Global Media and Communication

For Peer Review Keeping news alive in Venezuela”: Social media as tactical media

Journal: Global Media and Communication

Manuscript ID GMC-20-0066.R2

Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript

Keywords: Venezuela, Latin America, Social Media, tactical media

Venezuela leads Latin America with the largest number of imprisoned journalists and extreme government-led media censorship. Our in-depth interviews with 25 Venezuelan journalists reveal that assisting journalists to combat government control are social media and technology platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook and , which, in Venezuela, have moved beyond their ability to share and mobilize, and have become tactical media, the media of crisis criticism and opposition. Theoretically, this study extends our understanding of tactical media beyond the nature and function of such media to its implications and influences on the Abstract: practice of journalism in Venezuela. The tactical use of social media has created a space for participation and collaboration between and among journalists and citizens. As journalists from different media convene together in virtual newsrooms created on WhatsApp and other digital platforms, organizational boundaries of traditional and digital media melt away to create a journalism “not of competition but of cooperation”, where getting the story first is no longer important but ensuring that audiences have access to uncensored information is the driving motivation.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 “Keeping news alive in Venezuela”: Using social media as 7 8 tactical media 9 10 11 12 Abstract 13 14 15 Venezuela leads Latin America with the largest number of 16 imprisoned journalists and extreme government-led media 17 18 censorship. Our in-depth interviews with 25 Venezuelan 19 For Peer Review 20 journalists reveal that assisting journalists to combat 21 government control are social media and technology platforms 22 23 like WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, which, in Venezuela, have 24 25 moved beyond their ability to share and mobilize, and have 26 27 become tactical media, the media of crisis criticism and 28 opposition. Theoretically, this study extends our understanding 29 30 of tactical media beyond the nature and function of such media 31 32 to its implications and influences on the practice of journalism 33 in Venezuela. The tactical use of social media has created a 34 35 space for participation and collaboration between and among 36 37 journalists and citizens. As journalists from different media 38 convene together in virtual newsrooms created on WhatsApp and 39 40 other digital platforms, organizational boundaries of 41 42 traditional and digital media melt away to create a journalism 43 “not of competition but of cooperation”, where getting the story 44 45 first is no longer important but ensuring that audiences have 46 47 access to uncensored information is the driving motivation. 48 49 50 Key words: social media, tactical media, Venezuela, 51 52 censorship 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 2 of 39

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Introduction 18 19 The developmentFor of Peernews media Review in Latin America has been 20 21 deeply tied to the commercial interests of private 22 23 24 enterprises, much like in the (Martens, Vivares 25 26 and McChesney, 2014). However, in the case of Latin America, 27 28 tightly knit relations and collaborations between political 29 30 powers and private journalistic endeavors in the region have 31 32 33 allowed the state to yield tremendous influence over the media 34 35 (Waisbord, 2014; Guerrero and Márquez-Ramírez, 2014). This 36 37 aspect is important, for, in the early 2000s, Latin America saw 38 39 40 the rise of leaders like Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa 41 42 in Ecuador and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and, consequently, a 43 44 salient wave of media reforms. The ascent of these political 45 46 figures saw the transformation of State media into partisan 47 48 49 media, serving as their representatives and being accompanied by 50 51 an extreme suppression of independent or privately-owned media 52 53 (Boas, 2005; Lugo-Ocando, 2008). Among Latin American 54 55 governments, Venezuela's stands out for its role and strong 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 3 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 dominance in influencing media policy (Cañizález, 2014; Weisbrot 4 5 6 and Ruttenberg, 2010). 7 8 In Venezuela, as the country progressed to a deeply 9 10 authoritarian system of governance, under official mandates, 11 12 public media have either broadcast faithfully the governmental 13 14 15 point of view or reproduced the commercially motivated 16 17 programming of private media, ensuring that dissenting voices 18 19 find little to noFor space Peer(Cabrera, Review 2010). Today, while the 20 21 constitution of Venezuela guarantees freedom of speech and 22 23 24 expression in the country, press censorship is severe. As the 25 26 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) says, Venezuela leads 27 28 Latin America with the largest number of journalists jailed 29 30 because of their reportage (CPJ, 2018). As a result, Venezuela 31 32 33 ranked in the bottom quintile (143) in the 2018 World Press 34 35 Freedom Index. Chávez may no longer be in power, but those that 36 37 followed continue this legacy of press suppression. 38 39 40 As Reporters Without Borders (2018) states, “Venezuela’s 41 42 president since 2013, Nicolás Maduro does his utmost to silence 43 44 independent media outlets and keep news coverage under constant 45 46 control.” While media censorship and its effects on the practice 47 48 49 and profession of journalism receives important scholarly 50 51 attention, and excellent research focuses on state and media 52 53 connections in Latin America, Venezuela's situation remains 54 55 understudied. In a bid to address this lacuna, this paper delves 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 4 of 39

1 2 3 into the various approaches journalists use to negotiate the 4 5 6 procuring and dissemination of information as free from 7 8 government interference as possible and the importance of 9 10 digital tools in “keeping news alive” (Personal Interview, 2018) 11 12 in one of the most repressive regimes of the world. 13 14 15 State of the Venezuelan media 16 17 In 1952, Venezuela was the ninth country in the world to 18 19 acquire televisionsFor and Peerby 1982, Reviewnearly 85% homes had television 20 21 (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Even in the pre Chavismo period, 22 23 24 publishers and political parties had close relationships, with 25 26 journalists getting rewarded in return for favorable coverage 27 28 but the presence of independent columnists and writers ensured 29 30 that unbiased editorial views also found space (Coppedge, 1994). 31 32 33 Media in the country was initially extremely supportive of Hugo 34 35 Chavez and enthusiastically supported his candidature (Nelson, 36 37 2009). But when journalists began reporting on the failure of 38 39 40 Chavez policies (Nelson, 2009), Chavez began media crackdowns 41 42 where journalists were called out and insulted besides being 43 44 attacked (Dinges, 2005). In 2002, following the Venezuelan coup 45 46 d'état attempt, Chávez was removed from office, only to be 47 48 49 reinstated in 48 hours. Media may have supported this coup but 50 51 once Chávez came back to power, he consolidated pro government 52 53 and government media and “closed, browbeaten or infiltrated 54 55 almost every independent outlet (The Economist, 2013).” 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 5 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 First, the Chávez government passed the Law on Social 4 5 6 Responsibility of Radio and Television (2004) and unsuccessfully 7 8 pushed for the Special Law Against Media Crimes (2009), which 9 10 would allowed the government to prosecute media organizations if 11 12 it felt that they were disseminating information not “pursuant 13 14 15 to the provisions set forth in the Constitution of the 16 17 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and the laws and treaties, 18 19 agreements and conventionsFor Peer subscribed Review and ratified by the 20 21 Republic” (Microjuris.com, 2009; Martens, Vivares and McChesney, 22 23 24 2014). By 2010, the law was extended to internet and online 25 26 media and required media companies to “establish mechanisms to 27 28 restrict, without delay, the dissemination of messages (Fossett, 29 30 2014, p 2).” Then came the annulment of broadcast licenses for 31 32 33 radio and television stations and the denial of foreign currency 34 35 to purchase newsprint paper and broadcast equipment as ways to 36 37 stifle or altogether eliminate critical voices. Reporting 38 39 40 against the government was clearly dangerous and this led to a 41 42 proliferation of multiple pro-Chavista media outlets who 43 44 effectively drowned the different privately-owned, independent, 45 46 news media, thus, successfully ensuring little to no independent 47 48 49 coverage of the national situation. 50 51 After twenty years of relentless media censorship, out of 52 53 the four major privately-owned television stations, Televen and 54 55 Venevisión have been pressured into self-censorship since 2004, 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 6 of 39

1 2 3 Radio Caracas Televisión saw its concession revoked in 2007 and 4 5 6 the only 24-hours news station in the country was bought out by 7 8 pro-Chavista businessmen in 2013 (Reimí, 2020). 9 10 President Nicolas Maduro recently acquired El 11 12 Universal, Globovisión and Últimas Noticias, three of some of 13 14 15 the largest Venezuelan media organizations, immediately ensuring 16 17 an unsaid blanket ban on critical coverage (Puglie, 2020). As 18 19 the National SyndicateFor ofPeer Press WorkersReview of Venezuela reports, 20 21 during Nicolás Maduro's government, between 2013 and 2018, 22 23 24 115 media outlets have been shut down, including 41 print 25 26 organizations, 65 radio outlets and 9 television channels (Reimí, 27 28 2020). 29 30 31 32 Fighting repression via digital platforms 33 34 In situations of information precarity that refer to 35 36 unstable conditions preventing audiences from accessing unbiased 37 38 39 news in situations of war or harsh censorship, cell phones and 40 41 different technical platforms often prove to be important 42 43 resources, as the experiences of Syrian refugees in Jordan show 44 45 (Wall, Otis Campbell, & Janbek, 2017). In Venezuela, uncensored 46 47 48 information is scarce. What role can such technical developments 49 50 play in ensuring greater access to unbiased information? 51 52 Media censorship coupled with the economic collapse has 53 54 left many hungry for food and information (Nugent, 2019) and, in 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 7 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 a bid to combat this extreme censorship of traditional 4 5 6 mainstream media, there has been a growth of online media. The 7 8 internet, which the government, until recently, had only 9 10 partially controlled, is home to many online-only news sites or 11 12 streaming channels on YouTube, Instagram, or PeriscopeTV, a 13 14 15 popular steaming app. For example, Runrun.es, a new website 16 17 that uses citizen reporting as well as investigative reporting 18 19 was created on TwitterFor (Nafría,Peer 2018),Review following the ousting of 20 21 its creator, Nelson Bocaranda Sardi, from one of Venezuela’s 22 23 24 leading newspapers, El Universal, after the outlet was bought 25 26 out by unknown businessmen and radically changed its editorial 27 28 line. Sites like Prodavinci.com, started about five years ago, 29 30 have seen manifold increases in the number of visitors since the 31 32 33 government stepped up censorship of other media. Online media 34 35 like La Patilla and the satirical site Chiguire Bipolar, which 36 37 satirizes politicians (Minaya, 2014), are popular. As Al Jazeera 38 39 40 (Rendon & Kohan, 2020) has reported, sites like Efecto Cocuyo, 41 42 investigative websites like Poderopedia and Infocracia.org are 43 44 also a part of the digital media scenario in the country. 45 46 Armando.info, started in 2014, was awarded the Knight 47 48 49 International Journalism Award (2018) for their relentless 50 51 exposing of corruption surrounding the country’s CLAP program1 52 53 54 55 1 56 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Committees_for_Supply_and_Production 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 8 of 39

1 2 3 (Venezuelan state-run food aid program) (Wyss, 2018). Audiences 4 5 6 access banned sites either through VPN services, which the 7 8 government has now become savvy about closing, or though some of 9 10 the peer-to-peer solutions devised by the banned outlets to 11 12 circumvent censorship. comScore (2014) reported that Venezuela 13 14 15 added a greater number of internet users per capita than any 16 17 other Latin American country among visitors to online and social 18 19 media. Venezuela Forhas about Peer 19,155,423 Review Internet users (Internet 20 21 World Stats, 2017), which means that about 60.0% of the 22 23 24 population has some kind of access to internet. Besides news 25 26 sites, as National public Radio (2018) has reported, social 27 28 media “is a valuable source of information in a country that 29 30 censors all forms of traditional news media. It can be a 31 32 33 lifeline for those seeking help, and a form of protest — the 34 35 only way to speak truth to power (Garsd, 2018).” 36 37 Social media during crisis 38 39 40 Social media, today, is criticized for being overrun by 41 42 trolls and bots and a conduit of fake news, yet few question the 43 44 role of social media and its potential to make communication 45 46 more democratic (Hemsley, Jacobson, Gruzd and Mai, 2018). 47 48 49 Twitter and other social media platforms have become powerful 50 51 communication tools during different kinds of crises, political 52 53 or otherwise (Forelle, Howard, Monroy-Hernández, and Savage, 54 55 56 2015); where social media like Twitter can provide a “stitching 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 9 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 mechanism” (Hemsley, Jacobson, Gruzd, and Mai, 2018, p 2), 4 5 6 helping articulate human and technology-based networks where new 7 8 spaces of participation can be created; where journalists, 9 10 activists and citizens can connect to share news and information 11 12 (Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015). In conflict zones, such as Syria or 13 14 15 Yemen, where war has made daily reporting difficult, social 16 17 media and digital platforms like YouTube have ensured that eyewitness 18 19 testimony finds spaceFor and Peer enable Reviewjournalists’ access to stories from 20 21 22 the ground (Cockburn, 2011). As Whitten-Woodring & James (2012) 23 24 have shown, new media can very effectively lessen government 25 26 control over information flow and increase access to 27 28 communication. For example, in Syria, in the absence of strong 29 30 31 professional reportage, citizen journalists and activists have 32 33 used social media to create a “pop-up news ecology” which is “an 34 35 entirely new, oppositional news system” to report on the war and 36 37 38 situation of conflict in the region (Wall and Zahed 2015: 1). As 39 40 de Certeau (1984) has explained, in situations where professionals with access to information are 41 42 “already caught in the nets of discipline,” they must resort to clandestine “procedures and ruses” 43 44 45 through the use of “tactical and makeshift forms of creativity” (pp. xiv-xv). 46 47 Such tactical use of media in exigent circumstances is not 48 49 rare, though using social media as tactical media is relatively 50 51 new. The term tactical media rose to prominence in 1996 and 52 53 54 denotes a type of media use and activism that is often guerrilla 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 10 of 39

1 2 3 in nature and created purely as an intervention and, thus by 4 5 6 default, is less permanent than usual forms of mainstream or 7 8 alternative media (Garcia, and Lovink, 1997; Raley, 2009) which 9 10 usually involve more permanent forms of means of communication 11 12 like printed newspapers, magazines or art. As a form of media 13 14 15 intervention, whether they are digital platforms or traditional 16 17 media outlets, tactical media is not monolithic in character but 18 19 is a flexible modelFor that Peer can be easilyReview adapted to suit the 20 21 Tactical media and 22 culture and context within which it must operate. 23 24 alternative media may seem similar but, unlike alternative media, tactical media do not want to 25 26 create a better media per se; rather, they are responses and creations in time much like guerilla 27 28 campaigns designed to create awareness and provide a point of mobilization. Thus, 29 30 31 criticism against tactical media emphasizes this fleeting and 32 33 temporary nature; characterizing them as “ephemeral,” “hold[ing] 34 35 no ground of their own,” “disappear[ing] once they are 36 37 38 executed,” and “represent[ing] no particular politics or vision 39 40 of a desirable future” (Ray and Sholette, 2008, p 20). 41 42 Tactical media can be a form of digital interventionism and 43 44 this is generally a creative and subversive use of communication 45 46 47 technologies, though it can draw on all forms of media, whether 48 49 new or old, to push subversive politics and noncommercial goals 50 51 (Garcia, and Lovink, 1997; Raley, 2009). Thus, like other media 52 53 used as tactical media, social media platforms can be used as 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 11 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 products that exploit “moments of opportunity and possibility” 4 5 6 (Meikle, 2014, 121) and provide space for collaboration between 7 8 various groups and audiences and even those working both inside 9 10 and outside mainstream media (Garcia and Lovink, 1997); much 11 12 like the Syrian citizen journalists who use social media 13 14 15 channels to post material for their mainstream media 16 17 collaborators, creating, in the process, what is now known as 18 19 the Collaborative NewsFor Clip, where Peer traditional Review media organizations incorporate citizen 20 21 22 journalist produced work into mainstream content (Wall and Zahed 2015, 1). The 23 24 character of such uses of social media as tactical media is 25 26 also, thus, framed and created by collective and collaborative 27 28 efforts (Kavada, 2015). 29 30 31 In the area of journalism, while not every reporter is 32 33 convinced about the usefulness and value of social media 34 35 (Opgenhaffen and Scheerlinck, 2014), as traditional news 36 37 38 organizations are socially and commercially forced to adopt a 39 40 more participatory style of news (Lewis, 2012), journalists, at 41 42 least in the USA, are veering towards using social media 43 44 predominantly as information-gathering tools and much less to 45 46 47 interview sources or to validate information (Carlson, 2018; 48 49 Weaver and Willnat, 2016). In the Venezuelan context, the 50 51 production and use of online news sites and social media were 52 53 reactions and mechanisms to combat extreme state media 54 55 56 censorship. From 2016, news consumption on social media has 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 12 of 39

1 2 3 grown in Venezuela (Nalvarte, 2016). Facebook (70%) and WhatsApp 4 5 6 (53%) are the most popular platforms in the country followed by 7 8 Twitter (24%), according to a Statistica 2019 report. A June 9 10 2018 survey conducted by Consultores 21 (a well-known Venezuelan 11 12 consumer research agency) showed that are no longer 13 14 15 turning to television for news. Instead, social media (Twitter 16 17 and Facebook) as well as online news sites and peer-to-peer 18 19 networks (mainly ForWhatsApp) Peer seem toReview be the main sources of 20 21 information. But as Maduro faces intense pressure to step down 22 23 24 as president, social media is being heavily monitored and, as 25 26 Bloomberg (2019) reported, the government is “rolling internet 27 28 blackouts and gag orders that have largely stopped the free flow 29 30 of information.” Recent comparative analysis of journalists’ use 31 32 33 of social media and digital platforms in Latin American 34 35 countries like Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, , , 36 37 and Peru (Saldaña, Higgins Joyce, Schmitz Weiss, & Alves, 2017) have shown that 38 39 40 journalists use Twitter for sources and stories and are open to participatory journalism; however, 41 42 they mistrust political sources and the information they provide. Although the study stated that 43 44 journalists from different Latin American countries use social media in various ways, it did not 45 46 47 explicitly look at how such digital uses impact and influence the 48 49 practice and profession of journalism in Venezuela, especially 50 51 in times of such censorship. 52 53 In this light, this study seeks to understand: 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 13 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 RQ1: How does the use of digital and social media influence 4 5 6 the ways journalists in Venezuela work and function as 7 8 journalists? 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Methodology 16 17 This analysis draws upon 25 semi-structured in-depth 18 19 interviews with VenezuelanFor Peer journalists, Review from online as well as 20 21 traditional media, based in different cities and regions of 22 23 24 Venezuela, such as Caracas, Maracaibo, San Juan de los Morros 25 26 and others. The snowball sample technique (Browne, 2005) allowed 27 28 access to participants without organizational intervention or 29 30 influence on responses. While 12 of our sample were women, 13 31 32 33 were men. The journalists’ ages ranged from 25 to 78 years and 34 35 their media experience ranged from five years to 50 years in 36 37 various organizations like television, radio and print and web 38 39 40 portals. Our participants are a part of media like Runrun.es, 41 42 Efecto Cocuyo, Poderopedia and Infocracia.org as well as other 43 44 mainstream news channels. Five of our interviewees worked 45 46 exclusively for online media. 12 participants had worked for 47 48 49 pro-government outlets and five said they work for media that 50 51 “toes the government line.” Interviews were conducted entirely 52 53 in Spanish, over phone and Skype, from October 2018 to March 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 14 of 39

1 2 3 2019. The length of the interviews ranged from 25 to 120 4 5 6 minutes. 7 8 Our primary motive was to examine how the use of digital and social 9 10 media influenced the ways journalists in Venezuela work and function as journalists. Our 11 12 13 questionnaire was adapted from the surveys done by the Pew 14 15 Research Center for the People and the Press and the Columbia 16 17 Journalism Review in 2002 that lend insight into self-censorship 18 19 in journalism as Forwell as Peer recent studiesReview by organizations such 20 21 22 as Freedom House (Freedom of the Press, 2017) and Human Rights 23 24 Watch (World Report. 2017). A series of open-ended questions, 25 26 asking about their typical routines, organization support, ways 27 28 they used social media, the kinds of censorship they faced, and 29 30 31 the value of digital media in their work were asked. McCracken’s 32 33 (1988, 85) long interview technique, which allows researchers to 34 35 “step into the mind of another person, to see and experience the 36 37 38 world as they do themselves,” was used and journalists were 39 40 asked to explain and describe the situations they referred to 41 42 for our understanding. Each interview, considered a unit of analysis, was translated 43 44 and transcribed by the authors. Our theoretical framework and research questions guided the 45 46 47 classification of the data which were coded into categories by grouping together and comparing 48 49 interrelated ideas (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2011), and reviewed multiple times, 50 51 by the two authors, for critical understanding and to find latent and manifest meaning. 52 Given 53 54 the Venezuelan situation, participants only granted permission to audio-record 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 15 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 interviews. All identifying information has been removed as per 4 5 6 IRB requirements. It was very important to keep the identities 7 8 of the journalists anonymous to protect them from any 9 10 repercussion. Our sample size is small (25 participants), and 11 12 this is an acknowledged weakness. But as studies (Chadha & 13 14 15 Steiner, 2015) have shown, a participant pool of 10 is 16 17 sufficient to go beyond the anecdotal and “investigate in detail 18 19 the relationship Forbetween Peer the individual Review and the situation” 20 21 (Plas, Kvale, & Kvale, 1996, p 20). 22 23 24 Results 25 26 As our interviews emphasize, in Venezuela, social media and 27 28 digital media play a “huge role” for journalists (Personal 29 30 Interview, 2018), representing one of the main means through 31 32 33 which journalists can inform and seek out information. Digital 34 35 media and online news are means to combat the restrictions 36 37 placed on newsprint to prevent circulation as well as a chance 38 39 40 to combat the government narrative. As our participants said, 41 42 Twitter is used mainly to connect directly with sources 43 44 (particularly, political sources), while Instagram is used as a 45 46 source for images and videos to accompany multimedia stories. 47 48 49 What stood out was the use of WhatsApp. Quotes, representative of most of the 50 51 responses, have been used below to facilitate a critical understanding of the categories and data 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 16 of 39

1 2 3 interpretation. These and other themes as highlighted by the 4 5 6 journalists interviewed are elucidated below. 7 8 Social media: Important means of information 9 10 Our participants overwhelmingly agreed that social and 11 12 digital media was “keeping news alive in Venezuela” (Personal 13 14 15 interview, 2018). As one participant with 11 years of experience 16 17 (print and online media), noted: 18 19 Social Formedia inPeer Venezuela Review have become the crucial means 20 21 22 through which citizens are informed… Venezuelans are heavy 23 24 users of Twitter and the.... media will be tweeting out the 25 26 minute-by-minute of what’s going on, on what’s being said, 27 28 while - in other countries - tweets are more spaced apart. 29 30 31 (2018). 32 33 Journalists themselves turn to newly formed digital media for 34 35 information. As one participant, said: 36 37 “New media such as Efecto Cocuyo or El Pitazo, provide food 38 39 40 for thought…. because of the focus they put on the information, 41 42 they don’t simply stay with publishing the politician’s quotes” 43 44 (2018). 45 46 A significant number of our participants said that 47 48 49 censorship and an ability to independently publish stories on 50 51 social media has encouraged the questioning of certain basic 52 53 professional norms. As one participant (with print and online 54 55 56 experience) explained: 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 17 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 “If you’re working for an outlet, the information that you 4 5 6 have is supposed to be for that outlet… but in situations of 7 8 censorship, those standards are not as important and you prioritize 9 10 broadcasting the information, even if that can result in problems 11 12 later on” (2018). 13 14 15 Despite all the restrictions to freedom of expression in the 16 17 country, most participants said that journalists revel in the 18 19 freedom offered online,For Peereven if thisReview came with limitations. As an 20 21 interviewed television journalist said, they do not even use a 22 23 24 pseudonym online: 25 26 “I’ll post my opinions whenever it is that I feel them and 27 28 that’s about it… to say more things than I might be allowed to 29 30 otherwise because of the station’s editorial line” (2018). 31 32 33 While social media is useful to produce and publish news that 34 35 do not find space elsewhere, as one participant with 12 years of 36 37 traditional media experience said, “if you are too loud and smoky, 38 39 40 the political police will come looking for you” (2018). There is 41 42 also a sense that the government (who controls the telephone 43 44 monopoly) has introduced distortions in the availability of 45 46 Internet whenever things get heated, many times blocking access to 47 48 49 sites altogether. As our participants introspected, given the 50 51 particularities of the Venezuelan situation, social media use and 52 53 digital platforms grew at an astounding pace, filling in the void 54 55 left behind by the absence of mainstream media amidst the high 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 18 of 39

1 2 3 volatility of the political process. This, in turn, produced a 4 5 6 chaotic adoption of social media, causing these spaces to develop 7 8 as information centers, using a combination of opinions, 9 10 information and personal topics. Perhaps, as one participant said, 11 12 because of this abrupt explosion, social media has become so 13 14 15 central in the dissemination of information in Venezuela, “a place 16 17 they hold now more than ever, representing a platform for the 18 19 discussion and formationFor Peer of public Review opinion in the country” (2018). 20 21 As another respondent said, the relative freedom provided by social 22 23 24 media finds in their haphazard adoption and growth in Venezuela 25 26 “somewhat of a problematic perception, as it is still unclear what 27 28 kind of spaces they really are” (2018). There is no editorial 29 30 control and journalists post about “real situations on the ground” 31 32 33 (2018) prompting one participant to ponder, “is every news fact 34 35 checked?” (2018). 36 37 Use of digital and social media 38 39 40 A significant number of participants said that journalists 41 42 use social and digital media in a variety of ways to combat state 43 44 suppression. The one theme that echoed in every respondent 45 46 interview was that “social media and digital tools have had very 47 48 49 far reaching effects on the profession and practice of journalism 50 51 in the country” (2018). Our interviewees agreed that such tools 52 53 not only gave them an outlet for news but helped them create 54 55 “virtual newsrooms” and coordinate information among themselves in 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 19 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 ways that could not have been conceived without this digital 4 5 6 assistance. Social media and digital platforms “…have become a 7 8 fundamental means of communication for journalists (in Venezuela) 9 10 ... you have no idea how many groups of journalists there are” 11 12 (2018), as one respondent pointed out. 13 14 15 Virtual newsrooms 16 17 In regard to the widespread adoption and use of WhatsApp and 18 19 (a messengerFor system) Peer among Review Venezuelan journalists, as one 20 21 participant (with 25 years of both print and digital experience) 22 23 24 said, the platforms operated not just as a source of information, 25 26 but also as virtual newsrooms. They explained: 27 28 “If there’s something Chavismo has been tremendously 29 30 effective in doing is the dismembering of the newsrooms [...] the 31 32 33 exchange (of information) suffered and so did the analysis. 34 35 Deliberate or not, but making journalists go out and work as 36 37 freelancers - at least those of my generation - was a 38 39 40 communicational success for Chavismo because it did away with that 41 42 structure of analysis [...] which has been somewhat recovered 43 44 through the use of WhatsApp and Telegram channels” (2018). 45 46 As our interviews show, WhatsApp groups function as those 47 48 49 spaces where information is shared and contrasted, news analyzed, 50 51 and sources crosschecked. Groups are often created in response to 52 53 events where journalists, hungry for information, share and 54 55 exchange the little official voices they can find access to and 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 20 of 39

1 2 3 post about situations as they unfold. As one journalist with 11 4 5 6 years of digital and traditional media experience said: 7 8 “… the groups serve to share information and, sometimes, to 9 10 vent and release some steam about this entire situation. They help 11 12 coordinate coverage among journalists and alert other colleagues 13 14 15 when street protests turn dangerous, providing up-to-the-minute 16 17 information regarding what routes are safe” (2018). 18 19 These WhatsAppFor groups Peer also operateReview as co-working nonprofits 20 21 and, as one participant explained, they serve to distribute 22 23 24 important news and information in a coordinated manner, such 25 26 that it is impossible for the government to crack down on select 27 28 journalists. By distributing the responsibility of publishing 29 30 something big, outlets are able to band together and break 31 32 33 through censorship in “Fuenteovejuna style journalism dynamics” 34 35 (2018), referencing the early 17th century play by Lope de Vega 36 37 in which villagers of a Castilian town commit a crime but escape 38 39 40 punishment by diluting the blame among the entire township. The 41 42 term has been broadened and applied to situations in which no 43 44 particular actor(s) can be clearly held responsible for an 45 46 action that would carry some form of individual penalty. As 47 48 49 such, the blame is diluted among all of the involved actors, 50 51 without the possibility of any of them being punished for it. 52 53 Public information system 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 21 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 Besides virtual newsrooms, social media platforms like 4 5 6 WhatsApp help journalists create information distribution systems 7 8 for journalists and the public. As one participant said, “The case 9 10 of ‘El Pitazo’ is quite something… they’re distributing some ‘noti- 11 12 audios’ (voice notes) via WhatsApp, especially to combat 13 14 15 misinformation perpetuated by the government” (2018). Our 16 17 participants highlighted how this was done during the 2017 protests 18 19 when different For opposition Peer leaders Review were arrested, and the 20 21 government refused to resolve the situation. Various well-known 22 23 24 journalists set up a WhatsApp group called the Public Information 25 26 System - an information system that sought to minimize or 27 28 altogether eliminate the rumors that were being spread around on 29 30 They sourced and curated other journalists' work and played various editorial 31 social media. 32 33 functions. This initiative has distributed independent reports over 34 35 WhatsApp whenever there are tumultuous events and provide 36 37 38 journalists with verifiable information that each one could then 39 40 forward to their own (non-journalistic) contacts. Although this 41 42 initiative was created during the 2017 street protests, it 43 44 continues to operate. Different web portals also distribute 45 46 47 articles via WhatsApp and other forms of social media, breaking 48 49 them down into Twitter threads, creating visual pieces that 50 51 highlight quotes from the articles, and even turning to printing 52 53 out materials based on their articles and distributing them among 54 55 56 users, schools, and NGOs. 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 22 of 39

1 2 3 Incorporating citizen media 4 5 6 The rise of such platforms has also encouraged the use of 7 8 citizen reports and media in reporting. As our interviews show, 9 10 reduced reporting staff at mainstream media has meant that staff 11 12 stationed in the capital, Caracas, rely on citizen-produced images 13 14 15 and information to learn about what is going on in the provinces. 16 17 These citizen reports are often the initial reports that show 18 19 journalists issuesFor that Peerneed coverage. Review Some digital outlets also 20 21 hold citizen journalist training workshops and later, these 22 23 24 trained citizen journalists function both as reporters in their 25 26 own communities and as distributors of the various WhatsApp 27 28 ‘products’ the portal puts out. Each of these distributors is asked 29 30 to post the portal’s contents to their list of contacts, thus, 31 32 33 greatly increasing the overall reach. But the fear of government 34 35 reprisal is real. As one participant said: 36 37 “I'm afraid, certainly... as a safety measure, I'll erase all 38 39 40 of my WhatsApp chats once or twice a week.” (2018). 41 42 WhatsApp groups immediately remove members who are arrested, 43 44 only to re-invite them, if and when they are returned to freedom 45 46 since, as our respondents emphasized, the phone is the first thing 47 48 49 taken when journalists are arrested. 50 51 Journalist ‘cartel’ 52 53 Digital media is sustaining investigative journalism in the 54 55 country. Our sample of journalists interviewed often referred to 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 23 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 the Armando.info site, which was blocked after being sued by 4 5 2 6 Alex Saab , the prime beneficiary of a massive corruption scheme 7 8 around the CLAP program to emphasize the kind of reporting that 9 10 was available on these sites and their importance in conveying 11 12 Venezuelan ground reality. 13 14 15 As one respondent said: 16 17 “…. journalists have collaborated in getting the 18 19 information out toFor the publicPeer and Review social media is an important 20 21 means of doing this. They (armando.info) ran another story about 22 23 24 Alex Saab and a large number of websites got together to publish 25 26 the report simultaneously... although armando.info was running 27 28 it, we cartelized to continue working and stand united in 29 30 pushing back against people not receiving the information” 31 32 33 (2018). 34 35 Collaborating through these groups also allows them to 36 37 increase their access to information, as individual access is 38 39 40 compounded into a shared wealth of knowledge of what’s going on 41 42 in the country. As one participant explained, there are plenty 43 44 of internal debates, therefore, allowing for a multiplicity of 45 46 approaches. The use of WhatsApp to verify information is seen as 47 48 49 a crucial step for journalists in Venezuela, for contrasting 50 51 information via peer-to-peer networks allows journalists to 52 53 54 55 2 56 https://www.csis.org/analysis/corruption-venezuela-alex-saab-case 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 24 of 39

1 2 3 somewhat break the information opacity imposed by the 4 5 6 government. 7 8 These virtual newsrooms make journalists hopeful about the 9 10 future of Venezuelan journalism. However, in terms of the larger 11 12 public, there are important barriers to viewing these as all- 13 14 15 encompassing solutions to censorship. Journalists valued social 16 17 media, but they were also aware of certain crucial issues. As 18 19 one participant stated,For Peer“The problem Review with WhatsApp and Telegram 20 21 is that they only reach a certain segment of the population… 22 23 24 there’s another segment (of the population), I’d dare say half 25 26 of Venezuelans, who are solely consuming the information or 27 28 propaganda being put out by the government” (2018). 29 30 Our participants agreed that, even while understanding the 31 32 33 value these spaces have, the cumbersome process entailed by all 34 35 the workarounds required certainly limits their usefulness. One 36 37 participant described how, even though these are important 38 39 40 mechanisms to skirt around government actions that limit access 41 42 to information, the added work that is required draws from their 43 44 daily activities, thus, underlining that - one way or another - 45 46 censorship ends up altering their everyday practices, both as a 47 48 49 citizen and as a journalist. Furthermore, it is clear to them 50 51 that no matter how hard they try to circumvent government 52 53 censorship, it is nearly impossible to entirely escape the 54 55 complex network of measures that limit freedom of information in 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 25 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 Venezuela. For example, in a prior job, when they weren’t 4 5 6 allowed to publish certain news or information, they would post 7 8 to their social media accounts, directing readers to visit other 9 10 outlets where the information was being published. In time, they 11 12 became increasingly fearful, in part, because there were office 13 14 15 rumors that the newsroom had been bugged (2018). 16 17 The emergence of digital media in Venezuela has also altered 18 19 the way in whichFor stories Peer are decidedReview upon or assigned. Unlike 20 21 traditional media, these recently formed digital outlets 22 23 24 commission pieces from freelance journalists. As one participant 25 26 said, “They clearly lay out the focus of the story and that gives 27 28 me the chance to accept or reject a specific assignment” (2018). 29 30 Once an assignment is offered, the outlet runs the story. This 31 32 33 change also reduces the frictions that could arise from the dynamic 34 35 of having journalists pitch ideas only to find, later on, that 36 37 they won’t be run due to censorship or pressure from groups in 38 39 40 power. 41 42 Journalism of cooperation 43 44 Although there is no clear policy in regard to censorship of 45 46 web portals in Venezuela, our respondents referred to what is known 47 48 49 as a ‘selective blocking strategy’ - which is enforced by both 50 51 CANTV (the State-owned telephone monopoly) and the private 52 53 carriers who are compelled to do so via legal instruments. This 54 55 ‘selective strategy,’ our interviewees pointed out, meant that 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 26 of 39

1 2 3 some sites will be blocked on some days, while made accessible on 4 5 6 others, making it extremely difficult to document this type of 7 8 censorship, which the government usually attributes to network or 9 10 server problems. 11 12 In this atmosphere of extreme censorship, WhatsApp groups and 13 14 15 social media provide safe spaces for journalists to produce news, 16 17 exchange and verify information. However, this has also done away 18 19 with the idea ofFor ‘scoops’, Peer thereby, Review fostering a journalism of 20 21 cooperation rather than one of competition, where getting facts 22 23 24 rights and out to the public are the main motivations (“Whoever 25 26 can say it, have them say it.”). As one journalist with over 20 27 28 years of media experience said: 29 30 “In Venezuela, the way you cover a story has changed… it’s 31 32 33 no longer about seeking to have the scoop, but rather as ‘let’s 34 35 all go together to cover this story’ more like a mechanism to 36 37 protect ourselves, because if there’s 10 journalists it’s better 38 39 40 than if there’s only one… at least, one of them will be able to 41 42 inform that the others have been detained” (2018). 43 44 Again, as previously seen, the interviewed journalists were 45 46 not blind to the drawbacks of digital media platforms. As one 47 48 49 participant pointed out, these WhatsApp groups run the risk of 50 51 resembling what was formerly known as the reporters’ pools, 52 53 where different reporters from different outlets got together to 54 55 share information, leading to similar headlines across competing 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 27 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 media. They also feared the misuse of these groups. They 4 5 3 6 recalled an incident when a journalist had uncovered Odebrecht’s 7 8 (Latin American construction giant) payment of $15 million 9 10 dollars to then-opposition candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski4 11 12 and other colleagues exerted pressure for them not to publish 13 14 15 the reportage, as it ‘debilitated the democratic cause’. 16 17 Something like this, they say, is completely contrary to what 18 19 journalism is. ButFor these Peer groups, Reviewas they point out, also lead to 20 21 discussions on ethics and implications of coverage and that they 22 23 24 think this is “good, because if there was one thing that wasn’t 25 26 done in Venezuelan newsrooms, it was talking about journalism” 27 28 (2018). Another participant emphasized that the amount of fake 29 30 news that are distributed through these platforms, mainly 31 32 33 through voice notes claiming to have direct evidence of things 34 35 that are simply false or outright factually incorrect, is a 36 37 menace (2018). 38 39 40 As government censorship expands to the internet and online 41 42 media, independent media in Venezuela, said two participants, have 43 44 resorted to going offline in order to distribute information to 45 46 the population. As one respondent said, “we have that capacity to 47 48 49 be resilient - which is something, I think, all Venezuelans have 50 51 52 53 3 54 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-39194395 4 55 One of the leading opposition politicians. Presidential candidate for the opposition who ran against Chávez and 56 Maduro, losing to both of them in questionable elections. 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 28 of 39

1 2 3 nowadays - so if they close a door, we’ll climb in through a 4 5 6 window.” (2018) 7 8 Discussion 9 10 Our in-depth interviews with 25 journalists reveal that 11 12 social media has certainly emerged as tactical media where 13 14 15 “tactical and makeshift of creativity” (de Certeau, 1984; pp. 16 17 xiv-xv) of such social and digital platforms by journalists have 18 19 deeply influencedFor the way Peer professional Review journalism is being 20 21 practiced in the country. Theoretically, this study extends our 22 23 24 understanding of tactical media beyond the nature and function 25 26 of such media to its implications and influences on the practice 27 28 of journalism in Venezuela. Censorship in Venezuela has 29 30 encouraged media to move to spaces where government censorship 31 32 33 is slow to reach. While the Maduro administration has continued 34 35 Chávez’s keen use of social media to increase their sphere of 36 37 influence, while blocking news sites that dare publish 38 39 40 unfavorable coverage, social media platforms have emerged as 41 42 major collaborative spaces to encourage the sharing of news and 43 44 information, effectively melting organizational boundaries. 45 46 Tactical media is about collaboration and working together on 47 48 49 digital platforms has transformed the competitive nature of the 50 51 profession in Venezuela, creating a journalism “not of 52 53 competition but of cooperation” (Personal Interview, 2018), 54 55 where getting the story first is no longer important but 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 29 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 ensuring that audiences have timely access to the right 4 5 6 information is the driving motivation. Mounting government 7 8 pressures, closures and purchases of mainstream media outlets 9 10 have prompted the creation of online spaces for journalists, 11 12 which enable the production of information, “relatively free” 13 14 15 (Personal Interview, 2018) of government interference. More 16 17 importantly, these outlets distribute “something big” (2018), 18 19 major news, in a Forcoordinated Peer manner, Review making it harder for the 20 21 government to crack down on individual journalists. This 22 23 24 dynamic, which one of the interviewees referred to as 25 26 “Fuenteovejuna style journalism” (2018), enables them to band 27 28 together and break through censorship. 29 30 While the bid to combat censorship has encouraged a 31 32 33 journalism of collaboration, we see that with social media, it 34 35 has also brought forth a journalism of participation where 36 37 citizen reports on social media help journalists find stories on 38 39 40 the ground. Media too has realized the value of citizen reports 41 42 and, in some cases, citizen reporters are also being trained to 43 44 find and distribute news. 45 46 Social media and technology platforms like WhatsApp, 47 48 49 Facebook and Twitter, have moved beyond their ability to share 50 51 and mobilize, and have become embodied actors in the fight to 52 53 produce free and unbiased information and have emerged as the 54 55 media of crisis criticism and opposition. Although there are 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 30 of 39

1 2 3 recent examples of the tactical use of social media in Syria, 4 5 6 especially with the idea of the pop-up newsroom, such uses in 7 8 journalistic practice and in Venezuela, in particular, remain 9 10 relatively unexplored. In Venezuela, journalists have emerged as 11 12 tactical media creators, using social media and platforms like 13 14 15 WhatsApp to not only broadcast news but also create virtual 16 17 newsrooms where news are fact checked and discussed and issues 18 19 debated. These spacesFor are Peer also safe Review zones where journalists are 20 21 informed about arrests and unsafe situations. Groups formed by 22 23 24 journalists in Venezuela on this peer-to-peer network operate as 25 26 “co-working nonprofits”(Personal Interview, 2019), functioning 27 28 as newsrooms where journalists share tips or information, trying 29 30 to contrast it with their peers. 31 32 33 Even though such tactical media have been described as 34 35 “ephemeral,” “hold[ing] no ground of their own,” “disappear[ing] 36 37 once they are executed,” and “represent[ing] no particular 38 39 40 politics or vision of a desirable future” (Ray and Sholette, 41 42 2008), the tactical nature of social media use in Venezuela – 43 44 especially virtual newsrooms and the Public Information System 45 46 on WhatsApp – have lasted, helping many independent online 47 48 49 sites to distribute large parts of their content through social 50 51 media, thus ensuring that “News in Venezuela aren't dying” 52 53 (Personal Interview, 2018). They not only represent but also are 54 55 creations of a vision for independent media. Born in situations 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 31 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 of extreme censorship that has lasted years, these newsrooms and 4 5 6 groups are certainly more permanent than other examples of 7 8 tactical media. Social media and digital platforms in Venezuela 9 10 are subversive tactical digital interventions; they protect 11 12 information from censorship and ensure that different voices are 13 14 15 included in the new media environment. They certainly exploit 16 17 “opportunity and possibility” (Meikle, 2014, 121), using groups 18 19 to inform each otherFor about Peer arrests, Review interventions and stories; 20 21 in the process gathering journalists together for collective 22 23 24 action and creating stronger connective logics that ensure 25 26 sustained participation. Arrested journalists are removed from 27 28 groups, although the groups also serve as points of contact to 29 30 ensure that persecuted reporters are helped. While social and 31 32 33 digital platforms may have emerged as tactical media, they are 34 35 also influencing the way journalism works in the country. 36 37 WhatsApp groups often serve as an important “stitching 38 39 40 mechanism” (Hemsley, Jacobson, Gruzd, and Mai, 2018, pg 2), 41 42 where within a context of extreme suppression and information 43 44 opacity, it provides information in Venezuela, for citizens and 45 46 journalists alike, both in terms of having access to public 47 48 49 figures as well as incorporating citizen journalism into their 50 51 work. Social media is crucial, say the interviewed journalists, 52 53 especially given the prevalence of government propaganda in 54 55 mainstream media and the opacity and unavailability of official 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 32 of 39

1 2 3 information. Journalists “caught in the nets of discipline” (de Certeau,1984), in 4 5 6 danger of being censored, are creatively using new media, to weaken government authority over 7 8 information flows (Whitten-Woodring & James, 2012). While Facebook is 9 10 the most popular medium, for journalists WhatsApp and Twitter 11 12 13 are the most useful. 14 15 Social and digital platforms, like tactical media in general, has not changed the nature of 16 17 mainstream media but, unlike tactical media used elsewhere, they are certainly emerging as 18 19 strong alternative contenders.For They Peer are also ushering Review in a journalism where discussions of news, 20 21 22 values and ethics are important. As one participant said, “…one thing that wasn’t 23 24 done in Venezuelan newsrooms, was talking about journalism” 25 26 (2018). But as our participants reported, while they may have 27 28 29 been successful in containing the effects of censorship, self- 30 31 censorship often prevents them from participating more actively. 32 33 For example, journalists frequently wipe clean their WhatsApp 34 35 chats to avoid exposing sources in case they are arrested. While 36 37 38 journalists effectively use digital media platforms to cartelize 39 40 a story as the Armando.info example showed, they are also very 41 42 aware that circumventing government censorship can often prove 43 44 45 to be impossible and that “if you are too loud and smoky, the 46 47 political police will come looking for you” (2018). 48 49 Since news and information distribution and creation 50 51 52 developed amidst a state of emergency leading to the chaotic 53 54 growth and adoption of such mechanisms, journalists were very 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 33 of 39 Global Media and Communication

1 2 3 aware that in spite of these platforms emerging as media 4 5 6 ecosystems where public opinion could be created and 7 8 incorporated into the news, they were also contested spaces. 9 10 There was little editorial control and not all facts were always 11 12 checked. Journalists are also aware this a flawed medium where 13 14 15 fake news and misinformation abound and where echo chambers may 16 17 be easily created. Journalists erase conversations, for fear 18 19 that, if arrested,For their Peer phones mightReview reveal sensitive 20 21 information. 22 23 24 While social media may have opened up new journalistic 25 26 spaces, practicing journalism in situations of such extreme 27 28 repression where fear of government reprisal is ever-present is 29 30 exhausting. 31 32 33 While our analysis sheds light on the digital practices and 34 35 social media use among journalists, our sample size does not 36 37 allow for generalization of results. Also, certain important 38 39 40 questions remain unanswered. How does this exhaustion of 41 42 dealing with censorship both as citizens and as journalists 43 44 influence the profession? While, for now, social media is an 45 46 active enabler, helping find and distribute information, as 47 48 49 censorship expands into this area, how will journalists reprise 50 51 their use of platforms? While this research is focused on the 52 53 implications of government censorship on the practice and 54 55 profession of journalism in the country, we do not explore, in 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 34 of 39

1 2 3 depth, the important issue of self-censorship among journalists. 4 5 6 How does self-censorship govern norms of participation? These 7 8 are important questions that invite further investigation, 9 10 especially in the Venezuelan context. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 For Peer Review 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 References 31 32 Boas, T.C., (2005). Television and neopopulism in Latin 33 America: Media effects in Brazil and Peru. Latin American 34 research review, pp.27-49. 35 Browne, K. (2005). Snowball sampling: using social networks 36 to research non‐heterosexual women. International journal of 37 social research methodology, 8(1), 47-60. 38 39 Cabrera, S. (2010). 'The informative agenda of Venezuelan 40 television during the coup d'etat of April 2002. An analysis 41 under the informative dimension of the Agenda Setting 42 process.' Unpublished Doctorate Thesis (Germany: Rostock 43 University). 44 Cañizález, A., (2014). The state in pursuit of hegemony 45 over the media: The Chávez model. In Media Systems and 46 Communication Policies in Latin America (pp. 157-177). Palgrave 47 48 Macmillan, London. 49 Carlson, M. (2018). Facebook in the news: Social media, 50 journalism, and public responsibility following the 2016 51 trending topics controversy. Digital journalism, 6(1), 4-20. 52 Chadha, K., & Steiner, L. (2015). The potential and 53 limitations of citizen journalism initiatives: Chhattisgarh’s 54 CGNet Swara. Journalism Studies, 16(5), 706-718. 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 35 of 39 Global Media and Communication

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