Army Transformaation
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ARMY TRANSFORMATION: A VIEW FROM THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Edited by Williamson Murray July 2001 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/welcome.htm ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-059-1 ii CONTENTS Foreword .......................... iv 1. INTRODUCTION Williamson Murray .................... 1 2. NEW AGE MILITARY PROGRESSIVES: U.S. Army Officer Professionalism in the Information Age David R. Gray ...................... 27 3. DISCOVERING THE ARMY’S CORE COMPETENCIES Frederick S. Rudesheim ................. 71 4. THE ARMY THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS William F. Grimsley ................... 91 5. BUILDING IRREVERSIBLE MOMENTUM Michael D. Formica ................... 129 6. IMPROVING THE STRATEGIC RESPONSIVENESS OF THE TRANSFORMING FORCE James W. Shufelt, Jr. .................. 159 7. ADAPTIVE TRANSFORMATION MODEL: A Branch to the Army Transformation Campaign Plan Michael J. McMahon .................. 195 8. FORCE PROJECTION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: The Key Enabler for Army Transformation Genaro J. Dellarocco .................. 225 9. TRANSFORMING THE ARMY SUSTAINING BASE Danny G. Nobles .................... 255 10. PROJECTING INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERIM BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM Stephen P. Perkins .................. 283 ABOUT THE AUTHORS ................ 307 iii FOREWORD The famous British general, the Duke of Wellington, wrote that, “The country must have a large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or they must expect to meet him at home.” These words written almost 200 years ago are no less true for our own country today. Our security interests and the need for landpower to secure them span the globe. The U.S. Army is now in the process of transforming itself to meet those needs in the future. The following essays are representative of current thinking at the U.S. Army War College by students considering the nature and direction of this transformation. Dr. Williamson Murray’s introduction sets the historical context for military transformation, comparing the modern European example with recent U.S. efforts in military innovation. The remaining essays address four themes: the nature of the transformed Army, building irreversible momentum for transformation, improving strategic responsiveness, and how to achieve transformation in key areas . Officers who participated in the Advanced Strategic Art Program (ASAP) during their year at the U.S. Army War College wrote these essays. The ASAP is a unique program that offers selected students a rigorous course of instruction in theater strategy. Solidly based in theory, doctrine, and history, the program provides these students a rich professional experience that includes staff rides, exercises, and the best expertise available. The program is designed to provide the joint community with the best strategists and planners in the world. In the case of these officers and their work, they have already begun to make a difference. They and their fellow graduates of the U.S. Army War College will continue to serve the Army and the nation for many years to come. ROBERT R. IVANY Major General, U.S. Army Commandant v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Williamson Murray As the United States enters a new century, its army confronts the difficult problems associated with transformation in an uncertain world. Moreover, the strategic environment makes it entirely unclear where, or when, or for what strategic purposes U.S. ground forces will find themselves committed to battle in coming decades. 1 Yet, both the strategic environment as well as the harsh lessons of the past have a direct bearing on why the Army has begun the processes of transformation. 2 The study of the past cannot lead to prediction as to the nature and conduct of war in the 21st century, but it does underline that sometime in the future the Army will find itself committed to a major conflict. Moreover, the nature of the current strategic environment suggests the parameters within which the future Army will have to operate. Finally, history is crucial to understanding what factors and approaches might best prepare the Army to meet future threats. This introduction, then, represents an attempt to set out for the reader the issues—past, present, and future—that could best frame the Army’s approach to transformation and innovation. The past is crucial to understanding why ground forces will always be essential to achieving the political aims for which wars are fought. Moreover, the current strategic environment indicates that U.S. military forces are going to have to readdress the two old questions of time and distance. The United States cannot escape the geographic realities that two great oceans separate it from much of the rest of the world by two great continents. 3 Equally important, the past suggests how best to think about the complex problems of transformation in a period of 1 rapid technological change. 4 What are the most important attributes of an innovative military institution? 5 What impediments have existed in the past to successful innovation and transformation? What kind of military culture is most conducive to transformation? What role has leadership played in transforming military institutions in the past? And how best can a military organization develop and maintain the momentum required for substantive, long-term change in its basic approach to war? There are no easy answers to these questions, but they lie at the heart of how the Army must think about transformation in the first decades of this new century. The Strategic Environment: Imperative and Difficulties. At the start of the 21st century, the Army confronts the reality that the ending of the Cold War a decade ago so altered the strategic landscape that virtually all of the strategic verities of a 50-year period disappeared. 6 The adjustment to that reality is still going on. In a matter of months, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had removed the great power threat to the security of the United States. The presence of that threat had provided the American military, and especially the Army, with a stable strategic and operational framework for thinking about future war. With the exception of the 7-year period during the Vietnam War, from 1950 on, the Army focused almost single-mindedly on how best to deter and, if deterrence failed, fight a war in Central Europe. However since 1991, at the upper end of the conflict spectrum the Army has only confronted regional challengers—and not particularly impressive ones at that—and at the lower end of the spectrum, a number of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. None of these have fit within the cultural and operational framework developed to fight World War II and to deter World War III. Exacerbating the Army’s difficulties in 2 adjusting to its new role has been dealing with the difficult problems associated with the major downsizing of its forces. Innumerable commentators have noted the impact of that change in threat as well as that of the downsizing on the Army’s psyche. But an additional factor of great importance is now in play. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces have been coming home from their Cold War positions in Europe and the Far East, either to be retired to the reserves or relocated to new bases in North America. It is entirely conceivable that by the end of the next decade, the United States will have virtually no troops stationed permanently on the far side of either the Atlantic or the Pacific. The return of those forces to North America has obviously led to the closing of many American bases on foreign soil as well. The continuation of that process will have important implications for the projection and sustainability of U.S. military forces throughout the world in the future, especially where the United States must protect its interests against significant challenges. It is worth noting, for example, that the world’s crucial energy resources lie in the Middle East—not just on the far side of the Pacific or Atlantic, but on the other side of the world . As U.S. military planners discovered in both world wars, there is a negative side to the protection the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans afford their country. U.S. military forces and their equipment must now move across oceanic distances and then be supported in any major conflict. Those critics of the performance of the U.S. military in World War II, who so vociferously criticize the supposed American overemphasis on logistics in comparison to the Wehrmacht, largely ignore the realities of geography. 7 In effect, the return of the American military to North America has resurrected the knotty problem of how to get military forces to the next war and then support them in the fight over sustained periods of time.