He can be classified as a career politician who spent time in the state legislature before being elected to Congress. He is active in the community and represents a district that leans liberal and contains a research university.

Congressman D (R-Southeast)

Congressman D is a Republican from the Southeast. He can be classified as a career politician. When he was elected to Congress he was one of the youngest members ever elected. His district is a swing district that separates a more liberal part of the state from a more conservative section.

147 APPENDIX B ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATION OF FRESHMEN DEMOGRAPHICS

Appendix B contains the graphical charts that correspond to the charts and

percentages presented in Chapter 2. These charts are meant to present an alternative

method for understand the demographic characteristics of freshmen members of

Congress. These charts are presented in the spirit of Donald Matthews (1960) and his

initial investigation of the United States Senate.

1994

1992

1990

s e

r 1988

g n

o 1986

s 1984

i F

1982

r 1980

a e

Y 1978

1976

1974

0 255075100 Number of Freshmen

Figure B-1. Freshmen elected per year

148 149

1994 Political Party Democrat 1992 Republican

1990

s s

e 1988 gr

on 1986

t 1984

r Fi

1982

r 1980

a e

Y 1978

1976

1974

0 25 50 75 100 Number of Freshmen

Figure B-2. Freshmen party affiliation and year of election8

Table B-1. Freshmen elected per year by amateur and professional status Year Amateur Professional Total 1974 38 (40.4%) 56 (59.6%) 94 (100.0%) 1976 25 (39.1%) 39 (60.9%) 64 (100.0%) 1978 30 (39.5%) 46 (60.5%) 76 (100.0%) 1980 32 (40.5%) 47 (59.5%) 79 (100.0%) 1982 28 (32.9%) 57 (67.1%) 85 (100.0%) 1984 16 (33.3%) 32 (66.7%) 48 (100.0%) 1986 8 (16.3%) 41 (83.7%) 49 (100.0%) 1988 12 (29.3%) 29 (70.7%) 41 (100.0%) 1990 16 (30.2%) 37 (69.8%) 53 (100.0%) 1992 29 (25.2%) 86 (74.8%) 115 (100.0%) 1994 43 (51.8%) 40 (48.2%) 83 (100.0%) Total 277 (35.2%) 510 (64.8%) 787 (100.0%)

8 One member of Congress, Bernie Sanders (I-VT), is not represented in this table. Congressman Sanders was elected in 1990 as an independent. As of 2006, he continues to represent Vermont in Congress as an independent. He was removed from the table for simplification purposes and because he votes and caucuses with the Democrats.

150

Female

e G

Male

0 200 400 600

Number of Freshman

Figure B-3. Freshmen gender

Other

Morman

Lutheran

Church of Christ

Did Not Specify

n Orthodox Churches

i g

i Methodist

l e

Espsicopalian R

Baptist

Jewish

Protestant

Presbyterian

Catholic

0 50 100 150 Number of Freshman

Figure B-4. Religious identification of freshmen: 1974-1994

151

Table B-2. Religious identification of amateur and professional freshmen Amateur Professional Total Catholic 38 (25.7%) 110 (74.3%) 148 (100.0%) Presbyterian 16 (32.0%) 34 (68.0%) 50 (100.0%) Protestant 9 (24.3%) 28 (75.7%) 37 (100.0%) Jewish 7 (20.0%) 28 (80.0%) 35 (100.0%) Baptist 24 (33.8%) 47 (66.2%) 71 (100.0%) Episcopalian 22 (44.9%) 27 (55.1%) 49 (100.0%) Methodist 31 (35.6%) 56 (64.4%) 87 (100.0%) Orthodox Churches 2 (40.0%) 3 (60.0%) 5 (100.0%) Did Not Specify 28 (38.9%) 44 (61.1%) 72 (100.0%) Church of Christ 3 (33.3%) 6 (66.7%) 9 (100.0%) Lutheran 7 (33.3%) 14 (66.7%) 21 (100.0%) Mormon 5 (27.8%) 13 (72.2%) 18 (100.0%) Other 13 (43.3%) 17 (56.7%) 30 (100.0%) Total 205 (32.4%) 427 (67.6%) 632 (100.0%)

Table B-3. Number of terms served by amateur and professional freshmen Amateur Professional Total 1 Term 34 (36.2%) 60 (63.8%) 94 (100.0%) 2 Terms 35 (42.7%) 47 (57.3%) 82 (100.0%) 3 Terms 34 (37.8%) 56 (62.2%) 90 (100.0%) 4 Terms 37 (46.8%) 42 (53.2%) 79 (100.0%) 5 Terms 17 (22.4%) 59 (77.6%) 76 (100.0%) 6 Terms 20 (33.3%) 40 (66.7%) 60 (100.0%) 7 Terms 10 (31.3%) 22 (68.8%) 32 (100.0%) 8 Terms 12 (41.4%) 17 (58.6%) 29 (100.0%) 9 Terms 9 (33.3%) 18 (66.7%) 27 (100.0%) 10 Terms 9 (42.9%) 12 (57.1%) 21 (100.0%) 11 Terms 1 (20.0%) 4 (80.0%) 5 (100.0%) 12 Terms 1 (20.0%) 4 (80.0%) 5 (100.0%) 13 Terms 3 (50.0%) 3 (50.0%) 6 (100.0%) 14 Terms 0 (0.0%) 3 (100.0%) 3 (100.0%) Currently Serving 55 (30.9%) 123 (69.1%) 178 (100.0%) Total 277 (35.2%) 510 (64.8%) 787 (100.0%)

APPENDIX C CATEGORICAL COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS OF AMATEURS AND PROFESSIONALS

The following charts breakdown the committee assignment process for each

category of amateur and professional freshmen. These charts compliment those in

Chapter 4 and illustrate how the leadership of both political parties considers pre-

congressional experience in the committee assignment process.

Table C-1. Primary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals with categorical breakdowns Semi- Mostly Pure Pure Mostly Semi- Profess- Profess- Profess- Amateur Amateur Amateur ional ional ional Totals Appropriations 3 1 0 3 0 13 20 (1.3%) (3.2%) (0.0%) (2.9%) (0.0%) (3.9%) (2.7%)

Budget 9 2 0 4 0 8 23 (4.0%) (6.5%) (0.0%) (3.9%) (0.0%) (2.4%) (3.1%)

Rules 1 2 0 0 0 1 4 (4.1%) (6.5%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.3%) (0.5%)

Ways and 6 1 2 1 0 3 13 Means (2.7%) (3.2%) (7.1%) (1.0%) (0.0%) (0.9%) (1.8%)

Totals for 19 6 2 8 0 25 60 Power (10.8%) (16.4%) (7.1%) (7.8%) (0.0%) (7.5%) (8.1%) Committees

Banking 33 3 3 24 2 50 115 (14.7%) (9.7%) (10.7%) (23.5%) (15.4%) (14.8%) (15.6%)

Education and 16 1 3 7 2 37 66 Labor (7.1%) (3.2%) (10.7%) (6.9%) (15.4%) (11.0% (9.0%)

Energy and 17 0 2 2 2 20 43 Commerce (7.6%) (0.0%) (7.1%) (2.0%) (15.4%) (5.9%) (5.8%) Foreign 9 1 1 3 1 22 37 Affairs (4.0%) (3.2%) (3.6%) (2.9%) (7.7%) (6.5%) (5.0%)

152 153

Table C-1. Continued. Semi- Mostly Pure Pure Mostly Semi- Profess- Profess- Profess- Totals Amateur Amateur Amateur ional ional ional Judiciary 8 0 0 1 1 11 21 (3.6%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (1.0%) (7.7%) (3.3%) (2.9%)

Government 21 5 3 9 0 29 67 Operations (9.3%) (16.1%) (10.7%) (8.8%) (0.0%) (8.6%) (9.1%)

Totals for 89 10 12 46 8 169 349 Policy (46.3%) (32.2%) (42.8%) (45.1%) (61.6%) (50.1%) (47.4%) Committees

Agriculture 28 7 8 9 2 46 100 (12.4%) (22.6%) (28.6%) (8.8%) (15.4%) (13.6%) (13.6%)

Armed 18 4 1 13 1 29 66 Services (8.0%) (12.9%) (3.6%) (12.7%) (7.7%) (8.6%) (9.0%)

Interior 18 2 0 5 0 19 44 (8.0%) (6.5%) (0.0%) (4.9%) (0.0%) (5.6%) (6.0%)

Merchant 6 1 1 5 0 10 23 Marine and (2.7%) (3.2%) (3.6%) (4.9%) (0.0%) (3.0%) (3.1%) Fisheries

Public 18 1 4 8 2 25 58 Works (8.0%) (3.2%) (14.3%) (7.8%) (15.4%) (7.4%) (7.9%)

Science, 4 0 0 4 0 6 14 Space and (1.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (3.9%) (0.0%) (1.8%) (1.9%) Technology

Small 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 Business (0.4%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.6%) (0.4%)

Veterans 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Affairs (0.4%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.1%) Totals for 94 15 14 44 5 137 309 Reelection (41.7%) (48.4%) (50.1%) (43%) (38.5%) (40.6%) (42%) Committees

District of 4 0 0 3 0 3 10 Columbia (1.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (2.9%) (0.0%) (0.9%) (1.4%)

Post Office 4 0 0 1 0 3 8 and Civil (1.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (1.0%) (0.0%) (0.9%) (1.1%) Service

154

Table C-1. Continued. Semi- Mostly Pure Pure Mostly Semi- Profess- Profess- Profess- Totals Amateur Amateur Amateur ional ional ional Totals for 8 0 0 4 0 6 18 Un-requested (3.6%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (3.9%) (0.0%) (1.8%) (2.5%) Committees

Total 225 31 28 102 13 337 736 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

Table C-2. Secondary committee assignments of amateurs and professionals with categorical breakdowns Semi- Mostly Pure Pure Mostly Semi- Profess- Profess- Profess- Amateur Amateur Amateur ional ional ional Totals Appropriation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 s (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)

Rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)

Ways and 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Means (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%)

Budget 1 0 1 1 0 4 7 (0.5%) (0.0%) (4.0%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (1.4%) (1.1%)

Total for 1 0 1 1 0 4 7 Prestige (0.5%) (0.0%) (4.0%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (1.4%) (1.1%) Committees

Banking 3 0 1 0 0 2 6 (1.5%) (0.0%) (4.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.7%) (0.9%)

Education 9 1 0 3 0 7 20 and Labor (4.5%) (4.8%) (0.0%) (3.3%) (0.0%) (2.4%) (3.1%)

Energy and 3 3 0 1 0 2 9 Commerce (1.5%) (14.3%) (0.0%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (0.7%) (1.4%)

Foreign 4 0 0 2 0 9 15 Affairs (2.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (2.2%) (0.0%) (3.1%) (2.3%)

Judiciary 7 0 1 5 0 15 28 (3.5%) (0.0%) (4.0%) (5.4%) (0.0%) (5.1%) (4.4%)

Government 14 2 1 11 1 29 58 Operations (7.0%) (9.5%) (4.0%) (12.0%) (9.1%) (9.9%) (9.0%)

155

Table C-2. Continued. Semi- Mostly Pure Pure Mostly Semi- Profess- Profess- Profess- Totals Amateur Amateur Amateur ional ional ional Total for 41 6 4 23 1 68 143 Policy (20.5%) (28.6%) (16.0%) (25.1%) (9.1%) (23.3%) (22.2%) Committees

Agriculture 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 (0.0%) (4.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.2%)

Armed 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 Services (0.5%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.3%)

Interior 7 1 2 1 2 17 30 (3.5%) (4.8%) (8.0%) (1.1%) (18.2%) (5.8%) (4.7%)

Merchant 8 1 4 14 2 25 54 Marine and (4.0%) (4.8%) (16.0%) (15.2%) (18.2%) (8.5%) (8.4%) Fisheries

Public Works 15 4 1 14 0 38 72 (7.5%) (19.0%) (4.0%) (15.2%) (0.0%) (12.9%) (11.2%)

Science, 40 0 7 10 2 51 110 Space and (20.1%) (0.0%) (28.0%) (10.9%) (18.2%) (17.3%) (17.1%) Technology

Small 37 2 3 19 2 42 105 Business (18.6%) (9.5%) (12.0%) (20.7%) (18.2%) (14.3%) (16.4%)

Veterans 32 3 3 7 0 33 78 Affairs (16.1%) (14.3%) (12.0%) (7.6%) (0.0%) (11.2%) (12.1%)

Total for 140 12 20 66 8 206 452 Reelection (70.3%) (57.2%) (80.0%) (71.8%) (72.8%) (70.0%) (70.4%) Committees

District of 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 Columbia (0.5%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.7%) (0.5%)

Post Office 8 0 1 2 2 10 23 and Civil (4.0%) (0.0%) (4.0%) (2.2%) (18.2%) (3.4%) (3.6%) Service

Standards of 0 1 0 0 0 5 6 Conduct (0.0%) (4.8%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (1.7%) (0.9%) Select 9 2 0 1 0 3 15 Committees (4.5%) (9.5%) (0.0%) (1.1%) (0.0%) (1.0%) (2.3%)

156

Table C-2. Continued. Semi- Mostly Pure Pure Mostly Semi- Profess- Profess- Profess- Totals Amateur Amateur Amateur ional ional ional Total for Un- 18 3 1 3 2 20 47 requested (9.0%) (14.3%) (4.0%) (3.3%) (18.2%) (6.8%) (7.3%) Committees

Total 199 21 25 92 11 294 642 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Jacob Straus graduated from the University of Florida with an M.A. in political science and from the University of Maryland, College Park with a B.A. in government and politics and a minor in Jewish studies. While in college, he worked as an intern in the offices of Congressman Bernie Sanders and for Senator Frank Lautenberg. He has also served as the Deputy Director of Conference Management for Envision EMI, and educational management and marketing organization, outside of Washington, D.C. In this position, he was responsible for selecting venues and negotiating contracts for youth leadership and career development programs run by the Congressional Youth Leadership

Council and the National Youth Leadership Forum. In the fall of 2006, he begins his career as Assistant Professor of Political Science at Frostburg State University in

Frostburg, Maryland.

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