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For Peer Review Keeping News Alive in Venezuela”: Social Media As Tactical Media Global Media and Communication For Peer Review Keeping news alive in Venezuela”: Social media as tactical media Journal: Global Media and Communication Manuscript ID GMC-20-0066.R2 Manuscript Type: Original Manuscript Keywords: Venezuela, Latin America, Social Media, tactical media Venezuela leads Latin America with the largest number of imprisoned journalists and extreme government-led media censorship. Our in-depth interviews with 25 Venezuelan journalists reveal that assisting journalists to combat government control are social media and technology platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, which, in Venezuela, have moved beyond their ability to share and mobilize, and have become tactical media, the media of crisis criticism and opposition. Theoretically, this study extends our understanding of tactical media beyond the nature and function of such media to its implications and influences on the Abstract: practice of journalism in Venezuela. The tactical use of social media has created a space for participation and collaboration between and among journalists and citizens. As journalists from different media convene together in virtual newsrooms created on WhatsApp and other digital platforms, organizational boundaries of traditional and digital media melt away to create a journalism “not of competition but of cooperation”, where getting the story first is no longer important but ensuring that audiences have access to uncensored information is the driving motivation. https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 1 of 39 Global Media and Communication 1 2 3 4 5 6 “Keeping news alive in Venezuela”: Using social media as 7 8 tactical media 9 10 11 12 Abstract 13 14 15 Venezuela leads Latin America with the largest number of 16 imprisoned journalists and extreme government-led media 17 18 censorship. Our in-depth interviews with 25 Venezuelan 19 For Peer Review 20 journalists reveal that assisting journalists to combat 21 government control are social media and technology platforms 22 23 like WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter, which, in Venezuela, have 24 25 moved beyond their ability to share and mobilize, and have 26 27 become tactical media, the media of crisis criticism and 28 opposition. Theoretically, this study extends our understanding 29 30 of tactical media beyond the nature and function of such media 31 32 to its implications and influences on the practice of journalism 33 in Venezuela. The tactical use of social media has created a 34 35 space for participation and collaboration between and among 36 37 journalists and citizens. As journalists from different media 38 convene together in virtual newsrooms created on WhatsApp and 39 40 other digital platforms, organizational boundaries of 41 42 traditional and digital media melt away to create a journalism 43 “not of competition but of cooperation”, where getting the story 44 45 first is no longer important but ensuring that audiences have 46 47 access to uncensored information is the driving motivation. 48 49 50 Key words: social media, tactical media, Venezuela, 51 52 censorship 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 2 of 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Introduction 18 19 The developmentFor of Peernews media Review in Latin America has been 20 21 deeply tied to the commercial interests of private 22 23 24 enterprises, much like in the United States (Martens, Vivares 25 26 and McChesney, 2014). However, in the case of Latin America, 27 28 tightly knit relations and collaborations between political 29 30 powers and private journalistic endeavors in the region have 31 32 33 allowed the state to yield tremendous influence over the media 34 35 (Waisbord, 2014; Guerrero and Márquez-Ramírez, 2014). This 36 37 aspect is important, for, in the early 2000s, Latin America saw 38 39 40 the rise of leaders like Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa 41 42 in Ecuador and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and, consequently, a 43 44 salient wave of media reforms. The ascent of these political 45 46 figures saw the transformation of State media into partisan 47 48 49 media, serving as their representatives and being accompanied by 50 51 an extreme suppression of independent or privately-owned media 52 53 (Boas, 2005; Lugo-Ocando, 2008). Among Latin American 54 55 governments, Venezuela's stands out for its role and strong 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 3 of 39 Global Media and Communication 1 2 3 dominance in influencing media policy (Cañizález, 2014; Weisbrot 4 5 6 and Ruttenberg, 2010). 7 8 In Venezuela, as the country progressed to a deeply 9 10 authoritarian system of governance, under official mandates, 11 12 public media have either broadcast faithfully the governmental 13 14 15 point of view or reproduced the commercially motivated 16 17 programming of private media, ensuring that dissenting voices 18 19 find little to noFor space Peer(Cabrera, Review 2010). Today, while the 20 21 constitution of Venezuela guarantees freedom of speech and 22 23 24 expression in the country, press censorship is severe. As the 25 26 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) says, Venezuela leads 27 28 Latin America with the largest number of journalists jailed 29 30 because of their reportage (CPJ, 2018). As a result, Venezuela 31 32 33 ranked in the bottom quintile (143) in the 2018 World Press 34 35 Freedom Index. Chávez may no longer be in power, but those that 36 37 followed continue this legacy of press suppression. 38 39 40 As Reporters Without Borders (2018) states, “Venezuela’s 41 42 president since 2013, Nicolás Maduro does his utmost to silence 43 44 independent media outlets and keep news coverage under constant 45 46 control.” While media censorship and its effects on the practice 47 48 49 and profession of journalism receives important scholarly 50 51 attention, and excellent research focuses on state and media 52 53 connections in Latin America, Venezuela's situation remains 54 55 understudied. In a bid to address this lacuna, this paper delves 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 4 of 39 1 2 3 into the various approaches journalists use to negotiate the 4 5 6 procuring and dissemination of information as free from 7 8 government interference as possible and the importance of 9 10 digital tools in “keeping news alive” (Personal Interview, 2018) 11 12 in one of the most repressive regimes of the world. 13 14 15 State of the Venezuelan media 16 17 In 1952, Venezuela was the ninth country in the world to 18 19 acquire televisionsFor and Peerby 1982, Reviewnearly 85% homes had television 20 21 (Swanson & Mancini, 1996). Even in the pre Chavismo period, 22 23 24 publishers and political parties had close relationships, with 25 26 journalists getting rewarded in return for favorable coverage 27 28 but the presence of independent columnists and writers ensured 29 30 that unbiased editorial views also found space (Coppedge, 1994). 31 32 33 Media in the country was initially extremely supportive of Hugo 34 35 Chavez and enthusiastically supported his candidature (Nelson, 36 37 2009). But when journalists began reporting on the failure of 38 39 40 Chavez policies (Nelson, 2009), Chavez began media crackdowns 41 42 where journalists were called out and insulted besides being 43 44 attacked (Dinges, 2005). In 2002, following the Venezuelan coup 45 46 d'état attempt, Chávez was removed from office, only to be 47 48 49 reinstated in 48 hours. Media may have supported this coup but 50 51 once Chávez came back to power, he consolidated pro government 52 53 and government media and “closed, browbeaten or infiltrated 54 55 almost every independent outlet (The Economist, 2013).” 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Page 5 of 39 Global Media and Communication 1 2 3 First, the Chávez government passed the Law on Social 4 5 6 Responsibility of Radio and Television (2004) and unsuccessfully 7 8 pushed for the Special Law Against Media Crimes (2009), which 9 10 would allowed the government to prosecute media organizations if 11 12 it felt that they were disseminating information not “pursuant 13 14 15 to the provisions set forth in the Constitution of the 16 17 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and the laws and treaties, 18 19 agreements and conventionsFor Peer subscribed Review and ratified by the 20 21 Republic” (Microjuris.com, 2009; Martens, Vivares and McChesney, 22 23 24 2014). By 2010, the law was extended to internet and online 25 26 media and required media companies to “establish mechanisms to 27 28 restrict, without delay, the dissemination of messages (Fossett, 29 30 2014, p 2).” Then came the annulment of broadcast licenses for 31 32 33 radio and television stations and the denial of foreign currency 34 35 to purchase newsprint paper and broadcast equipment as ways to 36 37 stifle or altogether eliminate critical voices. Reporting 38 39 40 against the government was clearly dangerous and this led to a 41 42 proliferation of multiple pro-Chavista media outlets who 43 44 effectively drowned the different privately-owned, independent, 45 46 news media, thus, successfully ensuring little to no independent 47 48 49 coverage of the national situation. 50 51 After twenty years of relentless media censorship, out of 52 53 the four major privately-owned television stations, Televen and 54 55 Venevisión have been pressured into self-censorship since 2004, 56 57 58 59 60 https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/gmc Global Media and Communication Page 6 of 39 1 2 3 Radio Caracas Televisión saw its concession revoked in 2007 and 4 5 6 the only 24-hours news station in the country was bought out by 7 8 pro-Chavista businessmen in 2013 (Reimí, 2020).
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